


CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION
ON MILITARY TRAINING AND
GENDER-RELATED ISSUES



FINAL REPORT

TRANSCRIPTS AND LEGAL CONSULTANTS' REPORTS

VOLUME II

JULY 1999

CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES



FINAL REPORT

TRANSCRIPTS AND LEGAL CONSULTANTS' REPORTS

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Special Thanks To:

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Debra Crnkovic
COL Hank Hodge, USA (Retired)

Acknowledgments

The Commission's almost 16 months has been both informative and hectic. The mandate set forth by the Congress in Public Law 105-85 provided the commissioners and staff a roadmap, but the knowledge was gained in the journey. The report and the journey would not have been possible, but for the cooperation and support of many individuals. We can mention only a few and, in doing so, apologize to the many who remain anonymous even to us.

First, we acknowledge the great service to the Nation provided by the men and women of our Armed Forces. In particular, we thank the thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who escorted, met, and spoke with us on the numerous trips and who took time to respond to the research inquiries.

The Commission thanks the many individuals from other governmental agencies who assisted in fulfilling our mandate. Specifically, the Commission thanks Mr. Mark E. Gebicke, Director, and William E. Beusse, Ph.D., Assistant Director, of the General Accounting Office for their advice and testimony. We also recognize the contributions of Special Agent Thomas Lyons, Chief, Physical Training Unit, FBI Academy, for assembling needed expertise and testimony from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

We wish to thank all the witnesses who testified at our hearings. This venue provided an interactive format for commissioners to inquire into several statutory sections. Much of the testimony came from current Defense officials and active duty military personnel; additionally, several private sector and retired individuals gave the Commission essential information. All are commended for their time and expertise. All witnesses are listed in Appendix C of Volume I.

The Commission's trip to visit TASK FORCE EAGLE in Tuzla, Bosnia, was an informative and extraordinary event. We commend our expert and gracious escorts, LTC Lunn and 1Lt. Peter J. Masich, USA. We also visited the USS ENTERPRISE in the Mediterranean Sea and salute her extraordinary and gallant crew for providing a unique adventure.

Washington Headquarters Services offices had the additional task of supporting this Commission. Mr. Richard Townsend was instrumental in quickly organizing support for the temporary and permanent office space. Also of note were the services provided by: Mr. Leroy Miles (Property Management), Mr. Neal Jacobson (Space Management), Ms. Judy Mitchell (Telecommunications Branch), Mr. Robert Yorke (Budget Branch), and Mr. H. F. "Butch" Christensen (Accounting Branch). We must single out the excellent support given by the Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, especially from Ms. Mary George, Mr. Russ Daul, and Mr. Robert (Bud) Parlette. They designed the management information system (MIS) and provided almost daily assistance and counseled the staff about the need for on-site MIS support.

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The Office of the Secretary of Defense provided excellent support. The Honorable Rudy de Leon, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and Mr. Frank Rush, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), assisted us on numerous occasions. Captain Martha E. McWatters, USN, and her staff in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy), Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management, contributed greatly. LTC Bruce Batten, USA, on several occasions provided exceptional support.

The Commission faced a challenge in capturing accurate information during the hearings. The Commission received court reporting services from Anita B. Glover & Associates, Ltd., Fairfax, Virginia. We gratefully acknowledge the services of Mr. Donald E. Scott who recorded and transcribed all 12 days of hearings with accuracy and speed. Dowless and Associates, Incorporated, Herndon, Virginia, provided the editorial and layout services for this report and the desktop publishing services of Mr. Costa Bugg and Mr. David Farquharson. Ms. Dawn Hottle of Betac Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia also contributed critical desktop publishing expertise. We recognize the editorial contributions of Ms. Rhonda Mohrmann to a section of the report. The Commission especially thanks the recording expertise of Headquarters, Air Force Television Service Center, and the U.S. Army Visual Information Center for providing a video record of the hearings and meetings.

Acknowledgments (Continued)

Personnel detailees from other organizations within the Department of Defense provided great support and assistance. The Commission wanted to do creditable and interesting research, but had constraints due to time and other limited resources. This dilemma was solved by borrowing our Research Director, Kathleen Wright, Ph.D., from the United States Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC) and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR). Thus, we were able to undertake an ambitious research program responsive to the Congressional mandate. Instrumental in providing this support were MG John S. Parker, Commander, USAMRMC; COL Martin H. Crumrine, Director, WRAIR; and COL Gregory L. Belenky, Director, Division of Neuropsychiatry, WRAIR.

The Commission thanks each of the Military Services for providing highly qualified, knowledgeable Service liaison officers. Additionally, the Director of the Department of Defense Education Activity provided the excellent services of its Deputy Comptroller, Mrs. Carolyn Duke, who also served as the Deputy Executive Director.

Finally, we acknowledge the assistance of the Congressional staffers. The Commission especially thanks Mr. John Chapla and Ms. Mieke Eoyang, professional staff to the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, and Mr. Charlie Abell and Mr. Gary Leeling, professional staff to the Subcommittee on Personnel of the Senate Armed Services Committee.



Stephen C. Fogleman
Executive Director

Explanation of Volume Formats and Footnotes

The Final Report of the Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues is presented in four volumes as follows:

Volume I. “Findings and Recommendations” consists of the commentaries, assessments, findings and recommendations that are responsive to the mandate set forth in Public Law 105-85. Volume I also contains several appendices (A through K) referenced in the commentary or responsive to a specific section of Public Law 105-85. Example of a footnote to this volume is: Volume I. “Final Report” page 65.

Volume II. “Transcripts and Legal Consultants’ Reports” contains the transcripts of the 12 days of Commission hearings as well as the Legal Consultants’ Reports presented on the last hearing day, 30 January 1999. The Commission wanted to record accurately the testimony of the witnesses and the question and answer dialog between the commissioners and witnesses. We used the excellent court reporting services of Mr. Donald E. Scott of Anita B. Glover & Associates, Ltd., Fairfax, Virginia.

In Volume II pages 1 through 540 are the transcript pages in a condensed format. Each volume page consists of six condensed transcript pages that are numbered at the top of each square. For example, Volume II, page 420 consists of transcript pages 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 for the hearing on January 29, 1999. A reference or footnote for that hearing in Volume I is: Volume II. “Transcripts” page 420 (29Jan99), pp. 2-7). A citation to a specific witness would be: Starling II, H. D. CAPT, USN, CO, USS EISENHOWER, Volume II “Transcripts” page 420 (29Jan99, pp 2-7). An abbreviated reference is Vol II, page 420 (29Jan99, pp 2-7).

Volumes III and IV. “Research Projects, Reports, and Studies” contains research studies referenced throughout Volume I. A complete listing of studies in Volumes III and IV is found at the Tables of Contents for Volumes I, III, and IV. A research report is footnoted as: Johnson, C. (1999), *The Study of Military Recruit Attitudes Conducive to Unit Cohesion and Survey of Military Leader Opinions on Recruit Training and Gender-Related Issues*, Volume III “Research Studies” page 155.

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CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES

Monday; October 12, 1998
1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 940
Arlington, Virginia

Pg. 2
 1 Those present:
 2 Anita K. Blair, Esquire - Chairman
 3 The Honorable Frederick F.Y. Pang - Vice Chairman
 4 LtGen George R. Christmas, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner
 5 CSM Robert A. Dare, Jr., USA(Ret) - Commissioner
 6 LtGen William M. Keys, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner
 7 Thomas Moore - Commissioner
 8 Charles Moskos, Ph.D. - Commissioner
 9 The Honorable Barbara Spyridon Pope - Commissioner
 10 - - -
 11 Stephen C. Fogleman, Esquire - Executive Director
 12 Hank Hodge - Staff Liaison
 13 James Renne, Esquire - Staff Counsel and Secretary
 14 Carolyn F. Duke - Staff, Budget
 15 CMSgt Billy Gregory, USAF - Staff, Administrative
 16 Kathleen M. Wright, Ph.D. - Research Director
 17 Janice Laurence, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 18 Charles Johnson, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 19 Capt J.S. Snyder, USN - Service Representative
 20 LtCol Mary Street, USAF - Service Representative
 21 LtCol Brenda L. Harris, USA - Service Representative
 22 Maj R. Scott LaShier, USMC - Service Representative
 23

Pg. 3
 1 Also present:
 2 The Honorable Rudy de Leon, Under Secretary of Defense
 (Personnel and Readiness)
 3
 4 Frank Rush, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force
 Management and Policy)
 5 LtGen Normand G. Lezy, USAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary
 of Defense (Military Personnel Policy)
 6
 7 Col Robert E. Reed, USAF, Associate Deputy General
 Counsel (Military Justice and Personnel Policy)
 8 Col Paul L. Black, Director Legal Policy, Office of the
 Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)
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Pg. 4
 1 P R O C E E D I N G S (1:30 p.m.)
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: This is the Congressional
 3 Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related
 4 Issues. My name is Anita Blair, Chairman of the
 5 Commission. Today is October 12th, 1998, and we are
 6 about to receive a briefing on part of our
 7 responsibilities for research, which are the questions of
 8 adultery and fraternization, and Mr. Rudy de Leon is
 9 going to begin the process of introducing the other
 10 speakers and talking about the results of the Good Order
 11 and Discipline Task Force. Thank you.
 12 MR. DE LEON: Okay. Thank you.
 13 If you are ready for us to proceed, what I
 14 thought I might —
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yes.
 16 MR. DE LEON: — first do is introduce the
 17 people that I have with me this afternoon.
 18 I am joined by Frank Rush (Indicating),
 19 who is the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
 20 Force Management and Policy.
 21 I am joined by Lieutenant General Norm
 22 Lezy (Indicating), who has responsibilities as Deputy
 23 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel

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 1 Policy.
 2 Colonel Robert Reed (Indicating), who is a
 3 Judge Advocate General of the United States Air Force
 4 assigned to the staff of the General Counsel of the
 5 Department of Defense.
 6 And then Colonel Paul Black (Indicating),
 7 another Judge Advocate General of the Air Force who is
 8 assigned to my organization.
 9 It was June of 1997 when Secretary Cohen
 10 established three different groups really to look at the
 11 rules the Department of Defense had to ensure that these
 12 rules on good order and discipline were fair and clear.
 13 One segment, he asked the General Counsel to do review of
 14 the Manual for Courts-Martial in terms of the
 15 instructions that pertain to adultery. Colonel Reed will
 16 be discussing that.
 17 A second of Secretary Cohen's initiatives
 18 was to appoint what is now referred to as the Kassebaum
 19 Baker Commission. Their work is well known to the
 20 members here today and I will really not discuss that.
 21 The third piece was to look at
 22 fraternization rules to make sure that those rules were
 23 fair and clear.

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 1 What I would like to do in the next few
 2 minutes is to talk through how my component of those
 3 three initiatives — that is, the review of
 4 fraternization and good order and discipline rules — was
 5 conducted, how the issue was debated, and then the
 6 outcome.
 7 Then with your permission, I'd like to
 8 yield to Colonel Reed to really talk about how the
 9 General Counsel's office proceeded with respect to the
 10 review of the Manual for Courts-Martial, and then all of
 11 us are here to answer any questions that you may have.
 12 So, Madam Chairman, if that's an
 13 acceptable way to proceed...
 14 What I'd like, then, to do is I know you
 15 have a handout and it starts — You've got some slides
 16 that say "Task Force," and these are the slides that the
 17 Good Order and Discipline Task Force used and I'd just
 18 like to essentially take a few minutes to talk through.
 19 These are the charts that the vice chiefs, the under
 20 secretaries of the services and myself use as we work
 21 through and look at the issue of good order and
 22 discipline.
 23 The first chart is relatively

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 1 straightforward. It directly references Secretary
 2 Cohen's memo to determine if existing policies and
 3 practices for maintaining good order and discipline are
 4 fair and effective. It shows who the membership was: the
 5 General Counsel, Frank Rush; Reserve Affairs; the
 6 Inspector General; and then the service under
 7 secretaries, vice chiefs, the Coast Guard rep, and then
 8 the Director of the Joint Staff.
 9 Just by introduction, then, the next
 10 slide, "Today's Military," is just a snapshot to note
 11 that we have a professional, all-volunteer force. They
 12 are the best trained and equipped force in the world.
 13 They are very well educated. Nearly all the enlisted are
 14 high school graduates; many of senior enlisted have
 15 bachelor's and graduate degrees. Officers have bachelor
 16 degrees; majority of senior officers have advanced
 17 degrees.
 18 Also, the force has a proven track record
 19 in addressing and solving problems, and I'd note that
 20 they have a distinct culture and operating environment
 21 which separates them from the civilian society.
 22 Now, in the next chart, the "Reasons
 23 Behind Our Military's Success," these charts and these

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1 points I think distinguish why military life is much
 2 different than civilian life. We begin with the Armed
 3 Forces being a very effective organization. They have
 4 clarity of purpose. They have a mission-oriented bottom
 5 line. Professionalism and self-sacrifice are hallmarks
 6 of service members.
 7 And then, additionally, and one component
 8 which is essential is that our key to success is the fact
 9 that our field commanders are empowered. They are the
 10 people that are chartered to make the key decisions in
 11 just about every aspect of military operation. They
 12 implement policy. They make decisions. They safeguard
 13 the welfare of their forces. They accomplish their
 14 missions. So we very much have decentralized decision-
 15 making with a strong chain of command to maximize
 16 organizational effectiveness.

17 Now, "Good Order and Discipline, Why Is It
 18 Necessary?" This chart may really be redundant to the
 19 members of the panel but this is one that I use
 20 frequently when I talk with persons who are not of
 21 military life and who really look at these issues from an
 22 outside perspective.

23 First, the chain of command is extremely

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1 issue differently than the enlisted rank. They ranked
 2 this issue low in terms of issues of concern on a ten-
 3 point scale. They wanted to maintain their authority and
 4 flexibility to address each case on its own merits. They
 5 needed the court-martial option for the most severe cases
 6 and they believed the current regulations were clear and
 7 adequate, and they supported each service maintaining
 8 their current policy.

9 When we met with the reserves, they were,
 10 of course, quick to draw the distinctions of a reserve
 11 force, part-time citizen soldiers. They concluded that
 12 policy members must consider the total force concept;
 13 that the part-time military/full-time civilians present
 14 unique situations. They felt that the current
 15 regulations were clear and adequate, that each service
 16 should maintain its current policies, and that training
 17 was very clear.

18 We also met with the chaplains and asked
 19 them for their view, and they put emphasis on the fact
 20 that in promoting good order and discipline, we needed to
 21 focus on the fact that we were building healthy military
 22 communities and that the perception of favoritism was a
 23 very serious concern.

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1 important. I come back to my point that field commanders
 2 are the heart of our system. The chain of command: the
 3 ability to execute military operations depends upon both
 4 individual and unit discipline. Peacetime practices are
 5 essential. We really can't afford the luxury of having
 6 one set of policies for peacetime and another during war.
 7 Our military trains together so that they can fight
 8 together and safely come home together. Clarity and
 9 consistency is a major factor to unit cohesion and
 10 morale.

11 Now, the next chart really outlines the
 12 "Task Force Strategy." Our purpose was to review
 13 policies and practices, and then look at enforcement
 14 data. We met with a senior enlisted panel; we met with
 15 field commanders, reserve component commanders, DACOWITS,
 16 and the Armed Forces Chaplain Board. And no surprise, we
 17 got a different set of responses from each of these
 18 groups.

19 For example, when we met with enlisted
 20 members on fraternization, they raise this as one of
 21 moderate concern. They said that on a ten-point scale,
 22 it was right in the middle; that it was not just simply a
 23 gender issue, but perception was as important as reality.

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1 They also stressed that the policy and the
 2 rationale for the policy needed to be clearly articulated
 3 to the troops along the lines that the health, welfare
 4 and survivability of the military community is paramount;
 5 that the policies on good order and discipline protect
 6 unit mission, cohesion and morale; and that violations
 7 undermine military effectiveness, unit mission, and
 8 overall service welfare.

9 That service members must be educated on
 10 policy and consequences of violation. That, again, they
 11 felt to the maximum extent that we should address
 12 fraternization infractions administratively, and that
 13 individual and unit discipline was extremely important.
 14 In fact, again, one of the themes that
 15 emerges from the discussions — and this is less
 16 important in the military community but more important in
 17 our discussions external — is the fact that while our
 18 civilian society may focus on the rights of the
 19 individual, the key element of military cohesion is, in
 20 effect, the cohesiveness of the organization, and that's
 21 why we have these rules to begin with.

22 So we felt that in going through the first
 23 part of our work, which was to solicit outside views, we

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1 They thought that policies were unevenly
 2 enforced. The very junior enlisted had a term that
 3 service members have to live in an "antenna up"
 4 environment to find out what the rules are on a base-to-
 5 base, installation-to-installation process, and the
 6 enlisted members said that they desired a very clear
 7 policy.

8 Continuing, the enlisted panel told us
 9 that overly-familiar officer-enlisted relations were
 10 disruptive; that officer-enlisted interactions should
 11 respect differences in rank. They also said that NCO
 12 relations also needed clear guidance; that in many cases
 13 they were more problematic than officer-enlisted
 14 relations.

15 And then in terms of the enforcement of
 16 these standards, they thought that administrative
 17 sanctions were more reasonable; that counseling should be
 18 a first step; that adverse administrative or punitive
 19 actions only as necessary; that commanders were more
 20 likely to enforce with the administrative tools; and that
 21 specific circumstances should be considered.

22 Now, our next chart summarizes what
 23 commanders concluded. No surprise that they saw the

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1 got a wide variety of presentations that we became
 2 familiar with the different focuses, and then we sat down
 3 in the next stage to truly try and really understand what
 4 the core of each of the service policies were.

5 Each of the services, at the senior level,
 6 felt they understood what their policies were. When we
 7 would meet with people at the junior level, however,
 8 there was confusion and tentativeness with respect to
 9 what the policies meant. We did a brief reading of the
 10 respective regulations, which totaled about sixty Pages,
 11 double-columned, small type, and we found that we entered
 12 lawyers' paradise at that moment.

13 First, the Army policy in terms of how it
 14 was briefed: that relations between soldiers of different
 15 rank are prohibited if prejudicial to good order and
 16 discipline. Prejudicial relations are those that involve
 17 or give appearance of partiality, involve improper use of
 18 rank or position, create actual or perceived adverse
 19 impacts on discipline, authority or morale. But officer-
 20 enlisted relations are not specifically prohibited.

21 The Navy policy, which, personally
 22 speaking, I felt had a number of —

23 DR. MOSKOS: Madam Chairman, I just want

1 to interject a clarification.
 2 MR. DE LEON: Sure.
 3 DR. MOSKOS: I thought the Army prohibited
 4 chain of command officer-enlisted.
 5 MR. DE LEON: Chain of command only.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: So —
 7 MR. DE LEON: As we get in, the other
 8 services have prohibitions —
 9 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. That was unclear.
 10 Yeah.
 11 MR. DE LEON: — on officer-enlisted.
 12 DR. MOSKOS: But, I mean, that is
 13 specifically prohibited.
 14 MR. DE LEON: In the chain of command.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Right.
 16 MR. DE LEON: And we'll get into that —
 17 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 18 MR. DE LEON: — in further detail.
 19 Again, this was just trying to read through the written
 20 policies.
 21 The Navy used different terminology in
 22 their policies, but unduly familiar relations that do not
 23 respect differences in grade or rank are prohibited if

1 prejudicial to good order and discipline. Those
 2 relationships were those that called objectivity into
 3 question, result in preferential treatment, undermine
 4 authority of a superior or compromise chain of command.
 5 Officer-enlisted romantic relationships are expressly
 6 prohibited.
 7 With the — Yes, sir. Do you have a
 8 question?
 9 DR. MOSKOS: I was just wondering if
 10 romantic — sexual relationships without romance are okay
 11 the way this is phrased.
 12 MR. DE LEON: We're using the service's
 13 term.
 14 MS. POPE: Rudy?
 15 MR. DE LEON: Please.
 16 MS. POPE: In this policy — It says
 17 officer-enlisted romantic relationships. Does it talk
 18 about chain of command, or is just officer-to-enlisted?
 19 MR. DE LEON: Officer-enlisted relations
 20 are prohibited, period.
 21 MS. POPE: Well, what about officer-to-
 22 officer in chain of command?
 23 MR. DE LEON: Officer-to-officer in chain

1 of command are prohibited.
 2 MS. POPE: Okay. Because it just says
 3 "compromise." It doesn't — Okay.
 4 MR. DE LEON: We believe.
 5 MS. POPE: Okay.
 6 MR. DE LEON: Okay? It is not entirely
 7 clear from —
 8 MS. POPE: From the policy.
 9 MR. DE LEON: When we get into our matrix
 10 —
 11 MS. POPE: Great.
 12 MR. DE LEON: — and how we tried to
 13 clarify them...
 14 The Air Force policy, which had been the
 15 most recently written, stated that relations between
 16 members are prohibited if prejudicial to good order and
 17 discipline. They went through their criteria. They
 18 specifically prohibited officer-enlisted romantic
 19 relationships.
 20 I'd be frank: we're trying to clean this
 21 up a little and use "romantic" rather than "sexual," and
 22 until you pointed it out, Professor — We will be more
 23 literal if that's preferred.

1 And then the Coast Guard, which is also on
 2 this last chart, again, their policy is quite similar to
 3 that of the Air Force. They specifically prohibited
 4 officer and enlisted romantic relations. We there have
 5 run the full gamut from dating to sexual relationships.
 6 Now, having gone through what the brief
 7 elements of each policy were, we then tried to answer
 8 some basic questions and found that it took two or three
 9 days of Colonel Reed and Colonel Black meeting with each
 10 of the respective judge advocate generals of the services
 11 to try to come to a matrix so that we could put the five
 12 policies in some kind of perspective, and we came up with
 13 this small matrix that essentially show that officer-
 14 enlisted relationships may be prohibited in the Army —
 15 Professor, back to your question of chain of command
 16 versus non-chain of command — that officer-enlisted
 17 relations in a number of areas other than professional
 18 were prohibited in the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and
 19 Coast Guard.
 20 Senior officer-junior officer relations
 21 may be prohibited. That was the chain-of-command issue.
 22 And then senior enlisted-junior enlisted may be
 23 prohibited. That was the chain-of-command issue again.

1 Colonel Black is the person who sort of
 2 conducted the review in the course of that weekend.
 3 I don't know if there are any comments
 4 that you would like to make in terms of the complexity of
 5 these rules.
 6 COLONEL BLACK: Just very briefly. "May
 7 be" is kind of a broad word. It can range from "nearly
 8 always," down to some other term, some spectrum, but it
 9 was the best that we could go with to put in a chart to
 10 try and give you some feeling of where the major
 11 differences were.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: But that really
 13 leaves — I mean, I don't — Based on my experience,
 14 there was no "may be" relative to senior officer and
 15 junior officer. What kind of relationships are you
 16 talking about? Are you talking about romantic or —
 17 COLONEL REED: The regulations basically
 18 had a qualifier in it that said "if prejudicial to good
 19 order and discipline" or "if unduly familiar." So when
 20 you had the qualifier "if" followed by that term, it
 21 forced us into a situation where the best analysis we
 22 could make was that it was sometimes. Because if that
 23 "if" wasn't there, then it would be okay, and if the "if"

1 — the clause after the "if" was there, then it would be
 2 prohibited.
 3 So where you see the "may be prohibited,"
 4 it was because of the wording in the regulation. This is
 5 an analysis of the regulation, not an analysis of maybe
 6 what is happening on the base or the post or whatever.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Okay.
 8 COLONEL REED: So using just an analysis
 9 of the language is how we had to come up with this matrix
 10 to — Was it clearly in all cases prohibited? In which
 11 case, it would be prohibited —
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: This is just
 13 based on the service's fraternization order.
 14 COLONEL REED: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: All right.
 16 COLONEL REED: An analysis of the
 17 regulations and the instructions in being at the time.
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Fred Pang.
 19 MR. PANG: But for the most part, my
 20 understanding is that in practice, you know, when you
 21 come to senior-to-junior-officer relationships, for
 22 example, in the Navy and Marine Corps, they were, for the
 23 most part —

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Always
 2 prohibited.
 3 MR. PANG: — prohibited.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Yes.
 5 And what's junior? One grade? Two grade?
 6 Any grade?
 7 MR. PANG: And the same is true with
 8 enlisted.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Yeah.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: That is a — Can I talk?
 11 Charlie Moskos.
 12 I was unclear. I thought the Navy had an
 13 E-7 through E-9, always prohibited. Not "may be
 14 prohibited." E-7 through E-9's cannot fraternize with E-
 15 6's and below in the Navy. Is that true?
 16 COLONEL REED: There is some language in
 17 the regulations that is — Again, they still have
 18 qualifiers in it but they do go — they try to do the top
 19 three NCO ranks and the junior enlisted ranks. All the
 20 regulations were trying, I think, to say the same thing
 21 or attempting to say the same thing but they weren't
 22 using the same language, so it was difficult in comparing
 23 all the regulations.

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1 I mean, I don't want to steal from Colonel
 2 Black's thunder, but, I mean, in the process of trying to
 3 make a matrix so that you could have an easy comparison
 4 without reading three paragraphs of the regulation to
 5 come to a conclusion, that was as best as we could come
 6 up with to try to make it as easy to understand as
 7 possible.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: You mean there's
 9 inconsistency in the Navy regulations on this question of
 10 E-7 and above and E-6 and below?
 11 COLONEL REED: As compared to the other
 12 services?
 13 DR. MOSKOS: No, just within the Navy.
 14 COLONEL REED: Oh. No. Each — If you
 15 look at the regulation of the Navy —
 16 DR. MOSKOS: It's clearer.
 17 COLONEL REED: — or the regulation itself
 18 —
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 20 COLONEL REED: — and it stands alone, it
 21 may be more clear than certainly comparing it to the
 22 other services. This exercise was trying to compare
 23 across-the-board from all the services and see how the

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1 language —
 2 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 3 COLONEL REED: — interplayed with one
 4 another.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: Well, that's what I was
 6 wondering — why it doesn't say "always prohibited,"
 7 then.
 8 COLONEL REED: Because I think — I don't
 9 have the reg in front of me, but as I recall, there was
 10 still some language in there saying "unduly familiar" and
 11 words like "if prejudicial to good order and discipline."
 12 It wasn't just a strict "no E-7 can ever date —"
 13 DR. MOSKOS: I see.
 14 COLONEL REED: "— an E-1."
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Is this the
 16 difference between black-and-white and some gray?
 17 MS. POPE: Right.
 18 COLONEL REED: Right.
 19 MR. DE LEON: The next chart, we really
 20 looked at officer-enlisted relations.
 21 Colonel Black, if you would like to talk
 22 through this chart briefly.
 23 COLONEL BLACK: Certainly. In trying to

Page 23

1 look at how the services define what aspects of officer-
 2 enlisted relationships might constitute fraternization,
 3 we looked at sexual relationships, dating and romantic
 4 relationships, business relationships and gambling, and
 5 tried to look at their regulations and say, "Okay. Do
 6 you prohibit all four of these, three of these, two of
 7 these? Are you specific in these areas? How consistent
 8 are you?"
 9 MR. DE LEON: Why don't you talk us
 10 through the charts.
 11 COLONEL BLACK: The chart itself reflects
 12 the language in those regulations.
 13 So that the Army would sometimes prohibit
 14 sexual relations, sometimes prohibit dating relations.
 15 They had stronger language but not totally exclusive
 16 language when it came to business relations and
 17 borrowing, and the same thing with gambling. Whereas,
 18 the Air Force clearly said, you know, prohibited under
 19 all circumstances in three of the four categories but was
 20 not as clear in the fourth category.
 21 And as you read across, you can see that
 22 there were some striking differences and some differences
 23 more of nuances, and striking differences, of course,

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1 being the Army's attitude.
 2 MS. POPE: Barbara Pope.
 3 Can you give us some examples of where in
 4 the Army policy sexual relationships were sometimes
 5 prohibited? Where wouldn't it be prohibited?
 6 COLONEL BLACK: You have to read — infer
 7 from the reverse.
 8 MS. POPE: Okay.
 9 COLONEL BLACK: All their regulations say
 10 is they're prohibited if they're prejudicial to good
 11 order and discipline in —
 12 MS. POPE: So a commanding officer — some
 13 lieutenant commander could decide that two officers/two
 14 enlisted were in a dating relationship but it was working
 15 fine? The regulations would allow them to go that far if
 16 they were in a dating relationship?
 17 COLONEL REED: If outside the chain of
 18 command or the line of supervision —
 19 MS. POPE: Right.
 20 COLONEL REED: — in the Army regulations.
 21 MS. POPE: You've got two officers —
 22 COLONEL REED: Then you would have —
 23 MS. POPE: — in the same organization.

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1 COLONEL REED: Right.
 2 MS. POPE: They could date.
 3 COLONEL REED: Well, this is officer-
 4 enlisted relationships — this chart.
 5 MS. POPE: Okay. All right. Well, say
 6 officers — say in the same organization, but you've got
 7 one officer and an enlisted. They're not in the chain of
 8 command but they're in the same organization. They would
 9 be allowed to date?
 10 MR. DE LEON: You are embarking on one of
 11 the most interesting issues that we encountered, because
 12 what we found is in terms of looking at the cases —
 13 MS. POPE: Right.
 14 MR. DE LEON: — that substantiate the
 15 point — what we found is that the Marine Corps, for the
 16 most part, always used administrative processes; that the
 17 Air Force tended to use military justice —
 18 MS. POPE: Okay.
 19 MR. DE LEON: The Navy would use
 20 administrative processes, and the Army — We had a hard
 21 time seeing where this policy was being enforced.
 22 MS. POPE: Okay.
 23 MR. DE LEON: The cases were not there.

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1 We saw the cases in the other services —
 2 MS. POPE: But you didn't see the cases in
 3 —
 4 MR. DE LEON: — but we did not see the
 5 cases —
 6 MS. POPE: Okay.
 7 MR. DE LEON: — of enforcement on the
 8 Army side.
 9 Is that a fair statement, Colonel Black?
 10 COLONEL BLACK: Yes, sir.
 11 MR. DE LEON: And so we saw — It is hard
 12 to give you a statistical measure because cases very
 13 rarely are pure vanilla, as Colonel Black would say.
 14 They're always a combination of things. But we did not
 15 see the cases there on the Army side that would help
 16 clarify for us where the lines of officer-enlisted
 17 relations were drawn broader than the explanation that it
 18 was chain of command versus non-chain of command.
 19 Is that —
 20 COLONEL BLACK: That's fair.
 21 And in further answer to your question, if
 22 you had an installation with one organization and a
 23 thousand people in it out in a very remote area — you

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1 raised the question of officer-officer — that
 2 relationship might be viewed differently than in another
 3 organization that might be made up of twenty-five-
 4 thousand people and you had an officer in one end of the
 5 installation dating, where they never had any duty
 6 relationships.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well, what about
 8 the money business? Like does that mean selling a car or
 9 buying a car from an enlisted guy?
 10 COLONEL BLACK: There is a specific
 11 exclusion which — for one-time business transactions
 12 like the sale of a house or the sale of a car.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: That's okay.
 14 COLONEL BLACK: This is directed towards
 15 an ongoing business relationship.
 16 MR. DE LEON: Colonel Black, why don't you
 17 make any sort of concluding comments you would like about
 18 the remainder of these charts.
 19 COLONEL BLACK: When we looked at the
 20 senior enlisted-junior enlisted, we found no "totally
 21 excluded" categories. In other words, we could not find
 22 language in the regulations that would say that under all
 23 circumstances these things were always prohibited.

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1 As you mentioned before, there is language
 2 concerning the Navy and I believe the Coast Guard about
 3 different grades, but it's set up in such a way that it
 4 doesn't give you an "always." It gives you a pretty
 5 strong presumption that you're not to do that.
 6 So if someone were to say can someone in
 7 the Navy in Washington, D.C. date someone else in the
 8 Navy in Japan when they meet on leave in Hawaii, the
 9 answer is possibly. It wasn't exclusive. It didn't say
 10 "always."
 11 The same thing with senior and junior
 12 officers.
 13 I would like to refer you back to the
 14 earlier definitions. If you — As you went through the
 15 service-by-service definitions of fraternization, they
 16 are really pretty close. I mean, the services pretty
 17 well understand what it is with fraternization. It's
 18 when you got into the — down one or two orders of
 19 magnitude into the finer details that the differences
 20 started to show.
 21 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Bob Dare.
 22 I am curious. There's one category here
 23 that it appears you didn't look at, and maybe rightfully

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1 so. But just — social, after-duty hour engagement.
 2 Racquetball games, those types of things.
 3 COLONEL BLACK: Yeah, let me address that.
 4 Fraternization is not a new concept. It
 5 goes back to the Roman armies, to George Washington's
 6 armies, and it exists for protection of enlisted troops
 7 so that when commanders have to order someone in battle,
 8 there's no question of favoritism or mistreatment or
 9 anything of that sort.
 10 There are always issues of gambling and
 11 business relationships and drinking together, playing
 12 golf together and playing racquetball together, and that
 13 was treated, if you will, on the "may be prohibited"
 14 side. Obviously it's okay if the general plays maybe a
 15 few times a year, but if he plays every day with the same
 16 people, you may have a different result.
 17 The intent here is not in any way to
 18 impinge upon professional relationships which are the
 19 lifeblood of the services. Supervisors and subordinates
 20 have to be able to communicate, officers and enlisted
 21 have to be able to communicate, but it is to reinforce
 22 what has been an historical military policy into our
 23 present day situation.

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1 MR. DE LEON: But golf games came up in
 2 our discussion with —
 3 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I'm sure they
 4 did.
 5 MR. DE LEON: — the enlisted panel. And
 6 where the commanding officer would routinely play with
 7 one enlisted person over and over and over, that raised
 8 the ire of other enlisted personnel, as contrasted to the
 9 CO who shows up at the fitness center and who logs in
 10 and, you know, plays in a round-robin, whoever happens to
 11 be there.
 12 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Sure.
 13 MR. DE LEON: So it would be — it showed
 14 that if they were in the same unit, the commanding
 15 officer had to be careful of the appearance of
 16 impropriety or partiality in his relations with the
 17 enlisted members.
 18 The last two charts — just in the chart
 19 — they both are titled "Tiered Approach to
 20 Fraternization." The darker chart — which you'll notice
 21 the largest box is on the right, "Court-Martial" — was
 22 prepared by the judge advocates. The second chart, where
 23 "Good Order" is the largest box on the left and "Court

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1 Martial" is the smallest on the right, was prepared by
 2 the chaplains.
 3 Generally what we found was that — with
 4 the exception that we did not see the cases in the Army
 5 — we saw that the Navy and Marine Corps, to the maximum
 6 extent, used administrative remedies in these cases.
 7 I had considerable discussion with the
 8 Commandant and the Assistant Commandant. The Marine
 9 Corps in particular was quite focused on addressing a
 10 problem up front and dealing with it, as contrasted with
 11 the Air Force, where we found that the notion would be to
 12 go and use the formal military justice process.
 13 So we came to a conclusion — we came to
 14 really one conclusion that there was consensus around and
 15 then a second issue that we forwarded to the Secretary
 16 and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
 17 The first one was that there was clear
 18 consensus that this chart that was drafted by the
 19 chaplains really should be used as a tool for commanders
 20 out in the field to see that they had a host of remedies
 21 available to them in terms of positive communications
 22 about what the policies were and then corrective actions
 23 in terms of oral and written admonitions, then formal

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1 reprimands, with court-martial being the venue of last
2 resort.
3 The Air Force will be quick to say,
4 having, I think, changed some of its policies, that field
5 commanders may have come to understand the wrong lessons
6 out of the Black Hawk shoot-down.
7 General Fogleman issued a communique
8 talking about commanders needing to be accountable for
9 personnel both when they were successful, also when they
10 went contrary to rules of procedures. He was getting at
11 a very specific issue, and that was, many commanders had
12 given the persons directly involved in the Black Hawk
13 shoot-down — commanders were still giving those people
14 positive written evaluations after, in fact, the
15 USCINCEUR had done a lengthy review of the Black Hawk
16 shoot-down, and I think that General Fogleman felt that
17 while he stressed accountability of commanders, he did
18 not necessarily conclude that every commander has to take
19 every case to court-martial; that there were a wide
20 variety of actions that were available.
21 So one conclusion in terms of handling
22 these cases was this notion of a tiered approach; that it
23 was as conducive to good order and discipline to handle

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1 cases with oral and written counseling as it was to go to
2 court-martial.
3 That left, however, the unanswered
4 question of whether we should have one policy with
5 respect to fraternization, the policy largely that of the
6 Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, or whether
7 we should have two policies, with the Army having a
8 separate policy.
9 There were lengthy internal discussions on
10 this. There were one-on-one discussions between the
11 Secretary and the service chiefs. There were tank
12 meetings on this topic.
13 Ultimately, the Secretary expressed his
14 own views in the July 29 memo on the topic of good order
15 and discipline where essentially he concluded that while
16 violations of these fraternization rules were not
17 widespread, there was, nonetheless, confusion in the
18 field; that we operate today predominantly as a joint
19 force and that it was possible for persons to be unclear
20 as to how these rules operated.
21 He really spelled out his rationale in
22 this policy. As you can see in paragraph number 4, he
23 really went to more or less the standard used by the Air

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1 Force, Coast Guard, Navy and Marine Corps. He also said
2 that we needed to stress to people in the field, who were
3 in the training side, that these rules needed to be
4 reinforced.
5 As he says on Page 2, also, in setting
6 forth rules prohibiting unprofessional relations, I want
7 to make clear that professional interaction between
8 officers and enlisted members is encouraged. He thought
9 that there should be teaching materials that would be
10 user-friendly to the force in the field. That he thought
11 that while the legal regulations were well understood by
12 senior officers and judge advocates, that there needed to
13 be training materials for military personnel.
14 That process is ongoing. The sixty-day
15 clock that the Secretary set for each of the services
16 should be expiring soon. When those materials are in
17 from each of the services, we'll be happy to forward
18 those materials to this task force.
19 But in short, it was a very lengthy,
20 deliberative, consultative process that really informed
21 the Secretary as he considered this matter prior to the
22 July 29th memo being issued. He consulted fully with the
23 Chairman and had the Chairman's concurrence. And in

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1 fact, each of the services are now moving out smartly to
2 implement the policy that was articulated on July 29.
3 So, Madam Chair, I think that is a summary
4 of how we looked at the fraternization issue. We can
5 proceed to Colonel Reed or we can answer any questions,
6 depending upon your desire.
7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I have a question about
8 fraternization myself, which is, in the popular press
9 during the Kelly Flinn story we heard that adultery is
10 very seldom prosecuted in the absence of other offenses,
11 and I wonder if the same is true of fraternization
12 complaints. Is there a comparable situation there in
13 which you would not be likely to get in trouble for
14 fraternization unless there were other factors present?
15 COLONEL REED: Statistically it's hard to
16 track that because fraternization — there's a specific
17 134 — Article 134 offense that you can charge
18 fraternization in the Manual for Courts-Martial, but some
19 of the services elect to charge or accuse under "conduct
20 unbecoming an officer," which is another article of the
21 Code.
22 Other services elect to charge it as an
23 Article 92 offense, which is a violation of a lawful

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1 general regulation or order. Others charge it as willful
2 disobedience of a superior's order because they've been
3 counseled, then they persist in the behavior, and,
4 therefore, it's gone beyond fraternization, into another
5 level of affront to a commander's authority.
6 So when you look at all the services and
7 you try to pull out of the databases, military justice
8 databases — and that's really the only database we have
9 because we don't track administrative actions across-the-
10 board for letters of reprimand and counseling — the
11 difficulty with fraternization and the reason we are
12 hard-pressed to give hard rules — hard statistics that
13 we feel comfortable with is because of the variety of
14 ways in which it can be charged.
15 And unless you pull the actual court-
16 martial record and read it, or the Article 15-nonjudicial
17 punishment action and read it — or the letter of
18 reprimand and read it, if you will — you're not going to
19 know whether that disobedience of an order is a
20 fraternization case or some other order.
21 So we've taken the very conservative view
22 that because it's statistically difficult to give hard-
23 and-fast rules, that we always put a qualifier on any

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1 numbers that we give out because we don't think we can
2 capture the universe of circumstance.
3 However, having said all of that, having
4 been the Air Force CRIMLAW chief for four years and
5 working with the other CRIM chiefs for four years in this
6 area, I would say, from our experience and from our
7 involvement in officer cases, which typically is a
8 fraternization scenario — all of us would say that the
9 number is very small. The incidence in which you run
10 into a situation of fraternization amounting to something
11 serious enough to get a military justice action is almost
12 statistically insignificant in our collective experience
13 dealing with military justice matters.
14 So I would say to your question on the
15 Kelly Flinn and the adultery statistics, from my
16 experience in the Air Force with Air Force statistics on
17 fraternization — because we've monitored officer
18 misconduct cases — that the numbers would be, you know,
19 single-digit percentage of military justice actions. You
20 know, three percent, five percent, something like that at
21 the most.
22 And that's just a WAG, based upon my
23 having seen the cases over the years. And in talking

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1 with my counterparts, their assessment of the situation
 2 within their service is the same. So that's the best
 3 pulse read I could give you or that I think that we can
 4 give you on the actual incidence of fraternization.
 5 Plus, if you look at the commanders'
 6 responses to Mr. de Leon's task force when they were
 7 saying what level of importance was it or difficulty for
 8 command was it, they were in the zero-to-three-percent —
 9 zero-to-three range on a scale of ten, which tells you
 10 also from their commanders' perspective this was not a
 11 significant problem to them.

12 So that kind of bolsters what I'm giving
 13 you of my experience in monitoring and looking at
 14 fraternization. That yes, we have incidence of it; yes,
 15 we do have to address it when it surfaces and it
 16 confronts a commander; but it's certainly not something
 17 that's preoccupying a commander's attention, nor is it
 18 the cornerstone of good-order-and-discipline problems in
 19 a military organization.

20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. May I follow-up
 21 just briefly? Also based on your experience probably
 22 because I understand there may not be statistics, can you
 23 give me an idea of how many — what portion of the cases

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1 are enlisted-to-enlisted versus officer-enlisted
 2 relationships —
 3 COLONEL REED: I can —
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — or officer-officer?
 5 COLONEL REED: I can tell you from the Air
 6 Force perspective because we looked at it as an officer-
 7 enlisted offense or predominantly as an offense, that our
 8 cases will track an officer having an inappropriate
 9 relationship with an enlisted person.

10 There's case law within the Army, for
 11 instance, where they have successfully disciplined, if
 12 you will, an enlisted-junior enlisted relationship, but
 13 that's even a — you know, that's even more difficult to
 14 identify.

15 I can only tell you that my sense is it's
 16 — Again, the enlisted people say it's maybe five out of
 17 ten on the scale of things that are troublesome to them,
 18 but it still — it doesn't seem to be a preoccupation of
 19 our everyday living or the responsibilities of exercising
 20 command or unit cohesiveness. It's not consuming that.
 21 It's not rising to that level.

22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Could I
 23 follow on that?

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1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: General Christmas.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Ron
 3 Christmas.
 4 And it's on a recent trip to an Army post,
 5 in discussing just this subject. It's really a follow-on
 6 in two questions that I was asking. I'd like to see how
 7 you all would answer them, having done that — your study
 8 in the task force.

9 And the first was — comes back to what
 10 you have just indicated. The senior leadership that I
 11 talked with looked me in the eye and said, "Well, is
 12 there really a problem? Is this something you really
 13 need to address? Is this really a problem?"

14 And the second aspect was a comment and
 15 then a question. And the comment was, "You know, since
 16 about 1985, as we tried to improve the professionalism of
 17 the Army, one of the things that we set about to do as
 18 part of cohesion was to ensure that the leadership
 19 understood that there was a relationship between officer-
 20 enlisted and that relationship was extremely important,"
 21 whether it be the relationship of the commander and his
 22 senior enlisted adviser or that relationship as it went
 23 through those various chains of command, the formal and

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1 the informal, which is obviously your staff NCO, down
 2 through your NCO rank.
 3 And then they looked at me and said, "You
 4 know, what we're concerned about is the unintended
 5 consequence of such a policy where we will have people"
 6 — and some comment was made to this in the brief — "we
 7 will have those that will say, 'well, here is the list;
 8 therefore, I may not or should not,' and that all of the
 9 effort that has been made of bringing about a certain
 10 amount of this cohesion will in fact be diluted, will in
 11 fact go as part of an unintended consequence and be worse
 12 for us than what we have now."

13 I'd like to hear how you would answer
 14 that.

15 COLONEL REED: Well, the way you would
 16 answer that, I think, is that it's like anything else in
 17 life: it's a matter of degrees. Even in the regulations
 18 — There is plenty of language in the regulations of all
 19 the services that talk about appropriate professional,
 20 business relationships between officer-enlisted personnel
 21 or within the officer corps or within the enlisted corps
 22 is important to a military organization and they should
 23 be encouraged and they should be fostered and they should

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1 be nurtured because it adds to esprit de corps and to the
 2 effectiveness of the unit.
 3 When you get to the four categories, if
 4 you will, that are reflected in these charts, what
 5 they're trying to do is say, "Okay. This is where the
 6 line gets crossed. This is where the line of an
 7 appropriate professional relationship starts to turn
 8 sour."

9 And it can be and historically has been
 10 shown to cause problems with an organization when you
 11 have officers having sexual relations with enlisted
 12 personnel within the organization; when you have, you
 13 know, your Sergeant Major of the Army or the unit having
 14 sexual relations with a subordinate and the conflict that
 15 it creates around the water cooler as everybody's talking
 16 about, you know, what's going on and, you know, "If
 17 you've only got one person that's going to be sent to a
 18 hostile zone and there's two of us, you know, which one
 19 is the old man going to send? Well, of course he's going
 20 to send me because I don't have that particular
 21 relationship with the commander."

22 So what the regulations are trying to do
 23 is not — is trying to point out those things that

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1 historically, from a core value in the military, saying,
 2 "Okay. If you've got this regulation, this is where the
 3 ice is the thinnest and this is where the problems are
 4 the most difficult, and you need to be aware of these
 5 dangers and you need to be — "You need to foster a
 6 professional relationship, but be careful that it doesn't
 7 grow into an unprofessional or" — not grow, but maybe
 8 diminish into an unprofessional relationship.
 9 So again, you have to go back. It's like
 10 anything in life, I think: it's a matter of degree as to
 11 — We were talking about golf as an example. If the
 12 commander goes out and plays golf with the first sergeant
 13 to get that, you know, command cohesiveness going in the
 14 unit, that's fine; but if he does it every Saturday, then
 15 you've got a problem with the staff sergeant or the
 16 airman there wondering whether or not there's some
 17 favoritism going on, you know.

18 So that is very difficult to regulate.
 19 But the whole intent of the regulation is to point out
 20 where the big potholes are and where the big difficulties
 21 are, and, yet, at the same time, with the other language
 22 and instruction they give, tell them there's nothing
 23 wrong with squadron picnics and squadron bowling teams

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1 and golf teams and things like that that build the
 2 cohesion, but you have to be careful because it can
 3 denigrate into a situation that becomes the opposite of
 4 what you're trying to achieve.
 5 MS. POPE: Colonel, I mean, I think
 6 General Christmas raises an important part and I'm sure
 7 all of you who are spending that time in the services are
 8 concerned. When the department comes down with
 9 regulations, whatever the final word is going to be, is
 10 it going to be integrated into the training for
 11 prospective commanding officers?
 12 COLONEL REED: I'm sure.
 13 MS. POPE: I mean, this kind of a dialogue
 14 that talks about —
 15 COLONEL REED: Yes.
 16 MS. POPE: So that when you cross that
 17 line — I mean, having a golf outing, having a softball
 18 team —
 19 COLONEL REED: Yes.
 20 MS. POPE: — going with three people for
 21 a drink after-hours is different than one-on-one or, you
 22 know, one-on-one every night. It seems like that's the
 23 piece that may be missing, because I think there's a —

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1 COLONEL REED: Well —
 2 MS. POPE: There is a big concern about
 3 the backlash.
 4 COLONEL REED: Well, there is a
 5 requirement for training regulations, I think, that Mr.
 6 de Leon mentioned, about within sixty days, come out with
 7 training. Typically what happens when the services come
 8 out with a rule, with any rule, they establish what it is
 9 they want the rule to be in; then they have to set in
 10 mechanism — into works — the written and the briefing
 11 types of training that goes down through the chain of
 12 command, from basic training through senior NCO academy
 13 and squadron officer school and air war college training.
 14 I mean, when I was at the JAG school, I
 15 taught this at the Army — at the Air Force Air War
 16 College, this type of relationship-type of briefing. So
 17 the training is there through the structure of the normal
 18 — and it's added to the curricula of whatever type of
 19 school you're in, whether it be a training command or a
 20 specialized training command.
 21 So to answer your question, they are
 22 working on it now and that's normally what would happen
 23 when a rule is issued by the service or the department,

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1 is it's coupled with an awareness/training requirement so
 2 that people — The worse thing you can do is have a rule
 3 that nobody knows about, and then through not knowing
 4 about it, violate the rule.
 5 That's not — you know, that's not what
 6 we're intending. We're intending to establish a rule
 7 that everybody — make everybody aware of it, and train
 8 them the best we can to comply with what is expected and
 9 what we think is best for the service.
 10 So it's a package deal. It's not in
 11 isolation, usually. And I think this case would fall
 12 into that category.
 13 COLONEL BLACK: Yeah. I think or I hope
 14 that you will find that the changes that the Secretary
 15 has made will make the rules clearer and more consistent
 16 and more easily understood. Those, after all, were the
 17 goals.
 18 So if you look at the "before" and the
 19 "after," you know, I think you'll say, "Yes, it is
 20 clearer" or "yes, it is more consistent." "Yes, people
 21 do understand it better."
 22 Does that mean that every sergeant and
 23 every major and every colonel will agree with the change?

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1 Certainly not. Does it mean that we will be able to keep
 2 1,500,000 troops fully educated on what the policy is as
 3 they turn over? It's an ongoing job.
 4 MR. PANG: You know, I have a question
 5 with regard to senior-subordinate relationships and the
 6 accountability when there's unprofessional conduct.
 7 COLONEL REED: Yes, sir.
 8 MR. PANG: Is the — Are the seniors and
 9 the subordinates held to equal accountability or is it
 10 different?
 11 COLONEL REED: The regulations make it
 12 clear that both parties to the relationship have an
 13 obligation to keep the relationship professional, but
 14 typically they look to the more senior person to enforce
 15 the rule than the junior person.
 16 If you have an officer and you have an
 17 enlisted person, you'd typically look first to the
 18 officer to set the standards, to set the rules, to put
 19 things in check when they are going out of bounds, to put
 20 termination to a relationship that has crossed the line
 21 from acceptable to questionable, much less to purely
 22 inappropriate.
 23 So you always look — It's like parent and

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1 child. You're always looking to the parent. You're
 2 looking at the parent-child relationship. The officer
 3 and the enlisted, the senior enlisted, the junior
 4 enlisted. That's classically how you would look to —
 5 who of the two you would look to for responsibility to
 6 keep things on the straight and narrow and within bounds
 7 of propriety.
 8 But in reality, the junior person who is
 9 fostering this relationship and is pursuing this
 10 relationship and continuing this relationship, knowing
 11 that it's improper to be in that relationship with an
 12 officer, is equally committing an offense.
 13 So that's the best way I can answer your
 14 question there.
 15 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Bob Dare.
 16 Now, I don't know if it was in your
 17 charter but I think it's in ours. Somebody correct me if
 18 I'm wrong.
 19 And that is — And I'm assuming that you
 20 had to use empirical data as you went about assessing it,
 21 and so you could not account for senior people who had
 22 improper relations or conduct with subordinates. And as
 23 a result, they were just moved away or asked to retire in

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1 lieu of any type of punishment, which, in turn, created
 2 the perception that the rules and laws are not
 3 consistently applied.
 4 The more senior you are, the more
 5 opportunity you have to escape prosecution, if you will.
 6 MR. DE LEON: Well, that is an important
 7 question because I think the perception is there that —
 8 you know, back to this chart (Indicating) — the more
 9 senior you get, the more likely it is to be
 10 administrative.
 11 And so that's one of the reasons we did
 12 this chart (Indicating) — so that commanders can see
 13 it's perfectly acceptable to handle a case
 14 administratively and that, you know, there are
 15 exceptional elements that should get it here into the
 16 court-martial (Indicating).
 17 I think that was where I was most
 18 impressed with the — you know, when you looked at the
 19 Marine Corps cases. They were much more interested in
 20 solving a problem administratively than punitively court-
 21 martialing someone. But since we don't qualify a
 22 retirement, we don't really have the statistical
 23 measures.

1 But there is that perception there,
 2 particularly with the enlisted force.
 3 MR. PANG: Mr. Secretary. So what you
 4 have done is looked at consistency across the services
 5 and how they approach, you know, infractions like this.
 6 But the individual cases themselves, you know — And
 7 that's the thing that bothered me as I read through our
 8 charter. I mean, you know, there is an implication that
 9 we need to be able to arrive at conclusions with regard
 10 to individual cases and I just don't know how you'd do
 11 that.
 12 I mean, you know — And I'd appreciate
 13 getting on the record some comment from you with regard
 14 to the individual cases —
 15 MR. DE LEON: It's a —
 16 MR. PANG: — and the approach to doing
 17 that.
 18 MR. DE LEON: I mean, there have been a
 19 couple of high-level cases involving one lieutenant who
 20 has been mentioned and a senior enlisted that has been
 21 mentioned, where you could argue any actions could have
 22 been in terms of the oral admonition or the written
 23 admonition, and it could have been handled

1 administratively and we would have not gone through some
 2 rather painful, painful experiences.
 3 You know, in one case — You know, I've
 4 been reluctant to talk about the Flinn case because I was
 5 involved, working for the Secretary of the Air Force as
 6 Under at the time. But I can say that at the time that
 7 her colonel raised these issues the first time, if her
 8 behavior had changed, then it's entirely possible that
 9 this would not have escalated into a military justice
 10 case.
 11 With respect to the Sergeant Major of the
 12 Army, I believe the record shows that he was offered an
 13 administrative sanction and elected to take it to a
 14 court-martial as essentially his right to do.
 15 But we put this chart together to show
 16 commanders that they have a wide range of tools that are
 17 available to them and that it is entirely appropriate for
 18 some cases to be handed with minimal corrective action
 19 rather than with maximum.
 20 MS. POPE: Did the proposed regs address
 21 the commanding officer who blatantly misuses that
 22 suggested list of appropriate procedures? You've got a
 23 commanding officer who knows that an officer — there's

1 an improper officer-to-officer, officer-to-enlisted
 2 relationship, and decides a counseling session is enough
 3 for that blatant kind of violation of the rules.
 4 MR. DE LEON: We had a long discussion on
 5 this exact issue, and, in fact, however you would try to
 6 clarify it, ultimately the strength of our system is that
 7 the commander in the field makes the call on how to
 8 implement the rules. And so while there are extremes in
 9 terms of how the rules are enforced, that was one where
 10 we thought to try to have more consistency other than
 11 just a general educational tool would have probably done
 12 more damage than not.
 13 MS. POPE: Well — And I'm not thinking
 14 consistency. I just — The question is the commanding
 15 officer who misuses the system. I mean, I think it's
 16 important that commanding officers have the discretion,
 17 so I'm not recommending —
 18 MR. DE LEON: Right.
 19 MS. POPE: — or saying that there ought
 20 to be a very specific —
 21 MR. DE LEON: Right.
 22 MS. POPE: — penalty for the violations.
 23 But in the cases where a commanding officer, because he

1 or she likes an individual —
 2 MR. DE LEON: Right.
 3 MS. POPE: — that preferential treatment
 4 that blatantly breaks the rules, as well as the two
 5 people involved.
 6 MR. DE LEON: Right. No, that's a good
 7 question because there are some commanders that look the
 8 other way —
 9 MS. POPE: Right.
 10 MR. DE LEON: — and there are some
 11 commanders that have a vengeance-is-mine philosophy.
 12 MS. POPE: Right.
 13 MR. DE LEON: And so —
 14 COLONEL REED: There is a provision in the
 15 Manual for Courts-Martial that every —
 16 MS. POPE: Right.
 17 COLONEL REED: — senior commander has the
 18 same authority as the junior commander.
 19 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: That's
 20 correct.
 21 COLONEL REED: So if a junior commander is
 22 sweeping something under the rug in the scenario I think
 23 that you're illustrating here and giving somebody a

1 letter of reprimand which would be clearly
 2 inappropriately lenient —
 3 MS. POPE: Right.
 4 COLONEL REED: — the senior commander —
 5 and, of course, if it involves officers, the fact that an
 6 officer is in difficulty is known in the chain of command
 7 — the more senior commander, when he finds out what was
 8 the reported action on the junior commander's or junior
 9 officer's problem and they find out it was a letter of
 10 reprimand, under the Manual for Courts-Martial, the
 11 senior commander cannot dictate to the junior —
 12 MS. POPE: Right.
 13 COLONEL REED: — for unlawful-command-
 14 influence reasons, change the action, but he can say,
 15 "I'm going to exercise my authority and I'm going to
 16 issue that officer an Article 15 notification letter" or
 17 "I'm going to prefer court-martial charges against that
 18 officer. Not because I'm dictating you, Subordinate
 19 Commander, what to do, but I'm going to exercise —"
 20 MS. POPE: My authority.
 21 COLONEL REED: "— the authority Congress
 22 has given me as a convening authority and a commander,
 23 and I will exercise my authority."

1 So that check-and-balance, if you will, or
 2 oversight, if you will, already exists in the Manual for
 3 Courts-Martial, in the system as it is structured. And,
 4 of course, each of those superior commanders has the
 5 benefit of judge advocates who advise them on the Manual
 6 for Courts-Martial and their options, so it's not done in
 7 a vacuum.
 8 COLONEL BLACK: Also, I might mention
 9 there's some — there's some safety valves in the system.
 10 Individuals who perceive that they are a victim of
 11 injustice because "so-and-so got away with it and I
 12 didn't," they have the right to go up the chain of
 13 command. They have the right to go to the IG. They have
 14 the right to petition their congressman. There's a whole
 15 host of rights.
 16 The thing that tends to make things the
 17 most consistent is commanders are committed to being the
 18 best commanders they can and doing the best jobs they can
 19 and succeeding in getting even bigger commands. And from
 20 a logical standpoint, why would you want to do something
 21 that would undermine your command by deliberately
 22 treating people differently?
 23 That's not to say that it's never

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1 happened, but, you know, there's — the whole weight —
 2 the whole emphasis on the system is to do the right
 3 thing.
 4 MS. POPE: But when you weigh out somebody
 5 with twenty years of outstanding service for a moment of
 6 indiscretion, I mean, those very things that make a
 7 commander good also make those decisions hard. And I'm
 8 —
 9 COLONEL REED: Very hard.
 10 COLONEL BLACK: Yes.
 11 MS. POPE: Very hard. And it's — Not
 12 because it's blatantly wanting to undermine the system,
 13 but it's hard to do that with what those penalties are
 14 after twenty years of service. And so — And I think
 15 well-meaning people get themselves and their
 16 organizations into trouble, and so that's — I don't know
 17 how you capture that. And I'm not saying that — Again,
 18 one size fits all. It's —
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEZY: It's difficult.
 20 MR. DE LEON: No, it's — the flexibility
 21 has to remain with command. And one of the things we've
 22 striven hard is to make sure we don't become a one-
 23 mistake military.

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1 MS. POPE: Right.
 2 MR. DE LEON: As the person who signs off
 3 on the general officer nominations, you know, we have too
 4 much of a tendency to IG these things to the extreme and
 5 there's got to be some perspective and some
 6 proportionality. You know, I have read a recent
 7 biography of General Pershing and, you know, he would not
 8 survive in today's environment, and, yet, you know, he
 9 was an extremely capable leader in the field.
 10 And so — But one of the things — I know
 11 this is — is the Secretary: "We should not allow
 12 ourselves to become a one-mistake military."
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: A comment,
 14 and then a caution, Mr. Secretary.
 15 The comment is I'm clearly a believer in
 16 guidelines as long as those guidelines help commanders
 17 and help those within the chain of command to understand
 18 the regulation and that it is drafted correctly.
 19 The caution is what I've heard here is
 20 this is all built around the training program. The
 21 problem with training programs is that that's hours away
 22 from the basic skills that soldiers, sailors, airmen and
 23 marines need to do their job. And we — And I've watched

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1 it for thirty-five years collectively: when we have or
 2 perceive we have a problem, we say, "Well, we're going to
 3 put it in the schoolhouse" or "we're going to train,"
 4 "we're going to teach it," "we're going to do this and
 5 that," and invariably where those hours come from is the
 6 basic skills training, the things that keep a young man
 7 or woman alive in their job and on the battlefield. You
 8 know, it's four or five or ten hours gone.
 9 And my caution is, is that I would hope
 10 that we're not going to go so overboard in this that
 11 we're creating whole sub-courses that must be devoured by
 12 our young people.
 13 MR. DE LEON: An excellent point. I would
 14 be content if there was simply a brochure or a training
 15 pamphlet that a normal human being could read and
 16 understand.
 17 And what we found is when we actually sat
 18 down that Friday evening, the Under Secretary of Defense,
 19 who strives to at least try to be knowledgeable on most
 20 things, found it impossible to read the regulations and
 21 to explain them back. And the General Counsel of the
 22 department, who is far better educated than I and a
 23 graduate of Yale, found herself unable to read the

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1 regulations and understand them.
 2 So one of the notions was that, to be fair
 3 to the people at the lowest rank, we've got to provide
 4 them information that is user-friendly.
 5 And I think, General, you're exactly
 6 right: we would fail if this required ten hours of
 7 training. But what — The indication was, you know, when
 8 the enlisted said they had to live in an "antenna up"
 9 environment, that if we could make the rules available
 10 for them in a more user-friendly environment, I think
 11 that's the threshold that we tried to articulate both in
 12 Secretary Cohen's memorandum, and then the one that I
 13 attached to it as well.
 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I have one last point of
 15 clarification.
 16 Colonel Reed, I think I dropped a pronoun
 17 in your explanation of what a senior senior officer might
 18 do in the case posited by Barbara Pope. I understood
 19 what you were saying to mean that he could not substitute
 20 his judgment for the lower commanding officer but that he
 21 could do something else, and I wasn't clear what
 22 something else was.
 23 Was it that he could take the offender up

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1 on some other kind of charge himself or that he could
 2 charge the —
 3 COLONEL REED: He could —
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — officer who was making
 5 that decision with some kind of —
 6 COLONEL REED: What I was explaining was
 7 in the chain of command, the superior commander has the
 8 authority over the subordinate commander as you go up.
 9 So if the subordinate commander should have — let's say
 10 theoretically should have given him a nonjudicial
 11 punishment but decided just to counsel the individual.
 12 The superior commander has nonjudicial
 13 punishment authority. So the superior commander could
 14 say, "I feel that that action is totally inadequate for
 15 the offense or misconduct involved here. I can't direct
 16 that junior commander to change it because that's
 17 unlawful command influence, but since I have the
 18 authority, I can tell that junior commander, "Forget it.
 19 I'm going to take care of this situation and I'm going to
 20 address what I think is the appropriate nonjudicial
 21 punishment action over it."
 22 That — I was trying to explain that that
 23 mechanism already exists in the Manual for Courts-

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1 Martial, and always has for years, to answer her basic
 2 question of where is there some kind of oversight if a
 3 junior commander is totally out-of-line in the
 4 inappropriate leniency that the commander exercises when
 5 confronted with the situation.
 6 Does that clarify it at all?
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. Let me just make
 8 sure I understand it. The junior commander who, let's
 9 say, abused his discretion in giving a punishment that
 10 was too lenient, there would be no recourse against him
 11 other —
 12 COLONEL REED: Oh, yes.
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.
 14 COLONEL REED: There could be. That was
 15 the Black Hawk situation that Mr. de Leon was explaining
 16 where commanders, knowing that subordinates acted
 17 inappropriately or were derelict in their performance of
 18 their duty, and despite that, the commander took no
 19 action, and, in fact, put glowing terms in that
 20 subordinate's efficiency report.
 21 And General Fogleman, upon being made
 22 aware of it, said that that would be inappropriate for —
 23 if you know that the subordinate acted inappropriately,

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1 to then go around and ignore that and compound the
 2 problem by putting something in his personnel records
 3 that enhanced his image rather than reflected the
 4 inappropriateness.
 5 So General Fogleman, at that time,
 6 reviewed all the actions at the direction of the
 7 Secretary of the Air Force and, based upon that review,
 8 determined that certain administrative actions were
 9 appropriate to correct the record.
 10 And that's the action that General
 11 Fogleman took and which he reported to Congress, and
 12 which basically he announced to the Air Force that he had
 13 taken that action. And the message was that commanders
 14 need to hold people accountable, but commanders also are
 15 accountable for their decision-making and they cannot
 16 just ignore problems out of favoritism or for whatever
 17 reason.
 18 So that's what — that was an
 19 illustration, if you will, on a level of what I was
 20 trying to explain where a senior commander can look at
 21 the action of a subordinate and say, "Totally
 22 inappropriate. I'm not going to tell you what to do, but
 23 I'm going to take some corrective action at this level."

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1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.
 2 COLONEL REED: You're welcome.
 3 MR. PANG: You know, I believe that this
 4 review was confined to relationships within the military.
 5 Is that correct? I mean, you didn't get into — in this
 6 review — relationships between military and civilians in
 7 the workforce, for example, or spouses of military. I
 8 mean, that's a question I think that was raised in some
 9 of the —
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well, you could
 11 be charged with adultery if it was a DoD personnel.
 12 MR. PANG: No, if it was not adulterous.
 13 You know, over-familiar relationships, you know, between
 14 — You know, the DoD workforce now, over a third of it is
 15 civilian.
 16 MS. POPE: Civilian.
 17 MR. PANG: So you have people in the field
 18 — a lot of civilians out there, you know, and the
 19 question, you know, is this review was — I believe was
 20 limited only to the military — within the military. Is
 21 that correct?
 22 MR. DE LEON: In terms of fraternization,
 23 it was looking at —

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1 MR. PANG: In terms of fraternization.
 2 MR. DE LEON: — at military
 3 relationships. The adultery panel have a different
 4 charter.
 5 MR. PANG: And I think — you know, the
 6 reason I raise that is because, you know, there are going
 7 to be questions with regard to that brought to us.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Yes.
 9 MR. PANG: And I would assume — okay? —
 10 that any kind of inappropriate relationships — there are
 11 — have to be inappropriate relationships between
 12 military and civilian personnel. They would fall under
 13 some other portion of the UCMJ?
 14 COLONEL REED: It could, depending on what
 15 the nature of the misconduct was and involved. You could
 16 have conduct unbecoming an officer that affects a
 17 commanding officer who is acting inappropriately with a
 18 person in or out of uniform. But again, it depends on
 19 what the conduct is that you're talking about as to
 20 whether it falls into that category or not.
 21 And then there are other offenses that,
 22 depending on the — again — the facts, what factually
 23 took place between the two as to what's involved.

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1 MR. PANG: That's correct. You know, let
 2 me give you an example —
 3 MR. DE LEON: But I can give you, Fred,
 4 the exact question. And Colonel Black — There's not a
 5 relationship that exists that could not impact the "good
 6 order and discipline" statute. A colonel and his spouse,
 7 even that is a relationship that in some context could
 8 impact good order and discipline. If they were
 9 intoxicated in public, for example. But we felt that
 10 essentially the authorities there were clear enough.
 11 At the heart of our deliberations were
 12 really military-to-military relationships because we
 13 thought that's where some of the ambiguity rested.
 14 MR. PANG: Yeah. And I think that the
 15 example, you know, I think that I wanted to raise — and
 16 it would be where an individual who was single and had a,
 17 you know, confidential secretary who was single and they
 18 would date.
 19 I mean, that doesn't violate this rule
 20 because I believe this applies to military. But that
 21 would also potentially undermine good order and
 22 discipline, so you would have to exercise — I would
 23 assume — okay? — a senior commander seeing that going

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1 on would view that as undermining good order and
 2 discipline and, therefore, would be, you know,
 3 actionable.
 4 COLONEL REED: It could under Article 133
 5 of the Code that says conduct unbecoming an officer and a
 6 gentleman or gentlewoman. It also could be an Article
 7 134 offense if that conduct was prejudicial to good order
 8 and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the
 9 Armed Forces.
 10 That key element of that offense and the
 11 officer offense is what basically amounts to "it
 12 depends." It depends on what the acts were, what the
 13 facts were. And if those facts exist in an environment
 14 and such that meet that level of "prejudicial to good
 15 order and discipline" or "service-discrediting," then,
 16 under Article 134, it could be an offense under that.
 17 I would venture to say, however, that if
 18 it was just a too-close relationship, it probably
 19 wouldn't rely on Article 133 or 134. It would be
 20 addressed in "appropriate officership" or "appropriate
 21 action as a commander" or "appropriate leadership,"
 22 "demonstration of leadership." You know, those are
 23 things that are not UCMJ offenses. You know, you don't

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1 have "failure to exercise appropriate leadership."
 2 But they certainly are officership and
 3 enlisted leadership qualities of a total force. And
 4 deficiencies in those qualities can be reflected in
 5 administrative things such as performance reports,
 6 assignments, promotions; you know, the whole personnel
 7 community actions regarding that individual if it's out-
 8 of-bounds.
 9 MR. PANG: But you don't have the same
 10 range of action. I mean, you know, you're more limited,
 11 I think. Isn't that correct?
 12 COLONEL REED: Well, before you can use
 13 any military justice action, Article 15 — nonjudicial
 14 punishment under Article 15 — or a court-martial, it has
 15 to be an offense described by the Code. If it's
 16 something you would raise your eyebrows about and
 17 something that you feel is totally against what you think
 18 ought to be appropriate but it doesn't constitute an
 19 offense under the Code, then your remedy is an
 20 administrative action.
 21 MR. PANG: Gotcha.
 22 COLONEL BLACK: It would quickly come to
 23 people's attention when something like that is coming and

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1 is happening because the annual bonus time comes around
2 and — or it's time for somebody to get some particular
3 training that will help them get upgraded or promoted or
4 something of that nature, and if you are in that kind of
5 a relationship as a commander, people will look very
6 closely when you have to take action regarding the person
7 you're in that relationship with.

8 So I think some of the same principles
9 apply and I think that — you know, that the overwhelming
10 majority — First of all, there are not a lot of cases to
11 begin with, and then the overwhelming majority of those
12 cases that do exist are handled administratively, and
13 appropriately so.

14 MR. RUSH: I think it's fair to say that
15 during most of the panels — the officer panels, the
16 commander panels, the senior enlisted panels — that that
17 issue didn't come up. It wasn't raised by the
18 participants. But it is a strength of this tiered chart
19 which talks about building values and honor and
20 integrity, et cetera, as a basis for addressing that type
21 of issue.

22 DR. MOSKOS: Shifting grounds a little
23 bit, what I should ask the group is — Rudy, could you

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1 So I think this was part of why the
2 Secretary and the Chairman in the end concluded the way
3 that they did after a very thorough discussion with each
4 of the service chiefs, both individually and in the tank.
5 What is expected and what is pending is an Army proposal
6 to have a transition of about a year's time. That is
7 under review at this moment.

8 I'd note, however, that the Air Force
9 changed its policy in 1995, made the implementation of
10 that policy immediate and really did not go through a
11 tremendous gnashing of teeth.

12 I'd also note that at the beginning of the
13 nineties, there are more officer-enlisted marriages in
14 the Air Force than in the Army, and that as the Air Force
15 changed its policy, its numbers came down. The Army
16 policy, for whatever reason, officer-enlisted marriages
17 have tended to go up.

18 Knowing your sociological interest,
19 however, I'd like to run the statistics for you that show
20 as a general proposition that — Rather than speaking
21 from memory, I'd like to get you the statistics, but what
22 it shows is that officer-to-officer marriages in the
23 military have a tremendous amount of pressure on them and

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1 respond? What was broke in the Army that one had to
2 change? Some of my army contacts say that now they're
3 going to have to be hypocrites like the other services.

4 And I'm wondering now, you know, obviously
5 everybody's who married in across-rank situations, we're
6 not going to annul those marriages. There would be some
7 kind of a grandfathering procedure. But isn't it kind of
8 a contradiction when you say all those who are already
9 married or presently dating, that's okay, but three years
10 hence or whenever the grandfathering date is set in —
11 And I'd like to know what the — if a date certain has
12 been set at which point army officers and enlisteds can't
13 fraternize anymore outside the chain of command.

14 How do you respond to those kinds of, you
15 know, concerns?

16 MR. DE LEON: It was an issue that was
17 discussed in not only great detail, but discussed for
18 eight to nine months. It depends upon what your premise
19 is. We've reached the point where we have become a joint
20 force. The joint environment is where we do most of our
21 critical operations today. And when you would — We sat
22 with one of the joint war-fighting CINC's at his command
23 and he had his Air Force and Marine and Army components

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1 that officer-enlisted marriages have even greater
2 pressure on them in terms of the length of time it takes
3 for that second spouse to separate from the service.
4 So I will get you those numbers.

5 DR. MOSKOS: Maybe the Army's more
6 romantic than the Air Force.

7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEZY: Tough issue.

8 MR. DE LEON: The officer-enlisted
9 marriages tend to congregate around career fields. And
10 in the Air Force, they tended to congregate around the
11 medical vocation.

12 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you.

13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEZY: Interesting
14 issue. For what it's worth, it's been debated a long
15 time. When I went to — You talked about training,
16 Charlie. I was at basic commander's course in 1982 and
17 that was one of the key — The JAG came over and talked
18 about why we were struggling and what is fraternization,
19 and the guy couldn't really define it; so we, as a class,
20 decided that every guest speaker we had, we would ask
21 that question.

22 And we had a series of three four-star
23 commanders and a wing commander, and the best answer we

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1 all sitting there; and he said in a perfect world we'd be
2 able to find a way so that we could, you know, do this
3 together. He said the service politics may be too hard.
4 But I think it's the fact that we really
5 are a joint environment today and it's hard to say that
6 two people working side-by-side in the field need to
7 operate under different rules.

8 Now, with respect to officer-enlisted
9 marriages, there will be a grandfathering of Army
10 personnel. I would note that there are officer-enlisted
11 marriages in each of the services. But a bootstrap
12 officer — that is, where there are two enlisted persons
13 married and one, because of their effort and hard work,
14 is promoted and becomes an officer — that those
15 relationships would be waived under the Secretary's
16 policy, as they already are under the other services'
17 policies.

18 So, you know, I think in the short term,
19 while there may be "gee, nothing is broke in the Army,"
20 you know, the Army policy, at first reading, appears to
21 be the most egalitarian and the most practical; but when
22 you really get into where are the lines, it becomes, I
23 think, ambiguous and extremely gray.

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1 got was a seasoned four-star from Strategic Air Command.
2 When we asked the question, he said, "I'll tell you what.
3 I can't define it, but I know it when I see it."

4 And as a group, we decided that's probably
5 — If we can create a culture and a sense of knowing, not
6 only amongst the generals and the colonels but down into
7 the trenches with the young and the mid-level NCO's and
8 young officers, so that we can take care of ourselves
9 when you see something developing that just doesn't look
10 right, knock it off and fix it right there. And I think
11 that's what this here is all about, in my judgment.

12 MR. DE LEON: In terms of the internal
13 debate, the fraternization debate was much more
14 contentious within the services than was generally the
15 discussion on the Manual for Courts-Martial for adultery.
16 That debate largely existed in the Judge Advocate's
17 corps. And with your permission, Madam Chair, I would
18 yield to Colonel Reed to discuss that.

19 MS. POPE: I have — Before we switch
20 topics, is there data — I know there is — that the
21 department captures on number of married across the
22 services, officer-to-officer, enlisted-to-enlisted, and
23 can we get a copy of where those trends are today?

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1 COLONEL REED: Yes.
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Does anybody want to take
 3 a couple-minute break before we —
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Yeah, why don't
 5 we take a comfort break.
 6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. We'll let the
 7 reporter rest his fingers. We'll resume at 3:00.
 8 (A brief recess was taken.)
 9 MR. DE LEON: The second issue to be
 10 discussed out of the Secretary's July 1997 memo was a
 11 request to the General Counsel that they review the
 12 Manual for Courts-Martial with respect to the charge of
 13 adultery. Colonel Reed is here on behalf of the General
 14 Counsel of the Department of Defense and has a briefing.
 15 COLONEL REED: Thank you, sir.
 16 I hope all of you have a copy of the
 17 slides. I also provided a copy of what the proposed
 18 additional guidance for the Manual that was proposed in
 19 the Federal Register, and I also provided you a DoD
 20 statistical summary regarding adultery offenses for a
 21 five-year period of time. So hopefully all of you have
 22 those.
 23 As Mr. de Leon indicated, this came in a

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1 period of time in June of 1997 when there was a lot of
 2 publicity of highly celebrated cases, predominantly
 3 involving the Air Force at the time, and it was given to
 4 the Department of Defense General Counsel to conduct an
 5 adultery review.
 6 The Secretary's explanation as to why and
 7 what was at work is provided to you in a quote and I'm
 8 not going to read it because of the time constraints we
 9 have, but I'll let the Secretary speak for himself. In
 10 essence, that he thought it was time because of the
 11 heightened interest, publicity and discussions that were
 12 going on within and without the services, that a review
 13 of the guidance provided in the Manual for Courts-Martial
 14 would be appropriate.
 15 Statistically — As Ms. Blair indicated
 16 earlier, she had heard that it was not statistically a
 17 high number — and that is correct — of the incidence of
 18 adultery that resulted in a court-martial offense.
 19 The statistics that you have before you
 20 basically show that in that five-year period of time,
 21 there were only eighteen cases in which adultery was the
 22 only offense charged that warranted a court-martial case.
 23 That amounts to less than one-tenth of one percent of all

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1 of our court-martial actions, special and general courts,
 2 over that five-year period of time.
 3 And even if you plug in the cases that
 4 were what I call — adultery was a tagalong charge to
 5 more serious offenses, which is typically what the case
 6 is, the numbers increase, but it's still a situation
 7 where it's, you know, less than five percent of the cases
 8 involve adultery charges against the military person.
 9 So despite the publicity and the attention
 10 that celebrated courts-martial cases get and the media
 11 cover, it's a very low percentage of our disciplinary
 12 actions, at least handled at nonjudicial — or through
 13 judicial actions.
 14 Again, I've already explained in answer to
 15 an earlier question fraternization, why it's difficult to
 16 come up with similar statistics because of the UCMJ
 17 charging alternatives available for that.
 18 The objective of the review was a policy
 19 review. The goal was to review the clarity of the
 20 existing guidance in the Manual for Courts-Martial, and
 21 there was no contemplated change to the Uniform Code of
 22 Military Justice as a result of adultery as an offense
 23 under the Code.

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1 Interestingly enough, adultery is not even
 2 mentioned in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It's
 3 not until you get to Article 134 of the Manual for
 4 Courts-Martial that you see an enumerated offense —
 5 along with about ninety others — a sample specification,
 6 a brief explanation, and an established maximum
 7 punishment for — just like all the other Article 134
 8 offenses.
 9 So the obvious and appropriate focus was
 10 on the Manual for Courts-Martial, because if there was
 11 any guidance provided as to what the offense of adultery
 12 was in the military, it was in the Manual. It wasn't in
 13 the Uniform Code. And so the focus was on the Manual for
 14 Courts-Martial provisions.
 15 In the next slide, I provide for you a
 16 summary of the elements of the offense of adultery.
 17 Either party in the military, if married. Whether the
 18 other party is or is not, both parties have committed the
 19 offense of adultery. Even the unmarried person has
 20 committed the offense of adultery.
 21 Obviously the element of the offense
 22 requires sexual intercourse.
 23 And then the third element is the one I

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1 talked to you briefly about before, the when-if: conduct
 2 prejudicial to good order and discipline or service-
 3 discrediting. That provision is typical of all Article
 4 134 offenses. That provision has been in the Manual for
 5 Courts-Martial and applied to the military since the
 6 Continental Army. So it's not a new provision; it's not
 7 a new criteria; it has always been there.
 8 So our focus, then, had to be on what the
 9 general guidance was on what does that mean, prejudicial
 10 to good order and discipline in the Manual. Paragraph 60
 11 is a general paragraph that talks about all Article 134
 12 offenses. Not specifically the offense of adultery
 13 versus some other offense under 134, but generally
 14 applicable.
 15 And in there it says if one of your
 16 elements to the offense is conduct prejudicial to good
 17 order and discipline or service-discrediting, then that
 18 conduct has to have a direct and palpable or measurable
 19 impact on the military. It cannot be remote, indirect or
 20 distant impact on the military. And that's applicable to
 21 the offense of adultery, as I said, in all 134 offenses,
 22 any time that element is required.
 23 Now, the current Manual for Courts-Martial

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1 guidance on adultery basically says "refer to paragraph
 2 60," and that adultery is not a lesser included offense
 3 of rape. End of guidance, end of discussion.
 4 Well, if you think back to 1997 and what
 5 was being played out in the military press and in the
 6 military and in conversations, perhaps that was
 7 inadequate guidance for commanders and people out there
 8 to understand what we're talking about as adultery as an
 9 offense in the military. So the Joint Service Committee,
 10 on the next slide, was chartered with the initial review
 11 and scrub of the offense of adultery and the guidance in
 12 the Manual for Courts-Martial.
 13 Now, why did this come to the DoD General
 14 Counsel and why did it go to the Joint Service Committee
 15 on Military Justice? The reason is that under a DoD
 16 directive, 5500.17, we have basically a standing
 17 committee with an annual obligation to review the Manual
 18 for Courts-Martial and to review the UCMJ provisions, to
 19 keep it current with military case law developments,
 20 United States Supreme Court case law developments,
 21 Federal Rules of Evidence changes.
 22 We do an annual review — this standing
 23 committee, the Joint Service Committee. I've been a

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1 member of that committee for six years now and I am Ms.
 2 Miller's — the General Counsel's representative to that
 3 committee.
 4 So since they are in the business and have
 5 the practice of looking at all provisions in the Manual
 6 to make sure it's consistent and in harmony with other
 7 provisions of the Manual, the Joint Service Committee was
 8 given the brunt of the work, to look at this and see what
 9 could be done. That's what the first bullet means by
 10 providing ongoing MCM reviews. Our job is to do that for
 11 the Secretary of Defense on an annual basis.
 12 They also, at this time — We decided to
 13 go out to the field and ask commanders what they thought
 14 about the adequacy of the guidance provided regarding the
 15 Manual for Courts-Martial and the commanders basically
 16 said, "We are not confused out here. We think we are
 17 getting good support with the help of our judge advocates
 18 on these cases." Some commanders said, "But, you know,
 19 it might be helpful if we got some additional guidance on
 20 this third element, this 'prejudicial to good order and
 21 discipline' or 'service-discrediting' element in the
 22 context of adultery. Perhaps that would be helpful."
 23 So the Joint Service Committee focused its

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1 attention on that because the first two elements weren't
 2 really that difficult as to whether somebody was married
 3 and whether there was sexual intercourse between the
 4 parties. So the third element is where we focused our
 5 attention.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Just a point of question. I
 7 mean, the second point might not be that clear — sexual
 8 intercourse. I mean, how is that actually defined? I
 9 mean, in light of discussions of the —
 10 MS. POPE: You couldn't resist that,
 11 Charlie.
 12 DR. MOSKOS: No, really. Has it got a —
 13 COLONEL REED: It doesn't include oral
 14 sex.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: It doesn't.
 16 COLONEL REED: It doesn't include petting.
 17 It does not include —
 18 DR. MOSKOS: It does not include oral sex?
 19 Okay.
 20 COLONEL REED: Right. It doesn't include
 21 sodomy. It includes basically heterosexual —
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Penetration.
 23 COLONEL REED: — penetration.

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1 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 2 COLONEL REED: Right.
 3 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you.
 4 COLONEL REED: So the Joint Service
 5 Committee then recommended to the Senior Review Panel,
 6 which was established here. And the Senior Review Panel,
 7 as you can see below on the chart, consisted of the Navy
 8 Principal Deputy General Counsel at the time, the Deputy
 9 Judge Advocates General, the Deputy General's Counsel,
 10 the Counsel to the Coast Guard, Legal Counsel to the
 11 Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Deputy Staff Judge
 12 Advocate and the Deputy General Counsel to the Commandant
 13 of the Marine Corps, and their job was to provide input
 14 through to the General Counsel, DoD General Counsel, as
 15 to what additional guidance would be appropriate.
 16 Let me back up a little bit on this slide
 17 and you'll see that there were some organizations invited
 18 to comment. At the time the review was given to the
 19 Joint Service Committee, the chair at that time, an Army
 20 colonel who is the Army CrimLaw Chief, recommended to the
 21 General Counsel that it might be appropriate because of
 22 the gender issue at the time — Kelly Flinn being in the
 23 news — whether male, female, the issue of adultery —

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1 whether or not there should be some outside organizations
 2 that should also be invited, to be told that this review
 3 is ongoing and invited to comment. And so the chair of
 4 the Joint Service Committee provided a list to the
 5 General Counsel and invited them, along with the American
 6 public, to comment on this issue, and that was back in
 7 June of '97.
 8 Now, the methodology used to do this is
 9 after the Joint Service Committee came up with the
 10 proposal, which was about ninety-five percent of what's
 11 been published in the Federal Register, there was a
 12 coordination phase with the military departments, the
 13 services, Secretary's office, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
 14 and then on 29 July, 1998, the Secretary of Defense
 15 announced basically what was a preliminary proposal on
 16 the additional guidance for adultery as filed in the
 17 Federal Register. It was — And that Federal Register
 18 publication, again, is a standard operating procedure for
 19 any change to the Manual for Courts-Martial.
 20 We held a public meeting on October 1st,
 21 1998, which is part of the procedure as well, and the
 22 public's written comments regarding the proposal are
 23 still open until October 28; after which, the Joint

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1 Service Committee will consider the public comments, will
 2 conduct a formal DoD coordination of what the Joint
 3 Service Committee feels to be the appropriate final
 4 review; the Secretary of Defense will approve it. It
 5 then goes through the normal process — OMB, Department
 6 of Justice review, White House coordinations — and then
 7 any changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial are
 8 Executive Order changes.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can I ask
 10 you who — what was — where the public meeting was held
 11 and —
 12 COLONEL REED: It was —
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — what
 14 sort of attendance you received?
 15 COLONEL REED: It was held in Arlington,
 16 over in — Help me out.
 17 MR. RUSH: Rosslyn.
 18 COLONEL REED: Rosslyn, sorry. There was
 19 — Basically, Mr. Kevin Barry came from the National
 20 Institute of Military Justice and made a verbal
 21 presentation. There was a presentation by Elaine
 22 Donnolly in writing from her organization. Another
 23 organization indicated that they were going to submit

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1 matters in writing. There was no press coverage. There
 2 were no other citizens that showed up, and there was one
 3 reporter from the Service Times magazine. And that was
 4 the extent of the public meeting.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 6 Thank you.
 7 COLONEL REED: The next slide basically is
 8 to talk about some of the provisions that are in the
 9 proposal as it currently exists.
 10 Rule for Court-Martial 306 has a policy
 11 that's been there for — I don't know how many years, but
 12 many years — and basically the policy there is that
 13 commanders, when confronted with allegations of
 14 misconduct, ought to evaluate all the facts and
 15 circumstances involved in the case — the individual's
 16 military record, et cetera — and take appropriate
 17 action, the lowest appropriate level of action to address
 18 the misconduct, that which is warranted, appropriate and
 19 fair.
 20 And so the Joint Service Committee felt
 21 that because of the controversy surrounding this, as it
 22 has been, that maybe that ought to be repeated and people
 23 ought to be reminded of that policy that applies to all

1 UCMJ offenses.
 2 There is also some additional guidance of
 3 marriage. Again, as you know or may not know, in some
 4 marriages there's a divorce decree and then you have a
 5 six-month waiting period, interlocutory period before it
 6 becomes final. We wanted to make clear that everybody
 7 understood that this was not a free zone; that you're
 8 married until — you're married until such time as the
 9 court says you're not married.
 10 And marriage is in the strictest sense of
 11 the term, from a legal perspective. We're not talking
 12 about Class B bachelors or TUY marriages. We're talking
 13 about marriage is according to what the law is. And
 14 until the law says you're no longer married, then that's
 15 what the definition means; so that nobody can be
 16 misunderstood as to what the requirement is that — if
 17 you are married.
 18 Also, there was case law that developed
 19 that indicated that obviously there can be a mistake of
 20 fact. You may believe that you're single, but for some
 21 quirk in the law you're actually married. You know, if
 22 something didn't go through the divorce proceeding
 23 appropriately or the person that you're having a

1 relationship with you thought was single but, in fact,
 2 they are married.
 3 In which case, if you honestly had reason
 4 to believe that that person was single, then that mistake
 5 of fact — that mistaken belief on your part — is a
 6 valid defense to this charge. There's military case law
 7 to that effect. So we plugged that into the rule.
 8 What the hope was of the Joint Service
 9 Committee was the guidance that you find in the Manual
 10 for Courts-Martial or the guidance on adultery in most
 11 cases is found in the law books because the law is
 12 developed by case law. That's the way our system of
 13 government is. So if a military court-martial goes up on
 14 appeal and the appellate court says, "Okay. Here are the
 15 rules regarding adultery," it's buried in the law books.
 16 So unless you have the lawyer there who can go into the
 17 law book to tell the commander what it says, that's the
 18 commander's resource.
 19 What the thought was from the Joint
 20 Service Committee was, "Let's take it out of the dusty
 21 law books. Let's take what the court has given us as
 22 guidelines and goals and objectives and standards. Let's
 23 take it out of the law books. Let's put it in the Manual

1 for Courts-Martial so commanders who are out there
 2 picking up the Manual for Courts-Martial, and sergeants
 3 and enlisted people, can read it and they can see what
 4 the law says about this particular offense that seems to
 5 be so controversial."
 6 And so that's what these guidelines and
 7 rules are in the proposal — what we've taken out of the
 8 Manual for Courts-Martial and out of the case law.
 9 Yes, sir. You had a question.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Yeah. It
 11 seems to me that honest mistake of fact as a defense has
 12 always been a defense. That, in fact, in a case that has
 13 reached a court-martial, the defense attorney — the
 14 defense counsel is, in fact, and does in fact use that.
 15 And in fact, he can use it twice in military law. He can
 16 use it as a defense, and then he can use it as
 17 extenuation and mitigation if, in fact, you know, there's
 18 been — there has been a conviction for a lesser — for a
 19 lesser sentence.
 20 COLONEL REED: But it nowhere appears in a
 21 discussion or an explanation of the offense of adultery
 22 in the Manual for Courts-Martial. You're right. It's in
 23 the case law. It's in the books. It's been on the books

1 for years.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Well, I've
 3 clearly understood that for thirty-five years.
 4 MS. POPE: But you're smarter than the
 5 average person.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 7 Thank you.
 8 COLONEL REED: Yes, sir.
 9 Additional guidance on nonexclusive
 10 factors: the Joint Service Committee came up with
 11 basically looking at the case law and how the courts have
 12 talked about it, of things that commanders ought to be
 13 mulling over in their head and considering when deciding
 14 whether an offense that's been committed, i.e., is
 15 prejudicial to good order and discipline or service-
 16 discrediting, and what type of action to take.
 17 The Joint Service Committee took a look at
 18 those cases and basically said, "Perhaps it will be
 19 easier and beneficial to commanders if we set forth them
 20 as not binding, not exclusive, but factors listed for a
 21 commander to consider," and so that format was
 22 established by the Joint Service Committee in order to
 23 assist commanders out there.

1 And then some explanation was added to
 2 that to try to help commanders with this aspect of
 3 "prejudicial to good order and discipline" and primarily
 4 language from the cases when they talked about what
 5 "prejudicial to good order and discipline" and "service-
 6 discrediting" was. Instead of leaving it in the books,
 7 bring it out into the open.
 8 The factors to consider were — are listed
 9 on the next slide. The military status of the parties or
 10 their spouses or their relationship to the military. In
 11 other words, some military nexus, if you will.
 12 The impact on the military unit; the
 13 ability of the parties or their spouses to perform their
 14 military duties. In other words, as a result of this
 15 relationship, was the ability to perform military duties
 16 impaired in any capacity?
 17 Was there any misuse of government
 18 resources to facilitate the conduct?
 19 Whether conduct persisted after counseling
 20 or if it was accompanied by other offenses.
 21 The existence of a legal separation.
 22 Again, not a defense; but if somebody has been legally
 23 separated for twenty-five years but they're not

1 officially divorced, it is a factor for the commander to
 2 consider. Certainly not controlling, doesn't have to be
 3 the final decision, but the commander ought to be able to
 4 consider that in deciding how to consider this offense.
 5 And then, of course, ongoing or recent or
 6 remote in time.
 7 MS. POPE: Colonel, I'm sorry, you just —
 8 you lost me there. You, just a minute ago, said if
 9 you're married, you're married until the law says you're
 10 not married.
 11 COLONEL REED: Correct.
 12 MS. POPE: And then you said, but you've
 13 been separated for twenty-five years, and even though
 14 you're legally married, then the military is not going to
 15 consider you married.
 16 COLONEL REED: No. What I'm saying is you
 17 are married under the definition of a marriage.
 18 MS. POPE: Right.
 19 COLONEL REED: And we're telling everybody
 20 that.
 21 When you're determining whether or not it
 22 had an impact on the organization and the degree of
 23 severity of the misconduct, the feeling was that the

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1 existence of a legal separation is a factor that the
 2 commander should consider. Not that it is a defense and
 3 not that it excuses the behavior, but it ought to be a
 4 factor for the commander to consider when he's looking at
 5 the options available to him to take disciplinary action
 6 on an individual.
 7 MR. PANG: So the factors to consider are
 8 factors you consider in administering or not
 9 administering the punishment.
 10 COLONEL REED: Yes, it can be used for
 11 that purpose as well.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Or charging him,
 13 right? You might not want to charge him.
 14 COLONEL REED: Pardon me?
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: This allows
 16 you not to charge him if you feel — I mean, you don't
 17 have to charge him, right?
 18 COLONEL REED: No, no. That's right.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Yeah.
 20 COLONEL REED: And now it could be a
 21 factor that decides that it's an appropriate
 22 administrative action, for instance. It's not a UCMJ
 23 action; it should not be — It should not be a criminal

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1 that sort of stuff. But these are factors that we
 2 thought — or at least at this point have been thought;
 3 they're not in concrete yet because they're still under
 4 review — that would help commanders in looking at this
 5 and evaluating this.
 6 Most commanders, as General Lezy indicated
 7 — he'll know if there's an impact on his organization
 8 because it's the sergeant that's complained about
 9 something that's going on in the organization, and so the
 10 complaint within the organization is already going to
 11 show the unrest and the effect and the impact on the
 12 organization and people are — You know, the complaint
 13 system's going to get kicked in and that sort of stuff.
 14 So —
 15 MR. PANG: Let me ask a question —
 16 COLONEL REED: Yes, sir.
 17 MR. PANG: — just so that I can clear
 18 this up in my own head. I mean, the elements of the
 19 offense are either party being married.
 20 COLONEL REED: Yes.
 21 MR. PANG: Sexual intercourse. And then
 22 conduct prejudicial to the good order and discipline or
 23 service-discrediting.

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1 offense, if you will, under the UCMJ.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But that
 3 exists now.
 4 COLONEL REED: What? That —
 5 MS. POPE: That discretion.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: That
 7 discretion.
 8 MS. POPE: Right.
 9 COLONEL REED: That discretion. Yes, sir.
 10 That discretion exists now and our effort was to maintain
 11 that discretion with the commander. We weren't trying to
 12 take the discretion away from the commander. We were
 13 trying to help a commander look at factors and
 14 considerations to help him exercise that discretion, if
 15 you will; give him things to think about.
 16 These are things that he's going to be
 17 discussing with his judge advocate, hopefully, when he's
 18 confronted with a fact pattern that illustrates that
 19 there's misconduct that he has to address. So what we
 20 were trying to do is put it in a readily available
 21 location, what the courts have talked to us about, and
 22 say, "These are things you want to consider. It's your
 23 discretion, Commander, on what you do with it, but we

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1 COLONEL REED: Right.
 2 MR. PANG: So when I read this and listen
 3 to the discussion thus far, what this kind of tells me is
 4 that you can have a situation where either party is
 5 married; there was sexual intercourse, but the
 6 determination made that it is not conduct prejudicial to
 7 good order and discipline and service-discrediting and
 8 that's okay.
 9 COLONEL REED: Precisely.
 10 MR. PANG: So a commander can say that. I
 11 mean —
 12 COLONEL REED: Well, not only the
 13 commander can say that, but the Army appellate court —
 14 MR. PANG: Yes.
 15 COLONEL REED: — has said that we will
 16 not establish a "per se" rule. And the court —
 17 MR. PANG: I see.
 18 COLONEL REED: The court language
 19 basically —
 20 MR. PANG: So if I'm a commander out in
 21 Korea and, you know, I have some married troops and
 22 they're downtown and they're having sex and I know that,
 23 but I may make the judgment that this is not conduct

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1 just think that these things are something that you ought
 2 to consider."
 3 Some of the misconceptions over the last
 4 couple of months since July 29th or thereabouts was that
 5 we were lowering the standards; that we were lowering the
 6 punishment; that we were creating double standards or
 7 that we weren't addressing the male-female or senior
 8 officer-and-others.
 9 And the point we were trying to make
 10 through these factors that — these are things that all
 11 good commanders should be considering in deciding as the
 12 Manual directs them to decide on what is appropriate.
 13 Does this thing that you disapprove of amount to an
 14 offense under the Code? And if so, what is the
 15 appropriate command response — getting back to your
 16 earlier question, what is the appropriate command
 17 response that a commander ought to address? Is it an
 18 aggravated situation or is it not an aggravated
 19 situation?
 20 Again, it's very hard in anything of this
 21 nature to draw a straight line in the sand and make it
 22 clear because you're dealing with human beings who come
 23 from different backgrounds and different careers and all

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1 prejudicial to good order and discipline or service-
 2 discrediting, I don't have to take any action. Is that
 3 true?
 4 COLONEL REED: That would be correct. If
 5 you determine that that last element is not established,
 6 then you —
 7 MR. PANG: Right. So you have to
 8 establish —
 9 COLONEL REED: You have to establish all
 10 three.
 11 MR. PANG: Three. Okay.
 12 COLONEL REED: Two out of three isn't good
 13 enough.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: But this is not
 15 new, right?
 16 COLONEL REED: No, sir.
 17 MR. PANG: No, it's not new. Right?
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: It's the same as
 19 it always has been.
 20 MR. PANG: I just wanted to make sure that
 21 I was clear in my head.
 22 MR. DE LEON: Well, the confusion is with
 23 the public —

1 MR. PANG: Yes.
 2 MR. DE LEON: — because I have often had
 3 to pull out a small catechism and go through the Ten
 4 Commandments and explain the difference between the Sixth
 5 Commandment and the UCMJ because they are different.
 6 MR. MOORE: Tom Moore.
 7 I'm glad you put this chart in. I think
 8 it's good that you address the problem of misconceptions
 9 and I'd like to ask you about that a little further and
 10 it may be calling for an opinion —
 11 COLONEL REED: Sure.
 12 MR. MOORE: — on your part.
 13 But assuming that the criticism that
 14 seemed to follow immediately upon the issuing of this new
 15 policy was well intentioned and — how do you account for
 16 it? I mean, I'm trying to — It seems to me that you
 17 haven't lowered the standards, accepting the brief at
 18 face value; you haven't watered down punishment. So
 19 where does — How do you account for the sort of
 20 backlash?
 21 Was it because it seems to be giving more
 22 discretion to commanders, or are you — by stipulating
 23 these factors, you're maybe allowing more mitigation to

1 come into the process? I'm —
 2 COLONEL REED: Most —
 3 MR. MOORE: — sort of puzzled why this...
 4 COLONEL REED: Okay. Most of the
 5 misunderstanding is because people don't understand that
 6 for this offense, you have to have that third element:
 7 conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline or
 8 service-discrediting.
 9 The complaint letters, if you will, that I
 10 respond to are typically, "Oh, my God. Now you're
 11 requiring it to be prejudicial to good order and
 12 discipline or service-discrediting? You're raising the
 13 bar. How are commanders ever going to be able to get
 14 above that to exercise appropriate discipline?"
 15 MR. MOORE: And that was always present,
 16 at least —
 17 COLONEL REED: And the —
 18 MR. MOORE: At least implicitly.
 19 COLONEL REED: This century it's been —
 20 MR. MOORE: You just made it more
 21 explicit.
 22 COLONEL REED: It has always been an
 23 element of the offense the entire century.

