Detailed Information on the
International Trade Administration: Import Administration Assessment

Complete an impact evaluation that assesses achievement of the program's mission and goals.

Implement a financial system to better track resource allocation across goals and activities.

Measure: Percentage reduction in trade-distorting foreign subsidy programs

Explanation:The Import Administration (IA) has identified approximately 200 unfair trade practices. This measure shows IA's five year target for the percentage reduction in unfair trade practices that were identified. The measure tracks IA's efforts to monitor and address unfair trade practices through negotiation or remedies provided under World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements or U.S. law. Many of the practices identified include preferential tax laws and subsidy programs.

Measure: Percent of Import Administration (IA) antidumping and countervailing duty decisions overturned by U.S. courts.

Explanation:This measure tracks IA's performance making accurate antidumping and countervailing (AD/CVD) duty decisions. The measure shows the percentage of decisions that were overturned when challenged in U.S. courts. The measure addresses the International Trade Administration's (ITA) goal of identifying unfair trade practices. The measure promotes accurate antidumping and countervailing duty decisions.

Measure: Percent of AD/CVD Determinations issued within Statutory and/or Regulatory Deadlines

Explanation:Tracks the number of case determinations issued within statutory and/or regulatory deadlines. Virtually all deadlines are set either by statute or regulation. For antidumping (AD) investigations, deadlines range from 90 to 300 days from case initiation or issuance of preliminary determination date, while countervailing duty (CVD) deadlines range from 65 to 130 days from case initiation or issuance of preliminary determination date. Meeting deadlines helps reach the programs goal of quickly responding to trading activity that does not conform to U.S. law. However, the target for deadlines is not ambitious because the long-term target is lower than the 2006 actual.

Measure: Percent of Ministerial Errors in IA's Dumping and Subsidy Calculations

Explanation:Measures IA's efforts to minimize/eliminate ministerial errors committed in the calculation of dumping margins and subsidy rates. Ministerial errors are technical mistakes in the calculation of duties placed on foreign firms. The importing public relies on accurate margins in order to estimate the amount of duties they may be responsible for and to make well-informed business decisions. Foreign exporters rely on accurate margins in order to adjust their business practices to eliminate dumping. U.S. producers require accurate margins in order to make business decisions and remain competitive. This measure does not seem ambitious because the 2011 target is worse than the 2006 actual.

Measure: Percent of Instructions Sent to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within five business days

Explanation:Measures IA efficiency in issuing cash deposit instructions to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in order to implement or make changes to the amount of AD/CVD duties collected. The amount of duties collected aims to remedy trade practices by foreign exporters that were deemed unfair. Getting instructions to CBP within five business days helps speed attempts to remedy trade practices that were deemed unfair.

Measure: Cost Per Workload Unit - Administrative Protective Order Staff Function

Explanation:Measures the efficiencies gained as a result of Import Administration activities associated with investigations. The dollar figure represents the cost per individual release of business proprietary and other controlled documents in the course of AD/CVD proceedings and NAFTA Binational Panel Reviews. The work activity captured by a workload unit includes: Administrative Protective Orders (APOs) and service lists; the review of proprietary information generated by the Department in the administration of AD/CVD proceedings prior to release under a APO; the release and review of Judicial Protective Order information to parties involved in litigation of AD/CVD proceedings; drafting of protective orders for Binational Panel Reviews. By reducing workload unit costs, the Import Administration becomes more cost efficient in processing requests and releases of business proprietary information submitted to or obtained by IA during AD/CVD proceedings.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: IA administers, in conjunction with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC), antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws to ensure compliance of foreign governments and exporters with AD/CVD sections of international trade agreements and applicable U.S. statutes. IA also shares responsibility with the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in World Trade Organization (WTO) rules negotiations, WTO dispute settlement proceedings challenging IA decisions, and in subsidy enforcement activities. Although IA's primary function is to administer AD and CVD cases, IA also assists U.S. exporters with foreign unfair trade cases, and operates the Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis (SIMA) system.

Evidence: Principal IA functions are set out in statutes implementing commitments made by the United States through its membership in the WTO and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Congress incorporated the WTO Agreement into U.S. law. 1. Statutory Authority: Tariff Act of 1930: Sections 701 - 783; Uruguay Round Agreements Act: Section 281 (Subsidies Enforcement Office) 2. Regulatory Authority: 19 CFR 351, 353 and 355; Substantive and Procedural Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Regulations; Regulations Regarding Revocation of an Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Order; Procedural Regulations for Violation of an Administrative Protective Order 3. Procedural Regulations for Sunset Reviews 4. Interim Final Rule: Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis System 5. Multilateral Agreements: WTO Agreements: WTO Implementation of Article VI of the GATT (antidumping); WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Dispute Settlement 6. NAFTA: Chapter 19, Dispute Settlement http://www.mac.doc.gov/nafta/chapter19.html 7. Reorganization Plan Number 3 of 1979 (19U.S.C. 2171 note) 8. Federal Register Notice, Vol. 63, No. 85, Monday, May 4, 1998/Rules and Regulations, Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Proposed Rules, Final Rule on AD and CVD Proceedings: APO Procedures; Procedures for Imposing Sanctions for Violation of a Protective Order http://ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/index.html 9. Federal Register Notice, Vol. 61, No. 39, Tuesday, February 27, 1996, AD Duties; CVD Duties http://ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/index.html 10. Federal Register Notice, Vol. 45, No. 37, Friday, February 22, 1980, Notices, International Trade Administration, Organization and Function Order http://ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/index.html 11. ITA Organization and Functions Order 41-1, http://www.ita.doc.gov/ooms/41-1.htm 12. ITA Department Organization Order 10-3, http://dms.osec.doc.gov/cgi-bin/doit.cgi?204:112:0d0967fb5f9620792066c3ae19d7ada953393916e214645703cc0894b5506f78:251

