| HANDOUTS
- Agenda, November 20, 2003
- October 16, 2003, Community Liaison Council (CLC)
Meeting Minutes Draft
- NIH CLC Members (as of November 18, 2003)
- NIH Building 33 Risk Assessment Executive Summary,
NIH CLC, November 20, 2003
- NIH, NIAID Building 33 Complex Final Site and Building
Plans (Submission to the NCPC, October 31, 2003)
WELCOME
Tom Gallagher, Ph.D., Director of the OCL, welcomed
CLC members and guests. He introduced a new CLC representative,
Joseph H. Yang, Camelot Mews Citizens Association, and
an alternate member, Joseph O'Malley, M.D., Locust Hill
Civic Association.
ANNOUNCEMENTS
Perimeter Shuttle Bus
Dr. Gallagher announced that the new NIH Campus perimeter
shuttle bus was operational. He noted this is a free
service available to provide transportation to and from
the Medical Center Metro station. Stella Serras-Fiotes,
Director of Facilities Planning, Office of Research
Facilities, Development and Operations, NIH, ORF, DO,
NIH added that the service operates from 6:30 a.m. to
7:30 p.m., that it is marked Priority One, and is specifically
designated as a perimeter shuttle bus. Dr. Gallagher
said the distance around the perimeter is 3 miles and
the trip takes between 8 and 12 minutes.
Members asked that further information about the shuttle
be available to CLC members and the public. Ralph Schofer,
Maplewood Citizens Association, asked how many vehicles
were in use for this route. Dr. Gallagher said there
was one designated perimeter shuttle bus. George Oberlander,
Huntington Parkway Citizens Association, and Lucy Ozarin,
M.D., Whitehall Condominium Association, recommended
publicizing the schedule and the locations of stops
along the route. Tom Hayden, ORF, OD, NIH, Facilities
Planning, NIH, said the first stop was on Battery Lane
at Old Georgetown Road. However, he added that it was
possible to flag the bus to stop at other locations.
Mr. Schofer wondered how the community would be informed
of the shuttle service start-up. He also provided information
about ridership patterns learned from his previous experience
in transportation planning. He said riders would arrive
at designated stops at a scheduled time if there were
four trips or fewer per hour. If there were more trips
per hour, he said that riders would arrive randomly
and wait. Dr. Gallagher said that the service was being
tested to assist planning, and that it would be well
established by the beginning of the year.
Mr. Oberlander asked when non-employee pedestrians would
no longer be able to walk through the gates. Arturo
Giron, ORF, OD, NIH, said this would begin in January.
He noted that the perimeter gates and fence would be
completed in January 2004 and all the pieces would be
connected by March 2004. Ms. Serras-Fiotes said a map
and information were posted on the NIH
website. Ginny Miller, CLC President and representative
of Wyngate Citizens Association, recommended that for
a short duration, signs be posted on NIH perimeter grounds
advertising the website as a source of information about
the shuttle service. Randy Schools, NIH Recreation &
Welfare Association, suggested that a press release
be sent to the Gazette. Dr. Gallagher offered to send
an informational e-mail to CLC representatives.
Landscaping
Dr. Gallagher reported that residents had requested
additional landscaping to obscure their view of the
new Neuroscience Center. Consequently, he said, 40 to
45 white pine trees had been added on the southwest
side of Campus. In addition, he complemented the outstanding
landscaping work of the NIH grounds crew around the
new pathway and fence. Mr. Clifford said that the NIH
is evaluating the potential to renovate the NIH south
lawn just north of the Whitehall Condominium property
line to resolve drainage issues and to provide a somewhat
large level field. First phase will be a survey by NIH
this winter to help develop options and then NIH will
present the results to the CLC before any design/ construction
proceed.
Dr. Gallagher noted that a bog had formed in that area,
and he asked Anthony Clifford, ORF, NIH, when this could
be corrected. Mr. Clifford said a solution was being
studied and that he would return to inform CLC members
of the results.