1 DR. MOSKOS: Charlie Moskos. I want to
 2 just piggyback on Tom Moore's question.
 3 I understood from a highly placed Defense
 4 Department official that in your original proposal for
 5 enlisted personnel, the adultery, meaning all these, you
 6 know, conditions, would be — go from a Dishonorable to a
 7 Bad Conduct Discharge. So there was a change in the
 8 punishment code, then, proposed, but then it backed down
 9 later because of the Marine Corps.
 10 COLONEL REED: Right.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: So, I mean, that isn't
 12 completely a misconception.
 13 MR. DE LEON: No. And I — to take
 14 Professor Moskos' point and also to respond to the
 15 earlier point, there was some press reporting that
 16 reflected some of the earlier internal considerations of
 17 the working group that were reported publicly —
 18 MR. MOORE: Prematurely, you mean?
 19 MR. DE LEON: Prematurely — and did not
 20 reflect either the Secretary's view or the Joint Chiefs'
 21 view. So I think that's part of where some of the
 22 confusion came from.
 23 COLONEL REED: If you look at the

1 statistics I gave you — this was developed in this
 2 process where we were looking at these cases — in
 3 essence, there were — like I said, there were eighteen
 4 cases where adultery-only was sent to a court-martial.
 5 Of those eighteen cases, none of them resulted in a
 6 Dishonorable Discharge.
 7 Only one resulted in a Bad Conduct
 8 Discharge, and the reason that one received a Bad Conduct
 9 Discharge was because it was an Army NCO who had three
 10 counts of different adultery in the same court-martial.
 11 So it was some kind of an aggravated case. I don't know
 12 all the facts, but that's basically what the Army tells
 13 me.
 14 The Marine Corps sent no adultery-only
 15 courts-martial — adultery cases to courts-martial during
 16 that period of time. So there was no possibility of a
 17 Dishonorable Discharge in a Marine Corps case in the last
 18 five years because they didn't send any to a general
 19 court.
 20 The Navy sent fourteen, the Army three,
 21 and the Air Force one, and that was basically the
 22 breakout of the services.
 23 And since none of them received a

1 Dishonorable Discharge but that is part of the maximum
 2 punishment, the question was raised: "Well, is
 3 Dishonorable Discharge, you know, too high of a
 4 punishment since that's not seemed to be a realistic goal
 5 of the commander in sending cases to court or the results
 6 of court?"
 7 So that's basically what raised the issue
 8 of discussion. And as —
 9 MS. POPE: And that's not changing, is it?
 10 COLONEL REED: Pardon me?
 11 MS. POPE: Is that changing?
 12 COLONEL REED: No, that's not changing.
 13 But it was reported as it was being contemplated.
 14 MR. MOORE: As a fact.
 15 MS. POPE: Because I'm now more confused
 16 than I was before we started. With adultery, the only
 17 path for dealing with it is UCMJ.
 18 COLONEL REED: No.
 19 MS. POPE: You can deal with it
 20 administratively?
 21 COLONEL REED: Yes.
 22 MS. POPE: And where is that description?
 23 Because you don't capture the administrative.

1 COLONEL REED: In Article — In Rule for
 2 Court-Martial 306, it says a commander who has
 3 information about an offense —
 4 MS. POPE: Right.
 5 COLONEL REED: — can do any of these
 6 options, and the listed options are: nothing —
 7 MS. POPE: So you're allowed to do
 8 nothing.
 9 MR. PANG: Yes.
 10 COLONEL REED: Nothing —
 11 MS. POPE: And that's not changing.
 12 MR. PANG: No.
 13 COLONEL REED: No. That's in the Manual
 14 for Courts-Martial. It applies to all offenses, not just
 15 adultery.
 16 MS. POPE: Okay.
 17 COLONEL REED: It can do nothing; they can
 18 do administrative actions, which are what we've
 19 discussed; it can do nonjudicial — the commander — the
 20 command can do nonjudicial punishment, or the commander
 21 can do courts-martial based on the offense. And that's
 22 where the discretion of the commander comes in when you
 23 evaluate the gravity of the offense; aggravating factors

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1 against mitigating circumstance involved.
 2 And the commander — That's why these are
 3 difficult command decisions. Congress has decided in the
 4 Uniform Code of Military Justice to put that burden on
 5 the shoulder of commanders. "We're giving you the
 6 discretion and we're holding —"
 7 MR. PANG: Regardless of the offense.
 8 COLONEL REED: Regardless of the offense.
 9 MS. POPE: Right.
 10 COLONEL REED: "We're giving you
 11 discretion. We're holding you responsible for
 12 appropriately exercising that discretion, and these are
 13 factors that we're giving you." And what I've spelled
 14 out for you is basically what Congress and presidents,
 15 through Executive Orders from the inception of the
 16 Uniform Code of Military Justice, have given on the backs
 17 of commanders to make those tough calls.
 18 And they're not easy calls when you look
 19 at all the human factors and changing facts and
 20 circumstances, additional offenses — some less, some
 21 more aggravated — that might accompany an incident of
 22 adultery or conduct of adulterous behavior.
 23 So this is what the Manual is trying to

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1 it."
 2 COLONEL BLACK: Let me reframe it another
 3 way. Some people felt that we ought to decriminalize
 4 adultery.
 5 MR. PANG: Right.
 6 COLONEL BLACK: That you ought to resolve
 7 the situations that come up administratively only.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Was this
 9 the major portion of the Armed Forces felt this, or was
 10 this two or three people that voiced their opinion or
 11 whatever? And I realize — And this is not fair to you
 12 who are trying to do this, but I keep coming back to "are
 13 we making much ado about nothing?" You know, is this
 14 something that's outside the realm of the Armed Forces
 15 where it's being handled very well — at least by your
 16 statistical figures and the like.
 17 COLONEL REED: That was part of the
 18 Secretary — Remember, I told you in the earlier slide we
 19 weren't going to change the Uniform Code of Military
 20 Justice. We were going to look at the Manual to see if
 21 there was additional guidance for those commanders —
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What I've
 23 just read here — or you showed in two slides before that

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1 provide them. And because of the controversy, we were
 2 trying to also take out of the law books and help
 3 commanders with these tough choices, because they are
 4 tough choices.
 5 Yes, sir.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can I
 7 follow on? You used the word "controversy." Where was
 8 the controversy? Was the controversy within the Armed
 9 Forces or was the controversy in the noise level of the
 10 press and those around outside the Armed Services that
 11 weren't directly impacted by the UCMJ?
 12 COLONEL REED: I think —
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And, you
 14 know, if you'll take that, please, one step farther and
 15 tell me, are we answering to the wrong audience or is it
 16 necessary to answer to that audience?
 17 COLONEL REED: There were people within
 18 and without the uniform, within DoD and not in DoD, who
 19 were on both sides of the question, on both sides of the
 20 issue of — you know, of the issue of "this is the
 21 military's business" or "this is none of the military's
 22 business." We don't know what — How can you — you
 23 know, how can you take action for adultery and how can

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1 this is going to result in an Executive Order, signed by
 2 the current President of the United States, which changes
 3 the Manual for Courts-Martial, which impacts every
 4 service member. That's what you said in that slide.
 5 Now, that's a big —
 6 COLONEL REED: It changes —
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — issue.
 8 COLONEL REED: It changes the Manual for
 9 Courts-Martial. It doesn't change the law. What it does
 10 is it allows the Manual for Courts-Martial to document
 11 what the status of the law is.
 12 MR. PANG: Executive Order is really in
 13 the form of — it's really guidance to commanders, right?
 14 Is that the best way to interpret it?
 15 COLONEL REED: No. The Executive Order is
 16 — The Manual for Courts-Martial itself is an Executive
 17 Order.
 18 MR. PANG: Okay.
 19 COLONEL REED: Okay? After the Uniform
 20 Code of Military Justice was established by Congress in
 21 1950, the President of the United States followed it up
 22 with an Executive Order establishing the implementing
 23 regulations of the Uniform Code, which is called the

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1 you not take action for adultery?
 2 And I'm not saying which one has the
 3 louder voice than the other. We've all lived through
 4 that period of time. I'll leave that to your best
 5 recollections. But having lived through it myself, I can
 6 tell you there were people within the military that said,
 7 "I don't understand this. How can this be a military
 8 offense?" You know...
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: All you
 10 have to do is open the —
 11 COLONEL REED: And you have people —
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: All you
 13 have to do is open the Manual for Courts-Martial if
 14 you're in the military.
 15 COLONEL REED: Right.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I mean,
 17 it's clearly there. And if you've lived in the military,
 18 you understand it's an offense.
 19 COLONEL REED: Right.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I don't
 21 understand that comment.
 22 COLONEL REED: But that was part of the
 23 controversy. That was part of — "We don't understand

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1 Manual for Courts-Martial. And presidents since that
 2 time have — whenever there was a change to the Manual
 3 for Courts-Martial, they issue Executive Orders changing
 4 —
 5 MR. PANG: I see.
 6 COLONEL REED: — the previous Executive
 7 Order, making it current with —
 8 MR. PANG: So the President established
 9 the Executive Order. He's the only one that can make
 10 changes to it.
 11 COLONEL REED: Yes.
 12 MR. PANG: Nobody else can.
 13 COLONEL REED: No, nobody else can.
 14 Yes, ma'am.
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I would like to find out
 16 more about the Manual for Courts-Martial and how it's
 17 used. And let me give you sort of a hypothetical.
 18 Let's say that there is a commander who is
 19 looking at a situation in which the offender, who is a
 20 military person, argues, for example, that he did not
 21 know the correct marital status of the other person. But
 22 let's say further that there is a lot of evidence that he
 23 went to great lengths not to know and that he's a

1 persistent offender.
 2 Now, this commander, I gather, can consult
 3 the Manual for Courts-Martial and see this guidance here
 4 which says that being ignorant of the marital status of
 5 the other person could be — is a factor to consider.
 6 COLONEL REED: If honest and reasonable.
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Okay.
 8 COLONEL REED: That's the rule.
 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right.
 10 COLONEL REED: So if the commander
 11 determines that "you're telling me you were mistaken, but
 12 I don't think that's an honest declaration on your part.
 13 And under the facts and circumstances that I know and you
 14 know, there is nothing reasonable for you to have been
 15 mistaken about that person's marital status," the
 16 commander can say, "That defense is not raised.
 17 Therefore, you can't take advantage of that defense, and
 18 the evidence is that the other elements of the offense
 19 have been established."
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.
 21 COLONEL REED: That's why, under the law,
 22 it has to be honest and reasonable under the facts and
 23 circumstances by the commander.

1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. So that commander
 2 could very legitimately go forward with whatever in this
 3 whole range of — anything from doing nothing to a
 4 courts-martial.
 5 COLONEL REED: If he, in his —
 6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All of those options
 7 would be within his range.
 8 COLONEL REED: Yes, ma'am.
 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Let's say, then, that the
 10 ignorance was in fact reasonable and honest, but, yet,
 11 the commander, simply for other reasons — because of the
 12 particular environment on post or something like that —
 13 felt it was better to proceed with this. What would be
 14 the effect of the Manual on that?
 15 COLONEL REED: First of all, the only role
 16 the commander has is to get a charge to a court. Once
 17 you get the charge to the court, the commander loses
 18 control over it. It's turned over to a judge and jury,
 19 and the judge and jury will determine based upon the law
 20 whether or not that soldier, airman, whatever, was
 21 honestly and reasonably mistaken in his belief, and,
 22 therefore, an affirmative defense.
 23 The jury verdict or the judge's verdict

1 could easily be contra to the commander's thought that
 2 sent it to court. It's like in American jurisprudence
 3 all over the place. When a prosecutor sends a case to
 4 trial, the jury or the judge can decide that the
 5 prosecutor — you know, "you had your opinion, but our
 6 opinion is different, and, therefore, we find not
 7 guilty."
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: He has a defense
 9 counsel.
 10 COLONEL REED: And he has a defense
 11 counsel.
 12 Even in the nonjudicial punishment range
 13 where a commander tries to impose nonjudicial punishment,
 14 the individual has an appeal to the commander's superior
 15 in the chain of command who can determine that the
 16 individual has suffered a clear injustice as a result of
 17 the evidence in the case.
 18 The commander had a closed mind, let's say
 19 in the example you're using, and he can set aside the
 20 Article 15 action of the subordinate commander because it
 21 would be unjust to let that Article 15 stand under those
 22 facts and circumstances. That applies across all the
 23 services.

1 And defense counsel are available to
 2 assist the individuals who are facing nonjudicial
 3 punishment, so he's not by himself.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: And he doesn't
 5 have to take an Article 15. He can say, "I want a court-
 6 martial," and then he gives him a trial.
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: So I'm trying to put the
 8 Manual for Courts-Martial in a context as a civilian
 9 lawyer. Is it more like hornbook law or —
 10 COLONEL REED: Federal Rules of Evidence,
 11 Federal Rules of Procedure.
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: So it's more like a rule
 13 of evidence or procedure than, say, jury instructions or
 14 sentencing guidelines or —
 15 COLONEL REED: Right.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: But you're also, if you
 17 will — just kind of a restatement of the law — but how
 18 much do they bind the prosecutor or the judge or anybody
 19 else making a decision along the process?
 20 And how much do they eliminate or how much
 21 do they move arguments away from the traditional elements
 22 towards a different kind of line of argument, if you
 23 will? That it's not so much that the elements do or

1 don't exist — the elements of the crime exist or don't
 2 exist, but rather that discretion was improperly
 3 exercised one way or another?
 4 COLONEL REED: At the court-martial level?
 5 Is that what —
 6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Or at any level. I mean
 7 —
 8 COLONEL REED: Well, first of all, the
 9 commander has to be satisfied that an offense was
 10 committed under the Code before he can issue nonjudicial
 11 punishment or send a case to trial, and a trial has to
 12 decide that the elements had been established — an
 13 offense has been committed beyond a reasonable doubt.
 14 Those basic principles.
 15 Of course, when you're making the decision
 16 as to whether to initiate, the commander is — based on
 17 the facts and the information presented to him, is
 18 drawing a conclusion as to whether he believes the
 19 evidence has been sufficient to establish that offense.
 20 That's where these factors come into play.
 21 That's where this mistake-of-fact defense has to be
 22 considered, if raised, and if honest and reasonable under
 23 the circumstances.

1 And if the commander is not satisfied with
 2 that defense existing but everything else is satisfied,
 3 then he is free to exercise his discretion and impose
 4 punishment, or express his opinion that that information
 5 ought to proceed to a court-martial for resolution; in
 6 which case, a judge and jury wrestle with the same
 7 issues.
 8 Affirmative defenses in the military are
 9 similar to in private practice, in civilian practice.
 10 They are defenses that need to be raised. And so, you
 11 know, typically the defense counsel or the military
 12 offender will say, "Well, yeah, that's true, but I didn't
 13 know they were married" — okay? — because the
 14 government's already established that she was married by
 15 — or he was married by the marriage certificate.
 16 So now the accused has to raise the issue
 17 that "I didn't know about it," and that's when the
 18 assessment of whether, under all the facts and
 19 circumstances, that disclaimer is honest and reasonable.
 20 And if it doesn't meet that test, then he can't avail
 21 himself of that defense, either in a commander's review
 22 or in a court-martial review.
 23 So our military justice system

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1 procedurally and from judicial standards is virtually
 2 identical to federal criminal procedure and practice.
 3 And the same — We have judges who are trained, who have
 4 to give jury instructions — in fact, I have the jury
 5 instruction on adultery here — and juries have to find
 6 beyond a reasonable doubt, and defense counsel and
 7 accuseds have a right to raise affirmative defenses just
 8 like any other criminal tribunal or proceeding that you
 9 would find in American society.

10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Are there any other
 11 offenses that have a lot of footnotes in the MCM that
 12 would be comparable? And if so, what has been the
 13 experience with spelling those out in accordance with
 14 case law?

15 COLONEL REED: They vary in length. Some
 16 of them are, you know, several paragraphs long of
 17 explanation, if you will, of what the offense is. And
 18 analysis. There's also an analysis section to the Manual
 19 for Courts-Martial for further explanation. Some
 20 offenses are very cryptic and others are lengthy.

21 So this would — this falls into somewhere
 22 between — the middle, I guess. Between very cryptic,
 23 which it currently is, and, you know, the most expansive

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1 this language and this guidance that is from the courts,
 2 appellate courts and from other provisions of the Manual,
 3 helps him in the scratching process come to what he feels
 4 to be an appropriate resolution of a problem that he
 5 didn't want and he doesn't want but he has to deal with.
 6 And so when you say "change," I would be
 7 cautious to say that we are changing anything. All's we
 8 are doing is adding to the Manual. That's why we're not
 9 changing the offense; we're not changing anything about
 10 the offense. What we are trying to do is expand upon the
 11 guidance that commanders have in the Manual for Courts-
 12 Martial. We're changing that explanation of "adultery is
 13 not a lesser included offense of rape" to the guidance
 14 that we're talking about.

15 Now, that is technically a change because
 16 it's going from something to something else, but it's not
 17 replacing something with something else.

18 MR. MOORE: It doesn't change the
 19 character or the nature.

20 COLONEL REED: No, sir. No, sir.

21 MR. MOORE: It elaborates, expands,
 22 clarifies.

23 COLONEL REED: And that gets back to your

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1 that you would find in Article 134.
 2 But all the offenses under — usually will
 3 have some text, explanation, sample specification to use,
 4 and a statement of what the maximum imposable punishment
 5 is if the person is found to be guilty of that offense,
 6 all of which are set out in the Manual for Courts-
 7 Martial.

8 What we're dealing with here is that text-
 9 and-explanation section on the one offense of adultery as
 10 it compared to all the other offenses. Some of them go
 11 on for Pages in the Manual. It depends on what the
 12 nature of the offense is.

13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I would not
 14 — I guess a concern over some of the conversation I have
 15 heard is perhaps relegating the Manual for Courts-Martial
 16 to less an important document than it really is. The
 17 reality to a commander, if the commander is worth
 18 anything, it's his bible.

19 COLONEL REED: Yes, sir.

20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And if, in
 21 fact, he has offenses, that's where he goes to get a
 22 clear idea of what those offenses are, whether they are
 23 in fact occurring, whether or not he truly has a good

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1 earlier question of me: why has there been so much
 2 confusion and criticism? Because that is not an easy
 3 concept to understand. You are adding words. You must
 4 be changing something. When, in reality, yes, we are
 5 adding words, but we're adding guidance to help them deal
 6 with what they already had an obligation to deal with but
 7 it was not readily available to them.

8 Yes, ma'am.

9 MS. POPE: A question on the
 10 misconceptions — misperceptions on the double standard,
 11 senior officer versus others.

12 COLONEL REED: Yes, ma'am.

13 MS. POPE: If you don't have a lot of data
 14 on the adultery cases, how can you say that there's any
 15 difference or there's not any difference? Either way.

16 COLONEL REED: The data that we have on
 17 cases that are in these statistics, the problem — Some
 18 of the services keep data on men, women, and the rank
 19 structure. Not all the services keep it the same and not
 20 all the services count it the same way and whatever.

21 MS. POPE: Right.

22 COLONEL REED: But of those services that
 23 do, the showing is that those recipients of military

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1 feel for them.
 2 So when we're talking about a change to
 3 the Manual for Courts-Martial, it is like a change to the
 4 law that you're talking about because it clearly sets out
 5 for the individual who sits in judgment as to whether
 6 it's going to go forward to a court-martial or something
 7 else is going to be done. And that's a decision point
 8 that affects the individual and clearly is a seat of
 9 judgment.

10 It's — That red book is what that
 11 commander uses. So that book is, and what the guidance
 12 is in it, is extremely important, and what it says is
 13 extremely important.

14 COLONEL REED: And that's why the
 15 provisions that we're trying to put in there: so that the
 16 commander, sitting in the privacy of his office, trying
 17 to familiarize himself with what's involved here, can
 18 pick up the red book, and instead of seeing it as it
 19 currently exists — adultery is not a lesser included
 20 offense of rape, period — we are trying to put something
 21 in the Manual for Courts-Martial that, in the privacy of
 22 his office, when he's scratching his head and trying to
 23 make sense out of what he's been handed to resolve, that

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1 justice disciplinary action for the offense of adultery
 2 are — well, they're predominantly men. Predominantly
 3 men receive nonjudicial punishment and then courts-
 4 martial for adultery.

5 And there are officers, from at least the
 6 data that I've seen, from the O-6, down to the junior
 7 enlisted person, that basically shows that there are
 8 enlisted NCO's and officers who receive Article 15's or
 9 courts-martial for — The problem with the statistics is,
 10 again, when you're trying to do all of the services, when
 11 they created their database systems and their
 12 computerized systems to track military justice actions,
 13 it wasn't centered on this, and so a lot of this
 14 information is not captured that way.

15 MS. POPE: Well, I guess that's why I'm
 16 questioning when you say there's not a double standard,
 17 because you really don't know because of the way the
 18 services capture or fail to capture the information. And
 19 if a service uses an administrative or, you know, quote,
 20 encourages someone to retire for whatever reason, and
 21 it's voluntary retirement, you have no knowledge and no
 22 way of capturing that data.

23 COLONEL REED: On the retirement, you're

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1 right. I don't have any data on the retirement.
 2MS. POPE: If someone's eligible for
 3 retirement and the commanding officer whispers in the ear
 4 and says, "You know, you really —"
 5DR. MOSKOS: You'd better go.
 6MS. POPE: "— need to go home" —
 7DR. MOSKOS: Right.
 8MS. POPE: Which, if it's somebody who's
 9 served twenty, thirty years —
 10 COLONEL REED: May be appropriate.
 11 MS. POPE: — most people will say, "Go
 12 home. You don't want this; I don't want this." And so I
 13 guess that's why I'm saying I don't know that you can say
 14 senior officers versus — And you can't say that they
 15 are, but I'm not sure that you can say that they aren't
 16 treated — and if you —
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well, if you're
 18 an enlisted guy with twenty years, you can do the same
 19 thing.
 20 MS. POPE: But if you don't know that
 21 person — I mean, if you know the person — I mean, human
 22 nature being what it is, if you know this person and
 23 you've served with this person, you know, you're going to

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1 a difference. I don't know how you would address that
 2 difference.
 3COLONEL REED: Well, it's very difficult
 4 to do that because anything short of a court-martial —
 5MS. POPE: Right.
 6COLONEL REED: — might be inappropriate
 7 to a person. In defending cases, to one client, going to
 8 jail was not getting away with it, but to another client,
 9 not getting a Dishonorable Discharge or a BCD was not
 10 getting away with it.
 11 MS. POPE: Right.
 12 COLONEL REED: So it's kind of in the eye
 13 of the beholder as to, quote, what is getting away with
 14 it. So, again, there is a certain degree of subjectivity
 15 there.
 16 But, you know, if somebody is forced to
 17 retire early with a letter of reprimand and a
 18 skyrocketing career all of a sudden comes to a crashing
 19 end, is that getting away with it because he wasn't sent
 20 to a special court-martial for the offense of adultery?
 21 I don't know.
 22 MS. POPE: Or given the option. I mean —
 23 COLONEL REED: Or given the option.

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1 do what's best for your commander.
 2LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well, why would
 3 — how would you not know him if he was in your command?
 4DR. MOSKOS: Well, you take the Sergeant
 5 Major of the Army, he did that choice.
 6LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Yeah.
 7MS. POPE: Right.
 8DR. MOSKOS: They didn't whisper into his
 9 ear.
 10 MS. POPE: Right. And so I don't know,
 11 and so I don't know that you can say either one way or
 12 the other.
 13 COLONEL BLACK: They did whisper in his
 14 ear.
 15 MS. POPE: They did whisper. He chose —
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Not with that —
 17 MS. POPE: I'm not sure that you can
 18 say...
 19 COLONEL REED: Well, maybe — All right.
 20 Maybe when I put the slide together it's an
 21 overstatement. What I'm saying is if you look at the
 22 statistics, the data that's available, you'll find that
 23 — for the offense of adultery, you'll find it's —

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1MS. POPE: — when you give him the
 2 option.
 3COLONEL REED: Right.
 4MS. POPE: So I —
 5LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I'll bet you if
 6 you could recap not just adultery over the years, that
 7 enlisted people get far, far, far more breaks than any
 8 officer does. I know that's been my experience. I mean,
 9 I have given many, many enlisted people an option which
 10 for an officer I wouldn't do.
 11 COLONEL BLACK: I'll defer to the other
 12 folks in the room. I mean, I've been in the military
 13 twenty-seven years. I've been hearing for twenty-seven
 14 years from enlisted troops that officers get away with
 15 everything and that they get shafted. And the people who
 16 say that to me believe that.
 17 MS. POPE: Right.
 18 COLONEL BLACK: I mean, for whatever
 19 reason. If you have a way that we could change that
 20 perception without violating the privacy act —
 21 MS. POPE: Right. Right. I just...
 22 COLONEL BLACK: It is a problem.
 23 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Bob Dare.

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1MS. POPE: And the problem is you can only
 2 capture a piece of it.
 3COLONEL REED: Exactly. We can't —
 4MS. POPE: Right.
 5COLONEL REED: — capture all of that.
 6 And I don't think —
 7MS. POPE: And that's the problem.
 8COLONEL REED: — anybody can capture all
 9 of it in the systems that we have in place and currently
 10 available. But in those statistics that we do look at —
 11 MS. POPE: Right. There's not.
 12 COLONEL REED: — the information appears
 13 to be spread out: men, women, and through the officer and
 14 enlisted ranks.
 15 So if that's an overstatement, then I
 16 apologize. I was just trying to reflect that my looking
 17 at the data and my talking to my counterparts, they would
 18 say — their reaction is that this appears about right
 19 from their experience on how they watch disciplinary
 20 actions being taken.
 21 MS. POPE: But there certainly is a
 22 mindset or perception out there among the several
 23 enlisted I've talked to across the services that there is

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1I would just offer, with twenty-eight
 2 years of experience, there is a double standard. It's
 3 not a perception; it's a reality. But there's no other
 4 way to have it if you're going to have the Uniform Code
 5 of Military Justice so that commanders on a battlefield
 6 — and that's primarily why it needs to be there, so that
 7 commanders on the battlefield can quickly and
 8 expeditiously discharge of an offense.
 9The fact of the matter is, from DUI's to
 10 much more serious offenses, there are decisions made —
 11 because commanders vary from unit to unit, from type to
 12 type, decisions are made that allows a double standard to
 13 exist, where a soldier in Company A receives an Article
 14 15 for an offense that a soldier in Company B was given
 15 an oral reprimand.
 16 I'm not sure that if it's not just an
 17 educational nightmare to all service people to understand
 18 why do we have the system we do and why is it a better
 19 system than someone else can dream up.
 20 COLONEL REED: Well, you know, district
 21 attorneys and United States attorneys have the same
 22 discretion.
 23 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: That's

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1 exactly right. Exactly right.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And they
 3 use it all the time.
 4 COLONEL REED: And our system has the same
 5 discretion and Congress —
 6 MS. POPE: That's right.
 7 COLONEL REED: And Congress has chosen the
 8 commander as the person to exercise that discretion.
 9 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: That's right.
 10 COLONEL REED: And any time you use the
 11 word "discretion," the word "unfairness" pops its head
 12 up. And how you evaluate a decision that has a multitude
 13 of facts and a multitude of circumstances, and careers
 14 that span the globe and careers that people have done
 15 heroic things for their nation versus somebody who barely
 16 gets to work every day, and say that these two actions
 17 have to be identical and the commander ought not to
 18 exercise discretion is very difficult to understand. And
 19 most people don't know, except the commander who imposed
 20 the punishment, all the facts and circumstances that went
 21 into the decision that was made.
 22 And so you said, is it too difficult?
 23 Well, we're talking about a universal situation. You

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1 DR. MOSKOS: Charlie Moskoss. I have a
 2 different type of double standard question.
 3 There is an official double standard,
 4 though — isn't there? — on trainer-recruit adultery? I
 5 mean, a recruit is not going to be treated in the same
 6 fashion that a trainer would.
 7 By the way, is "trainer" spelled, Barbara,
 8 with an E-R or O-R?
 9 This is — We're trying to get a neutral
 10 term for all services here.
 11 MR. MOORE: E-R, unless —
 12 MS. POPE: E-R. Bob started it first.
 13 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I did spell-
 14 check.
 15 COLONEL REED: Let me answer —
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Maybe that's the double
 17 standard that's official —
 18 COLONEL REED: Well, let me —
 19 DR. MOSKOS: — and perhaps proper.
 20 COLONEL REED: Well, I don't know what
 21 you're dealing with.
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Like the Aberdeen case.
 23 COLONEL REED: No. If the offense is —

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1 know, why is the person in Alexandria prosecuted for the
 2 same offense that the person in Fairfax County isn't? I
 3 don't know. But that's the discretion we put on, you
 4 know, officials within our communities to make those
 5 tough calls.
 6 And if the commander perpetually makes the
 7 wrong call in the opinion of his superior, chances are he
 8 won't be a commander very long because he's not
 9 exercising the appropriate judgment and leadership that
 10 the military expects out of him.
 11 COLONEL BLACK: And I think we're using
 12 the term "double standard" differently. When I used the
 13 term "double standard," I was not referring to the
 14 commander's difficult decision that a commander makes in
 15 individual cases and different commanders. I was talking
 16 about an institutional bias that was alleged, for
 17 example, in Kelly Flinn that women get punished when men
 18 do not. That kind of a double standard obviously would
 19 be a problem.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I think you're
 21 talking about inconsistency more than a double standard.
 22 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Yeah. Yeah.
 23 COLONEL REED: Well, there were seven male

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1 All the offenses under the Code — And all the system and
 2 military justice system applies to anybody who, at the
 3 time of the commission of the conduct, is on status,
 4 active duty status.
 5 That's what the Supreme Court told us ten
 6 years ago: Look no further than the fact that the person
 7 who committed the offense, at the time he committed it,
 8 was on active duty status; if so, that person is subject
 9 to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the
 10 disciplinary system and the military justice system.
 11 So if the trainer and the trainee, if you
 12 will, were both active duty military persons —
 13 DR. MOSKOS: Yes.
 14 COLONEL REED: — then the Manual for
 15 Courts-Martial and the Uniform Code of Military Justice
 16 apply equally to them, depending on what the offense is.
 17 DR. MOSKOS: Oh, come on.
 18 COLONEL REED: The same offenses are
 19 there, and the commander has to exercise discretion with
 20 each one of them according to the decision-making tree
 21 that Mr. de Leon showed you: administrative, nonjudicial,
 22 judicial.
 23 That same system applies to both is what

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1 cases at the same time as Kelly Flinn's, but — So, I
 2 mean —
 3 COLONEL BLACK: Yeah, I understand. But
 4 that's the perception that you — you know, that because
 5 someone is Hispanic or black or white or ten years —
 6 those kinds of double standard perceptions are a matter
 7 of concern.
 8 COLONEL REED: They're difficult to
 9 address because it's difficult to get all the facts and
 10 circumstances of a case out to that person who's
 11 formulating an opinion and expressing a criticism or an
 12 opinion.
 13 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I'm on your
 14 side. I'm just saying down where the rubber meets the
 15 road, where the young service person is, their perception
 16 is there is because they saw their buddy receive a very
 17 stringent punishment for something that they know another
 18 person had the same offense and did not get the same
 19 thing.
 20 So in their mind, it's a double standard,
 21 and it's an educational problem, I think.
 22 MR. DE LEON: Yeah, you're right. It's an
 23 awareness problem and an educational problem.

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1 I'm saying.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: Well, I don't think it's
 3 quite that way because there is a Fort Jackson regulation
 4 — which I don't have the paper on but others have seen
 5 it — where it says trainer-trainee misbehavior is not to
 6 be treated — I mean, trainees cannot be punished because
 7 they are in a, you know, one-down situation.
 8 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: No, no. They
 9 can't be punished for a specific offense, which that
 10 policy letter prohibits them from being punished if the
 11 trainer was done. That's a different — I mean, you've
 12 got to read that policy letter very carefully, Charlie.
 13 It doesn't say the trainee cannot be punished for some.
 14 It says a particular offense that they state in there.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Which are — could include
 16 adultery. But anyway...
 17 COLONEL REED: I don't — I'm not familiar
 18 with the specific regulation you're talking about.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Well, I mean, the question of
 20 the double standard. Again, what the print says and what
 21 happens in real life is — there's a difference. I mean,
 22 there are double standards on trainers and recruits.
 23 COLONEL BLACK: I don't think that —

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1 MR. DE LEON: That comes to the issue,
 2 Professor, though, whether you believe that a trainee and
 3 a superior can have a consensual relationship.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Fine. That's a point to be
 5 raised. But it is a standard that's different, though.
 6 MR. DE LEON: It is. And in the training
 7 environment, you may need to have it.
 8 COLONEL REED: Previously I had mentioned
 9 also that — Somebody asked me what you focus on, the
 10 person in authority versus the subordinate. You know,
 11 the officer and the enlisted. The trainer, the trainee.
 12 The recruiter, the recruitee. The den mother, the den
 13 person.
 14 I mean, in that context, the regulation
 15 probably is reasonably consistent that, you know, you're
 16 going to focus on the person in authority who is expected
 17 to enforce the rules and not take advantage of the rules,
 18 and the person — the trainee might be the disadvantaged
 19 person in that limited circumstance. I don't know.
 20 But the general proposition is — from a
 21 UCMJ perspective is if they're in uniform and they're on
 22 active duty, that book applies, and the rules and the
 23 procedures and the standards in that book apply to them,

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1 action against the senior person than they would take
 2 against the junior person.
 3 Now, when you add to that that the junior
 4 person is in a training situation and that the senior
 5 person is doing the training, so that they literally have
 6 control of that person's life night and day, it is not
 7 surprising that you would court-martial the senior person
 8 and possibly decide to do nothing to the junior person.
 9 That does not mean that the junior person
 10 has not committed an offense. It just means that you
 11 have — I have advised — and I suspect you have, too —
 12 commanders to make those distinctions. But they're not
 13 distinctions without meaning. They are distinctions —
 14 deliberate distinctions with meaning.
 15 COLONEL REED: In many cases, depending on
 16 the facts and circumstances, the junior person is looked
 17 upon as a victim, is considered a victim. You were
 18 victimized by the powerful, more senior person. And,
 19 therefore, the question is, do you discipline the victim
 20 as well as the perpetrator, or do you, you know, focus
 21 your attention on the perpetrator?
 22 So those are things that you have to
 23 evaluate in the fact pattern of a particular case: the

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1 from the lowest recruit to the highest.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: That said,
 3 would you further clarify, then, the recruiter to the
 4 poolee?
 5 COLONEL REED: The recruiter to the who?
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: The
 7 recruiter to the poolee. That individual that has been
 8 signed but not active. Could be in the pool for a year.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Was he subject
 10 to the Code?
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Well,
 12 that's my question.
 13 COLONEL REED: I don't know whether that
 14 person, under those circumstances — I doubt seriously
 15 that they are subject to the Code. If they're not,
 16 they're not subject to —
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Then how
 18 does this review impact that? How does this —
 19 COLONEL REED: The recruiter who —
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: You've
 21 already talked to him. In your other paper, you talk
 22 about the recruiter to the poolee in fraternization.
 23 COLONEL REED: Right.

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1 pursuer and the pursuee, and all that sort of stuff.
 2 So, again, this is not cookie cutter
 3 business, sir. You can't fit everybody into, you know,
 4 one size shoe. Everybody has got to be looked at
 5 slightly different because all the fact patterns are
 6 slightly different and all the considerations are
 7 slightly different.
 8 And then we tell the commander, "Go out
 9 and do the best you can, and if you don't succeed, you're
 10 out of here."
 11 MS. POPE: Right. I mean, it comes back
 12 down to leadership. All of it.
 13 COLONEL REED: Yes, ma'am.
 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Charlie's reference to
 15 the Fort Jackson regulations raises two things. One is
 16 that I think we ought to ask Colonel Harris to clarify
 17 for us for the record. It doesn't have to happen now,
 18 but we can go into that.
 19 And then, secondly, as a structural
 20 matter, I would like to know if what we're referring to
 21 is a few Pages of what I would call regulations for Fort
 22 Jackson that refer to a lot of things, including
 23 fraternization. And it appeared to be fort-specific and

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay. But
 2 what about the recruiter to the poolee in adultery?
 3 COLONEL REED: The recruiter, if he is on
 4 active duty, is subject to the Code. The recruitee —
 5 The poolee is not, any more than a civilian is subject to
 6 the Code; whereas, I am subject to the Code.
 7 So, again, you look to the status of the
 8 parties. If one person is subject to the Code and the
 9 other isn't, then the Code can only speak to that person
 10 that is.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Got it.
 12 That clarifies it. Thank you.
 13 COLONEL BLACK: I think maybe the source
 14 of the confusion here is we both advise many commanders
 15 and staff judge advocates, both the commander in the
 16 installation and commanders further down, and if you get
 17 a situation in which you have a junior person and a
 18 senior person in some sort of an improper relationship,
 19 the advice that you give the commander is the same thing
 20 that's spelled out in the SECDEF's letter: the senior
 21 person is primarily responsible. That's the person we
 22 wish to hold fully accountable, most accountable, so we
 23 would expect that a commander would take far more serious

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1 I take it that every installation probably has similar
 2 kind of regulations from its commander.
 3 What is the relationship of rules like
 4 that to the Manual for Courts-Martial and to the UCMJ?
 5 COLONEL REED: Okay. I will try the best
 6 I can. Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military
 7 Justice says that if a proper authority establishes a
 8 regulation and the rules of that regulation pertain to a
 9 military purpose, then those subject to those rules have
 10 to comply with the rules; and if you don't, then you
 11 violate Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military
 12 Justice. If the commander who issued the rule is high
 13 enough in the chain of command, then knowledge is imputed
 14 to those subordinate.
 15 If it's a base regulation — usually, you
 16 know, you're down at the installation level — then
 17 actual knowledge of the rule in that regulation has to be
 18 established beyond a reasonable doubt. You can't rely on
 19 imputed knowledge or general understanding or you-should-
 20 have-knows. You have to establish actual knowledge. So
 21 most of your regulations will be issued at your general
 22 regulation level.
 23 Now, you can — all commanders can issue

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1 squadron regulations, I guess, and installation
 2 regulations, but you also have to do two things. You
 3 have to specify what the individual can and can't do, and
 4 you have to clearly put that individual on notice that if
 5 he violates that, it's punitive. You have to tell the
 6 individual that he is subjecting himself to punitive
 7 action for violating; it's not just bad form. Okay?
 8 And that's why the lawyers are called in,
 9 because we have to input into those regulations to make
 10 sure that the rules are as clear as possible and the
 11 punitive language putting people on notice that violation
 12 of this is just not bad form, but it's also subjecting
 13 you to UCMJ discipline — we have to put that language in
 14 there.
 15 And there's usually a direct reference to
 16 Article 92 of the UCMJ. I would look — That would be
 17 the first thing I would look for, is a reference to
 18 Article 92. And if it's not there, look for the
 19 equivalent — that violations of this provision will
 20 subject you to punitive action under the UCMJ. And that
 21 says not only will I not like you because you didn't
 22 follow the rules, but I have the UCMJ punitive sanctions
 23 available to you as well as a commander.

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1 I don't know about this training
 2 regulations, which category it falls into.
 3 COLONEL BLACK: Well, one of the things
 4 when we were doing the "good order and discipline"
 5 review, you remember that there's three — there's three
 6 features to it: one addresses officer-enlisted, one
 7 addresses trainer-trainee, one addresses recruiter-
 8 recruit. All the services had some sort of guidance or
 9 regulation or punitive regulation dealing with those
 10 situations. In some services where there's more than one
 11 training base or basic training base, it might have
 12 varied from base to base, the exact language. In other
 13 places, it was different between the different services.
 14 So one of the conclusions that the
 15 Secretary has made is that these decisions should come
 16 out of the military department, at the secretarial level,
 17 and it should prohibit those categories of relationships
 18 that we talked about before between recruiter and
 19 potential recruit and between — in the initial training
 20 phase, between the trainer and the trainee. This was,
 21 again, to make things more consistent and clearer in
 22 those areas.
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Well, if there are

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1 any more questions from our commissioners?
 2 Our researchers and other folks? Jim?
 3 MR. RENNE: I just have a question,
 4 Colonel. Point of clarification. Article 134, the — Am
 5 I speaking too loud?
 6 Oh, speak up louder?
 7 In Article 134, the consistent element is
 8 good order and discipline. What I heard in your
 9 presentation is that under the adultery offense, which is
 10 a subsection of 134, the element is a little different in
 11 its application because of court precedent and other
 12 offenses under 134. What you're saying is that — Well,
 13 first of all, that's my first question. Then I'll follow
 14 up.
 15 COLONEL REED: No. Adultery — The three
 16 elements that I put in your slide — on one of the early
 17 slides where it said "marital status," "sexual
 18 intercourse" and "prejudicial to good order and
 19 discipline" — that third element, "prejudicial to good
 20 order and discipline" and "service-discrediting" is
 21 applicable to all Article 134 offenses.
 22 The other two may change, obviously,
 23 between — you know, pick another offense, but, you know

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1 — but the last element is common among all Article 134
 2 offenses. You have to — The government's burden is to
 3 prove that beyond a reasonable doubt.
 4 MR. RENNE: Right. Actually, to be more
 5 specific, defining "good order and discipline" as having
 6 a direct measurable — that is the same for all offenses
 7 under 134, or is that different for different offenses?
 8 COLONEL REED: It's the same — basically
 9 the same if you look in paragraph 60 of the Manual.
 10 Adultery is in paragraph 62, which refers you back to 60.
 11 Paragraph 60 is the one that talks about — among other
 12 things, but it's got to be direct, can't be remote; it's
 13 got to be — you know, it can't be remote in time; can't
 14 be indirect. It's got to be those types of — that type
 15 of language, if you will.
 16 MR. RENNE: So no other offense under 134
 17 has the redundant sort of printing of that definition in
 18 it.
 19 COLONEL REED: That is correct.
 20 MR. RENNE: Adultery will be, if the
 21 Manual is changed, the only one. Okay.
 22 COLONEL REED: That's correct.
 23 MR. PANG: You know, I have a — I have

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1 got a question, Mr. Secretary. You know, we have been
 2 dealing with the active component. Could you just spend
 3 just a brief, brief time talking about how these two, you
 4 know, relate to the reserve components? Because I think
 5 that is part of our charge, too.
 6 COLONEL BLACK: Yeah. Let me — Let me
 7 start with fraternization. When the reserve panel came
 8 in, each — You know, there's seven pieces to the reserve
 9 component — five reserve, two national guard — when you
 10 include them all. Every one of those seven was
 11 represented. Each one of the individuals that came in
 12 said that while they handled situations a little bit
 13 differently, essentially, that they were comfortable with
 14 their services' policy.
 15 And the reason why they have to handle
 16 situations a little bit differently is because folks are
 17 not on active duty. You have the potential for role
 18 reversal. You can have employer-employee in civilian
 19 world, and then they come on duty on the weekend and
 20 you've got that reversed. You have individuals who are
 21 dating during the week and they come on — or they're
 22 married, or they're father-and-son as you often see in
 23 guard units.

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1 They indicated that they look carefully at
 2 those things; that they were professional; that they
 3 expected folks in the reserves to act professionally when
 4 they put the uniform on. They were not subject to the
 5 UCMJ when they don't have the uniform on; but when they
 6 put that uniform on, they were to act professionally.
 7 If either because the situation was
 8 impossible to translate — In other words, there's no way
 9 — with just the nature of the relationship they had
 10 during the week, could not be accommodated on the
 11 weekends, or because the way they treated each other on
 12 the weekends was not professional, that they would then
 13 take appropriate action.
 14 Now, appropriate action might be to put
 15 them in an inactive status; might be to transfer one to
 16 another unit because they might not have any kind of
 17 court-martial jurisdiction over them because it happens
 18 — things that were going on happened during the business
 19 day. But they said, "We're proud of our units." You
 20 know, "We have a mission to do, and anybody who threatens
 21 that mission with an unprofessional relationship we will
 22 deal with accordingly."
 23 MR. DE LEON: In many respects, the

1 reserve element was the most pragmatic in terms of the
 2 application of these rules.
 3DR. MOSKOS: Is there a — Charlie Moskos.
 4On fraternization, same-rank sex that is
 5 prejudicial to good order and discipline, is that
 6 anywhere in the Manual for Courts-Martial?
 7COLONEL REED: It could be — It can be
 8 if, under the circumstances, it's prejudicial to good
 9 order and discipline. A public park, in the company —
 10 in the company of other persons. You know, that same-
 11 rank sex, it's not in and of itself, if private and
 12 consensual, behind closed doors, an offense, but because
 13 of the location and the manner in which it's conducted,
 14 it brings you to the third element. And that third
 15 element — and the courts have said — can make it
 16 prejudicial to good order and discipline or bring
 17 discredit upon the services.
 18 So that's why the Congress, I guess, has
 19 established the Article 134 offense. It says any
 20 neglects can be charged under Article 134 if the
 21 government can establish that the conduct, whatever that
 22 conduct is — spitting on the sidewalk could be — is
 23 legally prejudicial to good order and discipline or

1 head on the facts and circumstances of each case laid
 2 before them.
 3CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, we're more or less
 4 on time. Thank you very much for coming.
 5As I mentioned, we may have some follow-on
 6 questions which we will — Now we know where to send
 7 them.
 8Okay. So we're closed out at 4:20 in the
 9 afternoon on October 12th. Thank you.
 10 (Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the hearing in
 11 the above-entitled matter was concluded.)
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1 service-discrediting as determined by the court.
 2So in your example that you're giving me,
 3 generally speaking, the answer would be no. But you can
 4 certainly let your mind run free and come up with an
 5 example where it would in fact be prejudicial to good
 6 order and discipline or service-discrediting for two
 7 consenting adults, in the privacy that they thought was
 8 private, to be caught in a situation that constituted
 9 conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline on that
 10 basis.
 11 MR. PANG: Well, I think — I think that
 12 distinction, you know, just now — I mean, you know,
 13 aboard — I think sex aboard ship — okay? — between
 14 consenting people is —
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Same rank.
 16 MR. PANG: — is punitive. I mean, you
 17 know, then if you're on —
 18 COLONEL BLACK: By regulation. Yes, sir.
 19 MR. PANG: By regulation.
 20 COLONEL BLACK: By regulation.
 21 MR. PANG: By regulation. But ashore, you
 22 know, apparently not.
 23 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, you

1 could have a situation — Correct me if I'm wrong. You
 2 could have a situation where not just two people of the
 3 same rank, but they could be married. You could be on
 4 deployment, a tactical deployment, and that could be,
 5 depending on the circumstances, disruption to good law,
 6 order and discipline.
 7COLONEL REED: As I recall the Navy
 8 regulation, it's basically on board ship, taboo; no ands,
 9 if, but, whatever.
 10 COLONEL BLACK: Married, not married.
 11 COLONEL REED: No exceptions. That's just
 12 prohibited. By regulation, not by the UCMJ. By virtue
 13 of Article 92 that I talked to you about previously, and
 14 then each service decides where that could be.
 15 I mean, the case law is clear, sir, that
 16 just sexual intercourse between two consenting adults in
 17 private is not a UCMJ offense. You need something more,
 18 and that's why you have "prejudicial to good order and
 19 discipline" or "service-discrediting."
 20 The government has to establish what is it
 21 about this that is service-discrediting or it's
 22 prejudicial to good order and discipline. And that's
 23 where the commanders have to do the scratching of the

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CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES

Tuesday; November 10, 1998

1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 940

Arlington, Virginia

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 2</p> <p>1 Those present: 2 Anita K. Blair, Esquire - Chairman 3 The Honorable Frederick F.Y. Pang - Vice Chairman 4 Nancy Cantor, Ph.D. - Commissioner 5 LtGen George R. Christmas, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner 6 CSM Robert A. Dare, Jr., USA(Ret) - Commissioner 7 Thomas Moore - Commissioner 8 Charles Moskos, Ph.D. - Commissioner 9 The Honorable Barbara Spyridon Pope - Commissioner 10 Mady Wechsler Segal, Ph.D. - Commissioner 11 --- 12 Stephen C. Fogleman, Esquire - Executive Director 13 Susan L. Fry - Executive Assistant 14 Hank Hodge - Staff Liaison 15 James Renne, Esquire - Staff Counsel and Secretary 16 Kathleen M. Wright, Ph.D. - Research Director 17 Janice Laurence, Ph.D. - Research Consultant 18 Charles Johnson, Ph.D. - Research Consultant 19 Capt J.S. Snyder, USN - Service Representative 20 LtCol Mary Street, USAF - Service Representative 21 LTC Brenda L. Harris, USA - Service Representative 22 Maj R. Scott LaShier, USMC - Service Representative 23 ---</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 5</p> <p>1 P R O C E E D I N G S (9:00 a.m.) 2(Presentation of United States Navy) 3CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. I think we're 4 still expecting a couple of folks who apparently are 5 still on the road but I think we can go ahead and get 6 started. 7Thank you very much for coming. And I was 8 just given a note by Captain Snyder that we also have 9 with us today Lieutenant Commander David Hammell, who is 10 from the Bureau of Medicine, and he's over on the side 11 and will jump in if anybody needs resuscitation. 12 DR. SEGAL: Now, that's reassuring. 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. I think you heard 14 the procedure that I just outlined for our briefings. 15 We'll hear from the representatives of the Navy, 16 uninterrupted, and then we will go around the table with 17 questions from each commissioner. And we have usually 18 followed a pretty informal procedure just amongst 19 ourselves; but as I noted, we are doing this for the 20 record, so I would just ask everybody to keep in mind not 21 to jump in and talk over one another. 22 Okay. And I understand you were given 23 eight minutes for summary and I think —</p>
<p>Page 3</p> <p>1 Also present: 2 Presentation of United States Navy 3 CDR Richard A. Shaffer, MSC, USN, Head, Clinical Epidemiology Division, Naval Health Research Center 4 James A. Hodgdon, Ph.D., Research Physiologist, Human 5 Performance Department, Naval Health Research Center 6 LCDR Neal A. Carlson, USN, Head, Health and Physical Fitness, Navy Personnel Command 7 LCDR David L. Hammell, MSC, USN, Bureau of Medicine and 8 Surgery, BUMED OLA (MED-09X) 9 Presentation of United States Marine Corps 10 LtCol Leon M. Pappa, USMC, Deputy Branch Head, Training Programs Branch, Training and Education Division, MCCDC 11 James Hodgdon, Ph.D., Research Physiologist, Human 12 Performance Department, Naval Health Research Center 13 Presentation of United States Army 14 LTG William J. Bolt, USA, TRADOC, Deputy Commanding General, Initial Entry Training 15 Col Stephen D. Cellucci, USA, Commandant, U.S. Army 16 Physical Fitness School 17 Col Maureen K. LeBoeuf, USA, Professor, U.S. Military Academy 18 Joseph J. Knapik, Ph.D., Research Physiologist, U.S. Army 19 Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine 20 Louis F. Tomasi, Ph.D., Research Physiologist, U.S. Army Physical Fitness School 21 Col Barbara Lee, USA 22 LTC Bruce Batten, USA LTC Monica Gorzelnik, USA 23 Maj John Snyder, USA</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 6</p> <p>1 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Yes, ma'am. We don't 2 need it. 3CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. We did receive 4 your very excellent materials in advance and I hope 5 everybody had the chance to read them. If not, questions 6 that replicate parts of the materials won't be shut down. 7So if you'll go ahead with your 8 presentation, then. 9COMMANDER SHAFFER: Yes, ma'am. 10 Well, good morning. My name is Commander 11 Rick Shaffer. You have our statement that all three of 12 us have had input on over the last week and a half, so we 13 won't be making any more opening statement details than 14 that. And basically all I'd like to do to start with is 15 introduce the three of us, starting with myself. 16 As I said, I'm Commander Rick Shaffer. 17 I'm from a place called the Naval Health Research Center, 18 which is in San Diego, California. I am the Head of a 19 division called the Clinical Epidemiology Division. My 20 background is that I have a Ph.D. in Epidemiology of 21 Physical Activity and Health. I have spent the last six 22 years guiding and directing research into the area of 23 physical activity, health, and injuries in the military.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 4</p> <p>1 Presentation of United States Air Force 2 Col James L. Laub, Aerospace Medicine Division Chief, Air Force Medical Operations Agency, Office of the Surgeon 3 General 4 Maj Neal Baumgartner, USAF School of Aerospace Medicine, Brooks AFB 5 Col Doug Acklin, USAF 6 LtCol Sandy Rufkahr, USAF 7 --- 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 7</p> <p>1 Specifically, the last five to six years I 2 have spent working at both the Navy and Marine Corps boot 3 camps. I am not a policy guy. I don't know policy. I'm 4 not here to answer policy questions. I leave that to the 5 two gentlemen that are with me. But my background is 6 specifically — And I've probably been at boot camps as 7 long as any military person is at boot camp because many 8 of them actually stationed there transfer on and move on, 9 where I have been continuing there, doing work over the 10 last five to six years. 11 I can speak to what the issues are and how 12 they're working. I can't speak as much to why they are 13 and what the official policy on them is. So I'm kind of 14 here as a resource for information for you all on the 15 area of, as I said, physical activity, injury and health 16 of recruits, both Navy and Marine Corps. 17 On my left is Dr. Jim Hodgdon. Jim is a 18 research physiologist at the Naval Health Research Center 19 also. He's in a separate department from myself and has 20 been doing research at the Naval Health Research Center 21 quite a bit longer than I have. Dr. Hodgdon has a 22 doctorate from the University of California at Berkeley 23 in exercise physiology.</p>

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1 He's been involved with the Navy's
 2 Physical Readiness Program since 1981, when he worked
 3 with Captain Bill Jackson at the Naval Military Personnel
 4 Command on the development of the Chief of Naval
 5 Operations Instruction 6110. At that time, it was .1B,
 6 which was the original one that came out.
 7 Since that time, he's provided research
 8 and professional assistance to the Bureau of Navy
 9 Personnel in the development of body composition
 10 standards, measurement techniques, as well as the
 11 development and refinement of physical readiness test
 12 measures and standards.
 13 Dr. Hodgdon has been somebody that — over
 14 the six years I've been at NHRC, has been somebody that I
 15 know is probably the best resource on a lot of the "why"
 16 and "how come." Not "the reason for," though. He, like
 17 I, gets an opportunity to provide our input. It's not
 18 always taken, but our input is always given.
 19 On my right is Lieutenant Commander Neal
 20 Carlson. Neal is a graduate of the University of
 21 Illinois exercise physiology program. He's got both a
 22 Bachelor of Science and a Master of Science from there.
 23 In 1987, he was awarded a Doctor of Philosophy degree in

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1 exercise physiology from the University of Wisconsin.
 2 His area of interest was respiratory physiology during
 3 immersion in water.
 4 In 1988, Lieutenant Commander Carlson was
 5 commissioned as a lieutenant in the Medical Service Corps
 6 following a one-and-a-half-year post-doctoral National
 7 Research Council resident research associateship at the
 8 Naval Medical Research Institute in Bethesda, Maryland.
 9 As a research physiologist at the Naval Medical Research
 10 Institute, he conducted research projects investigating
 11 the physiological and psychological effects of
 12 respiratory apparatus on U.S. Navy divers.
 13 In 1990, he qualified as a Navy diver by
 14 completing the Diving Medical Officer Course at the Naval
 15 Diving and Salvage Training Center in Panama City,
 16 Florida. He qualified as a Dive Watch Officer for the
 17 NMRI — Naval Medical Research Institute — man-rated
 18 hyperbaric chamber complex in 1993.
 19 Lieutenant Commander Carlson began his
 20 current duty as the Head of Health and Physical Fitness
 21 Branch at the Navy Personnel Command, Millington,
 22 Tennessee, in June 1998. As Branch Head, he is
 23 responsible for advising the Navy on health and physical

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1 readiness issues and providing the Fleet with guidance on
 2 the Physical Readiness Program. Lieutenant Commander
 3 Carlson is certified as an American College of Sports
 4 Medicine Exercise Leader and a Cooper Institute for
 5 Aerobics Research Personal Trainer.
 6 So having said our three introductions,
 7 basically our position here is to be at your disposal to
 8 answer questions, to clarify information that's been
 9 provided, and to provide you with any other guidance that
 10 we can provide.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, for the benefit of
 12 our latecomers —
 13 DR. CANTOR: Sorry.
 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: No problem.
 15 Rather than try and count who's raised
 16 their hand first and so forth, I thought we would just
 17 start someplace and allow each commissioner a question
 18 and a follow-up, if relevant, and then just move on. And
 19 if you're not ready with a question at the moment, you
 20 can say "pass," and we'll simply keep going around.
 21 Would anybody like to start with a
 22 question?
 23 MR. PANG: I think the Chair —

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1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Fred.
 2 MR. PANG: I think the Chair should start
 3 first.
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. All right, I will
 5 be glad to.
 6 In the materials, the distinction is made
 7 between physical fitness and requirements for job
 8 performance. And I would like to hear from you about how
 9 physical fitness, which I understand is a basic physical
 10 requirement, relates to the general requirements of the
 11 service or readiness.
 12 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Do you want to start
 13 with that one?
 14 As a policy?
 15 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: As a
 16 policy? Well — This is Lieutenant Commander Carlson.
 17 I think that the general policy is that
 18 the programs — in particular, the Navy Health and
 19 Physical Readiness Program — is to address the health
 20 and —
 21 DR. MOSKOS: A little louder, please.
 22 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: Okay.
 23 Thank you.

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1 The — I've drawn a blank.
 2 DR. HODGDON: The current Physical
 3 Readiness Program is designed to promote overall health
 4 and a general level of fitness for Navy personnel, as you
 5 can see from the material that was provided.
 6 So that, in its current form, this program
 7 began in 1982, about, and was in response to President
 8 Carter noting that the troops were unfit and looked
 9 unmilitary. But at that same time, there was a movement
 10 in the country to promote wellness among people in
 11 general physical — levels of physical activity. It was
 12 thought to be an enhancement to just lifestyle in
 13 general.
 14 And so the Navy adopted that as the
 15 rationale for its Physical Training Program at that time.
 16 And, therefore, the standards that were developed and, by
 17 and large, the items that were included were designed to
 18 be indicators of general health and fitness.
 19 The Navy has not focused on specific
 20 requirements for performance of jobs. I believe — and
 21 this is my belief. My belief is that the Navy feels that
 22 working on the job prepares you best to do the job, and I
 23 think that's the approach they've taken and that the

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1 program provides a general level of fitness.
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Do you know whether there
 3 is any attempt to link the general fitness requirements
 4 in the Navy to any specific Navy requirements? And let
 5 me give you a little background. I look at the services
 6 and they all seem to have little, slightly different
 7 fitness requirements. And so what I'm trying to get at
 8 is, is there a rationale other than independence for the
 9 differences?
 10 DR. HODGDON: Certain elements of the Navy
 11 have tried to link their physical fitness standards to
 12 job requirements, and those would be the Special Warfare
 13 kind of people — explosive ordnance disposal, SEALs;
 14 divers, for that matter — but I'm not sure about the
 15 rational development of the standards they have. That's
 16 not something I was involved in.
 17 By and large, the Navy has not focused on
 18 strictly relating the physical standards to job
 19 performance.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.
 21 MR. PANG: I pass to Barbara.
 22 MS. POPE: Well, I guess I want to follow-
 23 up on the Chair's question. And that is — Let me see if

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1 I understand you. That except for Special Warfare —
 2 divers, SEALs —
 3 DR. HODGDON: Aviators, explosive
 4 ordnance. Yeah.
 5 MS. POPE: — there are no physical
 6 requirements for the job?
 7 DR. HODGDON: The physical —
 8 MS. POPE: Those are the only four?
 9 DR. HODGDON: To be in the Navy, you are
 10 required to pass the Physical Readiness Test.
 11 MS. POPE: Right.
 12 DR. HODGDON: But the standards for the
 13 Physical Readiness Test are not anchored in job demands
 14 — that's correct — except in those instances where
 15 other standards have been set. Is that clear enough?
 16 MS. POPE: I don't think so.
 17 DR. HODGDON: No.
 18 MS. POPE: What I hear you saying is that
 19 there are only four — SEALs, divers, Special Ops,
 20 aviators — that have physical requirements for the job.
 21 DR. HODGDON: They have higher standards
 22 than the Navy's PRT, with —
 23 MS. POPE: Right. The PRT — I

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1 understand.
 2 DR. HODGDON: The rationale that they
 3 provide for those different standards is that they need a
 4 higher level of physical fitness to perform the job.
 5 Whether they have explicitly linked their standards to
 6 elements of the job I could not say. But they do have
 7 higher standards, and the rationale —
 8 MS. POPE: But there are only four is what
 9 you're saying.
 10 DR. HODGDON: Those are the four that come
 11 to mind.
 12 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: Those are
 13 the closest — Those are — right — four primary:
 14 ordnance —
 15 MS. POPE: Can we get an answer for the
 16 record if there are any additions to those four?
 17 Thank you.
 18 DR. HODGDON: "Yes" is the answer to that.
 19 MS. POPE: I saw the head nod, and so...
 20 DR. SEGAL: I see that there's a statement
 21 here that the sit-reach distance is no longer scored.
 22 That was the measure of flexibility that the Navy used to
 23 use in its fitness test and it's not used anymore. Is

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1 that correct?
 2 DR. HODGDON: It's not correct to say that
 3 it's not used anymore. It's that the standard is that
 4 you be able to touch your toes while sitting on the deck.
 5 There was some literature that we came across that
 6 indicated that hyperextension or hyperflexion of the back
 7 was actually risky for you to do and people would not
 8 always, you know, lean forward gently. Sometimes they
 9 would bound out there to see how far they could get.
 10 DR. SEGAL: How far they could get.
 11 DR. HODGDON: Right.
 12 DR. SEGAL: So now the standard is to just
 13 be able to touch your toes while sitting?
 14 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Just do it in a —
 15 DR. HODGDON: That's right. And it's a
 16 pass-fail event.
 17 DR. SEGAL: And if they fail that, they
 18 fail the fitness test?
 19 DR. HODGDON: If they fail sit-reach —
 20 DR. SEGAL: If they fail the sit-reach
 21 distance.
 22 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: No, not —
 23 DR. SEGAL: That they fail —

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1 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: Not now.
 2 That was the case until September 1st, and —
 3 DR. SEGAL: And why was this dropped?
 4 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: Basically
 5 because there wasn't much belief that they would — that
 6 someone who failed to touch their toes, one, people would
 7 actually decide that that's worth separating — Okay. In
 8 our policy right now, if you fail the Physical Readiness
 9 Test three times in four years, you could be processed
 10 for administrative separation. It's not required but you
 11 could be.
 12 And the thought that someone would be —
 13 who wouldn't be able to touch their toes three times in a
 14 four-year period would be separated from the Navy just
 15 didn't seem to have the support of the —
 16 DR. SEGAL: Well, why was that particular
 17 one considered less important than the other aspects of
 18 the test, then?
 19 DR. HODGDON: I believe because as — if I
 20 could jump in — This is Jim Hodgdon.
 21 I believe because there's very little data
 22 to show that it is a good indicator of either long-term
 23 health or job performance. The literature is quite

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1 mixed, in fact, on the benefits or lack of benefits
 2 associated with flexibility training, stretching. It's
 3 generally believed that it's good for you, but there are
 4 — you know, there's a real lack of data proving that
 5 point — demonstrating that.
 6 DR. SEGAL: Would the same thing be said
 7 — I mean, how does that compare to the literature and
 8 support for the other events, like how many times you can
 9 sit-up in the space of a certain period of time?
 10 DR. HODGDON: Certainly the preponderance
 11 of data relating health to physical fitness relates to
 12 aerobic capacity and, therefore, the run that we have is
 13 probably the greatest indicator of long-term health
 14 benefits related to exercise.
 15 DR. SEGAL: So what's the justification
 16 for the others, then? The sit-ups and the —
 17 DR. HODGDON: The justification for the
 18 sit-ups is that there's a modest literature — and it,
 19 too, is modest — suggesting that the doing of sit-ups is
 20 — helps develop the musculature of the anterior, the
 21 front part of the trunk, and, therefore, is protective
 22 against the development of low-back pain and back injury.
 23 It's a modest literature, but it appears

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1 that, by and large, people tend to exercise their backs
 2 but not the front half of the trunk, and, therefore, you
 3 get muscle imbalance across the trunk and that's part of
 4 what leads to the development of low-back pain later.
 5 At the Cooper Institute, Steve Blair has
 6 recently put out a report that suggests that the number
 7 that you can do may not be related to the development of
 8 back pain, but it still may be — it still appears to be
 9 the case that the doing of sit-ups — So training for the
 10 test is good for you.
 11 Okay?
 12 DR. SEGAL: I've got another follow-up but
 13 I can hold it if you'd like.
 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: That's fine. I just
 15 remind everybody to keep your voices up.
 16 DR. HODGDON: Okay. Am I letting mine
 17 drop? Sorry.
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, we all are.
 19 DR. HODGDON: Yeah.
 20 DR. SEGAL: It follows on the same thing,
 21 but I can wait.
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Sure.
 23 DR. SEGAL: I see that in the Marine Corps

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1 package that we got, they talked about the change that
2 they made to go to an abdominal crunch rather than a sit-
3 up. You mentioned the Cooper Institute and that they
4 were the ones who did the study and they got input — So
5 the Marine Corps got input from this study and, as a
6 result, changed from sit-ups to the crunches. And I
7 wondered if you're familiar with that work and if you've
8 considered doing that as well.

9 DR. HODGDON: The Marine Corps — Well, I
10 can't speak for them exactly but it's my understanding
11 that, in part, what they were doing is in fact adopting
12 the same exercise that we used in the Navy. There was
13 some data again in the literature to indicate it's a
14 little safer for your back to do a crunch rather than the
15 sit-up that brings you all the way forward to break the
16 plane of your knees and —

17 DR. SEGAL: Is that what you actually do
18 in the Navy — is the crunch?

19 DR. HODGDON: That's what the Navy — The
20 Navy and the Marine Corps right now have the same sit-up.
21 We've been doing it — That's how we started.

22 DR. SEGAL: Been doing the crunch. So you
23 call it the sit-up, but it's actually a crunch?

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1 know that, boot camp came to us, Naval Health Research
2 Center, and asked them to start helping put together the
3 curriculum to address that issue, and they have been
4 doing that now over the last sixteen months.
5 They went to — They added exercise
6 periods, and I think what you're referring to with the
7 sleep is the way they had to add some of those was start
8 them at 4:30 in the morning. Is that — Because
9 basically in order to get additional exercise in a day
10 that was already full, what they did is they added it at
11 the beginning of the day. So they had to make them get
12 up earlier on some days in order to get six exercise
13 periods in a week.

14 We were involved in the development of
15 those six exercise periods. Actually, at the time they
16 put together the six exercise periods, the curriculum
17 they were using for exercise — just the exercise part —
18 was one that we developed for them the summer prior to
19 that. They went to the six exercise periods in order to
20 try to prepare for the Battle Stations.

21 My comment on it, though, and Rick
22 Shaffer's comment on it, is that physical fitness is not
23 necessarily related to success of Battle Stations,

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1 DR. HODGDON: It's actually referred to as
2 a "curl-up" —

3 DR. SEGAL: A "curl-up."

4 DR. HODGDON: — in the instruction.

5 DR. SEGAL: Okay.

6 DR. HODGDON: But the Marine Corps calls
7 it a crunch. Same exercise.

8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My question
9 deals with Battle Stations. Battle Stations is
10 relatively new at recruit training at Great Lakes. The
11 literature says and shows that because of Battle Stations
12 and the increased physical fitness required to prepare
13 for those, that you went to six days of physical training
14 per week but based on the current or the standards that
15 were in place at the time. And my question is twofold.

16 The first is did you scientifically look
17 at what the physical training program should have in
18 those six days to prepare the recruits for this very
19 difficult Battle Stations, which requires a lot of not
20 only upper body strength but, you know, a great deal of
21 muscular use throughout? Number one. And number two: if
22 in fact I was — I had moved to physical training for six
23 days a week and I had a strong regimen, how sleep

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1 especially the standards as they are.
2 In fact, they asked us to give them a
3 standard at which, on day one of boot camp, what would
4 the standard be that would be the — that would put a
5 recruit at the best likelihood for passing Battle
6 Stations, and by the data, there isn't one. There is not
7 a standard. There isn't a number that we could give
8 them, short of just being able to pass Battle Stations on
9 day one, that could assure the recruit would pass Battle
10 Stations.

11 Also, we don't see any correlation between
12 the PFT score, neither the one at the beginning of boot
13 camp or the one that they take right prior to Battle
14 Stations, that is related to success in Battle Stations.
15 So at this moment, my opinion is that they
16 don't — it isn't going to very easily correlate any
17 fitness standard nor fitness curriculum in the seven
18 weeks prior to coming. And the one other caveat to that
19 is that seven weeks is not a whole lot of time to prepare
20 somebody physiologically for an arduous exercise such as
21 Battle Stations if you're not ready in that seven weeks
22 prior to, you know, when you arrived.

23 So the first challenge is — And many

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1 deprivation plays within that aspect?

2 What I mean by that is my observation was

3 that it appeared to me that as the physical fitness
4 program was increased to six days, no one was looking at
5 the fact that there was a basic sleep deprivation
6 program. Perhaps not knowingly. And I would ask your
7 opinions on that and what that portends.

8 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: Our program
9 at the Naval Personnel Command has basically focused only
10 on the Physical Readiness Test. It has not addressed
11 issues like some of the specific extra training or
12 testing requirements of some of the other — of some of
13 the specific groups, like we talked about the SEALs, and
14 we haven't focused on the development of Battle Stations.

15 COMMANDER SHAFFER: And let me just
16 comment. And this is — And this — Once again, this is
17 Rick Shaffer's opinion because I am not at the boot camp.
18 I just have been watching it for the last five to six
19 years.

20 In the beginning when Battle Stations was
21 first implemented, there was no change on the physical
22 fitness program in the seven weeks prior to Battle
23 Stations. And at that point, though — and the reason I

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1 times you can't get some people ready in just seven
2 weeks.

3 So I think that it's progressing. In
4 fact, there's been some changes that they've made in the
5 last couple of months up at boot camp to address the
6 physiological issues of Battle Stations, but my data that
7 I had gotten from them is that fitness issues don't
8 necessarily relate to failure, except that many of the
9 failures are in what they call transit time, which is
10 when they're running from station to station.

11 Some of these stations are as much as a
12 mile apart. By my measurement when I follow them around
13 — and I don't know what the official measurement is at
14 boot camp. By my measurement, they run about four miles
15 in that eight-hour period. It's up to twelve hours now,
16 but at the time we were measuring, it was eight hours;
17 and they ran four miles, and that was just getting from
18 one side of the base to the other. And they do this in
19 formation. If you fall out of that formation, you
20 typically — again, it's the discretion of the instructor
21 — you typically fail.

22 And so that's, I think, where a lot of the
23 issue of fitness as it relates to Battle Stations

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1 failures come from, but I'm not sure that that's actually
 2 a real live physical fitness issue that causes that
 3 failure. There are other things that could cause that
 4 kind of failure.
 5 So I think that right now, as far as the
 6 preparation that's going on to prepare for Battle
 7 Stations, there's still a couple changes that I
 8 understand they're making now. We've been working with
 9 them pretty concurrently as they're doing that. There's
 10 some changes that they're making now to beef that up a
 11 little bit.
 12 They're also talking about doing some
 13 early screening where they're going to take recruits into
 14 the beginning — at the beginning of boot camp and have
 15 them test out to whether they should go into a remedial
 16 program before they start boot camp in an effort to try
 17 to get all these things so they build up to being able to
 18 do Battle Stations.
 19 The one last comment is the amount of
 20 running that it takes over the seven weeks to prepare you
 21 for Battle Stations and we've looked at various different
 22 running mileages over the seven weeks. We've had
 23 divisions that have run as few as ten miles over seven or

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1 eight weeks, which is about a mile a week, and we've had
 2 divisions that have run eighty to ninety miles in that —
 3 And these are — you know, these were our tests. These
 4 weren't because that's what they were doing. And
 5 basically there's no difference in the fitness at the end
 6 of boot camp in these kids that walk in the door whether
 7 they are running X-number of miles. There isn't any set
 8 X-number of miles to run.
 9 So I guess all this boils down to the
 10 fitness standards and the fitness curriculum as they
 11 relate to Battle Stations are still not established
 12 exactly what that needs to be, but they're working
 13 through that as they've had Battle Stations in place to
 14 prepare better for the Battle Stations issue.
 15 DR. SEGAL: Can you just —
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can I
 17 follow-up that just to —
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Sure.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Do I draw
 20 an implication that if, in fact, recruit training and
 21 physical fitness training was longer — in other words,
 22 if I had several more weeks, whatever that might be —
 23 that I might in fact increase the recruit's ability to

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1 complete the Battle Stations run between the stations and
 2 so forth —
 3 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Well, first —
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — over
 5 time?
 6 In other words, I'm conducting a physical
 7 fitness program, say, two or three extra weeks.
 8 COMMANDER SHAFFER: The first comment on
 9 that — and I'll let — The first comment on that is
 10 there aren't that many Battle Stations failures to start
 11 with. The Battle Stations failure is very minor. And
 12 the numbers — And these are my numbers and they are not
 13 — I don't think they are the official NTC numbers. I
 14 had about three hundred people failing Battle Stations in
 15 a year, in a twelve-month period, out of the forty-eight-
 16 thousand that were trained.
 17 So the Battle Stations failure issue is a
 18 concern to them. It's not a huge magnitude. And I guess
 19 the point would be if you are just trying to fix the
 20 Battle Stations failure point, what would your tradeoff
 21 be in adding the amount of time?
 22 Having said that, though, I think that
 23 there is a function that there is a certain amount of

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1 time more that could be required for a portion of the
 2 incoming kids who need that extra time it would benefit.
 3 I don't know what proportion, though, of the overall
 4 population. Probably not that much that would benefit
 5 fitness-wise and Battle Stations-wise at the end of boot
 6 camp.
 7 Did you want to make a comment?
 8 DR. HODGDON: This is Jim Hodgdon again.
 9 I want to preface my remarks by saying I
 10 know very little about Battle Stations. What I know
 11 about Battle Stations I've learned from Rick. But I
 12 would like to comment that the fact that people drop out
 13 during the run part suggests that at least for those
 14 individuals there's a need for additional actual running
 15 training.
 16 That may not change your measurable
 17 fitness in terms of time on a mile-and-a-half run or your
 18 maximal rate of oxygen consumption or something, but it
 19 does prepare the muscles, the bones and the ligaments to
 20 run and to take the shock forces, and the way you develop
 21 that ability is in fact to do the exercise that you'll be
 22 asked to do later.
 23 And while our data do not directly —

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1 "Our." I helped him analyze it but it's his data — do
 2 not suggest that mileage during training is a factor in
 3 success or failure at Battle Stations. It is likely, but
 4 at this point I think unsurveyed, that past running
 5 history interacting with the amount of running you get in
 6 during basic training may interact to dictate your
 7 response to Battle Stations.
 8 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Because that's an
 9 important — Running the race is what Jim was talking
 10 about in his — You can be physically fit, but if you
 11 don't know how to run a mile and a half, you may sprint
 12 that first hundred yards and die. And many people at
 13 eighteen years old don't know how to run the race, so
 14 there's a training aspect to running the race that is
 15 very critical as well.
 16 DR. HODGDON: Yes.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 18 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Bob Dare.
 19 Are the current Navy policies and
 20 practices as it pertains to the training and the
 21 maintenance for all aspects of physical fitness, to
 22 include body fat for both men and women — are they
 23 adequate so that sailors in the fleet are able to perform

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1 satisfactorily on a daily basis?
 2 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: The policy
 3 right now is that the test and procedures are not to
 4 address — they don't address and are not based on
 5 performance of their occupation. That's a — Perhaps
 6 that's a subtlety or not, but it's not based — the
 7 Physical Readiness Test and the standards for those are
 8 not based on any job occupation.
 9 Such as an aviation ordnanceman: an
 10 aviation ordnanceman may have to lift armament, but
 11 that's not — that isn't what goes into the Physical
 12 Readiness Test and the body fat program. It's based on
 13 health.
 14 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: So I guess a
 15 quicker question is, is the Navy healthy based upon the
 16 policies and practices?
 17 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: I don't —
 18 I don't think we —
 19 DR. HODGDON: I believe so.
 20 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: They're
 21 healthier to the extent that they can perform those tests
 22 and those tests as they relate to health.
 23 Now, whether — if you're asking are we

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1 seeing lower costs for medical care, lower injury rates,
2 other measures of health, we don't — I'm not aware that
3 we have that information.

4 DR. HODGDON: What we do know along those
5 lines is we have some cross-sectional information that
6 suggests that people — And this is not rocket science.
7 This is documenting the obvious — people in more
8 physically demanding jobs are injured more frequently.
9 Whether that's something that could be addressed by
10 physical training interventions — in particular,
11 strength training — is unclear, but we do have that
12 information.

13 But these injury rates are fairly low.
14 It's not a big-time problem.

15 MS. POPE: I'm sorry, but can you supply
16 that to the Commission? I mean, is that a report? In
17 what format is that in?

18 DR. HODGDON: It's a report. There's a
19 report that's under review at our center now that
20 addresses that. So as soon as that clears its hurdles
21 locally, we can certainly make that available. But it
22 addresses the issue of physical demand and injury rates.

23 DR. SEGAL: Does it give it to us, injury

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1 But then in answer to Bob Dare's question,
2 I seem to hear you saying — you're going even a step
3 further — that there's no explicit linkage between the
4 physical standards and the testing and a sort of
5 generalized occupational assumption of sort of an overall
6 fitness to serve on ship, for example.
7 And let's take away the SEALs and the
8 divers and the EOD people who admittedly are in a special
9 category, but I'm talking about just your standard ship
10 crewman. And all of those people have to do damage
11 control, fire-fighting, evacuating casualties, regardless
12 of their specific job occupation, and that at times may
13 require a certain kind of strength or upper body
14 exertion, whatever.

15 Are you saying that there's no linkage
16 between the fitness standards and even the generalized
17 ability to do routine duties on board ship?

18 DR. HODGDON: There's a distinction
19 between, I would say, routine duties and emergency tasks,
20 performance of emergency tasks. You know, most people
21 are obviously — not obviously, but most people are fit
22 enough to do their job because they're not falling over
23 dead and they're not being injured, you know, at great

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1 rates and failure rates, in —
2 DR. HODGDON: It's not tied back to the
3 Physical Readiness Test or anything else.

4 DR. SEGAL: Okay.

5 DR. HODGDON: In fact, it's based on
6 ratings of physical demands at jobs.

7 DR. SEGAL: Is it done separately by sex?

8 DR. HODGDON: No, there are no — We have
9 a very limited database from which — not limited, but
10 somewhat constrained database from which we're working.

11 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I would
12 suspect we'd have to be careful with it unless it
13 discerns the — I mean, there's certain tasks that if you
14 perform them on a regular basis, the chances of you
15 getting hurt periodically escalate. I mean, you jump out
16 of an airplane enough times, the odds are you're going to
17 get hurt. That has nothing to do with how physically fit
18 you are in most cases.

19 DR. HODGDON: Correct.

20 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Right.

21 DR. HODGDON: Yes.

22 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: So can you
23 discern — I want to make sure when we get the data we

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1 rates. So people are obviously in good enough shape to
2 perform their duties. That may just be a function of
3 being young and healthy. And there's also — you know,
4 for routine duties, there's a wide variety of demand.
5 For the — But it is true that the

6 standards are not linked to, for instance, performance of
7 emergency tasks aboard ship. I cannot tell you — Again,
8 I'm not the "why" person, but there have been some
9 attempts in the past to do that and I don't know — I
10 don't know the reasons for which those, you know,
11 suggestions were not accepted or what was found
12 unacceptable or, you know, why decisions weren't made
13 along those lines.

14 MR. MOORE: I guess I'm just — I'm
15 surprised at that. A routine duty of a yeoman, for
16 example, on a ship, is a fairly non-stressful demand —
17 physical demand; or somebody that works in the Combat
18 Information Center plotting —

19 DR. HODGDON: Right.

20 MR. MOORE: — data on a plotting board.
21 But everybody at some point might be called upon to
22 perform those emergency tasks. If the ship is hit by an
23 Exocet missile and you've got to put out fires and

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1 don't read it the wrong way is what I am saying.
2 DR. HODGDON: The information is actually
3 split out by ratings for the Navy; by Months's for — And
4 so we have higher injury rates for hull techs, for
5 example.

6 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.

7 DR. HODGDON: Okay? Now, these are not
8 people who are going to be jumping out of airplanes.

9 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Correct.

10 DR. HODGDON: And in general, I think
11 you'll be able to discern those who might be at sort of
12 operational risk, you know, rather than simple physical
13 demand.

14 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.

15 MR. MOORE: Tom Moore.

16 Thanks for coming to answer our questions.
17 We appreciate it.

18 I want to sort of come back to what I
19 think is kind of an underlying theme or underlying
20 unanswered question. You've made it fairly clear that
21 there's no explicit linkage between the physical test and
22 standards and a specific job occupation. I can accept
23 that.

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1 evacuate casualties, that's going to require physical
2 ability beyond the physical demands of being a yeoman or
3 a radio operator.

4 And there's no linkage there, you're
5 saying, between — Is there at least some implicit
6 assumption that if you could pass the PRT, you —
7 DR. HODGDON: Yes.

8 MR. MOORE: — can do X, Y and Z in terms
9 of emergency drill?

10 DR. HODGDON: Yes. But it is that — an
11 assumption. It hasn't been linked explicitly.

12 And, also, it needs to, I think, be borne
13 in mind that when you're confronted with these emergency
14 tasks, there are always a variety of ways to accomplish
15 them and, you know, sometimes it takes more people to do
16 a job than it would if you had sort of a hulking brute
17 versus a team of smaller persons. The key will be does
18 the job get done, and, you know, so far it has.

19 DR. CANTOR: Are you done?

20 MR. MOORE: I guess. I'm just —

21 DR. HODGDON: We're still here.

22 MR. MOORE: I think this needs a lot of
23 exploration but we can come back.

1 Excuse me. Go ahead.
 2 DR. CANTOR: Yeah. I was going to
 3 actually continue along —
 4 MR. MOORE: Please.
 5 DR. CANTOR: — I think some of the same
 6 lines as my colleagues.
 7 Nancy Cantor.
 8 Speaking of a team of small persons, you
 9 — in referring to the question we posed about training
 10 women to achieve some levels of physical performance —
 11 the same levels as men, you make a rather general
 12 statement. In fact, you say, “In general, we do not
 13 believe it is currently possible to train women to
 14 achieve the same levels of maximal performance as men.”
 15 Okay. And then you say, “Most military tasks do not
 16 require maximal performance.”
 17 So this gets back to my colleague’s sense
 18 of questions. I mean, you are — I presume you believe
 19 that you are not putting women at risk on ship even
 20 though you say that, indeed, you won’t be training to the
 21 same level of strength. And in fact, you go on to say
 22 that there’s a sort of informal sorting, you suspect,
 23 that goes on on board into lower strength-related tasks

1 in any occupational group and that that may be why there
 2 isn’t a higher injury rate — musculoskeletal injury rate
 3 for women than men.
 4 I mean, that’s all of little concern from
 5 my point of view given what we have just heard. I mean,
 6 given that you are not doing analyses that look at the
 7 relationship — that link the relationship between your
 8 training and particular levels of endurance and
 9 particular tasks on board if, indeed, you know that women
 10 are at a higher risk for injury and you’re leaving it to
 11 a sort of informal sorting system.
 12 I guess I’d like — rather than me draw a
 13 conclusion about that, I’d like you to give us a little
 14 more information on that, you know, but...
 15 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Comment on the maximal
 16 performance part first. I think that’s...
 17 DR. HODGDON: Right. You know, it’s just
 18 biologically the case that women will not train to have
 19 — cannot be trained to have the same maximal abilities
 20 as men.
 21 DR. CANTOR: I understand that. At least
 22 in that domain.
 23 DR. HODGDON: Yes. Yes. I’m sorry that I

1 didn’t limit it — Anyway — and I don’t want to go down
 2 that road.
 3 DR. CANTOR: Yes. Right, you don’t.
 4 DR. HODGDON: Yeah.
 5 On the other hand, you know, all work that
 6 we do by and large is sub-maximal. If we worked at our
 7 maximal capacity every day, we’d break, or we’d train so
 8 that our maximal capacity was higher; one or the other
 9 thing. So it is reasonably — it’s well documented that
 10 you can increase the strength of the average woman by
 11 putting her on a strength training program.
 12 What is — It is not clear that there is a
 13 higher injury rate for women.
 14 You can address that probably better than
 15 I, actually, Frank, but — And so I have to admit that
 16 what was said beyond that is kind of speculation.
 17 We have a survey of women aboard ship.
 18 The women surveyed reported lower physical demands for
 19 their jobs within the same rating, because they were all
 20 matched with males in the same rating. And so beyond
 21 that, it’s an assumption.
 22 And I said that. You know, it’s an
 23 assumption that, you know, the assignment to lower-demand

1 aspects of the ratings jobs may contribute to a lower
 2 injury rate. The higher injury rate’s only a theoretical
 3 — you know, is a theoretical construct. Not unproved,
 4 but — but, nonetheless, unproven for the Navy at this
 5 point. And without having analyzed jobs to say these are
 6 in fact the strength demands and looking at the strength
 7 capacities of the populations, we can’t really draw you
 8 an exact risk diagram.
 9 DR. CANTOR: Well, let me then return to
 10 the question that I think many of us are asking. Do you
 11 have any intention of analyzing jobs or at least jobs
 12 that are fairly consistent across a large set of the
 13 trainees in your operational force to look at the ways in
 14 which you can link the fitness you’re preparing them for
 15 in the jobs?
 16 I mean, you — again, in response to my
 17 question, you talk about sub-maximal performance.
 18 DR. HODGDON: Right.
 19 DR. CANTOR: You know, that’s — Well,
 20 that’s sort of an assumption so far, right? I mean, I
 21 don’t have —
 22 DR. HODGDON: Yes.
 23 DR. CANTOR: There’s nothing in here that

1 tells us that the majority of the jobs they are
 2 performing are indeed at sub-maximal levels in terms of
 3 taxing the system. Right?
 4 DR. HODGDON: Well, yes. Again, it should
 5 be borne in mind that if a job is maximally demanding,
 6 what you do is get someone to help you. And I don’t
 7 think that matters what gender you are or even what size
 8 you are. It’s dependent on what it takes to do the job.
 9 DR. CANTOR: I guess I find that a little
 10 disconcerting, honestly, as an answer. I mean, if we’re
 11 really looking at the —
 12 DR. HODGDON: Right. But —
 13 DR. CANTOR: — training and what kinds of
 14 training you would want to do, you don’t want to build
 15 into the system the reliance on someone else helping you.
 16 I think that seems —
 17 DR. HODGDON: I want to get back —
 18 DR. CANTOR: Or maybe you do.
 19 DR. HODGDON: I want to get back to your
 20 original question, but in answer to that, maybe you have
 21 to because maybe the maximal job the hull tech does is
 22 move an armature out of some giant generator and there
 23 are three people in the world that can do it. Well, you

1 don’t want that to be the standard — to be the guy who
 2 moves the armature.
 3 DR. CANTOR: That would be fine. But that
 4 would be an analysis, then, right?
 5 DR. HODGDON: Yes. I agree.
 6 DR. CANTOR: That’s all I’m asking for —
 7 is, are you intending to do that kind of an analysis.
 8 DR. HODGDON: Not precisely that kind of
 9 analysis. We do have a work unit from the Bureau of
 10 Medicine and Surgery to look at fitness as it relates to
 11 job physical demands. This is my comment, but any help
 12 you could give us in promoting those efforts would be
 13 well received.
 14 Anyway, we are — yes, we are doing work
 15 along those lines.
 16 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Let me comment on the
 17 informal setting, though, or informal — You mentioned
 18 informal kind of organizing, such that women may not be
 19 in a particular — the most demanding task. Actually a
 20 lot of that is a function of the people of — the
 21 leadership of the crowd doing that.
 22 I mean, there is a function of — It’s not
 23 as informal as I think it may sound. It was reported

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1 that way in that data that you saw, but what you don't
 2 know is why they were separated that way, and many times
 3 that is at their discretion and many times there's a
 4 reason why people are separated as a function of who can
 5 do certain tasks and whether their background is of
 6 certain specialties or not.
 7 So that would be the only comment as far
 8 as informal. I don't know that it's as informal or
 9 arbitrary organization as it may sound from that data.
 10 DR. HODGDON: And I don't believe that
 11 selection is strictly related to gender.
 12 COMMANDER SHAFFER: No, it's not.
 13 DR. HODGDON: There are small people who
 14 don't do those jobs.
 15 DR. CANTOR: I'm just going from what you
 16 wrote, okay?
 17 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Yeah, that needs
 18 clarifying.
 19 DR. CANTOR: I'm sure there are other
 20 things that sort this.
 21 DR. SEGAL: Well, that's an important
 22 point, so I don't want it lost. That it's not just
 23 gender — that sorting of people, as you said.

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1 DR. HODGDON: Right. It's strength and
 2 size.
 3 DR. SEGAL: Strength and size.
 4 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: As far as
 5 the — Excuse me. As far as the direction or the type of
 6 research that's being done or why are we basing our
 7 fitness on — not on occupations, I think it needs to be
 8 — we need to really make sure that we understand the
 9 distinctions between what's our Physical Readiness
 10 Program, which is the sit-ups and the push-ups and the
 11 mile-and-a-half run, and what other physical requirements
 12 or "testing" goes on at recruit training or at some of
 13 the other training sites that also — that might be
 14 confused with the Physical Readiness Program.
 15 The Physical Readiness Program, which is
 16 the body fat, the push-ups, curl-ups, the mile-and-a-half
 17 run — the basis for that is — has been dictated in a —
 18 by the Department of Defense to be, amongst other things,
 19 health.
 20 Okay. If they know that it can be based
 21 on a variety of items — okay? — they could — you could
 22 decide or it could have been decided that the physical
 23 fitness — Health and Physical Readiness Program could

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1 have addressed and could be directed to address
 2 occupational or work-related standards, fitness, however
 3 you want to phrase that, but the program that we're
 4 responsible for says it is health-based.
 5 So it becomes a matter of, again, should
 6 they — Someone decides what the basis of that program is
 7 and I think any of the researchers and people that
 8 develop those programs would work towards that goal. But
 9 right now, the goal has been, and has been over the
 10 years, health.
 11 So to hold somebody or hold the
 12 researchers or the program individuals, the people that
 13 are functioning and working with the program, making
 14 decisions on that program — to hold them responsible for
 15 making it on health and not occupation is not quite
 16 right.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: May I
 18 follow that up? Ron Christmas.
 19 Isn't that the crux, though, of what we're
 20 trying to talk about here? You are talking about the
 21 health-based physical fitness test, but the reality is
 22 that we also have to have a performance-based endurance
 23 requirement for any soldier, sailor, airman or marine to

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1 be able to perform the task that the services are
 2 required to perform.
 3 And I guess that's really the basis of the
 4 question. I would recognize in a minute we have a
 5 health-based program, but do we have a performance-based
 6 program also that complements that health-based program
 7 so that we're putting in the hulls of ships the most
 8 physically-fit sailor that we can, who will be not only
 9 healthy but, in fact, in time of emergency, will in fact
 10 be able to be strong enough to do the things that need to
 11 be done?
 12 I assume we went to Battle Stations at
 13 recruit training for a defining event and we picked those
 14 things that were the most strenuous. And what I hear
 15 from sailors is, "Well, what we go through at Battle
 16 Stations at recruit training and what we see at — "you
 17 know, the play things we do not-for-real that we're
 18 supposed to be doing for-real aboard ship are different."
 19 So I guess the point is, are we doing
 20 both? Or yes, we're doing health very well but we aren't
 21 doing the performance aspect very well? That would be
 22 the question.
 23 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: I think, to

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1 use that tired phrase of personal opinion, there is — I
 2 think if you look at the history of development of
 3 standards for the Navy, there is this investigation
 4 ongoing of, well, what do various job occupations, job
 5 demands, require physically? They've never been totally
 6 away from that, but the organized program that we see —
 7 and again, in regards to the Navy's Health and Physical
 8 Readiness Program, does not — has not focused very much
 9 at all on job performance.
 10 I think the assumption, as we mentioned in
 11 our submitted testimony, is that in many ways health —
 12 part of the basis for the program of health is that there
 13 are these general — even beyond physical requirements of
 14 the job, that by being generally healthy, you hope that
 15 those can allow the sailors to meet the demands of
 16 general service life and shipboard life, shore-based
 17 life.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Tom, go ahead.
 19 MR. MOORE: Could I ask one just apropos
 20 of that since we're on that? Regarding the history of
 21 development of the Navy standards, was there a time that
 22 you are aware of — a generation ago, ten years ago
 23 perhaps — when the emphasis was on performance-based

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1 standards? And if so, when did the shift occur away from
 2 a performance-based standard toward a generalized health
 3 basis?
 4 DR. HODGDON: I can tell you my
 5 observations. I know that in the early eighties —
 6 again, with this — when interest in physical fitness for
 7 military tasks — that wheel spun up again — that there
 8 was a study done by Dave Robertson and his colleagues at
 9 the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center and
 10 essentially his thesis was the defining characteristic
 11 for physically demanding jobs was adequate strength, the
 12 individual characteristic most important.
 13 And he did a variety — he did some
 14 studies in which he developed a set of strength tests and
 15 did some surveys of the most physically demanding jobs,
 16 modeled some tasks from those jobs, and then applied the
 17 tasks to Navy personnel and essentially, I think, showed
 18 that women would be excluded from all the physically
 19 demanding jobs. At that point, his recommendations — I
 20 don't know. I think it was for DACOWITS that he did it
 21 but I'm not sure, but the Navy did not accept his
 22 recommendations to implement those strength tests.
 23 Now, you know, there are questions about

1 issues — there are issues related to how the study was
 2 done and how the tests were put together and what they
 3 really mean in terms of doing a job because they're all
 4 short-burst, high-strength kinds of tasks. Well, you
 5 don't do work that way. You continue to work all day.
 6 And those studies ignored kind of that aspect of it and
 7 ignored —
 8DR. SEGAL: So they weren't based on
 9 systematic task analyses of the entire job.
 10 DR. HODGDON: They were — The answer is
 11 kind of. They were based on a survey that was sent out
 12 to the Fleet. It actually had a reasonably low return
 13 rate. And that's another of the questions that gets
 14 raised about the study — had to do with it being this
 15 mega questionnaire, that everyone just went "eh..."
 16 But tasks were identified and individuals
 17 were asked to identify weights of objects lifted, how
 18 high; weights of objects carried, how far. You know, the
 19 kind of task analysis questions that are normally a part
 20 of such a survey.
 21 However, it also relied strictly on the
 22 individual's perception. So there are reports like, you
 23 know, I helped push, at that time, an F-4 on the deck.

1 Well, so I'm moving a, you know, forty-ton, fifty-ton,
 2 whatever, object. You know, people would say that. So
 3 there's — obviously there were some questions about the
 4 fidelity of the reports that they got. Nonetheless, he
 5 did identify — and probably appropriately — that
 6 strength is the major element of physically demanding
 7 jobs in the services.
 8And at that time, also, all the services
 9 did surveys — Dave Robertson's was one. Moe Au did one
 10 for the Air Force, and probably Vogel and Patton did the
 11 one for the Army. I'm not sure — where they looked at
 12 the kinds of tasks that were done that were physically
 13 demanding, and across-the-services it turned out that the
 14 physically demanding tasks were those associated with
 15 materials handling, the extent to which we're an industry
 16 kind of.
 17 And those were — And the most common
 18 things were carrying, lifting, and then it varied to be
 19 pulling, pushing, or something else, depending on the
 20 service. You know, the Navy ends up pulling because we
 21 pull lines in and things. I think the Army pushed on
 22 things. But, whatever. You can draw from that what you
 23 like.

1 So in the early eighties —
 2DR. SEGAL: When was that survey? It was
 3 early eighties —
 4DR. HODGDON: Yeah, this is early
 5 eighties.
 6DR. SEGAL: — the survey was done?
 7DR. HODGDON: This is — All of this fell
 8 out from Carter's comments about, "Boy, you guys look
 9 sloppy and out-of-shape," and followed from the meeting
 10 at Arly House that the services — Because the Department
 11 of Defense directive that comes out of that — the '81
 12 directive, 1308.1 — says there are three reasons to be
 13 fit: you need to be healthy; you need to look good; and
 14 you need to be able to do your job. In fact, that —
 15 because they have three criteria, part of that, as
 16 you've seen, the criticism in the last GAO report.
 17 But, nonetheless, those are the three
 18 things that were listed. The one that's been focused on,
 19 certainly for the Navy, has been the health. I can't
 20 necessarily speak directly to the other services.
 21 They'll talk to you later.
 22 DR. MOSKOS: I'm Charlie Moskos. Thanks
 23 again for coming.

1 Is it fair — I wanted to ask a second
 2 question, but just in light of the last responses:
 3 rightly or wrongly, is it your view that the de facto
 4 exclusion of women under the old standards shaped the
 5 current physical training program?
 6DR. HODGDON: You're asking for an
 7 opinion, clearly.
 8DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 9DR. HODGDON: And I guess this is, again,
 10 my personal response. I believe in part.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: In part. Okay.
 12 DR. HODGDON: Yeah. It wasn't — There
 13 wasn't — People weren't out to drum women out of the
 14 service. In fact, I believe part of what happened was
 15 they realized that this was — if they adopted the
 16 policies that the research had suggested — and again,
 17 research with some problems — that, in fact, they would
 18 be taking a big hit in terms of —
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. I had two sort of very
 20 empirical-type questions. One is — excuse the
 21 alliteration — you know, is running really relevant?
 22 Has anybody done studies on running and what it means to
 23 people after they get out of the service, as they age, on

1 their knees and things of this sort? Is this really good
 2 for people in the long haul? I mean, make them healthy
 3 for the ship, but what does it do later on?
 4I mean, there's a lot of anecdotal stuff
 5 about running on hard surfaces is not good for people.
 6 What's the study —
 7DR. HODGDON: I'm not aware of specific
 8 studies.
 9COMMANDER SHAFFER: From the — If you're
 10 just talking about the injured point of view, yes, the
 11 more miles you run, the more injuries you're going to
 12 have. That's a pretty standard accepted, not just
 13 military, but civilian issue.
 14 DR. SEGAL: Do we know what impact it has
 15 long term on the knees?
 16 DR. HODGDON: No pun intended.
 17 COMMANDER SHAFFER: That's right.
 18 Well, and that's the issue. The impact —
 19 What — I mean, from the Rick Shaffer style of exercise,
 20 you know, prescription, basically we try in every case to
 21 assume that running is not the answer for everyone. It
 22 is for many people. But I think it has shown — And what
 23 we don't have, though some of us would love to do it —

1 what we don't have is to know whether excessive running
 2 in your fifteen-to-thirty years makes a knee problem in
 3 your fifty-to-seventy years, and there isn't data on
 4 that. And I think, though, that most — the assumption
 5 is that there's got to be some impact, but there isn't
 6 data.
 7DR. MOSKOS: Okay. The last item that I
 8 wanted to raise on stress, you did mention in the
 9 testimony that there is a differential stress fracture
 10 rate between men and women, though no numbers were given.
 11 Just using basic training independent of the job they do
 12 on a ship, whether it's heavy labor or light labor, do
 13 you have a — What is the stress fracture rate, males to
 14 females? A, is it a large number to begin with? And B,
 15 are there such differences — whatever they are that you
 16 alluded to, what are the differences between —
 17 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Most of the stress
 18 fracture data that you have is from boot camps, Navy and
 19 Marine Corps boot camps. They typically run something
 20 about less than 5 percent.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: About 5 percent.
 22 COMMANDER SHAFFER: And actually the
 23 Marine Corps boot camp, after some pretty innovative

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1 interventions that we were involved with about three
 2 years ago, have gotten it down to somewhere in the order
 3 of 2 percent.
 4 They do differ. Reported rates do differ,
 5 men to women.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: About what ratio would you
 7 say?
 8 COMMANDER SHAFFER: About 50 percent.
 9 Women tend to report about 50 percent more stress
 10 fractures than men. My data shows, though, that that has
 11 actually as much to do with the reporting difference in
 12 how men and women utilize medical care. But if you —
 13 And we've actually done some work looking at whether —
 14 If you go out to find injuries, the stress fracture rates
 15 are not nearly as drastically different as they are that
 16 I publish data on and when you're looking at reported.
 17 So you're talking — Stress fractures are
 18 a big magnitude problem. An individual stress fracture
 19 leads to a big problem. There aren't that many, though,
 20 stress fractures percentage-wise of the overall, both
 21 force and in boot camps. As I said, it's typically 5
 22 percent or lower. The Navy runs under a percent having
 23 stress fractures.