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The international trade community permits the use of AD and CVD tariffs as a means to address dumping and subsidies that result in injury to industry. The primarily beneficiaries are U.S. companies in competition with foreign firms deemed to be engaging in unfair trade practices. IA's administration of the United States' AD/CVD laws and its subsidy enforcement activities enables U.S. industry to address this type of unfair trade, via the imposition of tariffs. The outcome of the program's work is the integrity of its administrative processes and creating a trading environment less distorted by dumping and subsidization. By improving the integrity of AD/CVD administrative processes, the program should improve the transparency and impartiality of the global trading system in general. This means that the IA program addresses a clearly defined problem, interest and need. The program ensures that its processes are transparent, timely and open and relevant information is provided to interested parties. The program strives to ensure involved parties have the ability to understand and comment upon the basis of decisions, thereby assuring full rights of participation, open treatment and due process under the law.

Evidence: 1. Multilateral Agreements: WTO Agreements: WTO Implementation of Article VI of the GATT (antidumping), WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Dispute Settlement 2. IA administers 276 AD/CVD orders on a wide variety of products including steel, agricultural products, bearings, and chemicals. In FY 2006, IA initiated 11 new investigations and issued over 300 determinations in its investigations, and its administrative, new shipper and sunset reviews of existing orders. 3. IA participated in more than 300 initial or continued counseling sessions with potential petitioners, the majority of which are small and medium-sized enterprises: ia.ita.doc.gov/pcp/pcp-index.html 4. IA's Subsidies Enforcement Office monitors foreign subsidy programs that may be actionable under U.S. or international law, maintains an electronic subsidies library and submits annual reports to Congress on its activities: www.ia.ita.doc.gov/esel/ 5. Report (2006) of the Committee on Anti-dumping Practices, G/L/791 (October 27, 2006) http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: : IA's role in administering AD/CVD does not duplicate any other Federal, state, local or private agency, as no other entity is tasked with the same functions assigned by law to IA. If a U.S. industry believes that it is being injured by unfair competition through dumping or subsidization of a foreign product, it may request the imposition of AD or CVD duties by filing a petition with both IA and the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). Upon receipt of a petition, IA analyzes and quantifies the level of dumping or subsidization in the related AD or CVD investigation. The ITC determines whether dumping or subsidization has injured the U.S. industry. If both agencies issue affirmative determinations, an AD or CVD order is imposed and duties are then collected by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on imports of those items. Once an order is published, IA is then tasked with its administration. The ITC is only involved in the initial investigation and five-year sunset reviews. IA shares responsibility with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in WTO rules negotiations, WTO dispute settlement proceedings challenging IA decisions, bilateral free trade agreement negotiations, and subsidy enforcement activities. The role of IA is to enforce AD and CVD laws, monitor the subsidies practices of other countries and provide the technical expertise needed to analyze and understand the impact of foreign dumping and subsidies on U.S. commerce. IA also provides advice to U.S. parties concerning the application of Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements. IA's role in ensuring foreign compliance with trade agreements is distinct from the Market Access and Compliance (MAC) program. MAC's compliance role ensures foreign compliance with international agreements with regard to market access for U.S. exporters. IA's role is the enforcement of U.S. laws and multilateral rules that relate to the import of goods that are unfairly dumped or subsidized, and to ensure compliance with international agreements that address unfair trade practices.

Evidence: 1. http://ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/index.html 2. Statutory Authority: Tariff Act of 1930: Sections 701 - 783 Uruguay Round Agreements Act: Section 281 (Subsidies Enforcement Office) 3. Regulatory Authority: 19 CFR 351, 353 and 355 Substantive and Procedural Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Regulations; Regulations Regarding Revocation of an Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Order; Procedural Regulations for Violation of an Administrative Protective Order; 4. Procedural Regulations for Sunset Reviews; 5. Multilateral Agreements: WTO Agreements: WTO Implementation of Article VI of the GATT (antidumping); WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; Dispute Settlement; 6. NAFTA: Chapter 19, Dispute Settlement

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: Antidumping and countervailing duty tariffs are accepted under international law as a means to address unfair trade practices. However, many economists believe that such tariffs can be detrimental to the overall economy since antidumping laws enable the US government to grant protection from any imports that are designed to injure or threaten to injure American industry, even imports whose prices are low simply as part of a normal and competitive trading process. Evidence also suggests that enforcement of AD/CVD laws can be detrimental to overall U.S. trade objectives. For example, research suggests that the growing number of AD actions taken against the United States (Mexico and China are two examples) is partially based on a desire to retaliate for US antidumping actions.

Evidence: 1. The statute and regulations cited above in Question 1.1. 2. IA's website provides additional information: Highlights: http://ia.ita.doc.gov/ia-highlights-and-news.html; Decisions and Data (e.g., Federal Register notices, Policy Bulletins): http://ia.ita.doc.gov/ia-decisions-and-data.html; Programs (e.g., SIMA system, Subsidies Enforcement Office, Petition Counseling): http://ia.ita.doc.gov/ia-programs-and-offices.html 3. PowerPoint Presentation, "Transparency and Due Process in Department of Commerce Antidumping Proceedings" 4. Basic Concepts and Principles of Trade Remedy Rules; Communication from the United States to the World Trade Organization Negotiating Group on Rules http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL33176.pdf. 5) Staiger, R., Wolak, F., Litan, R. & M. Katz. Measuring Industry-Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States. Brooking Papers on Economic Activitiy. Microeconomics, Vol. 1994, 51-118.7. For examples of criticism of "dumping" see King, N. "Catch of the Day: Battle Over Shrimp; While U.S. Operators Troll for Protection, Critics Cite Industry's Inefficiencies. Wall Street Journal. June 11, 2004, A4. and Mallaby, S. "Shrimp Follies." The Washington Post. November 15, 2004, A25. 8. Mankiw, N. and Swagel, P. "Antidumping: The Third Rail of Trade Policy", Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005, p.107-119.

