Detailed Information on the
Non-Security Embassy Construction Program Assessment

OBO will establish new measures, indicators and improvement plans that reflect the current situational needs of the program, contingent upon receipt of funding.

The State Department will reexamine the mission and purpose of the program as compared to the security construction program in order to determine that these programs are complimentary rather than duplicative.

Projects being constructed in war-zones, or hostile environments often face unpredictable challenges related to security, equipment and staff as well as funding particularly if contracts are not fixed-price. State Department will work to continue to pursue fixed-price contracts in order to meet contracting and funding goals set at the commencement of a project.

The State Department will create new performance measures and goals specifically tailored to this program in order to differentiate it further from the Security Construction program.

Measure: Ratio construction management costs to Long Range Overseas Buildings Plan construction project costs over $25M

Explanation:Luanda NEC was only Regular/Asset Management (Non-Security) capital construction project completed in FY 2005 on which to base efficiency results.

Measure: Number of regular capital construction projects completed (within construction timeframes) following construction contract awards as scheduled in the Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP)

Explanation:

Measure: New building sites acquired for regular/asset management capital construction projects

Explanation:

Measure: Number of regular/asset management capital construction projects awarded IAW the LROBP . The number of projects is based on OMB and Congressional approval of specific projects and the cost associated with each project. There are years where no projects are approved and therefore no funding is appropriated for this program.

Explanation:

Measure: Complete regular/asset management capital construction projects within the approved construction budget

Explanation:

Measure: Complete regular/asset management capital construction projects within the schedule authorized in the construction contract

Explanation:

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: Projects in this program differ in four ways from those in the Capital Security Construction Program: (1) they are required primarily for non-security reasons (e.g., when facility needs are related to re-establishing relations with a country or existing facilities are woefully inadequate); (2) the facilities are not on the list of the top 80 posts to receive security construction funds; (3) they will not be funded under the inter-agency cost-sharing program; and (4) their funding sources will be regular capital appropriations, or supplemental appropriations, or asset management proceeds. The latter refers to proceeds of sale derived from OBO's vigorous asset management program. With congressional support, between this and the Capital Security Construction Program, all major new capital construction requirements can be met. The clear purpose of this program is to ensure that essential capital requirements, expected and unexpected, can be funded and executed.

Evidence: a. Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926 (P.L. 69-186), as amended b. OBO Mission Statement e. Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan, FY04-09 f. FY2004 Bureau Performance Plan g. Dept FY04 Performance Plan (DPP) sss. FY 2005 Budget Request eeee. OBO Stewardship Report (2003) BPP Evidence: A/S Statement:

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest or need?

Explanation: This program's objective is to provide overseas posts with feasible, urgently needed facilities that are as functional, safe, and secure as possible. Although not all projects fit the criteria for capital security appropriations, they are still critically necessary, provide essentially the same benefits, and are similarly treated in OBO's Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP) that clearly presents the particular need for each project and how desired results will be achieved. The German Government move to Berlin, for example, dictated the need for a new chancery; and proceeds of sale from properties in Germany and Seoul were used for this purpose. Proceeds from worldwide sources were applied to construct new facilities in Luanda, and Dili, while supplemental appropriations were provided for Kabul, and nearby Dushanbe, Tajikistan. As noted in 1.1 above, this program fulfills a need for a category of projects, and each project overcomes exisiting, specific problems.

Evidence: See Sec. 1, Q 1 c - i j. Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, 6/85 k. Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act of 1985 m. America's Overseas Presence in the 21st Century, Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP), 11/99 e. LROBP (FY04-09) BPP Evidence: A/S Statement:

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: This program is similar to the DOS Capital Security Construction Program, in that both fulfill many of the same objectives and are carried out in essentially the same way. State DEpartment does their best to assure that these programs are complementary rather than duplicative. And, each is driven by different Congressional requirements that, together, satisfy the Department's overseas major facilities needs. However, they are constructing facilities using the same designs, models and staff. The DOS overseas capital programs do not overlap with programs of other Government entities. The Department of Defense has an overseas facilities program, but DOD buildings are separate from those on diplomatic posts. USAID has received funding to place buildings on a few embassy compounds, but these are constructed by OBO and planned and synchronized between USAID and OBO, with annual State-USAID Strategic Plans and a recently formed Joint Management Council. USAID buildings pose no danger of duplications or overlaps. There are no other overseas construction programs of the nature of that carried out by OBO.