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1 But these few stress fractures do cause a
 2 lot of lost training time; up until recently, have
 3 resulted in an attrition from boot camp. Both Navy and
 4 Marine Corps boot camps are doing a terrific job at
 5 keeping that down. It's now — They only lose about 20
 6 percent of their stress fractures compared to about 80
 7 percent of their stress fractures about three, four years
 8 ago.
 9 So it's their biggest problem injury, but
 10 it's not their biggest magnitude injury. And the last
 11 thing I'll say on it is, it is a very good measure of
 12 overall injury, though. What I use it for typically is
 13 because the stress fracture is usually not related to a
 14 malingering issue that many times is a problem in boot
 15 camps and it's a good indication of all overuse injuries,
 16 but it's an injury that is very easy to diagnose and
 17 quantify.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: But the Marines' is much
 19 higher than the Navy's?
 20 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Yes, sir. Well,
 21 currently the Marines are running 2 to 3 percent men. I
 22 mean, the Navy, they're running under a percent in men.
 23 Actually, under a half a percent in men. The Navy — or

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1 the Marine Corps women are running anywhere from 3 to 5
 2 percent, and the Navy women are running under a percent
 3 as well.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Thank you.
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I'd like to continue with
 6 running for a moment. When I was at Great Lakes, I got
 7 the impression — and please verify or contradict if you
 8 can — that running is always done in formation. Do you
 9 know if that's correct?
 10 COMMANDER SHAFFER: That's not correct.
 11 It, for many years, was correct, until — Well, I should
 12 say that there were very few individual mile-and-a-half
 13 runs performed at Navy boot camp up until about four
 14 years ago. Now there are many individual mile-and-a-half
 15 runs performed.
 16 My observation of why that happened is
 17 because you came out of boot camp being able to do your
 18 mile-and-a-half run in formation and you got your first
 19 time in the Fleet where you ran your mile-and-a-half by
 20 yourself for the first time and you didn't know how to
 21 run the race, and so what happened is that had to be
 22 trained in as part of what happened.
 23 So boot camps were saying, "We're sending

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1 kids out meeting the standards at the end of boot camp,"
 2 but the Fleet was saying, "But they're not passing their
 3 first PRT at the Fleet," and that was actually a function
 4 of how they did it, not a function of fitness.
 5 So that's changed pretty dramatically and
 6 there are quite a few individual runs throughout boot
 7 camp. There are still formation runs. The Marine Corps
 8 has more than the Navy, and it's an esprit-de-corps issue
 9 that I fully support and there needs to be a nice balance
 10 of both.
 11 But there is also — the last — the final
 12 thing is there are issues of running in formation that
 13 could cause injury problems, and we've actually shown
 14 that where you run in the formation at Navy boot camp is
 15 related to injury risk. If the short people are in the
 16 front, that causes shorter strides in the whole
 17 formation; the taller people have to alter their strides
 18 and those tall people are more at risk to injury. And
 19 that happens vice versa.
 20 So formation runs have their place and
 21 they aren't doing that as a rule only.
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Does the Navy at Great
 23 Lakes have a formal program of ability groups, or is it

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1 just sort of a free-for-all when they do their individual
 2 running?
 3 COMMANDER SHAFFER: When you say — For
 4 the test itself?
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Let me just — The reason
 6 I ask that is at Fort Jackson runners are divided up into
 7 four or five ability groups so that the very fast people
 8 run more or less in competition with one another and the
 9 slower people run in a group at the end, and you work
 10 hard to go from Echo into Delta group.
 11 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Yes, ma'am.
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Does the Navy have a
 13 formal program like that or is it just individual —
 14 COMMANDER SHAFFER: I don't know whether
 15 NTC has a policy of that. They typically aren't doing
 16 that. They usually — It's partially a function of they
 17 have to do a lot of running in field houses and they have
 18 to do it all at one time, and it's a limited amount of
 19 time; so pretty much everybody's got to go out from a
 20 division and do their PT in their block of an hour, hour
 21 and a half, so they've all got to do it at once in order
 22 to have them all complete all the exercises.
 23 MS. POPE: Yeah. At NTC, they race

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1 against themselves because of the — they implant —
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: But that was a test —
 3 MS. POPE: No.
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — wasn't it? Was that
 5 the normal PT?
 6 MS. POPE: Yeah.
 7 COMMANDER SHAFFER: That's the normal PT.
 8 Championship actually is something that we provided for
 9 them several years ago.
 10 MS. POPE: So there's a record.
 11 COMMANDER SHAFFER: So that is — But the
 12 point of it is they don't separate the division. The
 13 whole eighty-person division runs their PRT and their
 14 individual runs all on as nine laps, and it really is
 15 kind of interesting to watch because everybody's out
 16 there just all over the place.
 17 But no, they don't separate them out. I
 18 don't know if they have a policy to do that, though, but
 19 typically for logistic reasons they don't.
 20 MS. POPE: Okay. Thank you.
 21 MR. PANG: You know, I have a — Fred
 22 Pang.
 23 I have a comment and a question, you know,

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1 and I think the comment hopefully will be to kind of
 2 collect some of the discussion with regard to the
 3 objective — okay? — of PRT, and that is, to test
 4 someone's general fitness and overall health. I mean, if
 5 you pass a certain hurdle, then you're assumed, I guess,
 6 to be healthy and physically fit for duty. Right? I
 7 mean, you know, I would assume that.
 8 And then I think the other thing is, is —
 9 I think we need to be aware of as commissioners, is that,
 10 you know, when the military is not at war, it's in
 11 training. I mean, so all this period of time, I mean,
 12 you know, we've got people around doing things; they're
 13 training.
 14 And I would assume that, you know, one of
 15 the things — one of the tests — okay? — of the ability
 16 of people to perform their duties would be the
 17 operational readiness inspections that are conducted.
 18 And, indeed, when the Fleet is out at sea and flying
 19 sorties, I mean, people have to move the airplane;
 20 they've got to get it up and down the elevators and do
 21 all the things that they need to do.
 22 So, you know, I suppose — okay? — that
 23 there must be, you know, integrated in the measure of

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1 effectiveness — okay? — in doing the mission, you know,
 2 the ability of people to physically do the demanding
 3 tasks that are expected of them.
 4 I mean, I know that — I don't know if
 5 there are any tests that one has to go through to — you
 6 know, to see whether or not they can — if you're working
 7 on a deck and responsible for moving the airplane, I
 8 mean, to — I don't think you'd test every individual to
 9 see how much they can push, but the fact is, as a team
 10 they move the planes.
 11 And if they aren't doing that, they that
 12 ought to be indicative of — you know, reflect back on
 13 the training that they're receiving in terms of physical
 14 fitness and ability to do these tasks because the tasks
 15 are — you know, from what I've observed, are
 16 extraordinarily taxing. I mean, you know, there's sleep
 17 deprivation; there are long hours; it's in heated
 18 conditions where people perspire a lot and have ____
 19 thing that they suck on to get liquids and things like
 20 this.
 21 So I'm just wondering, I mean, whether or
 22 not we're drifting off here into something that, you
 23 know, kind of implies that somehow or another the force

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1 is not fit. I don't know how to measure that. I mean,
 2 you know, if there's a way of measuring that, I'd like to
 3 know.
 4 So that's just by way of comment and, you
 5 know, you can react to that.
 6 The other question — The other thing I
 7 wanted to raise is a question. You know, there's a
 8 General Accounting Office report in draft form — This is
 9 an official setting, so I just want to raise it because
 10 the Defense Department has responded to it. And this
 11 report really has three major findings — okay? — and
 12 let me just read those three major findings to you.
 13 And I won't go into the sub-elements
 14 because there are sub-elements as well, but one is — one
 15 finding is "lack of adherence to DoD policy and confusion
 16 over multiple objectives contribute to differences in
 17 service requirements." That's number one. The second
 18 finding is "inconsistent and sometimes arbitrary
 19 standards create potential gender and age inequities."
 20 That's the third general finding — second. And the
 21 third is, "DoD oversight of the physical fitness program
 22 is inadequate." And then there are, you know, sub-
 23 elements under each one of those.

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1 And then in the back part of this are
 2 seven recommendations. And I'm not going to read them, I
 3 mean, but they are — every single case — concurred in
 4 by the Defense Department. So that means these
 5 recommendations are based on these findings, so I have to
 6 assume that — you know, that these are accurate findings
 7 and that the recommendations in each case are going to be
 8 carried out because it says, you know, that there's
 9 concurrence.
 10 And I'm wondering how much you were
 11 involved in responding to this General Accounting Office
 12 report, if at all.
 13 COMMANDER SHAFFER: I was not.
 14 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: Dr. Hodgdon
 15 and I were.
 16 MR. PANG: So you concur —
 17 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: And my
 18 predecessor.
 19 DR. HODGDON: No, not necessarily. But
 20 that's my non-concurrence, not the Navy's and not the
 21 Department of Defense.
 22 There are several things that I guess
 23 bother — not too many — a couple things that bother me

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1 in the report. I don't find it problematic that there
 2 are multiple criteria for having a program. And the
 3 recommendation is in fact that the services go to basing
 4 their programs on the maintenance of general health and
 5 — or health and general fitness I think is the kind of
 6 terminology that's used.
 7 One problem is I defy somebody to tell me
 8 what "general fitness" is, but that's one of those issues
 9 that probably has a solution somewhere. It's just, you
 10 know, not readily at hand for me.
 11 So, anyway, I think there can be multiple
 12 objectives. I believe that we should not lose sight of
 13 the fact that some of our jobs in the military have
 14 physical demands and that we ought to prepare our people
 15 as well as possible to meet those demands, and I think
 16 that that element will be lost in the acceptance of the
 17 GAO report. I mean, certainly if we were to implement
 18 those findings we would lose the statements of importance
 19 of being able to do your job.
 20 MR. PANG: You know, did you raise that —
 21 I guess, did you raise it and somebody said, "No, we're
 22 going to concur"? Is that —
 23 DR. HODGDON: I raised that, yes, and I

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1 discussed that at length with — John Nelson was the guy
 2 who came out and talked to me for this and we talked at
 3 length about various reasons for having standards and
 4 stuff, and I can only conclude that his opinion after all
 5 the testimony was in was that the services should focus
 6 on that element.
 7 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: I'd like to
 8 bring up that — again on the point of concurrence/non-
 9 concurrence, there's a variety — I mean, we represent
 10 different organizations in the Navy. My submission on
 11 behalf of — The material that I drafted and submitted on
 12 behalf of the Navy points out in regards to that specific
 13 item, that not to concur — recommended not to concur,
 14 with their recommendation that it be based on health —
 15 okay? — I didn't say don't base it on health. Base it
 16 on something else.
 17 What the point was, they were saying make
 18 it on health; we said, "Come to a decision on some
 19 criteria. Whether it's health, whether it's job
 20 occupation, some idea." Right now there's multiple tasks
 21 and the various services view them with differing degrees
 22 of priority, different levels of priority.
 23 So the submission that I put in and

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1 drafted — and I don't know how that's worked its way
 2 through the chain of command — was make a decision,
 3 identify what criteria and what priorities, and then we
 4 can address them; but don't simply accept the
 5 recommendation that it be based solely on health.
 6DR. HODGDON: One other comment. You can
 7 actually — This is a comment I've shared with Neal
 8 before, but you can actually get those — the criterion
 9 of job relevance and health — to converge if you'd just
 10 lump injuries into health. And once you do that, you
 11 will now begin to find that it's the high-demand jobs
 12 that have the high injury rates.
 13 It is possible that additional physical
 14 training, particularly in strength, can reduce those
 15 injury rates. If you take that approach, not only do you
 16 converge on being ready to do your job but you have a
 17 metric by which you can judge your success. You can
 18 follow injury rates by occupation.
 19 DR. CANTOR: That was exactly why I was
 20 asking my questions earlier.
 21 DR. HODGDON: Okay. Well, then I've now
 22 answered it. So yes, you can — they all converge.
 23 MS. POPE: And that doesn't — that does

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1MS. POPE: So zero percent of sailors go
 2 from RTC directly to the Fleet.
 3COMMANDER SHAFFER: I don't — I don't
 4 know. I think it's a very small percent. I don't know
 5 exactly —
 6CAPTAIN SNYDER: That's correct, ma'am.
 7 But there — about 40 percent go to only about two or
 8 three weeks of training.
 9MS. POPE: Okay. But that's my — next
 10 part of my question, is — okay — 99 percent go to some
 11 follow-on school. Two weeks, twenty-four weeks,
 12 whatever. In each of those rating schools is there a
 13 physical fitness requirement — job requirement, not
 14 physical fitness — a job requirement for that rating in
 15 that training?
 16 MR. PANG: Sure.
 17 COMMANDER SHAFFER: I can comment on the
 18 fitness requirement. I can't tell you —
 19 MS. POPE: No, I'm not talking about
 20 fitness.
 21 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Yeah. No, I can't —
 22 MS. POPE: I mean, because I think the
 23 answer to the fitness is no, which is a concern among the

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1 not exist today.
 2DR. HODGDON: That does not exist today.
 3 In part, because the databases upon which to base those
 4 kind of decisions haven't existed. And I'm not sure the
 5 extent or the uniformity with which they exist across all
 6 of the services. We, for instance, have hospitalization
 7 data going back some time, but we're only now bringing
 8 outpatient data on line as part of the database.
 9Isn't that correct?
 10 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Correct.
 11 DR. HODGDON: And so we're actually
 12 starting to improve the measure that we have because
 13 hospitalization is pretty far down the road in terms of
 14 being injured.
 15 So in defense of the services, they
 16 haven't had the information to try that approach.
 17 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: Neal
 18 Carlson.
 19 And that addresses the Commission — or
 20 some aspect of the Commission's recommendation about the
 21 databases being available.
 22 MR. PANG: You know, I think, you know,
 23 the one point I would raise here is, you know, there is a

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1 instructors — that there's not a follow-up physical
 2 fitness...
 3COMMANDER SHAFFER: There's a standard.
 4 There's not a program.
 5MS. POPE: Right, there's a standard and
 6 it's self-monitored. But is there requirements that are
 7 related to the rating they're going into? You have to
 8 lift fifty pounds. You have to lift a hundred pounds.
 9 You have to...
 10 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: Not all the
 11 —
 12 MS. POPE: I didn't say all. I'm saying
 13 if the rating requires some physical requirements;
 14 there's a physical element to the job.
 15 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Schools may have their
 16 own. I mean, there may be some individual things at the
 17 school. But I think the answer — Go ahead.
 18 DR. HODGDON: Yeah. Basically I believe
 19 the answer is no, there are not — the physical training
 20 program is not geared to the job you're about to perform.
 21 It is —
 22 MS. POPE: I understand. But my question
 23 —

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1 response that was sent out of OSD that I think you
 2 probably — I know you take issue to because of the way
 3 you responded. And I'm just wondering whether or not it
 4 would be appropriate for the Commission to ask for the
 5 responses of the services so we can see, you know, what
 6 those services said with regard to the — you know, to
 7 the recommendations.
 8MS. POPE: Whether they'll give it to us
 9 or not...
 10 MR. PANG: Yeah. You know, I think that's
 11 a legitimate question, you know, so —
 12 MS. POPE: Yeah.
 13 MR. PANG: You know, I think we want to be
 14 on the record as requesting that. If nobody objects...
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. It sounds good.
 16 MS. POPE: Barbara Pope.
 17 I'm confused now more than I was Friday,
 18 at nine o'clock, so I have a several-part question. How
 19 many or what percent of sailors from RTC go directly into
 20 the Fleet?
 21 COMMANDER SHAFFER: I don't — I think a
 22 very — They all go to some sort of apprenticeship or "A"
 23 school right after — Correct.

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1DR. HODGDON: But they do — But my —
 2 Well, again, this is my personal observation. For a long
 3 time we were at NTC — you know, our lab was at NTC San
 4 Diego and all the service schools did PT regularly.
 5MS. POPE: Right.
 6DR. HODGDON: So they all do physical
 7 training. It's that it's geared to the Navy's
 8 maintenance standards, the PRT.
 9MS. POPE: But if there's — if you're
 10 going to a rating where there's a requirement to lift a
 11 hundred pounds, regardless —
 12 DR. HODGDON: No, nobody trains you to
 13 lift a hundred pounds that I know of.
 14 MR. PANG: Can I help maybe on this one?
 15 Fred Pang.
 16 You know, when a person graduates — okay?
 17 — from "A" school, what you're doing is you're saying
 18 this individual is qualified —
 19 MS. POPE: To do the job. Right.
 20 MR. PANG: — to do the job. I mean, so I
 21 find it very puzzling — okay? — you know, when you say,
 22 I mean, that you're passing somebody on to the Fleet who
 23 you say now is qualified to do this job and, yet, you

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1 know, you say we're not — we're not sure with regard to
 2 their physical capabilities.
 3 I mean, that doesn't claim a — you know,
 4 make sense in the sense that, you know, you're certifying
 5 to the fleet commander out here that they're getting a
 6 person that can do the job. I mean, you know, that's
 7 kind of bothersome.
 8 DR. HODGDON: But that certification — I
 9 think at this point you really need to ask this question
 10 of the people who provide follow-on training because the
 11 person running the "A" school, for example, can decide
 12 that somebody is unqualified and not release them to the
 13 Fleet, and that could be in part — I don't know whether
 14 it is or is not, but could be in part based on their
 15 physical abilities to carry out the jobs.
 16 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: But are you
 17 saying that you don't have the knowledge that if there is
 18 a task that has to be performed — Let's take Barbara's
 19 point of view: there's a task within that framework of
 20 that job to pick up fifty pounds.
 21 Are you saying you don't have the
 22 knowledge whether or not that individual demonstrates he
 23 or she can pick up the fifty pounds during that training,

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1 or are you saying to the best of your knowledge, it just
 2 doesn't exist in the physical fitness training program?
 3 DR. HODGDON: I'm saying I do not know
 4 whether they —
 5 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 6 MS. POPE: Okay. That's different.
 7 DR. HODGDON: — assess the ability to
 8 lift the fifty pounds.
 9 MS. POPE: Okay.
 10 CAPTAIN SNYDER: If I could, the Navy
 11 representative, Captain Snyder.
 12 I had an "A" school and I taught sonar
 13 technicians and we had power supplies that weighed
 14 seventy-five pounds. During the curriculum there, they
 15 had to change that power supply and they had to actually
 16 move it out and do it. So they did not complete the
 17 course unless they could do that power supply. An
 18 aviation ordnanceman, he has to move a 250-pound bomb
 19 during that training certification. He will move a 250-
 20 pound bomb with yellow gear and all that.
 21 So I think the task skills with our
 22 schools that we have to replicate what Fleet requirements
 23 are are done in the schoolhouse to get that "A" school

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1 certificate or follow-on subsequent "C" school
 2 certificate to go out to the Fleet to serve their duty.
 3 MS. POPE: And I guess that's why we're
 4 asking the question. And that's why I asked how many
 5 sailors go from the Fleet — from RTC, into the Fleet,
 6 and the answer is less than one percent. But job
 7 specific requirement happens in "A" school, "C" school.
 8 That they're not going into the Fleet not able to do a
 9 job.
 10 Now, the second piece of the question is
 11 — And we probably formally need to ask that of the "A"
 12 school so we get a formal answer on Navy. And this
 13 question also may have to go to the Fleet — is I'm not
 14 sure — or maybe I do understand the informal division of
 15 labor.
 16 You have a department head on a ship —
 17 okay? — who has no standards, no policy for how you
 18 divide it? I mean, you have a job to get done. There's
 19 a division of labor. That's all very logical. But as
 20 the department head, the chief, whoever it is who's
 21 making that decision — okay? — I've got no guidance? I
 22 can just say all the small-built people, all the
 23 Hispanics, all the Blacks, all the women? I can divide

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1 it up with no policy guidance?
 2 DR. HODGDON: Well, there is guidance that
 3 says you may not discriminate on the basis of — and the
 4 things are listed. I mean —
 5 MS. POPE: Right. But short of that, I
 6 can divide it up however I want and I could decide that
 7 the women, regardless of whether I test them or not,
 8 can't do this job? Or I can't make them come up to
 9 standard?
 10 I mean, your quote on — the quote that
 11 said "women are not always assigned to the most demanding
 12 tasks within an occupational group," I would think for
 13 leadership that's a major readiness issue, and I would
 14 think it's also a discriminatory issue and a major
 15 readiness issue. If the people are in ratings that they
 16 can't perform their job, you've got a readiness issue.
 17 COMMANDER SHAFFER: I think probably the
 18 three people at this end of the table are not the right
 19 ones to answer that question, but I would say that the
 20 leadership issue is the key. I think that the people
 21 leading that division or organization —
 22 MS. POPE: Right.
 23 COMMANDER SHAFFER: — know what they need

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1 to have done. They know the capabilities that are
 2 required to do the job. They know from experience what
 3 somebody's going to have to do to perform what their
 4 division has to perform.
 5 And to me, it boils down to more of a
 6 leadership issue than a physiological standard or
 7 anything else, but I think that's probably the extent to
 8 which the — unless the other two — we can probably
 9 answer that from a division and how you assign your labor
 10 to do the task your division has to do.
 11 I think, though, there are probably quite
 12 a few policies within each job category or job
 13 specialization that we wouldn't be aware about from a
 14 physiological point of view.
 15 DR. SEGAL: I'm Mady Segal.
 16 I have a question about the physical
 17 fitness test. Not anything related to job performance
 18 now. I'm coming back to the general measure of fitness
 19 and health. And right now, the services have gender- and
 20 age-normed the tests so that all men are subject — all
 21 men of the same age are subject to the same standard, all
 22 women of the same age are subject to the same standard.
 23 There are differences — And this is done

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1 because there are differences in the distribution of
 2 various physical performance capabilities as a function
 3 of both gender and age.
 4 But my question has to do with whether
 5 there are other options for how we would measure health
 6 and physical fitness in military personnel that would
 7 take into account other differences besides age and
 8 gender, that would account for some of these different —
 9 some of these differences.
 10 That is to say, you have overlapping
 11 normal curves, basically — Let's just take the gender
 12 issue. You have overlapping normal curves in various
 13 abilities that are determined — And I have a couple of
 14 questions that are related to this. One, it is my
 15 expectation — you can correct me if I'm wrong — that
 16 there is as much variation within the genders as there is
 17 between them on many physical performances.
 18 DR. HODGDON: Yeah, that's correct.
 19 DR. SEGAL: So as things stand now, we're
 20 actually judging every man and every woman of the same
 21 age — let's take them — say, recruits — by the same
 22 standard even though there are wide distributions in
 23 their abilities to reach those standards.

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1 So, for example, when it comes to the run,
 2 there may be individual physical traits that will affect
 3 the ability of someone to run a certain distance in a
 4 certain period of time that really are irrelevant to
 5 fitness but that have to do with height and weight and
 6 body structure, size —
 7 DR. HODGDON: Genetics.
 8 DR. SEGAL: — genetics, differences in
 9 body type and such.
 10 So would it be at all feasible and has
 11 there been any consideration given to rather than setting
 12 up a gender-norming like this where all men are subject
 13 to the same standard and all women to the same standard
 14 — not for purposes of measuring performance on the job,
 15 because there we recognize that we may want for some jobs
 16 people at the top of the distribution or the bottom of
 17 the distribution, but to measure health and fitness that
 18 — And it may be a way that we could get over some of
 19 this perception of inequity in the performance standards
 20 because I watch small men having to meet a standard for
 21 things where there is an advantage of height and they are
 22 at the same disadvantage as women are who are small, and
 23 the women who are tall have actually more of an advantage

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1 for some things.
 2 So would it be possible — And there are
 3 differences by race and ethnic group, so that Latinos
 4 might be smaller on average and so — and there's
 5 different body structure between many African Americans
 6 and many Whites.
 7 Would it be possible to develop more of an
 8 individualized standard so you could assess an
 9 individual's, in whatever capacity — And I'm asking you
 10 as the experts because I don't know this. I'm a
 11 sociologist. I know what happens socially in terms of
 12 the perceptions of this.
 13 Would it be possible to develop a more
 14 individualized standard to actually measure somebody's
 15 health and fitness for that individual and bring them —
 16 make them as physically fit as possible and have some
 17 sort of — And I have a follow-on about norming but
 18 you're obviously ready to start answering, so...
 19 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: Right. As
 20 — Yes, it's possible. The next question, though, is how
 21 well will that — can you address it with this new
 22 breakdown? And then, two — or the third point is, is it
 23 practical?

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1 Such as, if we're talking about genetics
 2 and running, it may be that, sure, we could take a muscle
 3 biopsy on every individual in the Navy and assess what is
 4 their future — what is their potential to run well? Is
 5 that practical? And just by doing that, is that going to
 6 be an effective — as effective when you have other
 7 concerns such as is the individual motivated? Other
 8 factors: what's their nutritional status, things like
 9 that.
 10 So the short answer is yes, but there are
 11 — but there are some concerns. There are some things
 12 that have to be taken into account.
 13 DR. HODGDON: And I guess adding to that,
 14 I would say that you need an outcome measure. If you're
 15 going to decide that there's some new basis for adjusting
 16 standards, you'd like that to be anchored in something.
 17 And I'm not sure that we have data that allows us to look
 18 at the impact of aerobic capacity normed for, say, lean
 19 mass, on which will, for instance, cause gender
 20 differences to decrease but not vanish.
 21 DR. SEGAL: Not disappear.
 22 DR. HODGDON: Never vanish. As far as we
 23 can tell so far, there's no basis for adjustment that

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1 allows the differences to vanish. Testosterone is good
 2 for something, I guess, but —
 3 DR. SEGAL: Aren't there differences among
 4 men and their amount of testosterone?
 5 DR. HODGDON: Yes.
 6 DR. SEGAL: And don't women also have some
 7 testosterone?
 8 DR. HODGDON: Yes. Yes, there's variance
 9 on both sides. That, too, is an overlapping
 10 distribution. And so, yeah, I'm speaking on average.
 11 But, nonetheless, a basis for gender-free
 12 norming doesn't appear to exist now. If you — And so to
 13 develop one, you need an outcome measure and I don't
 14 think we have a database that allows us to determine that
 15 right now. I mean, you know, the researchers are still
 16 fighting over is it absolute aerobic capacity or your
 17 activity level that gives you the health benefits
 18 associated with aerobic activity?
 19 DR. SEGAL: But it sounds as if there
 20 might be some adjustments possible that would still be
 21 practical, like an adjustment for lean body mass, that
 22 would substantially reduce the perceptions of inequity on
 23 the gender-normed tests.

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1 DR. HODGDON: Yes.
 2 DR. SEGAL: So that if you made
 3 adjustments, you could still gender-norm it, but the
 4 differences would be such that the men who are
 5 disadvantaged in meeting the current requirements would
 6 be less disadvantaged if they were also meeting a
 7 requirement that was adjusted for their lean body mass.
 8 Is that correct?
 9 DR. HODGDON: Yeah. I'm not sure, you
 10 know, the exact magnitude of the difference that would
 11 remain and, therefore, I can't appreciate what the
 12 perceptions would be.
 13 DR. SEGAL: But is this worth taking a
 14 look at so that, in addition to adjusting for gender and
 15 age, we adjust for lean body mass, and so people see that
 16 there is more to —
 17 COMMANDER SHAFFER: I think that fine-
 18 tuning the PRT standards right now for additional issues
 19 other than just gender and age, I think, would be a very
 20 reasonable thing to do and would solve a lot of the
 21 issues that we try to deal with every day.
 22 Mainly, the question that always is put to
 23 me: "All right. Well, Dr. Shaffer, you don't necessarily

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1 think these standards are the best. What else do you
 2 have to offer us?", and my answer is "nothing right now."
 3 And so that's where we stand on those, but
 4 —
 5 DR. SEGAL: So one of our jobs could be,
 6 when we talk to some other experts, including the
 7 civilian experts, to ask them what sorts of adjustments
 8 they would see that would make for better measures of
 9 health and fitness.
 10 COMMANDER SHAFFER: That are implementable
 11 in a huge group and all those other issues that are as
 12 much the reality of the situation as anything else.
 13 DR. HODGDON: And lean mass is certainly
 14 one of them to consider.
 15 DR. SEGAL: Lean mass.
 16 DR. HODGDON: Lean mass is also valuable
 17 in that it, in terms of very rough approximations, tells
 18 you something about overall strength. And so it might
 19 also be part of screening and binning processes, things
 20 like that. You know, it's not fantastic, but it might be
 21 close enough.
 22 DR. SEGAL: And you did say that the
 23 differences among men and women are greater than the

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1 differences between them in most of these measures; is
 2 that correct?
 3 DR. HODGDON: No, I don't know whether
 4 they are or not. I could probably go look that up but I
 5 don't know offhand.
 6 DR. SEGAL: Could we get the answer to
 7 that in terms of the distributions of the — Because
 8 generally what we've had is a comparison and average, and
 9 occasionally we've had some standard deviations given us
 10 in terms of actual performances. But if we could have a
 11 sense of the overlap in the distributions where I don't
 12 have to do the statistics from a means and the standard
 13 deviations.
 14 COMMANDER SHAFFER: There's lots of good
 15 things that I think could be done to refine those — even
 16 taking into account previous scores of yourself that you
 17 could use, that could refine these standards.
 18 DR. SEGAL: Well, that's the Coast Guard's
 19 method in their boot camp — is that they rate where the
 20 recruits are and they develop an individualized — an
 21 individualized fitness program for them to improve their
 22 performances.
 23 DR. HODGDON: But they aren't processing

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1 nearly as many people as the Army, the Marines, the Navy
 2 or the Air Force.
 3 DR. SEGAL: That's correct. Yes, nor do
 4 they have as many people to process.
 5 COMMANDER SHAFFER: That's correct.
 6 DR. HODGDON: That's also true.
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Let me jump in for a
 8 second here because we're almost out of time, and so I'd
 9 like to let Ron ask a question, if he has one, and then
 10 invite anybody who has a burning question to do so and
 11 let that be the last. And I remind everybody that we can
 12 go back with further requests through our service reps in
 13 case other things come up later.
 14 So, Ron.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My question
 16 deals with maintenance training, basically. Recognizing
 17 the health issue and the like, and that we only have a
 18 physical fitness test and it's based on health and that's
 19 good, too, but we — And I think I heard you allude to
 20 it, Doctor. We take a recruit, we put them through seven
 21 weeks of training. We build them. We build a physical
 22 fitness program. And then we put them in "A" school and
 23 what do we do?

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1 We don't have a program, physical fitness
 2 program. We have a maintenance where — so we can run
 3 the PFT or the physical test or whatever it is. If I go
 4 aboard ship today — If I go aboard any new, modern ship,
 5 I've got all sorts of new equipment as far as physical
 6 fitness is concerned. I've got better weight rooms. I
 7 have — But I have no program.
 8 So my question — And yes, it is a
 9 personal opinion program — or personal opinion question
 10 about programs. Are we missing the ball that we don't
 11 have a follow-on program that indicates in "A" school
 12 that each week you should do this amount — these amounts
 13 of things with those young men and women that are in "A"
 14 school? Are we missing the ball that we don't have a
 15 specific program aboard ship that in fact not only
 16 emphasizes and encourages, but a program that uses these
 17 new facilities that are becoming available?
 18 LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CARLSON: What we're
 19 — That's kind of funny because in my personal experience
 20 with the Navy's Physical Readiness Program, I saw that as
 21 a weakness. That if you go — if you look at the
 22 material that the Navy has produced, say, back in 1989,
 23 there actually is a booklet — a pamphlet — that has

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1 guidance on exercising and it does say something like on
 2 — for this certain week, you should run X-amount of
 3 miles — okay? — in a given amount of time.
 4 As far as being more specific than that,
 5 there's — strength may not be as specific; it may be a
 6 little more specific. I don't know the details of it —
 7 of that program. I don't recall the details of that
 8 program. There is — So there is some material.
 9 But currently at the Navy Personnel
 10 Command, my branch at the — just as a general concern,
 11 realized that that is a problem and I think the approach
 12 has been up until now that people could — sailors would
 13 find some help, whether it was through morale, welfare
 14 and recreation fitness centers or fitness individuals to
 15 help or they're — they'd learn it on their own.
 16 Our concern was that either they weren't
 17 learning on their own or that they weren't provided the
 18 material to learn on their own, and so we're trying to
 19 address those. One, we're trying to — we are
 20 cooperating with MWR and their fitness professionals who
 21 are becoming more trained in that area so that we can
 22 help commands help sailors individually address these
 23 kind of fitness issues and health issues.

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1 Now, that's well and good for a lot of our
 2 shore-based facilities where, say, in Washington you can
 3 go to the Navy Yard, or in San Diego, they have a large
 4 fitness facility with equipment. We realize that that's
 5 a problem on board ships, and so we're working — As a
 6 matter of fact — What was it? About two weeks ago we
 7 had a group of individuals — about ten people from the
 8 MWR fitness community — come in and begin to lay the
 9 groundwork for a very specific program so that they —
 10 that the sailors can basically have a booklet that says
 11 this is what they need to do, here's how they need to do
 12 it, and one of the criteria was that it should be able to
 13 be done anywhere. On board ship.
 14 So that, say, if you go out to many of the
 15 fitness centers or organizations, many times they'll
 16 emphasize running. That may not be very practical aboard
 17 a ship. We don't totally eliminate that but we want to
 18 try and provide them other guidance.
 19 So we realize that it's a shortcoming and
 20 we're trying — and we are trying to address it.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But I think
 22 there's one thing missing in your answer and that's the
 23 word "supervision." If I don't have the supervision when

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1 I — in a physical fitness program when I'm at "A" school
 2 or I don't — my division head's chief breaks out half
 3 and I break out the other half as a young lieutenant once
 4 or twice or three times a week or whatever, you know —
 5 yes, there's a percentage of my sailors that are in fact
 6 going to do it and there's a very large percentage that
 7 are just not going to do anything.
 8 DR. HODGDON: It's my impression, though,
 9 that the "A" schools have formal programs. If physical
 10 fitness is a part of the training —
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My point
 12 about — or my question about that, though, is that a
 13 physical fitness program that has been looked at by the
 14 experts, just as you have crafted or should have crafted
 15 the physical fitness program at recruit training, you
 16 know; so that in fact is a follow-on that takes what has
 17 been developed, not only maintains it but equally allows
 18 those who want to excel or to have their physical fitness
 19 performance increased — that it's available to them.
 20 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Well, at NTC level,
 21 that has been — that has been for the last — About five
 22 years ago, actually, Admiral Tracy started that. So that
 23 there was a program that was not just to gain fitness

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1 during book camp and then follow on to service schools,
 2 but to learn how to exercise appropriately so you have a
 3 good health promotion knowledge after you're going.
 4 And I see Captain Snyder standing up.
 5 There may be more details on what there is.
 6 CAPTAIN SNYDER: General, there is in fact
 7 a Navy military training program that has a dictated
 8 physical training program after boot camp.
 9 MS. POPE: We need to interrupt because
 10 you all need — I would suggest that maybe you go back to
 11 NTC and ask the question because one of the major
 12 frustrations from the instructors was that they could not
 13 make their sailors in "A" school work out and exercise.
 14 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Well, I — I mean,
 15 having been there — And like I said, my observation is
 16 exactly what you've just said. At boot camp, they have
 17 the ability to and they are given the time to do it.
 18 The service school situation is a very
 19 individualized situation, and it also is based on the
 20 knowledge of the individual doing — that happens to be
 21 there, that happens to be in the billet, and some of them
 22 are done very well and I've observed a lot of them.
 23 There's been NTRR's on this issue — Naval

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1 Training Resource Reviews — that I've been — I've
 2 observed, and they do very well individually. But —
 3 MS. POPE: All I'm saying is one of the
 4 frustrations we've heard from the instructors who wanted
 5 to do this was they had no enforcement to make their
 6 sailors physically fit. A major frustration.
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We're going to have to —
 8 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Well, they certainly
 9 can do it three times a week because the instruction says
 10 so.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — give our reporter a
 12 break, so —
 13 DR. SEGAL: I have one last, I think,
 14 small question.
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. Mady, Dr. Hodgdon
 16 is going to be here for the next session, too. So if you
 17 can hold your question —
 18 DR. SEGAL: Well, it's on Battle Stations.
 19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. It's got to
 20 be real quick because we've got a —
 21 DR. SEGAL: Okay. We — You talked about
 22 —
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — physical limitation

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1 here.
 2 DR. SEGAL: — changing the training to
 3 better prepare trainees for Battle Stations. And my
 4 question is do you think that Battle Stations is
 5 measuring physical fitness the way that it ought to?
 6 And you talked specifically about the run
 7 in between the events — that that was what the trainees
 8 were having the most trouble and was causing the greater
 9 failure rates. And that was my experience in terms of
 10 what I saw when I was at Battle Stations and talking to
 11 — when we were at Great Lakes and talking with the
 12 trainers.
 13 Do you think it might be better if they
 14 didn't do so much running between events and maybe,
 15 instead, did brisk walking so that you wouldn't lose as
 16 many people during that run?
 17 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Like I said, I don't
 18 — first of all, I don't think the failure rate of Battle
 19 Stations should be as big of an issue as maybe it is.
 20 It's not that — It doesn't occur that often.
 21 I think that — I think part of it should
 22 be a fitness issue. I mean, I think Battle Stations
 23 should include a fitness part to make it a difficult

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1 thing. It's supposed to be a difficult thing and it
 2 ought to be a difficult thing.
 3 And I'm not sure that doing brisk walking
 4 would be something that would be militarily appropriate,
 5 nor would I think that it would be something that would
 6 meet the goal of what boot camp has set for Battle
 7 Stations, which is make it a tough exercise at the end of
 8 boot camp so they feel like they've really accomplished
 9 something.
 10 So I'm not sure that there is a need of a
 11 fix there necessarily after watching it.
 12 DR. SEGAL: So you think you'd rather
 13 change the training and put in more running in the
 14 training to take the — in order that they can get
 15 through without injury?
 16 COMMANDER SHAFFER: Once again, I'm not
 17 sure that the failures should be as much of the issue
 18 that it is. I do — And I don't think that adding too
 19 much to the beginning is going to make that much of a
 20 difference on that Battle Stations thing.
 21 So — And that's my opinion, because I
 22 think it needs to be somewhat arduous.
 23 DR. SEGAL: All right. Thank you.

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1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Well, we thank you
 2 very much for coming today. I have a feeling there will
 3 be some follow-on questions which we will route through
 4 our service rep.
 5 And we'll go off the record.
 6 (A brief recess was taken.)
 7 (Presentation of United States Marine Corps)
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I think we have a quorum,
 9 so we will go back on the record.
 10 Colonel, good morning and happy birthday.
 11 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPAS: Thank you,
 12 ma'am. And good morning, Madam Chairman.
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: As you can tell, we are
 14 prepared for you, and so —
 15 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPAS: Thank you.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — we'll invite you to
 17 take along a piece of cake.
 18 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPAS: Thank you,
 19 ma'am. And actually you've taken my first paragraph. I
 20 wanted to send birthday greetings first to Lieutenant
 21 General Christmas, and along with General Keys and all
 22 our current and former Marines, which I know we have some
 23 in this room.

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1 Now the issue at hand. You know, when
 2 Lieutenant General Van Riper had the 2d Marine Division,
 3 he often remarked that he had really two number one
 4 priorities for his Marines. He wanted them to be able to
 5 shoot straight, and he wanted them in superb physical
 6 condition. And his outlook on this was really rather
 7 simple: he believed it did no good to get to a fight if
 8 his Marines couldn't shoot. Likewise, once they got to
 9 that fight, if they weren't physically fit, they couldn't
 10 undertake the rigors of combat.
 11 But this viewpoint was not unique to
 12 General Van Riper or the 2d Marine Division. It was
 13 simply an expression of two of the defining
 14 characteristics of being a Marine: every Marine a
 15 rifleman — hence, the correlation with marksmanship —
 16 and, of course, the priority we put on maintaining
 17 optimal physical fitness.
 18 Additionally, these two characteristics
 19 are the only two training requirements that we note on
 20 our fitness reports for all Marines, sergeants and above.
 21 Failure to maintain standards in annual re-qualification
 22 or passing — or failing the physical fitness test will
 23 result in that fitness report — rendering it an

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1 "adverse" report. Likewise, failure to qualify with the
 2 service rifle or failing the PFT is also noted in
 3 decisions to reenlist or retain Marines and it's the part
 4 of every promotion board's deliberations.
 5 I tell you this only really to set the
 6 stage to show you how important marksmanship and physical
 7 fitness are to the Marine Corps, but the issue today is
 8 physical fitness, of course.
 9 So I'd say to start off our current
 10 program really is an evolutionary process, really based
 11 on two areas. One is the advances in the study of
 12 physiology and sports medicine, and probably more
 13 importantly as far as the Marine Corps goes, the changing
 14 role of women in the Corps.
 15 Now, prior to 1971, physical fitness
 16 requirements for men and women were radically different
 17 and reflected the roles of each gender in the operating
 18 forces. The Physical Readiness Test or PRT, as we called
 19 it then, for men, consisted of five events, all of which
 20 were performed in full combat gear, and those events are
 21 listed in your testimony.
 22 But since women were never expected to be
 23 engaged in combat, their Physical Readiness Test was more

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1 garrison in orientation and was designed to promote a
 2 general level or moderate level of fitness. Again, the
 3 events that they undertook are in your testimony.
 4 Now, with the introduction of the Physical
 5 Fitness Test — we changed the term in 1971 — for men,
 6 the emphasis began to shift more from combat-oriented
 7 skills to one of measures of general, overall fitness:
 8 cardiovascular endurance and muscular strength. The test
 9 menu at that time consisted of nine events, five of which
 10 a test administrator would select. But of those five, a
 11 three-mile run was a mandatory requirement at the time.
 12 Now, during this period, women continued
 13 to be evaluated using the same events of their PRT.
 14 Now, in a sense, because male and female
 15 tests for the first time were now measuring general
 16 fitness, this could be considered the initial step in
 17 developing common male and female physical fitness
 18 standards.
 19 Now, in 1975 our Physical Fitness Test was
 20 standardized to currently or similar to the three events
 21 we have today: a timed distance run and a measurement of
 22 upper body strength, and a measurement of abdominal
 23 strength.

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1 The disparity in standards and
 2 requirements, though, continued to reflect the commonly
 3 held belief of the time that women were simply not strong
 4 enough to perform to the levels of their male
 5 counterparts. Additionally, there were no operational
 6 requirements for "women Marines" to do anything more than
 7 maintain an acceptable level of fitness.
 8 From 1975 to '92, therefore, the PFT
 9 really remained unchanged and basically unchallenged.
 10 However, as the role of women in the Corps evolved and
 11 expanded, and development in training methods and sports
 12 medicine began to indicate that women could perform at
 13 much higher physical levels, the PFT now came under
 14 closer scrutiny.
 15 But probably the most important fact at
 16 that time was the Commandant's panel in 1992 on "Women in
 17 the Marine Corps." Among many of its findings, one
 18 pertaining to physical fitness concluded that there was a
 19 disparity in physical fitness standard requirements
 20 between men and women and there was perhaps a perception
 21 among male Marines that women Marines weren't "real
 22 Marines" since they weren't held to the same physical
 23 fitness standards.

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1 So as a result, in 1993 we initiated a
 2 "Female PFT Study" to determine if women, given the
 3 proper training, could satisfactorily complete the male
 4 PFT. Fifty women were chosen and trained in a three-
 5 month program at Quantico, Virginia.
 6 Now, the results of the test indicated
 7 that yes, they could run three miles, but to an adjusted
 8 time standard. They could also perform sit-ups to the
 9 male standard. However, it was also found that during
 10 that study they did not significantly increase their
 11 upper body strength, and, therefore, the recommendation
 12 at the time was to maintain the flexed-arm hang event for
 13 females as an upper body strength and endurance test.
 14 Now, that ability to do the three-mile run
 15 for the female with a gender-normed standard really was
 16 nothing new to the Marine Corps. A gender-normed
 17 standard for the run did not cause much concern because
 18 for years we had been doing it from an age adjustment.
 19 Older Marines had historically been given additional time
 20 and required to do fewer repetitions in other events for
 21 passing scores.
 22 So in 1995, the Commandant directed that
 23 the three-mile run would be conducted by both men and

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1 women; that women would do two minutes of sit-ups to the
 2 male standard. Males, however, would continue to do the
 3 "deadhang" pull-up, as we refer to it, and women would
 4 continue to do the flexed-arm hang.
 5 Actual implementation of these changes did
 6 not begin until October '96, at the Recruit Depot, and we
 7 phased in this implementation in the Delayed Entry
 8 Program for the poolees before shipping to Parris Island
 9 and San Diego in July of '96. Actual implementation of
 10 these changes in the Marine Corps was January of '97.
 11 Now, I might note that this phased
 12 implementation really was a key part, especially on the
 13 recruiting side, because it allowed recruiters to recruit
 14 and develop young men and women in these pools to a new
 15 standard; prepare them for recruit training and then the
 16 operational forces.
 17 The Initial Strength Test that we
 18 administered to poolees both in the DEPs and also at
 19 recruit training on the second day they arrived as a
 20 pass/fail measure of physical condition was appropriately
 21 changed. The only aspect we changed on the male side,
 22 however, was a requirement that they perform their pull-
 23 up in a deadhang fashion.

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1 But the female IST or Initial Strength
 2 Test was changed significantly. We increased their run,
 3 which had previously been three-quarters of a mile, to
 4 one mile. We increased their sit-up requirement, which
 5 had been nineteen sit-ups in two minutes, to thirty-five,
 6 also reflecting what the males were doing. And they
 7 maintained their flexed-arm hang event at twelve seconds.
 8 Now, I might note, in hindsight, we may
 9 have made a mistake in not requiring women at this time
 10 — or at that time — to do 1.5 miles vice the one mile
 11 and, as a result, may have unwittingly made that fitness
 12 ramp a bit steeper upon arrival at boot camp and then
 13 being required to meet a three-mile Physical Fitness Test
 14 at a later stage in training. So as a result, this past
 15 October we began requiring women in the Delayed Entry
 16 pool and at the IST test done at the recruit training
 17 depot to do a 1.5-mile run in fifteen minutes as part of
 18 their IST.
 19 Now, we intend to monitor the female
 20 physical failure and injury rates in this area.
 21 Now, the most recent changes to the
 22 Physical Fitness Test occurred in July of this past year
 23 — or July of this year, I should say — as a result of

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1 input received over the past several years, received from
 2 both Department of Defense and civilian fitness experts,
 3 to include the Cooper Institute, Naval Health Research
 4 Center, U.S. Sports Academy, University of Dayton, among
 5 others. We changed the following...
 6 From the bent-knee sit-up, we now conduct
 7 an abdominal crunch exercise for men and women, to the
 8 same standard, for two minutes. Likewise, we increased
 9 the repetitions from eighty to one hundred repetitions in
 10 those two minutes.
 11 We also enacted an altitude waiver for
 12 Marines stationed at commands at or above 4,500 feet
 13 above sea level, and we basically adjust their run times
 14 for physical fitness tests by ninety seconds to
 15 compensate for the effects of altitude on aerobic
 16 capacity.
 17 And finally — probably the most striking
 18 change — we're now requiring all Marines age forty-six
 19 and above to conduct a semiannual Physical Fitness Test
 20 like the rest of the Marine Corps.
 21 However, in closing, there remains one
 22 issue which requires further examination, and that is,
 23 the issue of the flexed-arm hang event for women. The

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1 basic question we've asked ourselves: is this the best
 2 evaluation of female upper body strength? We think not.
 3 To answer these questions and others that
 4 we've had, we've enlisted the aid of the Naval Health
 5 Research Center in completing a study by early 1999. We
 6 anticipate being able to make a recommendation to our
 7 Commandant during the first quarter of that year.
 8 In summary, let me simply say we believe
 9 the physical training required by Marine Corps Order
 10 6100, which you have as a part of your read-ahead
 11 material — we feel very strongly prepares Marines to
 12 satisfactorily complete a semiannual PFT.
 13 We believe the test itself is an accurate
 14 measure of personal physical fitness for all Marines. It
 15 requires every Marine to perform to a common standard
 16 which, as a most important fact, provides our commanders
 17 with a foundation on which to build unit unique physical
 18 conditioning programs — the ultimate objective of which
 19 is success of Marines in combat.
 20 Madam Chairman, Commission members, that
 21 concludes my testimony. I'm prepared to answer your
 22 questions.
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much.

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1 We've been following a procedure this
 2 morning, just kind of going around the table with
 3 commissioners rather than trying to find who raised his
 4 hand first, and we left off with Bob Dare.
 5 Bob, are you prepared at this time or do
 6 you want to pass?
 7 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: No. Sure,
 8 I'll start it.
 9 I don't have any questions about the
 10 initial physical fitness but I would just ask that you
 11 expound on what you said in closing about unit specific
 12 physical fitness training.
 13 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: We look at the
 14 Physical Fitness Test as a foundation or a baseline. We
 15 think it provides a very strong foundation regardless of
 16 the job or specific task a Marine would have to do. And
 17 from that point, we feel that it's important that the
 18 commanders have the flexibility built around his or her
 19 mission essential task. What is that mission — What is
 20 that unit expected to do in combat?
 21 The PFT provides that commander some
 22 pretty good insight as to the overall fitness of his or
 23 her Marines. From that, the commander builds his MOS

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1 requirements, what he wants his Marines to be able to do,
 2 and more particularly, what that unit may have to do.
 3 I'll give you an example. We would look
 4 at a light-armored vehicle company. All male, gender-
 5 segregated, obviously. But that unit commander, knowing
 6 full well that every Marine must maintain at least as a
 7 minimum a second-class swim qualification, that would be
 8 unit unique type training. An infantry unit required to
 9 do as a unit unique physical requirement a forty-
 10 kilometer march with full gear and weapons under a
 11 certain time limit.
 12 So it's almost like a three-tiered
 13 approach, with the PFT really being the strong
 14 foundation, what MOS requirements that that commander
 15 might think, but probably most importantly, what is that
 16 unit going to have to do in combat? And from that, the
 17 commander decides "I believe my Marines should have to do
 18 the following," and establish it from that point on.
 19 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And a quick
 20 follow-in. To the best of your knowledge, does the
 21 operational force — is the operational force happy with
 22 the physical condition of the folks coming out of recruit
 23 training and school training to the Force?

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1 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: I would say so,
 2 sir. And I would expound on that a bit. The physical
 3 fitness requirements for our graduating recruits are the
 4 same as the operational force's. Passing the Physical
 5 Fitness Test is a graduation requirement. Actually, out
 6 of the six graduation requirements, several have a
 7 physical fitness spin, so to speak; but every recruit,
 8 male or female, must pass the Physical Fitness Test.
 9 In the last two years, the average scores
 10 for our recruits have almost mirrored what it is in the
 11 operational forces. And that is to account also — And
 12 that takes into account the fairly dramatic changes we've
 13 enacted on our Marines, especially on the male side with
 14 the modification to a deadhang pull-up.
 15 So I believe in — if there were problems
 16 in the operational forces — i.e., "the Marines you're
 17 sending us are not in the best of shape" — I believe we
 18 would have heard something significant.
 19 And a lot of the input that I had
 20 described in my testimony that we have gotten from folks
 21 like Naval Health Research Center, et cetera — we also
 22 included a fairly large segment of the Marine Corps
 23 represented at a conference about two years ago. So we

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1 heard from the operators. We heard from the commanders.
 2 They attended the conference — what changes were
 3 necessary to improve that Physical Fitness Test, et
 4 cetera, and what we were doing in recruit training and
 5 follow-on training.
 6 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 7 DR. CANTOR: I guess I have — You
 8 mentioned in your testimony the Delayed Entry pool and
 9 the use of that as a way to sort of begin to get people
 10 up to speed before the PFT. Could you describe a little
 11 more about how systematic that is? Is it indeed a sort
 12 of recruiter's requirement that they have a very
 13 organized program of PT?
 14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: Yes, ma'am.
 15 Well, I think the first statement I should
 16 make about the Delayed Entry Program is it is completely
 17 voluntary. The poolees, as we refer to them, aren't
 18 required to do anything; attend any session, any physical
 19 training. They're only required to do one thing, in that
 20 they must pass that Initial Strength Test before they
 21 ship. So regardless of how structured or unstructured a
 22 recruiter's DEP would be, if the poolees don't show up,
 23 there could be problems.

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1 So I think you would probably see in as
 2 many DEPs that you would visit — you'd probably see that
 3 many different programs. And other factors I would think
 4 would come into play — the amount of area that sergeant
 5 or staff sergeant has to cover; the size of his pool —
 6 but I think the main factor is the voluntary nature of
 7 that pool.
 8 So some pools I am sure are very
 9 structured. Every Saturday there's physical training or
 10 every other Saturday, and once a week there may be poolee
 11 meetings where they'll discuss customs and courtesies or
 12 go over things that they can expect the first week in
 13 recruit training, et cetera.
 14 You have in your read-ahead a conditioning
 15 program that every poolee gets. Again, a lot of that is
 16 based on their own initiative to conduct that training.
 17 It's designed to be done in conjunction with DEP physical
 18 training, but it also allows the poolees to work out on
 19 their own.
 20 DR. CANTOR: But it's really left very
 21 much up to both the individual poolee and who's running
 22 the —
 23 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: I'd say more so

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1 it's left up to the voluntary nature of the poolee. I'm
 2 sure every recruiter and the recruiting station CO
 3 establishes a very structured program. It's whether that
 4 — in reality, whether that can actually be carried out.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: I guess I'm next. I'm
 6 Charlie Moskos.
 7 Just as a general request — it doesn't
 8 deal with Colonel Pappa's presentation — I'd like to see
 9 — I think Mady brought this up — the comparisons across
 10 services. Like Army women and Marine women, being the
 11 two ground forces, what are the differences or
 12 similarities of their training — PT requirements.
 13 The question that I wanted to ask you is,
 14 is it fair to — What is your view? I mean, it's just a
 15 personal opinion, obviously. Had the number of women not
 16 increased in the Marine Corps from virtually zero to 6 or
 17 7 percent, would the physical training changes that you
 18 described have occurred or not?
 19 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: A personal
 20 opinion, sir? Perhaps not.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Perhaps not.
 22 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: Or maybe not as
 23 when they did. I suppose if — I think it wasn't so much

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1 perhaps numbers; perhaps their changing role. I think
 2 that's what dictated our utilization or implementation of
 3 increasing their physical fitness requirements. And I
 4 think, as I said, a lot came out of 1992, where our role
 5 — our perception was changing, that we needed to prepare
 6 women better because they were viable Marines. They were
 7 viable members of units.
 8 So I don't think it necessarily was the
 9 numbers increasing, manning of females in the Marine
 10 Corps. I think it was the — reflected more of the
 11 changing role and the fact that we were learning that,
 12 hey, women can do a lot of the same physical standards.
 13 Many of them, yes, gender-normed, but yes, they could
 14 perform to a higher level than we had been really
 15 presenting them with or challenging them with up to that
 16 point.
 17 DR. MOSKOS: The follow-on, though, as I'm
 18 thinking more on the male side: what's the difference
 19 today, as you go to the physical fitness sort of norm or
 20 model, as opposed to what was the previous one that men
 21 did?
 22 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: The previous
 23 test that the males did, I'd say — Probably the most

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1 radical change was from the sixties to now where the test
 2 was more — well, it was solely combat-oriented, where
 3 the test really since '75 has been general fitness —
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Fitness.
 5 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: — though we're
 6 still stressing those areas that we feel have a
 7 correlation to combat; though we'll be the first to say
 8 our Physical Fitness Test is not a combat fitness test,
 9 but obviously some of the skills that we require in that
 10 Physical Fitness Test carry over: upper body strength,
 11 muscular, endurance. Being able to pull yourself up on a
 12 bar certainly corresponds to pull yourself up on a rope,
 13 up through a window, over a wall, et cetera, as an
 14 example.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Thank you.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I'd like to follow-on a
 17 little bit with the theme of Charlie's. What was the
 18 source of the Marine Corps' growing understanding that
 19 women could do better? Was it a continuing program
 20 within yourselves to do better, or external knowledge,
 21 you know, from the world at large —
 22 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: Yes, ma'am.
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — or from other

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1 services?
 2 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: I'd say
 3 probably the emphasis was probably more internal. That,
 4 first, women could do more. I think from that point on,
 5 probably a benchmark period or benchmark event was
 6 probably the 1993 study. For all intents and purposes,
 7 the focus of that study was could women do the same as
 8 men?
 9 And the focus really — even though it
 10 stressed in the conditioning period of three months all
 11 the areas, the real focus was — because we knew this
 12 would be a stumbling block — was in developing their
 13 upper body strength. Could women do the pull-up?
 14 Because we felt in a number of ways that might erase some
 15 of the perceptions; that might put women on equal footing
 16 in the minds of some Marines, even though, again, that
 17 standard probably would have been gender-normed.
 18 So I would say for the most part these
 19 changes have been internal, have been proactive.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Do you know whether there
 21 was programs — I'd say probably during the eighties —
 22 to compare your performance requirements for women versus
 23 other services and other kinds of, you know, civilian

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1 activities, police and fire?
 2 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: I'm not aware
 3 of any studies in the eighties comparing what our women
 4 did physically as to others. I'm certain we could
 5 research that.
 6 But I know in developing our current
 7 standards for females we looked at some comparative data
 8 outside the Marine Corps. We looked at Cooper data. We
 9 looked at Army data, even though no other service or —
 10 Cooper does a lot of work with law enforcement, for
 11 example — no other service or any of Cooper's data women
 12 run longer than two miles.
 13 So a lot of it had to be based on our own
 14 studies, our own tests. So, again, we looked at '93.
 15 And in '96, the summer of '96, we did a validation test
 16 as well to look at the results from '93 and they held
 17 pretty current. And we actually had a much larger study
 18 sample as well. Again an internal effort.
 19 MR. PANG: Fred Pang.
 20 You know, from your testimony I gather
 21 that, you know, over the course of time, the standards
 22 for women in the Marine Corps with regard to physical
 23 fitness training — the standards have been raised, and

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1 it was done on, you know, scientific — on a scientific
 2 basis.
 3 What effect — you know, over the same
 4 period of time, what is your evaluation with regard to
 5 the physical fitness training for men? Did it stay the
 6 same, go up, or regress?
 7 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: I would say
 8 overall it stayed the same, with the exception of the
 9 changes in the last two years. Probably the most
 10 sweeping change — and I really don't even like to use
 11 the word "change" — was more of a modification or a
 12 reminder to Marines we were — the pull-up was a deadhang
 13 event, not a kip.
 14 And for those of you in the room that
 15 don't understand what that is, a kip is almost a
 16 gymnastic-like movement that all of us did and it really
 17 made the test easier. We felt that it technically was
 18 mitigating that test of upper body strength. That as I
 19 said to the Commandant two years ago, Marines were
 20 testing or Marines were training to kip vice training
 21 their upper body.
 22 So I think the most sweeping change for
 23 the males has been the requirement to do a deadhang

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1 movement, which has had a serious impact on their scores,
 2 which we understand; which we fully understand as well
 3 that that Physical Fitness Test is also factored in — I
 4 mentioned it's factored into fitness reports. It's also
 5 factored into a Marine's cutting score for promotion for
 6 lance corporals to corporal and corporal to sergeant.
 7 So yes, it is a performance test, though
 8 many Marines two years ago would say performance in terms
 9 of promotion, we agree, but we also look at it as
 10 performance in terms of physical performance.
 11 So a Marine that — So we felt a revision
 12 or a modification of twenty, back to a straight deadhang
 13 pull-up, really we're forcing male Marines to work on
 14 their upper body and we're seeing the scores coming back
 15 up. Will they come back up to pre-1997 levels? I don't
 16 know, but I would feel safe in saying that male Marines
 17 are a lot stronger.
 18 MR. PANG: You know, I raised the question
 19 to the previous group in the Navy with regard to a draft
 20 General Accounting Office report that I think you're
 21 familiar with.
 22 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: Yes, sir.
 23 MR. PANG: You know, there were three

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1 major findings in it and sub-elements to those findings.
 2 I won't read them to you. But there were also seven
 3 recommendations. And, you know, the Defense Department's
 4 response was that it concurred — okay? — with every
 5 single one of the recommendations, so that means that it
 6 also, in essence, concurred with the findings.
 7 Is that the Marine Corps' position? Or,
 8 you know, I mean, I'm not trying to point the finger at
 9 DoD or anything like that. I just want to know, you
 10 know, whether or not you objected to or did you kind of
 11 agree with the report. Or are you familiar...
 12 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: Sir, is this
 13 the one gender-inequalities that was recently — I forget
 14 the full title.
 15 MR. PANG: Yeah. Gender issues, improved
 16 guidance and oversight are needed to ensure validity and
 17 —
 18 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: No, sir, we did
 19 not concur with all the findings or the recommendations
 20 that were submitted.
 21 MR. PANG: Okay. You know, it would, you
 22 know, I think be a legitimate request for us to get those
 23 as well because I'd like to see what — how you

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1 responded.
 2 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: And most of —
 3 I'd say the preponderance of our "non-concur" or "non-
 4 concur in part" really was in the area of the services-
 5 wide body composition equations, observations that
 6 services weren't using — were only using two compartment
 7 analysis, there was an ethnic and gender bias, all things
 8 that we have recently changed. And actually not
 9 recently. It's been a year.
 10 Now, I understand a lot of that report was
 11 based on the Institute of Medicine's research within the
 12 last two years and we have since made those changes.
 13 For the record, I non-concured to make
 14 sure that we gained that visibility that we were pursuing
 15 more innovative ways and that there were some DoD
 16 standards we didn't agree with.
 17 MS. POPE: I just have two short
 18 questions. Was the women's role in Desert Storm a
 19 significant factor in the '93 study? Their performance?
 20 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: It may have
 21 been, ma'am. I don't know. I think the bulk really was
 22 the changes — really from what I had briefed before,
 23 that male Marines just weren't viewing females in the

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1 same light perhaps. And since so many women were in
 2 units that already were requiring as far as unit training
 3 much stiffer standards, then why not increase the
 4 physical fitness requirements of women so they could be
 5 on equal footing? Because we were actually putting them
 6 at a disadvantage.
 7 So I really don't have any insight on
 8 their performance in Desert Storm.
 9 MS. POPE: Okay.
 10 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: If that had any
 11 bearing.
 12 MS. POPE: And second is does the Marine
 13 Corps gender-norm anything other than physical fitness?
 14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: The only
 15 gender-norm in the testing is just the run.
 16 MS. POPE: But, I mean, is there anything
 17 else that the Marine Corps — I understand that the run
 18 is gender-normed. Is there anything else in requirements
 19 that the Marine Corps gender-norms?
 20 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: Not that I'm
 21 aware of, ma'am.
 22 MS. POPE: Okay.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: Well, I mean, there are

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1 different exercises, though, like a pull-up. I mean,
 2 women don't do that. I mean, that's —
 3 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: Oh, that's a
 4 different event. Right.
 5 MS. POPE: But I'm talking about all
 6 physical fitness. I'm not just talking about one piece
 7 of physical fitness. I mean, physical fitness is gender-
 8 normed. There are pieces of the physical fitness
 9 requirements that are —
 10 DR. SEGAL: The test.
 11 MS. POPE: The test — that are gender-
 12 normed. What I'm asking is if the Marine Corps gender-
 13 norms anything else.
 14 MR. PANG: I think — The obstacle course,
 15 I think, you do. Don't you? I mean, the —
 16 DR. SEGAL: Confidence course.
 17 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: There are
 18 certain —
 19 MR. PANG: Confidence course.
 20 DR. SEGAL: Confidence course.
 21 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: There are
 22 certain events on the confidence course at the Marine
 23 Corps Recruit Depot. Some of the obstacles — the

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1 confidence — in the obstacle course, the obstacles are
 2 the same; the height is different. There are certain
 3 events at the confidence course they don't do.
 4 The two key factors historically, to —
 5 because of those changes, are height considerations and
 6 considerations for upper body strength. For example, the
 7 confidence course, female recruits do not climb up to the
 8 third level as individuals when they run it through the
 9 first time. However, they do run it during the Crucible
 10 because the Crucible is a team event. That's one
 11 example.
 12 DR. SEGAL: Okay. I'm Mady Segal.
 13 As I understand it from your written
 14 testimony, many of the changes in the men's test occurred
 15 without relevance to the women at all. It says prior to
 16 1971, there were five events, in full combat dress, and
 17 they were combat-oriented skills. And then in 1971,
 18 there was more of a change from the combat-oriented test
 19 — this is for the men and had nothing to do with the
 20 changes in the women — in order to measure general
 21 cardiovascular endurance and muscular strength. That's
 22 what it says here.
 23 And at that point in 1971, the Physical

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1 Defense, in their directive, doesn't specify what test;
 2 they just say test cardiovascular endurance and muscular
 3 strength and endurance. They don't tell us to do that.
 4 DR. SEGAL: Don't they also say something
 5 about agility or flexibility?
 6 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: I believe they
 7 do.
 8 DR. HODGDON: They do mention it, yes.
 9 DR. SEGAL: Do you measure agility or
 10 flexibility?
 11 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: Not
 12 flexibility, ma'am.
 13 DR. SEGAL: Thank you.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: Well, I'm going to follow-up
 15 on Mady's question. There's an essential point she
 16 raises, and the answers you gave her and the answer you
 17 gave me earlier a little bit maybe have to be reconciled.
 18 Is it the — You know, you sort of implied
 19 at first the expanding role of women had an effect on
 20 shaping the physical fitness program, and Mady brings up
 21 the point that really it started before the expanding
 22 role of women.
 23 DR. SEGAL: This didn't have anything to

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1 Fitness Test had nine events, including leg lifts, squat
 2 thrusts and rope climbs. Okay? And then in 1975, the
 3 PFT, it says here, was standardized at three events, and
 4 that's where you got to basically the three events you
 5 have now.
 6 This was for the men. And then later the
 7 question was could the women do what the men were doing?
 8 So that — is that the development as it took place?
 9 Okay. What led the Marine Corps to settle
 10 on these particular three events as the three tasks that
 11 all Marines would be measured on to see if they had met
 12 — to measure their general cardiovascular endurance and
 13 muscular strength? Why these particular three?
 14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: Well, I would
 15 say — First of all, we'll start with the run since there
 16 was a similar event with the previous test, and obviously
 17 a timed distance run would provide a measure of
 18 cardiovascular endurance.
 19 The pull-up was decided upon by, say, the
 20 push-up, because of the correlation between those type of
 21 events that they may have to do or actions in combat, and
 22 the fact that with a pull-up, the rationale was you're
 23 actually engaging a hundred percent of your body weight

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1 do with the women. It was the change — the test was
 2 changing from men irrespective of women.
 3 DR. MOSKOS: So that's what I — Both can
 4 be true, by the way.
 5 DR. SEGAL: Can it?
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. Yeah.
 7 DR. SEGAL: Yeah. And then later it was
 8 — the question was could the women be judged on the same
 9 test that the men were already being judged on. That's
 10 the evolution.
 11 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: Yes, ma'am.
 12 Correct. I don't think they're — Yeah, I don't think
 13 they're inconsistent answers.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But they
 15 were being judged — I guess maybe I'm not following now.
 16 When the Physical Fitness Test was developed in '75 — or
 17 actually it was when they finally approved the three
 18 events. Just prior to '74 is when it really came into
 19 being.
 20 There was a study group and there were
 21 physiologists involved and so forth. They took a look at
 22 the old PRT and they took a look at emerging
 23 physiological thoughts at the time, emerging — which

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1 where you may not be doing the same with a push-up.
 2 The sit-up: abdominal strength,
 3 correlation, trunk muscles, ability to shoulder a pack,
 4 et cetera.
 5 So, in essence, I think they were getting
 6 away from a combat-oriented test but, at the same time,
 7 wanting to maintain events that still had measures of
 8 general fitness, but had some type of tie-in with combat.
 9 DR. SEGAL: So rather than starting from
 10 sort of a blank slate and say how would be the — what
 11 would be the best measure — best way to measure the
 12 physical fitness and health of men and women, it actually
 13 went from a test that was developed for men specifically,
 14 to look at some limited number of tasks that might have a
 15 relationship to combat, and then you later went — you
 16 later transformed the women's test to go along with the
 17 men's.
 18 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: I'll be honest
 19 with you, ma'am, there really isn't a lot of elaboration
 20 on what was their rationale. I understand your question.
 21 You know, why not other tests altogether, even other than
 22 the ones that I've already mentioned?
 23 For instance, even the Department of

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1 wasn't as great as it is today — and the reality is then
 2 they came forward in a full decision briefing that came
 3 to the Commandant of the Marine Corps — I was there at
 4 the time. That's how I know — and it proscribed the
 5 events, the three events, and it proscribed the rationale
 6 for those particular events and why. It was based to a
 7 degree on the health issue that we've heard about already
 8 in the changing standards.
 9 The follow-on to women Marines, as it came
 10 along, it was a Marine physical fitness standard. It had
 11 nothing to do with gender. It was a Marine standard,
 12 except now we have the pull-up; how do we take women, and
 13 that's a tough one, so how do we go ahead and do the —
 14 you know, do we do a flexed hang?
 15 So I guess that's why I'm coming back at
 16 you all — is that it was never looked at as male and
 17 female. It was only looked at at that time as Marine.
 18 Okay?
 19 Now —
 20 DR. SEGAL: At which time?
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: When the
 22 three events were determined.
 23 DR. SEGAL: Not in 1975.

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1 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: '73, 4 and 5.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: '73-4.
 3 DR. SEGAL: At what point did the women
 4 have to start doing these three events?
 5 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: In '75.
 6 DR. SEGAL: Oh. So that was true for the
 7 women as of —
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: They
 9 started to do them at that time. That's correct.
 10 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: Yes, ma'am.
 11 DR. SEGAL: Okay.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: It was a
 13 Marine — It was a Marine decision: "Marines will do this
 14 test." And the only differences were the norming that
 15 was done on the standards.
 16 DR. SEGAL: Okay.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: So it was
 18 never — It just wasn't looked at as male and female.
 19 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: And that change
 20 in '75, if I didn't highlight that, the women were only
 21 running a mile and a half at that time and their sit-ups
 22 — their sit-up requirement was different than males.
 23 And, of course, the upper body test.

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1 DR. SEGAL: Speaking of that, I think
 2 there is a slight error in one of these things you
 3 prepared. I just wanted to check. There were some
 4 changes made to show the new three-mile run times.
 5 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: Yes, ma'am.
 6 DR. SEGAL: The ones that are actually
 7 written in here for the women are exactly the same as the
 8 men. Is that a mistake?
 9 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: That is a
 10 mistake.
 11 DR. SEGAL: Okay.
 12 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: That was —
 13 That was caught this morning.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: That's very good, Mady.
 15 MR. PANG: Yeah, here it is right here.
 16 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: In essence,
 17 there's a three-minute time —
 18 DR. SEGAL: Just to prove that I've done
 19 my homework, right?
 20 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: There's a
 21 three-minute time difference between men and women.
 22 DR. SEGAL: Three minutes all the way
 23 through for each age?

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1 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: Yes, ma'am.
 2 DR. SEGAL: Okay. So that would be...
 3 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: So, for
 4 example, in the youngest age category, seventeen to
 5 twenty-six, that male Marine has twenty-eight minutes to
 6 pass. A female of the same age group would have thirty-
 7 one.
 8 DR. SEGAL: Thirty-one.
 9 Okay. Thank you.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I really
 11 have no questions. I would just — And I say this to you
 12 only because I was there, and that's — This whole
 13 evolution with the physical fitness program has been
 14 internal. And where the — quite frankly, where demands
 15 for women Marines to do three miles, to do sit-ups and
 16 the like, came from within; came from women Marines.
 17 I can remember the day in Quantico,
 18 meeting with fifty — thirty, excuse me — thirty women
 19 Marines who said, you know, "It's wrong that we're not
 20 running the three miles. We can run the three miles."
 21 So it's been an internal look, an internal thing.
 22 So I would just like to echo what the
 23 Colonel has said.

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1 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I'd like to
 2 ask from where you sit — I asked this at the break of
 3 the Navy. How much — How many queries do you get —
 4 questions, concerns, complaints — about the gender-
 5 norming as it pertains to the PT test? In other words,
 6 how much dissatisfaction is there on the part of males
 7 that women have three minutes longer to run their three
 8 miles than they do?
 9 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: From within the
 10 Marine Corps? None. If I get any complaints, it's from
 11 women saying, "Why aren't you making it more
 12 challenging?"
 13 And there may be a revision at some point,
 14 but the — In fact, in 1997, the average PFT score in the
 15 Marine Corps was higher for women than it was for men.
 16 Now, the males are a little bit higher this year to date,
 17 but they're very close, almost within the same range as
 18 they were prior to 1997 as far as differences. So
 19 there's been very positive feedback.
 20 Within the Marine Corps we have something
 21 called "Marine Mail," which is basically Marines can get
 22 on the Internet or get on Marine Corps Banyan and send in
 23 their complaints or suggestions or how to make their

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1 Corps better, write to the Commandant.
 2 Well, if it has to do with training or
 3 even smells like training, I get it. In the last three
 4 years, I've answered over two hundred and fifty and I
 5 would say easily 90 percent have been on physical
 6 fitness, weight control, and to an extent, recruit
 7 training, because we also oversee that, and the majority
 8 are very positive.
 9 In fact, I'll be honest with you, some of
 10 the changes, the genesis of, came from Marine males. And
 11 that's not to say that we rule by committee and, well,
 12 because the Marine male says it, it must be the pulse of
 13 the nation, to so speak.
 14 As an example, one of the driving factors
 15 to at least discuss and look at the sit-up came from the
 16 influx of Marine mail on this highly contentious event.
 17 And Dr. Hodgdon can attest — he was at the conference in
 18 '96 — we spent a lot of time on looking at alternatives
 19 and was this the most viable test, if it was a viable
 20 test to begin with, and how we could change it.
 21 So I would say the feedback has been very
 22 positive.
 23 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thanks.

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1 DR. CANTOR: I guess I want to go back to
 2 — You mentioned in several places that — You put that
 3 although the emphasis is generally on fitness and health,
 4 that you're putting — you're doing some gearing towards
 5 combat specialization, even in the initial fitness. What
 6 kinds of things and in what way do you feel you're
 7 gearing it towards what a Marine will have to do?
 8 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: That would fall
 9 again —
 10 DR. CANTOR: This has become an issue with
 11 other services, and so —
 12 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: I understand.
 13 I would say that again would fall under the example I
 14 used, and a very critical point, and that's the units
 15 themselves; what the commander believes. Is he going to
 16 list them on paper? He may have unit SOP's — standard
 17 operating procedures — but there are things that that
 18 commander knows that his or her Marines have to do and
 19 he's going to isolate those tasks if they're of a
 20 physical nature and stress those.
 21 DR. CANTOR: But that's all after boot
 22 camp.
 23 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: Yes, ma'am.

1 That's after boot camp.
 2 DR. CANTOR: So is there anything in the
 3 physical training in boot camp that you see as — I mean,
 4 you said it was a general foundation. But is there
 5 anything in fact —
 6 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: The only thing,
 7 too, in boot camp, that may have a correlation to a
 8 particular MOS, is we will qualify some recruits to a
 9 higher swim qualification because they're going to
 10 require it in their MOS schools. For example, light-
 11 armored vehicle, air crew. There are several others.
 12 They have a second- or first-class swim requirement. It
 13 makes it much easier on the school when they report to
 14 it, if they've already come to that point with that
 15 required swim classification.
 16 And the recruit depots have the capability
 17 to upgrade actually the entire company or series. They
 18 dedicate four or five days for this. So, in essence,
 19 they could upgrade all Marines.
 20 I should say recruits. They're not
 21 Marines yet.
 22 DR. MOSKOS: I pass.
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Dr. Hodgdon has had

1 DR. CANTOR: I just wondered. I was just
 2 trying to get it.
 3 DR. HODGDON: Yes, this standard is more
 4 demanding.
 5 DR. CANTOR: I mean, you're —
 6 DR. SEGAL: Is it highly demanding?
 7 DR. HODGDON: I don't know what that
 8 means.
 9 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, I think
 10 we've got to be careful about getting into comparisons
 11 now. And also keep in mind that the mission of the
 12 service —
 13 DR. SEGAL: Well, I'm out of the
 14 comparison. Do you think that the standard for the
 15 Marine Corps is highly demanding for the typical recruit,
 16 male and female?
 17 DR. HODGDON: You would actually be better
 18 prepared to answer that than I.
 19 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: Well, we've
 20 seen — As far as what's done in the Delayed Entry
 21 Program and is it preparation for recruit training?
 22 We've seen over — First of all, I'd say yes. I wouldn't
 23 — even though I mentioned earlier that there's no way to

1 nothing to do for a while, so I'll pose a question to him
 2 which he may not be able to answer. But because you have
 3 experience with both the Navy and the Marine Corps, and
 4 one difference — prominent difference is the existence
 5 of the Delayed Entry Program, can you comment on the
 6 differences between the services, if any, that may result
 7 from the fact that the Marines make an effort to prepare
 8 people for entry into basic training — prepare them
 9 physically for entry into basic training?
 10 And if that's just outside of your realm,
 11 you can just say so.
 12 DR. HODGDON: That's pretty much outside
 13 of my realm. I will go ahead and say that some of the
 14 more demanding schools, such as Basic Underwater
 15 Demolition SEAL training, has a similar thing where
 16 people arrive early and they have — they provide them
 17 with physical training to prepare them for that school.
 18 But the Navy does not — I don't find the
 19 Navy — This is my opinion. I don't find the Navy's
 20 standards particularly demanding, and so I'm not sure
 21 that there — you know, that there's a need for pre-
 22 preparedness, if you will.
 23 The data that we talked about from Great

1 measure accurately whether every DEP is doing it the same
 2 way, the program is structured, it's there, but reality
 3 is always a factor to consider.
 4 Does the DEP and the related physical
 5 training prepare a recruit for recruit training? Yes, it
 6 does, but it also gives the insight to the depots who is
 7 not ready to begin training.
 8 As I said, an IST — strength test — is
 9 administered the second day of training. Automatically,
 10 males that fail that have to go through a mandatory
 11 twenty-one-day training program at Physical Conditioning
 12 Platoon. Females go through a mandatory fourteen-day.
 13 And in actuality, we're seeing the
 14 preponderance right now of female IST failures in the
 15 sit-ups, which is kind of odd. So maybe that one-mile
 16 run wasn't —
 17 DR. SEGAL: The standard's been raised,
 18 hasn't it? The IST —
 19 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: Well, that was
 20 even before we had raised the standards. Where males,
 21 historically, it's the pull-ups.
 22 But I think the — I think the move to 1.5
 23 miles is still a good thing.

1 Lakes earlier suggests that people who fail the PRT on
 2 entry have a very good possibility of passing it later.
 3 That's why there was — we couldn't find any cutoffs for
 4 the PRT to suggest who needed remedial training, because
 5 the ability for people to go even from "failure" to
 6 "excellent" or "outstanding" existed and there were
 7 individuals who did that.
 8 And so I'm not sure that there's a
 9 demonstrated need, given the way things stand right now.
 10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Do you —
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Is that
 12 because the standard was too low? Is that what you're
 13 saying?
 14 DR. HODGDON: I will say I think the
 15 standard — I personally don't think the standards are
 16 very demanding. Whether that's the reason that these
 17 events occur or not, I couldn't say.
 18 DR. CANTOR: By implication, this standard
 19 is more demanding.
 20 DR. SEGAL: The Marine Corps standard.
 21 DR. HODGDON: Well, I think if you read
 22 the papers, you will find this standard to be more
 23 demanding.

1 So I would not want to send a recruit to
 2 recruit training without any type of preparation.
 3 Historically, recruits that do poorly or fail the IST
 4 obviously have a high attrition rate. Likewise, those
 5 recruits that may not be — or may be close to their
 6 weight also have more problems.
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: You may have mentioned
 8 this before, but have you done any studies to correlate
 9 faithful performance of the DEP program to later success
 10 in basic training? Or do those data not get collected?
 11 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: No, ma'am, we
 12 haven't — I believe the Center for Naval Analysis may
 13 have done a study several years ago, but I wouldn't want
 14 to say for any certainty. We haven't at Training
 15 Education Division.
 16 MR. PANG: Pass.
 17 MS. POPE: Pass.
 18 DR. SEGAL: I have a question. Has the
 19 Marine Corps done a systematic task analysis to determine
 20 what tasks are done in each MOS and what skills or
 21 abilities would be required, both physical and otherwise,
 22 for each task? You talked about commanders having a
 23 sense of what's required, but has there been any

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1 systematic task analysis done that would look at
 2 incumbents of the job and find out what they're actually
 3 doing and under what circumstances?
 4 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: Yes, ma'am.
 5 Every MOS has individual training standards, by rank,
 6 that those Marines must be able to complete.
 7 DR. SEGAL: Right. Those are the
 8 standards for them in order to be in the job. But has
 9 there been an analysis done of the incumbents in the job
 10 to see what is actually being performed on the job?
 11 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: That I can't —
 12 I can't say with any certainty. I don't know.
 13 DR. HODGDON: There has for the rifleman.
 14 It was done by Paul Davis and his group at that time.
 15 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: Oh, in the mid-
 16 eighties.
 17 DR. HODGDON: In the mid-eighties. And
 18 they looked at — They did a task analysis for the MOS —
 19 DR. SEGAL: Was that part of the Joint
 20 Service Performance Project looking at first term —
 21 first-termers and hands-on performance testing? Is that
 22 part of that program?
 23 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: I think that

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1 now is to recommend that we go out with a second phase
 2 and make it a directive that units provide — of all age
 3 groups — That's the other thing: we came up short in the
 4 oldest age category.
 5 I do believe we'll eventually replace the
 6 flexed-arm hang and I do believe it'll be with push-ups.
 7 When that happens, we should be able to turn to our
 8 female Marines and say, "This is a conditioning program
 9 that has worked" — it's up to them whether they want to
 10 use it — and "this scoring was based on female Marines."
 11 It may — It may mirror what the Army and
 12 the Navy is doing with their women as far as scoring, but
 13 we wanted to be able to say we looked at it ourselves.
 14 Again, an internal or proactive approach.
 15 So I think through '99 we'll probably —
 16 at least early '99, we'll be pursuing the second phase of
 17 this.
 18 DR. SEGAL: So that's the study that's
 19 referred to in here on page 6 —
 20 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: Yes, ma'am.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Is there
 22 any concern about perceptions of some Marines now not
 23 getting up on the bar?

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1 was out of the Institute of Human Performance.
 2 DR. HODGDON: Well, they're the people who
 3 did it, but it was actually interest generated within the
 4 Marine Corps. They were interested in seeing that their
 5 PRT items in fact predicted performance on tasks that
 6 related — were related to being a rifleman, and they
 7 were found to do so.
 8 DR. SEGAL: So it was just done for that
 9 one MOS that you know of.
 10 DR. HODGDON: Yes. Right.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My final
 12 question is because you've piqued my interest. You
 13 indicate that you're taking a look at the deadhang pull-
 14 up versus the flexed-arm for the women, and I would just
 15 like to ask where you're going with this.
 16 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: Right now, sir,
 17 we're not going very far at all. The problem being is
 18 our goal was to attempt to — Well, first of all, let me
 19 say the purpose — We knew the — We weren't pleased with
 20 the flexed-arm hang. We felt it was not an accurate
 21 measure of upper body strength.
 22 At the time when we were briefing the
 23 Commandant on these initiatives that just went into

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1 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: I don't —
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: As far as
 3 the test is concerned, if male Marines are going to get
 4 up on the bar to do pull-ups and female Marines are going
 5 to do push-ups, are you concerned about a perception that
 6 currently does exist as an unintended consequence?
 7 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: We have
 8 considered that and we know there probably still will be
 9 a perception. My counter to that would be the push-up is
 10 a whole sight better than the flexed-arm hang.
 11 Could women be trained to do pull-ups?
 12 Yes. We feel, though, it would take an inordinate amount
 13 of time and perhaps a misplaced focus. That women would
 14 be forced to spend a great deal of time working on a
 15 single event rather than all events or, more importantly,
 16 their regular jobs.
 17 There would be some impacts on the
 18 recruiting command — how to start a female in a pool
 19 that — Again, with a voluntary environment, how to
 20 prepare her for recruit training if she doesn't — if she
 21 elects not to attend pool functions, PT functions, to
 22 prepare her for pull-ups.
 23 So there were some ramifications we had

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1 effect in July, we wanted to take a longer look at the
 2 female upper body test but not enact a change without
 3 some type of study at that time.
 4 So the purpose of the study was not to
 5 determine whether push-ups or even pull-ups were viable
 6 tests for females. From what I said before in the '93
 7 study, we had some reservations about pull-ups. The real
 8 purpose was to develop a conditioning program with push-
 9 ups and a Marine Corps-based or female-based scoring
 10 standard.
 11 So it wasn't to determine are push-ups a
 12 viable test for females — we knew they were — as a
 13 substitute for the flexed-arm hang. We set out to test
 14 one-tenth of the female population of the Marine Corps,
 15 which equated to about a thousand women. Instead of
 16 being directed in nature, we requested personnel support,
 17 and we basically have gotten about two hundred and fifty-
 18 plus volunteers, which I know is probably a dirty word to
 19 researchers but we felt, well, we'll take what we can
 20 get.
 21 So we're going to view that as a phase
 22 one. We plan to — When I said in my testimony we would
 23 provide the Commandant with a recommendation, our plan

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1 considered. Will male Marines still say, "Yeah, but
 2 she's not doing the same test," sir, I'm sure they will
 3 be. But they're saying it even more so now, I think,
 4 because it's viewed as — the flexed-arm hang is not a
 5 very good test.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 7 DR. SEGAL: Who views it that way?
 8 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: Ma'am?
 9 DR. SEGAL: Who views it that way?
 10 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: I would say
 11 there are males that do. And many female Marines will
 12 say, "Well, have you ever gotten up on the bar and tried
 13 it?" Yes, I have.
 14 DR. SEGAL: Because actually our
 15 experience was, in talking to some of the Marines, that
 16 the men said that they thought the flexed-arm hang was
 17 harder.
 18 DR. HODGDON: It's different.
 19 DR. SEGAL: It's different, right, if
 20 they're not trained in —
 21 DR. HODGDON: I mean, we're worrying about
 22 whether they'll accept push-ups as an alternative. Well,
 23 it, too, is very different from a pull-up and it measures

1 different abilities in fact.
 2DR. SEGAL: I'm out of turn here, so...
 3CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Go ahead, Mady.
 4DR. SEGAL: It's coming back around.
 5Have you gone to outside experts to ask
 6 what would be a good measure of upper body strength?
 7 Because you said the concern has been that the flexed-arm
 8 hang is not a good measure of upper body strength. Has
 9 there been — I'm not an exercise physiologist, so I'm
 10 asking. Have you gone to the exercise physiologists both
 11 within and outside the DoD establishment to find out what
 12 is a good measure of upper body strength?
 13 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: Well, first of
 14 all, I mean, this goes — this dates back to September of
 15 '96 where we brought a host of folks in and this was on
 16 the table. I mean, we did discuss this at the time.
 17 This first led us to Naval Health Research
 18 Center, who was actually sponsoring this study for us —
 19 so I would certainly say they're an expert outside agency
 20 — and we laid our concerns out that, one, we wanted to
 21 replace the flexed-arm hang; we wanted a viable
 22 substitute, a test of upper body strength. We voiced our
 23 concerns that we didn't want to go in a direction of

1 pull-ups and we wanted —
 2DR. SEGAL: So the question was just what
 3 to do for the women. It wasn't in general, what's a good
 4 measure of upper body strength?
 5LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: Correct, ma'am.
 6 It was directed solely towards women.
 7DR. SEGAL: Okay. Just to women.
 8LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: We had
 9 considered at one point a replacement of the pull-up for
 10 males and the flexed-arm hang for females and going to
 11 push-ups for men and women, and for a variety of reasons
 12 we elected not to do that. Traditional links, the
 13 traditional link to pull-ups for males as being one, and
 14 I suppose an additional change to the scoring structure
 15 of the PFT itself, and the fact, as a final note, we had
 16 just enacted a change to a deadhang pull-up.
 17 DR. HODGDON: One of the things you guys
 18 — I don't know. There's a terminology problem that
 19 bothers me a little, and that is, that these measures are
 20 not strictly measures of strength as classically defined.
 21 Strength is the maximal force that you can exert with a
 22 muscle or muscle group. And these are all indicators of
 23 muscle endurance — any of these calisthenic exercises —

1 unless you reach the point where you can only do one.
 2 Then it truly has been a strength measure.
 3And that in no way means that they're bad
 4 testing items or anything like that. The argument that's
 5 been laid out as to why the items that were selected were
 6 is still valid and all that, but they aren't classically
 7 strength measures.
 8And the only reason I express that is that
 9 the Navy has got some concerns about what that means for
 10 its materials handling kinds of jobs. The Air Force
 11 actually — You'll hear from them, I'm sure. They
 12 actually select people using a strength test and have —
 13 DR. SEGAL: So you're saying it's muscular
 14 endurance rather than strength.
 15 DR. HODGDON: It's muscular endurance.
 16 It's an appropriate thing to measure it,
 17 but it's — you know, but it's not strength.
 18 DR. SEGAL: So it's not how many pounds
 19 can you lift. It's —
 20 DR. HODGDON: Right.
 21 DR. SEGAL: — the endurance of the muscle
 22 in exerting force.
 23 DR. HODGDON: Right. It's how many times

1 can you lift less.
 2CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Colonel, this may be a
 3 little out of your area but we heard a lot at Marine
 4 Advanced Training or — I forget what it's called now —
 5 over at Camp LeJeune, about people coming back from basic
 6 combat training either with injuries or becoming injured
 7 shortly after, and I just wonder, is the Marine Corps
 8 looking at this?
 9Do you have any studies going on or
 10 anything to see if there is a problem? And if so, what
 11 might be done about the — I guess the difference between
 12 the basic combat training and the next step, which I can
 13 just say I sure saw a lot of people walking around on
 14 crutches at LeJeune.
 15 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: Yes, ma'am.
 16 That's Marine Combat Training, which all non-infantry
 17 Marines, male and female, go to. The only Marines that
 18 don't go to that are the infantry Marines, and they go to
 19 Infantry Training Battalion.
 20 And yes, it's very physical. It's
 21 seventeen days long, fourteen of which are spent in the
 22 field. If that new Marine has not gone on a Recruiter's
 23 Assistance Program, he really has only been home for ten

1 days between recruit training and MCT. A time to heal
 2 up, but perhaps not completely.
 3And there are, I'm sure, a lot of recruits
 4 in weeks ten, eleven and twelve, that see the light at
 5 the end of the tunnel and are just gutting it out. You
 6 know, the pride of "I want it complete." So a lot
 7 probably go home banged up a little bit and obviously,
 8 likewise, they probably report to Marine Combat Training
 9 still feeling the effects.
 10 The second part of that, no, we haven't —
 11 we're not doing any studies on it, though we, at both
 12 Marine Combat Training on east and west coasts, have some
 13 fairly substantial sports medicine clinics, so they are
 14 getting more attention. They're getting turned back to
 15 training a little bit faster than before. But I would
 16 say — I don't recall the stats offhand, but probably the
 17 highest reason for attrition out of those two schools is
 18 going to be physical.
 19 It's a very physical course. And again,
 20 if they've gone into it with some bumps and bruises from
 21 recruit training, they may be just accentuated a bit.
 22 DR. SEGAL: I've got another one.
 23 What muscles are actually measured in

1 pull-ups? In talking with the folks at the Coast Guard,
 2 they were talking about that they've discovered that many
 3 of their shipboard tasks do not actually work in terms of
 4 push-ups, for example, but there's much more pulling.
 5 There's more of the triceps rather than the biceps that
 6 they need and such.
 7So what muscle — Are there different
 8 muscles that are measured in pull-ups and push-ups and
 9 flexed-arm hangs?
 10 DR. HODGDON: Well, not specifically
 11 between the flexed-arm hang and the pull-up. Those —
 12 DR. SEGAL: Those are closer —
 13 DR. HODGDON: It's the same muscle groups.
 14 You're just looking at a different attribute: how long
 15 can the muscle contract before it — you know, it poisons
 16 itself, essentially, whereas —
 17 DR. SEGAL: As opposed to contraction and
 18 release.
 19 DR. HODGDON: Right. Right.
 20 When you do a pull-up, actually you are
 21 measuring biceps initially and you include the triceps
 22 when you control your rate of descent. So it uses the
 23 whole shoulder girdle — the deltoids, traps, and then

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1 the whole arm musculature, including grip. So you have
 2 forearm, the whole arm.
 3 DR. SEGAL: For pull-ups.
 4 DR. HODGDON: Huh?
 5 DR. SEGAL: For the pull-ups?
 6 DR. HODGDON: For the pull-ups.
 7 DR. SEGAL: Pull-ups.
 8 DR. HODGDON: Push-ups flexes — Actually,
 9 it does triceps and pecs, primarily, and — Pectoralis,
 10 the chest muscles. And...
 11 DR. SEGAL: So then the pull-ups and the
 12 push-ups —
 13 DR. HODGDON: And some biceps again,
 14 controlling rates of decline and stuff. What it doesn't
 15 measure is — Well, it measures a different set of
 16 muscles. It measures the ones in front of your chest
 17 instead of the ones that make up the shoulder girdle, the
 18 rest of the shoulder girdle.
 19 DR. SEGAL: So there's somewhat —
 20 DR. HODGDON: I'm not being very clear, I
 21 can tell.
 22 DR. SEGAL: — difference in —
 23 DR. HODGDON: Yes.

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1 DR. SEGAL: — the muscles that are being
 2 tested.
 3 DR. HODGDON: Correct.
 4 DR. SEGAL: So some people, depending upon
 5 their actual musculature, might be able to do better on
 6 one than another, where other people — and I'm saying
 7 people within each gender — might do better on another.
 8 DR. HODGDON: In general, people will do
 9 better on push-ups than on pull-ups. Just in general.
 10 The weight moved for a push-up is something like 45 —
 11 something between 40 and 45 percent of body weight and
 12 you actually move it with a fairly large set of muscles.
 13 The pectoralis muscles.
 14 DR. SEGAL: So they'll be able to do more
 15 push-ups than they can do pull-ups. But you're, of
 16 course, going to norm this so that it's just as demanding
 17 regardless of which one it is.
 18 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPA: Well, the
 19 intent would be to norm it, yes.
 20 DR. HODGDON: That would be the intent.
 21 I'm reacting to your word "demand." You know, you will
 22 be — The norm —
 23 DR. SEGAL: Well, the rating —

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1 DR. HODGDON: — will put you in the same
 2 point in the distribution on either one of those.
 3 DR. SEGAL: Which brings up another
 4 question — and I had seen it in the Navy — that the
 5 scoring on the Physical Fitness Test seems to be a norm-
 6 referenced grading so that the bottom 10 percent of the
 7 people fail.
 8 DR. HODGDON: The bottom 10 percent at the
 9 time the standards were set fail. In actuality — I
 10 believe from the last sample we've looked at — maybe 1
 11 percent fail. 2 percent, something like that.
 12 DR. SEGAL: So that the criterion —
 13 You're doing — You're using a criterion referenced
 14 grading system in actuality that's based upon a norm-
 15 referenced —
 16 DR. HODGDON: Yes. We're saying the Navy
 17 looks okay as it is today, how would we distribute scores
 18 for that set of people.
 19 DR. SEGAL: Okay.
 20 DR. HODGDON: And we're in the process of
 21 revising that now.
 22 DR. SEGAL: On the basis of the way
 23 they're doing now?

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1 DR. HODGDON: Yeah. People have really
 2 improved.
 3 DR. SEGAL: So you'll ensure that the
 4 bottom 10 percent are going to fail. Is that —
 5 DR. HODGDON: No, I don't know that that
 6 part will happen again.
 7 DR. SEGAL: Okay.
 8 DR. HODGDON: But we are changing the
 9 upper categories for sure because we're finding what
 10 actually — what the Marine Corps has in that is we can
 11 probably set a single standard for — from both men and
 12 women on the sit-ups. Distributions —
 13 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I think in the
 14 military, those in uniform would tell you that they refer
 15 to that as those that fail to achieve the minimum
 16 standard fail.
 17 DR. SEGAL: But the minimum standard is
 18 defined as being above the bottom 10 percent.
 19 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: But that's
 20 after the science and how we apply leadership.
 21 DR. HODGDON: Good point.
 22 DR. SEGAL: So it isn't that people will
 23 do better on push-ups than pull-ups. They'll do more

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1 push-ups than pull-ups.
 2 DR. HODGDON: Yes. Correct.
 3 DR. SEGAL: Okay.
 4 DR. HODGDON: And they'll use different
 5 muscles to do them.
 6 DR. SEGAL: I'm learning.
 7 The question is, how do we keep fit while
 8 sitting in meetings all day?
 9 DR. HODGDON: You don't. You go do
 10 something when you're not in the meeting.
 11 DR. SEGAL: Thank you. Now I know why we
 12 called you in as an expert.
 13 DR. HODGDON: To document the obvious.
 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Tom, have you any...
 15 MR. MOORE: Well, I apologize for having
 16 to pull away for a while. And I realize this is the
 17 Marine portion of the brief, but since Dr. Hodgdon is
 18 still here, I wanted to ask a Navy-related question, if
 19 you don't object to that.
 20 DR. HODGDON: Will you yield your time?
 21 MS. POPE: Reluctantly, right?
 22 MR. MOORE: And if this has been covered,
 23 I apologize to my colleagues.

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1 It's pretty widely acknowledged that the
 2 operational —
 3 DR. SEGAL: That's been covered.
 4 MR. MOORE: Today's operational
 5 environment is sending ships to sea with considerable
 6 shortfalls in the crew complement. I mean, I've read
 7 recently I think the Eisenhower went to the Gulf with 25
 8 percent below strength in the crew.
 9 DR. HODGDON: I didn't know it was that
 10 high, but...
 11 MR. MOORE: I think that was the number.
 12 And I wonder if the Navy's doing any study of the impact
 13 of having to, in effect, spread out the burden among
 14 fewer crew on physical conditions. That's not a training
 15 issue, per se, but it is a matter of concern to us since
 16 we are also looking at the whole continuum from training
 17 into the operational forces.
 18 And you had — you had alluded earlier to
 19 the fact that if there is an emergency task that has to
 20 be performed or a maximal task that a crewman can get
 21 help, and obviously if the crews are short, that
 22 complicates that problem.
 23 So is the Navy looking at this? Is there

1 any acknowledgement that this may be a problem that
 2 relates to greater physical stress on crews?
 3 DR. HODGDON: I can't tell you whether the
 4 Navy acknowledges that or not. I know that we, in our
 5 center, are concerned with that and that's part of our
 6 interest in looking at job requirements and physical
 7 fitness requirements for jobs, is because it goes beyond
 8 that. The plans for the next set of ships are that they
 9 in fact have fewer crew members and more automation, and
 10 so that means when you have manual things to do, there
 11 are now in fact fewer people to draw on.
 12 MR. MOORE: Fewer people to do that,
 13 right.
 14 DR. HODGDON: And I will admit there are
 15 times when — Well, there are times you could have when
 16 you couldn't find the second person as the ship — as the
 17 crew size gets smaller and the risk of that becomes
 18 higher as you lower the crew size. It's all simple kind
 19 of just math stuff.
 20 MR. MOORE: Math.
 21 DR. HODGDON: And I — you know, we have
 22 expressed sort of a longer term goal but we haven't
 23 gotten, you know, explicit funding or acknowledgement

1 that this is a place the Navy wants to go. That we want
 2 to look at those issues, all right.
 3 Now, we know something — we hope to find
 4 something about the distribution of physical abilities
 5 within the Navy. We need to look at at least ratings of
 6 physical demand, followed by some actual task analysis
 7 sorts of things within the Navy, and then we might try to
 8 do some modeling about what happens when now I have one-
 9 third the crew size of a current vessel and you take a
 10 hit or something like that.
 11 I mean, so we would like to go there.
 12 We're not sure right now that we're being directed down
 13 that path.
 14 MR. MOORE: Thank you.
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Any other questions?
 16 Well, we thank you very much.
 17 (Discussion off the record.)
 18 (Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the meeting of
 19 the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at
 20 1:00 p.m., the same day.)
 21 - - -
 22
 23

1 (AFTERNOON SESSION)
 2 (1:02 p.m.)
 3 Presentation of United States Army
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Back on the
 5 record.
 6 And to review briefly for everybody, we
 7 are video-taping as well as preparing a transcript, so I
 8 hope that even though we just had a good lunch, we will
 9 all keep our energy up and keep our voices up so as to be
 10 heard.
 11 General Bolt, I'll let you do the
 12 introductions and begin.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Thank you very
 14 much. And again, thank you for the opportunity to appear
 15 here today. I am the Army expert present here today and
 16 look forward to the opportunity to present the Army's
 17 position on the physical fitness test, physical fitness
 18 of our men and women, the background on how and why we
 19 arrived at our present standards, and the impact of
 20 physical conditioning on the overall health and wellness
 21 of our soldiers.
 22 The panel members I've brought with me
 23 today represent the expertise of the Army and they will

1 answer questions that you have pertaining to all aspects
 2 of the Army Physical Fitness Test and explain the
 3 physiology and the aging norms used by the Army.
 4 But before I introduce you to my panel
 5 members, there are some key points I'd like to make and
 6 review for you. While these are not entirely keyed to
 7 the Physical Fitness Test, they are central to the
 8 overall discussions of the Commission.
 9 As our panel of experts will inform you,
 10 our Army Physical Fitness Test is designed as a
 11 measurement of fitness through a gender- and age-normed
 12 process to ensure all of our soldiers have achieved and
 13 performed to acceptable levels of individual fitness.
 14 One point I would like to emphasize is that the Army's
 15 Physical Fitness Test is not a readiness test, but is in
 16 fact a measurement of individual fitness.
 17 As the Deputy Commanding General for
 18 Initial Entry Training in the United States Army's
 19 Training and Doctrine Command, I'd like to restate the
 20 Army's position with regard to training and gender.
 21 Renewed emphasis on training of all soldiers on core
 22 values and principles of leadership is an effective means
 23 of promoting professional behavior by all our soldiers.