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: IA resources are directly targeted to its administration of AD/CVD laws and regulations. The beneficiaries are American companies who compete with foreign firms that are deemed to be partaking in unfair trade practices. The Import Administration works to reach these intended beneficiaries by publishing determinations in the Federal Register, releasing policy bulletins, providing petition counseling, creating an extensive website, and hosting trade seminars. The program expanded its outreach efforts to U.S. small- and medium-sized industries by conducting more than 325 initial and follow-up petition-counseling sessions over the past two years. Evidence that the Import Administration is reaching intended beneficiaries is shown through the number of AD/CVD proceedings efficiently and correctly completed and the number of distortive subsidies that have been identified, evaluated and addressed through negotiation, formal/informal intervention or dispute settlement. IA also aligns its resources to target its highest priorities. For example, IA has devoted resources to China to reinforce effective monitoring of China cases. IA works with many U.S. companies experiencing difficulties with other countries' antidumping actions, including engaging the foreign government when circumstances warrant, and if necessary, assisting the USTR in addressing such problems at the WTO. IA pro-actively assists the private sector by monitoring trade-distorting practices by governments worldwide, including the provision of harmful subsidies. As of March 2007, IA has identified and evaluated nearly 200 distortive foreign government subsidies. These efforts are led both by a team of technical experts in Washington, D.C., and overseas IA officers who identify and address problems before they develop into trade disputes. This is done to ensure that CVD investigations are not conducted against governments that might otherwise have taken steps to address the trade problem. This will minimize the number of unnecessary CVD actions.

Evidence: 1. Multilateral Agreements: WTO Agreements http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/final_e.htm 2. WTO Implementation of Article VI of the GATT (antidumping) http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.pdf 3. WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Dispute Settlement http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf 4. Statute and regulations cited above in Questions 1.1 5. Federal Register notices, http://ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/index.html 6. Trade law conferences (e.g., Georgetown Law Seminar: https://www.law.georgetown.edu/cle/showEntDetail.cfm?ID101 7. Petition counseling efforts - http://ia.ita.doc.gov/ia-program-and-offices.html 8. Presentations before Industry Trade Advisory Committees. 9. Meetings with Industry/Trade Associations (e.g., National Association of Manufacturers, American Iron and Steel Association, Committee to Support U.S. Trade Laws, Consuming Industries Trade Action Committee, Steel Manufacturers Association, Emergency Committee for American Trade, Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, American Institute for International Steel). 10. Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis email contact list - list of roughly 3,000 people who use or have expressed interest in the system. These people are notified by email of significant actions or events regarding the system. 11. IA website: http://www.trade.gov/ia/index.asp

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The Import Administration (IA) has one long-term outcome measure that tracks the percentage reduction in trade-distorting subsidies over a five year period. IA helps broader subsidies enforcement activities of the U.S. government by providing counseling and advocacy services to U.S. parties harmed by unfair subsidies in other countries. Also, IA monitors and evaluates foreign subsidies and works with the United States Trade Representative to address them through negotiations or remedies provided under World Trade Organization agreements or U.S. law. IA has one other long-term output measure that tracks the percentage of IA decisions in antidumping and countervailing duty investigations that are rejected by U.S. courts. This measure tracks IA's success in accurately identifying unfair trade practices.

Evidence: 1. Listing of long-term and annual targets performance measures 2. ITA-Wide Customer Satisfaction Survey, IA Program Unit Results Meeting, May 23, 2006

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: IA's output measure records the percent of antidumping and countervailing (AD/CVD) duty determinations that are entirely rejected when the case is challenged in a U.S. court. Over the last two years, IA has not had a case fully rejected. While case volume and complexity fluctuate, the long-term target of 98 percent is not ambitious. Also, IA only records cases where the IA determination is fully rejected, which may miss important findings by a court. IA's outcome measure shows the percentage reduction in foreign trade distorting subsidies. This measure is new and targets should be updated as more data becomes available.

Evidence: 1. Listing of long-term and annual performance measures 2. Characteristics of Transparency Under International Antidumping Regime (chart) 3. Characteristics of Impartial Treatment Under International Antidumping Regimes (chart) 4. ITA FYs 2007-2012 Strategic Plan Overview and priorities (chart)

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: IA has a limited number of annual performance measures that demonstrate progress towards achieving its long-term goals. These metrics demonstrate IA's progress towards improving its administrative processes, which will allow for faster and more accurate determinations that attempt to remedy trading activities that are deemed unfair. Faster and more accurate remedies lead to the program's goal of reducing unfair trade practices. These measures include the Percent of AD/CVD determinations issued within statutory and/or regulatory deadlines, Percent of ministerial errors in IA's dumping and subsidy calculations, Percent of instructions sent to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within five business days, and Cost per workload unit - Administrative Protective Order Staff Function.