Evidence: a. Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926 (P.L. 69-186), as amended zzz. STATE 268997 on DOS-USAID Joint Strategic Plan sss. OBO FY 2005 Budget Request ffff.DOS-USAID Joint Mgt Council (JMC) business plan e. LROBP (FY04-09) BPP Evidence: A/S Statement:

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: Beginning in 2001, based on its new Director's extensive experience and knowledge of key industry best practices, OBO underwent a major reorganization; made extensive, corresponding procedural improvements; and had a period of further refinements. While all OBO programs have benefited, the central focus was to enable OBO to effectively and efficiently execute the greatly expanding capital construction program that came in the wake of the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa. Regardless of funding source (security, regular, and supplemental appropriations or asset-management proceeds) all capital projects, have shared in the successful push to lower project costs, accelerate schedules, and produce superior products based on improved program design, superior planning, and enhanced execution methodologies. Thus, potential major flaws have been eliminated, and the program is progressing with superior levels of effectiveness and efficiency.

Evidence: y. New Org. Chart (eliminate previous deficiencies) ii. "What's New in OBO (The Pillars)", examples of new strategies to overcome past deficiencies aaa. OBO Director/COO memo on mandatory COR training (example of solving a particular deficiency in program). List of cap construction projects completed since FY01 and proj in construction cccc. Comments at 4/22/04 IAP mtg by Derish Wolfe (Chairman, Burger Group Holdings) on OBO excellent effectiveness eeee. Stewardship Report 2003 gggg. OMB Circular A-11 (part 3) - Cap programming guide BPP Evidence: A/S Statement:

Is the program effectively targeted, so that resources will reach intended beneficiaries and/or otherwise address the program's purpose directly?

Explanation: The program's purpose is clearly articulated in OBO's LROBP, with the specific need, nature, and benefits of each project spelled out in detail. The annual LROBP updates are, in turn, the products of wide-ranging intra-Departmental and inter-agency coordination to ensure that funding requests are optimally planned and directed at the highest priorities. Based on OBO budget request documents that provide full project rationales and the expected results, extensive consultations are then carried out with OMB and the Congress. These usually result in some corresponding changes to the published LROBP, as also occurs when international events or particular in-country situations dictate the need for changes. These wide-ranging consultations, along with growth in the program and OBO's improvements in its organizational capabilities, have produced a situation in which projects are highly visible, meticulously planned, closely scrutinized, and precisely targeted.

Evidence: e. LROBP FY2004-09 sss. OBO FY 2005 Budget Req. List of capital construction projects completed since FY2001and projects currently in construction BPP Evidence: A/S Statement:

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The program is designed to improve the capacity to perform foreign policy work in appropriate, functional, safety-hazard free facilities and to provide greater protection for overseas employees and intelligence. Success is linked to major, specific measurements: (1) acquiring sites for facilities according to OBO's LROBP; (2) completing projects on schedule and (3) within budget. These limited, very meaningful indicators are complemented by OBO's comprehensive performance measures that range from macro- to micro-levels (individual performance) and cover initial planning through post-occupancy evaluation. The relevant measures and outcomes remain fixed, and the associated projects generally are projected in six-year increments in the LROBP (with unexpected, emergency projects assigned to this dynamic program sometimes being outside of the annually updated LROBP).

Evidence: e. Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP) FY 2004-2009) ll. Performance Measures for a Results-Based Organization eeee. Stewardship Report 2003 BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: Goal Paper I/P#5

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: Performance targets are ambitious and the program's "fast track" projects entail tight timeframes. With one FY04 completion, three ongoing projects, and ten more planned for funding and construction awards before the end of FY08, the 14-project total will exceed the number of capital projects built by OBO's predecessor organization in the FY95-99 period. Then too, targets become increasingly ambitious with unexpected facility requirements, such as when a new nation emerges or diplomatic ties are renewed. Kabul, for example, was an emergent requirement and designated by Congress as an immediate need in the "War on Terrorism." The program has shown that it has a "surge capability" to handle such projects. Overall, with quality standards, much tighter execution timeframes and cost controls, and an expanding number of projects (some located in the most difficult environments), this is a highly ambitious program.