PRESENTATION
Building 33 Risk Assessment
By Deborah E. Wilson, Dr. P.H., Director, Division
of Occupational Health and Safety, ORS, NIH
Dr. Gallagher noted that beginning in the spring of
2003, CLC members had posed many questions about any
risks associated with Building 33, a facility under
construction that will house biosafety level (BSL)-2
and -3 laboratories. He said the Building 33 Risk Assessment
Steering Committee was formed and charged with posing
questions about probable or possible risks associated
with this facility, after which consultants were to
conduct a risk assessment. Dr. Gallagher introduced
Deborah E. Wilson, Dr. P.H., Director, Division of Occupational
Health and Safety, ORS, NIH, who chaired the committee.
Dr. Wilson said that in order to meet the National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases' (NIAID) mandate
to assume a leading role in biodefense, a new Integrated
Research Facility (Building 33) was being constructed
on the Bethesda NIH Campus. She said research in this
building would focus on naturally occurring infectious
agents and agents of biodefense to protect and treat
the civilian population. The research mission includes
developing new antibiotics, vaccines, or therapies,
and new and improved tests and techniques for diagnosis
and prevention of disease. She emphasized that the biomedical
research mission of the NIH, which is to protect and
treat the general population, differs from that of the
U.S. Army program, which is battlefield related. Dr.
Wilson pointed out that the NIH would never have a part
in producing offensive weapons and was not conducting
bioweapons research. Moreover, she noted that Building
33 would house only BSL-2 and -3 laboratories. She also
noted that smallpox, Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa viruses
would not be studied there.
Although in previous meetings the CLC received information
that Building 33 was an unlikely target, of low-level
interest to terrorists, the community representatives
continued to pose questions and express concerns about
this facility. Dr. Gallagher elaborated that such a
facility would not be on terrorists' agendas because
their objective would be to cause large-scale disruption,
economic or political turmoil, and death. Dr. Wilson
noted that it had been CLC member Mort Goldman's suggestion
to conduct a quantitative risk assessment; and the Building
33 Risk Assessment Steering Committee, composed of CLC
members, law enforcement and security personnel, and
NIH scientists, had been formed to ask what could happen
in various worst-case scenarios.
Dr. Wilson added that she found the risk assessment
to be an intriguing project to undertake. She complimented
the committee members on their positive and forceful
role to ensure a thorough investigation. Dr. Wilson
introduced two consultants, Ted Trum, a mechanical and
industrial engineer, and Murray L. Cohen, Ph.D, MP.H,
CI.H, World Health Organization, Expert Consultant in
Biosecurity and Biosafety, who assisted in designing
and preparing the risk assessment, along with a team
of some of the best people in the country that he put
together to work on the process. She said that a full
report had been presented to the Committee in October
2003.
Dr. Wilson noted that her presentation before the CLC
would include information about the risk assessment
process. However, she explained it would cover neither
all 15 scenarios nor the steps planned to mitigate specific
risks, because this information had to be kept confidential.
Dr. Wilson referred to a handout, entitled National
Institutes of Health Building 33 Risk Assessment Executive
Summary, which outlined the risk assessment process
and information about its two parts-the hazard assessment
and the risk assessment. She said this document included
a basic risk assessment model, an explanation of the
geometric assumptions associated with the release of
Bacillus subtilis, [used in this model as a
surrogate for B. anthracis, the pathogen causing
anthrax], and the results. Dr. Wilson said that both
credible and extreme scenarios had been included in
the quantitative risk modeling of the impact of Building
33 on the surrounding community. Dr. Wilson invited
members to take the document home to read and to submit
any questions about this information to Dr. Gallagher.
Dr. Wilson stated that each of the 15 scenarios proposed
by the Committee received a maximum possible risk analysis.
She said it was shown that the countermeasures planned
for the operation of Building 33 would be sufficient
to prevent any potential public health harm. The Executive
Summary notes security programs implemented by the
NIH which complement Building 33 design features and
comply with anti-terrorism legislation and regulations.
These include personnel reliability screening, physical
security, information technology security, material
control and accountability, material transfer security,
and biosecurity program management.