Evidence: 1. Listing of annual measures 2. FY 2008 President's Budget Request Percent of AD/CVD determinations issued within statutory and/or regulatory deadlines measures whether statutory and regulatory requirements are met on a timely basis in a fair and impartial manner consistent with the AD/CVD laws and regulations of the United States and our international obligations. U.S. AD/CVD laws provide domestic industries the opportunity to obtain relief from injury caused by imports of foreign products that are sold at less than fair value or that benefit from foreign government subsidies. IA administers the program that determines if the imports of foreign products are sold at less than fair value or benefit from actionable foreign government subsidies. Fair, transparent and impartial administration of the AD/CVD laws benefits U.S. firms and all interested parties. Percent of ministerial errors in IA's dumping and subsidy calculations measures IA's efforts to minimize/eliminate ministerial errors committed in the application of the specific methodology and programs used to calculate the dumping margins and subsidy rates that are published as preliminary or final determinations in investigations or as final results in administrative reviews in the Federal Register. The importing public relies on accurate margins in order to estimate the amount of duties they may be responsible for and to make well-informed business decisions. Foreign exporters rely on accurate margins in order to adjust their business practices to eliminate dumping. U.S. producers require accurate margins in order to make business decisions and remain competitive. Percent of instructions sent to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on a timely basis measures IA efficiency in issuing cash deposit instructions to CBP in order to implement or make changes to AD/CVD cash deposit rates as a result of full range of AD/CVD activities performed by IA, including investigations, reviews (or lack thereof), negotiation of suspension agreements, scope and circumvention inquiries, and the resolution of litigation resulting from these proceedings. The amount of duties to be collected aim to remedy unfair trade practices by foreign exporters and governments. Cost per workload unit - Administrative Protective Order Staff Function measures efficiencies realized and sets forth ambitious operating cost targets for future years, using automation and procedural reengineering where and when possible to reduce the cost of workload output in this activity area. The work activity captured by this measure includes: Administrative Protective Orders (APOs) and service lists that apply to the vast quantities of business proprietary information submitted to or obtained by the Department in the course of its AD and CVD proceedings from both companies and foreign governments as well as the U.S. domestic industry and other sources; the review of proprietary information generated by the Department in the administration of AD/CVD proceedings prior to release under APO and public versions of APO documents; the release and review of Judicial Protective Order information to parties involved in litigation of AD/CVD proceedings; drafting of protective orders for Binational Panel Reviews under Article 1904 of the NAFTA and the review of the proprietary information released under NAFTA protective orders; and the training of employees and outside parties in regard to the handling and protection of proprietary and protected/sensitive information in AD/CVD and other proceedings.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: The target for the percent of determinations issued within statutory and regulatory deadlines is 90%. The target for the percent of ministerial errors is 9% by FY 2011, versus <13% target for FY 2007. However, the actual for 2007 is 8%. IA should adjust targets as more data becomes available. The target for the percent of instructions sent to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within five business days 88%, which is a 15% increase over current levels. The target for "Cost per workload unit - Administrative Protective Order Staff Function" is $48 by FY 2001 from $63 target set for FY 2007.

Evidence: 1. Listing of long-term and annual performance measures 2. FY 2008 President's Budget Request, http://www.ita.doc.gov/ofm_guidance/budgets/FY08PresBud.pdf

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: While IA does not have any grantees, contractors or other non-government partners that receive program funding or contribute to the long-term goals of the AD/CVD program, it does work with several U.S. Government partners. However, none of these partners directly report on IA's performance measures, rather each is involved in administering antidumping and subsidies-related enforcement actions. IA's key partner, CBP, supports IA's overall strategic goal to "identify and resolve unfair trade practices" and its objective to "enforce U.S. trade laws" through statutory and regulatory requirements and various procedures. AD/CVD duties and deposits are collected at the border by CBP to implement IA's determinations. IA has access to CBP's automated commercial system and can run data queries to perform analysis on entries of merchandise subject to AD/CVD orders. These customs data are used to verify claims of no shipments by foreign respondents or to support analyses concerning other issues raised in proceedings. CBP also provides IA with entry documentation for imports involved in many of its cases to verify certain facts of a proceeding. In addition, CBP's national import specialists send information to IA regarding changes in tariff classifications. This information is used to ensure that AD/CVD duties are being applied at the border to the appropriate merchandise. Several other agencies work with IA. The ITC notifies IA when injury determinations are made. IA supports USTR in WTO negotiation on antidumping and subsidies matters. As part of its economic analysis, Ex-Im Bank consults with IA to determine whether there are ongoing or final AD/CVD actions affecting the production of products subject to potential Ex-Im Bank financing.

Evidence: 1. ITA FY 2007 - 2012 Strategic Plan website will be provided when the strategic plan will be released in April 2007 2. http://addcvd.cbp.gov (AD/CVD Customs instructions) 3. Daily communication regarding IA customs instructions to ensure they are clear; regular reports from CBP to ensure that CBP finalizes all entries relevant to IA's customs instructions; CBP enforcement actions, such as instituting fraud cases, to help prevent evasion of AD/CVD laws; IA's regular participation in CBP-sponsored activities to educate CBP on AD/CVD activities; IA's special access to CBP's database system and sharing of entry documentation to assist with effective administration and enforcement of AD/CVD laws; CBP workshops for IA regarding CBP's automated commercial environment devoted solely to effective integration of AD/CVD activities in this new system 4. http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/custboil.htm (boilerplate instructions to CBP) ITC: 5. http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/index.htm (ITC website) 6. http://www.ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/97-12201.txt (AD/CVD regulations) 7. http://www.ia.ita.doc.gov/download/title7.txt (AD/CVD statute) 8. Notice to IA from ITC regarding affirmative determination 9. http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/TIMETABL.PDF (statutory timetable for AD.CVD investigations) DOJ: 10. Dept. of Justice defends IA determinations at the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) and, if appealed, at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) 11. www.cit.uscourts.gov/slip_op/slip-op.html (CIT rulings/opinions) 12. www.fedcir.gov/dailylog.html (CAFC rulings/opinions) 13. The prohibitions against Ex-Im Bank financing that supports the production of merchandise subject to antidumping or countervailing duty measures is set forth in the Bank's economic impact procedures and can be found at: www.exim.gov/products/policies/revecon_impact_proc.html

