Detailed Information on the
Coast Guard: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security Assessment

Evaluate the data quality of key data sources used in program to improve the accuracy and reliability of performance information, with specific focus on validation of risk assessment models, processes and methodologies used in strategic mission planning.

Develop a stronger strategic planning process that clearly links strategy goals and vision to program performance.

Develop and implement an additional long-term outcome measure for the Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security Program.

The Coast Guard should continue to improve its statistical understanding of its PWCS threat and risk measures, and develop a more empirical methodology for setting and validating annual and long-term targets

The Coast Guard should deploy its web-based PWCS scorecard to the Pacific area of the agency so that the entire organization can benefit from improved operational and program management efficiencies

The Coast Guard should investigate additional methods for determining program effectiveness at responding to rapidly-unfolding events, either through red-celling techniques, scored/graded table-top exercises, or other simulated threats to port security. Coast Guard should consider linking managerial performance in such exercises to annual commanding officer performance evaluations.

The Coast Guard should work to collect better comparative estimates of program performance to determine whether the PWCS program is as effective as other similar programs conducted by other peer governments.

Measure: Annual Percent Reduction in Terrorism-Related Maritime Risk that the Coast Guard is able to influence

Explanation:This measure is a risk-based proxy measure of outcome performance. Maritime attack scenarios are scored with respect to Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence to define a level of terrorism-risk that exists in the maritime domain. The Coast Guard, using subject matter experts, estimates the portion of that risk that is within its authority to influence, then scores its best estimate of reductions to Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence that its activities, policies, and initiatives may have accounted for - for each scenario. The estimated percent reduction in risk serves as the proxy for Coast Guard outcome performance. In order to improve the validity and objectivity of the measure in the future, the Coast Guard intends to invite external experts to participate in the evaluation.

Measure: USCG PWCS Program Efficiency (Outcome Performance/Program Cost)

Explanation:This measure is the program's annual terrorism risk-reduction outcome performance divided by the program's annual cost, expressed as: Annual estimated percent risk reduction per $ billion.

Measure: Percent risk reduction for the "transfer of a terrorist" meta-scenario

Explanation:This measure is an estimate of the percent of terrorist-related maritime risk reduction in the transfer of a terrorist(s) through the maritime domain (as a percent of the risk that the Coast Guard has the ability to impact). This is a risk-based measure that involves the scoring (by maritime security representatives) with respect to threat, vulnerability and consequence of the transfer of a terrorist(s) into the United States with intent and capability to carry out terror attacks within the United States where vessels en route from foreign countries are used as a means of conveyance. Such scoring generates an index of "raw risk" that exists in the maritime domain. Next, Coast Guard incremental interventions (awareness, operational and regulatory -based) that have taken place throughout the fiscal year are scored with regard to the effectiveness that each has been estimated to have afforded.

Measure: Percent risk reduction for the "transfer of a weapon of mass destruction" meta scenario

Explanation:This measure is an estimate of the percent of terrorist-related maritime risk reduction in the transfer of a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD)/ materials into the United States through the maritime domain (as a percent of the risk that the Coast Guard has the ability to impact). This is a risk-based measure that involves the scoring (by maritime security representatives) with respect to threat, vulnerability and consequence of the transfer of a WMD/materials into the United States to support ongoing terrorist operations where vessels en route from foreign countries are used as a means of conveyance. Such scoring generates an index of "raw risk" that exists in the maritime domain. Next, Coast Guard incremental interventions (awareness, operational and regulatory -based) that have taken place throughout the fiscal year are scored with regard to the effectiveness that each has been estimated to have afforded.

Measure: Completion rate of required inspections of vessels for compliance with the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)

Explanation:This measure is the percent of required annual MTSA security plan compliance inspections conducted (for inspected vessels only).

Measure: Completion rate of Required High Capacity Passenger Vessel Escorts

Explanation:This measure is the percent of required HCPV escorts completed by the Coast Gaurd. The criteria for a requried HCPV escort is not listed here.

Measure: Completion rate of required visits to critical infrastructure.

Explanation:This measure is the percent of required visits to critical infrastructure completed by the Coast Guard. The criteria for required visits to critical infrastructure is not listed here.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: Coast Guard's Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission has three strategic objectives: prevent terrorist attacks, sabotage, espionage, and subversive acts; protect the U.S. Maritime Domain and U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS); and respond to and recover from those terrorist attacks, sabotage, espionage, or subversive acts that do occur. The strategic objectives are supported by Maritime Domain Awareness activities, maritime security and response operations activities, and maritime security regime activities that address terrorism threats, target vulnerabilities, and/or potential consequences of a transportation security incident. Performing these activities generates a terrorism risk reduction.

Evidence: ?? The Homeland Security Act of 2002 identified "Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security" as one of five homeland security missions for Coast Guard. ?? Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (HSPD-13) states that it is the policy of the United States to take all necessary and appropriate actions, consistent with U.S. law, treaties and other international agreements to which the United States is a party, and customary international law as determined for the United States by the President, to enhance the security of and protect U.S. interests in the Maritime Domain. ?? The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 highlights the importance and vulnerability of the Marine Transportation System (MTS). MTSA tasked Coast Guard and other agencies with addressing, or ensuring industry stakeholders address, the vulnerabilities through domestic and foreign port assessments, as well as Area, vessel, and facility security plans. ?? The National Strategy for Maritime Security (September 2005) identifies the Department of Homeland Security (with Coast Guard as its executive agency) as the lead for maritime security. In carrying out the PWCS mission, Coast Guard is meeting this responsibility. ?? The PWCS mission statement is articulated in Maritime Sentinel, Coast Guard's Strategic Plan for PWCS, as well as other documents (e.g., Operation Neptune Shield Operations Order, Coast Guard Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security 2002.)

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The risk of terrorist attacks and activities in the Maritime Domain is significant. Since 9/11, terrorists have attacked maritime targets abroad. Credible threat reporting indicates an ongoing terrorist interest in the Maritime Domain. An attack in or exploitation of the Maritime Domain (including the maritime transportation system or other critical infrastructure) could yield devastating consequences. As terrorist capability to acquire weapons of mass destruction materials abroad increases, the risk associated with the transfer of these materials through the Maritime Domain for an attack on the U.S. increases dramatically. In order to mitigate risk in the Maritime Domain, Coast Guard consolidated existing competencies into its Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission, which was subsequently codified in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. In 2004, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (HSPD-13) was promulgated. HSPD-13 states that it is the policy of the United States to take all necessary and appropriate actions, consistent with U.S. law, treaties and other international agreements to which the United States is a party, and customary international law as determined for the United States by the President, to enhance the security of and protect U.S. interests in the Maritime Domain, including the following: ?? Preventing terrorist attacks, criminal acts, hostile acts in, or the unlawful exploitation of, the Maritime Domain, ?? Reducing the vulnerability of the Maritime Domain to such acts and exploitation; ?? Enhancing U.S. national security and homeland security by protecting U.S. population centers, critical infrastructure, borders, harbors, ports, and coastal approaches in the Maritime Domain; ?? Expediting recovery and response from attacks within the Maritime Domain; ?? Maximizing awareness of security issues in the Maritime Domain in order to support U.S. forces and improve United States Government actions in response to identified threats; ?? Enhancing international relationships and promoting the integration of U.S. allies and international and private sector partners into an improved global maritime security framework to advance common security interests in the Maritime Domain. Coast Guard's execution of its PWCS mission is guided by HSPD-13 and the National Strategy for Maritime Security that was developed from HSPD-13. Coast Guard uses a three-pillar approach to accomplish the PWCS mission: ?? Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) ?? Lead and Conduct Effective Maritime Security and Response Operations ?? Create and Oversee an Effective Maritime Security Regime These three pillars with their subordinate activities directly support the objectives outlined in the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the National Security Strategy of 2002, and the National Security Strategy of 2006.