1 We continue to believe that it's better to
 2 have soldiers training together as they will interact
 3 through their careers from the outset. Empirical studies
 4 show that women perform better and men perform equally
 5 well in gender-integrated Basic Combat Training. The
 6 bottom line here is, is that separate training does not
 7 produce equally-trained soldiers.
 8 Army gender-integrated training is not a
 9 social experiment. It is in fact a readiness necessity.
 10 The Army cannot accomplish its mission without its women.
 11 In this past year, 21 percent of our recruits were women
 12 and 60 percent of all the recruits served in gender-
 13 integrated Military Occupational Specialties across our
 14 Army. The Army chose to integrate Basic Combat Training
 15 to produce the best trained soldiers possible, soldiers
 16 who train and work together in a garrison environment as
 17 they would in a combat environment.
 18 Ideally, the Army will continue to train
 19 as it fights. Under current policy, 40 percent of our
 20 recruits in direct ground combat Military Occupational
 21 Specialties are in male-only training units, training as
 22 they will fight and work. 60 percent of our recruits —
 23 combat support and combat service support — are in

1 integrated basic training, training as they will fight
 2 and work.
 3 The business of training our soldiers to
 4 be the most effective fighting force possible is a
 5 continually evolving process. Our initiatives have taken
 6 us from the lessons of Korea and Vietnam to the successes
 7 of Desert Storm and the challenges of Bosnia. I ask that
 8 you have confidence in the Army leadership to train
 9 America's sons and daughters in the best possible way for
 10 success on the battlefield. Your understanding is
 11 essential in supporting the conditions for our continued
 12 future success.
 13 And in closing, I'd like to introduce now
 14 the panel of experts. First, on my right here from the
 15 Army Physical Fitness School at Fort Benning, Georgia, is
 16 the Commandant, Colonel Steve Cellucci. The lead
 17 research physiologist of that school is to his right, Dr.
 18 Lou Tomasi.
 19 On my left, from the United States
 20 Military Academy at West Point, is the Director of
 21 Physical Education, Colonel Maureen LeBoeuf. And lastly,
 22 from the Center for Health Promotion and Preventive
 23 Medicine is a research physiologist, Dr. Joseph Knapik.

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1 Thank you again for the opportunity to
 2 address the Commission, and we welcome your questions.
 3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Fred, would you like to
 4 start?
 5 MR. PANG: Why don't you.
 6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Well, we have
 7 — I noted, General, in your statement you mentioned
 8 specifically that the Physical Fitness Test is not a
 9 readiness test. Is there a connection between general
 10 fitness of soldiers in the Army and readiness? And what
 11 is that connection?
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: There certainly
 13 is a connection. First of all, the Physical Fitness Test
 14 would be a dipstick measure of individual readiness at
 15 any one specific time and we use it to measure readiness
 16 through the training process, and it is used by
 17 commanders in the units where they are assessed or where
 18 they are assigned to give him a snapshot and assessment
 19 tool of individual readiness.
 20 The second component of readiness in the
 21 Army is battled-focused physical training programs based
 22 on the requirements of that organization to accomplish
 23 its mission. A commander goes through an assessment of

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1 its mission requirements, whether they be tactical
 2 missions or tac-defend, delay, or locations having
 3 environmental requirements, such as operations in Alaska,
 4 operations in Panama, and builds a training program to
 5 support and ensure the unit's ability to accomplish its
 6 mission physically.
 7 And that's where you get different
 8 standards in just the three-event Physical Fitness Test:
 9 road marching, load-bearing, upper body strength for
 10 handling of ammunition, loading howitzers, endurance,
 11 strength. Overall wellness is involved in that to keep
 12 soldiers healthy over a period of time. And that battle-
 13 focus training program then becomes a commander's tool to
 14 ensure mission accomplishment. That is evaluated by
 15 himself.
 16 That's evaluated in external evaluations
 17 of mission accomplishment, and is also evaluated during
 18 periods that he is — or she is at the National Training
 19 Center, joint readiness training centers, or any of the
 20 combat training centers.
 21 Those are the two components. That really
 22 is a measure of readiness and that assessment. But the
 23 fitness test is a one-time look at the individual fitness

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1 level of soldiers.
 2 MR. PANG: Thank you.
 3 You know, this is a question that I've
 4 asked, you know, the two previous panels and it has to do
 5 with a draft GAO report that we have a copy of which I
 6 believe, you know, you have responded through or back to
 7 the OSD on.
 8 In this report, there are three major
 9 findings and there are seven specific recommendations.
 10 And interestingly, the OSD response concurs in all of the
 11 findings and all of the recommendations, you know, with
 12 comment, and I was just curious to know whether or not,
 13 you know, the Army, in its response to OSD, agreed with
 14 all of the recommendations and — all of the findings and
 15 recommendations or if you're aware of it or not.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I am not
 17 personally aware of that. None of us work in the arena
 18 that probably would —
 19 MR. PANG: I see.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: — have
 21 commented on that. We certainly can provide you that
 22 information for the record if you would like to.
 23 MR. PANG: Okay. Yes, we would like to.

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1 We want to know what your comments were with regard to
 2 the report to OSD so that we can kind of compare, because
 3 each one of the other two services basically disagreed
 4 with some of the findings. So we'd like to know directly
 5 from —
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I have only seen
 7 paraphrases of the report itself from an Army
 8 perspective, so I can't comment on it. But we will
 9 provide that for the record.
 10 MR. PANG: Barbara.
 11 MS. POPE: I'll pass. Go ahead.
 12 DR. SEGAL: Can you talk about the reasons
 13 for the choice of the three particular physical tasks
 14 that are used in the fitness test and why these three and
 15 not all the other that might be used to measure fitness
 16 and health?
 17 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Yes, ma'am. Yes,
 18 ma'am.
 19 Back in the early nineteen-eighties, they
 20 — basically three individuals were asked to come up with
 21 a test that could be done anywhere in the world without
 22 any equipment, that would measure upper body muscular
 23 strength endurance, aerobic capacity — Now, when we talk

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1 about upper body strength and endurance, we're also
 2 talking about mid-body also.
 3 So the tests that could be done without
 4 equipment anywhere, at any time, was the two-mile run,
 5 which we benchmarked off of the Cooper Clinic. And they
 6 put us in the "fair to good" category, which is good, and
 7 they have thirty years of experience — the Cooper Clinic
 8 — so benchmarking off of them is very good. And the
 9 Cooper Clinic is known worldwide.
 10 We went to the push-up event because
 11 that's upper body muscular strength and endurance. And
 12 you've heard other times they've used pull-ups. Some
 13 services use pull-ups, push-ups. Again, we're targeting
 14 upper body muscular strength and endurance. And then the
 15 sit-up was your mid-body — again, your mid-body strength
 16 and endurance.
 17 That was established in the nineteen-
 18 eighties. And the great news, which is so very true for
 19 the Army — and I'll say this up front — is that the
 20 level of fitness in the Army for both men and women, and
 21 specifically women, has increased drastically — and we
 22 have empirical data to show that — from the test that
 23 was developed in nineteen-eighties. It was developed at

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1 Fort Benning.
 2 And then, of course, as most of you may or
 3 may not know, we have a new test coming out, the same
 4 three-event test, in the very near future. We think
 5 February — which the easiest way to say it levels the
 6 playing field. It was gender- and age-normed, as it
 7 should be, because there are physiological differences
 8 between men and women, specifically when you look at
 9 upper body muscular strength endurance. You're looking
 10 at a 50 to 55 percent difference or an advantage for men
 11 over women when you talk about the push-up or the pull-up
 12 or that type of thing, and that's significant.
 13 So when we normed — when we normed this
 14 data, the thing that we feel most proud about is that the
 15 entire Army — men and women, different age groups —
 16 will either be performing at the sixtieth percent, which
 17 is the minimum required to wear the uniform in the United
 18 States Army — That is the minimum level. Sixty points
 19 in each of those events; equal points for equal level of
 20 effort. That's the new generation PT test that we're
 21 getting ready to do.
 22 And that follows the same lines with the
 23 maximums. The maximums in the past were set arbitrarily

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1 at forty points or forty repetitions higher or running
 2 merely four minutes faster, so the maximums had different
 3 percentiles spiked up and down which, in their — at that
 4 point, is an issue of leveling the playing field.
 5 So the three events have proven over
 6 thirteen years, based on the level of performance — has
 7 proven — We used to be at the eighth percentile in the
 8 minimum. That is now the tenth percentile, because the
 9 level of fitness, especially at the twenty-seven-year-old
 10 age group — The light switch has gone on; they
 11 understand that fitness is tied to everything they do in
 12 the Army.
 13 It's a part of the Army's life. It's tied
 14 to promotion, it's tied to advancement, and it's tied to
 15 what I call the lead-from-the-front attitude — the
 16 ethic, the ethos — and that's why our Army — when you
 17 hit the twenty-seven-year group, they continue to climb
 18 as opposed to go the other way.
 19 DR. SEGAL: Has there been any
 20 consideration of other events that would meet the
 21 requirement of measuring physical fitness and health?
 22 Have there been in the past any other measures that have
 23 been used or any that are considered?

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Let's make Dr.
 2 Tomasi cover — address that.
 3 DR. TOMASI: There certainly have been
 4 other events that have been considered. When Secretary
 5 Marsh asked these physical fitness experts to come
 6 together in the Arly House and locked the door and said,
 7 "Don't come out unless you come up with a PT test" — it
 8 wasn't quite that, but that's paraphrasing it — he gave
 9 them some criteria. The Colonel mentioned some of them.
 10 Number one — And I'm going to — no
 11 equipment. And that is the key, because when you start
 12 getting into pull-ups and other events, then you have a
 13 piece of equipment. Not that that's wrong; it's just
 14 that the guidance was no equipment. The second guidance
 15 was administered anywhere in the world, and then three
 16 additional guidances, of course, were the upper body,
 17 mid-body and aerobic assessment. And, also, an event or
 18 a test that both genders and all age groups can do.
 19 And so depending on who you talk to — and
 20 I've talked to two or three people who were in that room
 21 and, depending upon who you talk to, they claim credit
 22 for the three events, but somehow out of that room came
 23 these three events. And when you consider those six

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1 criteria, it's the best possible test under those
 2 criteria.
 3 DR. SEGAL: Now, if you were to start
 4 anew, forget the test that you have now — And I
 5 understand the reason why it's been developed and your
 6 experience with it. Given all your experience and all
 7 that you know and all that you've read and the studies
 8 you've seen, if you were to start now to develop a
 9 measure of physical fitness to be used Army-wide for men
 10 and women — without necessarily the restriction that it
 11 couldn't have any equipment, let's say — are there other
 12 things that — other events or ways of going about
 13 deciding on other events or perhaps to measure other
 14 physical capabilities that you would in fact look at?
 15 COLONEL LeBOEUF: Sir, I'll talk about
 16 that.
 17 First of all, there are five components of
 18 physical fitness: cardiorespiratory endurance, muscular
 19 strength, muscular endurance, flexibility and body
 20 composition. So when you look at the components of
 21 fitness, there's certain things you're limited to.
 22 Probably the one thing that we talk about a lot but we do
 23 not test is flexibility. But when you're going to

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1 measure flexibility, you're going to need equipment.
 2 And there are a couple of common
 3 flexibility tests administered for school-aged children
 4 or high school children: the sit-and-reach test or a test
 5 called the trunk rotation test. But again, both of those
 6 tests need equipment.
 7 But I think, you know, having been around
 8 for twenty-two years and seen various fitness tests, this
 9 is a — For ease of administration, which I do think is
 10 important for commanders, especially now with all they're
 11 given, it's a test that people can read FM 2120, the
 12 fitness manual, and understand the standard. It's
 13 nothing that's very convoluted. They can administer the
 14 test to a standard and drive on.
 15 I honestly think when you look at the
 16 three components that it does test, it's a good test.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I'd just sort of
 18 give you a perspective. I've probably been through five
 19 or four different kinds of tests during my period of
 20 time. Everything from throwing hand grenades to doing an
 21 alligator crawl, and then an inverted crawl because the
 22 alligator crawl got too hard, to ladders that you went
 23 down.

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1 All of those — One-mile runs, two-mile
 2 runs, combinations and various permutations — run-dodge-
 3 and-jump, which was very, very equipment.
 4 All of those had major disadvantages to
 5 them depending on body style and shape. I used to always
 6 max the ladders. And it was supposed to be an upper body
 7 strength, but light lower torso and long arms, became —
 8 it became a coordination drill for me as opposed to a
 9 strength drill. If you weighed 180 or 190 pounds and
 10 were short, it certainly was a strength test.
 11 And so over the last thirty-some years, I
 12 think this is the truest measure of fitness with a
 13 combination ease of administering the test that's out
 14 there.
 15 DR. SEGAL: So you're saying that body
 16 size and type affected the performance on some of these
 17 other —
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: That's right.
 19 DR. SEGAL: Doesn't body size — Don't
 20 body size and type affect performance on the current
 21 three tests that you have?
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Probably the
 23 only one, I would think, would be running, wouldn't it?

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1 COLONEL CELLUCCI: The running is the
 2 biggest one.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Yeah, the
 4 running is the big —
 5 COLONEL CELLUCCI: The heavier folks do
 6 not score as well as folks that are lean.
 7 DR. TOMASI: There are physiological
 8 differences even within the gender itself. I mean, some
 9 people are tall and some people are short.
 10 Now, I mean, that's not earth-shattering,
 11 and certainly different leverons, when you get into
 12 biomechanics, et cetera, there is an effect on that. But
 13 when asked to come up with a Physical Fitness Test that
 14 can be administered with the ease with which this one is
 15 administered, there is none.
 16 I mean, I'll kid you a little bit. I
 17 mean, we could run treadmills, 490,000 treadmills twice a
 18 year, but you couldn't do that. And so this is —
 19 because of the statistical correlation, which I know
 20 you're a statistician, there's a high correlation between
 21 max VO2 and a two-mile run and it can be administered
 22 anywhere in the world.
 23 DR. SEGAL: One of the things that's in

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1 this report, the GAO report, and it's something that I've
2 seen in talking with troops over the years, is that there
3 is — there's a perception of inequity because of the
4 gender-norming. There is never as much complaint about
5 the age-norming as there is about the gender-norming, and
6 I think some of it comes from the recognition that there
7 were differences among men and among women according to
8 things like height and weight and body type and shape.
9 Has there been any consideration to try to
10 norm the performance standards not just for gender and
11 age, but for other body characteristics? If you're
12 trying to measure fitness, what's fit for someone who's
13 six-two might be quite different from someone who's five-
14 four. And I'm talking both about men who are within —
15 who are at those heights.

16 And so for some of the performances, it's
17 going to be more difficult for people with differing body
18 types and heights and weights, too, even though they're
19 fit by a criterion that you would all agree if you had
20 good measures, if you had the ideal measures, that you
21 can't use because they're not perhaps as practical.

22 Wouldn't it make sense to have some
23 norming done on the basis of those other characteristics

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1 meeting the minimum requirements for physical fitness as
2 measured by the Physical Fitness Test of 150.
3 So what you've just sort of laid out very
4 clearly is how we get to the point of testing.
5 Now, the other thing I would tell you is
6 that you won't see METL-based or combat-based or combat-
7 focused physical training in basic training. What we're
8 trying to do is provide a baseline physically fit soldier
9 to the field so that the field now can start training to
10 the mission requirements of the unit that soldier is
11 assigned to.

12 And that's not MOS-specific. I mean, if
13 you're in an infantry unit, there are mechanics; there's
14 cooks; there's a whole range of MOS's that could have to
15 have the same mission requirements as the infantry and
16 that is not — and that would not be across all those
17 units. Those are not age-normed. They are not gender-
18 normed or they are not MOS-normed. In that unit, you
19 have to meet the standards set for that unit.

20 DR. SEGAL: So commanders set some of the
21 requirements for their own units?

22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Yes, ma'am.

23 DR. SEGAL: Are they free to set whatever

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1 of individuals as opposed to gender-norming?
2 DR. TOMASI: I think you've got to go back
3 to the root of what we're doing here, and what we're
4 looking for is METL-based physical training. This APFT
5 is just a snapshot of what is going on in the physical
6 fitness development. Units must train for the mission
7 and their METL, as we call it. You've probably heard the
8 term: mission-essential task force.

9 That's what physical fitness and physical
10 training needs to be directed toward, not training for
11 the APFT. The APFT is the snapshot, dipstick, whatever
12 we want to call it, but we must train for that mission
13 of that unit and they must train together in a cohesive
14 environment.

15 DR. CANTOR: Mady, can I just follow
16 something for a point of clarification?

17 You're emphasizing here the Physical
18 Fitness Test. My memory of boot camp that we went to was
19 that, in fact, you did a lot of training that was in fact
20 ability grouped, which would take into account the body
21 shape and height, et cetera. Even though you are gender-
22 norming here, that, in fact, the on-the-ground training,
23 so to speak, really is geared to —

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1 requirement they want?
2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Yes, they are.
3 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Yes, they are.
4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: That's part of
5 the assessment of how they're going to accomplish their
6 mission. Clearly those are reviewed. You brief your
7 METL to your next higher commander. Your subordinate
8 commanders take their METL from your METL as
9 implementing, and so you would not have a wild-eyed
10 heretic out there that was making unjustified claims of
11 fitness.

12 But, for example, I would tell you that
13 the battle-focus fitness requirements of a Ranger
14 battalion is different than a transportation battalion in
15 terms of —

16 DR. SEGAL: I don't want to dominate this,
17 so if you have some follow-up —

18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: — degree of
19 effort, road marching, heavy strenuous kinds of work.

20 DR. SEGAL: Have there been systematic
21 task analyses done for MOS's within units of what kinds
22 of performances are required on a day-to-day basis, both
23 physical and other, within MOS's in units, or does it

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Let me see if I
2 can address. We're talking about a testing standard and
3 a training methodology.

4 DR. CANTOR: Yeah. I mean...

5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Ability groups
6 is a training methodology, because as I'm sure we will
7 get to here today, people come into our forts at a much
8 different — wide range of fitness levels, from doing
9 almost — having no fitness level to being very fit.

10 So that to ensure that nobody gets held
11 back because of either of those fitness levels, for run
12 groups you will go to ability groups, and so you'll end
13 up with — In fact, in the start of basic training, there
14 is either four or five ability groups normally, the fifth
15 group being some very — You'd have some overweight or
16 bumping up against green weights. You put them on
17 tracks. Probably the last two ability groups, you put
18 them on tracks for the first two weeks. You don't let
19 them get on hard pavement.

20 What you're doing there is trying to make
21 progress without injuring, and providing a way of moving
22 up into — By the end of the basic training, they're all
23 at least in three ability groups and ideally they're all

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1 come from commanders' expectations?
2 DR. KNAPIK: Well, there is a regulation
3 or it's an AR, 611-201, that describes the physical
4 requirements for different MOS's. And those are not
5 based on — they're not based on any particular criteria.
6 Basically, there's individuals out in the schools. A lot
7 of times they're the officers or the NCO's in the schools
8 and they say, "Okay. For this particular MOS, what tasks
9 are required," and they say what those tasks are and
10 that's what go into the regulations.

11 DR. SEGAL: So you haven't done systematic
12 task analyses filled out —

13 DR. KNAPIK: Not systematic — No.

14 DR. SEGAL: — by incumbents who — or
15 observation of what they're actually performing on the
16 job.

17 DR. KNAPIK: That's correct. It's based
18 on how experienced —

19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: What is done,
20 however, though, there is a — that systematic task
21 analysis is done for what tasks we want to train inside
22 of Advanced Individual Training. The field comes back
23 into Fort Benning, for example — say, if you're taking

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1 infantry — and the subject matter experts, field unit
 2 representation, they will go through the list, take the
 3 amount of time available inside of Advanced Individual
 4 Training and construct a list of tasks that the field and
 5 the proponent for infantry thinks is essential for the
 6 infantryman to be experienced in given the amount of time
 7 that's in that course to turn out the best possible
 8 infantryman.
 9 All of those have physical components to
 10 them, whether it be rappelling — you have to lift a
 11 thirty-foot piece of rope to get it into a break position
 12 — whether it be road marching, road marching to certain
 13 standards. Those are all physical requirements that you
 14 have to pass to become an infantryman and pass the
 15 Advanced Individual Training portion of that OSUT.
 16 All of the schools do that kind of
 17 analysis because that forms the basis of what you're
 18 producing out of the school and sending to the field in
 19 terms of the specific MOS's. All of that has a physical
 20 component to it and you have to demonstrate the ability
 21 to do that to be successful inside the MOS.
 22 COLONEL CELLUCCI: We also have — If I
 23 may, sir.

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1 DR. KNAPIK: "VO2 max" is the ability of
 2 your body to consume and utilize oxygen. What you do is
 3 you put someone on a treadmill and you progressively
 4 increase the load until you find what their maximum
 5 capability is. And the higher their "VO2 max" is, the
 6 higher their endurance capability in a laboratory.
 7 And then we've also validated the push-ups
 8 in factor analytic studies against other measures of
 9 upper body strength, and the same thing with the sit-ups.
 10 I can provide you with those studies if you want those.
 11 DR. SEGAL: I would like to see those if I
 12 could.
 13 DR. KNAPIK: Okay.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: Let me — Before we pass it
 15 on to Ron, I want to find out one thing about Mady's
 16 query.
 17 Did the Army have something in the
 18 seventies in which they did what Mady said — a physical
 19 criterion test matched to MOS groupings, and they did it
 20 by gender — and somehow that disappeared? Was such a
 21 program —
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I'm not an
 23 expert in that, but I —

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1 We also have Master Fitness Trainers.
 2 That's a very, very successful Army program. I even
 3 briefed it to Brazil — the country of Brazil — and they
 4 liked the battle-focus piece and they liked understanding
 5 what a PT test is for, which I think we've clearly
 6 highlighted. They liked the battle-focus PT process, and
 7 this was the leadership of the Brazilian army in there
 8 and they — What we like about the Master Fitness Trainer
 9 Course — and of course, we'd like it to be even longer
 10 than it is, but it's a two-week course where they learn
 11 exercise physiology; they learn how to build programs so
 12 that we don't injure soldiers; they work with that
 13 commander — that becomes that commander's special
 14 subject matter expert — to build programs to meet their
 15 mission requirements.
 16 And that has been a very popular program
 17 that we have in the Army and that's another useful tool
 18 that a commander has to say, "Okay. Build me a training
 19 program that has the physical components in it that are
 20 going to make my unit successful."
 21 DR. SEGAL: I have other questions but I'm
 22 going to pass it along to —
 23 DR. TOMASI: Well, let me just — Can I —

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1 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Yeah, we're not aware
 2 of that.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I think there
 4 was some exploration. But the problem is, is that I
 5 think there are like 277 individual MOS's, and it became
 6 tremendously unmanageable to be able to establish the
 7 standards for that amount of MOS's by gender, by age, or
 8 by component of that MOS.
 9 DR. SEGAL: I think what you're talking
 10 about Charlie, was the Women in the Army Policy Review
 11 Group tried to establish physical strength requirements
 12 for jobs — how much heavy lifting was involved —
 13 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 14 DR. SEGAL: — and such. And they went to
 15 the proponent schools and asked them how much —
 16 MR. PANG: Yeah. Yeah.
 17 DR. SEGAL: If that's what you're talking
 18 about.
 19 MR. PANG: Okay.
 20 DR. SEGAL: But that is not the
 21 methodology of the systematic task analysis because it
 22 tended to be the senior NCO's at the schools who were
 23 responding and they were certainly not responding without

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1 One thing. You might have written this down when your
 2 task analysis question — All of these are task analyses
 3 (Indicating). So when we agree by saying that there is
 4 no task analysis, that's not correct. All these people
 5 pointed out that there is task analysis.
 6 DR. SEGAL: It's a certain kind of task
 7 analysis.
 8 DR. TOMASI: Yes.
 9 DR. KNAPIK: Well, it's not criterion-
 10 based task analysis —
 11 DR. SEGAL: Exactly.
 12 DR. KNAPIK: — which is what she's
 13 talking about. Yeah.
 14 DR. SEGAL: Yeah. Exactly.
 15 DR. KNAPIK: But let me address one other
 16 point that you brought up earlier about if we would
 17 readdress the APFT. What the APFT measures, we've also
 18 validated those. The two-mile run time is validated
 19 against VO2 max. The correlations are around .8. And
 20 the push-ups is a measure —
 21 DR. MOSKOS: What is "VO2 max"?
 22 DR. KNAPIK: Pardon?
 23 DR. MOSKOS: What is "VO2 max"?

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1 regard to the issue of gender-integration in their MOS's.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: That would be interesting.
 3 That exists somewhere, though?
 4 DR. KNAPIK: Yeah. There is — ARIEM did
 5 the study. It seems to me, though, it was in the late
 6 seventies and basically what they did is they broke — as
 7 I recall, they broke — There were two levels that they
 8 looked at — strength and endurance — and they broke
 9 strength down into three components and endurance down
 10 into three components, then they classified MOS's into
 11 those nine cells.
 12 But I can get you that study also. I've
 13 got that.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My
 16 questions really come out of the recommendations of the
 17 1995 Army PFT Update Survey and the final concluding
 18 paragraphs, and they're just for my own edification of
 19 trying to understand.
 20 But the first one, you mentioned the
 21 physical fitness trainers. Where are they in each of the
 22 Army's organizations, where do they fit from a TO&E
 23 standpoint, that sort of thing?

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1 COLONEL CELLUCCI: I understand. Right
 2 now — We're trying to establish it. But right now,
 3 where we'd like to be is one per company-size unit in the
 4 Army. And there's approximately, as I understand, in the
 5 total Army, about 5,000 companies.
 6 We have — My school trains about a
 7 thousand a year. We have just started a new initiative
 8 that will, in the — training Master Fitness Trainers by
 9 drill sergeants in the drill sergeant school, that also
 10 will bring out about a thousand.
 11 Colonel LeBoeuf has a Master Fitness
 12 Trainer at the United States Military Academy. We also
 13 have the Master Fitness Trainer at the Sergeant Majors
 14 Academy.
 15 The person that would benefit most
 16 probably from it is that drill sergeant or that — we
 17 would say E-6/E-7. They're the ones typically that run
 18 the PT.
 19 That's where that program is.
 20 Now, where it's going is the Vice Chief of
 21 Staff of the Army has said that he would like to see the
 22 Army have and designate it.
 23 Now the good news. Three weeks ago, the

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1 ASI, which is a six-pappa for the officer and pappa-five
 2 for the NCO —
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Additional Skill
 4 Identifier, ASI.
 5 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Right, Additional Skill
 6 Identifier — was reinstated, and that is very good for
 7 the school, which means that we need to track the ones we
 8 have in the Army now so that they are being used for the
 9 education that we give them.
 10 So that's the goal. Are we there right
 11 now? We are not. So you may have in one division
 12 twenty-six, in another division you may have thirteen.
 13 That's the reality of where we are today, but where we
 14 want to go is one assigned per company-size unit.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What kind
 16 of direction do commanders then in fact receive
 17 concerning these Master Fitness Trainers and the use of
 18 them in comparison to what their normal job is and being
 19 the Master Fitness Trainer?
 20 COLONEL CELLUCCI: I understand. Of late,
 21 we also have what we call Master Gunnery that are in the
 22 Armor Corps and also in the Infantry, and those people
 23 help with gunnery and with RTF training. The Master

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1 Fitness Trainer is the same type of individual. They
 2 become the expert on building a unit PT program so that
 3 they can be successful in combat, whether it's in a
 4 Ranger — And right now, the smart commanders — I having
 5 been one — the smart commanders will in fact —
 6 (UNKNOWN): Commander, or smart commander?
 7 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Well...
 8 (UNKNOWN): Did you record that, General?
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Not so fast
 10 there, big guy.
 11 COLONEL CELLUCCI: The smart commanders
 12 use the assets that are made available to them and,
 13 unfortunately, for some reason some commanders have not
 14 used them. They have not said, "Where is my Master
 15 Gunner? Where is my Master Fitness Trainer? Bring them
 16 into the training meetings so that they can do what
 17 they've been trained to do." And they do it very
 18 successfully if the commanders use them.
 19 But that, again, is — We're heading
 20 there. We're not there yet, but we're heading in that
 21 direction.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Let me add one
 23 more thing to that, and that would be that the additional

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1 benefit of Master Fitness Trainers is for selected and
 2 focused training programs for specific requirements.
 3 They can build programs — wellness programs for soldiers
 4 that are bumping up against weight limitations. They can
 5 — They do an awful lot of good work with designing
 6 specialized training programs for training while
 7 recovering from injury. And so there's a wide range of
 8 abilities for those Master Fitness Trainers inside the
 9 organizations for high payout.
 10 We could never make the numbers and get
 11 them all in the right places with the output of the
 12 school, and so that was one of the impetuses to go to —
 13 into the drill sergeant schools; because you now have a
 14 drill sergeant after two years that's going to go back to
 15 the field with the same kind of skills, having utilized
 16 them very, very intensively for two years. And so we
 17 think that's a positive thing.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My follow-
 19 up or final one — and it's just — you need to tell me
 20 why this is, if you will. In your study, it indicates
 21 that you found basically the career soldiers appear
 22 satisfactory while fitness in younger soldiers is not;
 23 however, these young soldiers failing the APFT in

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1 alarming — It would appear that we're — based on what
 2 I've read, we're demanding more of the seasoned soldier
 3 than we are of the new soldier who's coming aboard — he
 4 or she, age eighteen to twenty-five. And if that's so,
 5 why is that so?
 6 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Okay. The fallacy with
 7 the first test, other than the fact that the sixty-point
 8 requirement — this is back to 1980 — that was based on
 9 soldier performance and that's good, and that was the
 10 level based on norming and — age- and gender-norming
 11 then — that was good. Sixty points in each event, you
 12 would stay in the Army. And if you continue to score
 13 sixty points in each event, you were fine.
 14 What we found out is that the Army does
 15 not try to score at the sixty-point level. They really
 16 try to score as close to the 300-point level — and
 17 commanders, obviously, and senior NCO's, are directing
 18 them toward a higher level of fitness. "We want to be
 19 all we can be."
 20 And the fallacy or the part of the test
 21 that we changed — Because in 1992, then General Sullivan
 22 said, "Look at the test and see if it measures what it
 23 should measure," and then the Vice said, "And

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1 specifically look at the women's portion and see if it is
 2 — "there's equal points for equal effort."
 3 What we found out was that by merely
 4 adding forty reps or running four minutes faster, that
 5 that made it offset. It made it — Some people —
 6 Example. The seventeen-to-twenty-one-year-old male, at
 7 11.54, which was merely four minutes faster than 15.54,
 8 was running at the 99th percentile. That's why only one
 9 soldier on our 1995 study — one soldier, probably a
 10 track star — ran it in 11.54, because they are at the
 11 99th percentile, while the age group of thirty-seven-to-
 12 forty-one — and they've been in the Army for a while now
 13 and they're performing still very well — they were
 14 running four minutes faster at the 82nd percentile, which
 15 means that — And we knew for a long time — You have a
 16 lot of folks sitting at this table right now — I'm
 17 forty-six and I'm still running a twelve-minute two
 18 miles.
 19 Now, I know I'm a statistical outlier. I
 20 know that. But there's a lot of commanders, senior
 21 officers, senior NCO's, that have continued to ramp up.
 22 I would tell you, I know the General runs very fast. But
 23 it's a status of the Army fitness level that has ramped

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1 up over time, over the thirteen years.
 2 So by everybody performing at the 90th
 3 percentile to get a hundred points, and then filtering
 4 down to everybody performing at the eighth percentile to
 5 get sixty points, now you have equal points for equal
 6 effort by both men and women and then among age groups.
 7 And then we validated that test with a
 8 field trial and it validated that we had a test now that
 9 leveled the playing field, both at the "mins" and the
 10 "maxes" and everywhere in-between. That's why we feel
 11 very positive about that.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Let me offer you
 13 one more observation. And that is, is that we have
 14 inculcated fitness into the culture of the United States
 15 Army. And if you look at what comes in the front door at
 16 any single day, the Army has got no requirement — no
 17 physical requirement other than to be sound, meet medical
 18 requirements, to come in. There is the fitness training
 19 and basic training, improved and enhanced and raised in
 20 AIT, and then soldiers go into units.
 21 And I think what you see is a progression
 22 of fitness over the life of a soldier; that probably by
 23 mid-twenties, you now have five years of hard, tough

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1 fitness training that starts reflecting itself very, very
 2 accurately in physical fitness tests or any kind of
 3 measurements that you want.
 4 I think that's just sort of a nature of
 5 the increased culture that has happened.
 6 DR. SEGAL: Do you think it's —
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: That culture has
 8 not always been in our Army.
 9 DR. SEGAL: Do you think it's the
 10 increased fitness of individuals or the lack of
 11 retention, both voluntary and involuntary, of those who
 12 don't meet the requirements?
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I think there's
 14 a little bit of that, but our retention is very, very
 15 good among NCO levels right now. I think it is a clear
 16 recognition that career soldiers have to stay in shape,
 17 required to stay in shape.
 18 And I think it's much broader than just
 19 fitness. Nutrition. Substance abuse is down in our
 20 Army. I mean, in 1980, as a battalion commander, I could
 21 tell you who probably was on drugs and who was not on
 22 drugs by how — by the four-mile run that we were out on
 23 every Friday morning, and that's who you kept an eye on.

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1 That's who, you know — We didn't target, but that's who
 2 you checked on.
 3 So now substance abuse is down. We do
 4 stress management stuff. Leaders understand that an
 5 awful lot more than they ever did.
 6 Dental wellness. I mean, ten, fifteen
 7 years ago, we didn't even understand dental wellness as
 8 an Army. Today, starting in basic training and right
 9 into AIT, every soldier meets deployable requirements by
 10 the time they get out of the Initial Entry Training now.
 11 That is something that has been within the first five
 12 years.
 13 And so all those kind of things have
 14 improved. Anti-tobacco, tobacco cessation, clearly
 15 that's a wellness and health and fitness issue.
 16 DR. SEGAL: Have you looked at rates of
 17 smoking?
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Pardon?
 19 DR. SEGAL: Have you looked at rates of
 20 smoking among the soldiers at different levels?
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Rates have gone
 22 — I can't give you empirical data.
 23 DR. TOMASI: It's about leveled off. It

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1 dropped and it's about leveled off over the last two
 2 years.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: What percentage?
 4 Do you have any idea?
 5 DR. TOMASI: High twenties. 27, 28, in
 6 that percent. Enlisted mostly. But it's in the high
 7 twenties.
 8 DR. SEGAL: How long has it been the
 9 policy — I know, I'm out of turn here. I just — How
 10 long has it been the policy not to allow smoking in basic
 11 training?
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I'd have to give
 13 you — I can go back five years. I know it's been that
 14 long.
 15 MAJOR SNYDER: '86.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: '86.
 17 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, not only
 18 has physical fitness increased, so has intelligence,
 19 because in 1987 the Master Fitness Course was ten weeks
 20 and they're doing now in two weeks what they did to us in
 21 ten weeks.
 22 DR. TOMASI: It was only four weeks but it
 23 probably felt like ten weeks, didn't it?

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1 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Well, they really walk
 2 out of that class — they walk out with heads this big.
 3 They think that it's —
 4 DR. TOMASI: He was a prime student.
 5 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Yeah.
 6 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: My question
 7 has to do with the new standards that were delayed going
 8 to the field. And there's a lot of conjecture and
 9 discussion in the press and in people's minds about why
 10 they're delayed, and to be perfectly honest, many
 11 attribute it to the "female" issue. That the standards
 12 are raised so high that there was a lot of concern in the
 13 field.
 14 So comment on that, please.
 15 COLONEL CELLUCCI: The absolute great news
 16 is the women have said nothing except "Let's get on with
 17 it. This is the right thing to do." Let me tell you
 18 what happened.
 19 When the implementation — On the 8th of
 20 October of last year, I briefed the Chief of Staff of the
 21 Army and he at that point, after the briefing, said,
 22 "Approved." He said — And that was put out in an
 23 implementation message to the Army, saying that "I have

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1 approved the implementation of the new standards as of 1
 2 October, 1998."
 3 On the second page of that memo was a
 4 statement that was made that said, "I would like MACOM
 5 commanders" — major commanders — "that have any input
 6 on the new standards because we recommended to the Chief
 7 of Staff that we would allow the Army to try on the new
 8 standards for a year and see what they think," and he
 9 said that makes sense.
 10 So the Army did that and we waited for
 11 feedback to come back from the MACOM's to the Physical
 12 Fitness School. We received two from different MACOM's.
 13 I'll leave them unnamed. But they came back. One
 14 basically said, "Roger, let's get on with it." The other
 15 one said, "I have some issues." I briefed the MACOM's
 16 personally. And after I briefed them, they said, "Got
 17 it. I understand."
 18 And so, coincidentally, we could not print
 19 the new APFT cards with the new standards until everybody
 20 in the Army was convinced we were doing the right thing.
 21 We have just printed 1.8 million cards which will go to
 22 the total Army, and they want to make sure that every —
 23 Not VIA, because we had a backdrop. The backdrop was to

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1 go to a web site and the fitness school put that on it.
 2 But the leadership of the Army — and
 3 rightfully so — said, “No, we don’t want to do that. We
 4 will go ahead and hold off the new standards until every
 5 soldier has one in his or her hand.”
 6 So what normally would take many, many
 7 months or many months to in fact print 1.8 million cards
 8 took how many weeks?
 9 DR. TOMASI: About two and a half or three
 10 weeks.
 11 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Two and a half, three
 12 weeks. They have been printed and they are being
 13 distributed. We received our packet last week.
 14 So that is clearly the answer to that
 15 question.
 16 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: So just to
 17 follow-up and make sure there’s no —
 18 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Conjecture. That’s
 19 right.
 20 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Right. It was
 21 totally administrative in nature?
 22 COLONEL CELLUCCI: That is correct.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Well, not

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1 entirely administrative. There was one commander that
 2 had concerns over the standards and the impact on active
 3 and reserve soldiers.
 4 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Entry into
 5 schools that required passing the test prior to entry.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I think that was
 7 one of his concerns. He has now agreed that the
 8 standards are right. I think he probably has some
 9 reservations but has concurred in the thing, and so we’re
 10 going to implement. Probably 1 February, as he said, we
 11 will — the message will come out. Sooner if we can get
 12 the cards all out in everybody’s hands, but I think 1
 13 February at least we will see the implementation of the
 14 new PT standards.
 15 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you,
 16 sir.
 17 COLONEL CELLUCCI: The feedback, just as a
 18 last point, is that what we did receive over the year is
 19 that there was only a six-point difference between the
 20 old test and the new test. And I would surmise — and
 21 that was six points less —
 22 DR. SEGAL: You mean across individuals?
 23 COLONEL CELLUCCI: The Army average —

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1 DR. SEGAL: Average.
 2 COLONEL CELLUCCI: The Army average today
 3 for both men and women — and he has the exact numbers —
 4 is 238. We call that a “B” level of fitness. You look
 5 at 270 and that’s in any level of fitness. And at 238 —
 6 So they’ll come in at, let’s say, 232 as an Army average.
 7 This is what we’ve been hearing. Once they train to the
 8 new standard — Again, I think that it’s going to
 9 probably be elevated.
 10 So I don’t know if you had those two —
 11 DR. TOMASI: Well, in your package you
 12 have some slides. And at the tail end of the slides,
 13 maybe slide 14 or 15 — Let’s get there and I’ll tell you
 14 exactly which one it is. You’ll have some information —
 15 It’s slide 13 and slide 14.
 16 You’ll see that we put in the average at
 17 — It’s at 238. The new average under the new standards
 18 is about 233, 232, decimal points. So that — And the
 19 only difference between the gender is a decimal point.
 20 One is 238.2 and the other is 237.9, so — which is
 21 insignificant.
 22 COLONEL CELLUCCI: And the interesting
 23 point is that many of the minimums and maximums in the

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1 running, especially for the women, have been increased
 2 because they needed to be. The women — We have not
 3 given credit to the great advances.
 4 Now, the analogy I use is that back
 5 thirteen years ago you had — in the United States, you
 6 had about 300,000 women involved in vigorous activities,
 7 sweating-type things. Today it’s 3 million and it’s
 8 soaring. That’s what’s happened. So the run times in
 9 the Army are reflective of what’s going on in the United
 10 States right now and the advances that women have made in
 11 not only the United States, but the Army.
 12 MR. MOORE: Tom Moore. Thanks for coming.
 13 I would just like to point out for the
 14 record that Colonel Cellucci is a graduate of The
 15 Citadel, so it’s perfectly self-evident to me that he
 16 would have been a smart commander, not to mention a
 17 statistical outlier.
 18 COLONEL CELLUCCI: I guess I’ll live with
 19 that one.
 20 DR. SEGAL: Guess who’s a Citadel
 21 graduate.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: And he can run
 23 fast, huh?

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1 DR. TOMASI: Real fast. I remember about
 2 a year ago we had this discussion also, sir.
 3 MR. MOORE: I have two questions. One is
 4 — and they’re not related. One sort of calls for a
 5 subjective use, so I’ll put that to General Bolt.
 6 There is — I think, at least — a
 7 misconception today about the level of fitness that’s
 8 required to be a soldier in the “modern army.” Very
 9 often you hear this debate that, well, today’s military
 10 is so highly automated and mechanized and modern warfare
 11 is essentially a push-button exercise.
 12 I’d like your views on that as Deputy
 13 TRADOC Commander, maybe based on actual experiences from
 14 missions in the —
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Well, I would
 16 just tell you that, if anything, I think today’s demands
 17 for physical fitness, endurance, stress, wellness, are
 18 higher today than they’ve ever been. We’ve got less
 19 divisions. It’s a deployable Army.
 20 You know, years ago you sat in Europe with
 21 four divisions, 230,000 man force, never went anywhere,
 22 waited for the Russians to come across the Folder Gap.
 23 The demands — you know, you had to get to your track,

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1 you had to load up your guns and your ammunition. But
 2 that was middle sixties I was there and that was not a
 3 vigorous, healthy Army at that time in my opinion.
 4 Today’s demands are much, much different.
 5 The missions are different. The rapidity of missions are
 6 different. The demands that you have on yourself I think
 7 are much higher. I mean, all you have to do is look at
 8 the Gulf War and the physical demands and the stress
 9 demands associated with deployment into the Gulf War.
 10 When I got there in the first week of
 11 September, I was down for two days just because of the
 12 jet lag and the heat, and I was in great physical shape.
 13 But we had people road marching; we had people working
 14 the battle-focus training at that point in time, staying
 15 in shape, managing stress, managing boredom sometimes,
 16 managing excitement sometimes.
 17 So I would tell you that the requirements
 18 on the force are even greater than they’ve ever been
 19 before. We move so much more rapid; the demands of the
 20 missions are so much more diverse; our training
 21 methodologies have become much, much more rigorous.
 22 I mean, the fact is, is that an event at
 23 the National Training Center is as close to combat and

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1 probably is tougher in terms of the stress on your body,
 2 the rapidity of the operations. You know, I think it's
 3 been said a couple times that — by junior leaders, "The
 4 Gulf War was easy. I've been to the National Training
 5 Center."
 6 And so I think that all goes to requiring
 7 a more fit soldier and a soldier that takes care of
 8 themselves over time. We've done just an awful lot of
 9 work and I'll hit a couple of them for you if you'd like,
 10 but this is a healthier Army than it's ever been before,
 11 in addition to being a more fit Army. But it doesn't
 12 happen the first day you show up. It happens over time,
 13 over the life of the time that you're in the service.
 14 MR. MOORE: Thank you.
 15 Second question, fairly specific: do you
 16 have any — I guess you do track this data. What's the
 17 most frequent injury among trainees in basic training?
 18 DR. KNAPIK: Well, the most — Okay. It's
 19 very difficult to define a single injury. Generally when
 20 an individual comes in, they're seen by a medic or a
 21 physician's assistant and a lot of times the only thing
 22 we get to know is that they have musculoskeletal pain.
 23 So we know that there's pain in either of

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1 DR. SEGAL: How about cold?
 2 DR. KNAPIK: Cold? Now, I'm not as
 3 familiar with that literature as I am with the heat
 4 literature. There's a lot more work that's been done in
 5 the heat arena.
 6 DR. SEGAL: Yeah, that's true. Actually
 7 —
 8 MR. MOORE: Most of — Most of the basic
 9 training is in —
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Most of the
 11 basic training centers are in southern locations and
 12 injuries do not occur because of cold. Discomfort comes
 13 with cold. But I don't — in three and a half years at
 14 Jackson, I don't ever remember a cold injury occurring.
 15 DR. KNAPIK: Yeah. And I can tell you
 16 that, you know, it's very easy to adjust in the cold.
 17 You just put on more clothes. You know, it's much more
 18 difficult to adjust in the heat.
 19 MR. MOORE: Thanks.
 20 DR. CANTOR: I just had a simple follow-
 21 up, actually, from an earlier conversation on — I was
 22 just curious as to whether you think the ability grouping
 23 training has led to a reduction in the perception — or

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1 the — you know, the muscles or some portion of the
 2 skeleton, but we don't diagnose it much beyond that. And
 3 so the largest category we have is musculoskeletal pain,
 4 and then the individual is turned around.
 5 If you look, that accounts for probably 40
 6 percent of all the injuries in basic training.
 7 MR. MOORE: Is that basically lower
 8 extremities?
 9 DR. KNAPIK: Approximately 80 percent of
 10 all injuries in basic training are lower extremity.
 11 Now, if you ask me for the — Okay. If
 12 you go beyond musculoskeletal pain, what's the second
 13 biggest diagnosis, it's probably fasciitis tendonitis,
 14 which means inflammations of the tendons and the fascia,
 15 the area surrounding the muscle.
 16 MR. MOORE: Any data — I'm sorry.
 17 DR. MOSKOS: I've just got a real quickie.
 18 MR. MOORE: Sure.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Are there gender implications
 20 on your — what you just said? These types of injuries?
 21 DR. KNAPIK: Generally the — as far as
 22 the men and women are concerned, both the men and the
 23 women, approximately 80 percent of the injuries are in

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1 misperception, if you will — that there is an equality
 2 because of gender-norming in fitness.
 3 I mean, I understand that gender-norming
 4 is indeed not — is leveling the playing field, but from
 5 the soldier's perception, it's — we often hear that
 6 people — that male soldiers feel they're better trained
 7 than female soldiers because of differences in the test.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Let me give her
 9 the first shot at that one.
 10 COLONEL LeBOEUF: I think the key word in
 11 that is ability grouping. It has nothing to do with
 12 gender. At the Military Academy, when the new cadets
 13 come in, we give them the two-mile run and then we put
 14 them into one of four ability groups. A good commander,
 15 in his or her unit, is going to have ability group runs,
 16 recognizing the physiological difference —
 17 DR. CANTOR: No, no, no. I understand
 18 that. What I'm saying is does the fact that you train in
 19 ability groups then carry over to the perception they
 20 take away when you do the testing, which is indeed
 21 gender-normed? Does that help get over the bias that —
 22 or misperception —
 23 COLONEL LeBOEUF: I think it does because

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1 the lower body and women tend to get more stress
 2 fractures than men do. The stress fracture incidence in
 3 basic training for men in the last study we just
 4 completed in May of '98 was about 3 percent; so about 3
 5 percent of the men got stress fractures and about 8
 6 percent of the women got stress fractures.
 7 So the distribution in terms of the upper
 8 and lower body are approximately the same. And if you
 9 look at specific injuries, yeah, you know, they are
 10 distributed differently.
 11 MR. MOORE: Any similar data on the
 12 ability of male and female recruits to withstand extreme
 13 heat and humidity? Heat injuries, in other words.
 14 DR. KNAPIK: Actually, women tend to
 15 tolerate heat stress a little bit better than men. When
 16 I say a little bit better, what do I mean by that? Well,
 17 they seem to be more efficient sweaters, you know, so
 18 they can cool the body a little bit better than men. How
 19 much more? Well, practically, it doesn't make much
 20 difference.
 21 So in terms of women's ability to
 22 dissipate heat, in men, for all practical purposes, it's
 23 about the same; maybe favoring the women a little bit.

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1 it allows people to be their physical best. They're not
 2 being held back. And it's the recognition that some
 3 people are faster than other people and that's okay, but,
 4 you know — And we have the — I'm sure you're familiar
 5 with the unit runs that people have, and I always say
 6 unit runs are great about once a month because they don't
 7 have a training effect for most of the people running
 8 that nine-minute mile. It's a great unit cohesion
 9 experience but it's not going to have a training effect
 10 which the ability group runs have.
 11 So I don't think that having ability
 12 groups causes a problem. I think it's people recognize
 13 that some people are faster and they want to be able to
 14 run fast.
 15 DR. CANTOR: I'm actually positing the
 16 opposite. Not that it causes a problem, but that in fact
 17 it reduces a problem.
 18 COLONEL LeBOEUF: Correct.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Let me just come
 20 at that from just a little bit different a slant. When
 21 we did the ARI study that led to gender-integrated
 22 training and then we did the second phase of that in
 23 which we assessed how that training was going in '95,

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1 there were some very positives that came out of that. I
 2 think you have that ARI study.
 3 And it doesn't specifically hit the issue
 4 of gender-norming, but there was a greater degree of
 5 cohesion in the units and a greater respect of one
 6 another for a gender-integrated experience. Involved in
 7 that was also ability groups. And so I'm not sure that
 8 you could specifically peg it to ability groups, but
 9 there had to be something in there.
 10 I would give you one more insight into
 11 this process. And again, it may not be specifically from
 12 an ability group perspective but it has everything to do
 13 with cohesion and acceptance of one another. And that
 14 is, the first six months that I commanded Jackson, I
 15 don't think a week went by that some male soldier didn't
 16 come to me and say the women are getting over, their
 17 drill sergeants are easier on them, they don't run as
 18 far, they don't run as hard, physically they're getting
 19 by — you know, all those things. And I say, "How do you
 20 know that?" "Well, we see it." Well, two hundred yards
 21 across the field, different PT field.
 22 As soon as we went to gender-integrated
 23 training, that accusation went away. The accusation

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1 — I don't know the title — that it's done — Again,
 2 it's gender-normed, like the top 5 percent of the men and
 3 the top 5 percent of the women, but that the top percent
 4 of the women would come around the 30th percentile of the
 5 male spread. Is that accurate or not?
 6 COLONEL LeBOEUF: Again, I just — you
 7 know, in talking about the Military Academy, I think it's
 8 important to understand that we are dealing with a
 9 different population than the young men and women that go
 10 to basic training because we give them a fitness aptitude
 11 exam as part of the admission process.
 12 As far as where they're normed, because we
 13 do use the Army Physical Fitness Test using the current
 14 system, the women may do better than that overall than
 15 the men, although we get around the 30 percent — about
 16 30 percent of — and higher, of both, will max the APFT.
 17 We only —
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. But, I mean, when you
 19 look at actuals, not effort or norming — the actual
 20 scores —
 21 DR. SEGAL: What percentage of women —
 22 DR. MOSKOS: — you're getting something
 23 like this (Indicating), and that the males who are not

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1 still was — is that Cellucci doesn't belong in the Army,
 2 but it could be "Ms. Cellucci" or it could be "Mr.
 3 Cellucci." It had nothing to do with gender. It had to
 4 do with how hard you worked, what your commitment was,
 5 and what you felt about your — how you formed in on the
 6 team.
 7 And so I don't — I guess from an
 8 observation, the units that do the best ability group
 9 training get the highest PT scores; they force people up
 10 into the system; they crunch their ability groups down
 11 the fastest; and the soldiers that feel good about really
 12 being fast and excelling feel good about being fast and
 13 excelling.
 14 And so I think there's something very
 15 positive — There's a personal satisfaction that comes
 16 out of that that says "I'm doing the best I can and I'm
 17 improving."
 18 DR. CANTOR: Thanks.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: The last part of
 20 that is if you don't do that, you have an increased
 21 injury problem that you just literally can't deal with.
 22 Your unit starts coming apart if you don't do that,
 23 especially early on in basic training.

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1 getting the merit badge or whatever it's called are doing
 2 better in actual performance than the woman who's getting
 3 it.
 4 COLONEL LeBOEUF: I don't have that data
 5 with me.
 6 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, let me
 7 just try to amplify that. Here's the issue. 290 or
 8 above gets you a badge.
 9 COLONEL LeBOEUF: Right.
 10 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Award of
 11 excellence.
 12 Now, if I'm seventeen to twenty-one years
 13 old, in the two-mile run — current standards, not your
 14 new ones — I've got to run it in thirteen minutes or
 15 less to get my hundred points. The female has to run it
 16 in 15.36 or something like that to get her hundred
 17 points. And I think that's what Charlie's talking about
 18 — is, is there an animosity or has there been any
 19 animosity because a female gets a hundred points running
 20 three and a half minutes slower than her male counterpart
 21 and rewarded in the same fashion?
 22 COLONEL LeBOEUF: You know, I don't hear
 23 that. And —

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1 DR. MOSKOS: I'm Charles Moskos. I have a
 2 different set of questions but I wanted — Nancy raised
 3 something. At West Point, you said other — these are
 4 gender-integrated ability groups.
 5 COLONEL LeBOEUF: Correct.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Now, I'm going to ask a
 7 "what" question. In the lower ability group, you've got
 8 — What's the ratio of males to females, and how do the
 9 males in that group feel?
 10 COLONEL LeBOEUF: I guess just — I don't
 11 have the stats in front of me. Probably —
 12 DR. MOSKOS: Well, impressionistic.
 13 COLONEL LeBOEUF: — more heavily women —
 14 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 15 COLONEL LeBOEUF: — and a lot of our
 16 linemen from the football team included heavy men. So
 17 how do they feel?
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Well, if they're linemen,
 19 they must feel okay.
 20 COLONEL LeBOEUF: At the end of the
 21 workout, tired. But...
 22 DR. MOSKOS: I was told, too, at West
 23 Point, when you give, you know, physical expertise medals

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1 DR. MOSKOS: We do.
 2 COLONEL LeBOEUF: From the corps?
 3 DR. MOSKOS: I've heard it from faculty
 4 members who are — But, anyway, that's neither here nor
 5 there. I don't want to get into that.
 6 DR. CANTOR: Faculty, as we all know, are
 7 always way behind.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Right. That's not my
 9 question anyway. I wanted to ask Colonel Cellucci a
 10 question.
 11 You're not related to the new governor in
 12 Massachusetts?
 13 COLONEL CELLUCCI: I am.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: You are?
 15 COLONEL CELLUCCI: I am.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 17 COLONEL CELLUCCI: I finally asked my dad
 18 in Massachusetts and I said, "Hey, Dad, am I related to
 19 him?"
 20 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 21 COLONEL CELLUCCI: And he's a distant
 22 cousin, that's all.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: Just one other remark on

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1 Mady's thing about smoking. I say I'm old enough to
 2 remember when adultery was a sin and smoking wasn't.
 3 Now, we had butt cans in basic training in
 4 my day.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Butt cans,
 6 painted red.
 7 DR. MOSKOS: All right. But anyhow,
 8 Colonel Cellucci —
 9 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Yes.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: — my question was, when we
 11 talked at Benning — and it was a very informative time
 12 with you —
 13 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Yes.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: — you made a distinction —
 15 I have a two-part question but let me address the first
 16 part. Combat fitness versus physical fitness, you made a
 17 distinction like that; that these were different kinds of
 18 measures and maybe the pull-up was a better measure for
 19 one than the other even though we have this problem of —
 20 well, the Marines do use the pull-up.
 21 Do you want to — not to take a lot of
 22 time, but just comment on that difference between
 23 physical fitness and combat fitness?

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1 COLONEL CELLUCCI: I think — and the
 2 General gave it on his opening statement. You want to
 3 have a standard. You want to have a level of individual
 4 fitness, our measure being — As Colonel LeBoeuf said,
 5 it's currently cardiorespiratory or aerobic capacity and
 6 upper body muscular strength endurance. We have found
 7 over the years — over thirteen, fourteen years — that
 8 that is the baseline.
 9 We call it the baseline level of fitness
 10 to wear the uniform in the United States Army, and we've
 11 tracked that for thirteen, fourteen years. And at that
 12 baseline level, we have found that that is a good
 13 indicator that soldiers, once they come into a unit,
 14 having to take that test twice a year regardless of age,
 15 regardless of sex, that that is a minimum that keeps us
 16 all true.
 17 That keeps us — Fitness-wise, if we did
 18 not have a fitness test — Let's just say we didn't have
 19 a fitness test. I don't think we would have — many of
 20 us would not have the — I guess it's kind of like a
 21 cloud hanging over your head. I don't like to look at it
 22 that way but it's — it's something you have to do
 23 because it's on our report cards.

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1 I applaud the NCO's. The NCO's can not
 2 get an "excellence" bullet — can not, current system —
 3 unless they have a 290 or above. So many NCO's may have,
 4 for example, "excellent success," "excellent,"
 5 "excellent," "excellent," "excellent." I applaud that
 6 with the NCO corps.
 7 So when we say a level of fitness,
 8 muscular strength endurance and aerobic capacity as a
 9 baseline, that's okay as a start. That's a starting
 10 point. That keeps us all true. But what the General
 11 said, which is so very true — and why we think the
 12 United States is a premier army and, I think, the most
 13 fit army in the world — is that the commanders have to
 14 assess their units. There's always that baseline there.
 15 I just took my PT test. And we always
 16 grab our chart and say, "Okay, I'm forty-six years old.
 17 Did I make the next" — I didn't. Forty-seven's the next
 18 gate. But I'm always looking, and I, as a commander —
 19 or I as a past commander, I as an officer — have always
 20 said, "What's the max?"
 21 That is the ethos in the Army right now.
 22 It's not — These soldiers don't look at the "min" and
 23 say, "Okay, that's the 'min'." The ethos right now is

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1 they look at the "max" and say, "Can I do that?" When
 2 the new standards came out, they don't look at the
 3 "mins." They looked at the "max" and said, "Wait a
 4 minute, they just took two minutes away from my run
 5 time," and I've already talked to that.
 6 So then you say okay, that's the fitness
 7 level that you need to be into the Army and to stay in
 8 the Army. You cannot get kicked out of the Army if you
 9 have sixty, sixty, sixty. But you could see what would
 10 happen to the Army if we had no level, no standard,
 11 because it also goes to wellness; it also goes to the way
 12 we look in our uniform.
 13 When you go to combat fitness and the tie
 14 there — I think it's very important that the distinction
 15 is, is that when you look at an infantry unit, for
 16 example — I wrote it down. They have a standard of
 17 twelve miles, three hours, with a minimum of thirty-five
 18 pounds on their back. That is a more criterion-based
 19 type of — and the dilemma — and it's a dilemma that
 20 we've always looked at — is you have 277 MOS's in the
 21 Army inventory.
 22 Now, let's try another way. Let's say we
 23 came up with a criterion-based test that was combat arms,

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1 combat service support and combat support. Again, a very
 2 — and we've looked at that — a very difficult task,
 3 because in an infantry unit you're going to have combat
 4 support and combat service support in there.
 5 So which standard are you going to train
 6 for? You have to train toward your METL. You have to
 7 train toward your mission essential task list which the
 8 commander lays down, and then you take your Master
 9 Fitness Trainers and all your NCO's and officers and you
 10 roll that all in to come up with a program that is
 11 fitness as a baseline, and then other capabilities that
 12 you need to perform your mission, like the RUCKSACK
 13 marching orders.
 14 The General pointed out if you're in
 15 Alaska, some of the things. So it's environmental. In
 16 Bosnia right now, there's an issue in Bosnia where
 17 they're standing sentry duty, so the issue is they're
 18 there and they stand in one place for six months.
 19 And I'm being a little facetious, but —
 20 but it is a problem. And the dining facilities are
 21 packed with food. It becomes a commander's issue to come
 22 up with a physical fitness program that will not allow
 23 those soldiers to deteriorate physically, and that's

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1 something that we're looking at right now, too.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: Steve — Colonel Cellucci, I
 3 should say. I wanted to ask you this question — No,
 4 this is to the group as a whole. And I know that time is
 5 getting short now but this is a general question.
 6 In the briefing prepared, the phrase is
 7 used "equal points for equal effort." And just from a
 8 philosophical standpoint, how does that become a
 9 determining factor? I mean, if somebody's working fully
 10 and is not really up to snuff, and somebody can do it
 11 easily — is only, you know, giving 50 percent but can do
 12 it terrifically — aren't we interested in output and
 13 outcome rather than effort?
 14 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Absolutely.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Well, why equal points for
 16 equal effort, then?
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Well, we are in
 18 terms of battle-focus training but not in terms of the
 19 fitness level. What we are doing is measuring how a body
 20 processes oxygen, how strong the body is, and we are
 21 looking at a level of fitness based on the physiology of
 22 male and female body structures and that becomes the
 23 difference.

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1 We really have to separate —
 2 DR. MOSKOS: I didn't even think that was
 3 gender-related, per se. I thought it was an independent
 4 factor. I mean, if somebody can —
 5 DR. SEGAL: Within each gender.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah, within each gender.
 7 DR. TOMASI: It's also within each age
 8 group. Remember, age and —
 9 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. Well, what if somebody
 10 is just better at something and doesn't have to exert
 11 themselves as much as somebody who's really striving?
 12 Why should that latter person —
 13 DR. TOMASI: But he gets more points.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: Gets more points.
 15 DR. TOMASI: He gets more points.
 16 COLONEL CELLUCCI: See, we added — Maybe
 17 this will —
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 19 COLONEL CELLUCCI: I think I understand.
 20 We've added — I did not mention this before when we —
 21 We could have — We could have just stayed at the
 22 minimum. That you had to get sixty, sixty, sixty, end of
 23 message. But because the Army wants to strive for

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1 excellence, we added — we upped the bar. The bar went
 2 — So that you could not only make your 180, you could
 3 make 300. And it used to be extended past that.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Right. Right.
 5 COLONEL CELLUCCI: We did not — On this
 6 new test coming out, we decided not to go to the extended
 7 scale because a 300 is a 300 is a 300, and there were
 8 issues about, you know, how far would you go? You know,
 9 420? Whatever? So we felt that what you're emphasizing
 10 is that you want to do as best as you physically — as an
 11 individual, as best as you can do.
 12 When you get into combat, we say you want
 13 to have enough energy, you want to be physically strong
 14 enough for — male or female, to be able to pull somebody
 15 off the battlefield twice the weight of that person. I
 16 mean, if you start tying things and that's a start at
 17 fitness.
 18 And as the General said, it's a growing
 19 process. The great thing about time and fitness is over
 20 time, if you keep practicing that fitness ethic, you get
 21 better and better and better. And we're not seeing a
 22 decline in that until probably about the age fifty, and
 23 then we see the aging physiological decline, if that's —

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1 In our Army right now, the forty-year-old —
 2 DR. MOSKOS: Seems like you're measuring
 3 motivation, though, with effort, rather than —
 4 DR. SEGAL: Can I follow up on this? Is
 5 that all right if — Okay. We have a dilemma here and
 6 let me see if I can sort out what it comes from.
 7 I have heard what Charlie has heard when I
 8 talked to soldiers in the field and when I talked to
 9 cadets. There is a perception by the men that the women
 10 have it easier. Or even — They don't buy this "equal
 11 effort" stuff because some of the men know — and that's
 12 what Charlie's getting at — that it takes more effort
 13 for them than some other guy who has more physical
 14 ability to begin with. And there's still this confusion
 15 and I think that maybe some of the Army policies are
 16 reinforcing that confusion. And it's the other services
 17 as well, but I'm not sure of the extent to which — Let's
 18 just talk about the Army.
 19 You've justified the Physical Fitness Test
 20 and the particular three tests on the basis of the ease
 21 of administration, but you've also talked about the METL
 22 and how for each unit they have the things that they need
 23 to be able to form. But the problem is that the only

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1 graded measure of physical performance that's being used,
 2 including in those units out there, is the Physical
 3 Fitness Test.
 4 So the medals are being awarded not on the
 5 basis of the full range of physical fitness and
 6 performance, but it's being awarded on the basis of
 7 scores on the Physical Fitness Test. So a test that was
 8 designed to actually — really was designed for the
 9 minimum, in a sense, to make sure that people were
 10 minimally physically fit —
 11 COLONEL CELLUCCI: As a standard, that's
 12 correct. That is correct.
 13 DR. SEGAL: But it's being used now to
 14 score people so that their chances for promotion, their
 15 chances for assignments in the unit, for all sorts of
 16 awards and things, are now being based on a test that was
 17 not designed to do that, and using it this way increases
 18 the likelihood that it's going to create senses of
 19 unfairness as Charlie has identified.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: Sort of the latent
 21 dysfunction.
 22 DR. SEGAL: Yes. So let me try another —
 23 I mean — And I know this. I mean, I don't need to be

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1 here to know this is happening. I've seen it. Charlie
 2 has seen it.
 3 DR. CANTOR: Do you see the same thing
 4 based on age?
 5 DR. SEGAL: No.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: No.
 7 DR. SEGAL: No, social construction with
 8 regard to the age is quite different. But then age and
 9 rank —
 10 DR. CANTOR: But that's an additional
 11 dilemma for them, then. Right?
 12 DR. SEGAL: Age and rank are so related
 13 within the military that there is less of a concern, I
 14 think, perhaps, about the age-norming because they're not
 15 necessarily — they're not usually competing with people
 16 who are different ages.
 17 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 18 DR. SEGAL: However, it's also the case
 19 that age is constructed differently than gender. Gender
 20 is seen — There's much more of a looking for unfairness
 21 on the basis of gender than there would be on the basis
 22 of age.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: I hope there's age, you know,

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1 prejudice in favor of old people.
 2 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: So what's our
 3 dilemma?
 4 DR. SEGAL: Okay. Well, the difficulty is
 5 that the test that was designed — And it's a compromise
 6 test as the way you described it. If you, as physical
 7 fitness experts, were to really come up with a test that
 8 truly measured an individual's level of physical fitness,
 9 this wouldn't be it.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Ma'am, I don't
 11 — I'm not sure I'd sign up to that at all.
 12 COLONEL CELLUCCI: No, I disagree.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: No, I would tell
 14 you I wouldn't sign up for this one. Unless we could
 15 afford to send everybody to Cooper Clinic, run them up
 16 treadmills, the VO2 and —
 17 DR. SEGAL: Okay. Maybe I overstated it.
 18 But it's certainly not ideal, and so you make compromises
 19 in terms of ease of administration.
 20 COLONEL CELLUCCI: The only change — Just
 21 because it's there. The only change that we're looking
 22 at is that the sit-up event, which measures your — The
 23 only change we're looking at is taking the hands from

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1 here (Indicating) and moving them — the fulcrum, moving
 2 them down to here (Indicating). And the reason, even
 3 though the medical expertise that we've used said that
 4 this is a safe exercise — all of them are unless you've
 5 had a previous neck or back injury.
 6 So we want to — The next iteration PT
 7 test, I would recommend — something we're looking into
 8 right now is that the hands — Everything else remains
 9 the same, but the hands come off the back so there's no
 10 jerking of the head for those that are trying to get the
 11 last-minute sit-ups in within the two minutes. And it
 12 shifts — it shifts the muscles used, the hip abductors,
 13 which is what you want as strong — it shifts the weight
 14 down there; so you actually, over time, can do more.
 15 And now we've also created from the old
 16 test to the new test the same standard for men and women,
 17 all age groups. That's a first.
 18 DR. SEGAL: You're also now measuring neck
 19 strength, whereas, before they could be supporting the
 20 head and the neck with the arms. So if you're moving it
 21 out here (Indicating), now they're going to be — the
 22 neck muscles are going to be involved.
 23 DR. KNAPIK: No, the neck muscles are not

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1 DR. TOMASI: That you have leveled this
 2 playing field by bringing this drastic difference in
 3 scores toward the center, measure of central tendency,
 4 which in this case is the average, the mean. That slide
 5 shows that what we have done is to bring that equity for
 6 effort — and that's where you were headed — in points
 7 and effort and so on.
 8 It shows that when a male or female, a
 9 young person, an older person, comes across the finish
 10 line, we believe there's an equal level of effort within
 11 the parameters of that gender and that age compared to
 12 this gender and this age. This person has put out as
 13 much as he or she possibly can to achieve this score.
 14 COLONEL CELLUCCI: To achieve an 80
 15 percent, to achieve a 90 percent, wherever they — So
 16 that has been —
 17 DR. SEGAL: On average.
 18 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Yes.
 19 DR. SEGAL: Since you — as you said
 20 before, different body types and such — I mean, if you
 21 could, for example, control this by lean mass, would it
 22 produce — if you could divide by lean mass —
 23 DR. TOMASI: Can I kid you a little bit?

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1 involved in that task.
 2 DR. SEGAL: Not at all?
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: What you do, you
 4 can pull at the head and pull your head down, but it
 5 doesn't help your body make a sit-up.
 6 DR. KNAPIK: This is — The muscle groups
 7 are in the thighs and the abdomen that are producing the
 8 muscular force. It doesn't — It becomes a little more
 9 difficult out here (Indicating) because you're pulling a
 10 larger lever —
 11 DR. SEGAL: It becomes more difficult.
 12 DR. TOMASI: Because you're not throwing
 13 your elbows, also.
 14 DR. KNAPIK: You have a larger lever here.
 15 COLONEL CELLUCCI: And if you — When I
 16 was in Brazil, they had ten countries that listed down —
 17 ten countries that had listed down the three events that
 18 they did. And for example, instead of a one-and-a-half-
 19 mile run, it was a three-mile run. They would have
 20 either pull-ups or chin-ups, or either, or they would
 21 have push-ups.
 22 So I guess in answering that I want to
 23 make sure that it was clear that —

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1 How would you do that? How would you control for lean
 2 body mass? I mean, I know the answer and you know —
 3 DR. SEGAL: You would have to measure it.
 4 You know, you'd have to measure it and it would take —
 5 It wouldn't be as feasible but it probably would be
 6 better normed.
 7 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Can I
 8 interject something here very quickly?
 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. Let's just remind
 10 everybody we've got five minutes.
 11 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: This is the
 12 old PT card — correct? — that's in the back of the
 13 book?
 14 COLONEL CELLUCCI: What you have in the
 15 back of the book is both. It's where we were, and then
 16 it should say "proposed." So it gives you a quick — I
 17 have a board but the General doesn't want me to show the
 18 board, but — That's it right there. That's right.
 19 The point is, when I show the myths that
 20 are out there in the Army right now — Let me dispel
 21 them, if I may, very quickly. When I speak to — I went
 22 to the Sergeant Majors Academy. Four hundred sergeant
 23 majors. And they said, "too easy for the young folks,

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1 DR. SEGAL: Okay.
 2 COLONEL CELLUCCI: — the test right now
 3 has been successful for thirteen years and all we've done
 4 now is leveled the playing field because the '80 test had
 5 inequities in it.
 6 DR. SEGAL: Because of this "on average
 7 for men and women differential effort required." "On
 8 average, for men and women." Now you're trying to make
 9 it so that, on average, men and woman have the same level
 10 of effort required.
 11 DR. TOMASI: Let me refer you to the
 12 package that you have. Slide 13 and slide 14.
 13 Now, you don't need to be a statistician
 14 to see what the picture is between slide 13 — and then
 15 quickly turn to 14, and what happens to the numbers?
 16 They move toward the center, correct?
 17 If you look on slide 13, a lot of 250's,
 18 one 217, and so on. Then if you quickly turn over to
 19 page — to slide 14, you see that the numbers are more
 20 centralized between the genders and amongst the age
 21 groups. That slide right there, slide 14, shows you how
 22 we have — Do you not have it?
 23 DR. SEGAL: Yeah, I have it.

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1 too hard for the old folks." I've taken that message for
 2 a year and a half. And when I finished, they go, "Oh, I
 3 understand."
 4 If you look at two slides that I put
 5 together just to explain very simply — and these are
 6 pages — 11 and 12. If you would for me, look at the
 7 seventeen-to-twenty-one-year-old male run. If you look
 8 at the 90th percentile, which equals a hundred points,
 9 that's thirteen minutes. They were running, based on
 10 just running four minutes faster than 15.54, which was an
 11 arbitrary number — they were running it at the 99th
 12 percentile.
 13 So you go to the next page very quickly
 14 and you see another problem. Here you have your platoon
 15 sergeants, your company commanders, thirty-seven to
 16 forty-one, who have a lead-from-the-front attitude, and
 17 they're going, "Wait a minute, you just — "you just took
 18 away a minute and a half away from my run time."
 19 Uh huh. But it wasn't "we" that did that.
 20 It was the 250 soldiers — combat arms, combat support,
 21 combat service support, from twelve installations —
 22 2,588 soldiers. But within that age group, based on the
 23 way the Army has ramped up, they ran — they ran — when

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1 you take the 90th percentile and run it across, they ran
 2 it in 13.36, not in 14.42.
 3 So the equity across the line is
 4 everybody, to get ninety or a hundred points, is
 5 performing at the 90th percentile.
 6 DR. SEGAL: So you're re-norming it to the
 7 current performance.
 8 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Yes, that is correct.
 9 DR. SEGAL: Okay.
 10 DR. TOMASI: Which, incidently, is based
 11 upon a stratified random sample, which brings in combat
 12 arms, combat support, combat service. And I'll say this
 13 — and you know that — that person has just as much
 14 chance at being selected as that person.
 15 DR. SEGAL: This is the distribution here
 16 (indicating)?
 17 DR. TOMASI: Stratified distribution.
 18 That's correct.
 19 DR. SEGAL: Does this represent Army-wide
 20 distribution?
 21 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Absolutely.
 22 DR. TOMASI: Yes, ma'am.
 23 DR. SEGAL: So I believe you had said

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1 would probably weight more in order to — Are there
 2 things that you would put in that women would out-perform
 3 men and that would remove this perception of inequity?
 4 Is that the — I think that's —
 5 DR. MOSKOS: You've got to give them
 6 cigarettes.
 7 DR. SEGAL: Cigarettes?
 8 DR. KNAPIK: Give the men the cigarettes.
 9 COLONEL CELLUCCI: You know, aerobically,
 10 men have a 10 percent — 10 to 12 percent advantage. So
 11 there's the run and anything to do with biking, cycling,
 12 swimming —
 13 DR. SEGAL: Is that true even if you
 14 divide it by lean body mass?
 15 COLONEL CELLUCCI: You could take it up to
 16 the world class athlete —
 17 DR. SEGAL: And if you divide by lean body
 18 mass.
 19 COLONEL CELLUCCI: That's —
 20 DR. SEGAL: Does it reduce the difference?
 21 DR. KNAPIK: It does reduce, but there
 22 will still be a difference even after you've corrected —
 23 COLONEL CELLUCCI: And then if you look at

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1 earlier that 60 percent of the new recruits are combat
 2 support and combat service support, but this looks as if
 3 86 percent in here —
 4 DR. TOMASI: Well, it's got it by genders
 5 now also there.
 6 DR. SEGAL: Well, I'm looking at the
 7 total.
 8 DR. TOMASI: What you have is at about 20
 9 to 25 percent — maybe 28 percent — of the entire Army
 10 is what would fall under the "combat arms" category. And
 11 what we did —
 12 DR. SEGAL: What percent?
 13 DR. TOMASI: It's in the high twenties.
 14 DR. SEGAL: Okay. But your sample is only
 15 about 14 percent combat arms.
 16 DR. TOMASI: Well, I stand corrected. The
 17 males are 28.5 percent and the females are only 1. —
 18 DR. SEGAL: Oh, okay.
 19 DR. TOMASI: Yes. I'm sorry. Thank you.
 20 DR. SEGAL: All right.
 21 DR. TOMASI: And what we have, then — And
 22 the people that were selected to show up to take the PT
 23 test were selected by the Defense Manpower Data Center,

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1 the upper body strength and endurance, to ask a woman,
 2 beyond coming short of a muscle builder or a weight
 3 lifter, it's just physiologically not —
 4 DR. SEGAL: What if you had measures of
 5 flexibility, agility, coordination?
 6 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Women would perform
 7 better than men in flexibility.
 8 DR. SEGAL: Okay. So if you added a
 9 flexibility measure, it might help to — And so if you
 10 added a flexibility measure — If women perform on
 11 average better than men on flexibility, then if you added
 12 a flexibility measure and gender-normed it in such a way
 13 that the men — I mean, even if you took the current one
 14 you have and added that one task that measured
 15 flexibility and gender-normed it so that the men could
 16 receive a higher score than the women for the same
 17 performance, would that be possible to do?
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: It would be
 19 possible, but I don't think it would take away the
 20 perception because flexibility is basically not measured
 21 by effort.
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We need a little
 23 consideration for the reporter here because he's trying

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1 which was 3,000 miles away from us, and we —
 2 DR. SEGAL: They were not volunteers for
 3 this study. They were a stratified random sample.
 4 DR. TOMASI: That is correct.
 5 DR. SEGAL: I actually was going someplace
 6 else with this. I just never got there.
 7 DR. TOMASI: I'm sorry.
 8 DR. SEGAL: I thought I was making a —
 9 DR. TOMASI: I'm sorry.
 10 DR. SEGAL: In the ideal world now —
 11 We're not talking practicality. But if you were to
 12 design a task that would measure physical fitness for
 13 both men and women, that would produce the same score for
 14 men and women without gender-norming — okay? — to
 15 measure physical fitness — because you're trying to put
 16 in equal — you're trying to norm for the differences
 17 between men and women — Now, I don't think you could do
 18 it with a test where you scored each individual event and
 19 people got a "go" or "no go," "pass" or "not pass" on
 20 each individual event.
 21 But if you had a composite, would there be
 22 physical performances — some sort of tasks that you
 23 would put into the test that you don't now have, that you

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1 to follow six conversations.
 2 And we're coming up on time, so why don't
 3 we just wrap up this discussion and this answer and call
 4 it an end.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: My personal
 6 opinion is I don't know of any test that I know of right
 7 now that would — without norming, would make up for the
 8 difference in the physiological difference in males and
 9 females in the fitness environment.
 10 DR. TOMASI: If you gave me the test just
 11 like you described it, that's exactly what we did for the
 12 APFT. But what you did is you added flexibility. You
 13 gave me the caveat that I could do gender; I can do age
 14 group norms. Then we could establish a flexibility
 15 standard just like this one under those conditions.
 16 DR. SEGAL: And if you did that, men would
 17 be able to get a higher score for the same level of
 18 performance as women.
 19 DR. TOMASI: I don't know that. I'd have
 20 to wait. But generally —
 21 COLONEL CELLUCCI: There is a truism,
 22 though. There is a truism. Because of women, lower
 23 center of gravity, the child-bearing muscles that we

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 242</p> <p>1 don't have, and because their arms are lighter — now, 2 catch this: their arms are lighter, so the fulcrum is not 3 as heavy — they can do probably more sit-ups than their 4 male counterpart. More sit-ups. 5 But they said, "Gee, we've taken them from 6 here to here. Why don't we come up with one standard?" 7 But, in fact, instead of going into flexibility, if you 8 wanted to go something where the women could say, "We can 9 do better. Physiologically we can do better," then, as 10 Colonel LeBoeuf said, flexibility. But the one that we 11 do currently use is a sit-up and they should be able to 12 do more based on those reasons. 13 DR. KNAPIK: Let me just say one thing 14 with regard to flexibility. We wouldn't — I don't think 15 we'd gain much — Flexibility is a component of physical 16 fitness, but one of the problems with measuring 17 flexibility is it's very joint-specific. So we can 18 measure flexibility with a sit-and-reach — and that's 19 one way of doing it and that's one way it's typically 20 done — but flexibility is very specific to the joint. 21 And to have that in the test, again, I don't think we'd 22 gain very much physiologically. 23 COLONEL CELLUCCI: You would even widen</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 245</p> <p>1 MR. PANG: Just to get it — 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: A "yes" or "no" question. 3 MR. PANG: Just to get it on the record, 4 you know. 5 In the Persian Gulf War, it was a 6 criticism that the guard and reserve, people who were 7 called up, were not as fit as they should be, number one, 8 with regard to physical fitness, and, number two, that 9 they were not trained to the same standard as the active 10 component in terms of training fitness. 11 Just a brief comment with regard to that. 12 I mean, I presume — I know that from basic training — 13 okay? — the guard and reserve are the same because they 14 train in basic training. After that, what happens? 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: They have a 16 training program. It is difficult for them because they 17 only see their soldiers one time a month. 18 But I would tell you the units that come 19 into the 101st, we ended up with MP units, chemical units 20 — There may have been some other augmentation. What I 21 saw in shape was never a limitation factor for the 22 operations. They were in fact — had the ability to do 23 — and were trained — Those units were trained very,</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 243</p> <p>1 the gap. 2 DR. SEGAL: The sit-and-reach is only one 3 area of flexibility? 4 DR. KNAPIK: It is one measure. It 5 measures primarily — 6 DR. SEGAL: Are there other relatively 7 simple — 8 DR. TOMASI: Touch your hands behind your 9 back. 10 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Touch your hands behind 11 your back. 12 DR. SEGAL: Okay. Any others? 13 DR. TOMASI: And most of the time you'll 14 find that your dominant hand, you'll have more — That's 15 exactly right. 16 DR. SEGAL: Of course, that's — arm 17 length is also going to affect that. 18 COLONEL CELLUCCI: But they would come 19 back and say — 20 DR. KNAPIK: That's flexibility. 21 COLONEL CELLUCCI: Even though it's a 22 measure of flexibility, they would — I think some people 23 would say, "So what? Why are you measuring flexibility?"</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 246</p> <p>1 very well. 2 I had no — The issue of training became 3 — the combat units, where in fact there's a higher 4 integration of skills, and when they went to National 5 Training Center, they were deemed to require additional 6 training before deployment. 7 That was not true of artillery units. 8 Artillery units went through the process and did very 9 well. But it was brigade level combat units, infantry, 10 heavy mechanized, armor, where that situation occurred. 11 So — 12 MR. PANG: But the PRT standards are the 13 same across the board? 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: The standards 15 are the same. 16 MR. PANG: Are the frequencies the same? 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Frequencies are 18 the same. 19 MR. PANG: Okay. 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: And they still 21 have to — for their senior force going to schools, they 22 have to pass the test before they enter the school 23 systems regardless of whether it's a reserve school</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 244</p> <p>1 Does that correlate to anything?" 2 DR. SEGAL: It is in — Well, see, that's 3 where you get into this dual purpose that you're using 4 your PFT for. It functions to measure physical fitness, 5 but it also — now you're trying to — Well, what is it 6 related to in terms of potential combat performance or 7 on-the-job performance? 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: We won't go 9 there. 10 DR. SEGAL: You won't go there. 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: We won't go 12 there. 13 DR. SEGAL: Okay. So you — 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We won't go anywhere at 15 this point, but we thank you very much for coming. It's 16 been our understanding with others that we may have some 17 follow-up questions and our wonderful Colonel Harris — 18 MR. PANG: Could I ask one — just one 19 question? 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Oh, okay. 21 MR. PANG: Just one question, just to get 22 it — 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Real quick.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 247</p> <p>1 system or an active school system. 2 In basic training, you can't tell the 3 difference from the soldiers. We train both active guard 4 and reserve. You can't — Every once in a while you'd 5 see somebody with a shoulder patch and they're a 6 reservist, but they're all trained to the same standards 7 at that point and have to meet the same standards. 8 MR. PANG: Thank you. 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Thank you 10 very much for coming. As I mentioned, we may have some 11 follow-up questions or requests for documents or 12 information and I know Colonel Harris will happily add 13 that to the many things she does for us. 14 And I also want to thank Colonel Batten 15 for coming by today because he's been a good friend. 16 It's great to see Colonel Cellucci and Dr. 17 Tomasi dressed this time. 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: You don't want 19 to know about that. 20 (Discussion off the record.) 21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We'll adjourn now until a 22 quarter of. Thank you again. 23 (A brief recess was taken.)</p>

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1 (Presentation of United States Air Force)
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We'll go back on the
 3 record.
 4 Colonel Laub, as we discussed earlier,
 5 we're video-taping and transcribing, and so I'd just ask
 6 everybody to remember to keep your voice up so that you
 7 can be heard. And we'll have your presentation at will,
 8 and then proceed with questions from the commissioners.
 9 COLONEL LAUB: Thank you, Ms. Blair.

10 Members of the Commission, thanks for this
 11 opportunity to address an important issue for the Air
 12 Force. For our many citizens who volunteer, whether for
 13 three or thirty years, we want to have an Air Force that
 14 does its part for the national defense in an atmosphere
 15 that creates a sense of pride and accomplishment for each
 16 airman who serves.

17 When I first came on active duty in 1969,
 18 it was a man's Air Force and we tolerated women in the
 19 ranks. With the introduction of the all-volunteer force
 20 in the seventies, more and more women have chosen to be a
 21 part of our country's defense forces. Women are now
 22 woven into the very fabric of today's Air Force and an
 23 integral part of our Air Force team.

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1 Gender differences do exist in human
 2 physiology, so we've developed a two-tiered evaluation
 3 program for both physical fitness and physical ability.
 4 These programs clearly highlight our efforts to maintain
 5 effective duty performance while accommodating the known
 6 physical differences between men and women.
 7 Many occupations within the Air Force
 8 require physical abilities not everyone has. For
 9 example, the flightline maintenance technician, the
 10 pilot, the fire-fighter, each has duties that require
 11 unique physical abilities.

12 Performance evaluations for these
 13 occupations are gender neutral. Whether it is the
 14 ability to lift forty pounds overhead, to have visual
 15 depth perception to 25 arc seconds, or to drag fire hose
 16 and climb a ladder, the Air Force uses the same
 17 occupational qualification standards for both men and
 18 women in all age groups.

19 Physical fitness for the purpose of having
 20 general good health and well-being is another matter.
 21 Here the purpose is not to qualify a person for a job-
 22 specific ability but to have a force of healthy, fit
 23 people.

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1 In this instance, we want a program to
 2 encourage each Air Force member to do a level of health
 3 that gives us the physical and mental resilience to
 4 overcome adversity. For me, a male over fifty years old,
 5 I would have to spend a generous portion of my day in the
 6 gym to have some physical fitness performance level that
 7 the average twenty-five-year-old male could maintain with
 8 minimal effort.

9 Here age and gender standards are
 10 important for communicating what it is we expect our
 11 airmen to achieve — a basic level of good health and
 12 fitness, a basic level that makes each of us a part of
 13 the team.

14 I'm ready to respond to your questions.

15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, I will go ahead and
 16 start because I know other people are catching up on the
 17 break.

18 I have asked this question of the other
 19 services as well. What is, in your view — in your
 20 service's view, is the relationship of physical fitness
 21 to readiness?

22 COLONEL LAUB: The relationship of
 23 physical fitness to readiness, again, I would say it has

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1 to do with our ability to be able to have the resolve to
 2 take on the challenges that are faced to us. What we
 3 want to do is to have people who have that resilience,
 4 that mental and physical resilience, so that as
 5 situations occur that we don't account for, we have
 6 people who have that ability to respond to them.
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.

8 MR. PANG: You know, this is also a
 9 question that I have raised with the other — the three
 10 services that presented before you, and that is, with
 11 regard to a General Accounting Office report — GAO
 12 report that's in draft form, that the services I believe
 13 have commented on to OSD and OSD has commented back to
 14 the General Accounting Office.

15 And, you know, in it there are three major
 16 findings, with sub-elements under each, and there are
 17 seven recommendations with regard to those findings.
 18 And, you know, I note that the Defense Department
 19 concurred in every single one of the recommendations; so
 20 that means to me that they accepted as correct all of the
 21 findings that were in the GAO report.

22 Did you concur in that fashion — Did the
 23 Air Force concur in that fashion? And, you know, if so,

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1 fine. You know, if not, you know, why not? And if
 2 you're not aware of it, you know, I'd like to — you
 3 know, we'd like to get a copy —

4 COLONEL LAUB: Well, we can prepare a
 5 response for that — yes, sir — for the record.

6 MR. PANG: Okay. You know, the other
 7 thing — you know, it's a comment — okay? — because I
 8 think, you know, your response to Chairman Blair's
 9 question was somewhat similar to the Navy's response, I
 10 believe, and, you know, I'm wondering — and this is kind
 11 of a — more of a comment than a question.

12 When someone completes basic training —
 13 they have gone through, you know, all the physical and
 14 mental demands of basic training — they must pass, you
 15 know, certain hurdles and meet standards. And the PFT
 16 also is a standard that you have that people have to pass
 17 periodically.

18 You know, the question about how physical
 19 fitness relates to performance is one that, you know,
 20 we've been grappling with, you know, because what
 21 happens to a young airman when he gets out of — or she
 22 gets out of basic training, is generally they go off to a
 23 school.

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1 So, you know, if I'm going to be an
 2 avionics maintenance person — it could be a male or
 3 female — then, you know, I have to go to the —
 4 presumably, you know, all the tests that are given, both
 5 written, maybe oral and physical, which means lifting
 6 heavy parts and turning wrenches and torquing and all
 7 those kinds of things.

8 And at the end of that training period,
 9 you presume — I would presume, you know, that that
 10 person now you can certify to the field as someone
 11 competent and qualified to do their job. So there must
 12 be some physical aspects to that, and is there — you
 13 know, is there any measure or — I mean, that's kind of
 14 the question.

15 Is there any kind of measure there or any
 16 measure out in the field — you know, after they get
 17 there — about whether or not they are actually, you
 18 know, qualified in terms of strength to do the job?

19 COLONEL LAUB: Other than just the daily
 20 performance of the job?

21 Normally in areas where you have tasks in
 22 a job, where you perform those tasks every day, the job
 23 itself keeps you fit for the duties that you have to

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1 perform tomorrow. So, really, when we get into — The
 2 question is what happens in people whose jobs don't
 3 challenge them each day. So the lifting of — the
 4 lifting and so forth that people do every day, say, in
 5 avionics maintenance, would be one of those that would be
 6 in that category.
 7 You can, if someone claims that they don't
 8 have the ability to do something — again, gender neutral
 9 — you talk about having lifting tests and some surrogate
 10 testing where we can evaluate whether a person is having
 11 a particular problem; then evaluate it from that point on
 12 from a medical standpoint as to whether it's a problem
 13 that they need — they can rehabilitate.
 14 MS. POPE: Barbara Pope.
 15 How closely does your division work with
 16 basic training and advanced training at Lackland?
 17 COLONEL LAUB: My division doesn't work
 18 very closely with that group at all.
 19 MS. POPE: Do you set the policy? I mean,
 20 do you coordinate on what their physical fitness...
 21 COLONEL LAUB: As far as the Surgeon
 22 General's Office?
 23 MS. POPE: No. As far as what their

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1 primarily looking at this issue, looking at BMT. There
 2 are proposed follow-ons that are just in the hypothesis
 3 stage at this time.
 4 Secondly, we — 21-22 September, we held a
 5 symposium in San Antonio where all the Air Force training
 6 and MAJCOM — major command — entities were represented
 7 as far as their physical fitness representatives and —
 8 MS. POPE: By whom? Who were they
 9 represented by? At what level?
 10 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Enlisted, officers,
 11 whoever represented their — who were their POC's —
 12 point of contacts —
 13 MS. POPE: Okay.
 14 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: For example, a captain
 15 —
 16 MS. POPE: Instructors?
 17 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Instructors. And
 18 again, we were looking at officer training — all your
 19 accession programs, both officer and enlisted. Then each
 20 MAJCOM had a representative, typically the Health
 21 Promotion Director was the one.
 22 And at that symposium we looked at one of
 23 the major issues, and that's connectivity, which I

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1 physical fitness requirements are and their physical
 2 readiness.
 3 COLONEL LAUB: No, we only — we would
 4 coordinate on a package, but it would be primarily a
 5 personnel package.
 6 MS. POPE: So there's no input into what
 7 they're doing as far as being physically ready?
 8 COLONEL LAUB: From the Surgeon —
 9 MS. POPE: Overall physical fitness of the
 10 recruits leaving basic training.
 11 COLONEL LAUB: I have no knowledge of what
 12 we as an office put into the basic training program.
 13 MS. POPE: Okay.
 14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: If I could
 15 add something. My name is Lieutenant Colonel Sandy
 16 Rufkahr. I'm on the Education and Training Staff over at
 17 the Air Staff.
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Can you just step closer
 19 to the microphone so we can —
 20 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: Sure. I'm
 21 sorry.
 22 I would just like to go on record as
 23 saying that right now, basic military training is working

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1 believe is what you're asking, and that's what happens to
 2 the recruit at basic training, when they go to tech
 3 school, when they go out to their active duty assignment,
 4 what kind of — yeah.
 5 We have different programs out there, all
 6 with laudable goals of fitness for the particular people,
 7 but we are trying to address how well can we connect
 8 these together. When that BMT graduate goes out, he's
 9 used to training — physical training — five, six days a
 10 week, what are they doing at tech school? When they're
 11 done at tech school, what are they doing, following on
 12 and on?
 13 MS. POPE: And you're in the process of
 14 getting those answers?
 15 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: We are — I have the
 16 draft symposium proceedings from the symposium putting
 17 together and we have nine major points coming out of that
 18 symposium. They're not ready for the record at this
 19 time, but within a month or so. Our goal is by Christmas
 20 time to have all that compiled in a final report and we
 21 will run that up Air Force channels.
 22 MS. POPE: Do any of these — I don't want
 23 to get into the specifics, obviously, because you can't

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1 with a military medical study group to determine the
 2 right standards for their physical fitness study or for
 3 the physical fitness standards that they have at BMT.
 4 MS. POPE: So there is some coordination
 5 going on looking at —
 6 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: There is.
 7 There is.
 8 MS. POPE: Okay.
 9 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: It may not be
 10 through his office —
 11 COLONEL LAUB: Not with our office.
 12 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: — but at a
 13 much lower office. But they have issued a study to
 14 ascertain what would be the right fitness standards to
 15 establish for both genders or if there is a gender
 16 neutral standard.
 17 MS. POPE: And is it that — is that so
 18 you're looking at just basic training or is it looking
 19 also at follow-on to advanced training?
 20 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: The study which is
 21 delineated in answer to number 15, that's actually — I
 22 took that from our proposal, our study proposal.
 23 But back to your question, ma'am, it's

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1 answer that. But do they address physical fitness of
 2 those recruits that go on to advanced training?
 3 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: This symposium did,
 4 yes.
 5 MS. POPE: But, I mean, the
 6 recommendations. You said there's nine recommendations.
 7 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: In general they do.
 8 There weren't specific, you know, if it's X-amount of
 9 criterion time for a run or something here, what should
 10 it be here?
 11 MS. POPE: No, no. I'm not talking about
 12 that.
 13 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: We're not into that —
 14 MS. POPE: I'm just talking about general
 15 standards. I mean, the concern that you've got recruits
 16 that are meeting high standards in basic; they're going
 17 on to advanced training, and there's very little focus on
 18 physical fitness unless it is a specific job skill.
 19 Overall physical fitness once they leave basic training.
 20 COLONEL LAUB: Well, we do have the
 21 aerobic conditioning program that we use.
 22 MS. POPE: But it's all voluntary. I
 23 mean, instructors —

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1 COLONEL LAUB: No, ma'am.
 2 MS. POPE: Their instructors —
 3 COLONEL LAUB: No, ma'am. The aerobic
 4 conditioning program is a compliance program.
 5 MS. POPE: And what is — Can you explain
 6 the aerobic conditioning program?
 7 COLONEL LAUB: Each — Annually, each
 8 person is tested in a cycle —
 9 MS. POPE: Okay. But that's separate from
 10 their experience in advanced training.
 11 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: You mean day-to-day
 12 training that they're doing at basic training.
 13 MS. POPE: Or week-to-week. I mean, three
 14 times a week, five times a week, as far as a standard.
 15 You know, one of the concerns we heard from instructors
 16 was that the recruits go from a very rigorous, you know,
 17 physical fitness regime as far as becoming an airman.
 18 Then they go into their school, their specific school,
 19 and there is very little motivation, emphasis, input,
 20 that their instructors have to keep them physically fit.
 21 I mean, they can't fail them from
 22 graduating from their "A" school if they're not
 23 physically fit. If they meet their course work and they

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1 phases —
 2 MS. POPE: They go from almost daily to
 3 three times a week and —
 4 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: That's
 5 correct.
 6 MS. POPE: — it's very loosely
 7 structured.
 8 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: It is. And
 9 towards — as they get more phased out, you know, into
 10 more self-reliance, there is less direction mandates put
 11 upon them. That's a true statement. But it is — for
 12 the first three to four weeks of the phasing out, there
 13 are very rigorous physical conditioning programs, and
 14 especially so depending upon what you —
 15 MS. POPE: We might want to go look at
 16 that.
 17 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: And that's
 18 why I was looking to see if we have it here — if not, we
 19 have it provided to you — where the frequency of it does
 20 lighten up as they go through the phased program, but
 21 that it is a very controlled segment and they have to do
 22 that. They have to prove that they have done the
 23 physical requirements in order to move into the next

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1 have dropped out on their physical fitness that they came
 2 out of at BMT, they can still graduate. And an
 3 instructor cannot make them go out and run.
 4 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: I understand.
 5 COLONEL LAUB: That's correct.
 6 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Again, back to the
 7 symposium we held, that was of concern. That's one of
 8 the issues —
 9 MS. POPE: Okay. That was part of my
 10 question. Did that come up and that's being addressed in
 11 —
 12 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Clearly. And it's —
 13 MS. POPE: Okay.
 14 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: — being addressed in
 15 the initial stage of —
 16 MS. POPE: And I'm not asking for your
 17 answer but I am — I was curious did it come up in your
 18 symposium, because it certainly came up in our
 19 discussions.
 20 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: And we had two days
 21 worth of classic brainstorming sessions. I've still got
 22 the sheets of paper —
 23 MS. POPE: Okay.

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1 phase.
 2 That's the motivation, if you will — is
 3 in order for them to move into more phases, which allows
 4 them a lot more liberties, they have to meet the physical
 5 conditioning program. It's the carrot before the horse.
 6 But I'll be happy to provide to you the
 7 phases and show —
 8 MS. POPE: We have the phrases.
 9 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: Okay.
 10 MS. POPE: No, we've been — we've seen
 11 that. I'm just saying —
 12 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: Okay.
 13 MS. POPE: — what the policy is versus
 14 what the practice is.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can I
 16 follow-on just to get an understanding?
 17 MS. POPE: Yes.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: If I am at
 19 basic military training, I am basically going to be
 20 tested in a two-mile run, push-ups and sit-ups, and now
 21 I'm going to go — and that's just in a four-week period.
 22 Then I'm going to go to AIT, and this is going to start
 23 to lengthen and the like. And then I'm going to enter

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1 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: And being heavily
 2 addressed. Our concern there is not only is that
 3 happening — We called it — In fact, the title of the
 4 conference was — it's a long one, but Life Cycle — the
 5 first two words — i.e., one of two goals of the
 6 conference was what's happening from accession to
 7 retirement, not just accession to your next level.
 8 MS. POPE: Okay.
 9 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: You know, is the
 10 fifteen-year member getting as much attention and fitness
 11 as the three-year, as the brand new recruit? So I agree
 12 strongly.
 13 MS. POPE: Okay. Thank you.
 14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: If I can
 15 insert myself one more time just to set the record
 16 straight on the Air Force program at technical schools,
 17 they have a phase program, and during the phrase they're
 18 kind of being taken out of the BMT —
 19 MS. POPE: Right. I understand.
 20 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: Okay. So
 21 there is a physical fitness requirement at that time and
 22 they are required to do PC three times a week. I don't
 23 have all of the details. And then as they go through the

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1 the regular Air Force after my schooling and I'm going to
 2 do an aerobic-type thing.
 3 First of all, I'm having difficulty moving
 4 from what are physical events that stress an individual
 5 physically — meaning run, push-ups, sit-ups — into an
 6 aerobic atmosphere, and then I would ask then how is that
 7 tested? It's tested in an aerobic atmosphere. And I'm
 8 having some difficulty tracking the rationale in that.
 9 Could somebody help me with that?
 10 COLONEL LAUB: Yes, sir. Yes, sir, I can
 11 — Well, I hope I can. I'll do my best.
 12 What we've looked at is sub-maximal
 13 testing that we do — for the aerobic testing, is sort of
 14 a surrogate for evaluating whether someone is staying on
 15 their own personal conditioning program. And that
 16 conditioning program, they can get assistance, personal
 17 assistance, or they can design it themselves. The test
 18 itself does not actually challenge a person significantly
 19 but only looks at a person's physiology and to a level of
 20 fitness.
 21 This has been introduced because in the
 22 maximal testing, we found that by maximally testing the
 23 Air Force members every year, we usually had about two to

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1 four people drop dead of a heart attack, trying to take
 2 the test. And so we found that by going to sub-maximal
 3 testing, we could evaluate a person's overall physiology
 4 and how fit they were without having to put them through
 5 a test that put people who did not keep themselves fit at
 6 risk. And we've been very, very happy with the results
 7 of that or keeping it that way.
 8 Now, if a person fails in the sub-maximal
 9 test, then they go through a certain rehabilitation
 10 phase; and if they continue to show failure, they can
 11 actually go into mandatory directed programs. But
 12 initially it's voluntary, and then we just evaluate how
 13 well their voluntary program works.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: If I may,
 15 Madam Chairman.
 16 If I'm going to an expeditionary Air Force
 17 where I'm no longer at a bed-down site — you know, that
 18 is Reagan National Airport, you know, in the country of
 19 Reagan or something — okay? — but is in fact an
 20 airfield that's been carved out of the desert and I am
 21 truly in field conditions and whatever, does this self-
 22 administered physical fitness program meet the
 23 requirements of being an expeditionary force?