Dr. Wilson said the non-pathogenic B. subtilis
was used as a surrogate for B. anthracis in tests
conducted by her and Dr. Cohen, along with members of
her staff. She described the test materials in terms
of their size in microns and spore concentration. Dr.
Gallagher asked Dr. Wilson to elaborate on why anthrax
had been selected for the risk assessment. Dr. Wilson
said anthrax had been selected because its spores were
hearty and survived in the environment for many years.
She said B. anthracis [anthrax] spores of 1 to
5 microns in size could be aerosolized for dispersal,
and inhaled and retained in the lungs. In addition,
Dr. Wilson said B. anthracis, was a vegetative
bacterium, common in the environment. She said the pulmonary
disease associated with anthrax was known as tanner's
or wool sorter's disease, and the cutaneous version
of anthrax caused pustules on the skin which were easily
treated with tetracycline or amoxicillin. She further
noted that, under the right conditions, the bacterium
when replicated produced toxins which; unless detected
and treated early, were 45% fatal when inhaled.
Dr. Wilson said the scenarios included explosions, fires,
and potential terrorist assaults. The tests were conducted
to determine any harmful impact and whether a pathogenic
concentration of anthrax spores could reach the surrounding
community at either 100 meters or 1,600 meters. For
the experiment, Dr. Wilson said it was assumed that
dispersion of the spores in various release risk models
occurred after all security systems had failed or when
several things went wrong at the same time. For example,
she said if powder containing highly concentrated spores
(1 x 1010 or 10 billion) were to come out
of an exhaust stack on the building or from a vial dropped
on a lab floor or a sidewalk outside the building, in
only one instance could a person breathe even one spore;
only the person carrying the vial could inhale the material.
Dr. Wilson explained that the experimental model showed
any spores released in exhaust or by dropping a vial
would disperse in either a half-cone or a full-cone
geometric pattern; and for an overhead impact or explosion
to the building, the dispersion pattern would be spherical.
From the maximum possible risk analysis, Dr. Wilson
concluded that the countermeasures planned by the NIH
were sufficient to prevent harm to the public health
from the operation of the labs in this building.
QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION
Bacillus involved in the risk assessment experiment
Dr. Wilson recalled that during the Committee's deliberations,
Mr. Schofer had asked how many replications of the experiment
were completed. She related that when he learned there
had been only three replications, he thought it insufficient.
After Mr. Schofer's inquiry, Dr. Wilson reported that
she ran additional experiments for a total of 25 replications.
Mr. Schofer and Dr. Ozarin, asked for reassurance that
real anthrax spores were not used in these experiments.
Dr. Wilson said that, while she knows how to work with
actual agents, she in fact used B. subtilis.
Ms. Rice asked what animals were used in the model.
Dr. Wilson said no animals were used and that there
was a static aerosol chamber in which test tubes of
spores were dropped and clouds of spores were measured.
Mr. Schofer asked if Dr. Wilson had measured the settlement,
and Dr. Wilson replied that instead what was of interest
was to count the respirable spores.
Ms. Miller asked if Dr. Wilson had pathology results
from the U.S. Postal workers who had inhaled weaponized
anthrax. Dr. Wilson said there was no way to determine
post mortem the number of spores inhaled.
Stephen N. Sawicki, Edgewood Glenwood Citizens Association,
asked how safe was the anthrax strain used by the NIH.
Dr. Wilson said that the type NIH works with now was
not capable of causing infection. She referred to such
strains as "cured," with one or both DNA plasmids
removed, and mentioned the Stern Strain, a veterinary
vaccine form [which is genetically unable to form a
protein encapsulation coat].
Mr. Sawicki asked for more clarification about anthrax
used in research. Dr. Gallagher reiterated that the
whole point of modeling for anthrax in the risk assessment
was to produce a worst case scenario. Dr. Wilson noted
that anthrax is on the list of agents for which the
NIAID wishes to develop a better vaccine. She said the
NIH would never use an enhanced anthrax strain: it is
illegal to do so.
Dr. Wilson explained that it is the protein coat and
physical characteristics that are different in weaponized
anthrax spores. She said that in developing a vaccine
to protect against weaponized anthrax spores, only small
amounts of pathogenic anthrax spores would be used in
animal models to challenge the vaccine.