Evidence: e. Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP) ll. Performance Measures for a Results-Based Organization eeee. Stewardship report 2003 ffff. DOS-USAID Joint Mgt Council business plan references to number of new USAID projects in next five years BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: Goal Paper I/P#5

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: From OBO's comprehensive annual performance goals, as described in its 75-page "Performance Measures for a Results-Based Organization," a limited number of key goals have been selected to demonstrate progress in the Capital Security Construction Program. These are to award contracts on time in accordance with the LROBP, to complete projects on schedule and within budgets, and to acquire sites for capital projects per the LROBP timetable. These discrete, quantifiable goals clearly represent meaningful measurements of progress. With acquisition of sites being a prerequisite for subsequent construction of facilities, for example, these sequential achievements indicate critical progression towards next steps in the upcoming target periods. The goal for awarding actual construction or design-build contracts is the clearest indicator of progress, with execution within budget and schedule goals being two central measures of efficiency.

Evidence: e. Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP) ll. Performance Measures for a Results-Based Organization BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: Goal Paper I/P#5

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: In six-year increments, OBO's LROBP provides baselines, targets, and other key data on each project. To these must be added unforeseen critical requirements such as Kabul and Dushanbe. Contracts with design/construction firms subsequently provide detailed project timelines. Measurement takes place weekly in project status sessions and monthly in project performance reviews that stress strict adherence to targets, throughout the overall planning/execution process, accompanied by constant attention to keeping projects on accelerated schedules and controlling costs. The ambitious nature of this program can be seen in its relationship with the Department's Capital Security Construction Program. The regular/asset management program funds capital requirements that, because of their nature and special circumstances, do not become capital security projects. This program will sizably add to the number of new NECs being constructed this decade.

Evidence: e. Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP) xxx. FY 2005 Dept. Performance Report (DPP) and FY 2005 BPP; baselines and performance measures yyy. OBO Bugle (2004 No. 1) BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: Goal Paper I/P#5

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: DOS bureaus, tenant agencies, and overseas posts are frequently consulted and provide input to the Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP) to ensure that all parties are committed to the goals and objectives of the program and that all are "on the same page" as to requirements and intended end results. The LROBP is constantly reviewed and, at the same time, planning and implementing data is collected, monitored, and updated quarterly in OBO's comprehensive Post Data Book. This broad intra- and inter-agency collaboration is evident in integrated design reviews (IDRs) and during all aspects of construction. Contractors become committed to projects by their contract terms and understanding of the goals reflected in the statements of work, as well as through participation in IDRs, value engineering studies, partnering sessions with OBO officials, and joint problem-solving efforts.

Evidence: q. Bureau/tenant agency input to the LROBP r. Integrated Design Review (IDR) process description gg. Cables that illustrate typical post involvement in planning for new construction projects kkk. OBO Post Data Book, 6/03" yyy. OBO Bugle (2204 No. 1) eeee. Stewardship Report 2003 kkkk. Integrated Planning Review (IPR) BPP Evidence: A/S Statement:

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The Inspector General (OIG), overseas posts, and outsiders (other agencies, GAO, and Congress) play extensive roles to ensure comprehensive appraisals. OIG/GAO reviewed the program several times and conducted numerous site visits. External agencies and others contribute to periodic revisions of the Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP) priorities and individual project plans. Value Engineering contractors, an Industry Advisory Board, and an Interagency Facilities Committee, as well as other outside groups, evaluate the effectiveness of the program and provide valuable information to assist in making program improvements. Post personnel rate the buildings during OBO-conducted post-occupancy evaluations. GAO and the DOS OIG have commented favorably on this multi-phase collaboration and accomplishments. Further reviews by these auditing entities of aspects of the program are ongoing.