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1 COLONEL LAUB: Yes, sir.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay. You
 3 feel that our airmen that will be put into those
 4 environs, which are, you know, not a pristine environment
 5 of a Langley or something like that, that the program
 6 physically prepares them and maintains them to be able to
 7 live in that expeditionary role?
 8 COLONEL LAUB: Yes, sir.
 9 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: If I may add,
 10 hopefully, I think, to two parts of those questions.
 11 The expanded fitness battery study, which
 12 easily can go for the record — it's a published — In
 13 1997, prior to the GAO report, our office conducted a
 14 study titled "Expanded Air Force Fitness Battery." I
 15 didn't bring the report with me but we actually published
 16 a technical report, and we published the workshop
 17 proceedings where we had both in and out of government
 18 experts in exercise physiology represented at that two-
 19 day program.
 20 Those folks came up with recommendations
 21 on, in fact, what you were saying, sir — push-ups, sit-
 22 ups, bench press, leg press — primarily looking at upper
 23 body, lower body, and abdominal strength, muscle strength

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1 and muscle endurance and flexibility issues, to add or
 2 expand — hence the title, "expanded fitness battery" —
 3 to our already one-dimensional cycle ergometry program.
 4 That report was actually lauded in the GAO
 5 draft report — our report was — because of its
 6 scientifically-based approach. And that's one thing
 7 that's been different from our sister services — has
 8 been that scientific approach.
 9 And also in the — attached in here, the
 10 fourth attachment to our answers here describes our two-
 11 tier science approach. Not necessarily all that novel.
 12 It's been in the physiology science community for a
 13 while. But Tier 1 health and Tier 2 performance alludes
 14 again back to maybe the deployment issue, and that's
 15 quite labor-intensive. It takes several years to come up
 16 with standard criteria per specialty. MOS in the Army,
 17 AFSC in the Air Force.
 18 But that approach is described in here and
 19 we have — we could take all of the projects in our
 20 office and put them in each one of those categories.
 21 Body composition study would be health tier number one,
 22 and I've delineated those and hopefully that will help
 23 answer some of —

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But is the
 2 bottom line you're going to move to that and have that
 3 type of — you're going to have a standard testing
 4 program that is based on those kinds of physical
 5 attributes or not? I guess I'm —
 6 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: I can speak — not for
 7 policy, but I can speak for science. Our science
 8 approach — yes, sir — is the two tier. That's, let's
 9 have health-based criterion standards across the Air
 10 Force independent of occupation, but gender dependent,
 11 and then also ideally have occupationally dependent,
 12 gender independent standards in the performance tier.
 13 And you can see those spelled out in that
 14 matrix in attachment four there that I'm referring to
 15 here.
 16 MS. POPE: And that's part of the report
 17 that's working its way up the Air Force?
 18 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Yes, that's included
 19 in our proceeding.
 20 And another part — back to your question
 21 of that — was the issue of incentives, and the colonel
 22 over here mentioned the carrot. That's a differentiation
 23 between carrot and stick. What do we do for those folks

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1 at tech school — we are really trying to let them
 2 mature, not have someone over them all day long like an
 3 airman one-striper.
 4 But eventually they've got to become
 5 senior people that, on their own, can volitionally go out
 6 and prepare themselves for the deployment and for combat,
 7 and part of that is what are the incentives? And some of
 8 the other services have used scores in their performance
 9 reports or a balance of carrot-and-stick can be used
 10 there, and we're working — That was one of our nine
 11 recommendations, was the whole arena of incentives.
 12 MS. POPE: And from tech school, the basic
 13 physical — Is there a basic physical requirement to
 14 graduate from tech school? I mean, is it the Air Force
 15 — you have to meet the Air Force standard?
 16 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: I would have
 17 to get back to you on that one, ma'am. I know it's a
 18 condition of advancing to your phases.
 19 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: I know they have to
 20 meet the cycle ergometry standard. I know that much for
 21 a fact.
 22 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: Right.
 23 Right, they do have to meet their cycle ergometry.

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1 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Which is the Air Force
 2 current standard.
 3 MS. POPE: That's the current standard.
 4 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: That's
 5 correct.
 6 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: They have to meet
 7 that, both at BMT and at tech school. I know that one
 8 for a fact.
 9 MS. POPE: Okay.
 10 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: And again,
 11 it's still a condition of in order for you to go — to
 12 graduate, you have to have gone through all those phases.
 13 So throughout that, you will have to accomplish certain
 14 physical conditioning programs to advance to the next
 15 phase if you expect to graduate.
 16 So it's imbedded, and there are certain
 17 milestones you have to accomplish that guarantee your
 18 graduation.
 19 MS. POPE: But you can be waived.
 20 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: Yes.
 21 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: So your
 22 response — I think I'm looking at Air Force. So your
 23 response to question 7 is inaccurate?

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1 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Let me check.
 2 Number 7 has to do with gender-segregated
 3 units.
 4 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Then I'm
 5 looking at the wrong service, then. Am I looking at the
 6 wrong service?
 7 DR. SEGAL: This says, "What happens to
 8 physical conditioning and physical skills when recruits
 9 transition to AIT?"
 10 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: No, this is
 11 Air Force.
 12 Now, this reads quite similar to the
 13 response we got from the instructors in advanced training
 14 at Lackland, that we visited, of the requirements, and
 15 different than what the colonel just recited.
 16 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: I'm sorry,
 17 sir. I don't know what question you're referring to.
 18 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Number 17?
 19 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: "What happens
 20 to physical conditioning —"
 21 DR. SEGAL: 7.
 22 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: 7, 7.
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Bob, it's just — There

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1 that's pretty close to what the instructors said.
 2 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: This still doesn't
 3 necessarily mean they're different from the Air Force
 4 cycle ergometry standard.
 5 MS. POPE: They may be if they're
 6 individual. I mean, if there's a two-minute — within
 7 two minutes of the time and they met the minimum time in
 8 basic, they could be two minutes below the minimum Air
 9 Force standard.
 10 If they came — If they just came in
 11 meeting Air Force standards at the minimum level and
 12 they've got a two-minute leeway, they could be two
 13 minutes under the Air Force time.
 14 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: I understand what
 15 you're saying. I can't speak to that as I'm not an AETC
 16 standard-setter there for —
 17 MS. POPE: Right.
 18 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: I really am not.
 19 That's —
 20 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: Again, in
 21 talking to the standards as far as what they are versus
 22 where we would like to take them, that's being studied to
 23 make sure that they are an accurate reflection of what we

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1 is — Just for everybody who's following along, there is
 2 a revised answer to question 7 that you will find —
 3 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Oh, okay.
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — on the page after the
 5 page numbered 5.
 6 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: It's actually number
 7 17.
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Between 5 and 6 in Tab U.
 9 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Tab U.
 10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. There is a
 11 question 7 response on page 4 which is superseded by the
 12 question number 7 answer on page — I'll call it 5A.
 13 Okay?
 14 DR. SEGAL: But that's what I think he's
 15 looking at.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.
 17 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: That's what
 18 I'm reading.
 19 DR. SEGAL: That's what he's reading.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. I'm sorry.
 21 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I'm reading
 22 right here (Indicating). I mean, I'll just — "In either
 23 situation, the recruit must pass a monthly physical

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1 feel is the right level of fitness.
 2 MR. PANG: I think we need clarity on this
 3 one. You know, I don't know what it means. It says
 4 "completion of a 2 mile run within 2 minutes of the time
 5 the recruit recorded in BMT." So if the recruit recorded
 6 in BMT the minimum time —
 7 MS. POPE: Right.
 8 MR. PANG: — you know, and then — you
 9 know, I don't think you're going to —
 10 DR. CANTOR: You could be below standards.
 11 MR. PANG: — allow somebody to go below
 12 the standard and —
 13 MS. POPE: Well, but you can waive them.
 14 You can — The standard — The physical fitness standards
 15 can be waived.
 16 MR. PANG: Yeah. You see, when you say
 17 "within the time," it could mean, you know, if you run
 18 eight minutes, you've got to be — I don't know. I don't
 19 know what —
 20 MR. MOORE: Either six or ten, right?
 21 MR. PANG: Well, six or ten, I guess. I
 22 don't know.
 23 COLONEL LAUB: We can get a clarification

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1 fitness test that requires the completion of a 2 mile run
 2 within 2 minutes of the time the recruit recorded in
 3 BMT."
 4 That's what they're saying the physical
 5 requirement is to get out of AIT. That's what this says.
 6 I don't know if that's accurate or inaccurate.
 7 DR. MOSKOS: You get two minutes slower.
 8 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Within two
 9 minutes.
 10 DR. SEGAL: And it's not the answer to the
 11 question that's in this 7 (Indicating), then.
 12 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Yeah. That's
 13 a different question 7.
 14 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: This is actually 17 in
 15 our block.
 16 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 17 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: This was supplied by
 18 Air Education and Training Command.
 19 DR. SEGAL: Yeah. So it's actually 17.
 20 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: That is pretty
 21 consistent with what the instructors told us they had to
 22 achieve when I was down at Lackland, by the way, if
 23 memory serves me right. I'd have to check my notes, but

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1 on that.
 2 MR. MOORE: That's a good point. Two
 3 minutes below the minimum would be a failure in any other
 4 service.
 5 MR. PANG: Yeah.
 6 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: You know, I have to
 7 say this is one of the five that our science shop didn't
 8 answer. We'll get an answer on that, though.
 9 DR. SEGAL: We need the full bureaucracy
 10 to get these all answered.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Mady, you're up.
 12 DR. SEGAL: Okay. And I want to follow-on
 13 with two questions and it has to do with a lot of this
 14 discussion, too. One on Tier 1 and one on Tier 2, if I
 15 understand these correctly. So that Tier 1 is the
 16 measure of fitness that's general for the whole Air
 17 Force, and then Tier 2 is the AFSC specific.
 18 Okay. With regard to the Tier 1 — I'm on
 19 page 3 of the answers. This is number — answer to
 20 number 2. That when you talked about this scientific
 21 workshop, this study and scientific workshop that you're
 22 doing — because you're examining the possibility of
 23 expanding your physical fitness test, basically — I'm

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1 concerned about — Well, I'd like to know the actual
 2 scientific work that this is based on.
 3 And I'm concerned, because given our
 4 discussion with the other services about the view that
 5 flexibility is in fact a component of physical fitness,
 6 but because there are no measures of total flexibility
 7 that are developed, it's being — it's not being — it's
 8 not one of the physical performances that you're
 9 considering measuring — It says it would not provide
 10 significant benefits. I'd like to know how you came to
 11 that conclusion, because some of our discussion would
 12 indicate that it would provide significant benefits in
 13 the measure of physical fitness, especially for men and
 14 women together.
 15 COLONEL LAUB: Just for flexibility? I
 16 think a better way to — or at least the way I look at it
 17 is — I first agree with you that flexibility is an
 18 important part of fitness. The question is how can we
 19 routinely put it into practice in a way that can be
 20 distributed throughout the force and manage it at a level
 21 parallel with the way that we manage the physical
 22 standards right now?
 23 Physical standards — Physical fitness

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1 standards are a dynamic process. And from Major
 2 Baumgartner's perspective, he sees it from his charge,
 3 which is to continually look at the issues that are
 4 involved in it. As you transition over into the area of
 5 policy, then we really have to see what works and what
 6 we're going to be able to make work within the force.
 7 And the only thing that I can say to you
 8 right now in terms of your question is yes, it's
 9 important. Right now, we don't really have a good
 10 measurement tool that we can really make a policy on, but
 11 that doesn't mean that that can't happen in the future as
 12 more research is done.
 13 DR. SEGAL: So perhaps maybe you'd want to
 14 have some research done to look to see if you could
 15 develop a good measure of flexibility if you think that
 16 it is an important measure of physical fitness.
 17 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Just a little
 18 background right specifically on that. The write-up that
 19 you aptly pointed out here came from our published
 20 technical report that you're referring to on page 3 here.
 21 I'm very familiar with those. I wrote those in there.
 22 DR. SEGAL: And they also are repeated in
 23 the back where there's more on that report as well.

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1 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: That report — right
 2 — is in one of the attachments.
 3 Those came straight out of our proceedings
 4 document which listed the recommendations from the
 5 science panel I referred to earlier. The government
 6 panel. Those members of that panel, which included Army
 7 and Navy representatives as well as outside — the late
 8 Dr. Pollack from the University of Florida, Dr. Nieman
 9 from Appalachian State, other experts in the area of
 10 exercise physiology.
 11 The consensus was flexibility is
 12 important; it's one of the five major health components
 13 of fitness; should be strongly encouraged in the training
 14 sense; all — In other words, all Air Force members
 15 should take part in flexibility training routinely.
 16 However, testing it en masse — hence the
 17 recommendation here — is difficult. "A," there's not
 18 one specific measure — For example, the classical sit-
 19 and-reach test doesn't measure whole body flexibility. I
 20 could be very inflexible in my shoulder joints but quite
 21 flexible in the lower back and hamstrings and do very
 22 well in that test, and someone will say, "He's
 23 wonderfully flexible," but I fail in the shoulder

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1 flexion.
 2 In other words, it's not a measure of
 3 whole body flexibility.
 4 DR. SEGAL: Neither is a push-up a whole
 5 body —
 6 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Well, that —
 7 Physiologically and scientifically, there are differences
 8 there.
 9 DR. SEGAL: — whole body muscle endurance
 10 and strength.
 11 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Yes, to a point. It's
 12 not quite the same parallel. There's a bit more of an
 13 apple and orange there, and that's from the science
 14 community.
 15 Secondly —
 16 DR. SEGAL: Could we get a copy of that
 17 full report?
 18 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: That's published.
 19 Public release. Yes.
 20 Yes, ma'am. You sure can.
 21 DR. SEGAL: If you could send it to us.
 22 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: And secondly, the
 23 reports — the general consensus from the experts was in

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1 their experience in the field of testing it is that the
 2 outcomes — we always want to look at metrics and
 3 outcomes — were not that strong. The outcomes we get
 4 from other tests tell us. The cycle ergometry, I can
 5 tell the level of aerobic fitness in my force. The sit-
 6 and-reach test, I can't necessarily get a solid outcome
 7 from that on what the level of flexibility of my force
 8 is.
 9 So the payback for the effort into that
 10 test is not there as there is with other tests.
 11 DR. SEGAL: Tell me what the outcomes are
 12 for the —
 13 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Well, in general, any
 14 test — If I want to do a physical test — a physical
 15 fitness test — I want to measure a component. The cycle
 16 ergometry tells me the VO₂, the volume oxygen consumed.
 17 I know what the aerobic fitness level is of my force from
 18 that test of the group.
 19 The sit-and-reach test, it tells me a very
 20 specific measure. It doesn't tell me the whole body
 21 flexibility of members or the group of members.
 22 DR. SEGAL: So if you had — if a test
 23 could be developed that would measure more of the whole

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1 body flexibility — I mean, maybe sit-and-reach would be
 2 one component of a three- or four-component test to
 3 measure flexibility — then you would feel that it would
 4 have a good outcome?
 5 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: That's a possibility.
 6 DR. SEGAL: Possibility.
 7 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: That's in my
 8 analytical stage there.
 9 And yes, I actually have a report here
 10 that looks at some of the latest literature. And if I
 11 may just make a comment here, there are some late 1997-
 12 1998 published articles — I have a few here from the
 13 European Journal of Physiology — that say certain
 14 activities — flexibility can inhibit certain types of
 15 exercise training.
 16 The bottom line is it's equivocal of
 17 findings of flexibility, unlike the other categories of
 18 fitness.
 19 DR. SEGAL: Well, I mean, you could talk
 20 about upper body strength. If you have a whole lot of
 21 upper body strength and you have a large muscle mass, it
 22 could interfere with other sorts of measures of fitness
 23 as well. I mean, there are a lot of trade-offs. If

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1 people have a lot in any one, then it can be a problem in
2 the others.
3 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Sure. I can say
4 scientifically that there's — in general, it's a convex
5 curve when it comes to flexibility. Those with very low
6 joint flexibility and those with very high tend to have
7 the greatest amount — you have a "U" shape — have the
8 greatest amount of injury and are prone to problems.
9 Those in the middle tend to be safe.
10 DR. SEGAL: So it would mean a different
11 kind of scoring perhaps.
12 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Right.
13 COLONEL LAUB: At a particular point you
14 get to where you need to test things that you can work
15 with from a policy standpoint and trust the fact that,
16 overall, with the requirement for overall fitness in
17 conjunction with an encouragement in a community that
18 wants to get involved and that voluntarily people will
19 still participate in those processes even when we can't
20 measure them very well.
21 DR. SEGAL: What kind of equipment do you
22 need to from cycle ergometry test?
23 COLONEL LAUB: It's a computer and a

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1 or number of specific injuries could be established."
2 DR. SEGAL: Okay.
3 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: So, in other words,
4 there's science basis to whether or not flexibility
5 testing provides us with outcomes that are — give us
6 solid information.
7 DR. SEGAL: Would it be —
8 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: I could find a person
9 that's very flexible and another one that's very
10 inflexible, but as far as the injury risk —
11 DR. SEGAL: Injury rates. Okay.
12 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Which is important.
13 That's part of the big health Tier 1 definition.
14 DR. SEGAL: If we could get actually
15 copies not only of that one, but the others that you've
16 been using to make this decision, that would be very
17 helpful for us.
18 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Again, this part is
19 early on. I'd be —
20 DR. SEGAL: I understand. But you're in
21 the process of developing, which is an important time to
22 have these discussions —
23 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Sure.

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1 stationary cycle that are linked together.
2 DR. SEGAL: So it does take a great deal
3 of equipment to test people en masse for this.
4 COLONEL LAUB: You've made a pretty good
5 investment in that, yes.
6 DR. SEGAL: Okay. So unlike the other
7 services — Right. So some of the services, what — one
8 of the criteria is practicality of administration to
9 large numbers of people all over the world and such. But
10 you're administering this annually; is that correct?
11 COLONEL LAUB: Yes, that's correct.
12 DR. SEGAL: Worldwide, from among all Air
13 Force personnel with —
14 COLONEL LAUB: That's correct.
15 DR. SEGAL: Okay. So presumably something
16 like a trunk rotation test which might require something
17 that hangs on a wall would be relatively simple compared
18 to the cycles and computers that you need to measure the
19 ergometry.
20 Okay.
21 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Relatively speaking in
22 that it adds more. I mean, we've got line commanders out
23 there saying, "How much more time are you going to take

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1 DR. SEGAL: — to be aware of the
2 potential —
3 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Again, this is — I'm
4 trying to support why we're looking at a science basis
5 before we just throw out a test.
6 DR. SEGAL: And you can talk a little when
7 we finish about some of the concerns about not doing it.
8 With regard to the Tier 2, on page 5 of
9 your response it says "everyone, regardless of gender,
10 must ultimately pass the specific physical requirements
11 of their career specialty in addition to meeting BMT
12 graduation standards."
13 Now, is this something that's still in the
14 process of development? That you're doing a task
15 analysis to develop the physical requirements for each of
16 the AFSC's?
17 COLONEL LAUB: Yes. And hopefully we will
18 always be continuing to improve on the development of
19 that because that's a very difficult thing to —
20 DR. SEGAL: Could you tell us something
21 about how that's being done? And is it being done —
22 Who's actually doing the development of the task specific
23 performances required? And is it only physical, or is it

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1 from me to take my guy over and test him?" We're looking
2 closely at that in our expanded fitness battery. We're
3 measuring down to seconds how much time between stations,
4 how much total time taken will this member have to go?
5 We multiply that by 300,000 people, that's a resource
6 investment. Time is, in some ways, more valuable than
7 equipment.
8 DR. SEGAL: Okay. The question is — I
9 would urge you in this development to be concerned about
10 the potential trade-offs of not measuring the full — not
11 measuring the full range of physical fitness and be aware
12 of the problems that exist with these measures that
13 you're thinking of adding, that the other services are
14 using, that also have difficulties associated with them.
15 But I want to move on to my Tier 2
16 question. We can maybe follow-up later.
17 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: May I add one more
18 comment?
19 DR. SEGAL: Sure.
20 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Just as an example,
21 from a recently published study here in a peer review
22 journal, here's one line out of the conclusions: "No
23 influence of flexibility on the total number of injuries

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1 other kinds of task specific analyses that are being
2 done?
3 COLONEL LAUB: From just the task work
4 itself? Do I understand the — What we do is we have
5 certain basic surrogate tasks; that we make the
6 assumption that if you can perform these, that's
7 sufficient to show that you have the basic ability to
8 perform the job. And the question is, how well do those
9 surrogate tasks transfer over into actual job
10 performance? And that's the issue that we always have to
11 be cognizant of in making sure that we continually
12 evaluate.
13 DR. SEGAL: Where do you get — Backing up
14 a stage, then, before you developed the surrogates, what
15 has been your methodology for developing the
16 understanding of what's in each AFSC that needs to be
17 performed? How do you get the list of tasks in the jobs
18 themselves?
19 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: I think you're — To
20 answer that, your first comment is very true. This is,
21 as titled, a concept. This is conceptually what we've
22 worked towards. And each paragraph below here — For
23 example, box 1A. In that text, it lists the projects

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1 that apply to developing standards within, for example,
 2 aerobic fitness, health.
 3 We have projects — For example, we've got
 4 a project that's nearly complete with the Institute for
 5 Aerobics Research in Dallas. A Dr. Stephen Blair, an
 6 internationally known epidemiologist — actually that's
 7 physiology — he's doing work for us here, helping us
 8 develop a standard in this arena that would be a health
 9 standard.
 10 Now, to develop an AFSC specific standard
 11 here would be then beyond the more ultimate goal. Have
 12 we started projects in here? We have a few and I've
 13 cited some of those. For example, a recently completed
 14 project for firefighters that is job or occupationally
 15 specific. Have we done it for all AFSC's? No. That's
 16 — And again, I cited in the literature here — I talked
 17 with the British Army personnel on that. They spent
 18 250,000 — Don't quote me on this one. If I remember
 19 right, it was around 250,000 pounds per year for six
 20 years to develop AFSC specific criterion and that was
 21 only for their enlisted — only the Army.
 22 So it's quite labor-intensive. They
 23 actually went out to the field. They video-taped the

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1 folks — between the training establishments and the
 2 folks in the field who are working with personnel in the
 3 AFSC to see if — what the job is requiring out in the
 4 field and how they're being trained in the school house?
 5 COLONEL LAUB: To my knowledge, it's more
 6 of a request type basis where people — if people notice
 7 there's a problem with a current issue, then they bring
 8 it to our attention. There's not a — There's not a
 9 regular process that goes on where we get together to
 10 review that.
 11 DR. SEGAL: Thank you.
 12 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: If I may point out one
 13 sentence that I have in the text here. This happens to
 14 be on page 23 of the answers we submitted. It's in
 15 attachment four. "Performance requirements vary across
 16 the military specialties; therefore, physical fitness
 17 performance standards based on physical requirements of
 18 duty tasks specific to AFSC's, or at least broad groups
 19 of similar AFSC's, are needed. Grouping of AFSC's may be
 20 necessary as development of detailed standards for each
 21 specific duty/occupation is highly resource intensive."
 22 Hence, you see our notional diagram of
 23 four groupings there. It may be three groupings, may be

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1 activities. They interviewed commanders. They did
 2 subject questionnaires for the personnel. For lifting a
 3 — it's much like his camera there (Indicating) — a
 4 heavy tripod off the back of a flatbed truck, carry it
 5 out to the field a certain distance and run back.
 6 That whole scenario is an example of how
 7 do we do this? They found out that roughly half of their
 8 women and about a quarter of their men could not complete
 9 this specific task, and those that could do it had a
 10 twofold problem. One, they were doing more than the
 11 normal amount of work for the task; and secondly, they
 12 had an increased rate of back injuries because they were
 13 carrying more than they should have been doing. So they
 14 had to say, "What do we need to do to get some entrance
 15 criterion into this?"
 16 That's an example of a performance or job
 17 occupationally specific one that we're working towards.
 18 A lot of work to do in that area. Right now, we're
 19 trying to just solidify everything we can across here.
 20 COLONEL LAUB: This also leads to the
 21 technological design of the jobs themselves. Oftentimes
 22 we look at is there a piece of equipment — or as the
 23 cameras get smaller, we don't have to carry as much, and

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1 five. But we could take bomber pilot and cargo pilot
 2 maybe in the same grouping, whereas, the PJ rescue jumper
 3 who has to have high aerobic capacity may be in the next
 4 grouping up. But we may not be able to have enough
 5 resources dedicated to each individual one, but that's a
 6 lot better than, you know, having none.
 7 DR. SEGAL: Right. Thanks.
 8 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Bob Dare.
 9 You'll have to forgive me because my
 10 experience is with one of those services that didn't take
 11 a scientific approach to PT. They just did it. So my
 12 question is why do you do what you do? And specifically
 13 when did you institute this test that's conducted in
 14 basic training? Do you know what year that was
 15 instituted and why?
 16 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: As far as the
 17 ergometry test, you mean?
 18 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: No.
 19 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: I'm sorry.
 20 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: No. The two-
 21 mile run, the push-ups and the sit-ups in BMT, what year
 22 was that instituted and why?
 23 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: Hang on a

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1 we have to reevaluate those as —
 2 DR. SEGAL: So you're saying that the best
 3 methodology to really do that is to do — use this
 4 method, which is labor-intensive and very expensive, to
 5 find out what people are actually doing on the job and
 6 how they're doing it.
 7 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Well, those would be
 8 words I didn't print in this. I wouldn't say that's the
 9 best. That is a method that's been performed by a
 10 military organization. In this case, the British Army.
 11 Whether or not we do that, as the colonel alluded to,
 12 there's other ways around it. Technology additions are
 13 always helpful.
 14 Team approach. Do we always have to have
 15 one person doing the one specific task? Why not three
 16 people? How many people does it take the lift a missile?
 17 COLONEL LAUB: And these are all solved
 18 within the management of the job itself. And if it shows
 19 that there are people who are showing up that are for
 20 some reason physically unable to perform what they expect
 21 to be the normal task, then we try to have feedback.
 22 DR. SEGAL: Do you have routine feedback
 23 actually between the proponents for the AFSC and the

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1 second.
 2 I can tell you — and I'll have to confirm
 3 — that it was back in 1993, when they revised and
 4 changed the physical standards. And at the time, it was
 5 because they wanted to put in more bodybuilding, more...
 6 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Muscle strength.
 7 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: Thank you —
 8 to incorporate that because they believed it needed to be
 9 more well rounded. At the time, it was just the run.
 10 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And, yet,
 11 there's no continuation of it in the operational Air
 12 Force.
 13 COLONEL LAUB: That's correct.
 14 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, let me
 15 say this. There's no formal process for assessing
 16 whether an individual is maintaining that more total type
 17 of fitness, if you will. The only way you assess it
 18 right now is you assess cardiovascular, correct?
 19 COLONEL LAUB: Assess cardiovascular, yes.
 20 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 21 COLONEL LAUB: That's correct.
 22 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: And part of
 23 the reason, if I may, that they incorporated more aerobic

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1 training type of exercises is to expose the Nintendo
 2 generation to the beginning of good aerobic fitness
 3 because it was found that, you know, these young people
 4 coming in had not done a whole lot of exercising.
 5 So it was more from the group commander's
 6 perspective at that time to start building the foundation
 7 for a good health program. Not necessarily to make them,
 8 you know, meet Air Force standards as much as he really
 9 thought he was going to build the foundation for a
 10 lifelong healthy approach to physical fitness.
 11 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 12 COLONEL LAUB: I really want to emphasize
 13 that we're really talking about a culture, trying the
 14 develop a culture of basic fitness and putting in the
 15 incentives to try to do that rather than to see if
 16 somebody can run two miles.
 17 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: But I don't
 18 understand, then, why — if that's important to the Air
 19 Force, why isn't there a continuation of that through the
 20 process — you know, through the entire life cycle of an
 21 airman, if you will?
 22 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: There is in the sense
 23 of — We just had briefings that have gone to the senior

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1 Air Force leadership, in process this very week, on the
 2 expanded fitness battery I alluded to earlier. That
 3 would be some type of muscle strength, muscle endurance.
 4 It may be a push-up/sit-up to start with, with continuing
 5 science ongoing. In the laboratory I'm building right
 6 now, I'm doing that work to look at upper body, abdominal
 7 and lower body muscle strength and endurance testing.
 8 And again, when I say "testing," we don't
 9 want —
 10 MS. POPE: Across the Air Force. I'm
 11 sorry, but —
 12 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Across the Air Force.
 13 MS. POPE: So this is part of your
 14 discussion of life cycle. So it would be from BMT until
 15 you retire.
 16 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Well, it would be —
 17 COLONEL LAUB: I want to emphasize we have
 18 not as a corporate Air Force decided to do any of this.
 19 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Right.
 20 MS. POPE: No, we understand that.
 21 COLONEL LAUB: These are some discussions
 22 that we're having right now and I think it's important
 23 for us to just realize that we're looking at that issue.

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1 But I don't think that we will have, in any stretch of
 2 the imagination, an effort to try to continue the fitness
 3 testing levels that we required in basic military
 4 training.
 5 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I understand
 6 that. I guess — And I don't think you can answer this.
 7 I guess what I would like is an official Air Force
 8 response to, one, the date when this was instituted in
 9 basic training —
 10 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: I'll get you
 11 that.
 12 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: — and the
 13 reason for it.
 14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: I'll get you
 15 a response to that.
 16 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 17 DR. CANTOR: I guess the question I have
 18 is related to your response to Mady, and that is, when
 19 you were talking about flexibility, you were talking
 20 about — And this was in your Tier 1 question. You were
 21 talking about the effects of general fitness, various
 22 aspects of general fitness on injury rates.
 23 What I'd like you to do is then relate —

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1 use injury rates as a kind of mediator and relate it to
 2 — as a way of relating Tier 1 to Tier 2; because right
 3 now you're talking as if these are very separate aspects,
 4 but we are, after all, dealing with one person and their
 5 life cycle.
 6 So couldn't you say that — would you say
 7 that you are creating a general fitness standard test and
 8 training program that makes people less prone for
 9 injuries that would inhibit their ability to meet the
 10 occupation specific standards that you're articulating in
 11 Tier 2?
 12 Does that make sense to you?
 13 COLONEL LAUB: Okay. If I understand your
 14 question correctly, does the type of fitness — overall
 15 general fitness that we encourage people to be involved
 16 in reduce their risk of injury when they're performing
 17 their occupational tasks?
 18 DR. CANTOR: Exactly. Exactly.
 19 COLONEL LAUB: I believe that —
 20 DR. CANTOR: Do you have an analysis of
 21 that? I mean, since —
 22 COLONEL LAUB: I don't personally have an
 23 analysis. I know I believe that to be true, but I —

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1 DR. CANTOR: I mean, that seems pretty
 2 critical because it's a piece of what everybody's asking
 3 that is this life cycle approach. I mean, you know, on
 4 the one hand you are acknowledging that it's important to
 5 look both at general fitness and at occupation specific
 6 standards; but on the other hand, how are you connecting
 7 those?
 8 I mean, one would hope that when you
 9 connect the general fitness to the ability to, in the
 10 field, engage in occupational specific...
 11 COLONEL LAUB: Occupational specific
 12 standards as opposed to occupational specific testing —
 13 okay? —
 14 DR. SEGAL: What's the difference?
 15 COLONEL LAUB: Oh, okay. I'm glad you
 16 asked.
 17 Okay. As I said, some occupations test
 18 themselves as you perform the duties each day. A person
 19 isn't asked to take one of these surrogate tests, like
 20 can you lift forty pounds over your head, unless you show
 21 on the job that you can't perform the job. Otherwise,
 22 you don't do any of these tests.
 23 DR. CANTOR: Okay. Well, for the purposes

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1 of my question —
 2 COLONEL LAUB: Whereas, in firefighters —
 3 DR. CANTOR: I think either of those — I
 4 mean, either there's a surrogate for it —
 5 COLONEL LAUB: Right.
 6 DR. CANTOR: — or, indeed, you end up
 7 being injured so you can't do it —
 8 COLONEL LAUB: Right.
 9 DR. CANTOR: — day to day.
 10 So either of those would work. I don't...
 11 COLONEL LAUB: Sure.
 12 DR. CANTOR: Okay. But I do think — I
 13 would like some sense of what — and maybe again it's in
 14 your report that has not yet gone up the channels, but
 15 some sense of how you would be connecting the overall
 16 fitness you're doing.
 17 And this is another way of saying that —
 18 what Chairman Blair said. That is, that — how does
 19 general fitness relate to preparedness or readiness, I
 20 mean. And I'm trying to take your own matrix of these
 21 two tiers and say what do you look at that connects Tier
 22 1 to Tier 2? Do you look at anything? Injuries would be
 23 one way to think of it, but maybe there are others.

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1 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: In the attachment
 2 number three, page 19 of mine, at the bottom, there's the
 3 comment that says — talks about identifying physical
 4 fitness test measures and standards. That paragraph.
 5 The last sentence there says, "Generally speaking, higher
 6 levels of physical fitness relate to both improved health
 7 and increased physical performance capability," which is
 8 right on the target of your question.
 9 DR. CANTOR: Right. But it's very
 10 general, right?
 11 COLONEL LAUB: But we don't —
 12 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Right, it's general.
 13 COLONEL LAUB: Do we evaluate the actual
 14 connectivity or have some metric that does that? Is that
 15 — I believe that's your —
 16 DR. CANTOR: In specific occupational —
 17 COLONEL LAUB: — question. And the
 18 answer to that is not to my knowledge, that we actually
 19 have a direct connectivity to that.
 20 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: I can say — Again,
 21 speaking only scientifically and conceptually, not
 22 policy-wise, I can say that even though I've demarcated
 23 the two tiers here, I've done that more so for

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1 understanding and introduction, but we don't necessarily
 2 treat them completely independent.
 3 We know of someone that's meeting the
 4 health standard, that a performance standard may be above
 5 that. The closer they — The higher they are in one, the
 6 more it does relate to the other.
 7 An example may be — And again, I'm
 8 speaking only scientifically here. Let's say thirty-two
 9 milliliters of oxygen per kilogram of body weight per
 10 minute is the standard of aerobic fitness for a desk
 11 clerk and that person has a capacity of forty ML's.
 12 They're clearly above what's considered by the experts as
 13 the minimum health, and the forty may be closer to three
 14 or four or five other occupations as far as performance
 15 minimums.
 16 So there's a — It's not like one doesn't
 17 relate to the other.
 18 DR. CANTOR: Okay. I won't keep pushing
 19 this. Just one more minute. Well, for my colleagues.
 20 And that is, this is where the distinction
 21 — and as a scientist, I think it's fair for me to say
 22 this — between science and reality gets a little blurry
 23 here.

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1 I mean, that is, it's fair to say that at
 2 a general level of the model you just outlined it's true,
 3 but it might be the case, for all we know, that the —
 4 I'm sure this isn't true, but that the Air Force fitness
 5 standards, the general fitness standards — in fact,
 6 there is no resemblance to anything that would impact on
 7 specific occupational specialties and the ability to do
 8 them.
 9 I'm quite sure that's not true, but —
 10 DR. SEGAL: But the question is what's the
 11 correlation.
 12 DR. CANTOR: Well, I mean, you said
 13 there's an overall correlation, but that doesn't tell us
 14 anything about whether this — And this goes back to, for
 15 example, why you would or wouldn't want flexibility to be
 16 in — In other words, what I'm anxious to hear about —
 17 perhaps in the future, in some ideal world — would be
 18 whether there are groupings of occupational specialties
 19 that would require you or lead you to emphasize certain
 20 aspects of overall general fitness because that would
 21 reduce injuries and/or increase the ability to carry out
 22 those occupational specialties; hence, connecting Tier 1
 23 to Tier 2.

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1 COLONEL LAUB: Sure. Sure.
 2 DR. CANTOR: And I don't think you can
 3 just do it in the laboratory. I mean, I don't think you
 4 can just say there's a, you know —
 5 COLONEL LAUB: Point well taken.
 6 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Splendid point. I
 7 agree. I totally agree. And that would be the straw and
 8 mortar —
 9 DR. CANTOR: I'm closing.
 10 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: — between the bricks
 11 of the tiers.
 12 DR. CANTOR: Yeah.
 13 COLONEL LAUB: Excellent point.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: Well, I'm Charles Moskos.
 15 This is sort of taking off from both Bob
 16 and Nancy. Looking at basic training, it seems like if
 17 it wasn't broke, why fix it? What was the big issue?
 18 Most of these jobs — I mean, it's also interesting,
 19 looking at one of these — on the talking paper or
 20 background paper. For example, your physical standards
 21 are much lower than those of the other services; yet, Air
 22 Force people perform their jobs well, and you can have 15
 23 percentile of the USA average level compared to the Army

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1 40 percentile. And I don't know what it is for the
 2 Marines or Navy, but it's probably in that same range.
 3 So what's the big deal? I mean, the Air
 4 Force — most of these jobs don't require, you know,
 5 brute strength or great endurance. Air Force people have
 6 been deployed in funny countries for decades.
 7 DR. SEGAL: They're smarter and that makes
 8 up for it.
 9 DR. MOSKOS: And they may be smarter.
 10 Which is true, by the way. The Air Force
 11 people are smarter as based upon —
 12 DR. SEGAL: They measure cognitively
 13 higher on the cognitive tests on average.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: Right, they are.
 15 And you've been the most civilized of the
 16 services. You treat your people the best.
 17 I don't get it. Why go through all these
 18 conniptions here?
 19 COLONEL LAUB: We can provide a response
 20 to that in —
 21 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: Right.
 22 DR. MOSKOS: No, just your own opinion
 23 here. I don't care about that. I don't want a written

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1 response.
 2 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: I have to go
 3 back to —
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Right.
 5 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: You know, I
 6 recently left BMT to come up to the Air Staff, and so I
 7 was there when they started looking at the physical
 8 conditioning side of BMT. More from the perspective of
 9 they really believed — and honestly, they really
 10 believed in doing more than just running. They felt that
 11 laying the good foundation, trying to build habits, so
 12 that when they go on and maybe left to their own devices,
 13 that somewhere, somehow, they found out that they could
 14 do something that wasn't as terrible — as strenuous as
 15 they may have thought.
 16 And, also, to prevent some of the injuries
 17 that we were previously talking about. A lot of folks
 18 come in not very well prepared physically for the
 19 challenges of BMT. We had some injuries.
 20 And so it was determined, you know, we're
 21 going to start building the foundation now that — in
 22 order to be physically fit. It goes much more than just
 23 "can you do a two-mile run?" Can you — you know,

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1 encouraging them to go and work out in the gym. To lay
2 the foundations.
3 And I can still see my group commander
4 there who looked like Superman. I mean, you have to
5 envision this man who was very healthy and very fit, of
6 trying to set the standards for them to continue
7 throughout their career.
8 It wasn't so much they wanted to, you
9 know, cast stones, that the Air Force standards aren't
10 well enough. It's just we wanted to lay the foundation —
11 LIEUTENANT COLONEL STREET: State your
12 commander's name. That'll tell you.
13 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: Oh. Wolfgang
14 Gesch.
15 DR. MOSKOS: Well, anyhow, I'm just saying
16 this facetiously. Maybe it's better to be reading the
17 computer workbook rather than being in the gym in the Air
18 Force. I mean, there are, you know, points that you want
19 really technical expertise more than people who are, you
20 know, good in the gym.
21 But my other question — This I think the
22 colonel can answer probably best. What percentage of Air
23 Force basic is physical training compared to classroom

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1 education? Do you have —
2 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: I have a
3 diagram back in the office that I would be happy to fax
4 over to you. It does show a percentage of the day that's
5 dedicated to PC. If you consider that we've now
6 increased the physical conditioning to six days a week, a
7 minimum of an hour each day, that that's at least six
8 hours a week. And they put in ten hours a day, so one
9 hour out of every — almost every day is spent on
10 physical conditioning.
11 DR. MOSKOS: Is physical.
12 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Ten official
13 hours a day.
14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: Ten official.
15 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Actually 75 now is the
16 latest.
17 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Thank you.
18 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Yeah. There's a
19 nicely done talking paper from the BMT folks that
20 delineates that.
21 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: Right. And
22 I'll provide that to you.
23 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: I'll give part of a

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1 science response here in my role. At the top of
2 attachment two, page 15, part of the — this is in answer
3 to — you say, "Well, why should the Air Force" — I get
4 that question all the time. You know, you're the science
5 fitness guy. Why do you have to mess — Why do we even
6 have your office? I just have to sit behind a computer,
7 that kind of...
8 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
9 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: The first two bullets
10 on here, one deals with not just the earlier, but the
11 muscle strength, muscle endurance, flexibility
12 components. These three components are related to
13 reduced risk for non-insulin dependent diabetes,
14 osteoporosis, falling osteoarthritis, et cetera, and
15 overall health-related quality of life.
16 The reference there is 1996, U.S. Surgeon
17 General's report. A very well done report, by the way,
18 talking about overall physical activity.
19 The second bullet, American College of
20 Sports Medicine and the Centers for Disease Control
21 recommend strength-developing activities, resistance-
22 training, should be performed at least twice per week.
23 And that's for all Americans, as low as age six. These

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1 are the experts nationwide recommending this for all
2 Americans, including the military, including the Air
3 Force member who sits behind a terminal.
4 So at minimum, there is strong scientific
5 basis for that. And part of that goes back to what our
6 Surgeon General has said. You know, we have to look at
7 the whole life cycle, even beyond retirement, as far as
8 just the health care cost picture. You know, the person
9 that sits for twenty years, what are they doing for
10 twenty hours, thirty or forty years post-retirement, as
11 far as health care costs?
12 COLONEL LAUB: Besides, we want balance of
13 people.
14 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Right. I won't
15 elaborate more for the risk of saying something I
16 shouldn't.
17 DR. MOSKOS: Was there a feeling there was
18 really a problem about the physical abilities of airmen
19 and air women? I mean, was there a kind of a mood of
20 this — that, you know, people were hurting themselves
21 and not being — I mean, visually, Air Force people look
22 fine and all of that. What was the genesis of this
23 concern with physical —

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1 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: Are you
2 talking more from the basic military training side?
3 Because, again, there's two different —
4 DR. MOSKOS: Both ways.
5 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: Again,
6 speaking on behalf of the former commander, he believed
7 that the individuals coming into the service were not
8 being exposed to physical training that his generation
9 had been exposed to, such as — And so it was kind of
10 like going back, and being in the position that he was,
11 to say we want to start demonstrating the ability to do
12 this and to work at it. And again, to build that
13 foundation for a healthy lifestyle.
14 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: If I may — and I'll
15 take from the sister service, the Army — they have some
16 splendid data going back twenty years. They took their
17 1978 data from two out of their six sites — Fort Jackson
18 was one. I can't remember the other one — where they
19 had data on the entrance level of their basic trainees —
20 you might have this already — for — I believe it was
21 push-ups, sit-ups, and either a mile-and-a-half or two-
22 mile run — basic test — and they compared that data,
23 entry point and graduation, '78, to the same thing in

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1 1997.
2 So a twenty-year span. And the lines of
3 entrance to — and if I can do it your way — entrance to
4 graduation, the rate of increase was the same. The big
5 difference and why they were less fit at graduation at
6 twenty years compared to the earlier time was not because
7 of the change during training; it was solely, exclusively
8 due to lower entrance levels.
9 In other words, what our nation is
10 producing to send to basic training are much less fit
11 people. Is that a shock? No, that's very parallel with,
12 again, the Surgeon General's report showing the high
13 percentage increases and the number of sedentary
14 teenagers, the decrease in high school physical education
15 programs, et cetera. The numbers are there.
16 DR. SEGAL: Could we actually see these
17 data? Could we get these data?
18 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: That's Doctor — I'll
19 probably say his name wrong — Knapik. It starts with a
20 "K."
21 DR. SEGAL: He was here.
22 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: His data.
23 DR. SEGAL: Could we ask the Army to get

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 314</p> <p>1 us that? 2 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: I'm sorry. Actually, 3 it's published data. 4 DR. SEGAL: Because this goes to one of 5 our requirements to take a look at the fitness levels of 6 what's coming into the services. 7 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: In the U.S. Surgeon 8 General's report — Chapter 5, I believe, of the six 9 chapter report. Splendid statistics. Probably the best 10 gathered on all of that, and that's from numerous studies 11 showing the level of high school fitness, et cetera. 12 We don't have that in the Air Force. 13 That's one of the pluses and minuses of changing 14 programs. You change to improve the program, but then 15 it's hard to track data over time. 16 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: And going 17 back, as a final note on BMT and why they changed, it was 18 noted that in '93, you know, we were seeing a higher 19 incident rate of injuries that sometimes would lead to 20 discharge. And so we decided to start phasing in, you 21 know, doing a run, finding out what everybody's 22 capability was, and then having them run in their own 23 speed groups, if you will, so that they wouldn't be out</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 317</p> <p>1 correct. There is not a requirement. 2 MS. POPE: Right. 3 LIEUTENANT COLONEL STREET: It is used as 4 a requirement to phase up only, not to graduate. 5 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Even though it 6 states specifically — 7 LIEUTENANT COLONEL STREET: That's 8 correct. 9 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: — to 10 graduate. That's inaccurate. 11 DR. SEGAL: By "phase up" means to enter 12 advanced training? 13 LIEUTENANT COLONEL STREET: No. They're 14 into — Within advanced training, there's — 15 (Unintelligible.) 16 DR. SEGAL: Okay. That's what "phase up" 17 is. Okay. 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yes. To earn the 19 additional privileges, you need to perform, but not so 20 much to "graduate." 21 Okay. Well, we thank you very much for 22 coming by. As I said, we may have some follow-on 23 questions and so we may be hearing from you.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 315</p> <p>1 there running with a bunch of mustangs and hurting 2 themselves as a result. 3 So we acknowledge that some of the changes 4 to the PC was also to try and work people into a proper 5 level of fitness without causing injury. 6 MAJOR BAUMGARTNER: Stratify it. 7 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: That's 8 correct. 9 DR. SEGAL: Actually, Charlie, it was 10 because they decided that the Air Force was too 11 occupational and they needed to get more institutional. 12 So they instituted — 13 DR. MOSKOS: That's too easy. That's 14 right. 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I think we have time for 16 one more question and I'm happy to yield to anybody who 17 has a question leftover. Actually, you answered my last 18 question — 19 DR. SEGAL: I want to go home and work 20 out. 21 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Except me. 22 Yield to me. 23 DR. SEGAL: No. I want to go home and</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 318</p> <p>1 (Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the hearing in 2 the above-entitled matter was concluded.) 3 - - - 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 316</p> <p>1 work out. 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Well, we had 3 a few requests and there may be some more, and I know 4 Colonel Street will help us out. 5 LIEUTENANT COLONEL STREET: Could I 6 clarify something? Ms. Pope, you mentioned the fact that 7 — I was at Lackland when the MTT's made their complaint 8 that students were not passing the physical requirement 9 after they graduate from school. There is not a 10 requirement in advanced initial skills to pass. It was 11 strictly to phase-up. 12 MS. POPE: Right. 13 LIEUTENANT COLONEL STREET: They must pass 14 it to phase up. 15 MS. POPE: I understand. Right. 16 LIEUTENANT COLONEL STREET: So it was a 17 misnomer. There was a comment that commanders were not 18 equal in their discretion in handling and that was one of 19 the issues, is that they were letting the students 20 graduate who didn't pass the physical requirements. 21 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Then the 22 answer — the response to number 7 is inaccurate. 23 LIEUTENANT COLONEL STREET: That is</p>	

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CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES

Tuesday, November 17, 1998

1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 940

Arlington, Virginia

NOV. 17, 1998

1 Those present:
 2 Anita K. Blair, Esquire - Chairman
 3 The Honorable Frederick F.Y. Pang - Vice Chairman
 4 CSM Robert A. Dare, Jr., USA(Ret) - Commissioner
 5 Thomas Moore - Commissioner
 6 Charles Moskos, Ph.D. - Commissioner
 7 The Honorable Barbara Spyridon Pope - Commissioner
 8 - - -
 9 Stephen C. Fogleman, Esquire - Executive Director
 10 Susan L. Fry - Executive Assistant
 11 Hank Hodge - Staff Liaison
 12 James Renne, Esquire - Staff Counsel and Secretary
 13 Kathleen M. Wright, Ph.D. - Research Director
 14 Janice Laurence, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 15 Charles Johnson, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 16 Kristina Handy, Research Staff
 17 Sunny Sites, Research Staff
 18 Capt J.S. Snyder, USN - Service Representative
 19 LtCol Mary Street, USAF - Service Representative
 20 LTC Brenda L. Harris, USA - Service Representative
 21 Maj R. Scott LaShier, USMC - Service Representative
 22 - - -
 23

1 Also present:
 2 DACOWITS Review of 1997 and 1998 Base Visit Reports
 3 Elizabeth T. Bilby, Present Chair, DACOWITS
 4 Holly Hemphill, Esquire, 1997 Chair, DACOWITS
 5 Judith Youngman, Ph.D., 1996 Chair, DACOWITS
 6 CAPT Barbara L. Brehm, USN
 7 CAPT Martha E. McWatters, USN
 8 - - -
 9 Defense Counsel/Non-Service Commentary
 10 on Cross-Gender Relationships
 11 LTG Richard G. Trefry, USA(Ret)
 12 BGen Gerald L. Miller, USMC(Ret), Director of the
 13 Exchange, Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA)
 14 - - -
 15 JAG Review of Services' Policies on Cross-Gender
 16 Relationships, Including Fraternalization
 17 and Sexual Harassment
 18 COL Ronald W. White, Chief, Criminal Law Division, Office
 19 of the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army
 20 COL Joseph Composto, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate to the
 21 Commandant of the Marine Corps, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
 22 Corps
 23 CAPT William A. DeCicco, Judge Advocate General's Corps,
 24 Legal Counsel, Bureau of Naval Personnel, U.S. Navy
 25
 26 Col David W. Madsen, Chief, Military Justice Division,
 27 U.S. Air Force Legal Services Agency, Bolling Air Force
 28 Base, U.S. Air Force
 29
 30
 31
 32
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1 Col Georgette M. Toews, Director, Personnel Force
 2 Development, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel,
 3 Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
 4 COL Doug Acklin, USAF
 5 LTC Monica Gorzelnik, USA
 6 LTC Anne Ehrens-Holland, USA
 7 CDR Dave Morris, USN
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S (9:08 a.m.)
 2 DACOWITS Review of 1997 and 1998 Base Visit Reports
 3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: It's Tuesday, November
 4 17th, and this is the Congressional Commission on
 5 Military Training and Gender-Related Issues.
 6 This morning, we are very pleased to have
 7 with us representatives from the DACOWITS committee, and
 8 they are Ms. Elizabeth Bilby, who is the present Chair,
 9 Dr. Judith Youngman, who was last year's Chair, and Holly
 10 Hemphill, who was Chair the year before. And in
 11 addition, Captain Brehm, who is the Executive Director of
 12 DACOWITS, is here with us, and Captain Marty McWatters,
 13 who has been very helpful to the Commission, is sitting
 14 in with us today.
 15 As I mentioned to you earlier, our usual
 16 format has been to allow the guests to give whatever
 17 presentation they would like to, and then the
 18 commissioners simply circle around the table with
 19 questions and brief follow-ups until we've exhausted our
 20 curiosity.
 21 So, Ms. Bilby, thank you very much for
 22 coming, and please begin.
 23 MS. BILBY: Thank you very much. We're

1 very happy to be here today to do anything we can to give
 2 you the information about what DACOWITS is all about, and
 3 particularly as it relates to training. And I felt it
 4 was very important and I was very pleased that both the
 5 '97 and the '96 Chair could join me because it is this
 6 year and the previous two years that we had been tasked
 7 to include training bases as part of our task to the
 8 Secretary of Defense.
 9 So I know that we've all just been
 10 introduced and I'd like to just begin by giving you a
 11 very brief history. I think as you know, DACOWITS was
 12 formed in 1951 by then-Secretary of Defense George
 13 Marshall, and at that time, his original purpose was to
 14 form this committee to assist the Department of Defense
 15 in recruiting enough women for the armed forces due to
 16 the Korean build-up.
 17 And I might mention that he was very aware
 18 that as we were moving to an all-volunteer force, that
 19 the equation of women serving in the armed forces was a
 20 very important component.
 21 Our current mission, as it is stated in
 22 our literature, is to provide the Secretary of Defense,
 23 through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force

1 Management Policy, information, advice, and
 2 recommendations on matters and policies relating to women
 3 in the armed forces, and what we really do is serve as
 4 eyes and ears to the Secretary of Defense.
 5 We are a committee of thirty-four people
 6 currently. Our task is to be between thirty and thirty-
 7 five members. The members of DACOWITS serve for a three-
 8 year term and approximately one-third are invited to
 9 serve on the committee each year. We represent diverse
 10 backgrounds, diverse interests, diverse geography. There
 11 are currently women and men serving on the committee. We
 12 have one common thread, which is that we must be a
 13 civilian when we are currently serving on DACOWITS.
 14 We have very many prominent past members
 15 I'd like to just mention that have served on DACOWITS
 16 through the years. One of the former members is Justice
 17 Sandra Day O'Connor, who is from my home state of
 18 Arizona. There is a current representative in Congress
 19 from New Mexico, Heather Wilson, who is a former DACOWITS
 20 member. When I was on my first year on DACOWITS, Judge
 21 Susan Graber from the Supreme Court in Oregon was a
 22 member and she has currently been nominated and appointed
 23 to serve on the Appellate Court for the Ninth Circuit.

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1 So we have judges; we have attorneys; we
 2 have business owners, people in agriculture like I am.
 3 So it's a very diverse background.
 4 Where the membership is nominated from is
 5 also diverse. The Secretary of Defense annually tasks
 6 the service secretaries to nominate outstanding civilians
 7 for appointment to this committee and the services do
 8 nominate. Also, members of Congress nominate, the White
 9 House nominates, and executive-level DoD's, so they come
 10 from a diverse area as well.

11 As far as getting into our methodology,
 12 I'd like to say that when we are asked to serve, we do it
 13 as volunteers. Expenses are paid for the two annual
 14 conferences that we attend each year, but out-of-pocket
 15 expenses are borne by the members when they do the
 16 installation visits that they agree to do each year.
 17 So when a new member comes on, they come
 18 and spend five days. Three of those days are in
 19 orientation processes of how DACOWITS operates, then the
 20 actual committee, and then the member agrees to do two
 21 installation visits, probably in the region where they
 22 live, which is one of the reasons we have the geographic
 23 diversity.

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1 All of the information that we deal with
 2 when we get to the conference level comes out of these
 3 installation visits that the members give. To give you
 4 an overview of what's happened in the last three years as
 5 we have been the Chair, we have visited in the last three
 6 years over 193 installations in the military, covering
 7 all five services, both CONUS and overseas; so in every
 8 operational environments overseas, both in the Pacific
 9 and in the European and Atlantic theater. And the way
 10 that we conduct our visits, we meet in very small focus
 11 groups with men and women, by rank and by gender, so that
 12 we have an informal discussion.

13 So what DACOWITS deals with at the
 14 installation visits when we do an inbrief with the
 15 commander of the installation, and also at the outbrief
 16 when we talk to the commander, is we are dealing in the
 17 perceptions of the men and women that we talk to.
 18 We do not have an agenda. We go into a
 19 focus group by saying, "What's on your mind," "How's it
 20 going," and "If you have five minutes to spend with the
 21 Secretary of Defense, what would you want to tell him?"
 22 So that when we get ready to do an installation report
 23 out of the installation, we deal with the perceptions of

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1 the members that we talk to. And we don't do individual
 2 cases or individual perceptions. We take a theme or what
 3 we hear that's most on the minds of our soldiers,
 4 sailors, airmen and marines. We also visit Coast Guards.
 5 We have in the last three years been
 6 tasked to visit also training installations and I'm going
 7 to let Holly Hemphill speak to you on that issue, but
 8 first I would like to just use an example of the process
 9 that we use where it relates to gender-integrated basic
 10 training.

11 When I took over as Chair at the very
 12 beginning of 1998, the media and the questions that I was
 13 most asked — and I think it's because of the time frame
 14 of when I took over the Chair — is, "What is your stand
 15 on gender-integrated training?" My answer was, "DACOWITS
 16 does not have a recommendation on gender-integrated
 17 training at this time."

18 As the Chair of DACOWITS, I have to be
 19 very careful to try to get people to understand that our
 20 recommendations come after our lengthy process. Our
 21 process — which, in the spring of '98, we did make a
 22 recommendation which I will share with you. After the
 23 perceptions that we received from the field and fleet, we

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1 asked for requests for information, because we didn't
 2 bring up gender-integrated training as a topic but that
 3 was brought up from the members of the military. So as
 4 that issue arose out of our installation visits, we have
 5 requests for information.

6 DACOWITS has military liaisons and
 7 military representatives to advise us and to work with us
 8 to give us briefings. We understand that we're all
 9 civilians. Some have past military experience or
 10 children in the military as I do, but we use our military
 11 liaisons and representatives to task — to provide us
 12 with the briefings.

13 Some of the things that we did in the last
 14 three years as we got involved with gender-integrated
 15 training is we had the Army's Senior Review Panel,
 16 General Siegfried and General Foot, come address our
 17 conference. We used the Rand study in our subcommittee
 18 groups. We looked at the GAO study and definitely the
 19 Kassebaum Baker study, and Senator Kassebaum Baker
 20 addressed our spring conference and spoke to our members
 21 as one of our keynote speakers. We gathered as much
 22 information as we could.

23 And I will have to also mention to you

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1 that in relation to the Kassebaum Baker study, we have
 2 found that twenty-eight out of their thirty
 3 recommendations are very much in keeping with what we
 4 have heard in the field and fleet and the perceptions we
 5 have received from our military men and women, and we can
 6 address that later.

7 But the recommendation that came out of
 8 this lengthy process is that DACOWITS recommends that the
 9 Secretary of Defense support the service chiefs'
 10 continued gender-integrated or gender-segregated basic
 11 training to meet individual service needs, and our
 12 rationale was that DACOWITS' installation visit reports
 13 and other sources of information provide compelling
 14 evidence that both gender-integrated and gender-
 15 segregated basic training are effective in the services
 16 where they are currently being used.

17 So that is the recommendation. And until
 18 this recommendation came forward in the spring, I did not
 19 address that issue as a stand that DACOWITS had taken, so
 20 I wanted to make that very clear.

21 I was very pleased that both Dr. Youngman
 22 and Ms. Hemphill could be here today because Ms. Hemphill
 23 was the Chair when then-Secretary Perry tasked DACOWITS.

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1 So at this time, I will come back and speak to this year
 2 again but I'd like to have Ms. Hemphill address you now.
 3 MS. HEMPHILL: Thank you.

4 For forty-seven years DACOWITS has done
 5 its job by — its job of advising the Secretary of
 6 Defense by visiting installations and by reporting on the
 7 issues that are raised by women, and in recent years we
 8 also report on the issues raised by men as well. But in
 9 years before 1997, when DACOWITS' members visited
 10 training bases, we did not meet with trainees. My
 11 understanding of the reason for that was a concern about
 12 interfering with the tight training schedules and the
 13 rigorous training regimens.

14 But with that background in mind, let me
 15 take you back to 1996, in the fall. The very serious
 16 allegations of sexual misconduct that came out of
 17 Aberdeen became known generally in November. But a month
 18 earlier, in October, DACOWITS was meeting in its fall
 19 conference in Oklahoma City, and at that point in time we
 20 reviewed the results of the year's installation visits,
 21 including those that we had visited in Europe that
 22 summer, and it was the group's observation that sexual
 23 harassment was on the decline.

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1 This wasn't to say that the problem wasn't
 2 a serious one, but our observation was it tended to be
 3 trending down, and that was consistent with the recent
 4 DoD-wide survey of sexual harassment.
 5 We did, however, note some troubling
 6 aspects based on our conversation with the troops. We
 7 were beginning to pick up some rumblings and that led to
 8 some specific recommendations regarding training. And
 9 again, this is in October, before the Aberdeen
 10 revelations had come to light.
 11 DACOWITS urged that troops at accession
 12 and thereafter be given some very practical training in
 13 order to know what is and what is not appropriate or
 14 inappropriate behavior, and the troops should be given
 15 the tools to enable them to properly respond when
 16 something untoward happens. We thought that that kind of
 17 training should underscore and clarify the right — in
 18 fact, the obligation — of military men and women to
 19 object to inappropriate or unprofessional types of
 20 conduct.
 21 Our idea was that service members are
 22 coming together from a wide variety of backgrounds and
 23 they need a common understanding from the very beginning

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1 of what is professional conduct, what is respect for the
 2 dignity of others, what is expected of them once they put
 3 on that uniform. In other words, we thought that that
 4 kind of basic instruction ought to come early on; it
 5 ought to be real frank and real specific.
 6 And we also at that time identified as a
 7 continuing concern the special situation of junior
 8 enlisted women. We noted they are relatively few in
 9 number and they may not be well prepared to deal with a
 10 difficult situation, should one arise.
 11 So that was in October. Following the
 12 Aberdeen reports in November of that year, Dr. Youngman,
 13 who was the incoming DACOWITS Chair, and I were invited
 14 to meet with Secretary of Defense Perry to discuss the
 15 situation and we tried to make some sense of it.
 16 Remember, we had just reported that sexual
 17 harassment was on the decline based on our installation
 18 visits and our trip to Europe in the summer. At the same
 19 time, we highlighted the need for greater attention to
 20 troops just entering the service and training — initial
 21 training of those recruits.
 22 We felt hampered by the fact that, as I
 23 mentioned before, the DACOWITS procedures precluded our

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1 meeting with trainees, and, in fact, my recollection is
 2 that there had been a kind of a general off-limits
 3 attitude regarding training in the Department. Again,
 4 the same idea was, let us not interfere with this crucial
 5 phase of indoctrination of the recruits; so I think there
 6 wasn't a lot of data available with respect to the
 7 training environment at that time.
 8 Secretary Perry was very supportive of the
 9 DACOWITS' recommendations regarding training,
 10 particularly the ones that were focusing on the young
 11 recruits, but the main point of interest, I think, to
 12 this Commission is the fact that he was of the opinion
 13 that trainees should specifically be included in
 14 DACOWITS' visits. We suggested then — and he directed
 15 — that DACOWITS develop a protocol for visits to
 16 training bases, and that would include focus groups with
 17 trainees, beginning in 1997.
 18 So based on Secretary Perry's direction,
 19 the 1996 Executive Committee of DACOWITS met with the
 20 incoming 1997 Executive Committee of DACOWITS, Judith
 21 Youngman as Chair. We met in December to develop plans
 22 for these training base visits that would take place in
 23 '97. Our objective, if I can characterize it, was this:

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1 that if we were going to take time from the training day,
 2 we wanted our visits to be as efficient and as productive
 3 as possible.
 4 And to that end, we decided on a
 5 fundamental framework that included these points: only
 6 the most experienced DACOWITS members would conduct the
 7 training visits; visits of training bases would be over a
 8 two-day period rather than the one day for ordinary
 9 installation visits — that would allow for more focus
 10 groups of trainers and trainees of both genders; the
 11 trainees should have completed at least a major portion
 12 of their training before we talked to them — they
 13 shouldn't be just off the bus, in other words; and the
 14 selection of places to visit should be a cooperative
 15 effort with the services. Those were some of the very
 16 fundamental ideas we had when we approached this task.
 17 Now, I believe that Dr. Judith Youngman is
 18 prepared to describe some of the specifics in terms of
 19 the protocol and the methodologies, and to describe the
 20 results of the 1997 visits that she and her committee put
 21 the plans into action.
 22 Thanks.
 23 MS. BILBY: Okay. Dr. Youngman is going

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1 to talk about the '97 training reports. As I talked to
 2 you, Madam Chair, the '98 training base visits have been
 3 completed but the report has been submitted to DoD and
 4 it's working its way up the chain of command, and with
 5 all the things going on in the last two weeks, we do not
 6 have the report back.
 7 But I do want to say that we work under
 8 the FACAs rules and all of the documents we have have been
 9 made public, and as soon as they are available, we will
 10 forward, you know, to your members so that you will have
 11 that updated information.
 12 Dr. Youngman.
 13 DR. YOUNGMAN: Thank you.
 14 When I became Chair in January of 1997, by
 15 that time we knew that Secretary Perry would be retiring
 16 and that Secretary Cohen would be incoming. Ms. Hemphill
 17 and I had jointly signed the proposal to Secretary Perry
 18 of the protocol which he had approved, but during the
 19 first month of my tenure, the DACOWITS Executive
 20 Committee believed that it would be important not to
 21 initiate the training base visits until we had an
 22 opportunity to review the protocol and also the tasking
 23 of DACOWITS to visit with trainees with Secretary Cohen.

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1 So we delayed implementation of those
 2 training base visits until Secretary Cohen took office
 3 and had an opportunity to both review and approve the
 4 training base visits. He did so. And, also, in doing
 5 so, I might say, sent I believe what had been a stronger
 6 message than that initially drafted by Secretary Perry to
 7 the service chiefs in terms of trying to ensure — and
 8 service secretaries — trying to ensure that we would
 9 have the full support and cooperation even though it
 10 might interfere with training of the services in
 11 undertaking this.
 12 We then proceeded to implement the
 13 protocol and to select the most experienced DACOWITS
 14 members, which were based both on the quantity of visits
 15 that they had previously made as well as the quality of
 16 visits that they had previously made, determined by
 17 really the kind of detail and the kind of information
 18 that was present in their installation visit reports.
 19 As it turned out, during 1997 the first —
 20 and this was not intentional, I assure you — the first
 21 training base team in 1997 included individuals who were
 22 diverse in ethnicity and region, but all had two things
 23 in common: they either had a degree in clinical

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1 psychology or in clinical counseling or they had been
 2 professional educators in secondary or university
 3 education. So as it turned out, they were people who
 4 were very used to dealing with — in small group formats,
 5 and people very used to dealing with young people as
 6 well.

7 We convened the training base team at our
 8 Spring 1997 conference with the purpose of fine-tuning
 9 and trying to further fine-tune the protocol, and to
 10 describe the kinds or try and discuss the kinds of bases
 11 that we wanted to visit.

12 One of the major issues that we dealt with
 13 and addressed at the spring conference was whether or not
 14 we ought to visit gender-integrated and gender-segregated
 15 bases the first year, and whether we ought to restrict
 16 our visits to basic training facilities, enlisted
 17 accession training or initial entry training, or also
 18 include officer training.

19 So we had some real decisions to make. We
 20 reached the following decision which is in the report.
 21 We decided to do visits at initial entry training of both
 22 enlisted and officer corps people, but the first year we
 23 decided to do only gender-integrated training.

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1 The reason was — to be quite honest, was
 2 because of Aberdeen, and because it was our perception,
 3 as Ms. Hemphill stated, that training installations —
 4 even though the Army was being studied quite a bit by
 5 that time and the services were beginning to take looks
 6 themselves, we decided that it was more in line with the
 7 Secretary's initial tasking to go out into the integrated
 8 environment, training environment, and to speak with the
 9 troops there.

10 We also decided on initial entry training
 11 for two very specific reasons: that both supported the
 12 fact that since, as Ms. Bilby suggested, we deal in
 13 perceptions and only reported perceptions, we wanted to
 14 ensure that the information we provided not only gave the
 15 Secretary a clear picture of service members' concerns
 16 and perceptions, but also the services themselves.

17 And so, first of all, we were very
 18 cognizant of the fact that the services have quite
 19 different stated objectives for different levels of their
 20 initial entry training as well as very different stated
 21 objectives for why they have selected either integrated
 22 training, segregated training, or mixed training.

23 For example, the Marine Corps — including

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1 in the revised program that includes both the Crucible
 2 and Marine Combat Training, the Marine Corps — General
 3 Krulak specifically — states and addresses the fact that
 4 Marine training is designed to prepare women, who are a
 5 very small minority in the Marine Corps and through the
 6 2010 personnel plan of the Marine Corps will not even
 7 rise above 6 percent of personnel by the year 2010 — to
 8 best prepare Marine enlisted women to be able to function
 9 in an environment that will be predominantly male in
 10 every duty station.

11 And so the focus of Marine training is to
 12 provide women with the coping skills and the ability to
 13 do that. Also, to be able to be deployed with Marine
 14 men. The Persian Gulf War was — the Marines realized
 15 that they could not deploy in a major action without
 16 taking women in support positions, and so part of it was
 17 skills training for women. That purpose of preparing
 18 women to perform in a predominantly male environment is
 19 very different than the stated intentions of the other
 20 services regarding training.

21 The Army assessment, as we understood it,
 22 is to train soldiers as they will serve and fight, and,
 23 therefore, the Army maintains a mixed training

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1 environment in which soldiers who are going to fight in
 2 the combat arms go through an entirely different training
 3 program called OSUT at Fort Benning, Georgia. That is a
 4 combination of individual basic training as well as some
 5 advance combat training in the very different training
 6 environment. Those soldiers going into combat support
 7 and combat service support branches attend gender-
 8 integrated basic training because those branches are
 9 gender-integrated, at either Fort Jackson, South
 10 Carolina, or Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

11 And so the Army philosophy was "train as
 12 we serve and fight," with specialized — with OSUT,
 13 again, being a combination of basic and, to some extent,
 14 advanced training with Leonard Wood, and Fort Jackson
 15 being only basic training, essentially, or separation of
 16 basic, and then soldiers would move on to advanced
 17 individual training perhaps at other locations.

18 The Air Force, with 99 percent of
 19 positions open to women — the Air Force sees their
 20 environment as one in which men and women must be
 21 interchangeable in any unit since women can access in the
 22 enlisted ranks virtually almost any job except for a few
 23 in Special Forces. Therefore, the Air Force's intention

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1 — the Air Force has a six-week training program compared
 2 to the Marine Corps twelve-week training program.
 3 The Air Force's program very much just
 4 values — not just, but values a soldierization training
 5 program with the intent that airmen will have a
 6 significant advanced individual training — technically-
 7 based in most cases, training program later on.

8 Because of the high level of integration
 9 in the Air Force, of course, its training has been
 10 gender-integrated for over twenty years, and so — but
 11 the focus was to ensure that every airman was
 12 interchangeable, and that meant you must, again, not only
 13 train as you fight, but train as you will serve in
 14 virtually any Air Force unit.

15 Similarly, the Navy — although it has not
 16 had gender-integrated training for twenty years, the
 17 Navy's stated intent in moving to gender-integrated
 18 training was now that both noncombatant — and now
 19 especially that combatant vessels are open to women and
 20 women are being assigned to combatant vessels, for
 21 general detail sailors — GENDETS — they can be assigned
 22 to a forward-deployed vessel or ship within three weeks
 23 of finishing basic training, the Navy believed that it

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1 must produce sailors out of basic training who are able
 2 to go into a combat forward-deployed ship and work
 3 effectively in a gender-integrated environment.
 4 And so we decided to look at initial entry
 5 training to look at basically the second point — what
 6 prepared the new enlisted or officer person, what made
 7 them fleet and field ready. What was the entire process?
 8 And we thought that we could best serve the Secretary, in
 9 his mandate to us, and the services, by sharing soldier
 10 and sailor perceptions of whether they felt field and
 11 fleet ready throughout the initial entry training
 12 process, be it for enlisted personnel or officer
 13 personnel.

14 And so it was a very conscious decision on
 15 our part to try and appreciate the real differences in
 16 both stated objectives of training in all of the
 17 services, especially related to gender-integration, and
 18 also to appreciate the fact that there is a grave
 19 difference, a large difference, between six-week basic in
 20 the Air Force and twelve-week basic, plus seventeen-day
 21 advanced individual training, Marine Combat Training in
 22 the Marine Corps, and that it would be very difficult for
 23 the services or the Secretary later to perhaps — that

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1 those different perceptions needed to be brought forward,
 2 and we really thought that looking at all of initial
 3 entry training was the best way to do that.
 4 So we began to implement our training base
 5 visits. We did go in for two days and sometimes more
 6 than that. Over 1997, we visited twelve training schools
 7 in nine locations, nine bases — they are in your report,
 8 so I won't take the time to go over them — and we met
 9 with about 1,200 trainees.

10 We are very aware of the General
 11 Accounting Office's assessment of our process and we
 12 agree with what they said about our process. Our
 13 methodology wasn't intended to support recommendations.
 14 That is not how the DACOWITS process works. It was
 15 intended only to generate perceptions.

16 I'd like to go — If my co-chairs here
 17 don't mind, I'd like, though, to disagree with one
 18 assessment provided by GAO. And that is, is that using
 19 same-sex, but using only women, would somehow create an
 20 environment in which soldiers or sailors would tell us
 21 what we wanted to hear; that there would be some
 22 distortion in that. I think the DACOWITS — And there's
 23 some evidence in the literature, behavioral and social

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1 science literature, that suggest that that can happen.
 2 Well, having done something like thirty
 3 installation visits myself over my time in DACOWITS, I
 4 can assure you that when you walk in from DACOWITS — And
 5 everybody knows what DACOWITS is because they have seen
 6 before they meet with you a tape that tells them what
 7 DACOWITS is. That the Secretary of Defense says, "They
 8 are my committee. They will report back to me. I want
 9 you to talk to them openly and I will listen to your
 10 concerns, and they are my own. Talk to them." That's
 11 what they see immediately before talking with us — that
 12 they tell it like it is.

13 And as a matter of fact, I would say that
 14 the fact that anybody who disagrees with what they
 15 perceive DACOWITS is, is more than ready to talk to us
 16 and to express their points of view. We have had a
 17 couple of cases during my year where there was a focus
 18 group scheduled with fifteen people and fifty showed up,
 19 because — on their own, which is — you know, which is
 20 hard to understand in a military environment but they did
 21 because they had things to say.

22 So we do not think that people are
 23 hesitant to — or are speaking to our agenda. We feel

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1 that they do speak their mind.
 2 With that said, again, you've read the
 3 report; let me just expand on a couple of the issues that
 4 came up.
 5 First of all, there was, looking across
 6 all the services, all five services visited, there was
 7 amazing similarity in the perceptions of the services.
 8 And as Ms. Bilby suggested, most of the perceptions of
 9 service members that we heard were reflected — were very
 10 identical to the kinds of concerns that were raised in
 11 the Kassebaum Baker report.

12 We also — Service members that we also
 13 visited with were extremely concerned about artificial
 14 gender relations that were present in training
 15 environments. We encountered a lot of confusion about
 16 whether they were formal or informal, don't touch, don't-
 17 whatever kinds of policies, but they existed in most of
 18 the training installations.

19 Trainees thought that these — and
 20 especially women trainees, but also men — generally
 21 believed that these kinds of policies inhibited their
 22 ability to learn to work in a gender-integrated
 23 environment, and that included within the Marine Corps.

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1 The trainers similarly, but in this case
 2 particularly the women trainers and supervisors of
 3 trainers, believed that these artificial constraints on
 4 interaction in training interfered particularly with the
 5 women service members' ability to prepare themselves
 6 because — And this was particularly a message in Marine
 7 Combat Training and Marine Corps service support schools,
 8 because if the artificial environment is maintained until
 9 the end of initial entry training, then these service
 10 members are indeed going out into the field and the fleet
 11 never having worked in or learned how to work in a
 12 gender-integrated unit. And for the women who will
 13 always be — perhaps except in a couple of airlift
 14 communities, will always be a minority in any unit, it
 15 was perceived as particularly impacting upon the fleet
 16 and field readiness of women service members.

17 There was a perception that trainers were
 18 undervalued in all of the services, except at Parris
 19 Island in the Marine Corps, and this undervaluation was
 20 both formal — It was not counted as a plum assignment.
 21 You know, in recruiters, that was — you did get some
 22 benefits. You might be — could choose your next
 23 assignment after that or you received some benefit in

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1 your performance evaluation, and in most of the services
 2 that was not true for trainers.
 3 But it was also perceived — they also
 4 perceived themselves as undervalued for a very different
 5 reason. And that is, that the condition, the funding,
 6 and the under-resourcing of training facilities was
 7 perceived as a strong signal to them, the NCO trainers,
 8 that training was no longer valued as highly in the
 9 service as it had been when they had come in or as other
 10 kinds of functions.

11 And so there were both perceptions that
 12 they were undervalued because of formal mechanisms in
 13 place in some of the services where they didn't get the
 14 same benefits from serving in training as they might have
 15 in recruiting, but also the informal undervaluation
 16 because of the condition of the barracks, because of
 17 outdated equipment, because of their undermanning in some
 18 training facilities.

19 And this was not just in basic training
 20 that this perception occurred, but also in advanced
 21 individualized training in which, for example, trainees
 22 were learning how to do computer work on computer systems
 23 that were no longer used in the operational force. And

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1 the service members felt that this not only was a signal
 2 of under-resourcing in training bases, but also was
 3 deferring to the operational units training that should
 4 have been accomplished in advanced individual training.
 5 Women trainers perceived that they were
 6 under-represented, and women trainers in some services
 7 themselves believed that they were subjected to gender-
 8 discriminatory behaviors. This is particularly true in
 9 those training installations in which the supervisors
 10 were men drawn from the combat arms.

11 There are still — or in 1997, at least,
 12 there were at least — there were still two services
 13 where even in gender-integrated training the key
 14 supervisors of training platoons were enlisted personnel
 15 with no experience in leading gender-integrated units
 16 because they were drawn from the combat arms.

17 The services' rationales, as stated by the
 18 trainers, were to ensure that the combat skills and the
 19 physical skills — that you had the most experienced
 20 people, and people from the combat arms or combat
 21 branches or whatever were best able to do that.

22 However, the way women trainers perceive
 23 that, as well as some men trainers were, the problem with

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1 this was, is that these NCO's were not skilled in leading
 2 and training gender-integrated units, and to give them
 3 platoons and squads of recruits as their first exposure
 4 to leading a gender-integrated unit was not the best
 5 approach to take.
 6 Most — Many women trainers in those kind
 7 of units perceived that they, too, were subjected to
 8 gender-discriminatory comments and behaviors that were
 9 led by the trainers with whom they worked.
 10 In terms of issues related to gender
 11 carrying on that the climates and the existence — we —
 12 our service — our training base members really heard few
 13 accounts of blatant sexual harassment or other kinds of
 14 egregious sexual misconduct. There was really only one
 15 location in which — that we visited, one training
 16 school, where that came out as a strong message, and the
 17 service was informed and the service took remediation
 18 steps.
 19 However, there was a perception in several
 20 training sites that gender-discriminatory behaviors
 21 persisted — those comments, a little chant that would
 22 slip into a chant during a run, the kinds of derogatory
 23 comments about women. And it was very interesting to

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1 most of the DACOWITS members that the soldiers and
 2 service people who had these perceptions, who expressed
 3 them to us, tended to be primarily initially male
 4 trainees. Male trainees were the ones who raised the —
 5 more frequently than women trainees, the gender-
 6 discriminatory behaviors that were occurring towards
 7 women trainees.
 8 We found at every installation that there
 9 was a wide range of climates related to gender on any
 10 given installation, and both trainees and trainers
 11 attributed the gender climate, be it highly positive,
 12 “the best I've ever experienced,” or very negative, to
 13 the NCO trainer heading — from the first — say, Army
 14 equivalent first sergeant and down.
 15 The perception of service members was that
 16 trainers set the climate. And if the trainer
 17 participated in gender-discriminatory behaviors or if the
 18 trainer tolerated gender-discriminatory behaviors, or if
 19 the trainer did not allow gender-discriminatory behaviors
 20 to emerge, that that set the climate, and that was across
 21 every service and every installation and every type of
 22 person that was spoken with.
 23 Finally, and in conclusion, on integrated

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1 — And I've spoken a little about integrated training but
 2 not service perceptions. The two issues that the
 3 DACOWITS report deviated from the Kassebaum Baker report
 4 most strongly on were over integrated training versus
 5 segregated training.
 6 The perceptions of service members
 7 expressed to us consistently across all five services,
 8 all twelve training schools, all nine installations, were
 9 the following: whatever kind of training that service
 10 had, those trainers and trainees at that time thought was
 11 best to prepare fleet and field ready enlisted or officer
 12 personnel for that service.
 13 Given that, every group, with two — every
 14 type of person we met with, with two easily definable
 15 exceptions, believed that greater gender-integration
 16 would further improve upon the fleet and field readiness.
 17 However, the nature of that greater gender-integration
 18 differed from between the different services.
 19 The two kinds of individuals that we spoke
 20 with who did not share those perceptions were NCO and a
 21 few officer male trainers who had come from the combat
 22 arms and were leading gender-integrated units or whatever
 23 — of whatever size, for the first time. They, in some

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1 focus groups, even articulated that they felt they were
 2 ill-prepared in their preparation to assume trainer roles
 3 for dealing with the gender-integrated training
 4 environment.
 5 And so since we all know what those
 6 services were, certainly the opposition to a greater
 7 level of training gender-integration that we heard were
 8 from some Marine and some Army trainers, especially Army
 9 first sergeants.
 10 And I do not know whether the Army has
 11 changed this, but at the time that we visited basic
 12 training in the Army, every first sergeant in the Army's
 13 gender-integrated training for combat support and combat
 14 service support units or branches had to be from the
 15 combat arms and was a male. There were no women first
 16 sergeants and they had to be from the combat arms, from
 17 infantry. And so there was a mixed perception among
 18 those Army infantry first sergeants as to whether or not
 19 more gender-integration was needed.
 20 The theme that was held in common — And
 21 the specific service-by-service specifics are in the
 22 report. The theme that they held in common, I just want
 23 to emphasize — And it is tied as a side note to what

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1 DACOWITS has been hearing over the last two years in the
 2 field and the fleet, domestically and overseas.
 3 Whenever we have, as an aside, in the last
 4 two years or three years, gone to any installation,
 5 gender — using the open-ended questions Ms. Bilby
 6 mentioned, gender virtually never is among the top —
 7 gender issues are virtually never among the top issues
 8 raised by service members. Their top issues in the
 9 regular installations and ships we visit are OPTEMPO,
 10 PERSTEMPO, forced restructuring, downsizing, pace of
 11 work, budget cuts, stress levels due to the heightened
 12 OPTEMPO and deployment schedule of the last decade.
 13 The other message that has been consistent
 14 — that is relevant, so I'll raise it — that comes out
 15 of the overseas reports and the CONUS reports, is the
 16 fact that, in particular, noncommissioned officers, NCO's
 17 across all services, consistently feel that they no
 18 longer have the time in operational units to perform the
 19 mentoring role that has been the hallmark of most
 20 American military organizations and units.
 21 They don't have the time to do the skills
 22 development, working with their troops, their young new
 23 people coming in from AIT and other advanced programs.

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1 They no longer have time to do the mentoring and
 2 professional development.
 3 And the message that we got in 1997, when
 4 gender-integrated training was on the front page of every
 5 newspaper — the message we got from the field and the
 6 fleet in all services — the message we got in the
 7 training bases was: do not send troops to operational
 8 units which are strapped and stressed, who have not been
 9 screened for being able to work in gender-integrated
 10 units.
 11 Just as, you know, we screen them for
 12 drugs, we screen them for discipline, we screen them for
 13 everything else, and get the people who can't hack it out
 14 in the field and the fleet before they get there — we
 15 try to do that — you cannot send us people, be they male
 16 or female, who are inexperienced and unable to work in
 17 this environment. We do not have time to deal with that.
 18 And if you're on a combatant vessel in the Persian Gulf
 19 and you get somebody three weeks out of Great Lakes, for
 20 example, we want you to do this invasive training.
 21 And so the increased level, the service
 22 specific recommendations that they made for greater
 23 gender-integrated training mostly came from trainers who

1 were very cognizant — who had been in those operational
 2 units and were very cognizant of the environment in which
 3 these young trainees and new soldiers, sailors, marine
 4 and airmen were going to.
 5 And so that is — I belabor this a little
 6 bit because it is the area in which what we heard
 7 differed so substantially from the ultimate
 8 recommendation of the Kassebaum Baker report.
 9 Thank you very much.
 10 MS. BILBY: I'd like to just briefly add
 11 to what Dr. Youngman has said from our '98 training base
 12 report. It was submitted two weeks ago to DoD. And as
 13 soon as it's forthcoming, I will get a copy to you, but I
 14 do have my draft with me and I'd like to share some of
 15 our findings.
 16 We visited in 1998 seventeen training
 17 commands at eleven installations from all the services.
 18 We followed the same methodology as previously has been
 19 mentioned. We used experienced DACOWITS members. This
 20 year, we did intentionally visit segregated basic
 21 training units, and I was the one that was tasked and did
 22 spend three days at MCRD in San Diego; so that was part
 23 of the equation of our '98 training base team.

1 The top issues raised in 1998 closely
 2 paralleled the concerns expressed by service members in
 3 1997. However, the major issues raised were the effects
 4 of downsizing, privatization and out-sourcing. These
 5 were discussed in all focus groups by all services. The
 6 participants felt that the fallout from downsizing is
 7 seriously affecting their ability to do their job as well
 8 as being detrimental to mission readiness.
 9 Specific aspects that were mentioned were
 10 recruiting, retention, manning shortages, increased
 11 OPTEMPO, and the inadequacy of training equipment. One
 12 of the comments that we heard at many more than one
 13 installation was that "we cannot continue to do more with
 14 less."
 15 The issues raised as far as specifically
 16 dealing with gender-integrated training, most of the
 17 groups that we talked to felt that the training should
 18 stay as it currently is — i.e., the Army, Navy, Air
 19 Force and Coast Guard have integrated basic training.
 20 The Marine Corps has segregated basic
 21 training, and they felt very strongly that that's the
 22 process that they should continue to use because it most
 23 fully meets the mission that they are tasked to do.

1 The trainers, interesting enough, this
 2 year really wanted to talk about some of their concerns
 3 about tri-care and some of their personal issues relating
 4 to the service, which very closely relates to our CONUS
 5 reports, that are not specifically dealing with training.
 6 We did hear that there is still some lax
 7 discipline in both basic and AIT training which the
 8 trainers feel negatively impacts the quality of the
 9 service members. We also heard again that there is a
 10 need to increase PT standards. We heard that across
 11 services — stronger, more rigorous physical training for
 12 both men and women.
 13 And, also, there is some talk of what we
 14 call the eggshell environment, where there is some
 15 backlash as a result of the heightened emphasis on sexual
 16 harassment concerns.
 17 And I will have to say that in our CONUS
 18 and overseas visits, we found climates that are favorable
 19 command climates and what we call realistic environments
 20 where, yes, situations may arise, but that the services
 21 have the situations in place to deal with those issues.
 22 We had many positive comments from
 23 trainees with praise for their drill instructors in 1998.

1 At the end of completing our training
 2 visits, we met and asked that this remain a cooperative
 3 effort with the individual services and that we continue
 4 to visit training installations.
 5 Normally, an installation visit does not
 6 occur from a DACOWITS member more frequently than in a
 7 two-year cycle because of the time and the effort it
 8 takes for the installation to host that kind of a visit.
 9 However, in 1998, two of the services specifically asked
 10 that a DACOWITS training team member revisit their
 11 installation that had been visited in 1997, and that was
 12 a request through the installation commander, through
 13 DoD.
 14 So we did in fact revisit Lackland Air
 15 Force Base, and that was because they felt that they had
 16 put some mechanisms in place that had been put in place
 17 post-KB. And we were also asked to revisit Pensacola
 18 Naval Air Station, and that visit will take place this
 19 month and I did specifically want to mention that to you.
 20 I would have to say that basically what we
 21 found is that trainers, trainees and supervisors, report
 22 the belief that they should train the way they eventually
 23 serve.

1 In the focus groups, we found some
 2 negative portrayals of recruiting practices and
 3 recruiters by trainees and trainers. Trainees feel
 4 sometimes that the recruiters mislead them in order to
 5 fill their quotas, and that was an issue that was raised
 6 from the trainees. They feel that this sends the wrong
 7 message about military integrity: "this is what's going
 8 to happen if you will join up," and it's quota driven.
 9 There was also some concern about using outdated
 10 equipment in 1998, as Dr. Youngman mentioned.
 11 I'd like to at this time just very briefly
 12 show you, we do — the Executive Committee goes on the
 13 overseas trip and spends sixteen days. This year we were
 14 from the 12th to the 26th of July, and this is the report
 15 which we can get copies of and I can leave with you
 16 because it is a public document.
 17 But as far as being out in operational
 18 units, we were in the Azores, Italy, Bahrain, Turkey,
 19 Bosnia, Germany, England and Iceland. The overriding
 20 concern was the high OPTEMPO, PERSTEMPO, and service
 21 members told us the merging of job specialties and
 22 compression of ratings is over-taxing the forces and is
 23 perceived as having a major impact.

1 Serious concerns were expressed about the
 2 lack of time available to train and educate personnel.
 3 The constant deployments, taskings, and the lack of
 4 backup personnel preclude time to fully train people in
 5 their specialties or in the use of their equipment.
 6 Everyone attributed this situation to too much to do with
 7 too few people.
 8 The TEMPO also prevents time being devoted
 9 to develop personnel for leadership. Many enlisted and
 10 officer leaders are overwhelmingly worried about the
 11 future of the military as the time they need for
 12 mentoring and developing their people simply does not
 13 exist.
 14 And we found that overriding out in the
 15 operational field, which I think speaks all to the issue
 16 of training and asking to be sure that when people get
 17 out into the field and fleet, they're ready to go
 18 operationally.
 19 The other two documents — So every year
 20 we have our overseas trip report. We will have the two
 21 training base reports. The other reports that we have,
 22 we have the two conferences a year. These were the
 23 findings from our spring conference (Indicating), and

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1 this is our fall conference (Indicating). And I think
 2 you know that the services rotated being the supporting
 3 service; so on my year the Air Force was our supporting
 4 service for our spring conference and the Army was our
 5 supporting service in Austin, Texas.
 6 So this has an executive summary and it
 7 has our requests for further information, the issues that
 8 have arisen out of our installation visits. It has our
 9 recommendations. And, also, we have statements of
 10 appreciation to either services, service secretaries, or
 11 to DoD.
 12 Do either of you have anything to add
 13 about our process or what our — what we're doing this
 14 year?
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much.
 16 That was a very comprehensive and easily understandable
 17 report, which is, I think, very beneficial to us. And
 18 you're welcome to have a glass of water.
 19 As I mentioned earlier, our process has
 20 been to just simply rotate around the table. And if a
 21 commissioner does not have a question at the moment, we
 22 just say "pass," but that does not preclude them,
 23 obviously, from coming up with a question on a future

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1 round. And as Chairman, I will begin the questioning.
 2 This is a philosophical question and I
 3 don't expect necessarily sort of a rote answer, but
 4 you've had several references to "mission readiness" and
 5 I wonder whether DACOWITS or any of you individually has
 6 a sort of thumbnail sketch of either the overall concept
 7 of mission readiness or the particular aspects of it that
 8 DACOWITS looks at. And could you just, you know, talk
 9 about that for a minute?
 10 MS. BILBY: I'll just give a brief
 11 overview and then defer to Dr. Youngman and Ms. Hemphill.
 12 But I would say that the pride in service that we see as
 13 we go out to the installation visits is definitely there
 14 and we hear from the people, "We will do the job that
 15 we're tasked to do."
 16 But we also are hearing that in the future
 17 and down the road, being tasked to do more with less —
 18 One of the things that we heard particularly overseas, in
 19 the operational environment, is, "We cannot continue to
 20 do less with less." And so it's the tasking of going
 21 places and staying there and "how long will we be here,"
 22 and the military — We did hear questions where people
 23 were asking us, "What is our mission and where are we

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1 supposed to be, and what are we supposed to do?"
 2 An example would be in Bosnia, where the
 3 young troops would say things to us: "Why can't this be
 4 like Korea, where we go for a year on an unaccompanied
 5 tour? We're here and we rotate in and out and in and
 6 out, and how long are we going to be here?"
 7 And I think that the military members
 8 understand what they're doing, but it's the civilian
 9 world — when I go back to my civilian life — where
 10 there is a disconnect in what we are tasking our military
 11 members to do.
 12 DR. YOUNGMAN: I think that in — at least
 13 during my year, many issues came up because it was the
 14 post-Aberdeen year. That year, our overseas trip was in
 15 WESTPAC, including Okinawa, Korea, Japan, Guam, Alaska,
 16 Hawaii. I think most of the time we accept — We don't
 17 have our own definition of "mission readiness." Whatever
 18 the individual services — individual units in those
 19 services believe is their mission needs, we accept that
 20 at face value.
 21 If any recommendation that the committee
 22 is going to develop requires a more in-depth
 23 understanding of mission readiness on our part in a

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1 specific service or branch of that service, that is how
 2 we use the services, our military representatives and
 3 liaisons; to bring in the appropriate service
 4 representative to help us to better understand that if
 5 it's essential for our recommendation or something of
 6 that nature.
 7 However, with that said — And so what we
 8 report or have reported is simply the perceptions of
 9 service members. One thing, though, that clearly changed
 10 — Since you allowed an opportunity for some personal
 11 observation, Madam Chairman, one thing that certainly
 12 changed during my three years on the committee doing
 13 installation visits was the first year, which was 1995,
 14 the troops talked a lot and the command, at whatever
 15 level you outbrief, listened.
 16 By my last year, including in our overseas
 17 trip in WESTPAC, the commanding officers, be it a colonel
 18 or a four-star, wanted their time with the committee
 19 members to express their perceptions of their needs as
 20 commanders in the current environment.
 21 And so many of the perceptions that are
 22 incorporated in both the '97 WESTPAC overseas trip report
 23 as well as our CONUS reports, we didn't say that the

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1 commanders necessarily individually in each installation
 2 may have said something, but that became a phenomenon
 3 that became more and more common, and at least in my
 4 perception, it was a change from my earlier time on the
 5 committee.
 6 MS. HEMPHILL: I would have to agree that
 7 the specific service leadership was very engaged with the
 8 inbrief and the outbrief, and in the discussions both at
 9 the unit and in the overall command — i.e., the whole
 10 European command — and they were lengthy outbriefs. And
 11 there is a definite request for follow-up for the
 12 individual installation reports from that installation,
 13 and I think an example is what I just mentioned when we
 14 had a member visit and they would like them to come back
 15 and take another look and spend time with the troops.
 16 MR. PANG: You know, you may also want to
 17 note that, you know, the chiefs themselves, I mean — and
 18 I mean now the Chiefs of Staff of each one of the
 19 services, the CNO and Commandant — have requested
 20 DACOWITS, as I recall, in the past, to come directly to
 21 them and brief them, you know, on their findings as
 22 they've gone out to the field.
 23 So you might want to elaborate on that a

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1 little bit.
 2 DR. YOUNGMAN: Well, certainly in 1997 we
 3 met or I met frequently with each of the service chiefs.
 4 Every service chief was personally briefed, as was the
 5 CINCPAC and his staff, as was all the Pacific commanders
 6 at the CINCPAC's — Pacific commanders conference — the
 7 entire PACAF staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the
 8 Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, as well as the
 9 civilian leadership of the Department — were all
 10 personally briefed in lengths that varied from one to two
 11 and a half hours on the results of just that trip alone.
 12 And so briefing and keeping the service
 13 leadership fully informed of all of the issues and
 14 perceptions that arise are part of what DACOWITS does.
 15 MS. HEMPHILL: I might add that this very
 16 close working relationship between the committee and the
 17 services has been an effort on the part of the committee
 18 stemming for a number of years now. I think, over time
 19 the relationship between the committee and the services
 20 has varied somewhat, but the committee made a concerted
 21 effort to develop the close working relationship with the
 22 services.
 23 The committee felt that it would enable

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1 the members to do a better job and would be ultimately
 2 more beneficial if that would be the case. And based on
 3 my observations from '96, it is working well and I
 4 believe that strong working relationship continues.
 5 MR. PANG: Well, you know, first of all, I
 6 would like to compliment you on a very impressive
 7 presentation, but I wasn't surprised by it, having worked
 8 with each of you. You know, you do represent a diverse
 9 spectrum, and I wanted to make sure that got on the
 10 record from my perspective. It is a nonpartisan
 11 organization.
 12 And, you know, when I was the Assistant
 13 Secretary of Defense, you know, we made a very concerted
 14 effort to get a very broad spectrum of views represented
 15 on the committee. So sometimes I'm a little bit dismayed
 16 when I read in the paper, you know, that — you know,
 17 that DACOWITS is cast as a group of very liberal minded
 18 people because my experience is that that's not the case.
 19 You know, I think that what you have done
 20 is just remarkable in bringing forward this information
 21 and hopefully, you know, we will take it on board. And
 22 quite frankly, I mean, a lot of the views you express are
 23 generally consistent with the views I have had personally

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1 on some of the trips that — some of the trips that I've
 2 taken.
 3 So I just want to compliment you with
 4 regard to the presentation that you made.
 5 I have a question regarding — you know,
 6 regarding a comment that Ms. Bilby made with regard to
 7 the way the services conduct initial entry training. My
 8 understanding is, is that it is the position of the
 9 DACOWITS — the official position of the DACOWITS that
 10 the way the services do initial entry training now is the
 11 way they ought to do it. Is that a correct phrase or
 12 understanding?
 13 MS. BILBY: Well, I think saying that the
 14 way they do it now — I think that, you know, missions
 15 and — different missions of the specific services
 16 certainly can evolve. So the way that our recommendation
 17 is worded is that the Secretary of Defense support the
 18 service chiefs' continued gender-integrated or gender-
 19 segregated basic training to meet individual service
 20 needs, which leaves it open-ended in the respect that
 21 their individual service needs could possibly evolve.
 22 But at the present time, that is our
 23 recommendation.

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1 MR. PANG: Thank you, Madam Chairman.
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Charlie.
 3 DR. MOSKOS: I had a specific question but
 4 I wanted to go on Fred's question about you said they
 5 have a diversity of opinion. Are there members of
 6 DACOWITS who are for less gender-integration, either in
 7 training or in other military roles, than the status quo?
 8 MS. BILBY: I can't speak to what
 9 individual members say their personal viewpoints are, and
 10 as the Chair, I'm very careful not to say my own personal
 11 views. I do know just from my interaction the last three
 12 years that, yes, there are definitely diverse views, and
 13 it is reflected if you look back at who nominated the
 14 specific service members also. And I would say that it
 15 is a fairly broad spectrum of both liberal and
 16 conservative viewpoints.
 17 However, we begin at day one of our
 18 orientation to remind our members that they are not to go
 19 into an installation with any personal agenda. That's a
 20 very difficult thing to do, and when you have private
 21 discussions, that comes out.
 22 But I know personally that my own personal
 23 views differ from some of the other members, but that we

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1 try very hard to make sure that we listen without agenda
 2 and those issues that arise are the issues that have been
 3 raised by those soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines.
 4 And we specifically mention at the end of
 5 each installation report if there is not necessarily a
 6 majority viewpoint expressed, but even a minority
 7 viewpoint — what we try to leave out of our reports are
 8 individual comments; that what goes into an installation
 9 report and what is briefed to the commander of the
 10 installation is the perceptions of more than one
 11 individual.
 12 DR. YOUNGMAN: May I add something?
 13 Dr. Moskos, actually, since this is in the
 14 public domain, two members of the Kassebaum Baker group,
 15 which unanimously recommended —
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Some separation.
 17 DR. YOUNGMAN: — some separation of
 18 training, one is a current DACOWITS member and one was
 19 the Vice Chairman of — or Vice Chair of DACOWITS in
 20 1996.
 21 So I think that that is an indication that
 22 there's a diversity —
 23 DR. MOSKOS: Sure.