Evidence: ?? It is an enduring and widely-held opinion that the U.S. Maritime Transportation System and Maritime Domain remain susceptible to terrorist attacks. (MDA Working Group Report, "Threats and Challenges in the Maritime Domain," October 2005) ?? Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (HSPD-13), Section II, Policy ?? The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 ?? National Security Strategy of 2002. ?? This past summer's attack on London's subway system was quickly translated to a potential threat to other forms of mass transit, including maritime mass transit, i.e., ferries and similar passenger vessels. (Execution Order (EXORD) 003-05 and 004-05, "Targeted MARSEC 2 for Maritime Mass Transit Vessels") ?? Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the vulnerability of the Gulf Coast energy/petrochemical sector was perceived to be greater, warranting additional preventative and protective security activities. (EXORD 006-05, "Additional Security Measures for Petrochemical Industry") ?? In MTSA, Title I, Section 101 Congress made numerous findings, including: o United States ports handle over 95 percent of United States overseas trade. The total volume of goods imported and exported through ports is expected to more than double over the next 20 years. o The top 50 ports in the United States account for about 90 percent of all the cargo tonnage. Twenty-five United States ports account for 98 percent of all container shipments. Cruise ships visiting foreign destinations embark from at least 16 ports. Ferries in the United States transport 113,000,000 passengers and 32,000,000 vehicles per year. o Ports are often very open and exposed and are susceptible to large scale acts of terrorism that could cause a large loss of life or economic disruption. ?? Details of the nature and magnitude of such concerns were captured in the Cost Assessment Summary of Coast Guard's MTSA regulations. Absent an actual terrorist attack or event in the maritime transportation sector, estimates of the resulting damages have been extrapolated from other events and/or war games. o The shutdown of 29 West Coast ports due to labor disputes in 2003 is similar to what would be experienced if a threat initiated broad-based port closures. Cost estimates for the eleven-day interruption in cargo flow ranged from $140 million to $2 billion a day. o The scenario of a 2003 war game played by businesses and government agencies included 2 initial port closures followed by a nationwide port closure. A 12-day closure resulted in a 3-month delay as containerized cargo backlogs were cleared. The estimated costs attributable to manufacturing slowdowns, halts in production, lost sales, and spoilage was estimated at approximately $58 billion. ?? The National Strategy for Homeland Security 2002 ?? The National Strategy for Maritime Security 2005 ?? The 9/11 Commission Report, page 391, with recommendations at pages 381, 387, 389, 390, 391, and 428 ?? GAO Report GAO-06-91 "Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructures." ?? National Security Strategy 2006

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: Through its role as the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator (FMSC), Coast Guard leads the collaborative and collective efforts of the Federal, state, local, and private entities who share responsibility for protection of the maritime transportation sub-sector. Responsibilities for protection of the transportation sector have been assigned by law to several federal agencies, based on existing authorities, capabilities, and competencies. As stated in the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the Department of Homeland Security, with Coast Guard as its executive agency, has primary responsibility for maritime homeland security. Each FMSC exercises authority by empanelling an Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC) with an all-inclusive maritime membership that draws from responsible Federal, state, local and private entities (stakeholders) and ensures their participation in anti-terrorism planning and preparedness activities. The process described above and the resultant work helps to eliminate redundancy and duplication across programs.

Evidence: ?? The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Section IV, identifies the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as having primary responsibility for maritime homeland security, through Coast Guard as the Department of Homeland Security's executive agency. ?? Coast Guard works in close cooperation with various Federal agencies to combat maritime terrorism. Examples include the following: o Coast Guard intelligence personnel interact with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel at the field level in Joint Terrorism Task Forces to support the FBI in its lead role (per Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5) for investigating domestic terrorism. (Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 5, "Management of Domestic Incidents") o Responsibility for the U.S. maritime cargo chain is divided between Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Coast Guard focuses mainly on the transportation aspect - vessels and receiving facilities. CBP focuses on containerized cargo (Container Security Initiative). Each supports the other in meeting these responsibilities. (Question for the Record, "Container Security Agency Responsibility) o While Coast Guard is the lead agency for Maritime Homeland Security, the Department of Defense (DoD) maintains the lead for Homeland Defense, including Maritime Homeland Defense. One Memorandum of Agreement (Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) Between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for the Inclusion of the U.S. Coast Guard in Support of Maritime Homeland) is already in place to specify how Coast Guard assets will be used in support of DoD's Maritime Homeland Defense mission, when needed. Another MOA Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for Department of Defense Support to the United States Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Security specifies the means by which DoD assets can be employed in support of Coast Guard's Maritime Homeland Security missions. ?? The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, Section 70103, describes Coast Guard's role as FMSC and relationship with AMSCs. The FMSCs role and relationship with AMSCs are discussed further in the MTSA regulations, 33 CFR Part 103. (33 CFR Subchapter H - Maritime Security, 33 CFR 103.205, "Authority of the Captain of the Port as the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator")

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: There is no evidence that a different approach would be more efficient or effective in delivering the benefits of Coast Guard's Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) program. In fact, the program's multi-faceted design (PWCS includes awareness, security operations, outreach, and regulatory initiatives) enables an optimal mix of activities to the goal of reducing terrorism risk in the maritime domain. In general, PWCS operational activities (such as armed patrols, boardings, vessel escorts, and other similar law enforcement activities) are inherently governmental roles that require Coast Guard assets and personnel to provide direct services. On the other hand, Coast Guard also employs a regulatory regime to hold the private sector, and local and foreign governments responsible for their portions of the responsibility to reduce maritime risk. With respect to the regulatory component of PWCS, the underlying statute is, in fact, designed to maximize net benefits - the requirements of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 balances the benefits of security with the benefits of free trade, transportation, and enterprise, with the intention to maximize all such benefits.

Evidence: ?? Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: In the war on terrorism, the Coast Guard's uses its budget authority to fund the following: 1) direct operations, such as vessel escorts and patrols, 2) regulatory activities that engage maritime stakeholders in maritime security, and 3) programs that increase maritime domain awareness. These activities, policies, and initiatives reduce the risk to the American public of maritime terrorism in the Maritime Transportation System. Reduced risk from terrorist attacks is the benefit the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) Program provides to the Marine Transportation System (MTS) and associated stakeholders. The beneficiaries are many and include the following: owners and operators of facilities which comprise the Maritime Transportation System (MTS); owners and operators of commercial vessels which use the MTS; the Department of Defense, as an additional user of the MTS; those portions of the public which utilize the MTS for transportation (e.g., ferries) or recreation (e.g., cruise ship passengers); and the general population living in and around port areas. Secondary beneficiaries include the national economy, which benefits significantly from international trade conducted through U.S. ports. The PWCS mission focuses on the maritime transportation sub-sector, with the most attention being paid to the 55 most militarily and economically strategic ports. The PWCS program is implemented through policy directives such as the Operation Neptune Shield Operations Order, Operation Port Shield Planning Order, Navigational and Vessel Inspection Circulars (NVIC) on port, vessel, and facility security; and 46 CFR Subchapter H. These directives and regulations employ risk-based decision-making to ensure proper targeting of resources. By executing these policy directives, Coast Guard ensures its resources are being used directly and effectively to meet the program's purpose.