Potential hazards considered in risk
assessment
Mr. Sawicki asked Dr. Wilson to talk about the risk
of a terrorist attack. Dr. Wilson said that she would
not elaborate, because it might provide information
about how to overcome a security system. She added that
they had scrutinized the building and its structural
security, security and personnel systems, and compliance
with the Patriot Act in the assessment.
Mr. Oberlander asked if the Committee had considered
the risk of a missile targeting the building from Rockville
Pike. She reported that they examined the possibility
of a helicopter attack with a dropped explosive. She
noted that Mr. Schofer had asked that the amount of
explosive modeled be increased.
Dr. Wilson reported that even at 6 times the amount
first modeled, there was risk to the building's personnel
from a hit, but no risk of spore dispersion into the
community. Mr. Schofer remarked that the models used
were by no means sophisticated ones. Dr. Gallagher said
that an attack on a low-level facility would not be
a high priority to a terrorist. Dr. Wilson said the
models used were those developed from an attack at the
Olympics and also by DiTra (Defenses Institute for Training
Resource Analysis), and these were based upon the most
credible events. Dr. Wilson said the work was done with
a model that was more cautious and conservative than
the Army model.
Dr. Wilson showed a scale model of Building 33, including
the location of the perimeter fence, and used a cone
to demonstrate various dispersion patterns of material,
which had a concentration of 4 x 105 (400,000)
spores. She noted that the risk assessment measurements
included pointing the dispersal area directly toward
the fence and considered prevailing winds.
Ms. Rice asked if the risk was considered for an incident
similar to one she thought involved a drunken janitor
in a weapons facility in the Soviet Union.
Dr. Wilson said that although there had been a catastrophic
failure in the Soviet Union weapons facility, there
now were treaties in place.
["In late April of 1979, an incident occurred
in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) in the former Soviet
Union which appeared to be an accidental release of
anthrax in aerosol form from the Soviet Military Compound
19, a microbiology facility. Residents living downwind
from this compound developed high fever and difficulty
breathing, and a large number died. The final death
toll was estimated at the time to be between 200 and
1,000... In the summer of 1992, U.S. intelligence
officials were proven correct when new Russian President
Boris Yeltsin acknowledged that the Sverdlovsk incident
was in fact a large scale accident involving the escape
of an aerosol of anthrax spores from the military
research facility. In 1994, Meselson and colleagues
published an in-depth analysis of the Sverdlovsk incident
(Science 266:1202-1208). They documented that
all of the 1979 cases occurred within a narrow zone
extending downwind in a southerly direction from Compound
19. A total of 77 patients were identified by Meselson's
team, including 66 fatalities and 11 survivors."
More...
]
J. Paul Van Nevel, NIH Alumni Association, asked if
the impact on NIH personnel exposed to this material
had been considered. Dr. Wilson reported that laboratory
staff would not become ill because the staff was vaccinated
for anthrax exposure.
Mr. Schofer recalled an incident at a Bhopal, [India],
chemical plant. Dr. Wilson responded that this was a
chemical production plant, and she said that there was
no doubt that when a production facility had a failure
there could be catastrophes.
["December 1984, Bhopal, India-An explosion
in the Union Carbide chemical plant in Bhopal, India,
released a deadly gas called methyl isocyanate, which
is used to make pesticides. The gas formed a cloud
that killed 2,500 people; another 50,000-100,000 people
became ill. Trees and plants in the area became yellow
and brittle. The explosion was caused by a mechanical
failure that was not noticed in time to stop it."
More...
]
Mr. Sawicki remarked that the risk assessment had not
addressed the possibility of attacks because Building
33 would be a laboratory building. Dr. Wilson reminded
the CLC that NIH research takes place in every building
on the Campus. She said that the NIH research agenda
was to develop vaccines to protect the public, and if
a terrorist incident were to occur in the Metro system,
or in the neighborhood, or in the DC metropolitan area,
the research could save lives.