Evidence: q. Bureau/tenant agency input (sample) to the LROBP r. Integrated Design Review (IDR) Process description u. Accreditation review procedures (MOU with DS) v. Post-occupancy evaluation sample (Ottawa) z. Project Performance Review (PPR) nnn. GAO testimony before Cmte On For. Relations 3/20/03 ppp. Test. Of Acting State IG on 4/7/03 before Govt Reform Subcmte on National Security

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: OBO emphasizes budget and performance integration, and this is especially the case for capital projects. Usually, a one-and-one-half page business case is provided for each project in the budget request to explain why it is needed, what will be accomplished, and how much each major component will cost. Budget requests are supported by the more extensive project descriptions in the LROBP, which serves as a background information budget document, and frequently by full-fledged project briefings. Those approving OBO funding end up knowing exactly what the funds are intended to purchase and how they fit into the Department's annual and long-term goals. Furthermore, once OBO became a results-based organization, adherence to declared project schedules and budgets has become a central, ongoing concern. To, to an unprecedented degree, what was transparently proposed has proven to be the final nature/cost of the project.

Evidence: e. LROBP h. FY03 OBO budget x. Financial Plan 4/1/02 & 8/9/02 (showing adjustments related to changed conditions) sss. FY 2005 OBO Budget Request bbbb. FY 2006 OBO Budget Submission Guidance 3/2/2004 BPP Evidence: A/S Statement:

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: OBO has undergone a thorough organizational restructuring and a sweeping, accountability-centered revamping of procedures and corporate culture to address previously identified planning deficiencies. OBO has made a commitment to planning to attain more effective operations. The LROBP, with other information, lays out a detailed, six-year road map for the Capital Construction Program (with current plan covering FY04-09). The plan receives input from OBO clients and stakeholders and ensures all parties are "on the same page" in planning for new capital security construction projects. Other improvements to the overall planning process include using regular weekly and monthly project reviews in which top management determines the ongoing effectiveness of OBO's planning efforts and make any needed adjustments; and the development of comprehensive Project Analysis Packages that provide project scopes, schedules, budgets, concepts, and execution plans.

Evidence: e. OBO Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP) f. BBP Overview (incls. organizational strategies) r. Integrated Design Review Process y. OBO organization chart z. Monthly Project Performance Review (PPR) example hh. OBO Industry Day charts ii. "What's New in OBO" (pillars) kk. Program Assessment briefing charts (re prior deficiencies) mm. GAO 1/01 Rpt.: Embassy Construction Requires Better Long-Term Planning ddd. Industry Advisory Panel, brief description eee. Standard Embassy Design Description" BPP Evidence: A/S Statement:

Has the agency/program conducted a recent, meaningful, credible analysis of alternatives that includes trade-offs between cost, schedule, risk, and performance goals and used the results to guide the resulting activity?

Explanation: Blue-ribbon panels and congressional committees in the 80s and 90s, having extensively examined overseas facilities requirements, established the general nature of the program. Within these parameters, analyses of alternative methods are a continual part of the development of comprehensive business cases for each project. Tradeoffs among costs, schedules, performance, and other factors determine priorities and the means for acquiring needed facilities. Decisions on whether to construct new facilities; to lease, build to lease, or direct purchase; to design/build or design/bid/build; or to seek other approaches are examples of analytical decisions involving cost/schedule/risk tradeoffs in meeting performance goals. Because regular capital projects tend to take place in posts with relatively unorthodox site or other conditions, there is a special emphasis on alternatives and innovative solutions, such as a modified design to compensate for the small site size in Luanda.

Evidence: r. Integrated design review (IDR) process description s. Value engineering policy decision memo; VE performance chart; VE study (Sofia) z. Project Performance Review (PPR) 7/30/02, showing Nairobi & Dar es Salaam results cc. "The Business Case, " with Capital Security Project Program examples ee. Telephonic report of construction activities (Zagreb)

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: Posts, DOS regional bureaus, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and tenant agencies participate in developing and prioritizing projects. Once a project begins, feedback from those entities continues'in design reviews and especially from posts during construction (directly to OBO or through regional bureaus). Within OBO, all participating offices and divisions closely monitor program performance and report to the Director/Chief Operating Officer during weekly project status meetings and monthly Project Performance Reviews (PPRs). During construction, on-site project directors also report detailed performance data on a monthly basis. All of these mechanisms are used to collect timely, credible, appropriate performance information that is used to manage and improve the program and individual projects. Performance indicators are also captured through the performance measure process.