Evidence: ?? Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) 2002, Title I, Section 101 states that the top 50 ports in the United States account for about 90 percent of all the cargo tonnage. ?? The National Strategy for Maritime Security identified the following five Strategic Actions, all of which are linked to the three pillars supporting Coast Guard's PWCS program (pillars are in parentheses below): o Enhance International Cooperation (Create and Oversee and Effective Maritime Security Regime) o Maximize Domain Awareness (Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness) o Embed Security into Commercial Practices (Create and Oversee and Effective Maritime Security Regime) o Deploy Layered Security (Lead and Conduct Maritime Security and Response Operations) o Assure Continuity of the Marine Transportation System (Lead and Conduct Maritime Security and Response Operations) ?? Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 9-02 ?? 46 CFR Subchapter H

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: To gauge long-term performance, the program tracks one overarching outcome measure and three subsidiary measures that consider risk as the product of threat, vulnerability, and consequence: ?? The annual percent reduction in maritime risk due to terrorism. ?? The annual percent reduction in risk due to threat management. ?? The annual percent reduction in risk due to vulnerability management. ?? The annual percent reduction in risk due to consequence management. The strength of this measures suite is that it aligns very well with long-term goals of the Program, the Department, and the nation to achieve Awareness of and Prevent attacks (lower the threat), Protect against attacks (decrease vulnerability), and to Respond to and Recover from attacks that might occur (mitigate Consequence). However, in deliberately choosing proxy measures that strongly reflect outcomes, Coast Guard has accepted the limitation that the annual measures are formed from an assessment, the best judgment of subject matter experts. It is widely acknowledged that there is little to measure directly with regard to outcomes in the war against maritime terrorism. Additionally, the relationship between these long-term outcome measures and the more objective annual output measures is not easily quantified. However, it is the professional judgment of the program's managers that progress in achieving annual performance goals will result in reduced maritime threat and risk. To increase the validity of its annual assessment of performance, Coast Guard is taking the following steps in subsequent measurement iterations: ?? Employing external parties in the evaluation process to increase objectivity ?? Improving modeling, simulation, analysis, and experimentation capabilities in order to validate that Coast Guard activities, policies, and initiatives have risk-reducing effects, and subsequently use the measure to help select the best mix.

Evidence: ?? PWCS Long-Term Outcome Measures and Targets ?? Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2005 Performance and Accountability Report

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: In setting targets for the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) risk-based proxy measures, Coast Guard assumes that the level of future maritime risk will change. Using the best available intelligence assessments, Coast Guard has painted a picture of increasing maritime risk - due in large part to expectations of increased enemy capabilities and increased vulnerabilities and potential consequences that will accompany projected increases in maritime trade. Even so, Coast Guard has selected targets that show improved performance in the five-year timeframe as known threats, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences are addressed and reduced. The Coast Guard does not have baseline estimates for this measure because it is new. Since the measure is based on point-in-time assessments by program staff, it is impossible to collect accurate historical performance statistics.

Evidence: ?? PWCS Long-Term Outcome Measures and Targets ?? Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2005 Performance and Accountability Report

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) program has a limited number of annual measures that fit within the three strategic courses of action described in answer 2.1. Each measure highlights progress on activities or initiatives to reduce risk in the maritime domain, which is the program's long term goal. While there is no quantified relationship yet available to show the exact effect achievement of annual performance goals has on the program's long-term success, it is the professional judgment of the program's managers that progress in achieving annual performance goals will result in reduced maritime threat and risk. The measures tracked on an annual basis are focused on outcomes, that is, what the program can achieve in any given year. Generally speaking, the program's annual measures can be grouped into the following broad categories: ?? Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness - one measure highlighting progress on the roll-out of the National Automated Identification System. ?? Maintain an effective Operational and Response Capability - measures showing progress for activities such as high-value shipping escorts, security patrols, and security screening and boarding. ?? Maintain an effective Maritime Security Regime - measures accounting for both the international and domestic facets of Coast Guard's regulatory initiatives.

Evidence: ?? PWCS Annual Measures and Targets

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: Baselines have been established for all annual measures. Most are reported on a quarterly basis; some are reported annually. In all cases, quantitative targets have been set as appropriate. Targets are very aggressive in most cases. For example, all of the targets for the operational measures are set to "Achieve 100% of the required operational standard" with last quarter's performance ranging from 65% to nearly 100%. Once sustained performance against the standard reaches 100% for these measures, Coast Guard's goal will be either: 1) to readjust the standards to make them more challenging, or 2) to realize the same sustained performance against the standard with less resources (increase efficiency).

Evidence: ?? PWCS Annual Measures and Targets

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: Coast Guard's government and maritime industry partners assist in developing and are committed to carrying out collective goals related to the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission. Coast Guard strongly focuses on collecting PWCS performance information from program partners. In the course of establishing the PWCS regulatory regime promulgated under the Marine Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, Coast Guard actively engaged agencies with port security responsibilities and regulated industry to provide feedback to determine success and address concerns identified after the regulatory regime was implemented. Regulated vessels and facilities are required to submit security plans describing how they would address the security vulnerabilities in their operations. This plan submission period involves constant contact and discussion with submitters to answer questions, explain policy, and assist with identifying the elements of a successful plan tailored for their operations. In the case of Facility Security Plans (FSP), Captains of the Port inspect facilities, review their plans, make final suggestions, and give ultimate approval of the plans. A cycle of regular compliance inspections and unscheduled spot checks by Coast Guard inspectors was established, with results entered into MISLE for performance tracking. On a strategic level, the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) and its eight supporting sub-plans were developed in interagency fora. These plans outline strategic objectives for Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security partner agencies with regard to preventing terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts, protecting maritime-related population centers and critical infrastructure, minimizing damage and expediting recovery, and safeguarding the ocean and its resources. Interagency collaboration and interagency approval of these plans show partner commitment to strive for collective goals. Similarly, the National Maritime Transportation Security Plan (NMTSP) was developed by Coast Guard with partner-agency and private sector input. The NMTSP received concurrence from Coast Guard's Federal partner-agencies during the approval process. Coast Guard also carries out its PWCS mission through port-level planning and execution of security activities with appropriate port partners. Each Coast Guard Federal Maritime Security Coordinator (FMSC) is responsible for development of at least one of the 45 port-based Area Maritime Security Plans (AMSP) in consultation with port-based Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC). AMSCs are comprised of state, local, Federal and industry partners who collectively establish/agree upon port-specific security prevention goals and security measures to be carried out to protect the port. In accordance with 33 CFR Part 103, each AMSC is specifically required to assist in identification of critical port infrastructure, identification of risks, and development of a process for continually evaluating overall port security. Committee members outline gaps and requirements which in turn drive the goals and strategies outlined in the AMSP. In addition to assisting in the development of the AMSP, Committee members and other partners play a role in executing security for the port. Federal, state, and local law enforcement partners assist in security such as enforcement of security zones and shore security patrols. Industry is committed to enhancing port security as well. As required by law, regulated vessels and facilities operate in compliance with Coast Guard-approved security plans, which support overall port security goals.