Dr. Wilson said she had attempted to address CLC perceptions
and concerns. She emphasized that the NIH was not conducting
any bioweapons research, and that the laboratories to
be housed in Building 33 were limited to BSL-2 and BSL-3
biocontainment facilities, not BSL-4. She noted that
valuable research on vaccines for West Nile and SARS
viruses, tuberculosis, and other emerging diseases was
being undertaken in similar laboratories on Campus.
Mr. Schofer asked if there were plans to use the existing
BSL-4 laboratory space for projects. Because of a lack
of BSL-3 space, Dr. Wilson said that the BSL-4 laboratory,
which had been located on the Campus since the 1970s,
was instead being used for BLS-3 lab work. Mr. Schofer
asked whether the BSL-4 lab was near Building 33. Dr.
Wilson said that it was not in close proximity.
Ms. Miller expressed that she does not wish to have
this laboratory building constructed on the NIH Campus.
However, she said she agreed with the scientists on
a committee that considered using the level 4 laboratory
for level 3 laboratory work. She felt it was very important
to work on SARS at this time.
Building 33 Attributes
Marilyn Mazuzan, Town of Oakmont, remarked that her
neighbors understood the purpose for which the laboratory
building would be used. However, she said that because
of the terrorism threat, NIH had taken security measures,
such as the installation of the perimeter security fence.
She said that to her neighbors these precautions suggested
that Building 33 was a bigger threat.
Ms. Serras-Fiotes noted that the NIH did not seek the
installation of a fence. She said that there had been
a review of all Federal facilities and installations
and security systems, and that the fence had not been
installed because the NIH was doing something risky.
Dr. Wilson added that federal building security measure
upgrades were mandated because of the vehicle bomb incident
at the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. She
related that the Department of Justice conducted risk
assessments at federal facilities and put out guidelines
for vulnerability assessments. She said that NIH had
favored maintaining an academic atmosphere and did not
wish to install a fence. [http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/1998_hr/h980604-peck.htm]
Mr. Giron noted that the NIH had undertaken its own
security assessments both before and after 9/11/01.
Dr. Wilson said these studies indicated that the NIH
should install a perimeter fence, but the NIH had resisted
this advice because it, as well as the surrounding community,
wanted to maintain a Campus environment. However, after
the DHHS Inspector General conducted a lengthy study
at the NIH Campus, Dr. Wilson said a report was issued
stating that NIH was to proceed with the installation
of a perimeter fence.
Mr. Oberlander asked if there had been structural enhancements
to Building 33. Dr. Wilson said that the building as
originally planned was hardened, and that it would be
hardened further based upon the scenarios proposed by
the Committee.
Lesley Hildebrand, Huntington Terrace Citizens Association,
commented that NIH was protected from car bombs by the
fence. Dr. Wilson noted that car bombs were not the
only type to consider, because bombs could be carried
in satchels and on persons.
Dr. Gallagher asked what would stop the NIH from converting
BSL-2 and BSL-3 laboratories to BSL-4 space. Dr. Wilson
responded that each level of laboratory space has to
be designed to specifications and that labs do not evolve
from one type to another. Dr. Gallagher said that the
Environmental Protection Agency provides specifications
for laboratory construction. When he asked officials
if it would be difficult to convert a lab to a higher
level, he was told it would cost as much to retrofit
a laboratory as to start from scratch. Dr. Wilson remarked
that BSL-4 labs have certain characteristics. For example,
they are required to be gas tight and to have positive-pressure
pneumatic gaskets, like those installed in submarines.
For the workers, she said "space" suits were
required, and as part of the life support systems, air
flowing into and out of the suit was twice HEPA filtered.
Inside the lab, experiments were done within a primary
containment device called a biological safety cabinet,
equipped with a HEPA filter, and waste decontamination
was required for both the suit and the room.