Evidence: f. Bureau Performance Plan (BPP) overview g. DOS FY03 Performance Plan (OBO section) z. Program Performance Review (PPR) 7/30/02 example dd. Project Director's monthly report (Abu Dhabi example) aaaa. Weekly "Projects in Planning & Development" report & review BPP Evidence: A/S Statement:

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: OBO project directors are held fully accountable for successful execution and must personally explain project performance to the OBO Director and senior management on a weekly and monthly basis, as noted in question 3.1. Stressing this accountability has been the Director's constant, forcefully emphasized, major focus, and this has included closely linking awards, promotions, and appraisals to relevant performance measures incorporated into each manager's and employee's personal performance standards. In the Guide for Developing NEC Staffing Projections, and as stressed in many forums, all tenant agency staffing estimates for a new facility are run through a multi-layer validation process, with any changes after OMB approval being severely limited and held within the total existing project budgets. Contractors also are held accountable for performance, with satisfactory work affecting payments and satisfactory end results being a prerequisite for participation in future contracts.

Evidence: z. Project Performance Review (7/30/02), showing Nairobi, Tunis, and Dar es Salaam results) jj. "What We Want in Accountability"" ll. "Performance Measures for a Results-Based Organization" rr. Evaluation factors for contract award (incl. evaluations for past performance)

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?

Explanation: Solid evidence for timeliness are the relatively short spans (2-3 months) between Congressional approvals and obligations for project design, design/build, or construction contracts. Some security and project direction expenses are spread throughout the project life cycle, and other costs'such as communications equipment and furniture'come up at appropriate intervals after construction begins. OBO has obligated funds in regular, sequential, timely steps, with the existence of unobligated balances reflecting project phase, not the lack of well-timed obligations. OBO's finishing projects on schedule demonstrates that post-construction contract award obligations have been timely. Once appropriations are made, and subsequent project-by-project congressional approvals have been obtained, OBO has obligated funds expeditiously and has maintained detailed documentation that all funds were spent for the intended purposes.

Evidence: z. Project Performance Reviews (PPRs) showing obligations against capital projects cccc. OBO financial accounting records eeee. Stewardship Report 2003

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: OBO comprehensively utilizes incentives and procedures to improve value per dollar. The most cost-effective solution for providing facilities is chosen (see question 2 CA1). For new construction, standard embassy designs (SEDs) are used. This saves money by using a proven model and reducing design requirements to post-specific adaptations. The contract award process predominantly uses fixed-price, design/build contracts that maximize competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, speed, and risk reduction. There are also intensive value engineering efforts to gain the needed functionality at reduced cost, and the use of other best practices, such the Project Definition Rating Index tool developed by the Construction Industry Institute, to improve project planning. Finally, progress is carefully scrutinized at every step of the process in regular, senior-management-level weekly and monthly meetings where efficiencies, effectiveness, and costs are continually scrutinized.

Evidence: s. Value engineering documentation/study v. Post-occupancy evaluation rr. Evaluation factors for awarding contracts ss. Solicitations re using fixed-price, design-build for standard embassy design projects, using one contractor for multiple projects (4 greater efficiency/lower cost strategies) aaa. OBO Director/COO's memo on mandatory COR training eee. Standard Embasy Design description yyy. OBO Bugle (2004 No. 1)

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation:  

Evidence:  

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: In recent annual audits of the Department of State's principal financial statements and controls, neither OBO nor its capital construction programs received any critical statements. OBO has instituted comprehensive procedures to ensure that payments are made properly for intended purposes and in accordance with prompt payment requirements. The Department's financial and OBO's voucher tracking systems have controls that prohibit duplicate payments. All Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs)are required to take 40 hours of COR training, with periodic updating sessions, that emphasize the handling of design and construction contracts. Performance measures have been established for the timely payment of invoices and the elimination of interest payments. These are reported on in the monthly in Project Performance Reviews, and they are reflected in individual performance standards.