Evidence: National Strategy for Maritime Security and eight supporting sub-plans: ?? Domestic Outreach Plan ?? Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan ?? Maritime Transportation System Security Recommendations ?? National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness ?? Maritime Commerce Security Plan ?? Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan ?? International Outreach and Coordination Strategy ?? Maritime Operation Threat Response National Maritime Transportation Security Plan and Appendices. Numerous agencies and organizations, as well as 4 interagency working groups, collaborated on development of the National Maritime Transportation Security Plan. Agencies involved in the collaborative planning and execution of this plan include the Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Transportation Security Administration, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs, the Army Corps of Engineers, Department of State, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Center for State Homeland Security, National Emergency Management Association, International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the International Fire Chiefs Association. Area Maritime Security Committees. Area Maritime Security Committees have been established in each Coast Guard Captain of the Port Zone and assist Coast Guard in the development of the 45 Area Maritime Security Plans (33 CFR 103 Subpart C.) Over 3000 partner members participate in these committees nationwide. The AMSCs meet regularly and by policy are required to meet at least once per calendar year. Individual AMSPs are reviewed at least annually for accuracy, feasibility, consistency and completeness. AMSPs are also reviewed after each activation, exercise, or drill. When port conditions change, the AMSP is formally reviewed every 5 years per Navigation & Vessel Inspection Circular 9-02 Change 2. Area Maritime Security Exercise Program. The Area Maritime Security Exercise program helps to ensure the effectiveness of the port security partnership and the AMSPs. Approximately 52 AMSP exercises have been held since June 2004. Port partners have been active players in these exercises. Additionally, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Coast Guard have partnered to execute the TSA-funded PortSTEP exercise program. One aspect of the PortSTEP program is specifically geared toward meeting Coast Guard's goal of exercising AMSPs.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: Although the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security program is still maturing, Coast Guard has utilized several General Accountability Office (GAO) studies to assess program effectiveness and identify successes and areas for improvement. Coast Guard has proactively responded to shortcomings identified by GAO. The Coast Guard has not yet conducted an independent evaluation of the PWCS program to determine the effectiveness of the program.

Evidence: ?? In September, 2003, GAO released a report, "Progress Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain." As a result, Coast Guard significantly increased the number of ports covered by the Automatic Identification System (AIS) from 13 in 2004 to 27 in February 2006. Additionally, port assessment tools used by Coast Guard have been modified to correct limitations in the early version of the assessment tool. ?? In June, 2004, GAO released a report, "Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security." Despite concerns expressed in this report regarding large numbers of vessel and facility security plans to be submitted, Coast Guard was successful in reviewing and approving plan submissions. ?? In December, 2005, GAO released a report, "Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructures." GAO said that "USCG established a foundation for applying risk management to port security, making progress in all five phases of risk management. Its next challenges are to refine and strengthen its approach." Subsequent to this report, refinements to Coast Guard's risk-management approach were pursued in several areas, e.g., development of an enhanced port assessment tool (MSRAM), refinement of Operation Neptune Shield Operations Order, and development of an outcome measure that reflects overall risk reduction in the MTS.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: Coast Guard uses a performance-based, full-cost budgeting system to tie funding directly to performance goals and targets throughout the budget build process, including resource proposal development, prioritization, and justification. For example, one of the Commandant's key budget themes for the Fiscal Year 2007 Budget, as documented in the Strategic Context section of Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Congressional justification, is "Enhancing Mission Performance." To ensure alignment with this budget theme, as part of Coast Guard's internal budget review, sponsors for all Fiscal Year 2007 Budget proposals were required to identify specific mission program performance impacts. Proposals that demonstrated strong support and linkage to specific mission-program long-term performance objectives were more competitive for consideration for on-budget funding. In Fiscal Year 2005, Coast Guard began to use a new risk index to demonstrate its Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security performance. This first-time effort is a baseline that will be refined and improved upon in the next several years as the modeling, simulation, and analysis of terror-attack scenarios improves. These risk reduction estimates represent Coast Guard's initial estimate of its outcome performance, expressed as a percent reduction of that potion of risk Coast Guard can mitigate. The assessment is based on the national threat assessment data and standardized actuarial methodologies. This risk measurement method builds upon industry assessment models, and provides for a balanced management approach to dealing with an unknown adversary: one that requires careful focus on prevention (threat), protection (vulnerability), and response - in the event an attack occurs (consequence). This scenario-based approach is accepted as a best practice and way ahead among the General Accountability Office, academia, and the private sector (insurance and other industries). This first risk-reduction analysis was largely an internal self assessment. Improved future iterations will seek to validate the process and improve the accuracy of the conclusions by including external stakeholders from among the maritime community. Specifically, external validation will be sought to refine the estimate of how much (and of which type) of maritime security risk Coast Guard itself is most responsible for mitigating.

Evidence: ?? Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2007 Strategic Context Congressional-Stage ?? Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2006 Annual Performance Report ?? Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2005 Annual Performance Report ?? Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2005 Performance and Accountability Report

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: Having just released its first strategic plan, Maritime Sentinel, the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) Program is already engaged in an effort to refresh the work. Using external analytical contract support, the Program is attempting to craft better linkages between specific Coast Guard activities and initiatives and maritime risk reduction. The desire to link and analyze the cost of PWCS operations is key to the risk-reduction benefit to the public. A "version 2.0", improved, comprehensive measurement strategic plan is an explicit deliverable of this effort and is slated for completion during Summer 2006.

Evidence: ?? Maritime Sentinel ?? PWCS 2.0 Contract Award

Are all regulations issued by the program/agency necessary to meet the stated goals of the program, and do all regulations clearly indicate how the rules contribute to achievement of the goals?

