portrait of Representative Rush Holt   
 Representative Rush Holt, 12th District of New Jersey

 

 

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
July 19, 2006
Contact: Pat Eddington
202-225-5801 (office)

HOLT: ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE SECURITY CERTIFICATION SHOULD BE MANDATORY

Lawmaker, Election Reform Groups Call For Passage Of Holt Bill As House Administration, Science Committees Hold Joint Hearing On Electronic Voting Machine Standards


Washington, D.C. -- At a press conference before the first Congressional hearing on electronic voting machines during this Congress, Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ) today called on the House leadership to pass legislation before the November elections that would ensure that electronic voting machines are secure from error or manipulation and that their results are auditable. 

“Electronic machines are, by their nature, vulnerable to error or manipulation that could change the outcome of elections,” said Holt. “Voluntary certification standards for electronic voting machines are inadequate to meet these challenges. H.R. 550 makes these machines less vulnerable by making their results truly auditable. Congress should pass this bill and make our elections transparent and auditable.”

Holt joined Common Cause and VoteTrust USA for the press event shortly before a joint hearing sponsored by the House Administration and Science Committees to hear testimony on the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) issued in December 2005 by the Election Assistance Commission, the first such hearing on the vulnerabilities of electronic voting machines during the 109th Congress.

Last month, the nonpartisan Brennan Center Task Force on Voting System Security (an initiative of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law) published the first comprehensive study of electronic voting machine vulnerabilities. The study examined each of the three most commonly purchased electronic voting systems: electronic machines (“DREs”) with a voter verified paper trail, DREs without a voter-verified paper trail, and optical scan systems (“PCOS”).  The report, The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World, found that:

• All of the most commonly purchased electronic voting systems have significant security and reliability vulnerabilities.

• Automatic audits, done randomly and transparently, are necessary if paper records are to enhance security. 

• Wireless components on voting machines are particularly vulnerable to attack. 

• The vast majority of states have not implemented election procedures or countermeasures to detect a software attack, even though the most troubling vulnerabilities of each system can be substantially remedied.

Rep. Holt’s Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2005 (H.R. 550) would address the key issues raised by the Brennan Center report. H.R. 550 currently has 199 bipartisan co-sponsors and is awaiting a hearing by the House Administration Committee. Holt called for rapid action on the bill. H.R. 550 has been called the “gold standard” of verified-voting bills. If passed, the bill would:

• Require that voters have the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their recorded vote.

• Require that all voting systems produce a voter-verified paper record for use in manual audits commencing in 2006 in accordance with the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) deadline. (Funding of $150 million is authorized to help states meet the cost of implementing this requirement.)

• Preserve HAVA's existing access requirements for voters with disabilities; clarifying and enhancing the security requirements demanded of systems to be used by voters with disabilities; and adding the requirement that an accessible voter-verification mechanism be provided.

• Ban the use of undisclosed software and all wireless and concealed communications devices in voting systems, and prohibiting the connection of any voting machine component to the Internet.

• Require random, unannounced, hand-count audits of the voter-verified paper records in 2% of all precincts, including at least 1 precinct per county. Such funds as may be necessary are authorized to fund the expense of the audits.

• Require manufacturers and election officials to document the chain of custody with respect to the handling of software; prohibit the use of software or software modifications that have not been certified or re-certified; and prohibit political and financial conflicts of interest among manufactures, test laboratories, and political parties.

• Establish procedures to be followed if there is a discrepancy between reported results and audit results, and preserving the rights of individuals and the Attorney General's authority to pursue legal resolution of the discrepancies.

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