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: IA has not had an independent evaluation that assessed how well the program is accomplishing its mission and meeting its long-term goals, including its impact on reducing unfair trade practices. IA plans to seek an independent source to evaluate the overall purpose, metrics and results of the AD/CVD program. IA has been referenced in broader studies about trade agreement compliance and process studies of program management. IA was referenced in two GAO studies dealing with China. In one report, U.S.-China Trade, GAO analyzed the challenges of applying countervailing duties to China. The GAO report highlighted the relevance of many of these issues. However, based on a petition received from U.S. industry, IA recently initiated its first countervailing duty investigation since 1991 on China and has imposed duties on Chinese paper. In 2005, IA was also involved in the Commerce Department's Inspector General (IG) survey on statutory deadlines and reviews. The IG recommended that IA focus on management control processes, procedures, training needs and technology enhancements. Also, IA hired the CFI group to conduct customer satisfaction surveys. CFI surveyed customers to gauge their satisfaction with the portfolio of IA's services provided to IA customers.

Evidence: 1. 2006 ITA-Wide Customer Satisfaction Survey Justification Package and Findings. The ACSI survey scope included a comprehensive evaluation of the overall program success and the portfolio of IA's services by: a. Benchmarking ITA and IA against other federal regulatory government agencies; b. Identifying "quality of service" concerns; c. Showing which aspects of service have the greatest effect on satisfaction; and d. Identifying recommended adjustments. 2. GAO China Antidumping Database (GAO-06-652sp) http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gao-06-652sp/osm.html 3. U.S.-China Trade: Challenges and Choices to Apply Countervailing Duties to China, GAO-06-608T, April 4, 2006 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06608t.pdf 4. U.S.-China Trade: Commerce Faces Practical and Legal Challenges in Applying Countervailing Duties, June 2005, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05474.pdf 5. U.S.-China Trade: Observations on Ensuring China's Compliance with WTO Commitments, February 4, 2005, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05295.pdf 6. U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General Final Survey, Report No. IPE-16952/March 2005 http://oig.doc.gov/oig/reports/2005/ITA-IPE-16952-03-05.pdf 7. 19 U.S.C. 1516a(b) (1999) (standard of review for IA determinations)

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: The Import Administration's (IA) budget requests tie resource requests to the accomplishment of performance goals and performance measures. IA's goals and objectives, as defined in the International Trade Administration's (ITA) Strategic Plan, drive the content and structure of its budget formulation process. For example, IA's program budget justification are related to ITA strategic priorities and organized by strategic goal to ensure that resources tie directly to IA's mission. Each budget request is supported by specific performance measures. The President's Budget illustrates exactly how resources are distributed across goals. All budget estimates also include direct and indirect overhead costs. Once the fiscal budget is appropriated and signed into law, IA receives an allocation and expenditures are tracked by goal and reported quarterly to senior ITA and Departmental management. ITA senior management briefs the Deputy Secretary quarterly on ITA's performance results, key program initiatives, and expenditures (obligations) by goal. This process allows ITA to more closely link its financial results to performance.

Evidence: 1. FY 2008 ITA President's Budget Request: http://www.ita.doc.gov/ofm_guidance/budgets/FY08PresBud.pdf 2. FY 2007 Congressional appropriation: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h.j.res.0020:

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: IA takes a multi-layered approach to upgrade its strategic planning. IA conducts regular reviews of its strategy, implements organizational modifications to reflect strategic, operational and workload factors, and responds to feedback provided by independent assessors and Congressional appropriators. Actual quarterly performance reports, which are provided to IA senior managers, focus on IA's efforts on target planning, efficiency of its operations, and actual performance. IA has integrated its relevant performance measures into individual employee performance plans that are designed to communicate organizational goals and objectives, reinforce individual accountability for meeting those goals and track and evaluate individual and organizational performance results. IA serves on the ITA Strategic Planning Leadership Team (SPLT), which is a group of senior managers who advise the Deputy Under Secretary for International Trade on overall policy and operational issues. The SPLT meets monthly to discuss key performance issues and to evaluate performance targets and results. IA uses the SPLT to continually review its performance measures to more accurately reflect the impact of its programs.

Evidence: 1. FY 2006 Performance and Accountability Report, starting on page 269: http://www.osec.doc.gov/bmi/Budget/06APPR/PAR06.pdf 2. FY 2008 ITA Annual Performance Plan: http://www.ita.doc.gov/ofm_guidance/budgets/FY08PresBud.pdf, page ITA-11 3. Example of FY 2007 Performance Plan for an IA employee 4. ITA Strategic Planning Leadership Team (SPLT) Charter 5. Listing of long-term and annual performance measures

Are all regulations issued by the program/agency necessary to meet the stated goals of the program, and do all regulations clearly indicate how the rules contribute to achievement of the goals?

Explanation: The Import Administration's (IA) AD/CVD regulations are needed to allow IA to administer the AD/CVD process. IA's rules govern the methodology for determining antidumping and countervailing duties, revoking duties, and reviewing duties in place. IA makes sure only necessary regulations are promulgated by evaluating legislative changes to determine if more guidance is needed to ensure clarity. IA revises these regulations as necessary to address litigation and changes to international trade agreements. For example, IA revised all AD/CVD regulations after passage of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA). IA's administrative protective order (APO) regulations establish the necessary procedural rules for releasing business proprietary information for use in AD/CVD proceedings, while protecting it from unauthorized disclosure. IA tries to educate the public about regulations by providing technical assistance and counseling to U.S. industries and posting all regulations on the IA website. After passage of the URAA in 1993, IA's regulations were simplified.