Explanation: Coast Guard regulatory development process is governed by 33 CFR Subpart 1.05, Rulemaking, within an organizational framework set forth in 46 CFR Part 1, Organization, General Course, and Methods Governing Marine Safety Functions. These regulations are supplemented by Coast Guard Headquarters Instruction HQINST 16703.1 (dated Jan 11, 1995), as modified by HQINST 16703.2 (dated June 25, 2001), Regulatory Development and Review. In the first phase of Coast Guard rulemaking process, development of a rulemaking work plan, intended regulatory action is aligned with program goals and statutory mandates. Alternatives are evaluated to determine if non-regulatory actions would be more effective in meeting program goals. The work plan is reviewed and approved by senior Coast Guard leadership which ensures consistency with stated program goals. In subsequent phases, the draft rulemaking documents are again reviewed to ensure conformance with guidance in Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review. The result of these numerous levels of review are summarized in the preamble of the published rule and explained to the public. Coast Guard annually reviews its regulatory plan for the upcoming year. The Commandant of the Coast Guard gives the final approval. In the case of regulations supporting Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security, the review includes consideration of the necessity of planned rulemaking actions using executive guidance from the National Strategy for Maritime Security and the National Strategy for Maritime Domain Awareness and statutory requirements in the Maritime Transportation Security Act, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, Coast Guard Authorization Act, and other relevant statutes. It also factors impacts from industry standards development, international activities at the International Maritime Organization, and federal advisory committees, such as the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee. This process ensures alignment of regulatory development efforts with program goals. New regulatory projects are compared to ongoing regulatory projects using a weighted prioritization tool. This weighted process also measures how the regulatory projects meet Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security, and Presidential goals. Maritime security regulations are necessary to meet the goals of increased maritime domain security from acts of terrorism. The regulations, particularly 33 CFR Subchapter H, part 101 through 106, establish the performance requirements for regulated vessel and facility owners/operators to meet in the effort to mitigate the vulnerabilities identified in assessments of their operations. Areas like access control, cargo security, and actions during vessel/facility interface are addressed and mitigation strategies established. Addressing these areas provides a basis for increased security for our vital maritime infrastructure. The regulations also establish broad Captain of the Port (COTP) authority to address particular vulnerabilities in a given Area of Responsibility (AOR) and, therefore, confirm the sufficiency of all maritime security actions in the port to the greatest extent possible. The regulations clearly indicate how the rules achieve these goals through clear description of intent, performance level, and the nature of the layered approach to security measures for port areas.

Evidence: ?? Coast Guard Headquarters Instruction M16703.1, Regulatory Development and Review, dated January 11, 1995, as modified by M16703.2, dated June 25, 2001. ?? Examples of workplans - Cruise Ship Security Measures USCG 2006-23846 ?? Maritime Transportation Security Act; Final Rules; http://dms.dot.gov, docket numbers, 14792, 14733, 14749, 14732,14759, 14757 ?? Merchant Mariners Licenses and Certificate of Registry ; http://dms.dot.gov, docket number, 17455 ?? Merchant Mariners Documents: Forms and Procedures for Issuance and Renewal; http://dms.dot.gov, docket number, 14500

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: Coast Guard actively and regularly collects performance information from Coast Guard field units and key program partners to manage and improve program performance. Current information is gathered from Coast Guard field units on Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS)-specific activities by populating the Abstract of Operations (AOPS) database and the Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) database. Coast Guard collects additional PWCS-specific performance information via a more recently developed PWCS Scorecard, which includes activities conducted by Coast Guard and those activities Coast Guard conducts in conjunction with other agencies. Data for AOPS and MISLE is entered in an ongoing fashion as activities are performed. PWCS Scorecard data is reported to Coast Guard Headquarters on a monthly basis. These databases can be accessed by Coast Guard districts, areas, and Headquarters elements to be used as the basis for management decisions. For example, information from AOPS, MISLE, and the PWCS Scorecard is being considered in the development of Maritime Sentinel v 2.0, PWCS' next strategic planning document. Coast Guard also strongly focuses on collecting PWCS performance information from program partners. In the course of establishing the PWCS regulatory regime promulgated under the Marine Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, Coast Guard actively engaged agencies with port security responsibilities and regulated industry to provide feedback to determine success and address concerns identified after the regulatory regime was implemented. Regulated vessels and facilities are required to submit security plans describing how they would address the security vulnerabilities in their operations. This plan submission period involves constant contact and discussion with submitters to answer questions, explain policy, and assist with identifying the elements of a successful plan tailored for their operations. In the case of Facility Security Plans (FSP), Captains of the Port inspect facilities, review their plans, make final suggestions, and give ultimate approval of the plans. A cycle of regular compliance inspections and unscheduled spot checks by Coast Guard inspectors was established, with results entered into MISLE for performance tracking. In addition, a help desk was set up to collect questions and feedback from field units and partners. Help desk information is collected in a database to determine commonalities and possible improvements. Now that the regulatory regime has been in force for nearly two years, performance feedback received from partners is being applied to develop and provide an updated 33 CFR Subchapter H to incorporate information developed through compliance activities recorded in MISLE and help desk databases. The process also includes incorporating customer input from individuals, business groups, and Area Maritime Security Committees.

Evidence: ?? AOPS and MISLE data are reviewed periodically or in response to specific queries about asset use. This data is given due consideration when Coast Guard develops its annual Mission Planning Guidance (Fiscal Year 2006 Mission Planning Guidance), which specifies resource ceiling hours for each mission. ?? Scorecard data is reviewed every month for trend analysis, ensuring a proper risk-management focus. It also is used to identify gaps or other indicators of areas for improvement (e.g., the need to expedite the provision of mounted automatic weapons for PWCS assets). Data regarding other government agencies' support to Coast Guard PWCS activities is assessed to determine the appropriateness of such OGA involvement, and whether it is masking a Coast Guard shortfall. ?? Input for revising regulations is gathered in the rulemaking process through issuance of notices of proposed rulemaking and through the help desk database.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Coast Guard holds its managers accountable by using a detailed and comprehensive officer evaluation and reporting system. Promotions and career continuance (selections for which are competitive), are based on qualitative performance criteria that, for example, notes whether an officer, "employed wasteful methods" (low score), was "cost conscious; sought ways to cut waste" (medium score), or "found ways to systematically reduce cost, eliminate waste," and improve efficiency" (high score). Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security managers are clearly identified in Coast Guard's chain of command from headquarters, down to the field (sector) level. Coast Guard also has mechanisms in place to hold its program partners fully accountable for performance. The best example is in Coast Guard's security regulation enforcement of the private sector, including ship and port facility owners. Maritime Transportation Security Act inspections results are reported in the Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement database, which enables Coast Guard managers to track the schedule and success of Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security Program efforts as well as the level of noncompliance on the part of regulated entities. Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circulars (NVIC) help to increase efficiency by explaining to the public and local Coast Guard Captains of the Port how compliance is to be assessed, how inspections are to be ordered to correctly reflect the intent of the regulation, and how efforts are to focus on gaining compliance rather than simply issuing fines. The use of the NVICs is instrumental in publicizing to all parties the expected baseline performance results and anticipated schedules and actions.

Evidence: ?? Sample Officer Evaluation for a PWCS manager ?? Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circulars at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nvic/

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: Coast Guard obligates substantially all (over 99%) of its operating funds (Operating Expense Appropriation) each year. Virtually all capital acquisition funds (Acquisition, Construction, and Improvement Appropriation) are obligated prior to expiring. Coast Guard's Office of Resource Management enforces the provisions of Commandant Instruction M7100.3 (series), Financial Resources Management Manual, which specifies quarterly spending rates and funding carry over limits. Obligation rates are tracked bi-weekly by Coast Guard's Office of Resource Management.

Evidence: ?? Quarterly spend down rates are enforced in accordance with the Financial Resource Management Manual, COMDTINST M7100.3 (series) ?? Estimated Obligations 15 March 2006

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: Coast Guard developed an efficiency measure for the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) Program that synthesizes the Program's annual outcomes (the estimated amount of risk reduction) with the cost to execute the program, adjusted for the effects of inflation. This measure has been incorporated into the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Future Year Homeland Security Program budget and planning database. The measure was baselined for Fiscal Year 2005. The PWCS program is dedicated to making investments in technology that improve the efficiency of operations and outcome delivery. The National Automated Identification System is a good example. By automatically and visibly identifying vessels that do not pose a threat from among thousands of vessels on America's waterways, Coast Guard efficiently focuses its effort, attention, and resources on a smaller, more critical subset of potential threats. The Coast Guard has also invested in program-specific technology improvements that enhance efficiency. Based on suggestions from program managers, the Coast Guard has developed a web-based scorecard to enable improved performance tracking. This system has been established throughout the Atlantic Command, and the Coast Guard plans to implement it throughout the Pacific Command in the near future.