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1 DR. YOUNGMAN: — of opinion and
 2 perspective, individual, on the committee, or at least
 3 their willingness to endorse that.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: My specific question was
 5 based on focus groups and some survey data in Bosnia,
 6 focus groups with basic trainees. Women, especially
 7 enlisted women, are now reporting that false accusations
 8 of sexual harassment are as much of a problem as genuine
 9 sexual harassment. Do you have any reaction to that?
 10 MS. BILBY: In our report, we talk about
 11 — It's in the overseas trip report from this year.
 12 Service members are asking that people that make false
 13 accusations — Do you know where that specifically is,
 14 Captain Brehm?
 15 CAPTAIN BREHM: I believe it's under
 16 Equality Management, ma'am.
 17 DR. MOSKOS: Not that they should be
 18 punished for making false accusations, but people are
 19 concerned about false accusations. Obviously we all
 20 agree that false accusation, I think, should be punished.
 21 MS. BILBY: Definitely. We have —
 22 DR. MOSKOS: But what about — Do you get
 23 any feedback — any mood that false accusations are now

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1 becoming the new problem?
 2 MS. BILBY: You know, we divide our
 3 committee into three subcommittees: forces development
 4 utilization, quality of life, and equality management.
 5 And under specific issues relating to the U.S. Army in
 6 the back of our overseas trip report, it states that,
 7 "Some military women reported that equal opportunity
 8 issues or complaints are not treated with the emphasis
 9 they deserve. In instances where the victim and
 10 perpetrator are properly notified, only limited
 11 information is given to others directly involved, such as
 12 coworkers. Men and women believe that proper
 13 disciplinary measures should be taken against those who
 14 make false accusations."
 15 So by having that stated in our report,
 16 that issue was raised — that that is something that
 17 needs to be dealt with.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: What about the question of
 19 sex, hanky panky among equals, not above? Superior-
 20 subordinate? Does that come up in any of your
 21 discussions; what effects, if any, this may have on unit
 22 operations?
 23 MS. BILBY: We find very realistic command

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1 climates and that the systems are in place to deal with
 2 it. I would say that the overriding commonality where we
 3 found the realistic environments relates directly to
 4 leadership. And so I would say that one of the things
 5 that we changed in 1998 versus 1997 of issues that we
 6 were looking at was more gender-discriminatory issues
 7 rather than sexual harassment issues.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: You mean — Sexual activity,
 9 I'm speaking of.
 10 MR. PANG: Consensual, you mean.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah, consensual.
 12 DR. YOUNGMAN: Certainly in —
 13 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. Hanky panky, okay?
 14 DR. YOUNGMAN: Certainly in 1997 —
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 16 DR. YOUNGMAN: — I think that there were
 17 — In terms of what appeared in our — both our domestic
 18 and overseas report, two themes came out. That kind of
 19 sexual activity really didn't hit our scan. In other
 20 words, the kinds of issues that get included in our
 21 report are probably those that have some frequency of
 22 being raised, maybe 15 percent of installations, and that
 23 would get it in — We would have seen it enough to get it

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1 in the report. At least in 1997, that issue did not come
 2 up at all in a widespread or frequent way.
 3 It did come up in two kinds of contexts,
 4 however. One had to do in the training discussions.
 5 That is exactly what — the kinds of things that the
 6 NCO's were talking about in terms of ensuring that
 7 service members are experienced in a gender-integrated,
 8 both training and, some people would argue, living
 9 arrangement, so that you can screen out those people who
 10 cannot adhere to standards of professional conduct. Just
 11 as you screen out people who cannot leave too much
 12 alcohol alone or drugs alone or other kinds of things
 13 alone, you don't want those people in forward-deployed
 14 areas, be they men or women. Let's screen them out.
 15 The other context in which we heard it had
 16 to do with Ms. Bilby's point in 1997, having to do with
 17 the realistic environment. And that is, that in an
 18 environment in which the command message is clear on the
 19 professional standards expected related to gender as well
 20 as other issues — in those commands in which the
 21 procedures are in place, in which they are perceived as
 22 fair to men and women and standards are clear and
 23 standards are consistent — if those kinds of behaviors

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1 emerge, they are dealt with, just as false accusations
 2 are dealt with, et cetera.
 3 So I think that we heard about it in two
 4 contexts. But saying that, I want to reiterate that it's
 5 rarely raised, or at least it was rarely raised in 1997.
 6 MS. BILBY: And it isn't anything we would
 7 ask. We are there to listen to what their concerns are.
 8 And we have talked among the Executive
 9 Committee in 1998 where our overriding issues really
 10 didn't even deal with gender issues. The overriding
 11 issues of the people we talked to again were the OPTEMPO,
 12 the training, the downsizing, the out-sourcing. A lot of
 13 concern about out-sourcing: "Will my job go away when we
 14 deploy?" "Do the civilians back home that have those
 15 jobs don't come with us?" And, also, the compression of
 16 ratings was an issue that was raised.
 17 Among the very young enlisted, an issue
 18 that came up that I don't believe came up in either one
 19 of your years and the young people felt passionate — It
 20 isn't an issue I would think about, having grown
 21 children, but they feel very passionate about the body
 22 piercing, tattooing. So that is in our report because
 23 that is an issue that is being raised by the very young

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1 enlisted because those are rulings and issues that are
 2 coming out.
 3 And so to put all of this in context, I
 4 realize what you're wrestling with and what you want to
 5 hear from us are the issues that we're hearing, but in
 6 the broader picture of talking to over 15,000 people in
 7 the last three years at almost 200 installations, the
 8 overriding concerns, I would have to say that the young
 9 people in the services where they have integrated basic
 10 training are taking it for granted that that's the way it
 11 is; so the issues that they're concerned about then are
 12 to discuss those issues.
 13 And, of course, we don't specifically ask
 14 them about things because that then generates that as
 15 becoming an issue when it might not be an issue.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you.
 17 MS. POPE: I think you've probably just
 18 answered my first question. It was a follow-up on Ms.
 19 Blair's, and that was the readiness.
 20 And, you know, in the combined experience,
 21 has gender-integration come up as — In your question of
 22 if you have, you know, five minutes with the Secretary of
 23 Defense, does that come up? And how often as far as

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1 gender-integration?
 2 MS. BILBY: As gender-integration —
 3 MS. POPE: Gender-integration as the top
 4 —
 5 MS. BILBY: — having an effect on the
 6 training?
 7 MS. POPE: Top issue, top concern,
 8 interfering with operational —
 9 MS. BILBY: No. No, it does not.
 10 MS. POPE: You may want to go backwards.
 11 You may want to start with the current and go back to
 12 Holly's...
 13 MS. BILBY: As I just stated, that is not
 14 the overriding concern of people. They're "let us do our
 15 job; give us the resources to do our job; give us
 16 direction as to what our mission is." You know, "Why are
 17 we rotating in and out of here and how long is it going
 18 to take place?" Overriding concerns about compensation
 19 from senior enlisted. These are the things that they
 20 feel passionate and want to talk about.
 21 The change in the compensation, we had
 22 senior NCO's that wanted to spend time talking about
 23 "What am I going to tell my ten-year people? What is

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1 their incentive to stay in? There's a robust economy out
 2 there."
 3 What we hear from leadership is, "We can't
 4 do our job without the women that we already have." And
 5 we do hear the overriding statement that, "Send me people
 6 that are trained." And I'm using the word "people," not
 7 men or women; people that are trained, people that know
 8 what's expected of them and can go right into an
 9 operational environment.
 10 And they talk about physical fitness in
 11 both genders equally. It isn't — That is not a gender
 12 issue. In fact, we're finding more and more that while
 13 we concentrate on the issues relating to women, that the
 14 issues that we hear from men and women, there's a great
 15 commonality.
 16 MS. POPE: I know you want to — but I
 17 have one follow-up question. And that is, physical
 18 fitness: are you hearing increased standards at basic
 19 training or for the operational commands?
 20 MS. BILBY: Both.
 21 MS. POPE: That men and women —
 22 MS. BILBY: Both.
 23 MS. POPE: You're hearing it both places.

1 Okay.
 2 MS. HEMPHILL: Judith?
 3 I wanted to say in response to your
 4 question, Commissioner Pope, that I think it's been
 5 remarkably consistent over our three years, the types of
 6 concerns raised by these troops that we've been talking
 7 to, and they do seem to be — gender issues are almost
 8 never the first things out of their mouth.
 9 We have discovered from these focus groups
 10 you'll hear people's major concerns first, and as you get
 11 toward the end of the hour, if they've exhausted that,
 12 they're going to bring up some minor things: oh, yes, and
 13 then there's this, that and the other.
 14 But I think it's been remarkably
 15 consistent that the folks are interested in mission-
 16 oriented issues and the like.
 17 One thing that I can think of in my year
 18 — and this is somewhat dated now — '96, that women we
 19 would talk to in those days were very concerned about
 20 uniforms and gear not being properly designed for
 21 females. Boots, packs, all kinds of gear. And I don't
 22 know if you folks are hearing that now, but I think that
 23 there is at least —

1 MS. BILBY: We still hear that in the
 2 operational environment, yes.
 3 MS. HEMPHILL: So things like that, things
 4 that affect how they do their job, we think they're going
 5 to bring it up to us and they do.
 6 MS. POPE: One last piece of the question
 7 and I'll stop. Are you hearing more concerns, issues, in
 8 OPTEMPO, PERSTEMPO? I mean, has it just been
 9 consistently an issue or is it increasing as far as a
 10 major concern?
 11 MS. BILBY: I feel that it increased this
 12 year over 1997. And of the three of us, I was on the
 13 WESTPAC trip last year and on the overseas trip this
 14 year, and I felt when I came out we were hearing "we're
 15 expected to do more with less." That was sort of the
 16 quote.
 17 MS. POPE: More of —
 18 MS. BILBY: More with less. This year, we
 19 heard "we can't keep doing less with less."
 20 MS. POPE: Less, right.
 21 MS. BILBY: So they took the "more" out of
 22 there.
 23 So I think it's a concern. And, yet, I

1 have to say at the same time when they — when these
 2 perceptions come up, we still hear overridingly, "We will
 3 do our mission. We will do what we are tasked to do."
 4 So there's a great deal of pride and sense of
 5 accomplishment, too.
 6 So while in a focus group they might say
 7 "Take these concerns back," we also hear, like we did in
 8 the training visits, you know, the respect and — you
 9 know for the trainer. So we do hear the positives, too.
 10 But I think the nature of the way we're
 11 there listening, it's the concerns that come out
 12 primarily.
 13 MS. POPE: Thank you.
 14 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I'm kind of
 15 curious to hear what would be your definition of "gender-
 16 integration." Because, Dr. Youngman, when you were
 17 speaking, I thought I understood you or you alluded to
 18 the Crucible and follow-on Marine Combat Training as
 19 being gender-integrated and I certainly did not see it
 20 that way. I just wonder what your definition would be.
 21 DR. YOUNGMAN: Well, in terms of
 22 addressing the Marine Corps, perhaps two points of
 23 clarification.

1 One, initial entry training in the Marine
 2 Corps, the entire package is designed — or so General
 3 Krulak at least had shared with me — his intent was to
 4 have a program of phased-in gender-integration — at
 5 least for the women, not the men, because there are the
 6 Marines trained on the West Coast who never do do that —
 7 but that it was a program of phased-in integration where
 8 there was separation at Parris Island; in Marine Combat
 9 Training, where there was company level integration but
 10 there was still not — at least in 1997, there was not
 11 integrated even trainers; and finally, in MCSSS — in the
 12 Marine Corps service support schools — there was finally
 13 integration.
 14 And the second point is, is that in terms
 15 of the service specific issues that were raised regarding
 16 integration — in the training base report I believe this
 17 is covered, but clearly the trainers at MCT and MCSSS —
 18 the great majority of trainers believed that more
 19 integration — greater integration of MCT would
 20 facilitate the overall phased-in integration, and their
 21 reasoning was the following.
 22 MCSSS, advanced individualized training,
 23 depending upon what you're specializing in, can be a very

1 individualized experience. If you're learning how to
 2 work a computer, if you're learning jeep repair or
 3 automobile repair, it's not the same kind of unit
 4 cohesion, team-building approach.
 5 And they felt two things. One, that it
 6 would be preferable to integrate more closely the
 7 trainees at MCT. Women trainers perceived that it was a
 8 discouraging factor for the women to have completed the
 9 Crucible in basic, to have proven themselves on a gender-
 10 neutral standard or what — experience, and then to still
 11 be kept separate.
 12 In addition, and if that were not
 13 something that was desirable, if that — then they then
 14 recommended that at least integrating the cadre would
 15 facilitate the — in MCT, would facilitate the training
 16 of both men and women because the male trainers at MCT
 17 were drawn from the combat arms and did not have
 18 experience leading gender-integrated units in a field
 19 environment or gender-integrated units.
 20 The women cadre were sent through combat
 21 training to develop combat skills but had never — had no
 22 experience utilizing combat skills in a field
 23 environment.

1 And if you paired the two together and had
 2 an integrated cadre, the perception of many trainers was
 3 the men would learn from the women how to lead gender-
 4 integrated troops; the women would be able to improve
 5 their combat skills from the men; and even if you kept
 6 the trainees separate, both men and women trainees would
 7 benefit from a more skilled cadre.
 8 MS. BILBY: I can speak just briefly to
 9 that, having been the training team member that visited
 10 MCRD in San Diego where they have the all-male training.
 11 One of our members also did visit Parris
 12 — Is it Parris Island or Camp LeJeune? Parris Island is
 13 — yeah, Parris Island. And actually one of our male
 14 members is the one that visited the gender-integrated
 15 training. He was part of our team.
 16 And I spent an additional day because the
 17 Marine Corps asked me to spend three days there, and I
 18 spent some time where they were doing their Marine Combat
 19 Training after the twelve weeks, too, and also spent some
 20 time with their Crucible.
 21 And I will have to say that,
 22 overwhelmingly, the trainers and the trainees at MCRD,
 23 from the top command on down, feel that keeping the basic

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1 twelve-week training separate is the way they feel that
 2 they need to train, and that was an overriding, pretty
 3 consistent theme.
 4 However, when we went out to Camp
 5 Pendleton, in the Marine Combat Training, and I spoke
 6 with the commander there — For the first time ever, they
 7 now do have a female — Would it be command sergeant
 8 major? — at MCT at Camp Pendleton. And in our
 9 discussions, it was discussed — although no one came up
 10 with any specific recommendation, but it was felt that
 11 since normally it's divided geographically, with West
 12 Coast training and East Coast training for males in the
 13 Marine Corps, but women all go to the East Coast, and
 14 then they apparently have a leave after they finish the
 15 twelve-week training before they go back to Marine Combat
 16 Training, that perhaps it should be looked at that since
 17 the Marine Combat Training is integrated on the East
 18 Coast, that rather than, say, a West Coast Marine who
 19 goes for the twelve weeks, goes home to visit their
 20 family and then goes back for that Marine Combat Training
 21 to the East Coast under their own dollars, that perhaps
 22 there could be some mechanism to introduce Marine Combat
 23 Training as it is on the East Coast on the West Coast.

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1 I'm not speaking about the twelve-week
 2 basic training. It's that follow-on seventeen-day
 3 training. That was brought up as a consideration. But I
 4 would not say that it was a recommendation. It was just
 5 a consideration to look at. And they were speaking of it
 6 more from a perspective of the recruit going back and
 7 forth across the country and the dollar part of it rather
 8 than whether it was fulfilling any need to actually
 9 integrate. So it wasn't even spoken of in that context.
 10 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: The intent of
 11 my question was not to analyze how the Marine Corps
 12 trains, but rather to see your perception of what is
 13 gender-integrated. There are different opinions —
 14 MS. BILBY: Right.
 15 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: — of that
 16 definition, and including now Kassebaum Baker's
 17 recommendation that, within a company, she considers that
 18 integrated, even though you segregate them by platoons,
 19 where the majority of training takes place on a daily
 20 basis. You see my point?
 21 MS. BILBY: I see what you're saying. And
 22 we have — I would have to say that what we hear is more
 23 integration at the beginning level. That if you are

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1 training the way you're going to serve, that those
 2 artificial separations at the very beginning, even at
 3 that beginning level, takes away cohesiveness and it sets
 4 up artificial barriers.
 5 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 6 MS. BILBY: And that's a general
 7 statement.
 8 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And one
 9 follow-up along this same theme. I did not hear you say,
 10 nor did I read, that you have visited combat service or
 11 combat service support OSUT in the Army that takes place
 12 at Fort McClelland, where it's totally gender-integrated
 13 — chemical, military police — and at Fort Leonard Wood,
 14 heavy engineering. And in those particular places, the
 15 cadre in total come from that same background, with no
 16 integration of combat arms folks into the training
 17 process.
 18 You have not had the opportunity to visit
 19 —
 20 DR. YOUNGMAN: Not those — Fort Gordon
 21 was visited. AIT.
 22 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Yes. That's
 23 signal AIT.

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1 DR. YOUNGMAN: Right.
 2 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: But I'm
 3 talking about OSUT now — one station unit training —
 4 that exists at Fort —
 5 DR. YOUNGMAN: Right. No.
 6 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. Thank
 7 you very much.
 8 MR. MOORE: We've reached the break hour.
 9 If you want to pause, I'll be glad to come back after the
 10 break.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: No. Why don't you go
 12 ahead, then we'll finish a round.
 13 MR. MOORE: Okay. I've got a lot of
 14 questions. That's why I —
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Oh.
 16 MR. MOORE: That's why I volunteered to...
 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, what's the sense?
 18 We would like to take ten minutes and then — Okay. Why
 19 don't we rejoin at quarter-of, and then we'll go through
 20 Tom's list of questions.
 21 (A brief recess was taken.)
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. We left off
 23 with Tom Moore's questions. And as I mentioned, we're

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1 going to try and excuse two of our visitors at about
 2 eleven o'clock so that they can make other commitments,
 3 and so Tom is going to talk fast.
 4 MR. MOORE: Right. I'll try to be — try
 5 to be brief.
 6 And, first, thank you for coming and
 7 giving us a very clear and solid and informative
 8 presentation. In fact, it's one of the best I think
 9 we've had, even better than any of the service briefs
 10 we've been getting. So I thank you and commend you.
 11 I think you do have a lot of influence in
 12 the Pentagon on this whole array of gender-related
 13 issues. And so that being the case, I'm interested in I
 14 guess what you would call process or procedure questions,
 15 just how you operate.
 16 You obviously are selected from a diverse
 17 pool of people. You're actually nominated by, as I
 18 understand it, just to review some of that — you're
 19 nominated by the services, by members of Congress, and
 20 the White House. Is that basically the three sources of
 21 nominations?
 22 MS. BILBY: I can give it to you
 23 specifically. Nominations are provided by the service

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1 secretaries and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard,
 2 and they're forwarded to the DACOWITS office.
 3 Nominations may also be provided by third-year DACOWITS
 4 members, members of Congress, the White House, and
 5 executive level DoD officials.
 6 MR. MOORE: Okay. All right. Then who
 7 selects —
 8 MS. BILBY: Those are the specifics.
 9 MR. MOORE: — once that pool of nominees
 10 has been established? Who actually picks the members?
 11 MS. BILBY: The actual is the Assistant —
 12 MR. MOORE: Is it the Secretary?
 13 MS. BILBY: Yeah. Can I ask Captain Brehm
 14 to address that specifically?
 15 MR. MOORE: Sure.
 16 CAPTAIN BREHM: On the 1st of May, sir, we
 17 send the letter to the services and everybody else asking
 18 for nominations, and it's closed the 30th of September.
 19 We ask them to fill out a form giving us some basic
 20 information.
 21 A package is put together by my office,
 22 and in it we include information on the graduating
 23 members so we can see geographically are we covering the

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 74</p> <p>1 whole United States and then, of the nominations, who are 2 the people, and do they have some particular backgrounds 3 that might be useful to the committee; are we losing the 4 person that understands medicine, and maybe it would be 5 useful to have that. 6MR. MOORE: Right. 7CAPTAIN BREHM: That whole package is sent 8 through the chain, and so the selection is made by the 9 Secretary of Defense. 10 Once that is done, then I call each of the 11 individuals and I read a script to them to make sure that 12 they understand what they're undertaking; that it's not a 13 conflict with their business and that they have certain 14 requirements to meet. 15 MR. MOORE: And that they are volunteers, 16 which I didn't know until today. I further commend you 17 for that. That certainly speaks highly — 18 MS. BILBY: And they do also run a — for 19 security purposes, a national agency check is performed 20 on all nominees. 21 MR. MOORE: I see. 22 CAPTAIN BREHM: And then we will hold — I 23 guess we could call it a school, ma'am, where the chairs</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 77</p> <p>1 briefings from the services. Usually the initial 2 briefings take place at the Executive Committee meetings 3 in partnership with our service liaisons and 4 representatives. 5 Then the subcommittee chairs and the three 6 different committees work with the Executive Committee to 7 set the agenda for either the spring or the fall 8 conference. Then at the spring or the fall conference, 9 the members of those subcommittees meet, and those are 10 also open meetings and the agenda has been set. 11 And we really don't add new items to the 12 agenda because it's published ahead of time. So that 13 also at our meetings, if someone wants to make a 14 statement, they submit it in writing to the DACOWITS 15 office and then they give the opportunity to speak. 16 We follow a format where at a subcommittee 17 meeting, the first people to speak are the active duty 18 DACOWITS members, then the former DACOWITS members, and 19 the military liaisons and representatives, and then 20 interested community people, time permitting, are allowed 21 to participate in the discussions. 22 Out of the discussions, and having had the 23 briefings on an issue, they might say that's all the</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 75</p> <p>1 do some instruction. Plus, we cover certain things 2 because we're under the FACA rules; we have ethics rules. 3MR. MOORE: Right. 4CAPTAIN BREHM: So we do that training as 5 well. 6MR. MOORE: It seems to me that much of 7 your primary work is done by the Executive Committee. 8 How is that group selected from the total membership? 9MS. BILBY: The Executive Committee is — 10 It's really a joint effort. The new Chair, who is 11 interviewed and named by the Secretary of Defense, meets 12 with the active duty DACOWITS staff — And, also, the 13 final say comes from DoD as to who actually serves on the 14 Executive Committee, although the recommendations come 15 from the incoming Chair, the outgoing Chair, and based on 16 who has the time available to serve on the Executive 17 Committee. 18 Because, again, as a volunteer, it's an 19 ambitious undertaking because we ask each Executive 20 Committee member to take the two-week overseas trip, 21 which many people do. Depending on their job, that's 22 their vacation for that particular year. And, also, in 23 addition to the two conferences a year, to also attend</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 78</p> <p>1 information that we need and we don't have a 2 recommendation at this time. We don't even need more 3 information. 4But, also, there might be requests for 5 information from the services, and those are tasked back 6 to — through the DACOWITS office, to the DCSPERS, 7 really, through the military liaisons and 8 representatives. And that request for information can be 9 written; it can be for an oral briefing either to the 10 Executive Committee or to the full committee when they 11 have their conferences. 12 After listening to the briefings — I also 13 might say there are reams of materials and read-aheads. 14 We are given information to read of current publications, 15 of information to read ahead of time, and are tasked to 16 make sure that we come prepared with the background 17 information that's been provided to us by the services. 18 And then at that time, the subcommittee 19 will put together either a recommendation to the 20 Secretary of Defense, a request for information to the 21 Secretary of Defense, or a statement of appreciation. 22 Then we meet as an entire group, not just 23 in subcommittee, and there is the opportunity for those</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 76</p> <p>1 the Executive Committee meetings which take place here in 2 Washington, and those are two full-day meetings 3 quarterly. 4MR. MOORE: That's in addition to your two 5 annual conferences. 6MS. BILBY: In addition to the two 7 conferences. Yes, sir. 8MR. MOORE: One more process question, 9 then. How do you reach a formal DACOWITS position or 10 recommendation? Let's say your '98 training report, just 11 for an example. I presume there will be bulletized, 12 specific recommendations. Are those — 13 MS. BILBY: The recommendations that came 14 out of — 15 MR. MOORE: Okay. You have a — Do you 16 just prepare a draft or do you vote individually on 17 individual positions? 18 MS. BILBY: Each individual member votes, 19 and we have a military active duty member serve as 20 parliamentarian. It's a public meeting. 21 The Executive Committee meets and we take 22 the issues that are raised from out in the field and 23 fleet, and we ask for requests for information and</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 79</p> <p>1 subcommittees to explain why that request for information 2 or recommendation is forthcoming. Then on the last day 3 we take a vote. And so — 4MR. PANG: As a matter — I've observed 5 one of these and I think it's fair to say that DACOWITS 6 takes advantage of technology, because the 7 recommendations are subject to vote and they are also 8 subject to amendment. And I've seen amendments voted on 9 and, you know, the recommendations are actually on the 10 screen and they make the change right there. 11 MS. BILBY: We have PowerPoint and — 12 MR. MOORE: You've got PowerPoint. 13 MS. BILBY: Yeah. And so everyone — The 14 other thing that we do — And I have to commend the 15 DACOWITS staff. When we finish our next-to-the-last- 16 day's session, the issue book is — and it's the 17 supporting service staff that puts it together with our 18 staff, and that is distributed to each member the night 19 before the actual vote so they have a hard copy in print 20 of everything that's going to be voted on. 21 MR. MOORE: Let me put a substantive 22 question to you since I know both of you have to go, and 23 I'll — Please, if you have to leave in mid-sentence, I</p>

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1 won't be offended.
 2 But, Dr. Youngman, when you were briefing
 3 on your experience on the '97 training visits, you
 4 surfaced a phenomenon that I think we've all encountered
 5 and that I remarked on particularly on my training site
 6 visits. It's what I call the great paradox.
 7 On the one hand, the services — the Army,
 8 the Air Force, the Navy in particular — are saying,
 9 "We're putting our trainees in a gender-integrated
 10 environment because that's the way they're going to have
 11 to operate in the field and in the fleet." And, yet, at
 12 the same time, as you've observed, there are all these
 13 artificial restraints and barriers on interaction.
 14 And with the way that NCO's always speak
 15 so vividly, one told me — I think it was at Fort
 16 McClelland — "We've had to create a prison camp
 17 environment in order to make gender-integration work."
 18 In other words, we put them together in order to foster
 19 the right sort of professional attitudes, learn how to
 20 work together, and then we inhibit them from working
 21 together.
 22 I don't know what the solution to that is
 23 and I — but you certainly observed the phenomenon, and I

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1 wonder if I could ask you to go — the three of you — to
 2 go a step beyond that and comment on how that paradox can
 3 be resolved, if at all.
 4 DR. YOUNGMAN: Well, personally, sir, I
 5 don't have a comment. But I think that the work that
 6 DACOWITS has done in looking at that paradox or
 7 phenomenon, starting in 1996 — going back to one of Ms.
 8 Hemphill's earlier points, one of the things that had
 9 become apparent to the committee is that some of the
 10 training on professional relationships and behaviors that
 11 service members told us they were receiving in basic
 12 training last year was either very minimum or was very
 13 late into the process. It was two to three weeks into
 14 the training schedule.
 15 And so the DACOWITS' fall of 1996
 16 recommendation was that ought to be one of the first
 17 issues that — that training on expected standards of
 18 conduct and behavior and professional behaviors is what
 19 basic training is all about, that ought to begin right
 20 away. In 1997, in our training base visits, that was not
 21 the schedule, at least at that time, that was perceived
 22 or that appeared to be occurring based upon what we were
 23 hearing.

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1 The one specific example that I can
 2 remember is in Army basic training, gender-integrated,
 3 where, for example, policies on fraternization were
 4 covered in a ten-minute briefing, at that time, the
 5 second or third week of training, and only once, and so
 6 the very complicated fraternization policy kind of thing
 7 was just a quick scan early in basic or midway in basic.
 8 So I think that to the extent that
 9 DACOWITS has commented or made recommendations on the
 10 issue you're addressing, that that 1996 recommendation
 11 was after two or three years look at gender relations and
 12 looking at professional standards of behavior and conduct
 13 and when that process of socialization or soldierization
 14 on those kinds of issues need to occur, resulting in the
 15 recommendation. It ought to be one of the first things
 16 in basic training.
 17 MS. BILBY: One of the things I might add
 18 that we have heard this year — and this is not so much
 19 in the training environment as out in the operational
 20 environment — is when you're discussing things, we want
 21 the positive training and how things work rather than all
 22 the "don'ts" and all the "shouldn'ts".
 23 In other words, rather than always

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1 emphasizing "don't do this," "don't do that," tell us,
 2 you know, what are the positives and what are the ways
 3 that we interact that are acceptable and appropriate,
 4 from the leadership, on down to the lowest command level.
 5 MR. MOORE: Well, it's eleven o'clock, but
 6 if you've got another minute or two...
 7 DR. YOUNGMAN: Please. Please continue.
 8 MR. MOORE: It's sort of a cosmic law in
 9 Washington that for every action, there's an equal and
 10 opposite criticism, especially if you're dealing with
 11 controversial subjects like this one. And that was
 12 certainly true of the —
 13 DR. MOSKOS: The best kind.
 14 MR. MOORE: That's right. The best kind,
 15 interesting kind.
 16 But that was true of the '91 presidential
 17 commission, it was true of the Kassebaum Baker
 18 commission. They got a lot of criticism. You've
 19 obviously had some —
 20 MS. BILBY: Absolutely.
 21 MR. MOORE: — sanity check from the GAO,
 22 and I'm sure we will as well.
 23 And so I guess we've been perhaps — our

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1 sensitivity to that has been heightened and I think we
 2 are eager to anticipate and avoid any unnecessary
 3 criticism, although certainly if we make errors, we
 4 should be criticized. And so I wanted to get some of
 5 your thoughts about how to position ourselves in this
 6 environment of controversy since you've had to deal with
 7 it.
 8 One thing that concerns me, that I'm
 9 afraid this type of process can be criticized for, is a
 10 sort of subjective bias. Maybe "bias" is too strong a
 11 word, but the process seems to be sort of inherently
 12 subjective when you go out and you interview trainees and
 13 you talk to people.
 14 And you yourself were fairly explicit
 15 about it. You indicated that the real purpose of your
 16 '97 training base visits was really to ferret out
 17 perceptions, and you asked people did they feel they were
 18 getting — were they being made ready to deploy and fight
 19 by their training, how did they feel about it, and that's
 20 largely subjective. To some extent, I guess we've done
 21 the same thing.
 22 How do you deal with the idea that this is
 23 all sort of soliciting emotional and subjective

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1 responses? I know the Army Research Institute, for
 2 example, did a study on the constructs of cohesion, which
 3 is another thing that we're looking at, and they tended
 4 to ask the trainee, "How do you feel about your unit? Do
 5 you like your fellow soldier," or sailor or whatever.
 6 And I'm not saying that's invalid, but it seems to be
 7 only useful up to a point.
 8 How do you get beyond that and get
 9 objective, empirical information about things like
 10 cohesion, which, after all, does sort of reside in the
 11 human realm?
 12 DR. YOUNGMAN: If I — Commissioner, I'd
 13 like to just correct the record a bit. We, in deciding
 14 to look at initial entry training, decided to do that in
 15 order to gather perceptions from the entire process that
 16 led to people being assigned to an operational unit being
 17 field and fleet ready.
 18 When we went out, then as now, into our
 19 focus groups, we did not ask specifically "Do you feel
 20 field and fleet ready" or did-you-do, what-did-you do.
 21 We asked, "How's it going?" "If you had five minutes to
 22 spend with the Secretary of Defense, what would you tell
 23 him," and those kind of non-agenda opening statements.

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1 We train and have — in the last several
 2 years, have trained our members rigorously in how to
 3 conduct these installation visits, to the extent that
 4 they initially go out with serving DACOWITS members to
 5 participate in installation visits before they ever go
 6 out on their own, and the format in most of the focus
 7 groups that is used is we do not ask specific questions.
 8 We only ask the kinds of follow-on or
 9 questions for clarification to make sure that we
 10 understand and are not misinterpreting what a service
 11 member is telling us, or we ask questions to try and
 12 solicit a response — to get a group discussion going to
 13 solicit a response.
 14 But we do not go out with any specific
 15 questions to ask any service member even in training
 16 bases.
 17 MS. BILBY: And I might just want to make
 18 one point here. You know, DACOWITS has not been tasked
 19 as you have to come up with specific recommendations. So
 20 when we make a recommendation, it isn't because we were
 21 tasked to make or not make a recommendation, and that's
 22 why it's really a different process, and it's why here
 23 today I wanted the three of us to be here to give you the

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1 historical perspective of how we got involved in this.
 2 And, yet, with the overriding feel that in
 3 our overall installation visits and our reports, which
 4 you will have, we have to put this one issue into
 5 perspective from what the overriding issues are that we
 6 hear.
 7 So we aren't really asked to go out to
 8 make recommendations on whether you should or shouldn't
 9 have gender-integrated training. We're saying this is
 10 what the soldiers and the sailors are telling us —
 11 MR. MOORE: No, I realize you —
 12 MS. BILBY: — what works.
 13 MR. MOORE: I realize you have a slightly
 14 different mission. I'm just hoping that we can benefit
 15 from your errors and your successes.
 16 We are particularly interested in this
 17 phenomenon of military cohesion, and I wonder if you —
 18 if DACOWITS has — You evidently didn't have a sort of
 19 objective standard working definition of "readiness" and
 20 I wonder if you have one for "cohesion." Or, again, do
 21 you defer to the services' definition?
 22 MS. BILBY: I think, as civilians serving
 23 on this committee, we are there to listen, and then if we

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1 want additional information — But I wouldn't say that
 2 we're tasked to provide the military with what we feel is
 3 the definition of "cohesion."
 4 We certainly listen at all levels of
 5 soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen, and then it comes
 6 back to us what they feel is what we call a realistic
 7 environment, which would include this issue of cohesion
 8 that you're talking about.
 9 And I would have to say that, generally
 10 speaking, when we are out in the operational
 11 environments, people knowing what their task is and what
 12 their job is and feeling comfortable that they're allowed
 13 to do that job within the confines of their unit, that's
 14 where the cohesion happens.
 15 And we have certainly seen, going from
 16 maybe the very early days where we were hearing things
 17 that maybe didn't create cohesiveness in a unit to seeing
 18 what we call today mostly extremely realistic
 19 environments where people are working side-by-side and
 20 there is unit cohesion.
 21 But I would have to say that one of the
 22 defining aspects of that is the clear understanding of
 23 what the leadership expects, and that goes into the

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1 issues of fraternization where people know what's
 2 expected of them. And in that arena, we are getting
 3 questions, particularly in joint environments, about, you
 4 know, "we just want to know what the rules are so that we
 5 can operate under the rules."
 6 MR. MOORE: Thanks. I think I'll pause
 7 there and —
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right.
 9 MR. MOORE: — let them go.
 10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Anyway, we're very
 11 grateful to you for coming along and spending some time
 12 with us this morning.
 13 And, Liz, I understand you're happy to
 14 stay for a little bit and you have somebody watching your
 15 clock.
 16 MS. BILBY: I do. I'm all the way from
 17 Arizona, so I don't go back until tomorrow morning.
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: So I think the other
 19 commissioners have indicated that they don't have burning
 20 questions, but it would be nice to be able to talk a
 21 little bit with you.
 22 And Dr. Youngman and Ms. Hemphill, we
 23 thank you very, very much for spending your time with yet

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1 another volunteer effort on your part for DACOWITS and we
 2 appreciate it very much.
 3 MS. BILBY: I'd like to thank them, too,
 4 because when I was originally tasked for this, I felt
 5 that it would give you a much better perspective to look
 6 at the whole three-year picture when we've been involved
 7 in training.
 8 So I thank you also for being here.
 9 MS. POPE: — separately, but having the
 10 three-year perspective has been, you know, immensely
 11 helpful.
 12 DR. MOSKOS: Yes.
 13 MR. PANG: Very helpful.
 14 MS. POPE: At least for me. So I know
 15 that all of you are giving up, again, the time, and thank
 16 you.
 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Do you want to go off
 18 record and just chat, or do you want to stay on the
 19 record?
 20 (Discussion off the record.)
 21 (Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the hearing in
 22 the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at
 23 1:00 p.m., the same day.)

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1 (AFTERNOON SESSION)
 2 (1:00 p.m.)
 3 Defense Counsel/Non-Service Commentary on Cross-Gender Relationships
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: This is Tuesday, November
 5 17th, the Congressional Commission on Military Training
 6 and Gender-Related Issues.
 7 This afternoon we have a couple of folks
 8 to speak with us about Section A of our statute which
 9 concerns cross-gender issues, General Trefry and General
 10 Miller.
 11 And I will — just for the sake of you
 12 guys, we've been having the witnesses give statements and
 13 then we just go around the table, one after another, with
 14 commissioner questions until we run out of time.
 15 I don't want to spend any more time, so
 16 we'll begin with you, General Trefry. Thank you for
 17 coming.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Thank you very
 19 much. I trust that you read the paper that I sent down
 20 here. We can save some time. And you have my background
 21 and we don't need to go into that. What I would like to
 22 discuss with you is how the Army handled allegations of
 23

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1 Now, I retired fifteen years ago but I
 2 believe it's still the same. I saw the IG here a couple
 3 of weeks ago. We rode back from Leavenworth together,
 4 and as near as I can determine, it's the same way.
 5 All allegations of misconduct by senior
 6 officers, senior NCO's, and senior civilians, are
 7 referred to the Inspector General by a memorandum of
 8 agreement between the Inspector General and the commander
 9 of the Criminal Investigation Command, and the two of us
 10 would meet and we would say, "This one is criminal. You
 11 take it," or "This one is an Inspector General item. You
 12 take it."
 13 In the course of the investigation, if I
 14 took it and it was an allegation that I started with and
 15 it turned criminal, I would turn it over to him, and vice
 16 versa. That was done with the knowledge and the
 17 affirmation of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the
 18 Secretary of the Army based on several years experience.
 19 What kind of investigations did the
 20 Inspector General conduct in this business of sex? The
 21 answer is what I would — what I call and used to call
 22 violations of the professional ethic.
 23 When you get with the Judge Advocate

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1 a very damning thing with the Army so close.
 2 And if I could make an observation here —
 3 this is what I used to say when I was the Inspector
 4 General — saintly women marry assholes, and vice versa.
 5 I saw very few cases where a lovely woman with a lovely
 6 family wasn't done wrong by a guy who should have known
 7 better, and I saw some very saintly fellows who were done
 8 in by women who should have known better.
 9 I think that the way it works is people
 10 lead, I'd say, good careers — I wouldn't say great
 11 careers, but good careers — up through the ranks. When
 12 they get to be colonels, they begin to think that they're
 13 God Almighty, and if they get selected to be a general,
 14 then they figure the rules no longer apply.
 15 Now, this is a very, very small minority
 16 of people. Maybe, I'd say, at the most, 2 percent. Same
 17 for sergeant major. And these are the people who do the
 18 dumb things.
 19 I was charged by the Chief of Staff of the
 20 Army to always address the charm school for new generals.
 21 That is, they would send them to school for a week. And
 22 my message used to be, on his instruction, "How do
 23 generals get in trouble?" And the answer is, "Just like

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1 General, they will tell you that probably one of the most
 2 difficult allegations to prove is adultery. It's kind of
 3 easy to prove assault and abuse of children and that type
 4 of thing, but when you get into adultery, it's — as one
 5 of the JAG's told me, you'd better be under the bed with
 6 a camera if you really want to make it stick on the
 7 elements of proof.
 8 On the other hand, it becomes very common
 9 knowledge when someone is having an affair or there are
 10 intimations of an affair and these are considered
 11 violations of the professional ethic. You certainly, if
 12 you are a commander, don't have a — run an affair with
 13 your secretary. It's very difficult to do this in the
 14 public forum that is the military.
 15 I think one of the real distinctions
 16 between the military and civilian life is that the Army's
 17 a global village. And I live out here in Clifton,
 18 twenty-six miles away. I've lived out there twenty-three
 19 years and there are people on the street I have never
 20 met. There's only eighteen people in the development.
 21 On the other hand, I have never been
 22 through Atlanta that I didn't run into somebody I knew in
 23 the airport. Or Seattle, or anywhere else, and I think

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1 corporals," only more so, because it's the same thing.
 2 Generals get in trouble in sexual ways for
 3 five things — booze, sex, money, airplanes and lying —
 4 and they're all tied together. Somebody gets to feel
 5 omnipotent and they think they can take two or three
 6 martinis, and then that leads to an assignation or a
 7 liaison.
 8 They start cheating on TDY, on application
 9 for funds. Their TDY is up on Friday; they'll take TDY
 10 over the weekend and collect from the government while
 11 they have an assignation at some hotel or some resort.
 12 They usually misuse government aircraft while they're
 13 doing this and then they lie about it. And in almost
 14 every case, I can tell you at least three and most of the
 15 time five of those elements were involved.
 16 Now, could we have gotten people on court-
 17 martial for that? Yeah, probably. But when you do that,
 18 you immediately throw all the gears in and you have to
 19 meet certain time frames and so forth; whereas,
 20 Inspectors General would go out and in a matter of a very
 21 few days we had the goods pretty much on these fellows.
 22 I remember one guy was brought to my
 23 attention who had been carrying on an affair with his

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1 that's the same. And not only that, but you know their
 2 families.
 3 And so people live on Army posts and they
 4 meet again and live on Army posts, and you live on the
 5 same street. And you start as classmates in OCS or ROTC
 6 or the Military Academy and then you're classmates in
 7 basic schools and in the advanced classes and in
 8 Leavenworth, in the War College, and you can't spend a
 9 career in this business without knowing a lot of people.
 10 And that's one of the reasons why most everybody knows
 11 the ethic and knows when someone is stepping out of line.
 12 Now, I think that — Let me talk in
 13 generalities because there are specific cases that would
 14 say, "Well, what about this case," but not many. In the
 15 six years that I was the Inspector General, I can't
 16 recall a single case that was tried in the court system
 17 for adultery.
 18 On the other hand, there were several
 19 officers and several NCO's who were asked to retire or
 20 resign because of sexual capers or promiscuity. And when
 21 these allegations would come in, it was amazing to me as
 22 to how many people would immediately step forward and
 23 say, "I observed this," "I observed that," because it is

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1 secretary for several months and he was charging it all
 2 off to American Express. Well, I had all his chits. And
 3 I said, "Now, whatever you do" — Now, I used to say this
 4 to all of them: "Whatever you do, don't lie to me," and
 5 "I have information that you were in this city with a
 6 female not your wife during this period of time."
 7 And I'm sitting there with the chit that
 8 he signed. Not once, but two or three times. Same
 9 hotel. And the hotel manager would say, "Oh, yeah. This
 10 guy comes out here frequently, always with the same
 11 woman." "Well, here's a picture of his wife. Is that
 12 her?" "No, that's not her." "Well, here's a picture of
 13 his secretary." "Yeah, that's her."
 14 Well, you run into all kinds of things
 15 like that. When you do that, we handled it very simply.
 16 I would go up and see the Chief of Staff of the Army and
 17 say, "Here's the investigation." And IG's never
 18 recommend a punishment. I never made anything other than
 19 "I recommend that the case is closed, that appropriate
 20 action be taken by the" — whoever commissioned me to do
 21 the investigation.
 22 IG's don't get in the business of being
 23 judge, jury, and everything else. They determine facts.

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1 And we put people under oath, and I think that we're very
 2 jealous of that. Then the Chief would just say, very
 3 simply, "I no longer have confidence in you."
 4 Now, that probably doesn't mean much to
 5 civilians. But, you know, your commission says, "The
 6 President, reposing special trust and confidence at this
 7 time" — That's what it says at the White House, "at this
 8 time." Here it just says "special trust and confidence."
 9 "I no longer have confidence. Sign here," and the guy's
 10 gone. And that's probably a pretty good way to do it.
 11 Now, if it's less than twenty years, the
 12 guy resigns and he gets nothing. When you resign, you
 13 don't get a pension. You cut that off. That's a very
 14 expensive proposition. We don't make a big thing about
 15 that thing, and the reason we don't make a big thing is
 16 because the family's involved. And the wife finds out,
 17 and she does, and the kids find out. And it's worse on
 18 the kids — that this idol that they've been serving all
 19 these years is a philanderer, a cheat, and has been told
 20 to retire or resign.
 21 That's pretty potent medicine and it
 22 doesn't take long for the word to get around. But we
 23 don't, you know, publish orders and cut people's buttons

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1 off over on the Mall steps. You don't need to. It takes
 2 care of itself.
 3 I think that there are a lot of
 4 allegations made on this, but when you come to the proof,
 5 it's a very small percentage, maybe 2 percent. There's
 6 — at the most. And then when it is, it's so obvious and
 7 it's so flaunted that there's no doubt and they should
 8 have been eliminated anyway.
 9 To me, there was one thing that was common
 10 about all of it even though these people had
 11 distinguished records as noncommissioned officers or as
 12 officers. When I got back and looked at their records —
 13 and I always did; I had the investigating officers bring
 14 me the complete personnel files of these people — it was
 15 almost a given that starting at the grade of captain or
 16 at staff sergeant, there would be a phrase, "This officer
 17 gets things done" or "This noncommissioned officer gets
 18 things done," but they never told you how he got things
 19 done.
 20 And when you started looking at his
 21 record, you'll find out that he's the kind of a guy who
 22 would turn his mother in for a file. Completely self-
 23 centered, just out for themselves, and the people who

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1 rated them really didn't know them; because they
 2 performed, they performed masterfully, but nobody stopped
 3 to ask how they performed.
 4 But when you started checking, you found
 5 some amazing stories and they were able to camouflage it
 6 up until the time they got to be prominent as a command
 7 sergeant major or as a colonel and generals. It came
 8 out. And that's why I say some people just can't stand
 9 prosperity that way.
 10 Now, I would be glad to continue on on
 11 anything that you want to talk in this vein. I can give
 12 you specific examples without mentioning names or
 13 anything else, but they all generally follow in that
 14 business.
 15 I think — before I turn it over to you
 16 for questions, I think the way we did it is extremely
 17 fair. And what concerns me about this proposed change is
 18 I think that there is a tendency to turn it over to
 19 commanders, and some commanders I think will turn around
 20 and immediately whip an Article 15 on somebody when they
 21 should be thrown out, and the only people who can throw
 22 anybody out are the Chief and the Secretary.
 23 So if you want to have standard

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1 punishment, then all cases involving senior NCO's, SES's,
 2 and general officers, should be referred to the Inspector
 3 General and the Chief and the Secretary for action, and
 4 then we get uniformity in punishment and everybody
 5 understands what the rules are; everybody understands
 6 what's going to happen to you if you do it.
 7 On the other hand, if you write a general
 8 article and you say the commanders handle this, well,
 9 this commander won't look at it as seriously as that
 10 commander will look at it, as that commander will look at
 11 it, and you'll start getting different punishments, and
 12 these are the type of things that poison the Army quicker
 13 than anything else.
 14 At the company level, there are three
 15 things that will kill a company. First is a barracks
 16 thief, where you lay a wallet on the bed and go take a
 17 shower and when you come back it's gone. That will
 18 destroy an outfit quicker than anything. The second
 19 thing is a homosexual, and that's because most of them
 20 are predators at this level. And the third thing is to
 21 have this kind of a situation where someone is cheating
 22 with someone's wife or someone is casting discredit upon
 23 the unit by promiscuity. Those three things will kill a

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1 company-size unit quicker than anything that I can
 2 remember.
 3 And with that, I'll turn it over to you
 4 for any kind of questions you might have.
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Thank you,
 6 General Trefry.
 7 General Miller, let's hear from you and
 8 then we'll just do our questioning on the two reports
 9 together.
 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: Well, my
 11 comments would come from just a bit of a different
 12 direction. And I think General Trefry's comments about
 13 the Inspector General, the types of offenses, certainly
 14 ring true with my experience as a lawyer, but my
 15 experience from that perspective permitted me to defend
 16 some of the people who were investigated by the Inspector
 17 General and other military criminal investigative
 18 offices.
 19 It also permitted me to provide the
 20 command advice to a fair number of general court-martial
 21 convening authorities, special court-martial convening
 22 authorities, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, for
 23 three years in dealing with, at that level, particularly

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1 offenses by general officers and colonels. We also
 2 supervised through the lawyers in the Marine Corps all
 3 officer discipline cases.
 4 I feel somewhat comfortable about some of
 5 the considerations that you are facing — that is, that
 6 this Commission is — and about some of the ideas that
 7 the Secretary of Defense has put in his "good order and
 8 discipline" directive of 29 July, '98.
 9 And I say that because I think that the
 10 issue of fraternization, inappropriate fraternization,
 11 has caused some difficulties that have been hard to wring
 12 out. They've been difficult to get our hands around, and
 13 someone now is addressing those problems, particularly
 14 with the increased number of female service members.
 15 As a lawyer in the military, it was
 16 difficult to provide advice to the Commanding General or
 17 the commanders and see a uniform treatment of offenders,
 18 if the commander could even identify the problem, in my
 19 view.
 20 I would say, though, that an attempt to
 21 make more uniform across the services — again, just from
 22 my parochial view in the Marine Corps — is encouraging,
 23 because for Marines serving in joint commands, with

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1 different policies and different regulations facing them
 2 in dealing with members of the opposite sex or people of
 3 different rank, that was frustrating. Not only for those
 4 Marines, but for the commanders who had to dispense
 5 justice or discipline, if necessary, or even investigate
 6 an alleged offense.
 7 I don't say that of all the services. The
 8 Marine Corps would have toed a harder line on
 9 fraternization, but I think that, in practice, it
 10 probably did.
 11 I do see missing, however, from the
 12 Secretary's directive two things, and I mentioned them in
 13 the written document that you permitted me to provide.
 14 One is I think consideration should be given to making
 15 appropriate personal relationships between senior
 16 officers and junior officers and between senior enlisted
 17 and junior enlisted in the same unit.
 18 I think, practically speaking, de facto,
 19 that practice exists in the more combat-oriented units
 20 anyway or they would not be effective units; they would
 21 not be combat ready; they would not have high morale;
 22 they would not have good discipline.
 23 The other thing that has troubled me as a

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1 tough calls relative to offenses and violations of the
 2 Code or even service regulations.
 3 It may be a bit micromanagement, but I
 4 think it's incumbent upon the Secretary to set the
 5 standard here. There should be that requirement in the
 6 schools. It should start with our recruit training.
 7 There is some there. I don't know whether it's enough.
 8 But when it comes to leadership schools, command schools,
 9 it's not there in the proportion that it was there
 10 previously. And I think if you took a look at it, you
 11 would find it slipping away, at least in the Marine Corps
 12 and the Navy side.
 13 I submit, for what it's worth, that those
 14 are a couple of things that the Secretary should consider
 15 and should perhaps be part of his policy.
 16 Thank you.
 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: I would like
 19 to make sure that you understand. We never did anything
 20 without giving the allegee the opportunity to have a
 21 lawyer. There was no kangaroo courts or kangaroo
 22 investigations. Whenever I started an investigation, I
 23 notified two people: the commander of the individual

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1 military lawyer over the years has been the changes to
 2 the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1968, which took
 3 officers out of the courtroom as special court-martial
 4 trial counsel and defense counsel and court members. It
 5 also took officers off of panels as general court-martial
 6 juries.
 7 "So what," we would ask. That deprived
 8 those officers of a significant amount of military
 9 justice experience that has over the years impacted, in
 10 my view, the quality of decisions that commanders have
 11 made relative to incidents reported to them, whether it's
 12 a barracks thief, a homosexual that needs to be
 13 investigated — homosexual acts — fraternization, gender
 14 abuses, or whatever.
 15 And who did we leave a lot of the guidance
 16 up to since the officers now are not exposed to that?
 17 They don't grow up with it, so to speak? Senior
 18 enlisted, also, are not parties to investigations as
 19 investigating officers that they could have been in times
 20 before these changes to the Code. We entrusted much of
 21 the guidance now, since '68, to the lawyers.
 22 My point is that military lawyers may know
 23 military law, but they do not know command. They do not

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1 involved and himself, and told him that he was perfectly
 2 free to have a lawyer and we allowed the lawyer present
 3 at all the things that we did.
 4 So I don't want anybody to think that we
 5 kept lawyers out of the picture.
 6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Well, I will
 7 start the questioning. One of the things that we are
 8 specifically asked to look at is perceptions of disparate
 9 treatment as to officers and as to enlisted. And I got
 10 some inferences out of your statements, but I wonder if
 11 you could be more specific about how you regard that.
 12 Is there actual disparate treatment or are
 13 there perceptions, and from what do those arise?
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, in the
 15 case of sergeants major, command sergeants major or
 16 otherwise, those were usually not handled specifically by
 17 the Chief of Staff but usually by the four-star in
 18 command of the command that the man was a member of. And
 19 that was done to make sure that the treatment was equal
 20 across the command, and it was usually brought up at
 21 commander's conferences: "This is what we're doing for
 22 these kind of things." There was no secret about it.
 23 Now, an officer is asked to resign, a

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1 know the intricacies of training and combat readiness
 2 like that commander does. It's not the lawyer's job to
 3 give such strong advice, as in many cases happens. It's
 4 the commander's role to make the enlightened decision
 5 whether there should be an investigation, whether the
 6 case should go to trial or nonjudicial punishment, or
 7 nowhere at all.
 8 Following from that deprivation of the
 9 experience that officers had in the past and no longer
 10 have, service schools, in my experience, in the Navy and
 11 the Marine Corps, and the Army War College — one other
 12 school I had the privilege of attending — did not
 13 provide substitute training and education to developing
 14 officers.
 15 We didn't have the time. There were other
 16 training requirements forced on these schools, frankly,
 17 by every step in the chain of command, on up to the
 18 Secretary of Defense.
 19 And the training and education in military
 20 justice continued to get a smaller and smaller piece of
 21 the pie, and, therefore, exposed those officers to less
 22 and less of what they needed to know, in my view again,
 23 to make the appropriate decisions when faced with some

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1 command sergeant major is asked to retire, a general
 2 officer is asked to retire — because usually they have
 3 more than twenty years — I would say that's about as
 4 close as you can get to uniform treatment across-the-
 5 board.
 6 Now, if there's other offenses with it,
 7 then a lot of times action was taken to reimburse the
 8 government for expenditures and that type thing. Misuse
 9 of airplanes and so forth, those were usually handled
 10 that way.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: General Miller.
 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: The question
 13 goes to gender-related offenses, or beyond that?
 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, we're specifically
 15 looking at cross-gender relationships. And I have kind
 16 of defined — Well, "hanky panky" is a good word. But I
 17 think in cases of sexual misconduct — And I will say,
 18 too, that as we have looked at — talked with people at
 19 various installations, including chaplains, it does seem
 20 that there is often a perception that enlisted people get
 21 the book thrown at them; whereas, officers caught in a
 22 hanky-panky situation — in a similar situation — are
 23 instead given an easy out.

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1 And one of the things that I'm interested
 2 in knowing is, is that an accurate perception? And if
 3 not, you know, what would be the reasons for it?
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, I think
 5 that —
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Just on Chair Blair's comment
 7 there, like the General Hale case. You know.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: I wish I had
 9 been the IG on that one.
 10 I think that it's a matter of numbers. I
 11 think that at the lower grades, there's a lot of it goes
 12 on and a lot of it is done out from under the flagpole
 13 and you don't see much of it. When you get to the senior
 14 NCO grades, those are people who live around the flagpole
 15 and a lot of people know them and a lot of people are
 16 looking for reasons to get at them. They've been turned
 17 down on a promotion or something like that. And it's the
 18 same with an officer. They generally are — you know,
 19 it's more well known what's going on.
 20 I will say this: there are certainly more
 21 junior female officers than senior officers, and I don't
 22 recall a single senior officer case involving a female
 23 officer, involving adultery at the grade of colonel or

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1 Fortunately they were in a minority, but some of them
 2 were there. I think they skipped out on or did not have
 3 the opportunity to serve on courts-martial when they were
 4 junior officers, or there's something in their personal
 5 lives that, you know, caused them to have this type of an
 6 attitude. But they're in a great minority.
 7 And from the Headquarters' perspective,
 8 through the lawyers again, the attempt by the senior
 9 lawyers or by the JAG's of the service was to urge a
 10 uniformity and a consistency. You can get to the
 11 commanders for the most part when you think they are
 12 astray.
 13 And I say fortunately most of them
 14 obviously are not or were not, in my experience, but you
 15 can't get to juries; military juries in particular. You
 16 can't influence them. And they'll come back sometimes,
 17 more often than commanders, with verdicts that are truly
 18 unsupported by the evidence, and you don't get a second
 19 chance at that.
 20 So the disparate treatments are there. I
 21 think it cries out, in my own view, for as much education
 22 and training that you can give along the way when
 23 enlisted and officers are going to the appropriate

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1 general or anything like that, the whole time I was the
 2 Inspector General. As a matter of fact, I haven't known
 3 any since.
 4 Now, at the lower grades, yeah, and — But
 5 I think that's a matter of numbers and mores and that
 6 type thing. You know, there's been a revolution in this
 7 country in sexual mores in the last twenty, thirty years,
 8 and the women who were colonels when I was on active duty
 9 were pretty much straight arrows and I don't recall any
 10 kind of allegations that ever came up on any of them.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: General Miller.
 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: I think the
 13 short answer is yes, there was disparate treatment
 14 between officers and enlisted — at least there was that
 15 appearance or that perception, and perhaps for the most
 16 part rightfully so.
 17 I don't say that casually, but obviously
 18 there were many circumstances surrounding the offense and
 19 the offenders that had to be considered by those who made
 20 the decisions, and I think it's unfortunate that the
 21 anecdotal information, the media grabbing on, public
 22 opinion, even within the military itself, and
 23 highlighting particular cases over other cases, tended to

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1 service schools, because I find it lacking, in my view.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: I'd like to
 3 just affirm that. I think he's exactly right on the
 4 business of training. And, interesting, I was out at the
 5 charm school here two weeks ago and one of the questions
 6 I asked these new brigadiers is, "How many of you ever
 7 sat in a court-martial?" I got about five hands out of
 8 ninety, and that's terrible. That's absolutely terrible.
 9 Inexcusable.
 10 As a matter of fact, up until the early
 11 fifties, we used to have to read the punitive articles
 12 once every six months to all the soldiers. That is a
 13 great step toward Christianity, I can tell you.
 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.
 15 MR. PANG: Well, first of all, I just
 16 wanted to thank you for giving us your time and your
 17 insights.
 18 You know, it occurs to me that, you know,
 19 having been in the military myself and having been a
 20 civilian appointee, when you step back and look at this,
 21 I mean, you're dealing in human enterprise, and when we
 22 talk about adultery and fraternization, you're talking
 23 about human frailty and human failure.

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1 throw these out of focus. You'll hear from the JAG's,
 2 I'm sure, who will bring out the numbers.
 3 It's not all that different, of course,
 4 than the civilian criminal justice system where you have
 5 juries and even prosecutors whose decisions are whacky;
 6 they're out in left field. I think there's a lot less of
 7 that in the military, but you're still dealing with human
 8 beings who must make very difficult decisions.
 9 Now, all that said, there were frustrating
 10 times from a lawyer's perspective with some commanders
 11 who had a particular view as to women or gender-related
 12 offenses, as I would call them, that did not sit easy
 13 with the judge advocate who would say, "But there is a
 14 right thing to do here, and that is, to face up to an
 15 offense and make a tough decision. Why are you waffling
 16 on the decision?"
 17 I don't know the answer to that except
 18 different human beings have different attitudes toward
 19 it. But I know in discussing these kinds of cases with
 20 some of those commanders, their view of women was
 21 certainly less than the view that I would have had or
 22 that the services would have expected.
 23 You could call them dinosaurs or whatever.

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1 And when you deal with these things, I
 2 mean, you know, there is no clear — you're not dealing
 3 with a black and white. You're dealing with, you know,
 4 in my opinion, shades of gray, because, you know, a
 5 certain case itself, you know, has many facets. There
 6 are many mitigating factors, sometimes there are
 7 aggravating factors, and you need to take that into
 8 context when a punishment is given. You know, it could
 9 be for a generic violation and some people, in one case,
 10 getting lighter punishment than another, and
 11 appropriately so.
 12 So, you know, there is — But having said
 13 that, there's this quest — okay? — for, you know,
 14 standardization, fairness and uniformity, at least in the
 15 eyes of those who read articles in the paper and the
 16 like. So that is a huge dilemma I think that the
 17 military and the Defense Department have when they're
 18 challenged with it.
 19 So in order to deal with that, you know,
 20 the Defense Department, just as you know, you know,
 21 policy guidance in this area, basically the approach they
 22 come up with is what Secretary de Leon called a ladder
 23 approach, where you try to take a case and try to deal

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1 with it at the lowest level possible, administratively,
 2 and then you move up this ladder. And presumably, you
 3 know, the person who's making the judgment about climbing
 4 that ladder in some cases knows not to start at the
 5 bottom but, you know, go right up to the top. But even
 6 that's not clear.
 7 And then when you apply this ladder — I
 8 think I hear what, you know. General Trefry is saying —
 9 is that, you know, that's probably a valid approach when
 10 you apply it to the masses, you know, the group of people
 11 that are in the commands, but for senior — and if you do
 12 that and if you have the training and all the other
 13 things that come along with it, then you're going to have
 14 some degree of standardization and fairness at that
 15 level.
 16 But for senior people, senior officers and
 17 senior enlisted personnel, I guess what I hear you saying
 18 is that in order to bring better uniformity,
 19 standardization, that that ought to really all come to a
 20 point, a pinnacle at the Defense — or in the Secretary
 21 of the Army or Chief of Staff of the Army's level.
 22 And that sort of makes sense, but it
 23 doesn't get away from this idea — okay? — that there's

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1 he was very honest. When I said, 'Are you having an
 2 affair,' he told me 'yes'."
 3 And again, he had a delightful wife and
 4 delightful kids, and why should I drag them all through
 5 this? If he had lied to me, that would have been
 6 something else. He was a major, and, believe me, he got
 7 turned over to his wife and his priest, and I probably
 8 would have gone to Leavenworth before I would have wanted
 9 that.
 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: Well, I agree
 11 that the punishments that are imposed upon general
 12 officers in particular may seem to be less in terms of
 13 they're not reduced in rank or go to a forum such as a
 14 court-martial or nonjudicial punishment always, although
 15 some do. And maybe it's the public relations job or
 16 inadequate public relations job we do in explaining the
 17 consequences to those people who are disciplined in that
 18 manner.
 19 But if you sit down and just figure the
 20 dollar losses alone, never mind the family and societal
 21 punishments that they really are — but just figure the
 22 dollar losses alone to an individual who retired at one
 23 grade less or retired without the opportunity to advance

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1 not fairness, disparate treatment between senior and
 2 junior personnel if you do that, because people are going
 3 to say, "Well, the reason they're doing that is to give
 4 them a break."
 5 And some of the — you know, in some of
 6 the arguments I've heard given back in response to that
 7 is that, well, for the junior people, I mean, you know,
 8 these are young people. When you punish them, they have
 9 really a lot less to lose than somebody who has had a lot
 10 of experience, served all this period of time, had a
 11 distinguished career up to a certain point, now all of a
 12 sudden, you know, is faced with the embarrassment of an
 13 early retirement or resignation and the like.
 14 And, you know, my question is, how do you
 15 respond to that?
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, I would
 17 say that, one, general officers belong to the Chief of
 18 Staff. Nobody commands general officers except the Chief
 19 of Staff. He assigns them. He punishes them. He
 20 promotes them, basically. He has a lot to do with
 21 promoting them beyond the boards, and so I think that the
 22 punishment of general officers probably does belong
 23 there.

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1 one more grade, which is there, of course, for most of
 2 them, there are some severe penalties. Their reputation,
 3 all of these things.
 4 I agree perhaps with the comment that I
 5 would rather go to Leavenworth than to face that as a
 6 flag or general officer in the service. It's severe, but
 7 it's not always understood. And you could perhaps equate
 8 it somewhat to the senior executives or CEO's of
 9 corporations, many who are — whether you work for Disney
 10 or whatever, who are let go with a golden parachute, so
 11 to speak.
 12 And that may or may not seem like much of
 13 a punishment, if it's that at all, but it certainly is to
 14 that individual and that individual's family, and it will
 15 be understood as such by the other flag and general
 16 officers in the military as well. Those are tough
 17 decisions but they have to be made.
 18 One of the concerns that I had — and I'm
 19 not sure how far this has gone in the Department of
 20 Defense. This was in the Marine Corps. And from the DoD
 21 Inspector General, unlike the Army, there have tended to
 22 be some criticism of the decisions made relative to
 23 disciplining senior officers.

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1 When you deal with senior NCO's, as I've
 2 said, it usually belongs to the four-star in command for
 3 the reasons that we've stated.
 4 General officers are expected to conduct
 5 themselves a hell of a lot better than a first lieutenant
 6 or a captain. They're supposed to be more experienced,
 7 and I think people would be more lenient, and my
 8 experience has been that it's just the other way. It's
 9 tougher on the senior officers than it is on the junior
 10 officers.
 11 There's a great tendency to look at the
 12 junior — Hell, when I was over at the White House, I had
 13 an officer who was engaged in an adulterous relationship,
 14 and the guy who was later Chief of Naval Operations was
 15 the DCSPER of the Navy at the time and I went to him.
 16 And I called the guy in and I said, "I've got allegations
 17 that you're having this affair. Is that right?" And he
 18 said, "Yes." I said, "Clean out your desk."
 19 And when I went over to see the DCSPER of
 20 the Navy, I said — he said, "Why did you let him go?" I
 21 said, "Because he didn't lie to me. If he had lied to
 22 me, I'd have turned him over to you and" — I mean, "I am
 23 turning him over to you, but I didn't punish him because

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1 And I always found it rather
 2 inappropriate, frankly, because you investigate for the
 3 facts and you turn them over to the disposing authority,
 4 who then does the right job. If the right job is not
 5 done by the service chief or the general officer
 6 convening authority, whoever makes that decision, then
 7 it's up to the service secretary to relieve them or take
 8 action or whatever.
 9 But there was, in my view — and I don't
 10 know where this has gone, as I say — too much of this
 11 second-guessing by the investigators, and it's
 12 unfortunate, but it's happened and it's there.
 13 I don't know if it's gotten under control
 14 or what, but it does make it difficult because then
 15 you're tending to look at that criticism if you're the
 16 person making the decision or the lawyer giving advice as
 17 opposed to doing what you have a responsibility to do in
 18 the first place.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: I'd like to
 20 comment on that. When it was first proposed to have a
 21 DoD Inspector General, I was all in favor of it. But
 22 when I saw what they proposed, I was adamantly opposed
 23 because it became very apparent to me that the thing they

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1 perhaps wanted the most was this business of getting down
 2 and investigating generals, and the personalities
 3 involved conducted themselves in a manner that I thought
 4 was perfectly horrible and my worst fears came true.
 5 There's a fascinating article in this
 6 week's New Yorker that you all ought to read about this
 7 business of creating special prosecutors and creating DoD
 8 IG's and all of this business.
 9 Now, one of the things that really gets me
 10 on this is the fact that we're a profession, by all
 11 descriptions that are given of a profession. One of the
 12 tenets of a profession is, is that you police your own
 13 ranks. What I was adamantly opposed to was having a
 14 bunch of auditors setting the standards for generals —
 15 or anybody else, for that matter — captains — and
 16 that's precisely what they wanted.
 17 And what I — As a matter of fact, I told
 18 Ike Skelton and Arch Barrett, and some of the people who
 19 wrote Goldwater-Nichols, that the DoD IG act, as far as I
 20 was concerned, was an abomination, because what it did,
 21 they took our name and ran and you have a bunch of
 22 auditors playing cop. When you give an auditor a badge,
 23 you create a fascist. They pride themselves on the fact

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1 that they have no responsibility; that they're
 2 independent.
 3 Well, you can't be independent in this
 4 business and you have to answer to someone. And I think
 5 one of the things that has deteriorated in these command
 6 climates and relationships is the fact that you have
 7 these guys coming down second-guessing and making
 8 judgments and not hardly any of them have any experience
 9 to do so whatsoever.
 10 There's one other comment I'd like to
 11 make, and that is, I think that the word "fraternization"
 12 is a misnomer. What we're talking about is a senior-
 13 subordinate relationship. That's — "Fraternization" is
 14 a term that was created for the post-war occupation of
 15 Germany and Japan. It never worked. It never will. As
 16 long as there are men and women, fraternization is — You
 17 can't beat it, and you shouldn't even try.
 18 On the other hand, the military is based
 19 on discipline and the discipline is based on senior-
 20 subordinate relationships, much more so than in civilian
 21 life. I can send a guy to jail for not showing up at
 22 work. A fellow down at Wal-Mart can't do that. But
 23 that's because of the statute. That's because of the

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1 culture.
 2 And I think we get into a great deal of
 3 trouble when we get into this business of fraternization
 4 because, you know, what the hell is wrong with
 5 fraternization? It's too broad. But senior-subordinate
 6 relationships, that's cold. That's absolutely cold, and
 7 that's the business of discipline and that's what we
 8 should base our actions on, particularly in the non-
 9 criminal bit.
 10 MR. PANG: Okay. Thank you.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Thanks. Again, as others
 12 have said, we're very grateful for the time. I just have
 13 two or three items that I wanted to cover, taking off
 14 from Anita and Fred.
 15 Concretely, what I gather from your — if
 16 we were to make recommendations — not that they'll
 17 necessarily be followed — one is you would like to put
 18 officers who are regular line officers back on juries.
 19 Is that right? That would be one recommendation?
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: On courts.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Huh?
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: On courts.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: On court juries. Yeah.

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, don't
 2 call them juries. They're courts.
 3 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Courts.
 4 All right. And the other is to get away
 5 from the DoD IG? Would that be the other strong
 6 recommendation?
 7 Do you agree with that, too, General
 8 Miller?
 9 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: Yes.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: The DoD IG is
 11 an auditor. He's not an IG.
 12 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. But that would be two
 13 concrete recommendations you would make.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Right.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Any other like one-liner
 16 recommendations like that, besides those two?
 17 MR. PANG: I think the general, General
 18 Miller, would like to see clearly written a prohibition
 19 against senior and junior officer relationships and
 20 senior and junior enlisted relationships.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: That's the
 22 senior-subordinate relationship that we're talking about.
 23 That's culture.

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1 DR. MOSKOS: What we now have is a —
 2 MR. PANG: But what you would like to see,
 3 though, is an explicit prohibition in the policy of —
 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: It seems like
 5 the Secretary is well on his way to that because he's
 6 breaking out all these categories here. You have drill
 7 instructor, recruiter, and others. What happened in the
 8 senior — just as you said, the senior relationships
 9 between officers and enlisted in a particular unit —
 10 DR. MOSKOS: But you would allow it
 11 outside the particular unit, like the Army's current
 12 fraternization policy. That's okay.
 13 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: I don't think
 14 that the detriment to the unit is there if it's outside
 15 the unit, but it's in that unit where it causes problems.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Let me tell
 17 you a story. This is a true story involving this kind of
 18 thing.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: I'm moving to the other side.
 20 MS. POPE: Is it the light?
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Huh?
 22 MS. POPE: Are you moving from the light
 23 or what?

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1 DR. MOSKOS: It's better vision.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: We had an
 3 instance in Germany were a young woman in the grade of
 4 corporal was brought up to an aviation unit where the
 5 commander was a major, and as will happen, they fell in
 6 love.
 7 Now, they didn't tell anybody they were in
 8 love. They just started dating, and some of the men in
 9 the unit complained to the commander. So the commander
 10 called them in and said, "I understand you two are dating
 11 and I don't allow that around here. That's
 12 fraternization," and so forth. "And if there's any more
 13 of it, you're going to go back to the unit you came
 14 from." She was up there on TDY. And they said, "Yes,
 15 sir," and departed. This was about November.
 16 New Year's Day. Commander's New Year's
 17 Day reception. Through the line comes the major and the
 18 corporal or the sergeant, whatever she was, in full
 19 regalia, and she's got a ring. And he implodes in his
 20 reception line and says, "Back to your unit by sundown
 21 tonight. You're confined to quarters."
 22 Now, he didn't have an IG. He had an
 23 acting IG, which is nothing more than a male clerk. You

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1 know, when you call down there you're going to do
2 something, you say, "I'm coming down. Get me a room."
3 Acting IG's have no authority to run investigations. He
4 calls his IG and says, "I want an investigation."
5 Well, the first I hear about it is I get a
6 call from Ms. Lister, who at that time was the General
7 Counsel, and she hands me a piece of paper that's signed
8 by the Secretary of the Army, in draft, and it says, "We
9 want you to cut orders transferring these two to a post
10 of their choice in CONUS."
11 So I went up to see Ms. Lister. She
12 wasn't there and I saw the deputy. I said, "You have to
13 understand, I don't cut orders on anybody. IG's don't do
14 that. I don't know anything about this. All I ask if
15 you give me the time to take a look and find out what's
16 going on."
17 And, I mean, this thing was — This is a
18 typical example of what happens when you get into this
19 business.
20 Now, it would be nice if we could issue
21 orders that people will not fraternize or will not
22 violate senior-subordinate relationships, but I'll tell
23 you what, you can't legislate against love. And we've

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1 made the decision that we're going to have women in the
2 services and that's just one of the things we've got to
3 live with.
4 And you can say that this is not
5 desirable, but I'll tell you, sometimes it's almost like
6 waving a red flag. When you tell people they can't do
7 something, they'll defy you to show you that they can,
8 particularly if — and it's the kind of people who are
9 restless and under-disciplined anyway. I would be very
10 careful of that. Ideally, yeah. But when we made the
11 decision to have women in units, that's something that we
12 have to accept, I think, and I don't think you can get
13 away from it.
14 Are you all — Never issue an order that
15 you can't carry out. You're all familiar with Ben
16 Butler's famous General Order 28, aren't you?
17 You never heard that story? Well, when
18 Ben Butler was occupying New Orleans —
19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Spoons Butler.
20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Spoons Butler.
21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. Beast Butler.
22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Yeah. I come
23 from Massachusetts, Anita.

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1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Down here in the South,
2 that's how we know him.
3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, that's
4 right.
5 Well, the ladies in New Orleans, when
6 Union officers would walk down the street, or Union
7 soldiers, they would flip their bustles or they would
8 spit — not very ladylike — or some even emptied thunder
9 jugs out of the second floor windows as they'd walk by
10 underneath. So he issued General Order No. 28 that says,
11 "In the future, any woman of New Orleans caught in an act
12 of disrespect toward any Union officer or soldier will be
13 treated as a woman of the streets plying her trade."
14 Well, I mean, they went wild. They wanted
15 to hang him on the spot — the Southerners did — and so
16 forth, and he very carefully pointed out that he'd copied
17 that from an ordinance of the City of London. But from
18 there on in, he was known as "Beast Butler."
19 But the order carried itself out. You
20 see, none of the women wanted to be treated as
21 prostitutes and all the prostitutes wanted to be treated
22 like ladies, so all these actions stopped.
23 DR. MOSKOS: Well, speaking of that, I

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1 wanted to go into the next question, which was —
2 MS. POPE: Wait a minute. You just moved
3 your seat around.
4 DR. MOSKOS: Do I keep my —
5 MS. POPE: Okay. Go ahead.
6 DR. MOSKOS: All right. The question
7 about these specific recommendations, do you have them —
8 the DoD re-thinking of the fraternization regulations,
9 now, what's the bottom line for you on this? Good, bad,
10 indifferent? Part's good, part's not so good? Or where
11 do you come out on this?
12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Where I come
13 out is — and I'm not a lawyer, but I come other — the
14 way I read the Secretary's statement, I thought he opened
15 it up too much. I thought too many people could take
16 that and deliberately not seek legal advice and say,
17 "I'll give this guy an Article 15 before everybody jumps
18 on him."
19 DR. MOSKOS: That's the ladder question
20 that Fred Pang raised. Is this a nice concept or do you
21 think there's too much leeway?
22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: I think
23 there's too much leeway.

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1 DR. MOSKOS: General Miller?
2 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: Well, I think
3 it doesn't address the issue of — If you're going to
4 address the inappropriate behavior of personal
5 relationships, it needs to address that at the seniors
6 within a particular unit. I would look to that.
7 I'm not so concerned about the carrying it
8 out, but I do think that the Secretary has not directed
9 appropriate education or training. And I don't mean to
10 make it over-simplistic, but it's not there. It
11 tangentially touches on it, but it's not there. And
12 unless you give that some priority, you're not going to
13 have it. There are other important things to do.
14 I don't — I would not recommend that we
15 put officers back into special courts-martial because
16 there's some times you just cannot walk the dog back on
17 that issue. It would be too revolutionary, in effect,
18 for the military services to go back to that.
19 Now, there are people — like a former
20 Commandant of the Marine Corps, Al Gray, would love to
21 take those lawyers and make them infantry officers and
22 aviators and give up the stuff that lawyers do and have
23 more of your combat types. Sure, that might work. But

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1 then you again take those combat officers away for the
2 duties that are important to them as well.
3 It's an ideal world if you could get it,
4 but I don't think you'll have that.
5 MS. POPE: One more question. I'm just
6 curious. Why do the services — That was across-the-
7 board? The '68 changes?
8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Yeah.
9 MS. POPE: And was there a history to
10 that?
11 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: Oh, yes.
12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Yeah.
13 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: Yeah, there
14 were hearings, extensive hearings and extensive history
15 —
16 MS. POPE: Was it manpower? I mean, what
17 was —
18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: No.
19 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: There were some
20 concerns about — and I can only recall some of them, but
21 simply about the way military justice was being carried
22 out appropriately across-the-board. There were
23 inconsistencies. There were the same — some of the same

1 problems that you —
 2 MS. POPE: That's today...
 3 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: — that you
 4 have now.
 5 MS. POPE: We should get some of those
 6 reports. You know, it's twenty years — thirty years
 7 later and it's the same argument.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, you see,
 9 the convening authority was usually the battalion
 10 commander.
 11 MS. POPE: Right.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: The trial
 13 counsel was in the same unit. The defense counsel was in
 14 the same unit.
 15 Now, you don't mean you wouldn't have them
 16 sitting on a court.
 17 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: Well, they
 18 should — If you had a way to eliminate the military
 19 judge-only courts, I would support that a hundred
 20 percent, and have members made up of officers and senior
 21 enlisted if the accused so asked.
 22 But, you know, something that's bothered
 23 the American military since World War II was — And this

1 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: — that came
 2 about in 1968. That's why many of us became military
 3 lawyers.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Let me just pursue this
 5 before I — The OSD's presentation here argued that the
 6 move toward reforming the regs on fraternization and
 7 especially adultery were generated within the services.
 8 Do you — How do you appraise that statement as opposed
 9 to being an outside-generated — I'd better not use
 10 "gender."
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, a lot of
 12 people called me and nobody told me it was ginned up in
 13 the services. It was all ginned up outside.
 14 MS. POPE: I was going to say, where did
 15 you hear that?
 16 DR. MOSKOS: That's what Rudy and his gang
 17 told us.
 18 MS. POPE: Oh.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 20 MR. PANG: No, it was generated from
 21 outside, having been part of it.
 22 DR. MOSKOS: It was generated — But they
 23 said — they told us it was service-generated.

1 is like fraternization. There are two types of command
 2 influence. There's inappropriate command influence and
 3 there's lawyer command influence. We want a lot of
 4 lawful command influence. It's called leadership, among
 5 other things. We don't want the inappropriate kind.
 6 And the criticisms that came out of World
 7 War II led to the changes in the Uniform Code I think in
 8 about 1949 or thereabouts —
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: '51.
 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: '51. And then
 11 further changed again — truly revolutionized the way we
 12 did courts-martial — in 1968.
 13 Now, that was the genesis for it.
 14 Because, as the General said, there were appearances of,
 15 again, unevenhandedness; unskilled, untrained people
 16 doing what was legal work, but they did it very well, in
 17 my view, and they learned a lot, too.
 18 MS. POPE: And now you have judges making
 19 legal decisions that may be taken out of context of a
 20 leadership environment or...
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Well, that's important.
 22 MS. POPE: Yeah.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: From the end

1 MS. POPE: He said the services had input.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: No, generated.
 3 MR. PANG: I think I can clarify that.
 4 There were a number of meetings, about — at least six
 5 meetings in which uniformed and civilian personnel
 6 representing the entire leadership — the senior
 7 leadership of the Defense Department — And in the course
 8 of these meetings, you know, the issues were reviewed,
 9 and after the review of these issues, you know, there
 10 were some options that were laid out. And in the end,
 11 some decisions were made with regard to what was going to
 12 be recommendations.
 13 And so that's, I think, what Secretary de
 14 Leon meant when he said that the results emanated from a
 15 process that involved the services. I don't — I know
 16 for a fact that the review itself, to a large extent, was
 17 driven by outside factors.
 18 Although, having said that, I recall that
 19 General Shalikashvili, when he was Chairman of the Joint
 20 Chiefs of Staff, raised the issue about senior-
 21 subordinate relationships and cross-gender relationships
 22 and the need for some better uniformity among the
 23 services in the joint commands.

1 of World War II until 1951, special courts were just
 2 composed of line officers or unit officers. That
 3 included the court, the president of the court, the trial
 4 counsel, the assistant trial counsel, the defense counsel
 5 and the assistant defense counsel.
 6 The Uniform Code of Military Justice, when
 7 it was adopted in '51, said that the defense counsel had
 8 to be a lawyer. Trial counsel did not, but — in a
 9 special court. But in a general court, the defense
 10 counsel, the trial counsel, and the president of the
 11 court, had to be lawyers.
 12 And that stayed until '68, I believe, and
 13 then they appointed the judge and —
 14 MS. POPE: Which is a full-time job now.
 15 I mean, we —
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: For lawyers.
 17 MS. POPE: It would be interesting to look
 18 at the history of the last thirty years in the job
 19 creations.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Yeah.
 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: This was a
 22 lawyer employment act.
 23 MS. POPE: Yeah. I mean —

1 I mean, I recall that very, very
 2 distinctly. And that was the genesis of an internal
 3 review which later, because of Aberdeen, grew, you know,
 4 into something much larger.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, you see,
 6 that's another part of the Goldwater-Nichols. I
 7 commanded jointly twice and court-martials are always
 8 referred back to the service. I had no court-martial
 9 jurisdiction. I went — When I was running the war in
 10 Laos, when I had an Army officer screw up, he went back
 11 to CINCAIRPAC. When I had a Navy bosun screw up, it went
 12 back to CINCPAC. CINCPACFLT, really. And so that's the
 13 way that was done.
 14 But if I may make an observation about
 15 your question — your comment, when that thing came out,
 16 I must have gotten a half-a-dozen phone calls from people
 17 saying, "What the hell does it mean?" And it isn't clear
 18 to people in the military. I mean, these are thinking
 19 people.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: I was going to ask your
 21 reactions. I made a little sort of scale here on
 22 adultery. I was just wondering and I'd ask you to
 23 respond to this. I'm not sure, this is very preliminary.

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1 But adultery committed with another
 2 service member, say that's the first level of upset in a
 3 system. And tell me your reaction to this. The second
 4 would be with a civilian spouse, a military member.
 5 Third might be a civilian staffer, or those two might be
 6 interchangeable. Fourth might be an outsider, a complete
 7 outsider of the military. And fifth would be prostitute
 8 or something like that.
 9 Do you think there's — Does a scale like
 10 that — does it have reality reading in terms of what the
 11 impact on an organization might be, something along those
 12 lines?
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well,
 14 adultery's adultery.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: You think adultery's
 16 adultery. Whether it's with a prostitute or with a
 17 fellow service member, it's going to have the same
 18 impact.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, one of
 20 the parties has to be married in adultery.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Yes, that's right.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: That's
 23 different than simple —

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1 DR. MOSKOS: I'm talking about sort of the
 2 sociological impact as opposed to the legal and even
 3 moral impact.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: No, there —
 5 DR. MOSKOS: But that's right, adultery's
 6 adultery is a perfectly —
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: I don't think
 8 you can —
 9 DR. MOSKOS: Different gradations of this
 10 —
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: I don't think
 12 you can grade that that way. Simple fornication you can
 13 grade. Homosexual acts you can grade.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: How do you grade homosexual
 15 acts? From "A" to "F," or what?
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, there's
 17 the guy who's celibate.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Oh, I see.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: He's
 20 homosexual but he's celibate. Then there's the fellow
 21 who maybe have had a few homosexual relationships in his
 22 life, and then there's the fellow who has many. And one
 23 of —

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1 DR. MOSKOS: But I want to get back to —
 2 MS. POPE: But following that logic —
 3 wait a minute. I mean, that's kind of like adultery.
 4 Either you have a relationship or you don't have a
 5 relationship.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. Why should there be a
 7 grading there and not here? I'm trying to get grades
 8 here.
 9 MS. POPE: Yeah.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, because
 11 there's a marriage involved.
 12 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. Let me ask you this,
 13 Dick: Do you know of a case in which an adulterous act
 14 was committed by a service member with a prostitute, in
 15 which that was punishable, as opposed to some of these
 16 other cases I mention here? Spouse, civilian spouse.
 17 Have adulterers been prosecuted for prostitutes?
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, let me
 19 put it this way —
 20 DR. MOSKOS: Or is it really — it has to
 21 get in this upper-echelon type stuff?
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: When we were
 23 running R&R's in Korea —

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1 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: — in the
 3 fifties, my guess is that a hell of a lot of people who
 4 were married went over and committed adultery in Tokyo
 5 and —
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: — and those
 8 places.
 9 Now, when we were in the Vietnam War, we
 10 were running R&R's over several places and I think there
 11 probably was a lot of adultery committed. And we still
 12 didn't have many women who ran the units, so I can't
 13 speak for female adulteresses, if there were any.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: So I'm just questioning. You
 15 think adultery is adultery.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Yeah. And I'm
 17 trying to —
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Because, otherwise,
 19 prostitutes would have to be — you know, activities with
 20 prostitutes should be equally punishable as activity with
 21 a fellow service member and a civilian spouse.
 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: No. No.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: So there are gradations.

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1 MS. POPE: Why? But why?
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: Because of the
 3 way the Uniform Code is written.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 5 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: You punish
 6 adultery under Article 134, or 133 for officers only, and
 7 there is the elements. Adultery is adultery, true
 8 factually, but for the legal — if you're concerned about
 9 the legal requirement, there has to be the "service
 10 discrediting" or "conduct unbecoming an officer."
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Yes.
 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: If that element
 13 is not there — And adultery with a prostitute —
 14 MS. POPE: So if you use Charlie's scale,
 15 a civilian female —
 16 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: May not be
 17 service discrediting. It may not be an offense under the
 18 Code.
 19 MS. POPE: So you could have adultery —
 20 you could have an adulterous relationship and not be
 21 service discrediting.
 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: That's true.
 23 You may not be convicted in the military of a violation

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1 of Article 134 and 133, yes. And that's where you have
 2 the "prostitute" example. I think, technically speaking,
 3 that's — It's not service discrediting necessarily, but
 4 it can be and there have been people, at least in the
 5 Marine Corps, who were prosecuted for that adultery with
 6 prostitutes because —
 7 MS. POPE: They were?
 8 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: — of the
 9 "service discrediting."
 10 Yes.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 12 MR. PANG: You know, I have, you know,
 13 just a follow-up to Charlie's question. I mean, you said
 14 that only officers are punishable under the Uniform Code
 15 of Military Justice.
 16 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: Article 133.
 17 Yes, sir.
 18 MR. PANG: Article 133.
 19 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: But 134 applies
 20 to — The general article applies to officers and
 21 enlisted.
 22 MR. PANG: Officers and enlisted.
 23 Okay. So the DoD policy basically, the

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1 way I understood it when I read it was, was that, you
 2 know, adultery involved sexual intercourse in which one
 3 of the parties was married. That was one of the — one
 4 requirement. And in order to be punished under the
 5 Uniform Code of Military Justice, the decision had to be
 6 made — a judgment had to be made that it undermined good
 7 order and discipline.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Yes.
 9 MR. PANG: And if it didn't undermine good
 10 order and discipline and there was adultery, it's not
 11 punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
 12 but that doesn't mean that the commander cannot take some
 13 sort of administrative action. Is that correct?
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: But that's
 15 another reason why I say, in the Army, general officers
 16 were left to the discretion of the Chief of Staff of the
 17 Army usually, because you didn't get into that kind of
 18 stuff.
 19 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: Well, the
 20 answer to that is yes, other administrative actions could
 21 very well be taken. You could even separate the — if
 22 it's an officer, administratively for that. Even if
 23 there an acquittal at a court, you could still go down

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1 Charlie Gibbons, for example, defending the Sergeant
 2 Major of the Army, you know, the jury is many times the
 3 better roll of the dice, so to speak. But most cases —
 4 and I would say 90 percent, at least, of courts-martial
 5 today — are judge-alone; a lawyer only.
 6 And I agree that the old system — We
 7 could not go back to the old system. You can't go back
 8 to that because of all the perceptions and problems that
 9 existed before it and the reason that the Congress saw
 10 the need for change.
 11 But what is missing is that experience
 12 that officers got from serving on those courts; not only
 13 that, but from doing investigations that led up to it.
 14 Today we have these big Criminal Investigative Division
 15 offices. A lot of those types of investigations are long
 16 gone and the services have relied upon lawyers and
 17 training to replace that experience.
 18 The lawyers are there, yes, but are they
 19 the full answer? No. The training and the education
 20 part of it is greatly lacking. I can just see it in the
 21 Marine Corps alone. Our Command and Staff College at
 22 Quantico, twenty years ago, may have dedicated 5 percent
 23 or more of its curriculum to training officers in

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1 that road if you want.
 2 MS. POPE: Nothing.
 3 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I guess
 4 something that's been said really disturbs me and perhaps
 5 I heard it wrong, and I don't make light of either one of
 6 your backgrounds or experience because clearly it speaks
 7 for itself. But I thought I understood you both to
 8 espouse the attitude that the military justice system was
 9 better when we had the battalion commander telling his XO
 10 to be the judge and the adjutant to be the prosecutor and
 11 some young lieutenant defend him. That was a better
 12 system?
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: No, that's not
 14 what I said.
 15 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: What I said
 17 was I think that the system is better when you have those
 18 kind of officers sitting — officers from the unit
 19 sitting on the court, as members of the court, but not
 20 doing the prosecuting and the defending.
 21 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: From the unit
 22 from which the soldier — the defendant is?
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Yeah. I sat

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1 military justice. These are the future generals of the
 2 Marine Corps; certainly the future leaders at all levels,
 3 but the generals come out of that.
 4 Now it's down to a day or two. It's so
 5 watered down that the experience is lost. And so it is
 6 with all other schools and at all other levels of
 7 command, starting with the corporals in their leadership
 8 school at the very beginning.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: It's a great
 10 education in human nature. The first year I was
 11 commissioned, I spent a year as the assistant trial
 12 counsel, and the second year I was the assistant defense
 13 counsel. The third year, I was on a court. Then I —
 14 the next time I was in the unit, I was a battery
 15 commander and battery commanders did not sit on courts,
 16 for obvious reasons. Other officers in the battalions
 17 did, usually the exec or the 3 of the battalion was the
 18 president of the court.
 19 I also served as an assistant trial
 20 counsel on a couple of general courts because they
 21 brought lawyers in from Heidelberg and I represented the
 22 locals. I could arrange the court to do that kind of
 23 stuff.

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1 on many court-martials and I never saw — really, I never
 2 saw an innocent convicted. I can honestly say that. I
 3 saw a lot of guilty guys get away.
 4 I think, by and large — You know, you
 5 take an oath. You take an oath when you sit on a court
 6 and a lot of people don't understand that. Oaths don't
 7 mean a lot to a lot of people. Oaths mean a hell of a
 8 lot to officers, and I think that's something that we
 9 lost.
 10 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, I don't
 11 know. I tend to disagree with you. I think oaths mean a
 12 lot to a lot of people. They always did to me. But what
 13 I'm speaking of is in court-martials today, the jury is
 14 comprised of officers and in some cases enlisted.
 15 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: There's rarely
 16 a jury in courts-martial today. Most accused elect
 17 judge-alone. Why? Because their lawyer, their defense
 18 lawyer, knows that judge, who is a careerist, at least
 19 for that tour; maybe longer. You know the disposition of
 20 that judge for those types of offenses or, if nothing
 21 else, for the punishment, so you go with the better —
 22 the more known commodity.
 23 If it's a riskier case, as it — in your

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1 I was President of the first My Lai court
 2 at Fort Hood that was —
 3 MR. PANG: Really.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Yeah. I
 5 lasted until arraignment and then I got challenged. And
 6 the defense counsel called me up — Sergeant Mitchell —
 7 and the defense counsel called me up and told me that the
 8 only reason he challenged me was that the convening
 9 authority was my rater, and if his client was found
 10 guilty, he lost his only chance of appeal.
 11 Well, what happened, they threw that case
 12 out because the House had held secret hearings and they
 13 wouldn't release the testimony, and so that case was
 14 never tried. Hugh Robinson threw it out. But that was a
 15 very interesting case.
 16 But since that time, I know very few
 17 people who have ever sat on courts and it's —
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Well, getting back
 19 concretely, then, if you don't think you can walk that
 20 cat back, what do you recommend for our consideration?
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, I think
 22 you could — It's still there. You can put them on
 23 courts, but it's part of the education of the thing. And

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1 I agree wholeheartedly that there have been many things
 2 cut out of the schools that ought to be put back in, and
 3 that's one of them.
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Did you get a turn,
 5 Barbara?
 6 MS. POPE: I did. I followed-up. Charlie
 7 went before and after me.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: You can move over here.
 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. I'd like to
 10 go a little bit off-subject, and so, you know, if
 11 somebody is — I have more of a global question, and so
 12 if somebody wants to stay on this subject, I'll defer.
 13 Well, let me ask my big question, which is
 14 just because I have the two of you here and we've talked
 15 a little bit about this subject in the context of the
 16 senior-subordinate relationships — that that is really
 17 the core difficulty that you want to see addressed in
 18 rules governing relationships between service people.
 19 And it's a philosophical question. I'm trying to get the
 20 limits of what we require in terms of having men and
 21 women together in the services.
 22 My question is, given that in some parts
 23 of the services serving is very much like having a job, a

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1 experienced. I damn sure wouldn't want my wife or my
 2 sister to experience what I saw.
 3 Now, that's culture, pure and simple. It
 4 has nothing to do with opportunity. And I'm very proud
 5 of what I've done for opportunity of women in the
 6 service. I sat — I chaired the first Board on Equal
 7 Opportunity as the ADCSPER of the Army back in 1975. I
 8 was the ADCSPER of the Army when we brought women into
 9 West Point. I think women owe me a hell of a lot for
 10 some of my contributions. So I don't stand in a point of
 11 prejudice from that standpoint.
 12 But from the standpoint of what it's like
 13 to be in an infantry division fighting, it is a
 14 completely different world. And the problem when you use
 15 a division — and that's the basic fighting unit of the
 16 Army — if you put women in combat service support units,
 17 you're going to have women up in the battalion area
 18 delivering stuff. You're going to have signal repairmen
 19 up delivering stuff and they're going to get hit.
 20 They're going to get hit with more frequency than if
 21 they're back in the core area, and modern weapons can
 22 attack the core area. That's a gamble they take.
 23 But I don't care what you say, most men do

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1 normal office job, what is it that's different about the
 2 service that requires these kind of rules to be in place?
 3 Why should we not, for people who are going to be in
 4 combat service support, treat them like college students?
 5 Eighteen-, nineteen-year-olds have dorms and — And I
 6 mean it. I'm not making a joke or anything, but help me
 7 find the limits of the question that we're looking at.
 8 You know, some people say they can't be
 9 separated because eventually — I mean, separated totally
 10 — because eventually they've got to bump into each
 11 other, but it seems to me that the rest of the world runs
 12 not too bad with a totally — I mean totally — gender-
 13 integrated format.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, let me
 15 start out by saying this. First of all, it's a culture.
 16 The military is a culture onto itself, and I can give you
 17 several quotations on that.
 18 Now, you're right. I spent World War II
 19 as an Air Force weatherman, and we brought women into the
 20 Air Force and the weather offices in 1944 and it was just
 21 like a job. It was — But they went home; they had their
 22 quarters. We went home; we had our quarters, and that
 23 was it. Nobody really thought too much about it.

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1 not like to see women hurt. It's just a natural thing.
 2 And people get hurt up where platoons and squads and that
 3 kind of business fight, and that's what I think the
 4 military has been — the Army, particularly — has been
 5 trying to tell people. And we're very inarticulate.
 6 It's hard to describe. It defies description.
 7 I commanded a battalion up on the DMZ in
 8 Vietnam in 1966-67 when it was a world of "hum." I fired
 9 175 — I commanded 175 Gun Battalion. I fired 300 yards
 10 direct fire. I had eighty men wounded and seven killed
 11 and I can tell you it's not a pleasant sight, and the
 12 last place that I would like to see a woman is up there.
 13 And it's a culture, and I plead guilty to that. And I'm
 14 very inarticulate and I can't describe it any more.
 15 There is still the senior-subordinate
 16 relationship and that is what multiplies it, because
 17 you're in a position of life or death. You say, "You
 18 take that squad out there," and the squad leader's a
 19 woman, the chances are I'm not going to say, "You take
 20 that squad out there" because I don't want that woman to
 21 get hurt.
 22 I know she's going to get hurt. She may
 23 not get hurt that day, but she's going to get hurt the

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1 I was a member of the first class at
 2 Leavenworth that had women. I was a member of the first
 3 class at the War College that had women. They were
 4 treated and accepted just as anybody else. As a matter
 5 of fact, I think in some ways we kind of felt sorry for
 6 them because there was only two of them and they were —
 7 you know, they got a lot of publicity and they were kind
 8 of set up and they didn't want it. They really didn't
 9 want it.
 10 When you get down into the Army itself,
 11 you have to have been shot at to really understand what
 12 they're trying to tell you. And it's not that this big
 13 division out there has imaginary lines and that kind of
 14 thing. Your world in combat is very small. It's a
 15 platoon, at the most; maybe a squad. At the very most, a
 16 company. And you have to live through that to understand
 17 what that means and you wouldn't want to wish it on
 18 anybody, having been through it.
 19 Not just because they were female. I've
 20 been shot at more than really the requisite number of
 21 times. I wouldn't want my father to have seen what I
 22 saw. I don't have a brother, but if I had one, I
 23 wouldn't want him to see what I saw or what I

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1 next day. And so you put yourself in a position of
 2 saying, "Well, if I — "I don't want to do that because
 3 she might get hurt." It's bad enough when you don't want
 4 to do that because he might get hurt.
 5 Remember, I said the third thing that
 6 kills you is nepotism or violations of the senior-
 7 subordinate relationship, and that's what it is. And all
 8 you have to do is have a favoritism or leave them
 9 Rasputins, whether it's male-male, female-male, male-
 10 female. That will kill you.
 11 That just multiplies the problem of
 12 leadership for company commanders, platoon leaders and
 13 squad leaders, and this is what people don't understand.
 14 And it's so frustrating because people have to be there
 15 to experience it to understand what I'm trying to say.
 16 MS. POPE: So — I'm sorry. Are you
 17 saying that women shouldn't be in combat support?
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: No, I'm not
 19 saying that. I'm saying women in combat support, it
 20 depends on where they are. When you put them in
 21 divisions in combat support, they're still going to get
 22 hurt and people are going to talk about it, but it's not
 23 the same as if they're in the brigade area forward

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1 assigned there. See? I think there's places for women
 2 in military intelligence.
 3 Now, you know, this business about women
 4 in MLRS, I wouldn't want to be in an MLRS battery.
 5 That's the hottest item on the battlefield. Every
 6 detecting apparatus they've got is going to be trying to
 7 find that damn thing and it's going to be the first thing
 8 to get hit.
 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, General, let me
 10 take the example of intelligence, for example. You know,
 11 as we went around and talked with, you know, trainees, we
 12 had both male and female trainees tell us "we're going
 13 into intelligence." And if that's where they're going to
 14 wind up and if they're going to essentially have a desk
 15 job, then should we be even concerned about what goes on
 16 in the barracks at night or — And again, I'm trying to
 17 get the parameters of the issue.
 18 I realize that somewhere along the line
 19 the discipline needs to take hold. And the question to
 20 me is are we worrying too much about what may be going on
 21 with all of our television cameras and locks on the doors
 22 and everything like that, or should there be more control
 23 and discipline? Where is the right place to draw the

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1 DR. MOSKOS: I'll go the whole hog.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Yeah. You're
 3 saying it doesn't matter. It's just like civilian life.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: But it isn't.
 6 MS. POPE: Yeah. I mean...
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: It isn't just
 8 like civilian life. And there is a senior-subordinate
 9 relationship whether it's in combat service support —
 10 MS. POPE: Actually, I mean, the State of
 11 New Jersey just implemented for their state employees —
 12 DR. MOSKOS: What are they saying?
 13 MS. POPE: Of fraternization, saying that
 14 seniors to subordinates —
 15 DR. MOSKOS: In the civil service?
 16 MS. POPE: — in the state government
 17 cannot fraternize. I mean, I think it's becoming —
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Even outside the chain of
 19 command? No, in the chain of command probably.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: In the chain.
 21 MS. POPE: In the chain of command.
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Right.
 23 MS. POPE: I mean, I know the answer to

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1 line?
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, let me
 3 go back. The Army is composed of battalions. There's
 4 twenty-four branches in the service and fifteen of the
 5 branches have battalions. There's field artillery,
 6 armor, air defense, infantry, the like. We don't have
 7 battalions of lawyers. It may seem like we do, but we
 8 don't. We don't have battalions of doctors.
 9 But when you get into combat support and
 10 combat service support — Now, combat support can get
 11 very active. Engineers, military police, military
 12 intelligence, aviation. You can get hurt there. Combat
 13 service support is usually found in the division support
 14 commands or in what's called the forward support
 15 battalions and the main support battalions, and they're
 16 back. You can get hurt when you're delivering things,
 17 but not —
 18 MS. POPE: Well —
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, but I'm
 20 trying to explain to you that when you segregate in the
 21 barracks and you have women living in one barracks and
 22 men living in another barracks in a support command, that
 23 reduces the problems a hell of a lot from the standpoint

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1 that part is yes. I don't know how — But senior-to-
 2 subordinate, I mean, that's the — I think — as far as I
 3 know, it's the first state that's looking at going more
 4 towards the military rather than the military going
 5 towards the private sector.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Do you
 7 remember the A.G. Cunningham case?
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yes.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Fendix?
 10 MS. POPE: Fendix. Charlie, you know
 11 Fendix.
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Right.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, as a
 14 matter of fact, just go out here to Giant. If there's a
 15 male manager of a Giant Store, do you think he can date a
 16 female cashier? I mean, who's single and everything
 17 else?
 18 MS. POPE: Right.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: No.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Hell, no.
 21 It's a violation of the senior-subordinate relationship.
 22 And you're not under the pressures and the tension of
 23 combat there.