Evidence: 1. ITA FY 2007 - 2012 Strategic Plan website will be provided when the strategic plan will be released in April 2007 2. The final regulations for IA's conduct of both antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings and for the administration of APOs may be accessed through the links provided at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/index.html.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: AD/CVD performance information is collected in a Lotus Notes-based Case Management System (CMS). Information is collected on a daily basis from multiple sources including AD/CVD case analysts and policy and legal staff, as each segment of an AD/CVD proceeding progresses toward completion. The CMS is used to generate performance measurement information required in documents including budget submissions, annual reports and strategic plans. The information is also used by management to monitor workload and manage distribution of new cases as they are received. The AD/CVD program uses this performance information to improve performance through resource-planning systems and accountability systems for offices and for staff.

Evidence: 1. ITA President's Budget FY2008, pg. 92, Workload and Performance Data: http://www.ita.doc.gov/ofm_guidance/budgets/FY08PresBud.pdf 2. ITA PBViews System on a quarterly basis 3. IA Actual First FY 2007Quarterly Performance Matrix distributed to IA managers

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Senior-level IA managers are held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results through annual performance plans. For example, managers are held accountable through individual annual performance plans, with appraisals linked to program performance, financial management, and other critical elements dedicated to efficiency and accountability. Performance appraisals are linked to key performance measures such as Strategic/Operation Planning, Management of Human and Financial Resources, and Customer/Client Service Responsiveness. Plans follow standard templates to ensure consistency and mission focus. An evaluation system is in place to hold managers accountable for performance and to recognize strong and weak performers. Like IA, program partners are held accountable by their specific regulatory requirements. IA's key participants - ITC and CBP - in the AD/CVD processes, have specific procedural criteria, which impact IA's timely completion of AD/CVD cases and eventual imposition of duties.

Evidence: 1. Managers' annual performance plans contain performance measures. FY 2007 performance plans for all other staff include performance measures. 2. Management uses the Case Management System to track results of managers and their staff and ensures agency goals are achieved. 3. Senior managers are responsible for fiscal expenditures. 4. ITC must notify IA of affirmative injury findings before IA can proceed with an AD/CVD investigation, 19 U.S.C. 1671b(a) 5. ITC Regulations: http://law.justia.com/us/cfr/title19/19-3.0.1.2.7.html

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: Appropriated funding for the AD/CVD program is obligated in a timely manner for all accounts. IA follows established procedures for reporting and tracking expenditures in order to allow management to verify that funds are spent appropriately and that obligations are consistent with the overall program plan. Independent auditors have verified that ITA follows generally accepted accounting practices for the United States and that only limited amounts of unobligated funds remain at the end of each fiscal year. To report actual expenditures, ITA also performs monthly variance analysis and projections at the unit and aggregate level, quarterly review of program needs, and resource adjustments are made, as appropriate.

Evidence: 1. In FY 2006, IA obligated 100% of its available operations and administration funds. This level of fund obligation is consistent with recent trends [FY 2004 - 98.4% and FY 2005 - 100%]. 2. KPMG verified that the ITA follows generally accepted accounting practices for the United States in its 2006 Independent Auditors' Report of the Department's FY 2006 and FY 2006 consolidated financial statements and statement of net cost presented in the FY 2006 Performance and Accountability Report (PAR). http://www.osec.doc.gov/bmi/Budget/06APPR/PAR06.pdf 3. Monthly IA Executive Financial Report

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: Specific annual measures are used to monitor the performance of the AD/CVD program and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution. Based on OMB's guidance and the previous IA PART, IA has developed a "per unit efficiency cost measure." IA also uses customer satisfaction surveys (most recently completed in May 2006) to assess the level of the overall customer satisfaction with IA's products and services and identify areas of improvement in the overall service delivery. Cost per workload unit - Administrative Protective Order Staff Function measures efficiencies realized in the production of Administrative Protective Order case files and sets forth planned operating cost efficiency targets for future years. Efficiencies have been realized through increased automation and process re-engineering in the face of increasing workload in this activity area. This performance measure supports IA in promoting the use of automation and procedural reengineering where and when possible to reduce the per unit cost of workload output. IA should also consider expanding the use of cost efficiency measures by creating a cost per determination measure.

Evidence: 1. FY 2006 Performance and Accountability Report: http://www.osec.doc.gov/bmi/Budget/06APPR/PAR06.pdf 2. FY 2008 ITA President's Budget (Annual Performance Plan), page ITA-11 http://www.ita.doc.gov/ofm_guidance/budgets/FY08PresBud.pdf 3. ITA-Wide Customer Satisfaction Survey, IA Program Unit Results, May 23, 2006

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: IA collaborates with CBP, the ITC, the Department of Justice, USTR, and other units within Commerce to meet IA's overall program goals. IA coordinates with CBP to implement AD/CVD duties and deposits. To ensure vigorous implementation, IA established a separate unit to manage customs-related issues and to serve as the liaison with CBP. IA and CBP officially meet monthly to exchange updates on the status of cases IA has referred to CBP or other cases that have a bearing on IA's proceedings. An example of collaboration is when IA receives an allegation of fraud or evasion of AD/CVD duties. IA discusses it with CBP to see if CBP can pursue it as a civil action or refer it for possible criminal investigation. If necessary, IA is permitted by statute to provide CBP with proprietary information to assist in its investigations. IA also supports USTR by providing technical expertise on antidumping and countervailing duties. As part of its economic impact analysis, Ex-Im Bank consults with IA to determine whether there are ongoing or final AD/CVD actions affecting the production of products subject to potential Ex-Im Bank financing.