Evidence: ?? PWCS Efficiency Measure and Targets ?? Extract from Department of Homeland Security Management Directive 1400 (Joint Requirements Council) ?? National Automated Identification System Brief

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: Coast Guard's Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) Program consistently engages internally and externally with related programs in a meaningful, collaborative manner to develop synergy and leverage capabilities across the international, Federal, state and local levels to improve security and reduce risk. Collaboration among related mission programs is evident in the promulgation of Mission Planning Guidance (Fiscal Year 2006 Mission Planning Guidance), which sets priorities and resource hour ceilings for each operational mission, in Operation Neptune Shield Operations Order, which establishes PWCS standards alongside other mission requirements, and in the establishment and oversight of PWCS-related regulatory requirements. Coast Guard's external collaboration with Federal partners occurs on many fronts, both within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and outside of it. Examples include the following: ?? Participated in the interagency Risk Management Working Group, which prioritized various threat streams and documented agency actions to counter them ?? Participated in an interagency Working Group to identify current and future agency initiatives to counter heightened risks during 2004-2005. ?? Participated in Petroleum Security Working Group discussions convened when the energy sector was unusually vulnerable to disruption (e.g., post-hurricane) ?? Engaged in interagency collaboration leading to the development of the National Strategy for Maritime Security and supporting plans. ?? When a maritime nexus exists, supports the Secret Service during National Special Security Events and DHS during a Special Event, Homeland Security ?? Interacts with the International Maritime Organization and led the effort to construct a common port security regulatory regime which resulted in the promulgation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Coast Guard visits foreign ports and collaborates with their governments in verifying ISPS Code compliance ?? Participates in Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Container Security Initiative (CSI) assessments by providing technical expertise in port security. Coast Guard also provides CBP with feedback on country visits so that CBP can better target cargo from various countries. In the field, the PWCS Program collaborates with CBP as a partner agency in the ports to share advance notice of arrival and departure of vessels, cargo inspection information, and security measures ?? Participates in the maritime portion of security vulnerability and consequence assessments of nuclear power plants and clusters of chemical facilities. This effort is conducted jointly with the DHS Risk Management Division, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Additionally, the Program is a partner in the DHS Office of Grants and Training's Port Security Grant Program. This effort, which also involves the Maritime Administration, helps insure that grant funding reaches the most appropriate recipients to best buy down security risk in ports. The PWCS Program collaborates with a number of other key programs like the State Department's Export Control and Border Security, the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force, and TSA's fielding of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential. ?? At the Coast Guard Sector level in the field, Area Maritime Security Committees incorporate expertise and representation from local and state agencies and facilitate cooperation in the tactical deployment of security measures. This results in layered port security. Efforts are port-specific and involve cooperation such as joint security enforcement by Coast Guard, local and state marine police forces, joint command centers, and information sharing.

Evidence: ?? Examples of results of internal collaboration: ?? Fiscal Year 2006 Mission Planning Guidance ?? Operation Neptune Shield Operations Order ?? Examples of results of external Headquarters level collaboration: ?? Strategic Threat and Action Report (STAR): concise report, provided to the President ?? Interagency Security Plans for 2004 and 2005: Two reports, which comprehensively catalogued agency initiatives (ongoing and future) ?? National Strategy for Maritime Security and its 8 supporting plans:  Domestic Outreach Plan  The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan  Maritime Transportation System Security Recommendations  National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness  Maritime Commerce Security Plan  Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan  International Outreach and Coordination Strategy  Maritime Operation Threat Response ?? Examples of results of external local collaboration: ?? G-8 Conference, Democratic & Republican National Conventions, Superbowl, Top Officials Exercise 3 ?? International Ship and Port Security Code - product of Coast Guard work at the International Maritime Organization ?? Chemical Comprehensive Review Fact Sheet ?? 2005 Port Security Grant Guidance ?? Transportation Worker Identification Card (Available when published in the Federal Register approximately May 1, 2006) ?? 33 CFR 103 Subpart C - specifies requirements for multi-agency/industry Area Maritime Security Committees and Area Maritime Security Plans ?? Substantial stakeholder participation in Area Maritime Security exercises

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General assigned Coast Guard 10 Material Weaknesses for financial reporting during the Fiscal Year 2005 Chief Financial Officer Audit. These audit results contributed to DHS receiving a disclaimer opinion on their Fiscal Year 2005 financial statements. In each of these 10 Material Weakness areas, Coast Guard processes do not comply with required reporting standards. In particular, Financial Management and Oversight, Financial Systems, and Financial Reporting are Coast Guard-wide Material Weaknesses that impact all programs. Coast Guard shares DHS's goal of clearing all Material Weaknesses by Fiscal Year 2007 and is engaged in an aggressive plan to address and correct all known issues. For managerial cost information, Coast Guard has a well-developed cost assignment system that meets or exceeds the standards for Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards # 4.

Evidence: ?? 2005 Independent Auditor's Financial Management Report ?? Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2005 Performance and Accountability Report ?? Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2005 Notice of Findings and Recommendations ?? Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2005 Audit Remediation Plan

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: The Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) Program has undergone continuous reassessment and improvement since the day it was defined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Reassessments and improvements have included a 2004 "PWCS Concept of Operations Study" by Anteon Corporation; the establishment of a spiral-program-design-and-refresh cycle intended to continuously update the Program's strategic plan, management objectives, and measures suite; and a recent re-assignment of management responsibilities among Headquarters staff to better align the Program's Prevention (regulatory regime) and Response (operations) roles with field units.

Evidence: ?? PWCS 2.0 Contract Award

Did the program seek and take into account the views of all affected parties (e.g., consumers; large and small businesses; State, local and tribal governments; beneficiaries; and the general public) when developing significant regulations?