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1 of fraternization and the senior-subordinate
 2 relationship. It really does. It has nothing to do with
 3 opportunity or anything else. It's just men are men and
 4 women are women and humans are humans.
 5 When you're up front, when you're forward
 6 of this, again, it's altogether different, and I just
 7 happen to believe that they shouldn't be there.
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. So basically —
 9 DR. MOSKOS: What about the question,
 10 though — What if you are in these combat service support
 11 jobs? Garrison duty. What's wrong with having, for the
 12 sake of argument, "no fraternization" regulations? I
 13 mean, so what?
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Because —
 15 MS. POPE: Subordinate — I'm sorry. But,
 16 Charlie, you're saying not having even subordinate-to- —
 17 DR. MOSKOS: Right. Just like it is in an
 18 office.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Yeah.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Equals.
 21 MS. POPE: Senior-to-subordinate? I'm
 22 sorry, I'm trying to get clarification.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Sure.

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1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: General Miller?
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: Well, I agree
 3 with everything that's been said. But I think the
 4 important thing is that combat support and combat service
 5 support units, to some degree, may be involved in combat
 6 anyway and are, given the nature of combat today, and I
 7 think the Gulf War is a good example of that. Take
 8 service aboard ship or wherever. So relaxation of the
 9 rules would be very difficult.
 10 I represent a number of veterans pro bono
 11 who are appealing cases to the Court of Veterans Appeals
 12 because of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder from wars past.
 13 World War II and Korea. And it surprises me as to how
 14 many of them didn't serve in the front-line combat units
 15 ever, but because of what they saw, heard or experienced,
 16 they still suffer Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and have
 17 yet today. Those kind of reactions are everywhere if
 18 you're in the military.
 19 And the individuals who serve in a combat
 20 service support unit today, at least in the Marine Corps
 21 — and I think to some degree in the other services —
 22 may very well be in a more combat-oriented unit tomorrow.
 23 They're interchangeable to some degree, whether you're in

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1 intelligence or whatever. You could be up there, your
 2 command post. The rear could be overrun.
 3 All of those things could be happening,
 4 and why not have the best, most efficient, disciplined
 5 force, whether it's the front-line combat, the combat
 6 support, or the combat service support, and have uniform
 7 regulations and rules for all those people across-the-
 8 board?
 9 Sure, there are going to be some
 10 differences in the rear units, obviously, or in post
 11 stations and whatever that are not in the combat zone,
 12 but for the most part, the uniformity and the equal
 13 application make it a lot better military, and I think
 14 it's expected.
 15 MS. POPE: Do you have any other —
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: No. Go ahead.
 17 MS. POPE: This question is to both of
 18 you. I mean, you both have a lot of experience and
 19 obviously — I mean, just in an hour and a half — this
 20 is a huge subject that it's hard to get your hands
 21 around.
 22 Based on both of your experience, both
 23 your career service experience and the IG experience, how

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1 hell to cope with that.
 2 And he wants to be fair and he doesn't
 3 want to see women get hurt. It doesn't bother him too
 4 much to see a kid get hurt, but — a young man get hurt.
 5 I mean, I'm talking — I'm not talking about getting
 6 wounded or something. I'm talking about lifting, just
 7 lifting.
 8 You don't want to see people taken
 9 advantage of because they can't do the job because that
 10 leads — Putting up a GP medium tent, women cannot put up
 11 a GP medium tent. It takes four or five guys to take it
 12 up. It takes ten women. When they want to put up a GP
 13 medium tent and the women are supposed to do this, you
 14 have to get some men over to help them. That takes men
 15 away from the job they're doing. Men don't like that.
 16 Men don't like that, and it's a cause of an unnecessary
 17 grumble.
 18 Now, they do it and it gets done, but this
 19 is what leads to the genesis of problems as you go in.
 20 I'm not sure that we'll ever turn the
 21 clock back. It's too far. But for God's sake, let's not
 22 go any further. It's one hellacious problem. And the
 23 guys who have to solve that problem are the young

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1 much of a role does leadership play in interpreting those
 2 fine lines?
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: 100 percent.
 4 MS. POPE: So regardless of what the rules
 5 are — and as we try to figure out what they are — the
 6 tone leadership sets, the command climate —
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: The whole ball
 8 of wax.
 9 DR. MOSKOS: I think there's a little,
 10 though — Taking off of Barbara, you just said earlier,
 11 though, boys are boys, girls are girls, so — That was
 12 part of the ball of wax, too. And then now you just said
 13 it's leadership is the whole ball of wax. How do you
 14 reconcile that?
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Well, what I'm
 16 saying is, you know, there's been thousands of tomes
 17 written about leadership, but the success of a unit
 18 depends upon the leadership of that unit and how it does
 19 it.
 20 Now, there's a lot of things that you're
 21 forced to do that you don't want to do, that you have to
 22 take the responsibility for. The last thing you want to
 23 do is tell somebody to do something because "they told us

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1 captains and the young lieutenants because they're the
 2 ones who have to live with these kind of situations.
 3 MS. POPE: Can I — Does someone else have
 4 a...
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: General Miller, did you
 6 want to respond to the last question?
 7 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: Well, I think
 8 the leadership aspect of it is exactly correct. And from
 9 the lawyer's perspective, for the most part, in dealing
 10 with leaders, you look to them to make what had to be the
 11 right decision given the legal parameters that they were
 12 provided.
 13 But on occasion — Again I would reference
 14 back at least in my own experience to a few leaders who
 15 could not make what I thought was the correct decision.
 16 Maybe it was a gender-related issue and because the
 17 victim was a woman, there was going to be no punishment,
 18 for example, for the male.
 19 In looking at that individual's career,
 20 something was missing, I think. That leader —
 21 Fortunately a rare individual, but that leader missed
 22 something in the development as a leader and was unable
 23 to make the appropriate decisions and perhaps set the

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1 to do it." You always assume the responsibility yourself
 2 and say, "This is what we're going to do and that's it,"
 3 and there's no question about that.
 4 Yes, boys are boys and girls are girls.
 5 And like I say, you know, if you issue an order, "You
 6 cannot fall in love," I'll tell you, everybody in that
 7 outfit's going to fall in love tomorrow morning just to
 8 prove to you that they can.
 9 MS. POPE: Right.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: We had the
 11 best messes in the world. The one thing that you can't
 12 force a soldier to do is go to a mess hall and eat, and
 13 I've seen soldiers turn down the best food in the world
 14 and go down and eat at some hotdog stand because —
 15 they'll turn around and tell you, "You can't make me eat
 16 in that place."
 17 Now, if you took it away from them, they'd
 18 raise hell. But the very fact is, is this is their one
 19 way of getting back. And if you tell somebody that
 20 there's a natural relationship between males and females
 21 — and there is, there's a natural attraction — and you
 22 say, "You can't do that," right away you're giving that
 23 commander a strike and he's got to figure out how the

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1 right kind of example along the way. Fortunately they're
 2 rare.
 3 But the more we can do to make sure that
 4 those young captains and whoever — whenever they start
 5 along the way, are exposed to what's expected of them and
 6 how to make these right kind of decisions based upon all
 7 of the mistakes — and there are plenty of them — that
 8 we have been making over the decades in the military,
 9 they will be better leaders for it.
 10 They are not going to come into the
 11 military and just become great leaders. It doesn't
 12 happen accidentally. It doesn't even happen necessarily by
 13 exposure to peer pressure, but it does happen by what the
 14 services do to them to make them into the quality leaders
 15 that we expect. Some is inside, of course. Obviously
 16 you screen to get the right people, but there's a lot of
 17 molding development that goes on over the years.
 18 MS. POPE: Following on the leadership
 19 issue and it's more on your command experience rather
 20 than the IG experience, but both, as you look back on
 21 your careers, both of you — and this is not gender, it's
 22 back to the leadership issue — do you question that the
 23 people in your command ever misunderstood what you

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1 expected or what your command climate was?
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: I think if you
 3 don't think about that all the time, you're in deep
 4 trouble. I think you have to think about that all the
 5 time.
 6 Let me put it this way. This sounds very
 7 egotistical. I was always very comfortable in command.
 8 I enjoyed what I was doing. But at the same time, I
 9 talked to everybody that I could get my voice to,
 10 particularly seniors who had been through it.
 11 I have a library of some 6,000 books that
 12 I read and it drives my wife up the wall, but the fact
 13 is, this is something that you can never get enough of
 14 and you learn something every day. You learn something
 15 every hour, and you hope in some cases you will never
 16 have to use what you have to learn and in other cases you
 17 hope that you use them the next half-hour.
 18 So to answer your question, yeah, and you
 19 — One of the neat little tricks is, is to question
 20 yourself, but at the same time appear very self-confident
 21 and to be able to pull that off without giving a false,
 22 phony —
 23 MS. POPE: And I guess a follow-up — and

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1 General Miller, I want you to respond, too — is that
 2 would either of you have ever just sent out a memo and
 3 expected, you know, the people in your command to have,
 4 you know, accepted it and not questioned it?
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Never.
 6 MS. POPE: Okay.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: There's always
 8 some guy who'll take it apart.
 9 MS. POPE: Right. But, I mean, as far as
 10 — You would never rely on just a memo, without
 11 explaining and making sure that people in your command
 12 knew exactly what your expectations were?
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Hell, it's
 14 even more difficult when you don't put a memo out, when
 15 you tell them something. You've got to tell them ten
 16 times.
 17 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: And there are
 18 circumstances where you may not have the opportunity to
 19 add that explanation. As you mentioned, out of that
 20 combat example, the order is given, particularly at the
 21 smallest unit, and there isn't the opportunity. But that
 22 trust and that unit cohesion has already been built, and
 23 because of the uniformity of training and other

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1 experiences, there is the trust in what directive the
 2 leader has given; so it's going to be for the most part
 3 followed out, if not at peril.
 4 MS. POPE: And I think you used the word
 5 "integrity" or —
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Yes.
 7 MS. POPE: — "ethics" at the beginning.
 8 I mean, I guess that's what I'm leading to or —
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: The
 10 professional ethic.
 11 MS. POPE: Right — is the day-to-day
 12 leadership where your troops don't question when you give
 13 an order.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: I think, Ms.
 15 Pope, that they're always going to question.
 16 MS. POPE: Well, "question" is not the
 17 right word, but second-guess you as far as the final
 18 word. Obviously you do want them to question, you want
 19 them to understand, but you would — as your leadership,
 20 would make sure that they knew where you stood and what
 21 your expectations were. That command climate, you
 22 create.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: One of the

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1 little tricks I learned over time is if I'm not sure, I
 2 get somebody in that I have a great deal of —
 3 MS. POPE: Right.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: — trust in
 5 and I say, "Okay, clowns, what the hell do we do now?"
 6 Now, he can't tell whether I'm kidding or not, but at
 7 least they appear appreciative of the opportunity to tell
 8 me what the hell they think and usually it's pretty good.
 9 You know, there's — I used to tell the
 10 generals, "There's 495,000 of them and there's one of
 11 you, and let me tell you, they're a hell of a lot smarter
 12 than you are and you'd better listen."
 13 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: Well, it's
 14 always surprising, though, when we embraced, at least in
 15 the Department of the Navy, this total quality leadership
 16 and management. W. Edward Demming came alive and well
 17 with the Department of the Navy.
 18 It always seemed to me, in a simplistic
 19 fashion anyway, that the concept of gaining from the
 20 people you supervised, commanded or whatever — those
 21 insights and input along the way was something that had
 22 already long been in practice in the American military,
 23 and if the commanders didn't do that, they would have

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1 failed long before.
 2 MS. POPE: Right.
 3 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: So it wasn't
 4 something that was new, but it was something that people
 5 lived with day-to-day. Commanders talk to their troops
 6 all the time and are laying underneath the wing of an
 7 airplane, fixing it, or are out in the field or wherever
 8 it was that they could get that kind of feedback. And
 9 from that, you had commanders who continued to improve
 10 because they did; they did learn something every minute
 11 of every day.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: I'd like to
 13 just say one more thing about IG's. You know, when they
 14 had the DoD IG act, not one service IG was ever called
 15 upon to testify.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: This was in front of the
 17 Congress, you mean.
 18 MS. POPE: You mean the original IG act?
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: The original
 20 IG act. And it was postponed for a year while they
 21 created the Boutay Commission and none of us —
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Refresh me. What year was
 23 this?

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: '79-80.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: '79-80. Okay.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: And we were
 4 never — As a matter of fact, in the six years I was the
 5 Inspector General, I was never called to the Congress
 6 once. Not once. But the auditors were there all the
 7 time. I have a case about auditors.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: I guess you should call the
 9 DoD IG the auditors.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: Yes.
 11 MS. POPE: Right.
 12 DR. MOSKOS: I see.
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Charlie?
 14 Bob?
 15 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: No.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Barbara?
 17 MS. POPE: Nothing.
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. We have the
 19 representatives from the JAG coming to see us in just a
 20 few minutes. Do you have any parting words of advice for
 21 us?
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: No, they're a
 23 necessary evil.

1 No. As a matter of fact —
 2 DR. MOSKOS: One step above auditors.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL TREFRY: No, no. No,
 4 far from it. As a matter of fact, I am very proud of the
 5 fact that I think I was the seventeenth guy who was made
 6 an honorable instructor at the JAG school. I used to go
 7 down to the JAG school as the IG and spend a couple of
 8 days down there and run moot hearings and so forth. I
 9 have a great deal of respect for lawyers.
 10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: General Miller, any
 11 things we should be sure to ask?
 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLER: Well, I would
 13 be curious to know what the JAG's current position is on
 14 the senior-subordinate relationship because I think
 15 Secretary Cohen has not fully developed it in his policy
 16 guidance.
 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Well, we certainly
 18 appreciate your coming to see us today. I think it's
 19 been a very valuable time for us and we appreciate it a
 20 lot.
 21 (A brief recess was taken.)
 22 - - -
 23

1 common-law counterpart, and because of that reason,
 2 whether the victim is military or civilian is really
 3 irrelevant. The UCMJ prohibits rape, forcible sodomy,
 4 indecent assault, which is much like the civilian offense
 5 of sexual battery in many jurisdictions, assault with
 6 intent to commit rape or sodomy, and attempted rape or
 7 sodomy. Additionally, the military has certain unique
 8 offenses that are used to address sexual harassment;
 9 notably, maltreatment of a subordinate or in some cases
 10 obscene or indecent language.
 11 The second category in which no human
 12 victim need be alleged includes offenses such as indecent
 13 acts, consensual sodomy, adultery, pandering,
 14 prostitution, fraternization, conduct unbecoming an
 15 officer, and violations of regulations that govern
 16 certain personal relationships.
 17 Some of these personal relationships are
 18 like those between trainees and cadre, and these
 19 regulations, like the Army's values training that's given
 20 in initial entry training, are designed to prepare
 21 soldiers for the environment in which they'll be training
 22 and working in today's Army.
 23 Now, the third category, perhaps the best

1 JAG Review of Services' Policies on Cross-Gender Relationships, Including
 2 Fraternization
 3 and Sexual Harassment
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I want to welcome our
 5 service JAG presenters this afternoon. As I was just
 6 mentioning, the format that we've been following is to
 7 have all of the presentations made without interruption
 8 and then we simply go around the table with questions
 9 from the commissioners until we run out of questions.
 10 And for anybody who may be not at the
 11 table, we ask if you do need to answer a question, to
 12 simply walk up towards a microphone so that we can make
 13 sure we get everything. We are video-taping as well as
 14 getting a written transcript made of the proceedings
 15 today, and so I will ask everybody to please keep your
 16 voice up and not become too conversational so that we
 17 make sure we get every single word.
 18 We thank you all very much for coming
 19 today and for providing the background materials which
 20 all of us have earnestly read. And we'll start with
 21 Colonel White, from the Army.
 22 COLONEL WHITE: I'd like to thank, first
 23 of all, the chairman and the commissioners for having me
 here today to testify. I'm Colonel Ronald White. I'm

1 defined offense is that of sexual harassment. This
 2 offense is described and prohibited by both Defense
 3 directive and by Army regulation; and under certain
 4 circumstances, sexual harassment may be prosecuted as a
 5 crime under the UCMJ and under other circumstances it may
 6 simply be dealt with by administrative measures.
 7 Also in this third category are certain
 8 acts or patterns of misconduct between soldiers of
 9 different genders that may violate policies and customs
 10 of the service and they may be the basis for counseling
 11 or even more severe administrative measures even though
 12 they fall well short of constituting a crime. In the
 13 same vein, there may be acts of this nature that may be
 14 dealt with administratively even though they do
 15 technically constitute all the elements necessary to be a
 16 crime under the UCMJ.
 17 Recently, the Secretary of Defense has
 18 directed the service secretaries to prohibit personal
 19 relationships between officers and enlisted members,
 20 regardless of their service, and I've been told that the
 21 Secretary of the Army has recently approved guidance and
 22 sent to the Secretary to meet the request of Secretary
 23 Cohen's directive.

1 the Chief of the Army Judge Advocate General Criminal Law
 2 Division and I'm here in response to the Commission's
 3 request for a military attorney from the Army to testify
 4 as to the laws and regulations and policies that govern
 5 intergender relationships in the Army. You have my
 6 record testimony, so my remarks will be in the form of a
 7 brief summary.
 8 The Army has a significant framework of
 9 laws and regulations and policies that govern intergender
 10 relationships. These can basically be classified for
 11 ease of dealing with them into three categories. The
 12 first one involves those acts that comprise crimes,
 13 violations of the UCMJ — the Uniform Code of Military
 14 Justice — that do not have the consent of the victim.
 15 The second classification are those things
 16 that violate the UCMJ but for which the consent of the
 17 victim is not a material issue.
 18 And the third are those acts or patterns
 19 of conduct that constitute violations of regulations or
 20 policies or practices that may or may not constitute
 21 actual violations of the Uniform Code of Military
 22 Justice.
 23 Most crimes in the first category have a

1 The commissioners asked whether Army
 2 personnel are treated differently with respect to
 3 relationships among soldiers or if there's a relationship
 4 that may involve a soldier and someone from another
 5 service. The answer to that is no, it does not — the
 6 status or service affiliation of the other actor is
 7 really immaterial to our analysis of how we apply laws
 8 and regulations.
 9 The commissioners also asked whether the
 10 laws and regulations and policies that we've just
 11 discussed are applied equally without regard to rank or
 12 gender. I'm aware of no differences in application of
 13 our laws and directives and policies based on either rank
 14 or gender except as specifically stated in those
 15 regulations or laws themselves. And I'm also unaware of
 16 any report or study regarding the effects or whether in
 17 fact there is such an inconsistent standard applied.
 18 Also, although the Commission has asked
 19 for data on fraternization, the data that we gather
 20 simply isn't recorded with the particularity that's
 21 needed to derive a meaningful statistic for this purpose.
 22 We only gather data as to the offense of fraternization
 23 as it falls under Article 134. That would leave

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1 literally untracked many charges that could really be
 2 fraternization but were couched as conduct unbecoming an
 3 officer or dereliction of duty. For that purpose, our
 4 data just aren't valuable in this respect.
 5 We have much the same situation with
 6 regard to sexual harassment as an offense. We can track
 7 for a couple of years of statistics of what our judges
 8 have recorded as sexual harassment at a trial; however,
 9 those statistics are based on the judges' interpretation
 10 of the offense frequently and whether the judge
 11 characterized it as sexual harassment or not.
 12 We have similar difficulty in producing a
 13 percentage of workload where — attributed to sexual
 14 misconduct. We don't gather data that would support that
 15 kind of a determination, and we also have no way of
 16 tracking the most common forms of correction or
 17 disposition, which would include minor, on-the-spot
 18 corrections, ranging up through comments in an evaluation
 19 report or even more stringent measures. So it's very
 20 difficult for us to be able to attribute anything in
 21 terms of workload to either consensual or not-consensual
 22 conduct.
 23 Finally, in answer to the Commission's

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1 UCMJ, all subordinates are bound to obey.
 2 There are certain provisions, for example,
 3 in the U.S. Navy Regulations, which are a departmental
 4 order, that regulate conduct by prohibiting sexual
 5 harassment and fraternization. The Marine Corps itself
 6 has a "service level" order called the Marine Corps
 7 Manual, which addresses fraternization as well. Military
 8 commands at lower levels may also issue their own local
 9 orders which augment these regulations wherever it is
 10 appropriate to do so.
 11 It's also worth mentioning that in
 12 accordance with the Secretary of Defense's guidance, the
 13 Marine Corps will soon publish a change to its regulation
 14 on fraternization and this change is going to make more
 15 clear and definite the rules governing interpersonal
 16 conduct.
 17 For example, right now, existing
 18 regulations and policies are intended to apply to Marines
 19 regardless of what service they're with and whether or
 20 not it's a joint command and whether or not the person
 21 they're having a relationship with is a member of another
 22 command. Our proposed change will not change that, but,
 23 in fact, will make that prohibition or will make the

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1 request for typical problems encountered with respect to
 2 laws and regulations governing intergender relationships
 3 in the Army, in the context of enforcement of such laws
 4 and regulations, I can only say that the framework that
 5 the Army has operated very well over the years to
 6 achieve its purpose of setting forth standards that we
 7 expect soldiers to follow and proscribing conduct that's
 8 either forbidden or criminal.
 9 This continually evolving framework has
 10 served the Army very well through decades of change, and
 11 because it's focused on the mission, on good order and
 12 discipline, and on the dignity of all soldiers, we really
 13 have not experienced any difficulty in enforcing these
 14 standards.
 15 Thank you very much.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you, Colonel.
 17 Next is Colonel Joseph Composto from the
 18 Marine Corps.
 19 COLONEL COMPOSTO: Madam Chairman, members
 20 of the Commission, I'm Colonel Joseph Composto. I'm the
 21 Deputy Director of the Judge Advocate Division at
 22 Headquarters, Marine Corps, and I too thank you for the
 23 opportunity to speak to this Commission on the policies,

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1 application of those regulations much more explicit.
 2 It is both Marine Corps policy and
 3 practice to take allegations of inappropriate
 4 relationships seriously, to investigate them thoroughly,
 5 and resolve them fairly, regardless of the rank, grade or
 6 gender of the Marines involved.
 7 Now, although, as it was already
 8 mentioned, there are some offenses that can only be
 9 committed, for example, by men — carnal knowledge is one
 10 — and some offenses that can only be committed by
 11 officers, such as conduct unbecoming an officer and a
 12 gentleman, the Marine Corps nonetheless applies the
 13 spirit and intent of all of these laws and regulations
 14 without any regard to grade or gender, without any
 15 favoritism or bias.
 16 Now, there's no formula or template that
 17 we use for disposing of cases of wrongful personal
 18 relationships. In fact, a commander is prohibited from
 19 using any sort of a cookie-cutter approach, as it's
 20 called, when dealing with criminal offenses.
 21 The commander is required to consider all
 22 circumstances surrounding the commission of an offense
 23 and is required to consider the age, the grade, the

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1 practices, laws and regulations in the Department of the
 2 Navy and the United States Marine Corps that pertain to
 3 personal relationships among Marines.
 4 The Uniform Code of Military Justice,
 5 which is our basic criminal code, governs the
 6 relationships and the sexual conduct both among Marines
 7 and between Marines, and members of other services and
 8 civilians. It includes both specific and general
 9 prohibitions of conduct.
 10 The Manual for Courts-Martial, for
 11 example, which is issued by the President, specifically
 12 prohibits under Article 134 of the UCMJ conduct such as
 13 adultery, indecent assault, wrongful cohabitation,
 14 fraternization, just to name a few of the offenses,
 15 whenever these acts are prejudicial to good order and
 16 discipline or are service discrediting. In the case of
 17 an officer, for example, there are also inappropriate
 18 relationships that may be prohibited under Article 133,
 19 which is the offense of conduct unbecoming an officer and
 20 a gentleman.
 21 Now, other regulations governing personal
 22 relationships of Marines can be found in the lawful
 23 orders issued by superiors which, under Article 92 of the

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1 education, the experience and the background of every
 2 offender, and then arrive at a disposition that is
 3 tailored for that particular individual as well as for
 4 the needs of good order and discipline in the unit and
 5 unit morale, cohesion, and effectiveness.
 6 Now, this individualized and decentralized
 7 system of justice in no way undermines the Marine Corps'
 8 commitment to accountability, and, in short, all Marines,
 9 regardless of their grade or gender, are expected to
 10 abide by the regulations. They're responsible for their
 11 actions and they are held accountable for their
 12 transgressions.
 13 Like the Army, we do not keep statistics
 14 on all forms of administrative and disciplinary actions,
 15 but you can see from the court-martial figures that we
 16 have already provided to the Commission, that sexual
 17 harassment cases and fraternization cases represent a
 18 very, very small portion of the annual general and
 19 special court-martial caseload that we have in the Marine
 20 Corps. Appropriately, the very, very large majority of
 21 all of these cases are being handled administratively by
 22 commanders at much lower levels.
 23 Regarding the offense of sexual assault,

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1 because court-martial data are not readily available,
 2 it's not possible to state precisely the proportion of
 3 court-martial cases involving sexual misconduct, and also
 4 not possible to state the ratio of consensual sexual
 5 misconduct to non-consensual misconduct that are tried
 6 before a court-martial. We just don't keep statistics in
 7 that format.

8 Nonetheless, it's still the practice of
 9 the Marine Corps to treat sexual misconduct cases as any
 10 other allegation of misconduct would be treated. We take
 11 them and we investigate them thoroughly and we resolve
 12 them fairly on a case-by-case basis.

13 In conclusion, the Marine Corps believes
 14 that the existing laws and regulations and procedures
 15 provide the necessary means to resolve the cases that
 16 arise. We appreciate and we applaud the Secretary of
 17 Defense's efforts to set minimum requirements for
 18 fraternization and on the limited clarifications he
 19 proposed in the Manual for Courts-Martial on the
 20 provisions pertaining to adultery.

21 These changes are really going to have
 22 very little effect on the practices within the Marine
 23 Corps. Nevertheless, we see this as yet another

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1 order which prohibits conduct prejudicial to good order
 2 and discipline and conduct that is service discrediting.
 3 Pursuant to a grant of authority in
 4 Article 36 of the code, the President of the United
 5 States has listed over fifty specific offenses under
 6 Article 134. Of these, I have found eight that I think
 7 could apply to personal relationships between men and
 8 women in the military.

9 And they are also listed, but briefly,
 10 adultery, indecent assault, assault with intent to commit
 11 rape or sodomy, bigamy, wrongful cohabitation,
 12 fraternization, indecent acts with another, and finally,
 13 pandering and prostitution.

14 In addition to the code, the Navy has in
 15 place various regulations governing these relations
 16 between men and women. In the area of fraternization,
 17 U.S. Navy Regulations, Article 1165 prohibits personal
 18 relationships between officer and enlisted members that
 19 are unduly familiar and do not respect differences in
 20 rank or grade. Such relationships are deemed prejudicial
 21 to good order and discipline.

22 Additionally, section 1165 states that
 23 when they are prejudicial to good order and discipline,

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1 opportunity for us to reinforce our core values of honor,
 2 courage and commitment. We always have and we will
 3 consistently continue to apply these values to both
 4 personal and professional relationships and insist that
 5 all Marines do so.

6 The fact is, we believe that the vast
 7 majority of Marines do in fact have rewarding and
 8 appropriate professional relationships with all of their
 9 fellow Marines and service members from other branches of
 10 the service and other nations, and that they honor their
 11 commitment to their spouses. We expect nothing less of
 12 our Marines.

13 And I thank you very much for this
 14 opportunity to speak to the Commission. Thank you again.

15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you, Colonel.

16 Next is Captain DeCicco from the Navy.

17 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Thank you, Madam Chair,
 18 members of the Commission. It's a pleasure to be here
 19 with you today. I am Captain William DeCicco, JAG Corps,
 20 United States Navy. I'm currently assigned as Legal
 21 Counsel to the Chief of Naval Personnel. In this
 22 statement, I would like to respond to the Commission's
 23 questions regarding the laws, directives, regulations and

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1 personal relationships between officers and between
 2 enlisted members are prohibited when they are unduly
 3 familiar and do not respect differences in rank or grade.
 4 Chief of Naval Operations Instruction
 5 5370.2A supplements this Navy regulation by specifying
 6 certain prohibited conduct between officers and enlisted
 7 personnel such as dating, cohabitation, intimate or
 8 sexual relationships, and business partnerships. It
 9 likewise prohibits such acts between officers and between
 10 enlisted members of different rank or grade when
 11 prejudicial to good order and discipline.

12 The instruction adds further a section
 13 discussing the special leadership position of chief petty
 14 officers in the Navy — that is, E-7, E-8, E-9 — and
 15 their relationships with more junior enlisted personnel,
 16 stating that such relationships are typically prejudicial
 17 to good order and discipline when they are unduly
 18 familiar and do not respect differences in rank or grade.

19 Finally, the instruction specifically
 20 prohibits personal relationships between staff and
 21 student personnel within Navy training commands that are
 22 prejudicial to good order and discipline.

23 A revision to this instruction, which

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1 policies governing personal relationships of men and
 2 women in the Navy.
 3 The central body of law applicable to
 4 military personnel is, of course, the Uniform Code of
 5 Military Justice. In this code, there are six specific
 6 articles, I think, that apply to relations between male
 7 and female service members and they've been summarized in
 8 the statements.

9 Briefly, they are Article 92, which
 10 prohibits the violation of lawful general regulations and
 11 other orders that can include orders against
 12 fraternization and sexual harassment.

13 Article 93, which prohibits cruelty and
 14 maltreatment of subordinates. Sexual harassment may be
 15 prosecuted under this provision.

16 Article 120, which criminalizes rape and
 17 carnal knowledge in the military.

18 Article 125, which prohibits sodomy, both
 19 forcible and consensual.

20 Article 133, which prohibits conduct
 21 unbecoming an officer and can be used to prosecute a
 22 variety of misconduct by officers and midshipmen.

23 And, finally, Article 134, the general

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1 complies with the Secretary of Defense's July 1998
 2 memorandum, is awaiting signature in the Office of the
 3 Chief of Naval Operations. The changes add prohibitions
 4 against commercial solicitations, gambling and borrowing
 5 money between officers and enlisted, as well as a
 6 prohibition against unduly familiar relationships between
 7 Navy recruiters and recruits and applicants who are
 8 interested in joining the Navy.

9 In the area of sexual harassment, Navy
 10 Regulations, 1166, prohibits sexual harassment, reprisal
 11 against persons who report sexual harassment. It
 12 prohibits knowingly making false sexual harassment
 13 accusations, and it holds commanders and supervisors
 14 responsible for condoning or ignoring sexual harassment
 15 complaints.

16 This section of Navy Regulations is
 17 supplemented by a Secretary of the Navy Instruction which
 18 restates the prohibition against sexual harassment and
 19 adds requirements regarding training, counseling support
 20 for victims, and investigations and the timeliness of
 21 these investigations. It further contains Navy policy on
 22 the administrative discharge of military offenders and
 23 the establishment of a system to resolve complaints.

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1 The Chief of Naval Operations has issued
 2 further directives in this area with more specifics,
 3 including a section of the Navy Equal Opportunity Manual.
 4 Except for those offenses that require
 5 both parties to have military status, these laws and
 6 regulations that I've just summarized all apply to
 7 relationships between military personnel and non-military
 8 personnel of the opposite sex.
 9 In reply to your inquiry concerning
 10 possible different treatment of cases involving naval
 11 personnel with members of another service, while I cannot
 12 speak for every single case that goes on, I can say that
 13 naval offenders may be held accountable for improper
 14 personal relationships regardless of the service of the
 15 other individual involved.
 16 Regarding the Commission's question on
 17 possible differences in the application of laws and
 18 regulations based on rank and gender, with the one
 19 exception that's been mentioned of Article 133, conduct
 20 unbecoming, which requires the accused to be an officer
 21 or midshipman, none of the laws and regulations discussed
 22 require any difference in approach based on rank, grade
 23 or gender of the accused.

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1 While rank and grade may be one of the
 2 factors that's considered by the commander in disposing
 3 of a case, all naval personnel may be held accountable
 4 for violations of these rules. How these cases are
 5 disposed of, of course, is vested within the sound
 6 discretion of Navy commanders after considering all of
 7 the circumstances of any given case.
 8 We also are not aware of any studies or
 9 reports regarding any inconsistent treatment that have
 10 been compiled.
 11 We've provided the statistics for the
 12 number of Navy courts-martial in fiscal years 1996 and
 13 '97, as well as a summary of those which included charges
 14 involving fraternization and sexual harassment. The
 15 statistics we have provided regarding sexual harassment
 16 and fraternization at courts-martial were derived from
 17 our Trial Judiciary Management Information System, which
 18 was a laborious process to put together because the
 19 military judges record on a screen the general nature of
 20 the charges and we had to have people manually go through
 21 all of the screens to determine how many they could
 22 count. And that was done manually. We do not have an
 23 automated system to do that. So that's where we got

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1 those numbers.
 2 The Commission has requested to be advised
 3 of any typical problems encountered. In my view, in
 4 these types of cases, they're largely problems of proof
 5 and proving an accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
 6 at a court-martial. Sometimes the victim will be
 7 reluctant to report an incident or make a statement for
 8 fear of being ostracized by shipmates or possibly opening
 9 to public scrutiny what that person may consider to be a
 10 very private matter.
 11 Some victims report incidents late, making
 12 the gathering of evidence and identification of witnesses
 13 difficult and result in a case of "he said-she said,"
 14 without any other circumstantial evidence one way or the
 15 other.
 16 The presence of alcohol in some cases can
 17 also affect memory and testimony.
 18 While statistics are not kept in the Navy
 19 regarding the proportion of sexual misconduct cases to
 20 total workload, based on a very informal survey, I
 21 surveyed the commanding officers of all the naval legal
 22 service offices and trial service offices around the
 23 world and asked them for their answer to this question,

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1 and the general consensus was about one-third of our
 2 total workload relates to sexual misconduct of one sort
 3 or another.
 4 Now, this is not restricted just to
 5 military-and-military type cases, but also where the
 6 victim may be a civilian, and it includes the whole range
 7 of cases dealing with sexual child abuse.
 8 Regarding how much of the sexual
 9 misconduct is consensual and how much is non-consensual,
 10 the Navy does not maintain such statistics, but I do not
 11 see this as a problem that needs fixing. Naval
 12 commanders have sufficient discretion and authority as
 13 well as the tools available right now to handle these
 14 cases appropriately. These commanders and commanding
 15 officers are well educated people; they are fair; they
 16 know their people and they know their commands, and they
 17 are in the best position to know the right thing to do.
 18 In the Navy, we do not believe the new
 19 rules regarding fraternization and adultery offenses will
 20 have a significant effect. The fraternization changes
 21 that we are making to our instruction are relatively
 22 minor ones under our current regulation and some of the
 23 conduct that we're adding is already prohibited by other

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1 regulations, such as gambling with subordinates and
 2 borrowing money, but the Secretary of Defense's directive
 3 to level the playing field for all military personnel was
 4 the right thing to do.
 5 In the adultery cases, we believe naval
 6 commanders have applied the factors proposed by the
 7 Secretary of Defense already and the new direction will
 8 not have any significant effect in the way those cases
 9 are handled in the Navy.
 10 Thank you very much for this opportunity,
 11 Madam Chairman.
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.
 13 Finally, Colonel Madsen from the Air
 14 Force.
 15 COLONEL MADSEN: Thank you for the
 16 invitation to testify before this Commission. I am
 17 Colonel David Madsen. I'm Chief of the Military Justice
 18 Division of the Air Force Legal Services Agency. The
 19 Judge Advocate General of the Air Force has appointed me
 20 to respond to the Commission's request for testimony on
 21 issues pertaining to the laws, regulations, directives,
 22 policies and practices governing personal relationships
 23 between men and women in the Air Force.

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1 We have provided written responses to the
 2 six questions posed by the Commissioner; however, I would
 3 like to briefly comment on some key points.
 4 First, disciplinary problems in the Air
 5 Force have been declining since the inception of the "all
 6 volunteer force." Part of this decrease can be
 7 attributed to the reductions in the active duty force —
 8 a 40 percent decrease since the end of the Cold War. But
 9 even factoring in the decrease in the number of personnel
 10 on active duty, the Air Force has experienced a one-third
 11 reduction in the rate of disciplinary actions over the
 12 past decade.
 13 Second, disciplinary problems stemming
 14 from improper relationships account for a small
 15 percentage of the disciplinary workload in the Air Force.
 16 Third, commanders have a responsibility to
 17 maintain good order and discipline and have been given
 18 many tools and considerable discretion by the Congress
 19 and the President to correct behavior having an adverse
 20 impact on their units.
 21 And fourth, it is Air Force policy to
 22 apply standards without regard to rank, grade, race, or
 23 gender. Also, all Air Force members are expected to

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1 adhere to Air Force standards in their relationships with
 2 members of other services.
 3 Because the written responses go into
 4 greater detail regarding all of the various laws and
 5 regulations and policies and practices that govern
 6 personal relationships between men and women in the Air
 7 Force, I will not elaborate at this time; but I assure
 8 you that the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Air Force
 9 regulations and policies, are sufficient to assist
 10 commanders in dealing fairly and appropriately in matters
 11 involving personal relationships.
 12 The foundation of military criminal law is
 13 the Constitution of the United States. The Constitution
 14 gives Congress the responsibility to make rules to
 15 regulate the military. It also establishes the President
 16 as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Congress
 17 exercised its responsibility over military justice by
 18 enacting the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the UCMJ.
 19 The UCMJ is federal law and is contained
 20 in Title 10 of the United States Code. The UCMJ was
 21 implemented by Executive Order of the President. This
 22 original order and subsequent executive orders are known
 23 as the Manual for Courts-Martial, the MCM.

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1 law.
 2 The Air Force places responsibility on
 3 commanders to educate its members on appropriate
 4 professional and personal relationships and expects
 5 commanders to take action in appropriate cases. The Air
 6 Force has also taken an aggressive stance against sexual
 7 harassment and other sexual misconduct and is firmly
 8 committed to continuing to do so.
 9 As I conclude, and before I answer any
 10 questions, allow me to introduce Colonel Georgette Toews,
 11 Director of Force Development, Deputy Chief of Staff/
 12 Personnel. And should you have any questions relating to
 13 Air Force policies as opposed to enforcement of those
 14 policies, she is available to answer those questions.
 15 Again, thank you.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Thank you,
 17 Colonel Madsen.
 18 Welcome, Colonel Toews.
 19 As I mentioned, we have been following the
 20 procedure of simply going around the table with
 21 commissioners until we are all asked out, so to speak,
 22 and I will begin with a two- or three-part question which
 23 is intended to get for us a better picture of some of the

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1 The MCM contains Rules for Courts-Martial,
 2 the Military Rules of Evidence, punitive articles,
 3 nonjudicial punishment procedures, and various other
 4 appendices governing the procedures and punishments for
 5 courts-martial.
 6 In adopting the UCMJ, Congress recognized
 7 the need for a separate system of criminal justice for
 8 the military. As a result, the military justice system
 9 is very flexible and can be enforced wherever military
 10 members are deployed. Military justice is a key
 11 component in maintaining military discipline and is a
 12 function of command. The Supreme Court has reviewed the
 13 military justice system and found it to be
 14 constitutional.
 15 The UCMJ proscribes many common criminal
 16 offenses such as murder, rape and robbery. However, of
 17 necessity, there are some unique "military offenses" in
 18 the UCMJ which have not been made criminal in civilian
 19 life but go to the heart of maintaining military
 20 discipline, such as the failure to obey lawyer orders,
 21 absence without leave, disrespect offenses, and
 22 fraternization.
 23 As a matter of policy, the MCM encourages

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1 practicalities of operating in an environment in which
 2 not only the legal arm, but also the commanders in the
 3 field have, if you will, shared enforcement authority.
 4 I'd like each of you to comment on
 5 whether, in your experience and your perception, the
 6 commanders are providing uniform and equal application of
 7 the regulations, and mainly with reference to the cross-
 8 gender relationship rules as we are looking at here
 9 today.
 10 And secondly, through what formal or
 11 informal mechanisms do you work with commanders? Not
 12 necessarily you personally, but the judge advocate group
 13 of your service.
 14 And then, finally, what suggestions might
 15 you have for other things that might be done as between
 16 the judge advocates and the commanders in the field?
 17 And I see Captain DeCicco not taking
 18 notes, so...
 19 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Well, I can say that at
 20 least as far as the Navy goes — And I have the
 21 additional advantage of working in the Bureau of Naval
 22 Personnel, I don't work in the Office of the Judge
 23 Advocate General, and I see a lot of other cases that are

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1 commanders to dispose of offenses in a timely manner at
 2 the lowest appropriate level of disposition. When faced
 3 with misconduct, commanders are required by law to
 4 consider the member's service record, conduct, and the
 5 circumstances of the offense, before deciding on the
 6 appropriate disposition.
 7 The MCM also requires that commanders
 8 consider such factors as the nature of the offense, any
 9 mitigating or extenuating circumstances, the character
 10 and military service of the accused, and recommendations
 11 made by subordinate commanders. As a result, commanders
 12 consider each case on its own merits.
 13 The goal for commanders, as stated in the
 14 MCM, is to reach a disposition that is "warranted,
 15 appropriate, and fair." To meet this goal, commanders
 16 routinely seek advice from their staff judge advocates
 17 and others in carrying out their responsibilities in
 18 administering discipline.
 19 The military justice system is a dynamic
 20 system that has served our armed forces and our nation
 21 well for decades. The UCMJ and MCM are reviewed and
 22 updated annually, as mandated by Congress, to incorporate
 23 needed changes, as well as the latest changes in federal

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1 handled administratively that the normal criminal process
 2 doesn't see.
 3 And based on my observations and my
 4 experience of numerous years, I think that commanders are
 5 handling cases fairly across-the-board without regard to
 6 rank or gender.
 7 I have seen specific cases where officers
 8 have fraternized with enlisted people; the officers are
 9 held accountable at an NJP proceeding just like the
 10 enlisted person is. I have seen females held to the same
 11 standard as the males. I have seen female officers
 12 discharged for fraternizing with male enlisted men.
 13 So I have to conclude from that that the
 14 rules are being applied as fairly as they can be applied.
 15 As far as how the judge advocates relate
 16 to that, we have staff judge advocates stationed around
 17 the world to assist the commanders in making these
 18 determinations. Not every ship has a lawyer aboard, but
 19 the aircraft carriers do; the battle group commanders all
 20 have lawyers. If a destroyer or submarine commander
 21 wants legal advice, it's readily accessible if they
 22 desire to get it.
 23 These commanders have also received

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1 extensive training for the most part in military justice
 2 through our Naval Justice School and its detachments in
 3 San Diego and Norfolk, and I have heard of no complaints
 4 in that regard.

5 As far as the — I'm sorry, the third
 6 question...

7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: What other suggestions
 8 might there be for improving the communication between
 9 the judge advocates and the commanders in the field to
 10 help the commanders?

11 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: We have — I think in
 12 the Navy we have a very free-flow back-and-forth between
 13 the line and the judge advocate community. We have the
 14 staff judge advocates in the field that are always in
 15 contact. I can't tell you how many phone calls I get a
 16 day from lawyers out there calling, asking for
 17 recommendations on what I think about a certain case.

18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: You should raise your
 19 hourly rate.

20 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Well, I wish I were paid
 21 by the hour.

22 But I think that the system right now, at
 23 least insofar as the Navy is concerned, is working

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1 intermediate level schools, and the top level schools
 2 that we send service members to.
 3 In addition to that, each and every one of
 4 our commanders that is special court-martial convening
 5 authority and above goes to a commander's course which is
 6 held down at Quantico and it convenes twice a year. It
 7 is a two-week-long course and it contains a whole wide
 8 range of instruction and information for these
 9 prospective commanders as they're going to their new
 10 commands, and included in that is a legal package where
 11 we speak about just these very matters. We talk about
 12 fraternization.

13 And one of my duties right now is actually
 14 to participate in that training program. We talk about
 15 fraternization as well as any one of the offenses and the
 16 need for commanders to ensure that they deal with these
 17 offenses in a fair and even-handed manner.

18 I really don't have a specific
 19 recommendation as to how we can improve it. I think we
 20 need to — "we," the lawyers in the Marine Corps, as well
 21 as the commanders — need to keep speaking to one another
 22 and making certain that we stay in contact.

23 And we have to be aggressive at seeking

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1 effectively. We do have a lot of cases, as I said, but
 2 the general trend is down and we're continuing to work on
 3 it.

4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Colonel Composto.

5 COLONEL COMPOSTO: Yes, ma'am.

6 My experiences and my information is much
 7 the same as Captain DeCicco's. I have, throughout my
 8 career, seen the whole wide range of spectrum of
 9 individuals who have been punished or disciplined or in
 10 some way administratively dealt with because of any one
 11 of — any offense, quite frankly, but most specifically
 12 any of the gender-related offenses or fraternization.

13 I really cannot detect any bias towards a
 14 particular grade or a particular gender. I think
 15 commanders are very, very much aware of the fact that
 16 their moral authority to lead stems directly from the
 17 perceptions of the men and women that they do lead. And
 18 if, in fact, a commander is not judged as being fair and
 19 unbiased, he loses the heart and soul of the Marines that
 20 he leads or she leads.

21 And most commanders know that intuitively,
 22 and so they are very — In fact, my experience is that
 23 they're very careful about making certain that they are

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1 each other's advice. We have staff judge advocates with
 2 every single command and I think every commander is very
 3 much urged to stay in contact with him. And on the other
 4 side of the coin, we urge the SJA's to make certain that
 5 they are at the right hand of their commander for
 6 virtually everything that they do.

7 As long as we keep doing that, I think
 8 we'll have that education and that flow of information
 9 that we need.

10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Colonel White.

11 COLONEL WHITE: We have much the same
 12 response. The best thing I can say with respect to the
 13 relationship between staff judge advocates and their
 14 convening authorities, the general, the commander, the
 15 commander has a large staff at the general officer post
 16 or division level; any number of the members of that
 17 staff would love to have the access to the commander that
 18 the staff judge advocate has.

19 When you call as a staff judge advocate to
 20 your commander and say, "Sir, I need to see you" — In
 21 the two years that I did that job, I was never denied the
 22 opportunity on an immediate basis to see the commander,
 23 because if there's something that the staff judge

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1 in fact having a level playing field, recognizing all of
 2 the factors that they have to consider under the Manual,
 3 some of which I went over — you know, the age, the
 4 grade, the bias — excuse me — the experiences and the
 5 training and education and the effect on good order and
 6 discipline. They have to factor all of that in. But,
 7 nevertheless, commanders try to factor that in. They
 8 want to make certain that they don't favor one individual
 9 or one particular class of Marines over another.

10 What do we, the attorneys, the judge
 11 advocates in the Marine Corps, do to assist commanders?
 12 I think we're very, very active. We have every — a
 13 large number of training programs. For example, it
 14 starts with the very first training that an officer gets
 15 at the basic school where he receives an entire education
 16 or a legal package, if you will, as part of his
 17 education, which deals with the various requirements of
 18 officers and the standards of conduct that they have to
 19 uphold and how they should administer discipline.

20 And that continues throughout their
 21 education, all the way through virtually every school
 22 they attend, whether it's the amphibious warfare school
 23 or any one of the other career-level schools, the

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1 advocate needs to see him for, he wants to listen. So I
 2 don't think you can improve that access, at least in my
 3 experience.
 4 That interface also comes from I think a
 5 career of a trusting relationship that's been built up
 6 between commanders and their judge advocates, beginning
 7 at the level where we have captains that we take a great
 8 deal of time to train as judge advocates, telling them
 9 that they are going to be the legal adviser to a
 10 battalion or brigade commander.

11 And we make sure that that captain
 12 understands that his job is not to shoot from the hip.
 13 It's to get all of the facts, all of the circumstances,
 14 research the law, discuss it with colleagues, and go back
 15 and give that commander some meaningful opinion. That
 16 kind of trust gets built up over careers of both of those
 17 individuals, to the point that we have today, and it's a
 18 very successful environment.

19 I think commanders literally bend over
 20 backwards to not only see that what they're doing is just
 21 in the objective sense, but that it will also be
 22 perceived as just. It was a frequent topic of discussion
 23 when it came time for the General to decide what should

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1 be done with an officer who had done something wrong or
 2 what should be done with a master sergeant who had done
 3 something wrong, how's this going to be perceived by the
 4 troops? What effect will this have on the command?
 5 That's a very important consideration and
 6 the commander frequently gets the advice of his senior
 7 enlisted adviser, his sergeant major, as well as his
 8 judge advocate in seeing how that is going to play with
 9 the command.
 10 So fairness and the perception of fairness
 11 are very important.
 12 I frankly don't have any real concrete
 13 recommendations for how we can improve the process. I
 14 really think it works pretty well.
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Colonel Madsen.
 16 COLONEL MADSEN: In my experience, as I
 17 mentioned in my opening statement, discipline is a
 18 function of command, and in my experience in dealing with
 19 commanders, they take this responsibility very seriously.
 20 And the staff judge advocate is a very key adviser in
 21 this role of discipline.
 22 In matters of cross-gender relationships,
 23 in my experience, commanders do apply the factors they

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1 business.
 2 But my suggestion would be that we be
 3 allowed to continue to have that kind of opportunity as
 4 mandated by Congress already, to continue to look at our
 5 processes and to update them and to keep them current and
 6 to make them responsive to the needs of command, and that
 7 would be my comment on your questions.
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much.
 9 Fred.
 10 MR. PANG: Thank you, Madam Chairman.
 11 You know, with regard to your testimony on
 12 cross-gender infractions, you know, the data obviously is
 13 not complete, but I think that it's fair to say that it's
 14 not complete with any other kinds of infractions as well.
 15 Is that correct?
 16 I mean, you know, what I see are very
 17 small percents reported with regard to what I would call
 18 serious infractions. I mean, those that rise to the
 19 level where you take action in the Uniform Code of
 20 Military Justice system, but there are many other
 21 infractions that go probably unreported, that are handled
 22 administratively, that involve cross-gender
 23 relationships.

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1 are required to apply in the Manual for Courts-Martial,
 2 looking at each case on its own merits, looking at the
 3 offense and looking at the accused, the record of the
 4 accused, and all of the factors I mentioned in my opening
 5 statement.
 6 Now some of the observations. Under
 7 Article 6 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the
 8 Judge Advocate General of each service is required to
 9 visit all of the installations and to see how the
 10 military justice process is working. This, of course,
 11 was instituted after World War II to make sure that
 12 unlawful command influence does not exist, because that's
 13 a great evil. That's an evil that Congress tried to
 14 avoid and this is one measure they implemented under
 15 Article 6.
 16 So I think these visits are very
 17 effective, and they take their responsibilities seriously
 18 and have the responsibility to train staff judge
 19 advocates and other lawyers in their duties with regard
 20 to advising a commander.
 21 And, invariably, as the staff judge
 22 advocate — the Judge Advocate General or the Deputy
 23 Judge Advocate General returns from an Article 6 visit,

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1 Is that also true of other types of
 2 infractions that don't involve cross-gender
 3 relationships, that are handled at the lower levels?
 4 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: That's true in the Navy.
 5 There are a number of cases that are resolved
 6 administratively or through nonjudicial punishment under
 7 Article 15.
 8 MR. PANG: Is there a compilation of that
 9 at, you know, the Department of the Navy?
 10 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Not that I know of, sir.
 11 No.
 12 COLONEL COMPOSTO: That's pretty much the
 13 same in the Marine Corps. I would say we probably have
 14 better statistics for gender-related offenses. As poor
 15 as they are, they're probably better than for most other
 16 offenses because there are various requirements that we
 17 have to report from local commands any time certain
 18 allegations are made.
 19 But for the most part, anything that's
 20 handled administratively, nonjudicial punishment, most of
 21 those records are kept at individual commands and only
 22 for two years. And if you really wanted to find out, you
 23 would have to literally go to each and every command

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1 the report from the installation commander is that "I
 2 have the best JAG in the Air Force." That is said over
 3 and over and over again.
 4 I think that's indicative of the respect
 5 that commanders have for the professionalism of the
 6 advice they are receiving, but also an indication of the
 7 regard they have for their responsibilities and the
 8 relationship of trust they develop with their staff judge
 9 advocates. This is a very key component.
 10 Now, on how we might improve the system.
 11 I am Chairman of the Joint Service Committee on Military
 12 Justice, which is mandated by Congress to review the UCMJ
 13 and the MCM annually, and we take that responsibility
 14 very seriously.
 15 We can always look at what we are doing to
 16 see if we can improve and that's part of our
 17 responsibility, and we do propose legislation and changes
 18 to the Manual for Courts-Martial when we consider that it
 19 is important or that it is necessary for us to modernize
 20 our system, and we have been, I feel, very successful in
 21 doing that and we have a streamlined procedure for doing
 22 that. We can expedite such matters far more quickly than
 23 our civilian counterparts because of the nature of our

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1 throughout the Marine Corps and ask them to go through
 2 their files, picking through it one at a time. We just
 3 don't keep those kind of statistics.
 4 COLONEL MADSEN: The Air Force does have a
 5 database system that we have had for years, that tracks
 6 nonjudicial punishment and the kinds of specifications
 7 that are available under nonjudicial punishment, and also
 8 for courts-martial.
 9 So depending on — As you heard testimony
 10 earlier today, an offense might be charged in many
 11 different ways. That would limit our capability, for
 12 instance, to determine sexual harassment offenses because
 13 we have begun tracking them under Article 93,
 14 maltreatment, only in the nineties, though we had very
 15 few of those that have ended up in a court-martial.
 16 Unless it ends up in a court-martial or
 17 nonjudicial punishment, we don't have a database system
 18 for tracking other administrative actions.
 19 MR. PANG: Is that the same — same
 20 answer?
 21 COLONEL WHITE: We're much the same, yeah.
 22 MR. PANG: Another question I had was with
 23 regard to the OSD policy — the recently announced OSD

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1 policy with regard to senior-subordinate relationships
 2 and adultery.
 3 I think it's fair to say that the policy
 4 establishes a minimum standard, but my understanding of
 5 that minimum standard is that it really didn't affect
 6 three of the services but affected one of the services —
 7 namely the Army — significantly, in that it prohibits
 8 officer and enlisted relationships and that's an explicit
 9 bar.
 10 So that's a minimum, and my understanding
 11 is that the services can go above that line if they wish.
 12 Is that a correct —
 13 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Yes, sir, that's
 14 absolutely right. The change I think was necessary,
 15 especially as we are becoming more joint in the sense
 16 where you have people from different armed services
 17 working in the same office.
 18 For example, under the old system, if you
 19 had a — and you can correct me if I'm wrong, but if you
 20 had an Army captain and a Navy petty officer who began to
 21 date, the Navy petty officer could go to prison for that
 22 and the Army officer would walk away scot-free.
 23 MR. PANG: "Could."

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1 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Could. And I don't
 2 think the American public would want to see that in our
 3 armed forces and this order now, as I said, levels the
 4 playing field for that. And as we become more joint and
 5 work together, I think it's very important that we have
 6 that rule.
 7 MR. PANG: Well, it levels the playing
 8 field, sort of, but if you have, you know, prohibitions
 9 — okay? — that go above the bar, then, you know, I
 10 wonder how that plays out. Because as I recall in the
 11 Navy, there is a prohibition between senior officers and
 12 junior officers and a prohibition between senior enlisted
 13 and junior enlisted.
 14 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: That's correct.
 15 MR. PANG: And if you're going to — in a
 16 joint arena, I mean, you know, how does that apply? You
 17 would still hold the Navy person accountable, but it
 18 would not necessarily apply to an Army enlisted person;
 19 is that correct?
 20 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: That's right. There's
 21 still that discrepancy between, say, an Army E-8 and a
 22 Navy E-4, for example.
 23 MR. PANG: But is it — you know, is the

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1 prohibition in the Navy regulation unconditional? I
 2 mean, is this just a flat-out prohibition?
 3 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: It's a prohibition if it
 4 is prejudicial to good order and discipline and is unduly
 5 familiar. Those are the requirements.
 6 Not every contact between those two people
 7 would be unlawful. For example, if they happen to eat
 8 lunch sitting next to each other or something like that,
 9 or participate on a command softball team together or
 10 something like that. There are many contacts which are
 11 not unlawful, but there still is this one — at least one
 12 difference that still exists, yes.
 13 DR. MOSKOS: So a Navy E-4 dating an Army
 14 E-7 is okay by the books?
 15 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: It may not be in the
 16 Navy. It may be for the Army person, but for the navy
 17 person — It doesn't matter what the service is. If she
 18 is dating — If the Navy E-4 is dating the Army E-7 —
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Yes.
 20 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: — and that becomes —
 21 If especially, say, she works for him and he has an input
 22 on her evaluation —
 23 DR. MOSKOS: Well, leave that out. Leave

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1 that out.
 2 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Okay. If they're in
 3 different commands? Is that your —
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 5 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: It's going to depend on
 6 the circumstances to determine is there anything which
 7 makes that prejudicial to good order and discipline and
 8 make it an unduly familiar relationship. If the answer
 9 to that question is —
 10 DR. MOSKOS: They're dating and the whole
 11 thing. I mean, yes.
 12 MR. PANG: I think the presumption — My
 13 understanding is that the presumption is that that would
 14 undermine good order and discipline.
 15 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: That's — The individual
 16 commander has to make that determination.
 17 MS. POPE: You have two — You have a
 18 joint command and there's two people — two different
 19 services, different ranks, that aren't in the chain of
 20 command, that aren't working together — then it's not.
 21 But if one is the EA or the MA to the general or the
 22 CINC, then you could have. I mean —
 23 DR. MOSKOS: Well, so it would be out of

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1 the chain of command, the E-4 Navy woman — let's make
 2 her the woman — dating the E-7 Army guy —
 3 MS. POPE: No, let's make her the E-7.
 4 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: If there's — Well,
 5 okay. Whichever way. But if there's —
 6 DR. MOSKOS: No, I want it that way
 7 because the E-4 can't — the male E-4, female E-7. Okay?
 8 MS. POPE: Thank you.
 9 DR. MOSKOS: Can they do it? No chain of
 10 command involved.
 11 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Well, if there's no
 12 chain of command problem and there's nothing else that
 13 affects good order and discipline, that would not be a
 14 violation of the Navy regulation.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: All right. But if the E-4
 16 was going to date the female E-7 in the Navy, outside the
 17 chain of command, it would be a problem?
 18 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: For her in the Navy?
 19 DR. MOSKOS: And him.
 20 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Well, for him in the
 21 Army, he'd be subject to —
 22 DR. MOSKOS: No, no. They're both —
 23 MS. POPE: No. They're both — He's now

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1 changed it.
 2 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Oh, they're both —
 3 DR. MOSKOS: They're both Navy now.
 4 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Okay. I lost you on the
 5 facts there.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah, right.
 7 MS. POPE: They're both Navy.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: That's a — That's a problem?
 9 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Yes, it could be.
 10 MR. PANG: More likely a problem than —
 11 MS. POPE: Right.
 12 MR. PANG: — than the other way, I would
 13 presume.
 14 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: It's awful difficult to
 15 talk in absolutes here —
 16 MS. POPE: Right.
 17 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: — because it always
 18 depends on the circumstances in the area of
 19 fraternization.
 20 MR. PANG: Okay. So there is judgment
 21 involved in the senior-subordinate relationship within
 22 the officer ranks and within the enlisted ranks, but
 23 there is no judgment with regard to officer-to-enlisted.

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1 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: That's correct.
 2 MR. PANG: That is just a flat-out
 3 prohibition. Unconditional.
 4 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: That's a flat-out
 5 prohibition. Officer-enlisted is a flat-out prohibition,
 6 yes.
 7 MS. POPE: And even officer — senior
 8 officer-junior officer, senior enlisted-to-junior
 9 enlisted, within the chain of command, it's a prohibition
 10 — clear prohibition if it's that chain of command.
 11 COLONEL COMPOSTO: I think the Marine
 12 Corps is probably pretty much in the same lines. We
 13 don't have the strict particulars in setting out grades
 14 and the senior enlisted with their relationships with the
 15 junior enlisted, but mainly we have the strict
 16 prohibition between officer and enlisted. We certainly
 17 have strict prohibitions, regardless of whether you're
 18 officer or enlisted, as long as you're in the same chain
 19 of command.
 20 But when you're just talking about
 21 relationships between a senior officer to a junior
 22 officer or senior enlisted to a junior enlisted and there
 23 are no chain of command problems, then it looks to see

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1 whether or not there's prejudice to good order and
 2 discipline, has there been any undermining of the
 3 authority of the individual or any kind of danger or
 4 damage to unit cohesion or effectiveness.
 5 It's a situational judgment call on the
 6 part of the commanders involved.
 7 MR. PANG: Is that also true of the Air
 8 Force?
 9 COLONEL MADSEN: We don't spell out
 10 specifically prohibitions with respect to enlisted ranks.
 11 Nevertheless, when there is a relationship, particularly
 12 in the same organization, under our Air Force
 13 instruction, it could be an unprofessional relationship
 14 if the senior enlisted member develops an unduly familiar
 15 relationship with a junior enlisted member and that
 16 impacts the organization. You look to the impact on the
 17 unit.
 18 And the other evils that are apparent for
 19 fraternization, you would go through the same analysis in
 20 that respect.
 21 MR. PANG: And that equally applies to the
 22 officer ranks?
 23 COLONEL MADSEN: That would apply as well

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1 in those — when it applies to the same organization.
 2 Although we don't make it as explicitly clear as the Navy
 3 does, nevertheless, we would apply the same analysis as
 4 to impact on the organization to determine whether or not
 5 it's an unprofessional relationship as opposed to
 6 fraternization. We determine it in those terms.
 7 DR. MOSKOS: Just to follow-up, then, with
 8 — And I have some other areas to open, but...
 9 We had an earlier session today in which
 10 one of the presenters argued that the real issue should
 11 be superior-subordinate relations rather than rank. So
 12 an O-6 dating an O-3 outside of the chain of command is
 13 okay, but an O-3 dating an E-8 outside of the chain of
 14 command is bad — is wrong. Is that — Am I stating it
 15 correctly?
 16 Does that strike you as sort of
 17 inconsistent or something? And not since you make the
 18 rules, I mean, but you're thinking about enforcing it.
 19 And it seems something's, you know, lopsided there. O-6
 20 to O-3, okay; O-3 to E-9, no good. O-1 to E-9...
 21 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Life in the military is
 22 a dynamic process. We're not static. We can transfer
 23 and — You know, an enlisted person who one day may not

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1 work for that officer, may at a later time end up working
 2 with that officer or —
 3 DR. MOSKOS: Well, so would the junior
 4 officer and senior officer who have the same likelihood.
 5 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: They could. But —
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Maybe more so.
 7 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: I think there's a
 8 judgment involved that we want to keep the
 9 officer/enlisted separation as distinct and as clear as
 10 we can, and that that's — as far as I would think would
 11 be the reason for the rule.
 12 COLONEL COMPOSTO: I think a great deal of
 13 it depends on the service cultures, and these are part of
 14 customs of the service. Within the Marine Corps, for
 15 example, the examples that you give, I could probably go
 16 to any Marine anywhere and they would tell you clearly
 17 it's wrong. They probably couldn't tell you why, but in
 18 their guts they know it's wrong.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: This is the O-6 to the O-3,
 20 you mean.
 21 COLONEL COMPOSTO: Even in the O-6 to the
 22 O-3. There are a great deal of Marines who would tell
 23 you that's wrong. There are others who would say it

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1 depends on the situation. I think you'd have a hard time
 2 finding a Marine who would find any situation that an
 3 officer could be in a relationship with an enlisted
 4 person.
 5 And again, they wouldn't be able to say
 6 why, but — And with that service culture that grows up,
 7 if you have that perception within the members of the
 8 service and if you see violations of what you know to be
 9 the customs and traditions of your service, that
 10 undermines the authority of the individuals involved.
 11 And once you undermine an individual person's authority,
 12 I mean, that certainly undercuts his or her
 13 effectiveness.
 14 But it also affects the entire service,
 15 because any subordinate who sees transgressions and he
 16 sees that they're not being redressed and he knows that
 17 they are transgressions, then that begins to question —
 18 he begins to question all of the superior's willingness
 19 to enforce the rules.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: But it still doesn't — you
 21 know, I don't want to belabor it, but an O-6 to O-3
 22 doesn't raise the same hackles as an O-3 to an E-9 does.
 23 Okay. Let's leave that aside.

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1 COLONEL WHITE: What Colonel Composto had
 2 to say, though, about service — the service feels or
 3 what you do in your tradition, just an anecdotal case.
 4 The last division I was assigned to, there was a
 5 battalion command sergeant major who was married to a
 6 captain company commander O-3. He was a tremendous
 7 sergeant major; she was a tremendous company commander.
 8 There was no chain of command difficulty. They got along
 9 quite well and there was not a point that ever came up.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Well, my question — I
 11 don't know, Barbara, if you weren't going to ask it. We
 12 read in this week's Navy Times — and I want to ask this
 13 to the group generically.
 14 What are the rules on same-rank sex?
 15 MS. POPE: Consensual relationship.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Consensually.
 17 COLONEL WHITE: What are the other
 18 circumstances?
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Consensual.
 20 COLONEL WHITE: Well —
 21 MS. POPE: No, no, no. He's saying
 22 circumstances. That was my argument, that there are
 23 circumstances —

1 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. That's what we want to
 2 know. We read, maybe erroneously, because that was
 3 always my understanding, that the Navy — Thou shalt not
 4 have sex on ships, I thought was the rule. But the Navy
 5 Times today had a piece which could be interpreted as
 6 saying it's okay, consensual sex among equals.
 7 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Some ship commanding
 8 officers have issued their own command regulations saying
 9 that all sexual conduct is prohibited on board the ship.
 10 Other commanding officers have not.
 11 MS. POPE: Now —
 12 DR. MOSKOS: So it's not a Navy — Go
 13 ahead.
 14 MS. POPE: Yeah.
 15 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: That's not a Navy —
 16 MS. POPE: Yes.
 17 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: That's not a — That
 18 rule about sexual conduct on board ship is not a Navy-
 19 wide rule —
 20 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 21 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: — to my knowledge.
 22 MS. POPE: So there is not a Navy policy
 23 that says on board ship or — if it's not a ship, but any

1 — in any deployment status?
 2 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 3 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: We have left that up to
 4 the commanding officers on how they want to enforce that,
 5 to the best of my knowledge.
 6 MS. POPE: How about the other services?
 7 DR. MOSKOS: And we don't — Say
 8 deployment.
 9 MS. POPE: Yeah, deployment.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: On the airplane, whatever.
 11 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: But there's case law, if
 12 I could finish —
 13 MS. POPE: There's no...
 14 DR. MOSKOS: Yes.
 15 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: There's case law that
 16 says that consensual sexual relations in private between
 17 two unmarried persons —
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 19 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: — is not a crime under
 20 the UCMJ.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Unless it's officer-enlisted.
 22 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Then you have
 23 fraternization.

1 DR. MOSKOS: Oh, okay.
 2 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: But say you have to E-
 3 3's.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Yeah, that's what
 5 we're talking about. Yeah.
 6 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: That is not an offense
 7 under the UCMJ —
 8 DR. MOSKOS: All right.
 9 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: — in the absence of
 10 aggravating circumstances.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: No aggravating circumstances.
 12 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: It's not a crime under
 13 the UCMJ. The Court of Military Appeals has held that
 14 time and time again.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: What about the other
 16 services? On deployment, say.
 17 COLONEL MADSEN: The commander of the
 18 deployment would determine the limitations on behavior.
 19 For instance, Desert Storm, Bosnia —
 20 DR. MOSKOS: Yes.
 21 COLONEL MADSEN: The issuance of General
 22 Order No. 1 required that all forces who are deployed
 23 abstain from alcohol.

1 DR. MOSKOS: Yes.
 2 COLONEL MADSEN: And there are certain
 3 factors as you deploy to certain regions of the world,
 4 cultural and otherwise, that would require a commander to
 5 issue certain orders. This became —
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Is there a General Order No.
 7 2?
 8 COLONEL MADSEN: General Order — General
 9 Order No. 1 is the one —
 10 DR. MOSKOS: Thou shalt not have sex in
 11 Somalia or Bosnia or what have you.
 12 COLONEL MADSEN: With regard to sex?
 13 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. Consensual same-rank
 14 sex.
 15 COLONEL MADSEN: I am not aware of any
 16 such orders being issued.
 17 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: But that would
 18 be left to the discretion of the operational commander.
 19 COLONEL MADSEN: And its impact upon —
 20 the potential impact upon the unit.
 21 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Right.
 22 COLONEL MADSEN: And upon the mission.
 23 You have to look at the mission, the total circumstances,

1 the sort of lodging facilities that are available, the
 2 work environment, all of those factors. The commander
 3 would have to make those judgments and that's what we pay
 4 the commander to do.
 5 MS. POPE: But I'm confused, I guess. If
 6 you — A deployment, any of the services — Let me let
 7 you speak up for the Army first before I ask my question
 8 as far as Army...
 9 COLONEL WHITE: We have taken a look at
 10 this issue a couple of times. It depends again on the
 11 circumstances. If you're talking about prohibiting
 12 recreational sex, I suppose there's a good argument that
 13 the commander need only establish a rational basis.
 14 If the commander is, in effect, attempting
 15 to get to something else — for instance, if there's an
 16 attempt to interfere with procreative rights — you may
 17 then enter into some form of strict scrutiny — maybe not
 18 true strict scrutiny, but intermediate level scrutiny —
 19 that would require the commander to demonstrate some
 20 interest more than a mere rational basis.
 21 For those reasons, I think you really need
 22 to have the whole picture before you can say yes, we
 23 could give such an order, or no, we couldn't. It's so

1 fact —
 2 MS. POPE: But —
 3 DR. MOSKOS: I mean, Bosnia's a real case.
 4 MS. POPE: Right.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: What do we do? It's a real
 6 case.
 7 COLONEL WHITE: Yes, sir.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Or Somalia.
 9 COLONEL WHITE: On the other hand,
 10 everyone in Bosnia is not situated the same as everyone
 11 else. When you attempt to make a theater-wide order,
 12 you've got to have some —
 13 DR. MOSKOS: It's pretty much the same.
 14 COLONEL WHITE: — some pretty specific
 15 ideas in mind.
 16 MS. POPE: But say you've got, for any of
 17 the services — you've got a unit deployed and you have
 18 two consenting adults, same rank, and you've got a morale
 19 issue because you've got two consenting adults who can
 20 have sex and you've got everybody else in the
 21 organization unit who can't. What does the commanding
 22 officer do?
 23 DR. MOSKOS: He looks the other way.

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1 COLONEL WHITE: That's what we pay
 2 commanders for. He's got to make a very difficult
 3 decision that may lead him to consider any number of
 4 alternatives, one of which I suppose could be an order
 5 that would limit sexual activity of the soldiers under
 6 his command.
 7 MS. POPE: Has that happened and been
 8 tested?
 9 COLONEL WHITE: Not that I'm aware of.
 10 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: The 25th
 11 Infantry Division deployed to Haiti and General George
 12 Fisher issued a special order that there would be no
 13 sexual activity, period, on the island of Haiti.
 14 MS. POPE: Okay.
 15 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: He had dual
 16 couples deploying together and he knew it, in addition to
 17 the local populous and the opportunity for disease.
 18 MS. POPE: Right.
 19 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And so he
 20 published the order, and you'd have to ask him what he
 21 felt, you know, the end result was —
 22 MS. POPE: Right.
 23 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: — and whether

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1 circumstances, I believe there's a valid — it would be a
 2 valid basis for making such an order.
 3 DR. MOSKOS: If memory holds right, I
 4 don't think the Gulf War had any such reg because there
 5 was sexual activity in the Gulf War and I don't remember
 6 them thinking there was a reg against it, but I don't
 7 know.
 8 I was just shifting the grounds — and you
 9 may want to come back to that, but on the false — Some
 10 of my recent stuff, both in basic training camps and in
 11 Bosnia, that a lot of people, women especially, were
 12 worried about false sexual — false accusations of sexual
 13 harassment, which you've alluded to.
 14 Do you know, has any — The regs say that
 15 you can't make false accusations. Gossip has it that no
 16 woman has been punished for making a false accusation.
 17 Do you have any data on this question? Has any woman
 18 been punished for a false accusation?
 19 COLONEL WHITE: For a false accusation of?
 20 DR. MOSKOS: Of sexual harassment.
 21 COLONEL WHITE: Of sexual harassment?
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Right. There's gossip that
 23 says that this doesn't happen —

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1 or not he eliminated it. But he did publish the order
 2 because he thought it was in the best interests of
 3 everybody.
 4 MS. POPE: So there is some historical
 5 data that...
 6 DR. MOSKOS: My other question — Oh, go
 7 ahead.
 8 MS. POPE: Has any other service —
 9 DR. MOSKOS: Oh, yeah.
 10 MS. POPE: I mean, has it been tested? Do
 11 you know about it? Have commanders —
 12 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: I'm not aware of it
 13 being tested.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: The ship news is news. I was
 15 surprised to hear that.
 16 MS. POPE: Yeah, I am too.
 17 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: There's no — Now,
 18 individual CO's can restrict it.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Right.
 20 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: The battle group
 21 commander can restrict it.
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Right.
 23 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: We can issue orders to

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1 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: I'm not aware of a —
 2 DR. MOSKOS: — even though you said it is
 3 on the books.
 4 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: It's on the books that
 5 that is —
 6 DR. MOSKOS: And that it never is
 7 enforced.
 8 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: — a violation of the
 9 regulation, but I am not familiar with any prosecutions
 10 of it.
 11 COLONEL COMPOSTO: I'm not familiar with
 12 any either as well. I mean, I would just think offhand
 13 it would be very difficult to prove if the woman had any
 14 basis whatsoever. Any contact between the two
 15 individuals, she could articulate some basis for feeling
 16 harassed, regardless of whether — whoever was the
 17 judging body, whatever they determined, it would be hard
 18 to say that it was a false and capricious allegation.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: So it's almost, then, an
 20 unenforceable reg, then.
 21 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: I don't know that —
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Because it is part of the
 23 UCMJ or the Manual, or what?

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1 restrict it, but there's no Navy-wide blanket
 2 prohibition.
 3 MS. POPE: Has there ever been?
 4 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Not that I'm aware of.
 5 There's a prohibition, for example, against alcohol in
 6 U.S. Navy Regulations aboard ships. But as far as I
 7 know, there's no similar provision to engaging in sexual
 8 relations.
 9 COLONEL COMPOSTO: The same is true in the
 10 Marine Corps. I'm not aware of any service-wide
 11 regulation nor have I ever known one to exist. It is
 12 really up to the commander. The commander makes the
 13 decision, and if in his judgment it would affect the
 14 effectiveness, morale, cohesion of the unit, then he has
 15 a lawful basis for prohibiting consensual sex.
 16 MS. POPE: But you don't know that a
 17 commander has done that in the Marine Corps.
 18 COLONEL COMPOSTO: I don't know
 19 specifically the case personally, but I would not be
 20 surprised to find out that it's occurred.
 21 COLONEL MADSEN: I'm not aware of any
 22 situation in the Air Force where that's been ordered by a
 23 commander, but again, under the appropriate

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1 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: No, sir. It's —
 2 DR. MOSKOS: False accusations.
 3 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: It's part of a Navy
 4 regulation — U.S. Navy regulation that prohibits sexual
 5 harassment, and also prohibits making false —
 6 DR. MOSKOS: False accusations, right.
 7 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: — accusations of sexual
 8 harassment.
 9 COLONEL COMPOSTO: I don't know that it's
 10 unenforceable. What I'm saying is that it would be
 11 difficult to enforce. I mean, there may be some
 12 circumstances — For example, the person making the
 13 allegation may have in fact told someone that that's
 14 exactly what they intended to do, or the person may
 15 retract the allegation and confess to having made a false
 16 allegation.
 17 I mean, so it's possible. But I could see
 18 in many cases it would be difficult to prove.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Thank you. I
 20 appreciate that.
 21 Barbara.
 22 MS. POPE: I forgot my question now.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: It'll come back.

1 MS. POPE: It'll come back, yeah.
 2 COLONEL COMPOSTO: If I could just add one
 3 thing to that, the one time that I've seen those kind of
 4 allegations made by individuals saying that so-and-so
 5 "made a false allegation of sexual harassment, nothing
 6 happened to her," usually what happened in that
 7 particular case was the woman made the allegation; a
 8 commander or a court — someone sat down and looked at
 9 all the facts and circumstances and decided there was not
 10 enough evidence to hold the accused guilty, and then
 11 other people turned around and say, "Well, she should
 12 have now been punished."
 13 Well, that's not the case.
 14 MS. POPE: That's different than...
 15 COLONEL COMPOSTO: She shouldn't be
 16 punished just because she couldn't — the case wasn't
 17 proved against the person she accused.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: So how do you make a false
 19 accusation case if that isn't clear — That would be a
 20 false accusation.
 21 COLONEL COMPOSTO: It may have —
 22 MS. POPE: But there's a difference —
 23 there's a difference between a false accusation and a

1 And, Colonel, I think you made the comment
 2 that being fair judicial is important for morale, and I
 3 agree. And so how do you find out about, discover, does
 4 it reach your level — that there is a commanding officer
 5 out there who's made some arbitrary, capricious decision
 6 that has let someone off, you know, that should have been
 7 punished?
 8 I mean, I'm comfortable with the data that
 9 you have and what you see and that part of the system
 10 being fair, and it may be a half a percent, 1 percent,
 11 but I also know that sometimes those trickle up and you
 12 do find out about them.
 13 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: We get letters at the
 14 Bureau of Naval Personnel all the time. For example,
 15 there was a case recently where a female officer posed
 16 for Playboy Magazine and was given a —
 17 MS. POPE: That seems to happen among the
 18 services about —
 19 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: And she was given non-
 20 punitive counseling. Shortly thereafter, a male officer,
 21 while he was doing his physical fitness test, indecently
 22 exposed himself as part of a prank and he received
 23 nonjudicial punishment and a formal letter of reprimand

1 lack of proof —
 2 DR. MOSKOS: He has to be found guilty and
 3 then found not guilty?
 4 MS. POPE: No, no, no.
 5 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: I think if she
 6 reasonably believed —
 7 MS. POPE: It's unsubstantiated.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 9 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: If she reasonably
 10 believed in her mind under the circumstances —
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 12 MS. POPE: Right.
 13 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: — that it was a valid
 14 complaint, she would not be able to be prosecuted for
 15 making that complaint. But as Colonel Composto said, if
 16 she comes in and says, "Well, I just made a false
 17 complaint because I wanted to get back at him," and she
 18 admits that —
 19 MS. POPE: Right. Or if she told
 20 somebody, or he told somebody.
 21 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: — then that's the kind
 22 of case where I think you would see action taken.
 23 MS. POPE: There's a difference between

1 in his record. And we received a lot of mail —
 2 MS. POPE: Right.
 3 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: — from people who felt
 4 that the male was unfairly being held accountable and the
 5 female wasn't. It was the same commanding officer down
 6 there in Florida.
 7 And that's how we hear about it, is a lot
 8 of times people will write to the Secretary of the Navy
 9 or —
 10 MS. POPE: Right.
 11 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: — the Chief of Naval
 12 Operations and those letters will be referred to the
 13 Bureau of Naval Personnel to answer, and we answer them
 14 with the answer that it's the commander's discretion,
 15 based on all the circumstances. We don't know all the
 16 facts that the commander on the scene might have and we
 17 have vested substantial discretion in that person to make
 18 those decisions and he made them.
 19 MS. POPE: But it gives credence to
 20 Charlie's point earlier — now I'm not sure which panel
 21 and which question — about the perception that women
 22 sometimes get off easier than their male counterparts.
 23 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: That was the complaint

1 false accusation and unsubstantiated claim of sexual
 2 harassment.
 3 DR. MOSKOS: Well, I mean, women are
 4 reporting this as an issue — that other women are using
 5 false accusations — and it seems to me that the legal
 6 system is not geared up to cope with this kind of
 7 phenomenon.
 8 COLONEL COMPOSTO: Well, the legal system
 9 also has to be careful. There are regulations, for
 10 example, within the IG regulations that you shall not
 11 take any kind of retribution against an individual —
 12 DR. MOSKOS: Right.
 13 COLONEL COMPOSTO: — who has brought an
 14 allegation of sexual harassment or any sort of sexual —
 15 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Reprisal, they call it.
 16 COLONEL COMPOSTO: Reprisal, exactly.
 17 MS. POPE: I do remember my question. I'm
 18 kind of getting over the shock of yours, Charlie.
 19 I understand the regs and where all you
 20 are on the cases that you see. What is your confidence
 21 level on — And I'm not saying that commanders shouldn't
 22 have the authority to dismiss certain cases. You know,
 23 it's an important authority for local commanders to have.

1 in that particular case.
 2 MS. POPE: Right.
 3 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Yes. And a lot of —
 4 Well, a number of people were upset by that disposition.
 5 MS. POPE: How about the rest of the
 6 services?
 7 COLONEL COMPOSTO: Pretty much the same.
 8 We have the same experiences. We will find out about
 9 those sort of cases usually because someone writes a
 10 letter or makes a phone call or reports it to a superior
 11 command.
 12 In the case of officers, we have some
 13 oversight. I mean, we actually have visibility of
 14 officer cases. Within the Marine Corps, we have a
 15 regulation that when an officer is alleged to have
 16 committed some offense, that that allegation has to be
 17 reported to Headquarters, Marine Corps, and we keep track
 18 of the investigatory process as it winds its way through.
 19 And then if it gets into a disciplinary or an
 20 administrative process, we keep track of that as well.
 21 The Commandant has no authority, for
 22 example, to force a commander or to try to influence him,
 23 but the sense that someone is watching and they're

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1 reporting their moves I think causes commanders, at least
 2 in the case of officers, to be certain of their grounds
 3 when they make decisions. Whether it's to discipline or
 4 to simply eliminate the case completely, they've looked
 5 at it thoroughly and carefully.
 6 So to that extent, we have some oversight.
 7 At lower levels, in the enlisted ranks, we
 8 do not have the same reporting procedure, but I've seen
 9 letters and phone calls.
 10 MS. POPE: In the case, Captain, that you
 11 mentioned, that individual's — that commanding officer's
 12 superior could have decided to review both cases.
 13 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: Yes, ma'am. He could.
 14 MS. POPE: Okay.
 15 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: But one of the factors
 16 that the public didn't know about is that that woman
 17 officer who was not punished but was counseled, had had a
 18 resignation approved and was about to get out of the Navy
 19 within a few days, and that was a factor that people
 20 didn't know about that played in the final equation.
 21 MS. POPE: Okay.
 22 COLONEL MADSEN: Let me get to the
 23 installation level in the Air Force where the action

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1 of potential offenses; not only military justice, but
 2 administrative law and other types of offenses that a
 3 commander has to confront.
 4 COLONEL WHITE: Yes, ma'am. We have judge
 5 advocates at ground level. Our judge advocates are
 6 assigned as captains at brigade level. At battalion
 7 level, the next level below that, we have legal
 8 specialists, who, although they are not lawyers, are very
 9 trained and dedicated folks to handle the legal issues
 10 and report to the judge advocates.
 11 This network creates a system in which the
 12 staff judge advocate is permitted all the information he
 13 can possibly get and can bring to a senior commander's
 14 attention that, you know, "Maybe you ought to re-look
 15 this case that was handled and let go a particular way by
 16 a subordinate commander."
 17 That frequently keeps that information
 18 flowing so that the senior commanders have the
 19 opportunity to review, as necessary, the actions of
 20 junior commanders, although, by and large, the need for
 21 review is exceedingly rare.
 22 MS. POPE: No, I know what we're talking
 23 about is on the fringe, but I just was curious of what at

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1 really occurs.
 2 MS. POPE: Right.
 3 COLONEL MADSEN: At the installation
 4 level, it's normally the practice that the wing commander
 5 or the installation commander will hold a meeting every
 6 month where disciplinary actions and other actions are
 7 reviewed to see that there is general consistency.
 8 However, they assiduously avoid unlawful —
 9 MS. POPE: Right.
 10 COLONEL MADSEN: — command influence and
 11 the prerogative of the commander to make an appropriate
 12 call, but this enables all of the commanders and first
 13 sergeants who sit in those meetings to see what is going
 14 on.
 15 MS. POPE: What's going on, yeah.
 16 COLONEL MADSEN: What level of conduct or
 17 misconduct merits nonjudicial punishment. What level is
 18 going to administrative discharge or what level of
 19 misconduct goes to a court-martial.
 20 So at the installation level, these
 21 meetings are held regularly and they're very valuable in
 22 giving commanders an idea of what's going on, what's the
 23 appropriate range of punishment for a certain offense.

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1 least your confidence level was.
 2 COLONEL WHITE: Yes, ma'am.
 3 MS. POPE: Thank you.
 4 COLONEL MADSEN: Of course — May I just
 5 add that there are other recourses available to
 6 individuals that feel that they were wronged.
 7 MS. POPE: Oh, sure. No, I — Yeah.
 8 COLONEL MADSEN: There's Article 138 of
 9 the UCMJ.
 10 MS. POPE: Right.
 11 COLONEL MADSEN: If they feel they've been
 12 wronged by a commander, there's — the Uniform Code of
 13 Military Justice allows them to —
 14 MS. POPE: Not so much that they've been
 15 wronged, but, you know, the perception in the command
 16 that somebody got away with something. And oftentimes
 17 it's a matter of communication, you don't know the whole
 18 story, but that it's disparate treatment with two, you
 19 know, equal behaviors.
 20 Thanks.
 21 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I have two
 22 questions. One is each of you very clearly stated what I
 23 understood very positive views of the existing policies

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1 But, again, as was mentioned earlier,
 2 there is no precise formula on this conduct merits this
 3 particular type of disposition. You have to look back to
 4 the factors, and I truly believe that commanders do
 5 carefully evaluate all of those factors in reaching a
 6 decision and staff judge advocates are there to assist
 7 them in trying to do their best to reach those decisions.
 8 But I think at installation level where
 9 these instances occur, that there's a great leveling
 10 influence in these types of meetings that are held and
 11 they are routinely done.
 12 And, of course, commanders also receive —
 13 and all military members, enlisted and officer, have
 14 professional military education in the Air Force where
 15 they are trained in military justice, and they also have
 16 case studies that they look at and they gain experience
 17 this way, but — And also in the Air Force there's a
 18 publication for commanders called The Military Commander
 19 And The Law.
 20 It's a very thick publication. It's a
 21 compilation of point papers on almost every imaginable
 22 subject that a commander might face across the spectrum,
 23 giving that commander a ready reference on a wide range

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1 and recent past policies of your each service as it
 2 pertained to the application of laws, regulations, et
 3 cetera, and it came out very positive.
 4 And if that is the case, then why was it
 5 necessary for the Secretary of Defense — why did the
 6 Defense Department think they needed a one-size-fits-all
 7 policy?
 8 And I know all about these joint
 9 operations going on, but I don't think there's data that
 10 suggests there were incredible problems with these joint
 11 operations to cause this. And even if there were, why
 12 wouldn't it be a joint policy while participating in a
 13 joint exercise and not fall back in?
 14 Because I wonder how you're going to apply
 15 this to the reservist, and in the case of the Army, the
 16 National Guard. I mean, it's an incredible problem from
 17 a reservist's perspective in many cases.
 18 So — I mean, if you don't want to offer
 19 your opinion — I realize this will be totally opinion.
 20 I have just seen in my time on this Commission there has
 21 been some reactions to things, policies that have fallen
 22 out of reaction; and not necessarily through a clear,
 23 logical approach to what really should be the decision,

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1 but rather people taking action just to say, "See, now we
 2 fixed that." And it maybe wasn't fixed, but it certainly
 3 was a check-the-block that said we did something.
 4 So if you don't want to comment, you don't
 5 have to comment, clearly.
 6 MR. PANG: Can I comment just, you know —
 7 and maybe this can lead into the answer.
 8 You know, one argument — okay? — that
 9 one could advance is — I mean, and I've heard this come
 10 out time and again — is any action or any activity that
 11 you engage in that is harmful to good order and
 12 discipline — right? — ought to be punished under, you
 13 know, one of the articles. I mean, or some sort of
 14 corrective action should be taken.
 15 Okay. If that's the case, you know, and
 16 you say that, then you leave to the judgment of the
 17 commander, you know, what is — what undermines good
 18 order and discipline. And if the commander — And, you
 19 know, we've all said that commanders are vested with huge
 20 responsibilities; they understand the cultures of their
 21 service; they know what's good and what's bad.
 22 Therefore, they would exercise their judgments
 23 accordingly, and they would do that anyway with the rules

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1 command in place to correct that. And not engaging in
 2 what was referred to as unlawful command influence by
 3 saying "you have to prosecute this," but superior
 4 commanders can take cases and prosecute them themselves.
 5 Or, on the other hand, if a commander is
 6 being too harsh, you know, he can be called in in front
 7 of his boss for a talking-to, and that has happened from
 8 time to time. But I think the key here is the
 9 commander's discretion. I can't emphasize that strongly
 10 enough.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, I have a question
 12 that may be a little more —
 13 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I had — Can I
 14 ask one more?
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Sure. Oh, sure.
 16 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. I'm sorry.
 18 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: The other
 19 question I was going to ask, we have heard from other
 20 people — some in testimony, some in just general
 21 conversation — that the application of laws and
 22 policies, when the law is broken by senior people — I
 23 mean, they've openly admitted that it's not necessarily

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1 that you have.
 2 So one could argue, you know, all the
 3 guidance you need is, hey, you know, any activity —
 4 okay? — with regard to cross-gender relationships that
 5 undermines good order and discipline you need to take
 6 action on. I mean, that was the Army's kind of — I'm
 7 over-generalizing but, you know, that's kind of what the
 8 Army said.
 9 The other services had specific
 10 prohibitions and you have to ask yourself, well, okay. I
 11 mean, some of them are very common-sense. You would say,
 12 yeah, that's right; I mean, that would undermine good
 13 order and discipline.
 14 So, you know, the question is do you need
 15 to be explicit about these examples? And if so, how much
 16 more explicit do you need to be? Or less explicit? I
 17 don't know. I mean, you know, OSD has made a judgment
 18 that it, as a body, needed to be explicit, and so it set
 19 a minimum standard, you know.
 20 So I'm just curious as to how you would
 21 respond to that kind of premise.
 22 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: I don't know if I can
 23 comment on the thought behind the Secretary of Defense's

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1 applied the same way.
 2 And in some of their own words, it is that
 3 when you're a senior officer — general officer level,
 4 for an example — the embarrassment that you get in the
 5 fact that you have to go home earlier than you wanted to
 6 and retire prematurely, that that's a pretty substantial
 7 punishment in itself, and I think anybody with experience
 8 would concur with that.
 9 But then down at soldier level, who sees
 10 what's going on and sees it applied different down at his
 11 or her level — this person's allowed to retire; this
 12 person is punished — their perception in fact is that —
 13 It's erroneously referred to as a double standard, but,
 14 in reality, they see it as an application — I mean, from
 15 a legal point of view, can you understand or do you have
 16 a comment on when things are done that way? Because
 17 clearly it happens. I mean, my —
 18 COLONEL COMPOSTO: The perception is
 19 always something that a commander always struggles with.
 20 As was mentioned earlier, any time that a commander makes
 21 a decision on discipline, regardless of who it is, he's
 22 wondering, "How is this going to be taken within the
 23 command? What are my Marines going to be thinking

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1 decision.
 2 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I understand.
 3 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: You know, it's way above
 4 me and I —
 5 DR. MOSKOS: Right.
 6 CAPTAIN DeCICCO: But as I said, I think
 7 the change that he made is a step in the right direction
 8 and it could make things a little clearer for people in
 9 joint commands, for example. So I think it was
 10 important. But, again, I think the individual
 11 commanders' discretion is the key to the functioning of
 12 our system.
 13 And as far as in the fraternization area,
 14 I think there are three things that the commander has got
 15 to make sure happen. One, training. He's got to make
 16 sure his people understand and know the rules. Two,
 17 leadership. He has to lead by example as officers have
 18 to lead by example. Three: when there are infractions,
 19 enforcement is the third. And if a commander does those
 20 three, I think the system will work and I think that's
 21 the way it's being done.
 22 If a commander, quote, gets out of the box
 23 and starts doing some crazy things, there's a chain of

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1 about?" And that's a fact that he looks at.
 2 I'm not certain that there's ever going to
 3 be a good solution for the problem that you discussed
 4 there because there are a great number of punishments
 5 that are very, very detrimental to a senior officer that
 6 a more junior person simply doesn't appreciate. That
 7 does not necessarily mean that the senior officer should
 8 receive a more severe punishment. It really is within
 9 that discretion of the commander.
 10 I know that within the Marine Corps, for
 11 example, that there is a great deal of emphasis placed on
 12 commanders to ensure that there is fairness within the
 13 disciplinary system, and so I've seen, quite frankly,
 14 senior individuals — You hear that expression of
 15 "different spansks for different ranks." Quite often you
 16 see the senior person coming away with a much greater
 17 punishment.
 18 For example, fraternization, as we talk
 19 about, or even adultery here. Quite frankly, if an
 20 enlisted man or woman were to commit fraternization
 21 and/or adultery, most often the punishment is going to be
 22 either counseling or nonjudicial punishment and back to
 23 duty. That may affect their ability to get promoted in

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1 the future. That might even affect their ability to be
 2 reenlisted at the time that their enlistment is over.
 3 But should an officer commit those same
 4 offenses, we're talking about the nonjudicial punishment;
 5 and should they decide not to resign, they're talking
 6 about a Board of Inquiry perhaps and maybe even a court-
 7 martial if they refuse the nonjudicial punishment. So
 8 the effect, if you will, of that kind of an offense, in
 9 those cases, the officers are getting punished to a
 10 greater degree than the enlisted person.

11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I'm returning actually to
 12 Bob's first question which I might put in a different
 13 manner to Colonel Madsen as the Chair of the Joint
 14 Services Committee on Military Justice.

15 You mentioned that your committee
 16 constantly reviews the UCMJ and looks for areas that can
 17 be improved, and you have a streamlined process for
 18 quickly inserting changes that your committee considers
 19 to be necessary.

20 I would like to know some examples of
 21 things that have emanated from your committee in the
 22 recent couple — last couple of years and whether — I
 23 would also like to know whether some of these changes

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1 And we're now reviewing the comments to
 2 the Secretary's policy, again at the Joint Service
 3 Committee level, and then we will make another
 4 recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on whether or
 5 not, based on the comments, the proposed policy ought to
 6 be changed.

7 But that's an example of things that are
 8 given to the Joint Service Committee to study. Another
 9 example — I think would be a very interesting one to
 10 this committee — is a change to military Rule of
 11 Evidence 513. Based on a Supreme Court decision of
 12 United States v. Jaffe, a privilege was created in civil
 13 lawsuits for psychotherapists and patients.

14 In the military, there is no recognized
 15 privilege between a doctor and a patient because of
 16 military necessity and the need for commanders to be
 17 aware of the state of their troops for military purposes.

18 But in the area of psychotherapist and
 19 patient, our committee has studied this subject very
 20 carefully and we are at the forefront in recommending —
 21 and it has now gone up through the chain — that a
 22 privilege be created where a psychotherapist — that
 23 could be a psychologist or psychiatrist or a licensed

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1 concerning adultery and fraternization had been
 2 considered by your committee recently and where you might
 3 put those in the scale of importance of the other kinds
 4 of subjects that you've been looking at.
 5 And anybody else I'd be glad to hear from,
 6 too.

7 COLONEL MADSEN: Well, you mentioned the
 8 adultery policy. Of course, when Secretary Cohen
 9 designated the commissions for studying various aspects
 10 of adultery, good order and discipline, and other aspects
 11 of our military life, the Joint Service Committee on
 12 Military Justice was tasked to come up — to study and
 13 come up with the proposed — a proposal on the policy.

14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: So that was not — did
 15 not originate from your committee but originated from the
 16 Secretary.

17 COLONEL MADSEN: That did not originate
 18 with our committee but that came from the Secretary of
 19 Defense, through the General Counsel. And we spent
 20 months reviewing, polling commanders in the field, staff
 21 judge advocates from all installation levels, receiving
 22 advice from them concerning their views.

23 Our guidance was to look at clarifying the

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1 social worker — can receive confidential communications
 2 from a victim or a witness or anyone with respect to
 3 problems they are experiencing.

4 We are particularly concerned about the
 5 effect — the potential for suicide that comes when
 6 people view seeking such help as a stigma on their —
 7 potentially on their careers if it's known that they're
 8 going to mental health to seek help for their problems.
 9 Recognizing that, there was a concern that

10 we ought to look at creating such a privilege so that we
 11 can help people who are very concerned and who need help
 12 with their mental state, and so we have proposed the
 13 psychotherapist-patient privilege, which does not yet
 14 exist in federal criminal law in criminal cases.

15 But this is one of the changes that we
 16 have proposed and it's gone through the DoD process and
 17 is now working its way up through the Department of
 18 Justice, and then the Office of Management Budget also
 19 has an opportunity to coordinate on that. And then it
 20 will go to the President for signature, assuming that
 21 they respond favorably to this, to create a new Executive
 22 Order which will change military Rule of Evidence 513 and
 23 create this privilege.

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1 policy on — on whether or not the policy on adultery
 2 should be clarified. That was our task, and so we
 3 devoted months to that effort.
 4 And we provided the report then to a
 5 Senior Review Panel, which consisted of senior military
 6 attorneys in the departments and also senior civilian
 7 attorneys, and they reviewed our work and made their own
 8 recommendations.

9 And then that report was submitted to the
 10 Department of Defense General Counsel and ultimately to
 11 the Secretary, who became personally involved and became
 12 — actually assisted in drafting the policy to his
 13 satisfaction. But it was a product of all of the
 14 services and unanimity was reached by all of the services
 15 in the product, in the recommended policy.

16 That's an example and that will require a
 17 change eventually. It's still undergoing review. It was
 18 published in the Federal Register so that the public
 19 would have an opportunity to comment on the proposed
 20 policy. That public meeting was held on the 1st of
 21 October and there were five organizations that were
 22 represented and who made comment. At that time, others
 23 submitted individual comments.

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1 That's merely one example. But we look —
 2 we have been also tasked by the National Defense
 3 Authorization Act to look at the way court-martial
 4 members are selected for serving by the convening
 5 authority and to consider the alternative of random
 6 selection of court-martial members.
 7 So that has been mandated by the National
 8 Defense Authorization Act. So sometimes we get
 9 promptings from Congress that they are concerned about
 10 certain areas, and so naturally we respond and we examine
 11 those areas.

12 But our process is open to anyone. Any
 13 member of the public can recommend to our committee a
 14 change in the Uniform Code of Military Justice or the
 15 Manual for Courts-Martial, and we receive comment from
 16 general members of the public and we acknowledge all of
 17 them and we evaluate all of the comments that we receive
 18 to see if we might improve our system.