Evidence: zz. Department of State Accountability Reports for FY01 (Independent Auditor's Report section) aaa. OBO Director/COO's memo on mandatory COR training ccc. PPR 8/2/02, Vendor Payments Processing Analysis ddd. Industry Advisory Panel, brief description jjj. Vendor Payment Approval and Processing Procedures "

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: Since March 2001, as a new bureau, OBO has undergone a thorough restructuring and a sweeping, accountability-centered revamping of procedures to address previous management deficiencies identified in numerous reports. For example the 1/01 GAO criticism about the quality of long-range planning has been amply answered by the creation of a multi-division office to provide integrated, expert planning and development of OBO's Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan that lays out a detailed map for the program. Other management improvements include making explicit, detailed business cases for major decisions; developing OBO-wide performance measures for programs, projects, and individuals; managing risk better by using the International Project Risk Assessment tool and requiring two independent cost estimates for all capital projects; and holding all program managers strictly accountable in weekly and monthly meetings chaired by OBO's Director.

Evidence: e. OBO Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP) f. BPP overview (incls. organizational strategies) r. Integrated Design Review Process y. OBO organization chart z. Monthly Program Performance Review (PPR) example hh. OBO Industry Day charts "What's New in OBO" (pillars) kk. Program Assessment briefing slides (re: addressing prior deficiencies) mm. GAO 1/01 Report:Embassy Construction Requires Better Long-Term Planning

Is the program managed by maintaining clearly defined deliverables, capability/performance characteristics, and appropriate, credible cost and schedule goals?

Explanation: OBO's extensive LROBP development process comprehensively and clearly defines capital project characteristics, with security aspects conforming to intelligence community standards and facility needs being determined with input by USG stakeholders. Performance requirements for deliverables (embassies, consulates, etc.) undergo additional adjustments at budget request time. Project statements of work describe the quality and performance expected from potential contractors, who share risks with performance-based, fixed-price agreements. Competitive procurements and negotiations further define requirements, including cost/schedule calculations and execution strategies based on Project Analysis Packages, Standard Embassy Designs, and OBO Architectural & Engineering Embassy Design Guidelines. At each stage'planning, design, and construction'projects are closely monitored in weekly and monthly review sessions for cost, schedule, and other key performance indicators.

Evidence: e. OBO Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP) qq. Project Analysis Package (Yaounde 7/02)--project justifications, details, and cost/schedule goals tt. Statement of Work (Kabul) abbreviated sample eee. Architectural & Engineering Design Guidelines for U.S. Diplomatic Mission Buildings qqq. Project Requirement Review Sessions (Examples: planning and design - Algiers, Jerusalem, Moscow) - June 2, 2003 rrr. Project Requirements Review Sessions (Examples: construction - Bridgetown, Cape Town, S??o Paulo) - June 2, 2003

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: The Program's goal is to provide urgently needed facilities not funded by the Capital Security Construction Program. Before the 1998 embassy bombings, all capital projects were in this program. With the post-bombings focus on security projects, however, a pre-bombing funding hiatus continued for other capital projects until the contract award for Luanda (9/01) followed by awards for Dushanbe (9/02), Kabul (9/02), and Dili (1/03). Berlin is on schedule for a 9/04 award, with another 9 awards to be made before end-FY08. All awards, plus needed site acquisitions, were made on or ahead of schedule; Dili was completed on budget and 2 months early. As noted in 4.2, Kabul (under extraordinary conditions) is late and over early cost estimates, and Luanda (with a small, difficult-to-build-on site) and Dushanbe (with a contractor struggling with difficult challenges of construction in Tajikistan) are behind schedule. Overall progress, nevertheless, has been excellent.

Evidence: e. OBO Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP) f. Bureau Performance Plan Overview h. & i. & sss: FY03 & 04 & 05 budget requests fff. Program Comparison: Inman Program vs. Current Program. List of capital construction projects completed since FY2001 and currently in construction uuu. STATE 221231Z Apr 04: Dili Cert. of Occupancy dddd. STATE 070710Z Apr 04: Luanda NEC Proj Monthly Rep. eeee. Stewardship Report 2003 BPP Evidence: A/S Statement:

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: OBO's partners (see 2.5) are supportive with project selection/prioritization; determining personnel in planned facilities; and, at post level, helping with site acquisitions. OBO, however, achieves the annual goals;obtaining sites and awarding contracts on LROBP schedules (or awarding within 4 months of Congressional approvals for special projects), and completing projects on schedule and within budgets. International conditions can be varied and often difficult, however, site acquisitions and contract awards have been made on or ahead of schedule. Dili was completed on budget and early, and Berlin is on target for a 9/04 award. The Luanda, Dushanbe, and Kabul NEC projects are about 4 months behind schedule, and Kabul's costs have exceeded estimates, but OMB has worked with OBO to make adjustments to contain costs. Nevertheless, with the exception of Kabul, overall goal achievement has gone well.