Dr. Wilson noted that laboratories are regulated by
the Center for Disease Control (CDC). Moreover, she
said that the NIH and the United Nations World Health
Organization collaborate on international standards
and that she herself reviews the laboratory facilities
of others. Mr. Oberlander asked whether the difference
between a BSL-3 and BSL-4 lab facility would be evident
from outside the building. Dr. Wilson said there would
be no visible difference. Ms. Serras-Fiotes referred
to the handout, entitled NIH, NIAID Building 33 Complex
Final Site and Building Plans, which includes information
about the hardening of Building 33 [pp. 6-7]. She noted
that the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC)
had reviewed this document and the floor plans for Building
33, but NCPC does not evaluate the work that takes place
inside Campus buildings.
Mr. Sawicki said he was uncomfortable relying on the
report of the consultants and that he wished to have
another agency, the Department Homeland Security, weigh
in on this building. He also mentioned that he understood
that Congressman Van Hollen had not yet received a reply
to an inquiry sent to the NIH. Dr. Wilson said the Homeland
Security Department did not have the expertise to do
this. She hoped that the CLC understood that there were
only 12 people in the world trained to evaluate laboratories,
and that she herself was one of those individuals.
Mr. Sawicki said that over the last 12 years, during
which he has been involved with the NIH CLC, he had
lost confidence in its process, and he felt the NIH
used "smoke and mirrors" in its response to
the community. Dr. Gallagher reminded Mr. Sawicki that
both the NIH and CDC were part of the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS), and this department
had tight oversight of the NIH.
Recommendations and Full Risk Assessment
Report
Ms. Miller commended the NIH for having a risk assessment.
She said she felt strongly that all recommendations
of the Building 33 Risk Assessment Committee should
be followed by the NIH. Further, Ms. Miller endorsed
making the NIH a "no fly" zone. Ms. Miller
said she believes it would not be inconvenient to follow
a route around the Campus.
Dr. Wilson said there is a no fly zone in effect adjacent
to the NIH Campus at the National Naval Medical Center.
She pointed out that the NIH is next to a trauma center
where helicopters bring patients and that there could
be delays in landing if the prevailing winds did not
favor a particular approach. Ms. Miller asked if Dr.
Wilson had checked this recommendation with Suburban
Hospital and the Maryland State Highway Department.
Ms. Serras-Fiotes said that all of the recommendations
were seriously considered and most of those not in the
original design were being incorporated or have been
implemented. She added that none of the remaining 3
or 4 recommendations had been ruled out.
Information about the Full Risk Assessment
Report
Dr. Ozarin asked if the CLC would see all the recommendations.
Dr. Wilson said that the CLC would not be privy to them.
Mr. Oberlander expressed his desire to review the full
report. He said that the risk assessment had been developed
using government funds and that under the Freedom of
Information Act full access should be available.
OTHER DISCUSSION
Mr. Sawicki remarked that the CLC should develop a
letter to the Department of Homeland Security to express
that the CLC does not support using space in Building
33 for BSL-2 and BSL-3 laboratories. In addition, he
suggested sending a copy to NIH Director Dr. Elias Zerhouni
and to the DHHS. Dr. Gallagher said that he believed
any such communication would be referred to the DHHS
by Secretary Ridge of the Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Schofer thought there would never be unanimity
on this issue. He said that he believed the laboratory
building should be constructed at Ft. Detrick and not
on the Bethesda NIH Campus. He acknowledged that the
NIH had an obligation to protect its people and to make
sure the institution was safe. The NIH needed a fence,
even though it is an inconvenience, particularly to
those residing on the northwest side, to be unable to
cross the NIH Campus to reach the Metro station. Mr.
Schofer noted that the natural gas line would be another
"hot button" issue, and he felt that the nearby
community did not know what was going on because it
had been cloistered in secrecy. He said the community
had not won many battles when fighting with the NIH,
with one exception being the incinerators at NIH. Mr.
Schofer stated that he thought Dr. Gallagher was a fair
adjudicator for both sides—the NIH and the CLC—and
that the letter could be passed back and forth between
the CLC and the departments via the OCL.
Ms. Miller stressed the importance of communicating
the CLCs perspective. Dr. Gallagher suggested sending
a letter signed individually by those who support its
contents. He thought it should not come from the CLC
as a group. Although Ms. Miller felt a letter could
be sent without each representatives signature, she
agreed that each member should be given an opportunity
to review the content and express or withhold agreement.