Explanation: Coast Guard often exceeds statutory requirements to seek public comment in its regulatory actions. It is part of a culture of engagement that Coast Guard embraces in all Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) issues. Following the events of 9/11, Coast Guard immediately responded to the need for quickly promulgated security regulations. A public meeting and a public workshop were held in January 2002 (66 FR 64898 and 66 FR 65020, respectively) to solicit ideas on the development of maritime security provisions at the International Maritime Organization and to solicit public input on the development of national maritime security regulations. Using this approach, Coast Guard incorporated public comment from the very start of the regulatory development process and helped to shape the series of regulations promulgated to support the objectives of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA). Although the MTSA specifically exempted Coast Guard from the statutory requirement to seek comments, Coast Guard held seven public meetings around the country to gather information for the interim rules and published final rules that were modified, in part, in response to more public comments received on the interim rules. In many cases, rules are substantially changed based on views expressed by the regulated community. For example, Coast Guard revised Notice of Arrival (NOA) reporting requirements for vessels carrying ammonium nitrate in bulk or ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer residue with the publication of the Interim Rule; Notification of Arrival in U.S. Ports; Certain Dangerous Cargoes; Electronic Submission, USCG 2005-19963. This revision was in response to public comments received on the Temporary Rule published by Coast Guard entitled "Notification of Arrival in U.S. Ports; Certain Dangerous Cargoes; Electronic Submission." Coast Guard discussed safety and security concerns with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives and concluded that it was not necessary to require an NOA when a vessel was only carrying such residue. Consequently, the Interim Rule added a definition of certain dangerous cargoes residue that would exempt vessels carrying such residue from NOA reporting requirements and thereby reduced the burden on industry. Similarly, the interim rule on Automatic Identification Systems, Carriage Requirements, was modified , in part due to comments received from fishing vessel owner/operators, when Coast Guard issued the final rule. Coast Guard maintains a web site to encourage and assist interested parties in commenting on regulatory projects. The website includes extensive information about the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Act to foster small business participation in the rulemaking process. Coast Guard also seeks regular input from the marine industry, the States, and the public through Coast Guard-supported forums such as the Chemical Transportation Advisory Committee, Merchant Marine Personnel Advisory Committee, and the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee. Membership in these groups includes industry representatives, the States, national organizations, and the public. The meetings are open to the public and are announced in the Federal Register.

Evidence: ?? Federal Register Notice of Public Meeting, 14 December 2001 ?? Federal Register Notice of Public Meeting, 17 December 2001 ?? Interim Rule, Notification of Arrival in U.S. Ports; Certain dangerous Cargoes; Electronic submission, http://dms.dot.gov, docket number 19963 ?? Evidence Public Law 107-295 Maritime Transportation Security Act ?? Automatic Identification System: Vessel Carriage Requirement, AIS docket #14757 ?? Federal Register Regarding Automatic Identification System: Vessel Carriage Requirement, 1 July 2003 ?? Coast Guard Regulations: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/regs/reghome.html

Did the program prepare adequate regulatory impact analyses if required by Executive Order 12866, regulatory flexibility analyses if required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act and SBREFA, and cost-benefit analyses if required under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act; and did those analyses comply with OMB guidelines?

Explanation: Coast Guard's regulatory development actions are supported by rigorous analyses that clearly identify the impact of proposed rules. Coast Guard evaluates every regulatory action using quantitative cost benefit and willingness-to-pay analyses that meet Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidelines under the A-4 circular (Subject: Regulatory Analysis). In the case of regulations whose benefits are non-quantifiable, Coast Guard utilizes threshold analysis to determine the impact of the regulatory action. In a three-year period (2003-present), OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs reviewed 26 Coast Guard regulatory actions under Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, including both proposed rulemakings and enforceable rules. Of those 26 actions, 18 were found by OMB to be consistent with change and 8 were found to be consistent without change. Over half of the regulatory actions reviewed by OMB in this period were Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security-related. All major planned regulatory actions are analyzed under OMB's guidance, whether or not the rule's anticipated impact is expected to be economically significant under Executive Order 12866. The General Accountability Office noted in a June 2004 report on Maritime Security (GAO-04-838) that while Coast Guard had little time to develop its cost estimates, GAO's more detailed analysis found only a relatively small difference (<15 percent) in the estimated costs of the rule.

Evidence: ?? All benefit/cost analyses associated with each rulemaking that Coast Guard conducts are located in the public docket at http://dms.dot.gov. Some examples follow: o Maritime Transportation Security Act final rule cost/benefit analysis docket #14792 o Notification of Arrival in U.S. Ports, Certain Dangerous Cargoes; Electronic Submission Interim Rule Regulatory Analysis docket #19963 o Merchant Mariners Licenses and Certificate of Registry; http://dms.dot.gov, docket number, 17455 o Merchant Mariners Documents; http://dms.dot.gov, docket number, 14500 ?? GAO report 04-838 (Appendix III): http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04838.pdf. ?? Federal Register Interim Rule With Request for Comments Regarding Notification of Arrival in U.S. Ports, Certain Dangerous Cargoes, Electronic Submission, 16 December 2005 ?? Federal Register Interim Rule With Request for Comments Regarding Merchant Marine Licenses and Certificate of Registry, Electronic Submission, 13 January 2006 ?? Federal Register Interim Rule With Request for Comments Regarding Merchant Marine Documents and Certificate of Registry, Electronic Submission, 06 January 2004 ?? Federal Register Temporary Interim Rule With Request for Comments and Notice of Meeting Regarding Implementation of National Maritime Security Initiatives, 1 July 2003 ?? Federal Register Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Salvage and Marine Firefighting Requirements; Vessel Response Plans for Oil 10 May 2002 ?? Federal Register Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Tank Vessel Response Plans for Hazardous Substances 22 March 1999 ?? Federal Register Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Notice of Public Meeting Regarding Marine Transportation-Related Facility Response Plans for Hazardous Substances 31 March 2000

Are the regulations designed to achieve program goals, to the extent practicable, by maximizing the net benefits of its regulatory activity?

Explanation: Coast Guard regulations are implemented, in part, as a result of continuing improvements to the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security Program. Rulemaking includes a cost benefit analysis, an analysis of the impact on small entities, and an analysis of the burden of information collection, where applicable. Regulations are prevention-focused with enforcement provisions designed to reduce the need for response. In general, prevention-related requirements offer far greater benefits relative to their costs than response-oriented requirements. Coast Guard looks carefully at each component of a draft regulation, using incremental analysis, benefit/cost analysis, and the development of analysis of alternatives in accordance with OMB Circular A-4 to maximize benefits across the entire rule.

Evidence: ?? 33 CFR Parts 101, 104, 105, 120, and 128 Cruise Ship Security Measures ?? Examples of workplans - Cruise Ship Security Measures ?? 33 CFR Part 104-- Maritime Security: Vessels (Notification of Arrival in U.S. Ports; Certain Dangerous Cargoes; Electronic Submission, USCG-2004-19963) ?? 33 CFR Part 105-- Maritime Security: Facilities (Notification of Arrival in U.S. Ports; Certain Dangerous Cargoes; Electronic Submission, USCG-2004-19963) ?? 33 CFR Part 160-- Ports and Waterways Safety-General (Notification of Arrival in U.S. Ports; Certain Dangerous Cargoes; Electronic Submission, USCG-2004-19963) ?? 33 CFR Part 160-- Ports and Waterways Safety-General (Vessel Requirements for Notices of Arrival and Departure, and Carriage of Automatic Identification System, USCG-2005-21869) ?? 33 CFR Part 161-- Vessel Traffic Management (Vessel Requirements for Notices of Arrival and Departure, and Carriage of Automatic Identification System, USCG-2005-21869) ?? 33 CFR Part 164-- Navigation Safety Regulations (Vessel Requirements for Notices of Arrival and Departure, and Carriage of Automatic Identification System, USCG-2005-21869) ?? 33 CFR Part 165-- Regulated Navigation Areas and Limited Access Areas (Vessel Requirements for Notices of Arrival and Departure, and Carriage of Automatic Identification System, USCG-2005-21869) ?? 33 CFR Part 155??(Salvage and Marine Firefighting Requirements; Vessel Response Plans for Oil USCG-1998-3417) ?? 33 CFR Part 155??(Tank Vessel Response Plans for Hazardous Substances USCG-1998-4354) ?? 33 CFR Part 154??(Marine Transportation-Related Facility Response Plans for Hazardous Substances USCG-1999-5705)