Evidence: f. Bureau Performance Plan (overview--strategies) r. Integrated design reviews s. Value engineering policy and study kk. Program assessment briefing qq. Project Analysis Package bbb. House Rpt on CJS FY02 Appropriations Bill (re cost reductions) mmm: Spread sheet of Value Engineering projects and savings for FY01-03 eeee.Stewardship Report 2003 BPP Evidence: A/S Statement:

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: OBO restructured its management and organizational elements and adopted best practices to gain greater efficiency and effectiveness in constructing capital projects. It attained bureau status and became a results-based organization that fully employs efficiencies that result from initiatives such as (1) adopting an automated design review/checking system ("Dr Checks") and integrated design review procedures to reduce design time and costs and increase project quality, (2) employing value engineering to gain greater construction efficiencies and cost effectiveness, (3) implementing new Standard Embassy Designs (SEDs) to reduce design times/costs and deliver better facilities with proven designs, and (4) making greater use of design/build contracts to cut construction time/costs and increase contractor accountability. Considerable emphasis has also been placed on reducing life-cycle costs while improving performance of new facilities.

Evidence: f. Bureau Performance Plan (overview--strategies) r. Integrated design reviews s. Value engineering policy and study kk. Program assessment briefing qq. Project Analysis Package bbb. House Rpt on CJS FY02 Appropriations Bill (re cost reductions) mmm: Spread sheet of Value Engineering projects and savings for FY01-03 eeee.Stewardship Report 2003 BPP Evidence: A/S Statement:

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation:  

Evidence:  

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: The OIG and GAO reviewed this entire capital program and made highly favorable initial observations. State's IG commended OBO, in Congressional testimony, for its significant improvements in planning and management, new standard embassy design concept, and other areas. The GAO, in its 1/03 semi-annual report and in Congressional testimony, complimented OBO on the many positive steps to improve program management, noting favorably OBO's development of a long-range overseas buildings plan (LROBP) and its use of an Industry Advisory Panel to ensure "best practices" are in place. In the latter regard, in March 2003, GSA's Management Secretariat, through the Gallup Organization, cited the Industry Advisory Panel as one of the top examples of Federal Advisory committees demonstrating superior results. GAO went on to list the many accomplishments that OBO had made and the excellent results attained

Evidence: f. BPP overview kk. Program assessment briefing bbb. House Rpt on CJS FY02 Appropriations Bill (re: cost reductions) mmm: Spread sheet of Value Engineering projs and savings for FY01-03 nnn.GAO test. before Cmte on For. Rel. 3/20/03 ooo. GAO Rep to Congress 1/2003

Were program goals achieved within budgeted costs and established schedules?

Explanation: The Dili NEC project came in early and on budget. Luanda, Dushanbe, and Kabul are behind schedule by about four months, and Kabul is over budget. OBO is working diligently to improve these projects. With Kabul, the need to construct in a hostile environment with changing requirements dictated a cost-plus construction contract that encountered rising costs. OBO converted to a fixed-price contract, but at a necessarily higher price. Despite OBO's best efforts, the contractor for Dushanbe has fallen behind in delivering over 250 modules required because of poor local construction capabilities. OBO and the contractor are working to mitigate the delays. The Luanda project has special challenges in constructing on a tiny site where Post continues to function.

Evidence: e. OBO Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan (LROBP) kk. Program Assessment briefing nn. OBO Capital Project Overview (5/02) oo. OBO Real Estate & Property Management Office (REPM) 8/02 Program Performance Review on new embassy compound (NEC) site acquisitions cccc. Comments at 4/22/04 IAP Mtg. of Derish Wolff (Chairman, Berger Group Holdings) representing the Amer. Council of Engineering Companies & the Bldg. Trades Group BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: Goal Paper I/P#5