Nancy Hoos, Sonoma Citizens Association, asked that
a draft letter written by Ms. Miller be circulated by
e-mail before December 18, 2003, in order for it to
be approved at the CLC meeting on that date. Both Dr.
Ozarin and Jeanne Billings, Wisconsin Condominium Association,
expressed their desire to review the letter. Ms. Rice
said that members should communicate about the content
of the letter. Ms. Miller reiterated that the CLC consensus
was that she circulate a draft letter by e-mail a week
prior [December 11] to the December 18 CLC meeting,
and that the majority opinion should obtain.
Chain Fence on the South Side of Campus
Dr. Ozarin asked whether the chain link fence on the
south side of the Campus could be painted to improve
its looks. Mr. Clifford offered to look at this fence
and contact Dr. Ozarin.
NEXT MEETING
Dr. Gallagher remarked that the CLC would
meet in four weeks and that the discussion about the
risk assessment would continue at that time, December
18, 2003.
ADJOURNMENT
The meeting ended at 6:20 p.m.
ACTION ITEMS
- Ginny Miller, CLC President and representative of
Wyngate Citizens Association, recommended to Ms. Serras-Fiotes
that signs be posted on perimeter grounds of the NIH
referring to the website as a source of information
about the shuttle service.
- Randy Schools, NIH Recreation & Welfare Association,
recommended sending a press release about the shuttle
bus to the Gazette.
- Dr. Gallagher offered to send an informational e-mail
to CLC representatives about the schedule and stops
for the perimeter shuttle.
- CLC members were invited by Dr. Wilson to submit
to Dr. Gallagher any questions they wished for her
to answer about the Building 33 Executive Summary
of the risk assessment.
- Ms. Miller said she would draft a letter concerning
Building 33, and that it would be circulated to CLC
members before the December meeting.
- Anthony Clifford, ORF, NIH, offered to look at the
fence and contact Dr. Ozarin with his assessment.
In addition, he will report the results of the study
on standing water.
CLC Members
- Lorraine Bell, Palladian Partners, Inc.
- Jeanne Billings, Wisconsin Condominium Association
- Anthony Clifford, Office of Research Facilities,
Development and Operations, NIH
- Harvey Eisen, Ph.D, Edgewood Glenwood Citizens Association
- Tom Gallagher, Ph.D., OCL, OD, NIH
- Morton Goldman, Sc.D., Luxmanor Citizens Association
- Jeanne Goldstein, Montgomery County Civic Federation
- Lesley Hildebrand, Huntington Terrace Citizens Association
- Nancy Hoos, Sonoma Citizens Association
- Marilyn Mazuzan, Town of Oakmont
- Ginny Miller, Wyngate Citizens Association
- Walter Mitton, OCL, OD, NIH
- George Oberlander, Huntington Parkway Citizens Association
- Lucy Ozarin, M.D., Whitehall Condominium Association
- Eleanor Rice, Locust Hill Civic Association
- Tom Robertson, Parkwood Residents Association
- Sharon Robinson, OCL, OD, NIH
- Stephen N. Sawicki, Edgewood Glenwood Citizens Association
- Ralph Schofer, Maplewood Citizens Association
- Randy Schools, Recreation & Welfare Association,
NIH
- Stephanie Sechrist, National Capital Planning Commission
- Stella Serras-Fiotes, Office of Research Facilities
Development and Operation, NIH
- J. Paul Van Nevel, NIH Alumni Association
- Joseph H. Yang, Camelot Mews Citizens Association
Alternate Member
Joseph O'Malley, Locust Hill Civic Association
Guests
- Laurie Doepel, NIAID,OFC Communications & Public
Liaison
- Arturo Giron, Office of Research Facilities Development
and Operation, NIH
- Mrs. Mort Goldman
- Thomas Hayden, Office of Research Facilities Development
and Operation, NIH
- Joan Kleinman, U.S. Congressman Van Hollen's Office
- Laurent Thomet, Gazette
- Ronald Wilson, Office of Research Facilities Development
and Operation, NIH
|