Evidence: CBP: 1. AD/CVD customs instructions: http://addcud.cbp.gov 2. Boilerplate instructions to CBP: http://ia.ita.gov/dpwm;pad/custboil.htm 3. Daily communication regarding IA customs instructions to ensure they are clear; regular reports from CBP to ensure that CBP finalizes all entries relevant to IA's customs instructions; CBP enforcement actions, such as instituting fraud cases, to help prevent evasion of AD/CVD laws; IA's regular participation in CBP-sponsored activities to educate CBP on AD/CVD activities; IA's special access to CBP's database system and sharing of entry documentation to assist with effective administration and enforcement of AD/CVD laws; CBP workshops for IA regarding CBP's automated commercial environment devoted solely to effective integration of AD/CVD activities in this new system. ITC: 1. ITC website: http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/index.htm 2. AD/CVD regulations: http://www.ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/97-12201.txt 3. AD/CVD statute: http://ww.ia.ita.doc.gov/download/title7.txt 4. ITC must notify IA of affirmative injury findings before IA can proceed with an AD/CVD investigation, 19 U.S.C. 1671b(a) 5. ITC Regulations: http://law.justia.com/us/cfr/title19/19-3.0.1.2.7.html DOJ: 1. Department of Justice defends IA determinations at the Court of International Trade (CIT) and, if appealed, at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). 2. CIT rulings/opinions: http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/slip_op/slip-op.html 3. CAFC rulings/opinions: http://www.fedcir.gov/dailylog.html 4. The prohibitions against Ex-Im Bank financing that support the production of merchandise subject to antidumping or countervailing duty measures is set forth in the Bank's economic impact procedures and can be found at: http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/revecon_impact_proc.html

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: ITA is free of material internal control weaknesses, as reported by auditors. ITA has received a clean audit since FY 2000 and there have been no deficiencies reported within IA. Systems for identifying and correcting deficiencies in program management exist within the program, and management takes prompt, corrective action if deficiencies are identified. On an annual basis, IA certifies that it has addressed deficiencies and that effective management controls are in place.

Evidence: 1. Critical element in managers' annual performance plans specifically address financial management practices. 2. Independent auditors have verified that the ITA follows generally accepted accounting practices for the U. S. as documented by KPMG in its 2006 Independent Auditors' Report of the Department's FY 2005 and FY 2006 consolidated financial statements and statement of net cost presented in the FY 2005 and FY 2006 Performance and Accountability Report, http://www.osec.doc.gov/bmi/Budget/06APPR/PAR06.pdf

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: In addition to its efforts to develop efficiency measures, IA is developing plans to respond to management evaluations. For example, upon issuance of a final report by the Office of the Inspector General, IA implemented recommendations for program improvement. The actions taken by IA in response to the report include, among others: (1) documenting the management control process for meeting internal and statutory deadlines; (2) issuing instructions to staff, including the roles and responsibilities of analysts and managers for updating the case management database; (3) formulating standard templates to ensure consistency in the content and format of agendas and reports dealing with verifications of foreign respondents; (5) simplifying and formalizing procedures for submitting data for storage and archiving; and (6) developing competency models for all Operations positions. In addition, IA is updating its Antidumping Manual and developing an Operations Handbook, which formalizes IA's practices and procedures for all employees, both of which are near completion. IA has also eliminated excess managerial positions and implemented special teams to improve (1) AD/CVD training (2) AD/CVD quality control and (3) AD/CVD-Customs & Border Patrol cooperation.

Evidence: 1. U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General Final Survey, Report No. IPE-16952/March 2005 http://oig.doc.gov/oig/reports/2005/ITA-IPE-16952-03-05.pdf 2. FY 2007 performance plans for all other staff include performance measures. 3. Management uses the Case Management System to track results of managers and their staff and to ensure agency goals are achieved. 4. Senior managers are responsible for fiscal expenditures. 5. Copy of a Monthly Financial Analysis Report 6. GAO-05-53: www.gao.gov/new.items/d0553.pdf

Did the program seek and take into account the views of all affected parties (e.g., consumers; large and small businesses; State, local and tribal governments; beneficiaries; and the general public) when developing significant regulations?

Explanation: IA seeks and takes into account views of affected parties when developing its regulations. IA revised all AD/CVD regulations after passage of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA). To revise the AD/CVD regulations, IA published an advance notice of interim, proposed, and final regulations. IA received over 500 written public comments regarding the proposed AD regulations. IA conducted a public hearing in which many people who commented on the proposed rules participated. After the public forum, IA received another 100 post-hearing comments. Similarly, IA received over 250 comments regarding the proposed CVD regulations. The preambles to the final regulations provided analysis of interested party comments. Similar processes were undertaken with respect to the APO regulations.

Evidence: 1. The final regulations for IA's conduct of AD and CVD proceedings and for the administration of APOs may be accessed through the links provided at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/index.html. 2. Federal Register Notice 19 CFR Parts 351,353 and 355, AD Duties; CVD Duties http://ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/index.html 3. Federal Register Notice 19 CFR Parts 351 and 354, Final Rule on AD and CVD Proceedings: APO Procedures; Procedures for Imposing Sanctions for Violation of a Protective Order http://ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/index.html

Did the program prepare adequate regulatory impact analyses if required by Executive Order 12866, regulatory flexibility analyses if required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act and SBREFA, and cost-benefit analyses if required under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act; and did those analyses comply with OMB guidelines?

Explanation: The Import Administration's (IA) regulations were determined as significant under Executive Order 12866. IA's AD/CVD regulations were certified as not having a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. The Department of Commerce found that there would not be any substantive effect on the outcome of AD/CVD proceedings as a result of the revised regulations. With respect to provisions implementing the URAA, the Department found that they would benefit domestic and foreign interested parties involved in AD/CVD proceedings without favoring any specific party, and, therefore, would not have significant economic effects. IA's APO regulations were determined not to be significant under E.O. 12866 and were certified not to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small businesses. These regulations simplified the procedures pertaining to the administration of the APO process. No cost-benefit analysis under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act has been required with respect to any of IA's regulations.