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: Because the program measures for the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) Program are relatively new, it is impossible to gauge whether the Coast Guard has been able to achieve long-term progress toward achieving its goals. However, the program appears to be achieving results, and its long-term goal of reducing maritime risk is an innovative approach to quantifying the performance of a program whose effectiveness is difficult to measure. The PWCS program baselined its long-term performance measures in Fiscal Year 2005. Coast Guard set aggressive long-term performance goals for future maritime domain risk reduction despite the forecast of increased maritime risk due to terrorism. The PWCS Program is on track to meet or exceed its long-term performance goals. Program partners are committed to PWCS' long-term performance goals. Program partner performance is reflected in Coast Guard's long-term performance measures. One example is the success Coast Guard has had in engaging port and industry partners on required Security Plans. The measures were designed to reflect, in part, the performance of program partners. The Department of Homeland Security has not defined a desired end-state for maritime terrorism risk reduction. Consistent with its mandate, Coast Guard will continue to drive down terror-related risk in the maritime domain as much as possible without negatively impacting industry, commerce, or the liberties of the boating public.

Evidence: ?? PWCS Long-Term Outcome Measures and Targets

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: Since most of the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) Program's annual measures are reported on a quarterly basis, performance goals have also been set for each quarter. The Program is on track to meet 6 of 8 non-demand-driven annual performance goals. Coast Guard sets goals high with the understanding that local operational commanders will often need to prioritize limited resources based on risk, which may mean not achieving targets. Although Coast Guard baselined these data for official program measurement purposes only recently, performance against the standard in most cases has trended upward since the 4th quarter of Fiscal Year 2005.

Evidence: ?? PWCS Annual Measures and Targets

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: The Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) Program baselined its overall efficiency measure in Fiscal Year 2005 and has set targets of efficiency that begin increasing in Fiscal Year 2010 when program risk-reduction performance is expected to begin "taking off" as a result of the anticipated fruits of current investments. Several examples demonstrate the Program's success in improving efficiency in the near term. The first round of security plan review, which covered 10,000 vessels and 3,200 facilities, required the support of contractor personnel to deal with the initial surge of submitted plans. Since then, however, Coast Guard has been able to build on efficiencies created during that period to greatly reduce the manpower necessary to perform these reviews and, in the case of facilities, to eliminate the entire cost of contractor support by delegating complete review and approval authority to local Captains of the Ports (COTPs). This efficiency was realized through clear and consistent guidance provided to COTPs that keeps the review process uniform while distributing the workload over the entire Coast Guard system. Likewise, Coast Guard has been involved in an effort with the Transportation Security Administration to develop a Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) for the maritime worker population. As part of this effort, Coast Guard is also exploring efficiencies to be gained by combining Coast Guard's merchant mariner documents with the TWIC to avoid any additional burden on the mariner population while exploiting the efficiencies gained through a single system of vetting and identification. Coast Guard intends to merge these documents as program design moves forward.

Evidence: ?? PWCS Efficiency Measure and Targets ?? SITREP 19 Regulated MTSA Facility Security ?? Transportation Worker Identification Card (Available when published in the Federal Register approximately May 1, 2006)

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: Although there is anecdotal evidence that the Coast Guard's PWCS program is well-regarded by the international community, there is no empirical evidence that the program's performance compares favorably with similar ones. There are several examples of Coast Guard participation and influence on other countries' port security regimes, and portions of the regulations developed by the Coast Guard to support the Maritime Transportation Security Act were largely duplicated as part of the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) code. It will be important, however, as the PWCS program matures, that the Coast Guard conduct rigorous, data-based benchmarking studies that compare its performance in mitigating maritime risk with that of other countries.

Evidence: ?? GAO-06-91, Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure, 15 December 2005

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: The Coast Guard has been exceptionally responsive to recommendations for program improvements issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). When GAO has highlighted programmatic deficiencies or vulnerabilities, the Coast Guard has moved swiftly to remediate the identified problems. However, there have not been any independent reviews of programmatic performance that indicate whether or how the program is achieving results, and the Coast Guard does not plan to conduct one for the PWCS program until 2009. While the Coast Guard should be commended for its flexibility in implementing programmatic changes, it needs to continue to develop analytical methods and processes that provide routine and objective feedback to program managers.

Evidence: ?? In September, 2003, GAO released a report, "Progress Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain." As a result, Coast Guard significantly increased the number of ports covered by the Automatic Identification System (AIS) from 13 in 2004 to 27 in February 2006. Additionally, port assessment tools used by Coast Guard have been modified to correct limitations in the early version of the assessment tool. ?? In June, 2004, GAO released a report, "Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security." Despite concerns expressed in this report regarding large numbers of vessel and facility security plans to be submitted, Coast Guard was successful in reviewing and approving plan submissions. ?? In December, 2005, GAO released a report, "Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructures." GAO said that "USCG established a foundation for applying risk management to port security, making progress in all five phases of risk management. Its next challenges are to refine and strengthen its approach." Subsequent to this report, refinements to Coast Guard's risk-management approach were pursued in several areas, e.g., development of an enhanced port assessment tool (MSRAM), refinement of OP Neptune Shield OPORD, and development of an outcome measure that reflects overall risk reduction in the MTS.

Were programmatic goals (and benefits) achieved at the least incremental societal cost and did the program maximize net benefits?

Explanation: Coast Guard's rulemaking culture is institutionalized to the point that our rulemaking actions, including review of the necessity for the rulemaking, consideration of alternatives, rigorous analysis of impacts, and feedback from the regulated public, inherently and consistently seek to find a balance between our statutory responsibilities and the costs and benefits to society. Coast Guard routinely conducts cost/benefit analyses of its regulatory proposals, even when not required to do so by Executive Order 12866. Several cost benefit analyses of regulatory proposals that became final regulations follow: ?? Coast Guard's Automated Information System (AIS) Carriage Requirements regulations were considered a "significant regulatory action" per Executive Order 12866, were reviewed by the OMB, and included a complete cost/benefit analysis. ?? Although not considered "economically significant," Coast Guard's "Notification of Arrival in U.S. Ports, Certain Dangerous Cargoes, Electronic Submission Interim Rule" was reviewed by OMB under Executive Order 12866 and included a complete cost/benefit analysis in the Regulatory Assessment. ?? Coast Guard Merchant Mariners Licenses and Certificate of Registry was reviewed on March 8, 2005, by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and designated the rulemaking a "significant regulatory action" under E.O. 12866. The Electronic Submission Interim Rule included a complete cost/benefit analysis in the Regulatory Assessment. In addition, section 610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act requires periodic review of regulations that have substantial economic impact on a significant number of small entities. Coast Guard periodically reviews Code of Federal Regulation Parts to identify any regulations covered by this requirement.

Evidence: ?? Automatic Identification System: Vessel Carriage Requirement, AIS docket #14757 ?? Notification of Arrival in U.S. Ports, Certain Dangerous Cargoes, Electronic Submission docket #19963 ?? Merchant Mariners Licenses and Certificate of Registry, Electronic Submission docket #17455 ?? Section 610 reviews.