Evidence: 1. The final regulations for IA's conduct of both AD and CVD proceedings and for the administration of APOs may be accessed through the links provided at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/index.html. 2. Federal Register Notice 19 CFR Parts 351,353 and 355, AD Duties; CVD Duties http://ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/index.html 3. Federal Register Notice 19 CFR Parts 351 and 354, Final Rule on AD and CVD Proceedings: APO Procedures; Procedures for Imposing Sanctions for Violation of a Protective Order http://ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/index.html

Are the regulations designed to achieve program goals, to the extent practicable, by maximizing the net benefits of its regulatory activity?

Explanation: Maximization of net benefits is not considered when promulgating regulations related to antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Regulations implemented for the administration of AD/CVD laws are largely procedural in nature. They translate principles of the implementing legislation into specific and predictable rules. Predictable rules will simplify and streamline IA's administration of antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings in a manner consistent with the purpose of the statue.

Evidence: The final regulations for IA's conduct of both AD and CVD proceedings and for the administration of APOs may be accessed through the links provided at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/index.html

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: The Import Administration (IA) has two new long-term performance measures. One measures the accuracy of IA's determinations of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations by comparing how often IA determinations are not fully rejected when challenged in U.S. courts. IA did not have any determinations fully rejected over the past two years. While the volume and complexity of cases varies over the years, this signals that IA's current target is not ambitious. Also, IA only measures when cases are entirely rejected, which may neglect important decisions. IA's other measure tracks the percentage reduction in foreign subsidy programs. This measure is new making a determination of success difficult.

Evidence: 1. Characteristics of Transparency Under International Antidumping Regime (chart) 2. Characteristics of Impartial Treatment Under International Antidumping Regimes (chart) 3. Listing of long-term and annual performance measures

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: IA met FY 2006 targets for "Percent of instructions sent to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within five business days." The "Percent of Ministerial Errors in IA's Dumping and Subsidy Calculations" is a new measure. For both measures, IA should adjust targets as actual data becomes available.

Evidence: 1. FY 2008 ITA President's Budget Request, http://www.ita.doc.gov/ofm_guidance/budgets/FY08PresBud.pdf

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: The "Cost Per Workload Unit- Administrative Protective Order Staff Function" measure is new. The cost per workload unit decreased from 2005 to 2006 because the Import Administration increased automation. IA did not receive full credit because the cost per workload unit measure is new and it is not a comprehensive measure. IA should explore a cost per AD/CVD determination measure.

Evidence: 1. FY 2006 Performance and Accountability Report http://www.osec.doc.gov/bmi/Budget/06APPR/PAR06.pdf 2. FY 2008 ITA President's Budget, page ITA-88, http://www.ita.doc.gov/ofm_guidance/budgets/FY08PresBud.pdf 3. IA shares office space with ITA/MAC in Beijing, China, to reduce overhead, and, at the direction of congressional report language, shares office space with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative in Geneva, Switzerland, to reduce costs.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: There are numerous countries that make use of AD/CVD remedies. However, many of their administrative processes are not as transparent as those in the U.S. The Import Administration (IA) compiled characteristics of transparency and impartiality from World Trade Organization (WTO) and Government Accountability Office reports. IA found that the US has the most transparent and impartial characteristics of WTO members . However, there are no performance evaluations that show IA is more effective than other countries at remedying trading practices that are deemed unfair.

Evidence: 1. The AD/CVD statute and regulations cited above in Question 1.1 http://ia.ita.doc.gov/regs/index.html 2. World Trade Organization Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the Antidumping Agreement) 3. World Trade Organization Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures http://www.chasque.net/frontpage/suns/trade/docof/02wto.htm 4. WTO summary statistics regarding initiations of antidumping actions and measures imposed http://www.heisummer.ch/pdf/Contingency%20Protection/jones%20wto_antidumping.pdf 5. Trade remedy laws and regulations for Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey, as notified to the WTO Committee on Antidumping Practices and Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 6. Where available, websites maintained by the trade remedy authorities of the governments of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey. 7. Public reading rooms maintained by IA and China's Ministry of Commerce. 8. Characteristics of Transparency Under International Antidumping Regimes (chart) 9. Characteristics of Impartial Treatment Under International Antidumping Regimes (chart)

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: While an independent evaluation of sufficient scope has not been completed, IA has participated in several independent evaluations. A recent IG report made a number of suggestions that recommended actions to improve the program. The IG's overall assessment of IA program management was favorable, stating that, "Overall, we found a hardworking organization, which is dedicated to meeting its statutory deadlines." Also, IA's 2006 Customer Satisfaction Survey indicated that IA customers are particularly satisfied with the counseling services they receive and IA's steel import licensing and monitoring system.

Evidence: 1. U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General Final Survey Report No. IPE-16952/March 2005 http://www.oig.doc.gov/report/2005/ITA-IEP-16952-03-05.pdf 2. ITA-Wide 2006 Customer Satisfaction Survey??IA Program Unit Results

Were programmatic goals (and benefits) achieved at the least incremental societal cost and did the program maximize net benefits?

Explanation: The program does not consider maximizing net benefits in implementing regulations related to AD/CVD laws. It is unclear whether program goals and benefits were achieved at the least incremental societal cost. However, regulations provide predictability to the program's customers and are required to allow IA to administer the AD/CVD process.

Evidence: 1. ITA-Wide Customer Satisfaction Survey, IA Program Unit Results, May 23, 2006 2. Characteristics of Transparency Under International Antidumping Regime (chart) 3. Characteristics of Impartial Treatment Under International Antidumping Regimes (chart)