19 This is a constant responsibility we have,
 20 but we think a very important one, to make it as modern
 21 and as flexible and as efficient as it can possibly be.
 22 And when I say that it's done quickly, that's, of course,
 23 relative —

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1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yes.
 2 COLONEL MADSEN: — in terms of how
 3 changes are made in society, so to speak, or in the
 4 civilian world. But from start to finish, we can see a
 5 manual change be made sometimes in a year, and that's
 6 rather rapid. A change also to the Uniform Code of
 7 Military Justice, we would make a similar proposal to
 8 Congress.
 9 The impact on random selection may be one
 10 that would require a change to the Uniform Code of
 11 Military Justice but our committee is empowered to do
 12 that, and we have service representatives from all of the
 13 services, including the Coast Guard, and we have a
 14 working group that spends a great deal of time preparing
 15 proposals for virtually who you see at this table or
 16 similar counterparts from the services, who then are the
 17 voting members for effecting changes and recommendations.
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I would imagine you've
 19 spent quite a lot of time on the regulations that we're
 20 talking about today in this Commission, but could you
 21 give me an idea of the proportion of projects that you
 22 receive basically as a result of being tasked by Congress
 23 or tasked by the Secretary versus tasks that you take on

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1 be very helpful.
 2 And so we determined to go ahead and to
 3 take existing case law and other known factors and
 4 compile it in one central location in the Manual for
 5 Courts-Martial, paragraph 62 in Article 134, dealing with
 6 adultery.
 7 The guidance was very scanty. There
 8 wasn't much guidance in there and so we added factors.
 9 But all of these factors came from existing case law, so
 10 we did not change the law but rather provided a
 11 convenient educational source.
 12 MR. PANG: Because your charge — my
 13 understanding is that your charge was relatively narrow.
 14 COLONEL MADSEN: Yes.
 15 MR. PANG: And that was, you weren't going
 16 to effect any change to it —
 17 COLONEL MADSEN: No.
 18 MR. PANG: — but you were going to —
 19 COLONEL MADSEN: We were not asked to —
 20 for instance, to eliminate — to consider eliminating
 21 adultery as an offense.
 22 MR. PANG: Right.
 23 COLONEL MADSEN: That was not part of our

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1 as a result of simply getting a good idea of something
 2 that is worth doing?
 3 COLONEL MADSEN: In my experience of being
 4 a working group member for two years as a major back in
 5 the eighties and now being a member of the voting
 6 committee and the Chair, I would say that we have more
 7 initiatives that come from within than are directed from
 8 oversight from Congress.
 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Thank you.
 10 MR. PANG: And I was just going to follow-
 11 up the Chair's, you know, line of questioning. You are
 12 tasked by the General Counsel of the Defense Department;
 13 is that correct?
 14 COLONEL MADSEN: By the Secretary of
 15 Defense.
 16 MR. PANG: By the Secretary of Defense.
 17 COLONEL MADSEN: Yes.
 18 MR. PANG: And then the reporting chain
 19 back up to him was what? To a senior panel and then —
 20 COLONEL MADSEN: The reporting chain was
 21 to the Senior Review Panel, consisting of basically the
 22 deputy judge advocates general of the service and number
 23 one or number — number two and number three in the

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1 charter. Our charter was to determine whether or not
 2 clarifying guidance was needed by commanders, and that's
 3 what our committee did.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: I was just going to make a
 5 comment from a conservative news letter, but it argued
 6 that the General Counsel, prior to the promulgation of
 7 the new regs, had consulted with the American Civil
 8 Liberties Union, the National Organization for Women, the
 9 Serviceman's Legal Defense Network, but not with any
 10 service organization or any veterans organization.
 11 And the indication being that only one
 12 side was brought in to sort of give feed on this as the
 13 process was starting and, yet, the more established
 14 organizations like the veterans organizations and the
 15 service associations were not consulted.
 16 COLONEL MADSEN: Well, the General Counsel
 17 made a decision to invite a wide range of organizations
 18 to comment, such as the American Bar Association and
 19 other groups. Admittedly, not every organization was
 20 consulted at the inception stage. However, as the
 21 process developed, every organization and, through the
 22 Federal Register notice, the entire American public was
 23 invited to comment on the policy.

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1 Office of the General Counsels of the various services.
 2 They compose the Senior Review Panel. And then they
 3 reported to the General Counsel, who then submitted the
 4 report to the Secretary of Defense.
 5 But, also, there was service coordination
 6 among — on the adultery policy.
 7 MR. PANG: But this was a very
 8 deliberative process. I mean, I can't —
 9 COLONEL MADSEN: Absolutely.
 10 MR. PANG: — imagine that you — you
 11 know, you came up with a recommendation and that that was
 12 the recommendation at the time it got to the Secretary.
 13 COLONEL MADSEN: Well, no. Our committee
 14 spent months on this project —
 15 MR. PANG: I see.
 16 COLONEL MADSEN: — a considerable amount
 17 of time, because we had to go out to the field and pulse
 18 commanders and lawyers on the issue of whether or not the
 19 guidance needed to be clarified.
 20 Most commanders believed that the guidance
 21 was adequate for them. However, there were many, in
 22 light of circumstances and media and other high-
 23 visibility cases, who felt that additional guidance would

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1 And all of these organizations, the ones
 2 you mentioned there, were given the full and free
 3 opportunity to come and they did, and they presented
 4 their views and their views were considered —
 5 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. But you met before the
 6 DoD —
 7 COLONEL MADSEN: That's right. Not every
 8 —
 9 DR. MOSKOS: (Unintelligible) but after
 10 the proposal was published.
 11 COLONEL MADSEN: That's correct. But the
 12 —
 13 DR. MOSKOS: Not passed, but published.
 14 COLONEL MADSEN: But the policy is not
 15 complete yet. It's still ongoing review.
 16 And this is one way of — The Federal
 17 Register notice is the way we have of extending that as
 18 widely as possible. In the future, it may well be that,
 19 knowing the interest level — Based on past experience,
 20 there are certain organizations that have expressed
 21 interest in military justice issues and other
 22 organizations that have not. And based on that, members
 23 of the general public and certain organizations were

1 asked to inquire.
 2 And these often have historically been
 3 organizations who have been interested in military
 4 justice issues, but in the future that could well change.
 5 If a similar issue were to come, the General Counsel
 6 might well invite veterans organizations, this particular
 7 organization, knowing now that they have an interest in
 8 military justice matters.
 9 But again, the Federal Register notice is
 10 the key —
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Well, these were consulted
 12 before the federal registration notice was published.
 13 COLONEL MADSEN: Yes, that's correct.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: I mean, they're in a
 15 different category.
 16 COLONEL MADSEN: Yes, that's correct.
 17 MR. PANG: You know, just to follow-up on
 18 Charlie's question, you didn't consult with them. The
 19 General Counsel consulted with them.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: Yes.
 21 MR. PANG: Or did you consult with —
 22 COLONEL MADSEN: The General Counsel
 23 invited comment from selected organizations as input to

1 MR. PANG: Thank you.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: Thanks a lot, folks.
 3 MS. POPE: Thank you. Thanks for the
 4 time.
 5 (Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the hearing in
 6 the above-entitled matter was concluded.)
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1 the review process. But again, that process is not
 2 complete.
 3 MR. PANG: But the input came to your
 4 panel.
 5 COLONEL MADSEN: To our panel.
 6 MR. PANG: I see.
 7 COLONEL MADSEN: And we considered their
 8 comments along with all of the comments of all field
 9 commanders, staff judge advocates, from all of the
 10 services. Literally hundreds of comments.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Just — Can I ask one last
 12 item?
 13 I don't know if there's a firm answer to
 14 this and I — When Trent Lott said "get real," you know,
 15 in the fallout on the Kelly Flinn case vis-a-vis adultery
 16 regs, do you think this had an impact on the eventual
 17 outcome of what's happening with the adultery
 18 regulations?
 19 COLONEL MADSEN: Well, Article 88 of the
 20 Uniform Code of Military Justice indicates that we really
 21 should not comment on the opinion of members of Congress,
 22 the President, and Secretary of Defense and other
 23 officials. So I really feel it would be inappropriate

1 for me to comment.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: Sure.
 3 MR. PANG: You know, no longer being in
 4 that position —
 5 DR. MOSKOS: Position, yeah.
 6 MR. PANG: — I think I can comment. I
 7 think it probably did not have an effect on the Defense
 8 Department, because if it did, then it would have gone
 9 back and looked at — on whether or not you needed the
 10 adultery provision at all.
 11 I mean, you know, "get real" means, "Hey,
 12 look at society." Then you would say, "Well, maybe we
 13 ought to evaluate whether or not we even need this rather
 14 than just seek clarification of it."
 15 That was my take on it personally.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Good.
 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Bob?
 18 Well, I think we're all asked out, so...
 19 Thank you very much. This has been a very
 20 informative session and we appreciate your taking the
 21 time. And I think you'll make your plane.
 22 All right. We're off the record, then.
 23 Thank you.

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CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES

Wednesday; November 18, 1998

1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 940

Arlington, Virginia

NOV. 18, 1998

1 Those present:
 2 Anita K. Blair, Esquire - Chairman
 3 The Honorable Frederick F.Y. Pang - Vice Chairman
 4 CSM Robert A. Dare, Jr., USA(Ret) - Commissioner
 5 LtGen William M. Keys, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner
 6 Charles Moskos, Ph.D. - Commissioner
 7 The Honorable Barbara Spyridon Pope - Commissioner
 8 The Honorable Mady Wechsler Segal - Commissioner
 9 ---
 10 Stephen C. Fogleman, Esquire - Executive Director
 11 Susan L. Fry - Executive Assistant
 12 Hank Hodge - Staff Liaison
 13 James Renne, Esquire - Staff Counsel and Secretary
 14 Kathleen M. Wright, Ph.D. - Research Director
 15 Janice Laurence, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 16 Charles Johnson, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 17 Kristina Handy, Research Staff
 18 Sunny Sites, Research Staff
 19 Capt J.S. Snyder, USN - Service Representative
 20 LtCol Mary Street, USAF - Service Representative
 21 LTC Brenda L. Harris, USA - Service Representative
 22 Maj R. Scott LaShier, USMC - Service Representative
 23 ---

1 Also present:
 2 OSD Consolidated Services' Responses to
 Kassebaum Baker Recommendations
 3 On behalf of OSD:
 4 CAPT Martha E. McWatters, USN, Director, OEPM
 5 LT Chris Riley (OSD intern)
 6 On behalf of the United States Army:
 7 LTG William J. Bolt, USA, TRADOC, Deputy Commanding
 8 General, Initial Entry Training
 9 BG Clayton E. Melton, Director of Human Resources, Office
 of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters,
 10 Department of the Army
 11 LTC Monica M. Gorzelnik, Human Resources Directorate,
 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
 12 Headquarters, Department of the Army
 13 LTC Bruce W. Batten, Program Division, Office of the
 Chief for Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of
 14 the Army
 15 LTC Gayla Carle (OCLL)
 MAJ John Snyder, USA
 16 On behalf of the United States Marine Corps:
 17 BGen T.S. Jones, Director, Training and Education
 18 Division, MCCDC
 19 LtCol Leon M. Pappa, Deputy Branch Head, Training
 Programs Branch, Training and Education Division, MCCDC
 20 On behalf of the United States Navy:
 21
 RADM Edward Hunter, Commander, Great Lakes Training
 22 Center
 23

1 CAPT Randy Abshire, Staff, Chief of Naval Education and
 Training
 2 CAPT Craig Hanson
 3 CDR David Morriss (OLA)
 Master Chief Richard Sheridan
 4 On behalf of the United States Air Force:
 5 Maj Gen Andrew J. Pelak, Jr., Commander, 2nd Air Force,
 6 Keesler AFB
 7 LtCol George J. Nixon, Deputy Commander, 737th Training
 Group, Lackland AFB
 8 COL Paul L. Black, Director Legal Policy, Office of the
 9 Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)
 10 COL Douglas Acklin (SAF/LO)
 LtCol Sandy Rufkahr, USAF
 11 ---
 12 Paul O. Davis, Ph.D., President and Founder of Applied
 13 Research Associates, Inc., a Research Consulting Group
 for Sports Teams, Fire Fighting, Law Enforcement and the
 14 Military
 15 ---
 16 Panel of Experts on Physiology, Physical
 Fitness and Physical Conditioning
 17 Deborah L. Gebhardt, Ph.D., President, Human Performance
 18 Systems, Inc.
 19 Phillip A. Bishop, Ed.D., Professor, Human Studies, University of Alabama
 20 Colleen Farmer, Ph.D., Associate Staff, College of Health
 21 and Human Performance, University of Maryland
 22 ---
 23

1 PROCEEDINGS (9:04 a.m.)
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Today is
 3 Wednesday, November 18th, and the Congressional
 4 Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related
 5 Issues is going to hear testimony from the Pentagon and
 6 the services concerning the implementation of
 7 recommendations arising out of studies of gender-
 8 integrated training.
 9 I understand Captain McWatters will begin
 10 with a presentation.
 11 CAPTAIN McWATTERS: Yes, ma'am. Thank
 12 you.
 13 Everybody at the table should have a set
 14 of colored slides that will follow along with my brief
 15 overview of these actions, and I think there's enough
 16 black-and-white copies that most of the people on the
 17 sidelines should be able to have a copy to follow along.
 18 Good morning, Madam Chair. I am Captain
 19 Marty McWatters. I am the Director of the Officer and
 20 Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate within OSD. My
 21 directorate reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for
 22 Personnel and Readiness on a variety of personnel issues,
 23 including gender-integrated training. For that reason, I

1 was selected to provide a short overview of the
 2 Department's actions in this area before we begin the Q&A
 3 portion of this morning's agenda.
 4 The format we selected for this
 5 presentation was a series of excerpts from departmental
 6 communication on this subject which demonstrates the
 7 Secretary's commitment to this issue. We have included a
 8 quantitative summary at the end of the overview to show
 9 you the amount of progress towards implementing
 10 recommended changes.
 11 A more detailed report of the actual
 12 progress on the recommendations was provided to you by a
 13 copy of a book that was prepared in my office. Hopefully
 14 — the format is easily indexed — you were able to look
 15 at one recommendation at the time. We put all of the
 16 services on one page, side-by-side, although the intent
 17 was not to do comparisons of services against each other.
 18 The first quote we chose to use was one
 19 that demonstrates Secretary Cohen's view of the
 20 importance of gender-integration in the services. He
 21 clearly sees people as our greatest resource and basic
 22 training as critical to their success.
 23 On the next slide, I'd like to begin with

1 a review of the most recent history of gender-integrated
 2 training activity within the Department. During the
 3 summer of 1997, Secretary Cohen appointed the Kassebaum
 4 Baker Committee in response to incidents which raised
 5 questions about the success of gender-integrated training
 6 and the treatment of women in the military.
 7 The committee made thirty recommendations
 8 to improve training in military-related issues.
 9 Secretary Cohen forwarded these recommendations to the
 10 services and asked them to review and report back to him
 11 within ninety days with their assessments.
 12 As you heard yesterday morning, Secretary
 13 Cohen also asked DACOWITS to specifically include
 14 trainees and trainers in their installation visits in
 15 1997 to provide him with a sense of how things were going
 16 within the training environment. The DACOWITS report,
 17 which documented the members' observations, provided the
 18 services with additional background from which to form
 19 their action plans.
 20 Secretary Cohen has remained personally
 21 involved throughout the process. Based on his vision of
 22 gender-integrated training, the Secretary directed
 23 additional focus on three specific items. Those areas

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1 are described on the slide that has a "16 March, '98" on
2 the bottom right-hand corner.

3 In communication from the Secretary, he
4 reserved final judgment on small unit gender-integration
5 until he had the opportunity to review the services'
6 reports on the actions which would be necessary to comply
7 with the Kassebaum Baker recommendations, and also to
8 respond to his areas of specific interest, and there is
9 some overlap in those recommendations.

10 In June, the Secretary publicly approved
11 the services' plans to improve initial entry training.
12 Taking into account service traditions, cultures and
13 unique missions, he sanctioned the different training
14 formats used by the services. He purposely noted that
15 these actions are part of a continuing process and are
16 not a series of one-time remedial actions. This is a
17 point he has consistently reiterated.

18 The services reported in a structured
19 format to the Under Secretary for Personnel and
20 Readiness, Mr. de Leon, for the first time on 30
21 September. This report established the baseline for
22 regular reporting on the progress of items not yet
23 completed. The reports are due on a quarterly basis and

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1 the next report will be due on the 31st of December.

2 The next slide gives you a quantitative
3 snapshot about the level of activity. As we bundled up
4 the services' responses and categorized them as completed
5 or ongoing, there was some discussion about some of the
6 ones that are noted as completed are actually going to be
7 perennial, ongoing, that will continually be reviewed,
8 which is part of a standard, you know, management
9 practice to emphasize certain things that were directed.

10 It's just part of good business practice.
11 So although they are noted as completed, it doesn't mean
12 that those items will never be addressed again. It's
13 just that there was no new action that needed a milestone
14 that we needed to monitor. It's just going to be a
15 continual monitoring action.

16 The areas that are ongoing fall into two
17 general areas. The personnel issues, some of the plus-
18 ups of female representation to give, you know, more
19 female leadership role models, takes a while in some of
20 the services when they restructure billets. In some
21 cases, there was a buy-back of civilianized billets and
22 those things take a while, but they are in progress and
23 they will be monitored.

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1 The administrative actions, changing
2 things like PT standards, also takes quite a bit of
3 review and I know you're intimately aware with all that
4 is involved in that from some of your previous hearings.
5 In general, those are the nature of the ongoing actions.

6 In conclusion, I'll finish with the final
7 slide which just comes back to a quote that the Secretary
8 used that underscores his commitment to assure the most
9 effective basic training for our soldiers, sailors,
10 airmen and Marines.

11 Thank you, Madam Chairman.

12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.

13 Okay. Well, we were provided earlier the
14 book that Captain McWatters referred to and in that book
15 there are more detailed summaries of the material that we
16 just went through. And I would suggest that the
17 commissioners turn to Tab 1, which is...

18 CAPTAIN McWATTERS: The first matrix is
19 just very brief. It has a recommendation and it's cross-
20 referenced to — A, B and C are the Secretary's areas of
21 particular concern.

22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.

23 CAPTAIN McWATTERS: I don't know if your

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1 books were put together the same way. We provided one.

2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Tab A, then,
3 refers to the Secretary of Defense Special Interest No.
4 1: "Effective training depends on the assignment of the
5 most highly skilled and motivated non-commissioned
6 officers and experienced, quality officers. Develop a
7 series of awards and incentives that emphasize the value
8 of duty as a basic trainer."

9 Okay. So I might invite anybody from the
10 services who has anything to elucidate about the status
11 of the action on this to step up and give us additional
12 information.

13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Bruce, why don't
14 you — From the Army perspective, I think Bruce Batten
15 here is going to explain that action for us.

16 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: Hello, ma'am.
17 I'm Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Batten. I come here today
18 as a representative from my previous job where I was
19 involved in the Kassebaum Baker Commission when assigned
20 to the DCSPER.

21 The Army breaks down its skilled
22 noncommissioned officers and officers in the training
23 base. I want to talk about two things. First, how we

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1 identify the cadre for both our drill sergeants and
2 officers, and also then how we reward service in the
3 training base and how that carries on with the future of
4 their career.

5 The Army's implemented a number of things
6 in the selection of our drill sergeants. They now have a
7 more rigorous record screening which goes in detail into
8 their family advocacy records, what we call their
9 restricted fish, and throughout all of their military
10 records, as well as MP and investigative documents, and
11 that's done centrally at the Department of the Army
12 level.

13 Every drill sergeant candidate must be
14 recommended by the first lieutenant colonel commander in
15 his or her chain of command. That's something that was
16 — Only some of the candidates required that before and
17 this has now been implemented for all members.

18 Additionally, we're working on a — they
19 all must have a clinical interview by a psychologist.
20 There's a much longer term program going on that will try
21 to formalize that Army-wide. It's becoming a resource
22 issue. But we do have psychological screening. And at
23 all of the drill sergeant schools there, is a staff

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1 psychologist, if you will, that can help the drill
2 sergeant candidates at the three schools work through
3 that.

4 On the officers' side, all battalion and
5 brigade commanders of training units in the training base
6 are selected by the same central command board that
7 selects commanders to command what we call a table of
8 organization and equipment, your tactical units. Same
9 command board, and the guidelines to that board are the
10 same quality in the training base as in the regular Army.
11 And individuals that command at one level — for example,
12 a lieutenant colonel that commands a training battalion
13 — can then go back into an operational unit if they are
14 selected for subsequent command as a colonel.

15 At the company grade level, another new
16 initiative for the Army that they've done in the
17 selection process is every company commander must be
18 validated by our personnel command, their assignment
19 manager, to ensure that they are a top quality individual
20 to be training our soldiers.

21 Let me shift gears now to some of the
22 incentive pieces that are associated with being a drill
23 sergeant, first of all. Our drill sergeants now, we've

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1 increased the amount of payment for special duty pay to
2 be a drill sergeant. Every drill sergeant now gets \$275
3 per month, which it used to be a graduated system, but
4 last year, on the 1st of December or 1st of January, that
5 was made once you start on the trail, all drill sergeants
6 are treated the same with regard to that.

7 Another advantage to them is when they
8 finish their drill sergeant tour of duty successfully,
9 they are given one of their first three choices for their
10 follow-assignment, provided a valid requisition — that
11 is, a valid slot for their skill exists at that location.

12 We give guidance to boards, to promotion
13 boards, on the value of drill sergeant service. I would
14 just like to share with you, the three most recent boards
15 are selection to sergeant first class for the last two
16 years and to master sergeant for the last year. The
17 other — This year's master sergeant board hasn't come
18 out.

19 In 1997, the sergeant first class board,
20 the overall selection rate for all staff sergeants to be
21 promoted to sergeant first class in the Army was 19.3
22 percent. Those with drill sergeant experience were
23 selected at a higher rate. In fact, 25.7 percent.

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1 To the master sergeant board, the overall
2 selection rate was 15.7 percent, and again, those with
3 drill sergeant experience were given at a rate —
4 selected at a rate of 19.1 percent.

5 The most recent sergeant first class
6 board, which was a few months ago, the overall selection
7 rate was 26.6 percent, and those with drill sergeant
8 experience were selected at a rate of 39.7 percent.

9 So clearly that's an indicator that the
10 instructions are working. We try to get the best quality
11 of people as drill sergeants and that's an indication
12 that they are being taken care of.

13 For officers, as again, I think I covered
14 some of those before where I talked about they are able
15 to then bounce from a training base back into an
16 operational unit. They receive branch qualification for
17 a training base assignment as well as an operational unit
18 assignment. So in other words, they are able to compete
19 with their contemporaries who were not in the training
20 base.

21 As we looked back over a period of time,
22 the promotion rates from captain to major and major to
23 lieutenant colonel are very similar — within a

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1 percentage point or two — if you had service in the
2 training base and the overall selection rate.

3 So that's an indication that we are
4 getting quality people in both those, and that's a
5 summary overview of how we are trying to select our
6 quality cadre and then how we try to reward them for that
7 difficult and demanding service.

8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. I'll tell you
9 what: so as not to pit the services against one another,
10 maybe we should stop after each brief brief and just see
11 if there are questions on this subject for the Army.
12 Anybody got any — Fred.

13 MR. PANG: You know, just a point of
14 clarity. You know, with regard to the assignment for
15 drill sergeants, are all of the drill sergeants
16 volunteers?

17 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: No, sir, they
18 are not. The last figure I saw, which is about four or
19 five months old, it's about 30 percent are volunteers and
20 70 percent are what we call the DA-selected, where
21 through a screening process we identify those top quality
22 individuals that meet the criteria of being a drill
23 sergeant; then they go through that same screening

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1 process. Must have that recommendation from the
2 battalion commander or lieutenant colonel.

3 DR. MOSKOS: This may be generic but I'll
4 ask the Army first. Promotion rates are — it is a zero
5 sum world. I mean, if drill sergeants are being over-
6 promoted, that means others are being under-promoted. Is
7 this a cause of concern or not?

8 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: It is not a
9 concern at this time. It's something that they do look
10 at very carefully within the personnel arena. In fact,
11 the percentages I cited, when you look at that, it is a
12 pretty large difference.

13 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.

14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: But in going
15 back and looking — and they did carefully go back to the
16 last board — it is not a problem for concern. Those
17 noncommissioned officers that do not do drill sergeant
18 duty can still be promoted based on the performance that
19 they do in their job and their potential for future
20 advancement. So we don't see that as a problem.

21 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And the
22 individuals not promoted as a drill sergeant, they're
23 promoted in their career field that they keep. So the

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1 total soldier is evaluated, not one aspect of it.

2 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: That's
3 correct.

4 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: My question
5 would be, unless it's changed, you select about the top 4
6 percent of an MOS to serve as a drill sergeant.

7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I think it's
8 probably down around the 20 percentile, inside of that,
9 because of overseas assignments availability and those
10 kind of things.

11 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. But the
12 bottom line is you select what you deem to really be kind
13 of the top of a particular MOS to serve.

14 Now, in the screening process, if it's
15 determined that someone's not fit to serve, there's no
16 stigma attached to that, is there?

17 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: That is
18 correct.

19 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: There's no
20 annotation in their record that —

21 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: That is
22 correct.

23 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.

Page 19

1 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: That screening
2 process is done centrally right now at the personnel
3 command, going through the records. If they identify
4 something in that very small group that does that, a note
5 goes back to the command that, you know, "you were just
6 — "this is not going to happen for you. Your assignment
7 is going to be here."

8 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.

9 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: But there's no
10 permanent stigma. If you went and looked at those files,
11 you would never know that a person had been screened and
12 not selected — not allowed to be a drill sergeant.

13 Yes, ma'am.

14 MS. POPE: On the next assignment, one of
15 three choices, are you keeping statistics on how often
16 you're able to provide one of three? I mean, I know the
17 needs of the Army —

18 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: The policy is,
19 ma'am — I don't know of the statistics. This is a
20 fairly new initiative —

21 MS. POPE: Right.

22 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: — so I can't
23 give you an answer. But the commitment is —

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: PERSCOM is
 2 keeping those statistics.
 3 MS. POPE: Okay.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I don't know
 5 what they are at this point in time. The feedback I have
 6 from the field, from the sergeant majors who watch that
 7 from the field, is that it is very effective at this
 8 point.
 9 MS. POPE: Okay. Well, that was my
 10 question — is that, if you're keeping statistics —
 11 Because it would lean into my next question. And that
 12 is, right now you currently have 30 percent that are
 13 volunteers. If drill sergeants are getting promoted at a
 14 higher rate and they're getting one of their three
 15 choices, then it ought to have an impact on who your
 16 volunteers are. And so down the road, at some point
 17 there will be some data that says it is or is not
 18 working.
 19 I mean —
 20 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: Yes, ma'am.
 21 MS. POPE: Okay.
 22 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: And they're
 23 going to track that. One of the challenges they found

Page 21

1 when looking at the volunteer piece, sometimes a
 2 noncommissioned officer will volunteer to be a drill
 3 sergeant, but based on where they are in the —
 4 MS. POPE: Right.
 5 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: — rotation
 6 cycle, they don't get to go that time. Then the next
 7 thing that may happen is they get the letter saying, "You
 8 have been selected to be a drill sergeant."
 9 So we don't have a way of separating out
 10 if someone has ever volunteered or they're volunteering
 11 for this particular assignment. That's one of our
 12 challenges with our records, because it is a dynamic —
 13 MS. POPE: Sure.
 14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: — assignment
 15 process. But they are going to — Those are kind of new
 16 things we're doing —
 17 MS. POPE: Right.
 18 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: — so we're
 19 trying to validate that we are trying to get more
 20 volunteers, which is a goal.
 21 MS. POPE: Okay.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: There is one
 23 branch that has very few volunteers, but they're all

Page 22

1 volunteers. In fact, there's an NCO — informal NCO-
 2 sergeant major chain that says, "You're a great NCO."
 3 Time for you to be a drill sergeant and I've sent your
 4 name in."
 5 That soldier then comes down and goes —
 6 It's part of the career development of that — and so
 7 literally they select all the drill sergeants. In AIT
 8 sites, the MI does that. And although, statistics-wise,
 9 none of them or very few would be volunteers, they have
 10 all been selected, worked with before, none of them
 11 object, and all of them go in there as career
 12 development.
 13 So the volunteer number gets skewed on us
 14 very, very...
 15 MS. POPE: Thank you.
 16 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: How about the
 17 selection rates for captains to CGSC? Is there any
 18 variance between the ones that are in the training base
 19 when it's time to be selected vice the ones that are in
 20 the operational force?
 21 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: The only way
 22 we've looked at that, Sergeant Major, is if they have
 23 experience in the training base, not at that particular

Page 23

1 snapshot in time, and it came out to be pretty much the
 2 same. I don't think we did it for CGSC. I've only seen
 3 the data for promotion to major and promotion to
 4 lieutenant colonel.
 5 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: It is about the
 7 same for CGSC, but in those cohorts, there are some
 8 combat service support officers that do better because of
 9 their duty in the training base. Combat arms, however,
 10 traditionally have not done as well. We're looking at
 11 ways of providing either second commands or follow-on
 12 assignments back in the branch to make them more
 13 competitive for CGSC.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: Can I have one more, if I
 15 may?
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Sure.
 17 DR. MOSKOS: Colonel, it says — one of
 18 the completed actions was totally separate and secure
 19 sleeping areas and latrines for each gender. Does that
 20 imply that it wasn't totally secure prior to the
 21 recommendation?
 22 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: No, sir. I'm
 23 going to defer that General Bolt because that's a

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1 different area. He can — That's in the TRADOC billets
 2 piece, so I'm going to stay in my lane, if you will.
 3 MR. PANG: Charlie jumped to Tab C.
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Colonel, will you also be
 5 the briefer for Special Interest No. 2?
 6 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: No, ma'am.
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. All right. So I
 8 would suggest, then, that we pass on to —
 9 DR. MOSKOS: Oh, I'm reading the wrong —
 10 MR. PANG: Yeah.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. We're on Tab A,
 12 which relates to the improvement of the NCO and officer
 13 —
 14 MS. POPE: Anita, I don't know — Maybe it
 15 makes sense and we may have to be flexible with each of
 16 the services, but instead of for each question going up
 17 and down, maybe while he's here, just — The ones you're
 18 responsible for rather than having you —
 19 MR. PANG: I think if you go then to Tab
 20 B, let the Army do that, and Tab C, let the Army do that,
 21 and —
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. Okay.
 23 MS. POPE: Right. So that we —

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1 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: The rest of
 2 mine are further down in the thirty, ma'am.
 3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.
 4 MS. POPE: Okay. All right.
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Well, let's
 6 stick with the Army for a moment, then, and go on to
 7 Special Interest No. 2, which is at Tab B. And that is,
 8 "Increase the rigor of training so as to produce fit,
 9 disciplined, motivated soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
 10 Marines. Ensure basic trainees achieve their maximum
 11 potential."
 12 Is there an Army — Okay.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I think that's
 14 my —
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. General Bolt,
 16 we did have an extensive briefing last week concerning
 17 the physical fitness, so we're a little bit up-to-date on
 18 that. But if you would like to talk to the specifics
 19 about the recommendation, then we can proceed with
 20 questions.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Let me just
 22 outline a couple of things. First of all, we've added
 23 one more week to basic training and to one-station-unit-

1 training. That in itself provides more opportunity for
 2 physical fitness and those kind of things. We have
 3 integrated values throughout the entire process of both
 4 OSUT basic training and extended those into advanced
 5 individual training.

6 We had four unwaiverable requirements
 7 inside of basic and OSUT for graduation: fire weapon,
 8 pass physical fitness test, throw two live grenades, and
 9 pass the end-of-cycle tests. That has now gone to nine
 10 requirements, and inside those nine requirements there
 11 are a significant amount of sub-tasks. One of the
 12 requirements is to participate in the FTX and make all
 13 foot marches.

14 Well, there's five required foot marches
 15 — three, five, eight, ten and ten kilometers — and then
 16 there's a ten and fifteen-kilometer inside of the Warrior
 17 FTX itself. Those are all non-waiverable events. Most
 18 of the other events — all the confidence courses, all
 19 the conditioning courses, hand-to-hand, bayonet, pugil
 20 fighting, field training — all that is non-waiverable at
 21 this time.

22 And so from an Army perspective, I think
 23 we have increased the rigor inside of the process

1 inside of the basic trainees.

2 We have, following the first time that we
 3 heard that accusation, changed the requirement — It used
 4 to be all the first sergeants were combat arms, infantry.
 5 We now have assigned females — E-8's — in first
 6 sergeant positions in gender-integrated environments.
 7 We have our — Three years ago, we put our
 8 first sergeant major into basic training at Fort Jackson.
 9 We have, I think, three or four command sergeant majors
 10 of battalions right now. There are other smatterings of
 11 women — We have always had women company commanders
 12 inside of basic training. We have now XO's, lieutenants,
 13 working as we've increased the number of lieutenants
 14 inside.

15 So we are more and more including women in
 16 the training process inside of basic training. But I
 17 think there's another side of that that we have to keep
 18 in mind, and that is, the combat skills, the toughness,
 19 the field training, those kind of things.

20 There's a great, great strength by putting
 21 combat arms soldiers in there to do that kind of thing to
 22 ensure that what we are trying to do is produce a
 23 rigorous experience for these soldiers coming out of

1 significantly for a soldier entering, soldier going
 2 through, having to meet every requirement, and then
 3 graduating to standard. They are non-waiverable.

4 I guess that's, in a nutshell, what the
 5 major changes in that are as we work through here. There
 6 is significantly more rigor in there. Lots of team-
 7 building has gone in there.

8 The other thing I guess I would tell you
 9 is that we've done a lot of work with drill sergeants.
 10 We have changed the drill sergeants school, and so
 11 hopefully we've made that drill sergeant a better trainer
 12 in addition to providing more rigorous events for
 13 everybody going through.

14 Thirty-nine hours human relations
 15 training. We have changed the focus of the drill
 16 sergeants schools from doing to how to be a master
 17 trainer. Lots more hands-on experiential work inside the
 18 drill sergeants school to prepare them for soldiers when
 19 they get out. And we have our first three classes in
 20 session right now that will be Master Fitness Trainers as
 21 they come out the back end of drill sergeants school.

22 We think all that has and will continue to
 23 contribute to the rigor inside of basic training.

1 basic training with very strong combat-oriented skills
 2 before they go on to their advanced schooling in other
 3 areas.

4 I think we've sort of — I think
 5 personally we've met that balance at this point in time.

6 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: General Bolt,
 7 I didn't get much time — I don't think any of us did —
 8 to spend at the drill sergeants school, but what you
 9 describe certainly helps to alleviate the problem, but I
 10 would think also the education of staff sergeant,
 11 sergeant first class, combat arms primarily, that rarely
 12 have an opportunity to work directly with females.

13 Have you changed the education process in
 14 the drill sergeants schools to accommodate that?

15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Yeah, we sure
 16 have. The first thing we've done is that — The first
 17 thing that happens is that all of the drill sergeants
 18 schools both have female and male drill sergeant
 19 candidates in there, and all the drill sergeants schools
 20 have drill sergeant leaders in their trainers, male and
 21 female. So right from the start, we have at least
 22 provided the opportunity for the relationships at that
 23 point in time.

1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Commissioners,
 2 questions?

3 MR. PANG: I had a question and I don't
 4 know how to phrase it, you know, because — but I'll try.
 5 It had to do with a comment yesterday by the DACOWITS.
 6 That in their visits and in talking to people in the
 7 training base, that a lot of the people who were put into
 8 leadership positions — and I'm going to turn to Bob to
 9 help me on this — come from the combat arms and really
 10 had very little interaction with women and now all of a
 11 sudden are put into a situation where they have to deal
 12 with, you know, mixed-gender training.

13 And it was a concern that they raised, and
 14 I was wondering whether or not this, you know, was
 15 brought to your attention and what you're doing with it.

16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: It has been an
 17 accusation inside the training bases for a long time. We
 18 have changed — Two years ago, we changed the drill
 19 sergeant mix inside of the drill sergeants school program
 20 and the content inside of basic training from — For
 21 example, 32 percent right now are authorized to be
 22 infantry. 50 percent is overall combat arms, 50 percent
 23 is non-combat arms. So you have a mix of all MOS's

1 Secondly, what we've done also is we've
 2 added thirty-nine hours human relations training. An
 3 awful lot of that is built on — Included in all of that
 4 is the gender issues — motivation counseling, stress
 5 management, physical differences in soldiers, leaders'
 6 attitudes, new soldier behavior characteristics, both
 7 male and female, specifically a couple hours on gender-
 8 integrated training, values, improper relationships, rape
 9 prevention, suicide, risk identification training. All
 10 of those, about thirty-nine hours that were not in there
 11 before specifically focused on this issue.

12 So I think we've made a major step in
 13 addressing that.

14 I don't feel — As I go around today, I
 15 don't feel the same anxiety levels of drill sergeants as
 16 I did one year ago, before we put this in, as to their
 17 ability to deal with women; combat arms dealing with
 18 women inside the training base. I think it is still a
 19 concern for some when they start the training; I think
 20 very rapidly they become very, very comfortable in that
 21 environment.

22 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.

23 MS. POPE: I just want to follow-on on

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1 Commissioner Dare's line, and that is, one that you
2 didn't mention — and I'll give you some feedback,
3 positive feedback, because I don't think any of us want
4 to compromise the rigor of training.

5 But the thing that we heard back from the
6 instructors in the school was the mentoring program. And
7 I know a couple of the services are starting to do that,
8 but I'm not sure if the Army calls it "shadowing" or
9 "mentoring" — that that's where it came together, and
10 that they were learning probably more there because they
11 were able to put in practice and also critique the drill
12 sergeants that were out there; what they should be doing
13 and what they're learning to do the classroom versus what
14 they're doing in practice.

15 And so we got a lot of very positive
16 feedback that they could see it before they go actually
17 on the point to do it and faced with some of the issues.

18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Well, you don't
19 have an effective drill sergeant until they've gone
20 through at least one cycle of basic or OSUT and been
21 mentored through that process; somebody tells them how
22 they're coming onto soldiers, how they react to soldiers,
23 what they're doing well, what they're not doing so well.

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1 It takes that long to make that transition from the
2 school environment.

3 But another thing we're doing in the drill
4 sergeants school is that we have active training in all
5 those locations, and so we are in fact putting drill
6 sergeant candidates into active training environments and
7 letting them deal with soldiers during their training in
8 a much different way than we did before. The opportunity
9 is there the way we've got the POI's built right now to
10 do that, and so I think that helps that transition also.

11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Any more questions?

12 Okay. All right. Let's pass on to Tab C,
13 which is Secretary of Defense Special Interest No. 3,
14 "Provide basic trainees with gender privacy and dignity
15 in secure living conditions. This must include
16 physically separated living areas, if not separate
17 buildings, for men and women and after hours supervision
18 by training professionals."

19 Charlie, you had a previous question on
20 this subject.

21 DR. MOSKOS: Does this imply that it
22 wasn't that way before?

23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: It was in most

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1 places, but there was one training center where Kassebaum
2 Baker went that it was in fact not the case. We had
3 males and females living on the same floor; in separate
4 rooms but on the same floor, with no physical barriers
5 between them, and that was the case. That has now been
6 rectified.

7 The Army has put about \$16 million into
8 barracks renovation, both in basic training and advanced
9 individual training. All of the advanced individual
10 training, the basics are in but some of the enhancements
11 are not. Basic training, it is all in.

12 There are physically separated barracks,
13 separate entrances, separate latrines, separate laundry
14 facilities, and there are permanent walls or impenetrable
15 walls which separate males' and females' sleeping areas.
16 And there are procedural means for Chain of Command to
17 access those areas with the right supervision and while
18 preserving people's privacy and dignity and security.

19 That has been done all through the
20 training bases right now. Every basic training site is
21 like that. Every AIT site meets the basics. But, for
22 example, there are some areas where we almost have motel
23 living, and that is, there are multiple accesses into

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1 rooms. We're going to have to move to some surveillance
2 means there to control access in and out of some of those
3 areas, and so the last money is being allocated out of
4 this — As soon as we get the money from this budget,
5 we'll get on with that one.

6 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you, Bill.

7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Let me ask a difficult
8 question, General, which is, if you had the choice to
9 spend, for example, \$16 million on enhancing barracks
10 security or on some other part of training, would it go
11 to barracks security?

12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Well, you have
13 to understand, my lane is basic and advanced individual
14 training, so I'm going to give you a very, very truthful
15 answer.

16 I think it is something that needs to be
17 done. I think there is no reason why we can't bring a
18 soldier into the United States Army, regardless of sex,
19 and provide security, provide a modicum of privacy. I
20 mean, you've joined a big organization, but there should
21 not be a concern of people in and out, up and down. He
22 shouldn't feel threatened by any other sex or any other
23 population inside that environment.

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1 So I think that's money well spent. I
2 think those are enhancements that are required. And in
3 fact, in many places they are an enhancement to buildings
4 that exist out there today that we're leveraging as
5 dollars. I mean, there are some fire and safety things
6 that probably should get done regardless of whether it's
7 safe and secure, panic-door hardware and that kind of
8 stuff that's being done. I think that's money well
9 invested.

10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Let's pass on
11 to the Marine Corps on No. 1, which again is the
12 assignment of "highly skilled and motivated non-
13 commissioned officers and experienced, quality officers."

14 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: My name is
15 Brigadier General Tom Jones. I'm in charge of training
16 at the Marine Corps. I'm stationed at Quantico. I have
17 brought along the real expert, Leon Pappa, who has been
18 with the commission, Kassebaum Baker, so he can correct
19 everything I put in the grandstand.

20 Obviously this has not been a problem for
21 the Marine Corps. For quite some time we've had a pretty
22 rigorous standard for how we identify both recruiters and
23 DI's. They go through a very diligent screening process.

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1 We are currently enjoying about a 94-percent volunteer
2 rate for recruiting and DI. They're kind of from the
3 same spigot.

4 I would kind of digress. We have MSG duty
5 also. They're kind of the same populace. They are
6 stationed at the embassies and whatnot. End-zone
7 promotion is presently 73 percent for folks who do
8 complete DI and recruiting duty. That's for all NCO's —
9 E-5, E-6 and E-7. That's sergeant, staff sergeant, and
10 it'll go into gunnery sergeant to master sergeant and
11 first sergeant.

12 There's been a lot of incentives ongoing
13 for a number of years, probably the chief of which is,
14 again, the duty station assignment post-recruiting duty
15 and DI duty. That's been going for ten years now.
16 Obviously the promotion rates as identified by one of the
17 commissioners is patently obvious around the Corps now.
18 That's enjoying a lot of — We're enjoying a lot of
19 success because of that.

20 Other things, proficiency pay, I don't
21 think — It's a tangible, but I don't think that's the
22 real draw. I think probably it's the promotion and just
23 the mystique of being a DI. I don't think the recruiter

1 has that same mystique. Having spent six years in
2 recruiting duty, there is absolutely no mystique to it.
3 It's just all misery.

4 But I do think the clothing issue, the
5 proficiency pay, the follow-on duty station, even new
6 initiatives that — Giving a DI — Giving a ribbon for
7 completion of recruiting duty and DI duty is a small
8 incentive. I think it's had some tangible rewards. But
9 I think the big thing probably is — pretty
10 straightforward — is the fact that we put them through a
11 very strenuous screen.

12 We have a very high rate of volunteers to
13 get into recruiting and DI to begin with. As I think the
14 Sergeant Major already identified in one of his previous
15 questions, they go through pretty strenuous screening and
16 I think that that's pretty much a cut in itself. Folks
17 who go to DI and recruiting duty pretty much know they're
18 on a fast track or a very good track, and so I think
19 we're in pretty good shape.

20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Questions.

21 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: No, I'd just
22 like to make a comment, and say it to all the services so
23 I don't forget to say it at the end. And that is, in my

1 travels, I must say for the most part I was extremely
2 impressed with the noncommissioned officers who were
3 serving as trainers in the services.

4 And they're dedicated to the job and they
5 certainly are paying a sacrifice that many others aren't,
6 and the testimony to that were the recruits, the comments
7 from the recruits, who almost to an "each" were just so
8 — I think if Mady Segal was here, she'd tell you the
9 word that was used more often than not was "awesome."

10 So...

11 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: I would add one
12 point, that we are presently at eighty-nine female DI's.
13 We have a class ongoing right now which will graduate on
14 17 December. I think there's twenty-seven still in that
15 class. That will put us in pretty good stead. Probably
16 about mid January, something like that, once they
17 complete their post-DI and Christmas leave and whatnot.

18 Recruiting. We have plans for building up
19 recruiting, but that will have to be next summer when you
20 actually — with summer rotation and whatnot, and that'll
21 be by next September or October time frame.

22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: General, there are very
23 few women in the Marine Corps and they seem to be in high

1 demand for everything. Do you —

2 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Well, that's a
3 problem.

4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Do you find that they are
5 attracted to the DI position and able to take advantage
6 of that?

7 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: I think the
8 numbers are pretty much in constancy with the males as
9 far as both promotion rates and for, you know,
10 volunteers.

11 That is a problem, though, ma'am, is that
12 we have such a demand for women. And in fact, as we talk
13 about putting women in certain other training billets
14 throughout the Marine Corps, you're looking at the best
15 and the brightest obviously you want in your training
16 billets. So that's going to be a concern.

17 DR. MOSKOS: Anita.

18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yes.

19 DR. MOSKOS: If I may ask.

20 In the Army case, visually, the female
21 drill instructors or training cadre are way
22 disproportionately black. Does this phenomenon occur in
23 the Marines as well? I'm thinking it's upwards of 80

1 percent.

2 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: I'm just giving
3 you a gut reaction now.

4 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.

5 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: This is not a
6 statistic. I don't think so at all.

7 Leon, do you have any idea? I don't think
8 so.

9 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: I don't have
10 any stats, sir, but I don't think that's the case
11 necessarily.

12 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: No, sir. I
13 don't believe so at all.

14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: And I don't
15 even — Sir, I don't even know if we track that. That's
16 just whoever's the best.

17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Charlie, you need to
18 spend a couple weeks at Parris Island next August.

19 Okay. At Tab B, Special Interest No. 2:
20 produce fit, disciplined, motivated trainees to their
21 maximum potential.

22 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: No. 2.
23 Well, of course, we increased the actual

1 boot camp to twelve weeks prior to Kassebaum Baker. We
2 added the Crucible, which was basically just a force
3 multiplier. It wasn't to correct anything. It was to
4 kind of add the team and bonding phenomenon, if you will.

5 We think boot camp has always been pretty
6 rigorous with the — And there's some of us Cro-Magnon
7 thinkers who were kind of skeptical of the addition of
8 the Crucible, quite frankly; but I think when you step
9 back and actually watch it in action, you'll see that
10 they have to complete this as a team. You can see it's
11 nothing but success.

12 The actual rigor of boot camp was, of
13 course, enhanced by that because that's fifty-four hours
14 in itself. Recruit training was increased by, again, the
15 additional week, which gives us an additional fifty hours
16 on core values, which, again, really amplified and
17 enhanced the team concept and whatnot.

18 The PFT, the physical fitness test itself,
19 the changes, the women went from a mile-and-a-half to
20 three miles just like the men. They now do the same sit-
21 up event, which we've gone from a sit-up to the crunch;
22 hundred for a maximum score. It used to be eighty on
23 sit-ups.

1 The women do not do the pull-up, but the
2 men's pull-up did go to the dead-hang pull-up. We used
3 to do this exercise where you could do a little bit of a
4 gymnastic into it. But the women do still do the flexed-
5 arm on the upper arm strength. And I think the other
6 change is the fact that now the women in the initial
7 strength test do the mile-and-a-half run as opposed to
8 the run they did before, which was less.

9 So I think that we have added, you know,
10 quite a bit of physical on the boot camp, but I think we
11 were in pretty good shape prior to that point. I do
12 think since the PFT — the physical fitness test — comes
13 under my domain now as a trainer — I think we've got a
14 pretty good test now. We're doing pretty well.

15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Questions on the fitness?

16 General, I know that the Marine Corps has
17 a delayed entry program in which, theoretically, pre-
18 recruits are urged to undertake the physical fitness
19 training program. And I wonder, has the Marine Corps
20 studied whether, first of all, the pre-recruits in fact
21 participate in that, and second, whether it has any
22 effect on their early —

23 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: We do more than

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1 study it.

2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Oh, okay.

3 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: In fact, having
4 been a recruiter twice, you'll live it. I mean, out of
5 every pore of your body.6 The idea of success in recruiting is if
7 you can get into the high schools and get the quality
8 young guy and gal early in the year, then they will bring
9 other quality guys and gals throughout the course of the
10 year.11 That sounds great conceptually, but it has
12 a down side. You join a young guy or gal in September,
13 then you've got to trot them all the way through until
14 next May or June, until they depart for recruit training.
15 And this gives you ample time to prepare them not only
16 mentally, but physically, but, also, they have a lot of
17 buyer's remorse, possibly, and they have their buddies
18 and gals that will tell them, "Hey, listen, this may not
19 be a smart" — and every service faces this.20 But I do think that one thing that all
21 recruiters — and having been on recruiting duty twice,
22 you're faced with — is the attrition rate in the pool,
23 and also the attrition rate you have at recruit depot.

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1 That's not Marine Corps. That's all services. We all —
2 all recruiters face that.3 The more time we spend with the poolee —
4 and we call them "poolees" and we have a poolee program
5 as far as your indoctrination and your physical fitness
6 and whatnot — the better success you're going to have in
7 keeping them in the pool and, of course, the lower
8 attrition you're going to have once you get to recruit
9 depot.10 And any recruiter is going to be
11 successful, whether it's a major in charge of a
12 recruiting station, in which we have two females that
13 honcho recruiting stations — probably the most demanding
14 job in the Marine Corps, short of combat, because every
15 month you see, you know, your stats, where you're going
16 to live or die by your success — but your success is
17 inextricably tied to how well you prepare this young guy
18 or gal to go to recruit training.19 And obviously if you in fact do prepare
20 them physically, they're going to do better. They're
21 going to have a successful tenure at boot camp and
22 they're going to go back and spread the word. The folks
23 that go to boot camp and have a tough time physically are

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1 not going to do well. They're going to fail recruit
2 training and then they're going to go back into town and
3 spread the bad word.4 So it all is inextricably linked. But I
5 think we've done a lot to try to codify a poolee program,
6 but a lot of it's just basic leadership. The guy goes
7 in, looks somebody in the eye: "Hey, we're going to take
8 care of you. We give you a program much in the manner of
9 which you're going to see in recruit training."10 You're got to kind of turn the rheostat
11 back because these aren't DI's, these are recruiters, but
12 on the Saturday morning runs and stuff like that, you'll
13 find that it not only builds the physical fitness of the
14 young guy or gal, but it builds a camaraderie already.
15 They feel a part of the team.16 And then when you get into the trauma of
17 going to boot camp — this is every service experiences
18 this — the trauma is not there as much because they've
19 already kind of gone with a group. And almost every
20 recruiting station — again, all services do this — we
21 try to send them in groups.22 And the buddy program is one thing, but if
23 you're a recruiting officer, if you can send ten together

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1 to arrive at San Diego or Parris Island at the same time,
2 it breeds to this thing we call in the Marine Corps the
3 cohesion program. We try to lump them together, bring
4 them together, train them together, let them live
5 together, and they'll succeed together as a team.6 So I think the poolee program is probably
7 one of our real bright spots for not only success in
8 recruiting, but success in boot camp and cohesion, and
9 obviously down the road for, you know, post boot camp.10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, I know the Marine
11 Corps has done some recent studies on injuries in boot
12 camp and I'm wondering if there's any sort of scientific
13 correlation between the amount of preparation that a
14 poolee had before coming to boot camp and the —15 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Well, I'll have
16 to defer to Leon on the scientific stuff, but I know that
17 you can almost chart the length an individual's in the
18 pool or actively engaged in a pool and their better
19 success at boot camp and whatnot.

20 Leon, do you have any stats?

21 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPPAS: In late '96,
22 the Center for Naval Analysis completed a study for us on
23 entry level training attrition and one of the three areas

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1 that they recommended was better preparation for
2 training.3 And they obviously drew a correlation
4 between time in the delayed entry program, but more
5 importantly, the success or failure of the initial
6 strength test, as I alluded to last week or the week
7 before in the testimony — i.e., that recruits that did
8 — or the poolees that did well on the IST in the DEP's
9 and then subsequently in recruit training had a lower
10 attrition rate. Also, the recruits that were not near or
11 at their weight standard did better. Conversely, those
12 that did poorly or failed the IST or were at a weight max
13 or a weight waiver had a higher attrition.14 The only stats — And I have those stats
15 that we can provide. The only stats I don't have is the
16 DEP stats, other than the time spent in the delayed entry
17 pool itself before shipping.18 So in summary, poolees and recruits that
19 did poorly or failed the IST — though, if they fail the
20 IST in the DEP, they wouldn't be able to be shipped; but
21 if they failed at recruit training, they'd go to physical
22 conditioning platoon. And, also, those recruits that
23 were at or above their weight standard attrit at a

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1 significantly higher rate.

2 The additional factor, those recruits that
3 go to physical conditioning platoon also, then you have
4 that multiplier that they get a little depressed, they
5 lose focus; they're off the cycle, so to speak.6 So obviously the key is better preparation
7 in the DEP.8 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: And of course,
9 an important point here is that if you're having problems
10 with recruiting duty, making your mission, you're going
11 to have problems in recruit depot, getting people
12 physically through; because if you're requiring yourself
13 to find somebody in October and ship them in November,
14 the preparation time is obviously not there. They're
15 going to get to the recruit depot and you can see the
16 spike just go off the wall. It's just absolutely
17 unbelievable how unsuccessful you're going to be if you
18 try to direct-ship people.19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: At Tab C, Secretary of
20 Defense Special Interest No. 3, "Provide basic training
21 trainees with gender privacy and dignity in secure living
22 conditions." Any discussion about that regarding the
23 Marine Corps?

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 50</p> <p>1 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: I think it's 2 pretty straightforward there. 3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. 4 All right. Good. Thank you, General. 5 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Thank you, 6 ma'am. 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We'll proceed to the 8 Navy, then, with Special Interest No. 1, the "highly 9 skilled and motivated NCO's and officers." 10 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Good morning, Madam 11 Chairman, commissioners. I'm Rear Admiral Ed Hunter. 12 I'm the Commander of the Naval Training Center at Great 13 Lakes. 14 We have put together a program at Great 15 Lakes addressing the rigor and intensity of training 16 which is designed overall for all of our recruits to 17 increase in both rigor and intensity in a very 18 sequential, analytical way, to a culminating event which 19 tests the success of that process, and that's our Battle 20 Stations. Battle Stations tests what we've done before. 21 Battle Stations is very successful. I think that process 22 holds together very well. 23 The increase in rigor and intensity has</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 53</p> <p>1 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I would ask a 2 question. 3 Admiral, one thing that kind of struck me 4 when I visited Great Lakes — and a lot of good things 5 going on up there, you're right, but the time of your 6 recruit training is pretty compressed. And it appeared 7 that because it's compressed and all the things that your 8 trainers have been required to put in there, it's 9 elongated the day to the point where — I don't want to 10 say it was a complaint, but one of the biggest comments 11 made by the recruits was living on three or four hours of 12 sleep a day. And I don't know if you've taken a look at 13 that — the possibility of lengthening recruit training 14 so that there's more opportunity for adequate rest. 15 Now, that's from a very — shall we say, 16 not a scientific point of view on my part, but it just 17 appeared that the recruits were suffering from sleep 18 deprivation. 19 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes, we look at that 20 very carefully, and we have a period of six hours set 21 aside for recruit rest every day, from 2200 at night to 22 0400 in the morning. We hold that sacrosanct in as much 23 as possible for each individual recruit. There are</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 51</p> <p>1 been through increasing physical training standards for 2 our men and women, increasing the amount of physical 3 training that our men and women do. Previously, we were 4 doing three physical training periods a week. That is up 5 to six, and we do that in a very structured way to bring 6 them along in physical fitness up to Battle Stations, as 7 I mentioned, in a very structured way. 8 Did I get started on question No. 2? 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Go ahead with 2, and then 10 we can go back to 1. 11 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: All right. That 12 process that I describe, the sequential process, 13 increasing in rigor and intensity through the recruit 14 training period, is not something that we have 15 established and we're leaving alone. We look at that 16 process continuously as a program of continuous 17 improvement. 18 Over the last couple of weeks, we had what 19 we call a Naval Training Readiness Review which addressed 20 basic military training for our recruits and we look at 21 ways to improve that process. The good news there is 22 that we both found ways to improve the process, but we 23 found that we had a very good process to begin with, and</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 54</p> <p>1 watch-standing requirements that sometimes affect that; 2 but in the main, I think we're providing adequate rest 3 for the program. 4 We think that the nine weeks-three days is 5 the institutionalized program we use for — that's the 6 length of it — for the recruit training. In fact, the 7 average amount of time in recruit training that a recruit 8 spends is seventy-one days. So that we really have ten 9 weeks and one day as an average for our recruits, and 10 this is because we have a standardized program of a set 11 length of time. 12 But if, for physical, academic or 13 personality reasons, one of our recruits is having 14 trouble making that time frame, we have ways to adjust 15 the program — sent-backs, remedial training — that can 16 get a person through the process fully qualified as a 17 sailor, and we use that to stretch our training program, 18 if necessary, to produce fully qualified sailors rather 19 than attriting them. 20 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. Thank 21 you. 22 MS. POPE: I did have one on No. 2 and it 23 was at NDC, in the living arrangements. And I don't have</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 52</p> <p>1 those improvements were in the small category rather than 2 the large category. I think that that is a "good news" 3 story for the Navy — that that process is in place and 4 good. 5 Now, we don't stop there. Our recruits, 6 when they leave recruit — or our sailors, when they 7 leave recruit training, most of them go over to our 8 Service Schools Command, which is our advanced and 9 technical training. We have a program of Navy military 10 training that we've instituted there which continues the 11 military training, the sailorization training, the 12 conditioning that we did on the recruit training side. 13 We do this through a series of formal 14 classroom training and physical training, which is 15 instructor-led PT, three times a week for those people. 16 We also use that program to maintain the standards of 17 military bearing and appearance that we trained so hard 18 to attain in recruit training. 19 So that's a continuing process and 20 stretches across both sides of the schoolhouse that I run 21 in Great Lakes. 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Any questions? 23 Okay.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 55</p> <p>1 my notes in front of me so I don't remember what building 2 it was where there were dividers on the floors. 3 I know it's for loading and depending on 4 — in advanced training, what the numbers of male-females 5 are, but it was the only place where we saw a movable — 6 It was a divider. It wasn't a wall. And the watch were 7 recruits or actually sailors in advanced training 8 oftentimes because of manning. There were not staff 9 available. 10 And that was the only place where I saw 11 the security issue because it was easy to walk around or 12 move — It was the only place where we saw you could 13 actually physically move a wall or you had a sailor on 14 watch. And you had open ladders where it was — you 15 could come up and down without being seen, and I think 16 the staff in the foyer area, the general receiving area, 17 was staff. It was not a sailor, but the actual watch on 18 the floors were. 19 And I don't know if that's how that's been 20 addressed or if it has been addressed yet. 21 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes, ma'am, your 22 recollection is correct. We do have barracks that 23 contain both men and women in our service schools command</p>

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1 which are segregated by wings as well as by floors.
 2 In some of those wings we do not have a
 3 physical barrier like doors or walls. We do have screens
 4 and dividers that separate those and we keep a twenty-
 5 four-hour-a-day watch there and we do that for exactly
 6 the reason you're talking about. It's loading in the
 7 barracks. Right now, I'm over a hundred percent loaded
 8 in the service schools barracks and we watch that very
 9 carefully.
 10 And again you're correct in that the
 11 general control area, the foyer where you come into a
 12 floor of that barracks, is manned by our staff personnel.
 13 And, additionally, the stairways that
 14 would provide access to any of the opposite-gender
 15 portions of the barracks are either locked or sealed,
 16 depending on whether they're required for an emergency
 17 egress.
 18 MS. POPE: Okay. And my recollection was
 19 that in some of those places where the staff in the foyer
 20 area could see were actually manned, because of manning
 21 and shortage of staff, by sailors, and so my concern was
 22 that, if you were able to compromise entryway access when
 23 there were sailors at a watch. I don't know.

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1 And I know that in some places there's
 2 cameras. I am not one of these that's in favor of
 3 cameras because it's —
 4 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes.
 5 MS. POPE: You know, I think we all have a
 6 concern about making prisons, you know, out of our
 7 training bases across the services and so we're trying to
 8 instill responsibility, and we give all these young men
 9 and women an awful lot of responsibility but we don't
 10 trust them. We've got security cameras, more security
 11 than a lot of prisons do. But, anyhow, that's another
 12 issue.
 13 So I'm not saying — I'm not an advocate
 14 that says you need to have cameras, but I was concerned
 15 and I don't know — I don't know if there are incidents,
 16 I don't know if anyone even knows, but the concern is,
 17 you know, the safety of those individuals in advanced
 18 training and access.
 19 You know, how comfortable are you and is
 20 it being watched, the actual access to and from those
 21 different floors?
 22 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes. I am —
 23 MS. POPE: I mean, I think the first floor

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1 is probably not a problem because there's a lot of people
 2 who are watching there. It's the floors that you can't
 3 see.
 4 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Right. I have
 5 confidence in our system and that's based on the fact
 6 that we do have the twenty-four-hour-a-day watches in
 7 place and those are manned by several people at the same
 8 time. So that if there were to be a compromise, it would
 9 have to be agreed to by a number of people and we've
 10 trained our people better than that.
 11 The other is our procedure for roving
 12 watches and our staff personnel in the barracks that
 13 also, you know, watch those security arrangements. And
 14 I'm confident that what we're doing is working there.
 15 MS. POPE: Thanks.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Let's return to No. 1,
 17 which is the "trainers" issue and the quality officers
 18 involved in training and awards and incentives.
 19 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes, ma'am. Our
 20 screening process for our recruit division commanders
 21 resides in the command that is providing them, the ships
 22 and shore stations that have people that want to come to
 23 duty at recruit training centers, RDC's.

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1 The screening process is conducted by a
 2 board convened by the command master chief of that
 3 command. He will convene a board of senior enlisted at
 4 the command who will review the records, and that's a
 5 very extensive record check. Legal records, physical
 6 fitness records, even family advocacy program records;
 7 all of the details that make up the record of that
 8 sailor's career.
 9 After that process is complete and the
 10 board convened by the master chief thinks that this
 11 person is good enough to go forward, then he has to be
 12 certified by the commanding officer of the command
 13 personally. The signature by the commanding officer
 14 cannot be delegated. He has to personally attest to the
 15 person's potential for successes in RDC.
 16 That's a screening process and I think we
 17 are getting our best people in as recruit division
 18 commanders, and that's from personal observation.
 19 And we also enjoy a high percentage of
 20 volunteers. 84 percent of our recruit division
 21 commanders right now are volunteers and we would like to
 22 make that a hundred percent. We're working on programs
 23 such as when our detailers, the people that write our

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1 Navy orders, go to the fleet to give presentations, we
 2 send RDC's with them to give the fleet some information
 3 on what it means to be an RDC and the challenge and
 4 rewards of that.
 5 In terms of incentives and quality of
 6 life, the special duty pay has gone from \$220 to \$275.
 7 We have instituted a process whereby we send people to
 8 brief selection boards on the challenge and difficulty of
 9 being an RDC. We've had increased promotion rates of
 10 RDC's at master chief level. Overall in the fleet it was
 11 14 percent. For RDC's, it was 24 percent.
 12 Again, this is spread out over ratings.
 13 If you were to look at individual ratings among those
 14 people that were promoted, the statistics would vary, but
 15 across the board it's obviously a successful program.
 16 We have done some other things in terms of
 17 quality of life. We've provided additional child-care
 18 for our RDC's who are single parents. We have provided
 19 some free laundry services so that it's much easier for
 20 them to maintain a very, very high standard of military
 21 bearing, which, of course, they have to do. We do give
 22 them preference on their follow-on assignments.
 23 And fleet-wide, through programs like

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1 accompanying detailers, we are enhancing the image of our
 2 RDC's through things like education, promotion rates,
 3 special pays, and the challenge and really wonderful
 4 opportunity of that job, and I think we're doing a good
 5 job there.
 6 We have not provided as many incentives
 7 for our top quality officers to come to the command but
 8 we are getting extremely good officers. We do have
 9 requirements for warfare qualification for our officers
 10 going into training and we are instituting or at least
 11 exploring some pilot programs to increase incentives for
 12 these officers such as longer tours, but which include
 13 educational opportunities that would lead to a master's
 14 degree. That's one program we're looking at trying to
 15 institute.
 16 So overall, I think we are getting and
 17 keeping the kind of leadership we need in the training
 18 billets in my training command.
 19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.
 20 Questions?
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I don't know if
 22 you said it or not, but how many are volunteers?
 23 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: 84 percent.

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 62</p> <p>1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Oh, is that 2 right? 3 DR. MOSKOS: This is extraordinarily high, 4 isn't it? It's sort of almost a mirror — a different 5 image from the Army earlier. The Marines and you are in 6 the same ballpark, basically. 7 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes, sir. 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Anything on the 9 Navy generally? 10 MS. POPE: Did you want to follow-up on... 11 On the 84, is that enlisted or is that 12 officer and enlisted? 13 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: That's enlisted, 14 RDC's. 15 MS. POPE: Is there a number for 16 volunteers of officers? 17 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: I don't have a 18 number for officers. 19 MS. POPE: Okay. Does the Navy track that 20 on officers? 21 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Captain Abshire, do 22 you know if we track that? 23 This is Captain Randy Abshire from our —</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 65</p> <p>1 complete training and complete a successful year of 2 training, the ribbon is awarded to you. No promotion 3 points are tied to it, but it gives you the distinction 4 of having a medal that you can wear — a ribbon you can 5 wear. And if you don't successfully complete your tour, 6 obviously it will be taken away from you, but it's an 7 incentive. 8 But we also have an assignment preference 9 process that we use. We place the individuals in the MTI 10 category in a higher status as far as volunteer 11 opportunities are concerned. We don't give them the top 12 three preferences necessarily, but when you weigh that 13 against the other people in the service that are being 14 moved because they have to move from overseas, 15 humanitarian reasons, they are placed higher in that 16 priority order. 17 In the promotion category, we've given 18 them a 20-percent promotion opportunity. We don't use 19 guidance, but we specifically tell — we actually promote 20 at that rate and we've been successful now in the last 21 two promotion boards that we've done that. 22 Now, there was a question about a little 23 controversy, that the other services or the other</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 63</p> <p>1 MS. POPE: You can just shake your head. 2 You don't have to get up. 3 CAPTAIN ABSHIRE: No, ma'am. Not to my 4 knowledge. 5 MS. POPE: Okay. 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Do you have any 7 kind of data on what the time-in-service — average time- 8 in-service is for your recruit trainers? 9 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: I do not. They 10 range in rank from second class petty officer through 11 master chief, so obviously there's a very broad range of 12 time-in-service. 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Thank you, 14 Admiral. 15 We'll proceed to the Air Force and stay on 16 the same subject of incentives and improvements for your 17 trainers. 18 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Yes, ma'am. Thank 19 you for the opportunity. 20 I'm Major General Andy Pelak. I'm the Air 21 Force Commander at Keesler Air Force Base in Biloxi, 22 Mississippi. I'm in charge of basic military training, 23 and also all advanced training, non-flying, for the Air</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 66</p> <p>1 enlisted folks have concerns about that. We also use 2 MTI's from all career fields, so it kind of levels the 3 playing field from that perspective. But there has been 4 some concern about the need to do that and we've been 5 asked by our NCO's to take a look at it for the next 6 couple years and see how the interaction really is across 7 the board. 8 Our training cadre is bigger than just the 9 MTI or the basic training instructor. The drill 10 sergeant, if you would. We also have military training 11 leaders that we have in advanced training which are not 12 included in this advantage, and also the instructors that 13 have to man to classrooms and the tactical part of the 14 arena. 15 So you can see I have a three-part 16 contingent in my training cadre, two of which are not 17 included in some of these incentives, but the focus, of 18 course, is basic training and that's where the more 19 rigors is involved — in the instructor process. 20 We're a little bit different from the 21 other services. We have an all-volunteer force and the 22 MTI's have been very successful in recruiting people for 23 that duty. You can tell by the fact that we've been</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 64</p> <p>1 Force. We have four wings, to include Lackland and a 2 training group out in Vandenberg. 3 The expert on BMT is Barry Barksdale — I 4 think most of you met him when you visited — and Teresa 5 Steele. Teresa Steele has moved on now to command 6 opportunity at Goodfellow. She's a wing commander for me 7 now. But I've got the deputy group commander here, 8 Lieutenant Colonel Nixon, who's going to give me top 9 cover if I can't cover these subjects properly. 10 We have taken a very aggressive approach 11 to a number of these issues, as the other services have, 12 and what you're going to hear is probably not a lot of 13 innovative things compared to what the other services did 14 as well. 15 In the area of MTI enhancements, we took 16 an approach to apply money to the problem. The special 17 duty pay was enhanced like the other services to \$275 per 18 month. We also took on the clothing allowance, which was 19 an issue that was of concern to our MTI's; increased that 20 from a \$300 one-time fee to \$180 a year, and a lifetime 21 of a tour, which could be three to four years. It's a 22 substantial increase. 23 We also pursued an MTI ribbon. When you</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 67</p> <p>1 doing that successfully. It's been prestigious for the 2 NCO corps to be involved. But it is very rigorous, very 3 demanding, and as a result, you have to go out and 4 recruit. 5 Now, in order to do that, we've gone out 6 and put together a special recruiting team. We used to 7 have two part-time people who would go around to CONUS 8 locations to find individuals. Now we put the manpower 9 against a six-person team, two of which will be female, 10 to go out and help us recruit even more actively with 11 this incentive program that we have. 12 And we have a very extensive screening 13 program, similar to the other services. In fact, when 14 Kassebaum took a look at us, they felt we really had a 15 benchmark program because we had a lot of the conditions 16 that are being implemented by the services now. 17 We also include a psychological makeup 18 evaluation to ensure that the individuals going in this 19 arena are going there for the right reasons, and it's 20 been very successful. And I think you've been exposed to 21 those people, and they're very enthusiastic and probably 22 the strongest part of our BMT environment down there. 23 On the officer side, we have very limited</p>

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1 officers at the BMT level. Most of them are in command
2 positions, selectively manned. They're junior officers,
3 normally captains. Promotion opportunity to captain is a
4 hundred percent, to major is about 90, 95 percent, so
5 that has not been an issue for us.

6 But we get good quality people and they
7 get command opportunities early in their career in the
8 Air Force. Some of those would be limited for young
9 people like that. Most are technical people at that
10 point in their career, so it does in fact give them an
11 advantage in that arena.

12 And those are the things that we've done
13 so far. Are there any questions about that?

14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Let's move —

15 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: I should mention one
16 other thing. We did increase MTI manning as well.
17 That's a quality of life issue. The ratio from our
18 instructors was 1.5 to 55, and now we're going from a 2
19 to 48, which increases the opportunity for those folks to
20 do other things and have a little more time to themselves
21 because of the rigor that's involved with that.

22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Any other — Okay. We'll
23 move on, then, to Special Interest No. 2: fitness and

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1 program — and this is the "warrior" week — is going to
2 be a second run through the confidence course. We used
3 to do that once and it was more a familiarization. Now
4 it's — you see it one time — and now you can go through
5 an exercise and see how well you can do.

6 So those are the ways that we've been
7 enhancing the rigor in our training. Do you have any
8 questions?

9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Does the increase in
10 length of the FTX —

11 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: No. Surprisingly,
12 we —

13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — impair your other
14 training? Because you mentioned specifically you have a
15 six-and-a-half-week —

16 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Six-and-a-half-week
17 program.

18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — program, and now
19 apparently several days of that as opposed to the one
20 overnight before are going to be taken up with the
21 "warrior" —

22 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Surprisingly, we
23 were able to compress some things. We de-emphasize some

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1 discipline and maximum potential.

2 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: I should say we
3 learned a lot from the other services in this arena, and
4 the Marine Corps, with their Crucible; the Navy, with
5 their Battle Stations event. The "culminating event" was
6 not, you know, our program, as you've probably
7 recognized. We had a "warrior" program. It was an
8 overnight encampment. But we've seen the value of going
9 to an expanded program and that's probably the
10 cornerstone to our increased rigor.

11 We're going to go to a week program, field
12 exercise activity. It should be on-line in a year or so,
13 depending upon funding, but we're already working very
14 actively in building that program, to include force
15 protection.

16 It's going to transfer a lot of the
17 activities that are being done at the first duty location
18 into this environment: buddy care, weapons qualification,
19 chem warfare, training, those types of things which would
20 tie it all together at the end of this training program,
21 which is, as you know, a little bit over six, six and a
22 half weeks now.

23 The rigor and the physical conditioning

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1 things that we spent a lot of time on. Room inspections,
2 for instance, were cut back dramatically to go and focus
3 more on the rigors of deployment and those type of
4 actualities that you're going to have when you go out
5 there in the real world.

6 The air expeditionary force concept is one
7 we're trying to get people acclimated to and the fact
8 that you'll have to be deployed; you can expect that the
9 OPSTEMPO is up and the PERSTEMPO is up, and you're going
10 to be in a position where you're going to have to go out
11 and defend and go do it wherever the duty calls.

12 So we were able to do that. But
13 remarkably — and I can — Maybe Colonel Nixon can talk
14 to that. I was always surprised. As a commander, I was
15 wondering what it's going to cost me to do this, and they
16 came back with "no additional time." It's going to cost
17 us money, about — I guess we've estimated about \$5.9
18 million to build this complex, but I think it's money
19 well spent, especially in light of what we're going to be
20 doing. It's a dramatic change.

21 And we'll have a "culminating event," much
22 like what the Marine Corps does; maybe not as rigorous as
23 they have, but we will have a march and other things

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1 had been an issue for us prior to the Kassebaum. Our
2 trainees, our survey when they leave, and they were
3 disappointed that we weren't doing enough of that.

4 I think perhaps we suffer a little bit as
5 a service because we're high-tech. One of our
6 attractiveness is the quality of life that we have, and
7 sometimes we lose sight of the fact that we're warriors
8 and we've got to make sure we instill that in our
9 trainees as they come in the door. So we've gone to a
10 six-time-a-week rigor now which is working very well in
11 the physical fitness area.

12 As you know, we have the same standard for
13 all genders there except for the graduation standard,
14 which is based upon physiological differences. Even
15 there we're looking at leveling the playing field now.
16 We're doing an extensive study in the Air Force to see if
17 we can't have the same even standards at graduation in
18 their physical conditioning program.

19 Most women use the graduation standard for
20 men as their standard anyway within the training
21 environment; so we see maybe that's an advantage to us,
22 but there are limitations of what they can and can't do.

23 And the other thing we've added to that

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1 involved in the activity.

2 Can you talk to that at all?

3 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NIXON: I wanted to
4 just add one thing, sir.

5 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Sure.

6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. Please come up to
7 the microphone.

8 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NIXON: On the other
9 half of the question — By the way, I'm George Nixon,
10 Deputy Commander of 737th Training Group, which is the
11 host organization from BMT.

12 The other half of the way we were able to
13 expand to a full "warrior week" without lengthening BMT
14 is we had sort of a marble-cake approach to warrior
15 preparedness before where different warrior preparation
16 and rigor opportunities in the curriculum were scattered
17 throughout.

18 Commensurate with going to warrior week,
19 we're starting in just a couple months, the 1st of March,
20 to go to a developmental approach similar to the one the
21 Navy described, which is more of a layer cake, and that
22 allows us to just re-sequence things into one week and
23 focus on warrior training at the right time, after having

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1 laid the foundation for military discipline and
 2 academics.
 3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Any questions or
 4 comments?
 5 MS. POPE: I just have one.
 6 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Sure.
 7 MS. POPE: \$5.9 million is what you've
 8 estimated to build. If you had the money earlier, would
 9 you be prepared to implement it — Because you said I
 10 think two years, within two years.
 11 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: We're going to
 12 actually start construction here in January and we've
 13 front-loaded some money from our command until the Air
 14 Force pays the bill to it. Could we do it faster? I
 15 don't know how fast you can get the construction done.
 16 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NIXON: The
 17 construction timeline, ma'am, calls for no earlier than
 18 June completion. We can't seem to push that one. It's
 19 just —
 20 MS. POPE: This June? This summer?
 21 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NIXON: June of '99.
 22 MS. POPE: '99.
 23 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NIXON: It's a hammers,

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1 nails and mortar issue —
 2 MS. POPE: Right.
 3 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NIXON: — that you
 4 can't push too much.
 5 As far as the curriculum, we'll be ready
 6 to go. We're starting in the spring, so we'll be ready
 7 to go by summer. So as soon as that —
 8 MS. POPE: So what's going to take two
 9 years?
 10 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NIXON: Well, that
 11 would be — There's initial operating capability and full
 12 operational capability. And we're going to start as soon
 13 as we can, as facilities allow, but we may not get all
 14 the way there, to include incorporating some of the
 15 initial entry training that General Pelak referenced —
 16 nuclear balance and chemical warfare training, for
 17 example — until phase II of the project.
 18 That piece costs a lot of money and we're
 19 going to defer it until later in the construction cycle.
 20 So it'll get the most dear things crucial to basic
 21 training done first, and then some of the things that
 22 we're going to roll from the operational units into basic
 23 training, we'll do that in a second level effort.

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1 So it might take anywhere from one year
 2 to, say, a year and a half, to get fully there, but we
 3 should be able to start in the summer of '99.
 4 MS. POPE: So money isn't the issue. I
 5 mean, if you had the \$5.9 million —
 6 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Oh, it's an issue,
 7 but not an issue as far as time. We can only do so much
 8 with what we've got.
 9 Yes, ma'am.
 10 MS. POPE: Right. Okay. Right.
 11 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Yes, sir.
 12 MS. POPE: Thank you.
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, I'd just like to
 14 take a moment to compliment the people of the Air Force
 15 who put together the FTX with scrounged parts and
 16 volunteer effort and everything. It was most impressive
 17 and I think their display of initiative deserves
 18 recognition.
 19 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: And they were all
 20 part of the equation. And I must say, much of what's
 21 happened — We were doing a lot of things in the Air
 22 Force, but there's obviously a drive when you get the
 23 Kassebaum Commission to focus and I was appreciative of

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1 it. In my business, in the training business, we're
 2 getting a lot more attention now than we had been in the
 3 past and I think it's good.
 4 MS. POPE: I think all four of you are
 5 getting more attention.
 6 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Well, I think that's
 7 exactly right. I mean, there's always a good side to
 8 some of these things. I mean, there's some times that
 9 I'd like to have less attention, but right now I think
 10 it's good and I think it's important because that's a
 11 criticality to our service.
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. The third Special
 13 Interest is the —
 14 MS. POPE: Anita, can I —
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Oh. Sure. Sorry.
 16 MS. POPE: I just wanted to correct an
 17 omission, and it's out of sequence at this point, but to
 18 say a comment to the Navy on Battle Stations. I mean,
 19 both of the services did an awful lot out of Hyde and it
 20 is very impressive.
 21 And we kind of went over it and I think —
 22 because it was also good that — like I said, it's out of
 23 order, but the same comment to the Navy. I mean, the

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1 Navy and Air Force in particular have done an awful lot
 2 out of Hyde that has — The recruits like it, your
 3 trainers like it, and it seems to be working.
 4 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes, it does.
 5 MS. POPE: And impressive for all of us
 6 who have seen all four.
 7 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: There has been a lot
 8 of good interservice cooperation with this whole process
 9 here. I know we've exchanged ideas and you can see a lot
 10 of commonality. And that's not bad. That's good. So I
 11 thank you.
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And No. 3, Special
 13 Interest, the living conditions.
 14 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Yes, ma'am. We
 15 always felt we had a pretty secure environment at basic
 16 training but we have done some things in order to enhance
 17 what we already had.
 18 I'll be very frank with you. The RHT
 19 environment, you visit those facilities, they're unique
 20 amongst the services. We confuse people because it's
 21 really a big building with ten group areas in it and we
 22 call them dormitories. They're really bay areas.
 23 But what we've done — We used to have

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1 control access points to those areas for the females.
 2 What we've done now, one aspect is to cloister all those
 3 areas into one floor now to give further privacy and
 4 further separation and less control access points.
 5 Now, we always had control access points
 6 but now it's a little bit more manageable for us, and
 7 that's going to happen over time here and we're doing
 8 that as we speak.
 9 We've also pursued the idea of some
 10 surveillance cameras. And we are sensitive to the idea
 11 that we don't want to, you know, convey the idea that
 12 we're having prisons either, but we saw some blind spots
 13 in our visibility over the folks that we deal with.
 14 Now, we have twenty-four-hour supervision.
 15 But, again, when you have a roving patrol, you can always
 16 figure ways around things like that if you want to. But
 17 we wanted to make people know that it's a leadership-
 18 discipline problem, but there's also somebody paying
 19 attention to you.
 20 When you're in basic training for the
 21 first six weeks, that's a big transition coming from the
 22 private sector. You can't really teach the kind of
 23 responsibility they'll gain over time. We in the Air

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1 Force have a short program at basic because we have this
2 phased program that we continue to develop this maturing
3 process throughout the technical part of the training.

4 But again, the first six weeks, it's tough
5 to have folks to the point you're going to have them when
6 you get done with that pipeline training, so we've
7 decided to put some cameras up in some areas that would
8 be vulnerable.

9 Entrance access points will be surveilled
10 and there will be a central point where the charge of
11 quarters will have access and visibility over those
12 areas. The common use areas, some of the dayroom areas
13 where we didn't have visibility, will now be with
14 cameras.

15 And we also have some alarms that we put
16 on some doors that were not normally used for access but
17 it would give us an idea if somebody's either going out
18 of the building or coming in the building, that type of
19 thing.

20 So those are expenses. \$280,000 is the
21 amount we're going to spend. You asked the question
22 earlier of the Army. I'd have to argue again from a
23 parochial point of view that to me, if we can enhance and

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1 asked the question why they weren't integrated. That was
2 my question because they were separate, in separate
3 areas. And that was a concern they had —

4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: That's because you didn't
5 want another commission.

6 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Well, probably so.
7 But I was thinking, boy, we're an integrated force. We
8 train that way. They're going to — I said, "How do you
9 deploy them? Are you going to have them?" — In reality,
10 in a deployed environment, you have a separate area for
11 the ladies for privacy, if nothing else, and security,
12 and that's what we plan on doing there — is have a
13 separate area for their hygiene things and all those type
14 of activities as well.

15 So we have thought that into the equation,
16 yes, ma'am.

17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Other questions for the
18 Air Force?

19 DR. MOSKOS: I have a question on the
20 security with the cameras. Would you have done this
21 without Kassebaum Baker? Was that independently done or
22 was Kassebaum Baker the impetus for this?

23 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: It was in response

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1 make people feel better, even if it's a perception
2 problem, it's worth doing.

3 The money is not that much when you weigh
4 the big order of things and we didn't take it away from
5 anything of any criticality. We asked for money and we
6 were given money.

7 Now, it came out of the big TOA for the
8 Air Force, but, again, a small amount. And I guess the
9 maintenance fee for the year is — What? About 17K?

10 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NIXON: Yes, sir.

11 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: — which is really
12 peanuts when you talk about it, but it gives people the
13 sense that somebody is paying attention to what's going
14 on. If somebody has a — It's a deterrence for folks
15 that may think that they can get away with something if
16 they're going to do that.

17 We didn't have a lot of problems with
18 instructor-student improprieties in the Air Force. We've
19 had a very good track record with that. Most of the
20 concern you might have would be between student and
21 student, and that's going to happen if they want to
22 cooperate with one another unless you make it more
23 difficult for them. And I think the surveillance systems

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1 to Kassebaum. We were not intending to do that. We were
2 asked to look at ways to enhance what we were doing.

3 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.

4 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: And we stepped back
5 and that was one of the solutions that we came up with.

6 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you.

7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. It's time for a
8 break now, so I would ask everybody to reassemble
9 promptly at 10:40 and we'll continue with the Kassebaum
10 Baker recommendation. And during the break, I'm going to
11 try to sort of put them in subject groupings so that we
12 can move along quickly.

13 Thank you.

14 (A brief recess was taken.)

15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Back on the
16 record.

17 There are thirty tabs in the book
18 reflecting thirty recommendations. Two of them I believe
19 are done — One is the stress cards in the Navy and the
20 other is the split option, so those are numbers 20 and
21 22.

22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Let me — I'll
23 need to touch on that.

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1 can at least give them some idea that somebody may be
2 watching and paying attention to what's going on.

3 And the other thing that we did in that
4 area is we increased some roving patrols, as I call them.
5 They're random teams, an officer and an NCO, that go
6 around without a schedule to show up and take a look to
7 make sure that the charge of quarters and the MTT's —
8 Now, we have two MTT's per squadron that are on duty
9 twenty-four hours a day, and that has also helped to make
10 sure that we maintain the right security in those
11 facilities.

12 We think we're in pretty good shape there
13 now.

14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: General, I have a
15 question to go back to the warrior week now.

16 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Okay.

17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Have you given
18 consideration to secure living quarters when they're out
19 in air conditioned tents in the woods?

20 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Well, we should have
21 brought the layout. There's a separate area for ladies
22 in that complex. There's a cluster of training, you
23 know, encampment areas, to include some tents, and I

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1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.

2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Clay, give —
3 Lay it down, Clay.

4 BRIGADIER GENERAL MELTON: Madam Chair,
5 Brigadier General Clay Melton. I'm the Director of Human
6 Resources and I was the one responsible to pull together
7 the responses to the Kassebaum Baker findings.

8 When we first initially looked at the
9 split option training, the decision was to do away with
10 it. However, there's been a lot of concern about that —
11 the impacts on the National Guard and Army Reserve and
12 their recruiting efforts — and so the Chief of Staff
13 directed us to re-look at it. He has made the decision
14 that he wants to keep split option training.

15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.

16 BRIGADIER GENERAL MELTON: And so
17 originally we non-concurred on that — I mean, we
18 concurred with the Kassebaum Baker to do away with it,
19 but we're going to retain the split option training and
20 we're going to take a new approach at it. The National
21 Guard and the Reserves are going to have a more bigger
22 role in making sure that they prepare the trainees for
23 the second phase of it.

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 86</p> <p>1 So we've had to re-look that, ma'am, and 2 strictly from the recruiting and a readiness point of 3 view, we're going to have to maintain split option 4 training. 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: The Chief this 7 morning said we do it for two years. We want to work the 8 analytics to make sure that we know what we're doing over 9 two years, and then we'll be back to him with a review of 10 that. Concurrently, we're still looking at alternatives 11 to that with another committee that's working inside the 12 Pentagon. 13 So it's not a dead issue, but it's one 14 that, from a readiness standpoint, just had to get done 15 for the National Guard particularly to make their 16 readiness requirements. 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: In a similar vein, there 18 was a recommendation, which is No. 9 in the book, 19 concerning the extended leave after boot camp in the 20 Marine Corps, and I understand the Marines non-concurred 21 with that and will continue the existing practice. 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Yes, ma'am, with 23 the caveat that we've obviously plugged in the physical</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 89</p> <p>1 Kassebaum Baker recommendations fall into five 2 categories. One is recruiting, one is training trainers, 3 another is general standards in initial entry training 4 and leading into advanced training; there are several 5 that relate to what I'll call just gender relations, 6 sexual harassment and other subjects. And then there are 7 three recommendations which are what we call the 8 Kassebaum Baker report, which concern the separate 9 barracks and their recommendation for separate training. 10 I have numbered them out. I would suggest 11 that we take the last one first, if the commissioners 12 would like to solicit any views from the services about 13 the bottom line Kassebaum recommendations, just so that 14 we don't end up at twelve o'clock with too little time to 15 discuss that. 16 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: What's the 17 numbers, so we can — 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Those are numbers 6, 17 19 and 18. 20 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. 21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: They are recommendations 22 for separate barracks for male and female recruits, and 23 for organizing same-gender training units at the platoon,</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 87</p> <p>1 fitness and whatnot while they're on this period of 2 leave, which will be the responsibility of the recruiting 3 officer and whatnot to oversee to make sure that we 4 maintain that same rigor that they have on completion of 5 boot camp. 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Who wants to do 7 this besides the recruiter? 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Kassebaum Baker. 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well, I'm 10 talking about go on leave. 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Oh. Oh. 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Sir, it's 13 generally driven by the recruiting service and the 14 demands of the recruiting — 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I mean, do we 16 have hard facts that back up that this is worth it? 17 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Leon. 18 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: Yes, sir. 19 From our recruiting command, they feel 20 that there are some valuable results of this. In 1997, 21 14,000-plus Marines were on PRASP. 22 Now, that's not just newly-graduated 23 Marines. That's counting Marines that have been on</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 90</p> <p>1 division and flight level in initial entry training. 2 And I do this just because we haven't 3 specifically addressed it and, as I said, I would not 4 like to come to 11:59 and have had no opportunity for it. 5 MS. POPE: Do you want us to... 6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Go ahead, Barbara. 7 MS. POPE: Mine is a general question on 8 this one and it's related to my concern or opposition to 9 security cameras as an answer. 10 Speaking for myself individually, I don't 11 believe that you can put an ocean between two individuals 12 if they want to break the rules and get together. You 13 can put them on opposite ends of the base. So I'm not 14 sure that the distance is the answer. 15 I'm not sure that the physical — I mean, 16 you've all seen, we've all heard of how creative young 17 men and women can get. And we certainly have heard from 18 the instructors what it does to their already tight day 19 if they have to physically, you know, move distances, 20 which is a concern. 21 My question to each of you is you've all 22 non-concurred on separate barracks, separate housing. 23 Are you comfortable that you are catching it? There are</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 88</p> <p>1 active duty for a while and are offered this opportunity 2 to work at a local recruiting station. The results have 3 been over 4,000 contracts. 4 In July of '98, we instituted a reduction 5 in the average time of PRASP, an item highlighted by the 6 Kassebaum Baker Commission, from an average of about 7 thirty days to twenty-one. There are some thoughts now 8 to further reducing that to fourteen. 9 But probably the greatest enhancement has 10 been as what General Jones mentioned. The RSCO's, in 11 September of '97, were tasked by the commanding general 12 of the recruiting command to enhance the amount of 13 supervision and mentoring time, core values, physical 14 fitness, inspection requirements, before those new 15 Marines go back out and report to their new command. 16 Rather than just sitting there for an 17 extended period of time and helping a recruiter, they're 18 going to hopefully sustain some of the work done in 19 recruit training. 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: How about giving 21 me a piece of paper, Leon, that says some of this stuff? 22 LIEUTENANT COLONEL BATTEN: Yes, sir. 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. The remaining</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 91</p> <p>1 going to be infractions of the rules. They're just — 2 Human nature, there are. Are you comfortable that you 3 are catching them and that they are being dealt with 4 appropriately? And do you have a percentage? Is it a 5 half of a percent? 1 percent? 5 percent? 6 So I guess I'd like for the record a 7 comment from each of the services. 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I can address 9 that. I would think, first of all, I am very comfortable 10 that in fact the standards in basic and AIT and the fixes 11 that we've made are appropriate in providing a safe and 12 secure environment. 13 I think safe and secure is much different 14 than the issue of consensual sexual activity among males 15 and females. In basic training, I think while, though, 16 it may occur, it is extremely small. I mean, I can't 17 speak for dumpsters and tree lines, but the days are so 18 full and separation is sufficient in the living areas, I 19 don't think it occurs. 20 The issue is not even in AIT do they run 21 back and forth across into barracks. I think the issue 22 there is the first time they get a pass, what happens in 23 the motel downtown, and I would be less than naive to</p>

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1 tell you that nothing occurs.
 2 So I guess for the record I would tell you
 3 that the instance of male and female misconduct inside
 4 the training establishments that get reported is
 5 extremely small. And percentage-wise, I can't give you
 6 that. I probably could go back and pull some percentages
 7 for you. It is extremely small.
 8 When it is handled, it is handled as a
 9 training issue and a discipline issue. If it is a minor
 10 infraction, it's dealt with minorly. If it's a
 11 significant issue, it is then subject for discharge, all
 12 the way through.
 13 So I'm comfortable to tell you that that
 14 is not the issue. And I don't think that has ever been
 15 the significant issue through this. This all started
 16 because we had drill sergeant misconduct and sexual or
 17 inappropriate activity between trainee and drill
 18 sergeant.
 19 MS. POPE: And I agree, but I think there
 20 is a perception outside of the military establishment
 21 that there is consensual sex that the services don't have
 22 a clue about or are not dealing with. So I think the
 23 perception within the services, but I think you also have

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1 Those that are not infantry go through
 2 Marine Combat Training, which lasts seventeen days,
 3 fifteen of which is in the field. I think there's very
 4 little opportunity or likelihood of any consensual sex in
 5 that period of time. Much like the General, I think that
 6 the safeguards are there that that's not a concern.
 7 Once they leave Marine Combat Training,
 8 all other MOS's go on to their follow-on school. 66
 9 percent of our MOS's are trained outside of the Marine
 10 Corps installations.
 11 For example, a good number of our people
 12 go to Pensacola for avionics and aviation training for
 13 enlisted. They may spend upward to a year and a half
 14 there. It looks much like a college dormitory. They've
 15 got a new complex. Some of you have already seen that.
 16 I think the safeguards are there to
 17 preclude consensual sex, and I think that there are
 18 regulations that don't allow them to actually spend time
 19 in the rooms together at night even though the
 20 dormitories are right next to one another. But like the
 21 General mentioned, much like a college university, I am
 22 sure there's a certain amount of or a certain percentage
 23 of consenting affairs and whatnot.

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1 to look at what the perception is outside of DoD or your
 2 specific services.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Well, I mean, I
 4 can't —
 5 MS. POPE: So that's why my question is
 6 are you comfortable.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I can't address
 8 the perception. I can tell you the realities of it is
 9 that —
 10 MS. POPE: Right. And that's what I'm
 11 asking.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: — is that
 13 inside of the training base, I don't think it is a
 14 significant issue. I think we have moved to safe,
 15 separate and secure. We have made the opportunities
 16 less, and it is not a major occurrence.
 17 That does not mean that does not happen on
 18 pass, off-post, or it does not say it does not happen at
 19 the next duty station. It does not say that it doesn't
 20 also happen at every major university.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: General Bolt — you know, the
 22 others may address it, too — is there a specific
 23 regulation in the basic training or AIT environment: thou

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1 But I think from my perspective in the
 2 Marine Corps, it certainly is prevented to the degree it
 3 can be prevented. Our concern is much like General
 4 Bolt's: once they leave Marine Combat Training or
 5 infantry training at the School of Infantry, then your
 6 chance to actually oversee them is going to be diminished
 7 somewhat.
 8 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Let me answer the
 9 first part of that question in a larger sense. At Great
 10 Lakes, we have in place a system of security, privacy and
 11 discipline that gives a safe and secure environment for
 12 all of our recruits, and the safety, security and privacy
 13 of our women recruits is part of that system.
 14 I say this because I want to emphasize
 15 that a gender-separated barracks in and of itself is a
 16 thousand men between the ages of about seventeen and, for
 17 the most part, twenty-four, and they need safety,
 18 security and discipline, and a safe environment as well.
 19 And so our safety and security for our
 20 women is done the same way, and we have not an absolutely
 21 foolproof system — no one does — but it's very, very
 22 effective in terms of physical security. Watches,
 23 alarms, rovers — we've been through all of that.

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1 shalt not have consensual sex among equals?
 2 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: No, sir.
 3 DR. MOSKOS: There's no such reg?
 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL MELTON: It doesn't say
 5 those words, sir.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: It doesn't say
 7 those words. There is a regulation that says — that
 8 prohibits sexual activity amongst soldiers in training
 9 while in basic training at Jackson.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: There is?
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Yes. I wrote
 12 it.
 13 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: And my JAG wrote
 15 it, and it has to do with all good order and discipline
 16 in barracks.
 17 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: I think for the
 18 Marine Corps it's pretty much the same. All Marines go
 19 to the School of Infantry subsequent to their recruit
 20 training. Infantry individuals spend thirty-six days in
 21 a very controlled atmosphere. There is no access really
 22 in that time frame — because most of it's in the field
 23 — to females.

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1 The second part of that equation is
 2 education. In our curriculum we educate our recruits on
 3 what constitutes proper relationships, how to get along,
 4 and professionalism in those relationships, and
 5 awareness.
 6 We emphasize awareness in training so that
 7 what we're seeing and have seen over the past months,
 8 year — I couldn't go back too far — is that if there is
 9 an impropriety, it is the recruits that come forward with
 10 the allegations, because we've given them enough
 11 education and awareness and confidence in the process
 12 that they will come forward and address any impropriety.
 13 The next part of the equation is
 14 consequences. When there is an impropriety, we address
 15 it through the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and
 16 those who are not meeting the standard we get rid of. We
 17 don't send them on to the fleet. And I think that's very
 18 important to note.
 19 And so when you put all of those pieces
 20 together, I think that we have the right security, safety
 21 and privacy; we have an awareness program; we get rid of
 22 the offenders so that they don't go to the fleet, and I
 23 think that's a good and successful way that we're

1 handling that problem.
 2 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: We have some
 3 prohibitions against sexual interaction between students
 4 in BMT. We have a regulation against that. The
 5 assurances that we are not having violations, I can tell
 6 you, in the BMT environment, that is — We don't want to
 7 call it a prison, but they are totally controlled.
 8 I think if you look at that experience
 9 down there, there's very little opportunity for any
 10 interaction. About the only time they get close to each
 11 other maybe is in the church service on Sunday, and
 12 that's controlled as well. But the bottom line is I
 13 don't think you have a problem in BMT.
 14 Now, advanced training, then you get into
 15 the area where you have some freedoms and you obviously
 16 have to teach discipline and good order. But we're just
 17 a reflection of our society. I mean, what happens out in
 18 the real world is going to be expected to happen
 19 sometimes in our environment as well.
 20 But we have standards and it can't
 21 interfere with how you perform your duty. What you do
 22 socially is another issue, I would think, but it can't be
 23 done in a way, like I said, that's not professional in

1 your interaction with other people and it can't influence
 2 — The fraternization issue comes in. All those things
 3 have to play. Those regulations are there for a reason
 4 — to make sure we don't have interaction that's
 5 inappropriate and affecting mission accomplishment.
 6 Our incident rate at BMT is very, very,
 7 very low. We talk in terms of less than 1 percent.
 8 Since 1994, I guess, we were keeping statistics. We had
 9 about 300,000 people go through BMT. We've had ten
 10 instances of improprieties, six involving instructor-
 11 student and four on student-on-student, and we took care
 12 of them.
 13 Now, you talk about the incident rate.
 14 That's very, very, very, very low. Our —
 15 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NIXON: Sir, those are
 16 flip-flopped.
 17 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: I'm sorry. Four —
 18 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NIXON: Four
 19 instructor-student and six student- —
 20 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Excuse me. That's
 21 better. That's better. I should've had students-on-
 22 student.
 23 But, anyway, bottom line is I think we

1 have a good handle on that and I think there's more of a
 2 perception out there than anything else.
 3 Again, advanced training, when you get out
 4 there in the active Air Force, how people interact with
 5 one another socially, that's another issue that's beyond
 6 — but it can't interfere with and there are specific
 7 prohibitions against doing things that would impact how
 8 you do your job.
 9 MS. POPE: Thank you.
 10 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. Well,
 11 I'm going to move off that subject because I think
 12 anybody that figures out the solution to that probably
 13 can rewrite a bible or something. But, anyway...
 14 I want to move into this subject of
 15 training together and — for the three services that do
 16 it. And let me tell you what I saw. My perception was
 17 it was helpful. It was controlled. It made sense. But
 18 the things that concern me — and I think this is a good
 19 time to perhaps — you give some feedback on how you're
 20 tackling it.
 21 It appeared that in some cases — not all
 22 cases, but in some cases — as it pertained to the
 23 interaction of recruits, there were either artificial

1 rules imposed by the trainer — and I would suggest to
 2 you that often it was done on their part to lessen the
 3 opportunity for an incident.
 4 So from the recruit's point of view, it
 5 was, you know, "they want us to train together and we
 6 think it's important to train together, but then when we
 7 have a conversation, we're punished or chastised or they
 8 think we're trying to make a date or something."
 9 So that would be my first question. I'd
 10 like some feedback on whether that has come to your
 11 attention.
 12 Now, you're at a very high level, and
 13 whether that's some to your attention and how you're
 14 approaching it.
 15 The other thing would be the criticism
 16 that because you are consolidating platoons, if you will,
 17 what you have done is disrupted the cohesion that is
 18 built in a barracks with a platoon in one location. You
 19 don't have that cohesion now because half of the platoon
 20 is really another half of another platoon, and the steps
 21 that you've taken to build cohesion in other ways.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Clay, you want
 23 to take the first piece on that or do you want me talk to

1 it?
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL MELTON: Being a former
 3 drill sergeant — but never training in a mixed-gender
 4 environment, but spending a lot of time with the training
 5 base — there are going to be times that I think that a
 6 drill sergeant, because of his or her perception that we
 7 may have a situation here that could kind of get out of
 8 hand, will impose their own rules sometimes.
 9 And, for instance, we've heard the "no
 10 touch, no talk." I can assure you that TRADOC has no
 11 such policy. Department of the Army has no such policy.
 12 But it gets down to that platoon level. That drill
 13 sergeant that's dealing with it on a day-to-day basis,
 14 for whatever reason, may have implemented a rule that
 15 day. You know, "no talk" or whatever.
 16 We've always had it arise where drill
 17 sergeants, for different reasons — just to build
 18 discipline within the unit — may say during a mess hall
 19 event — a dining facility — and says, "Okay, we're
 20 going to go in there. No talking." I mean, it's just a
 21 rule today. I mean, you get in there and eat and get
 22 out. Sometimes a drill sergeant imposes those rules, but
 23 there is no policy about it.

1 And, sir, I'd have to agree with you that,
 2 yes, at times a drill sergeant probably is going to do
 3 that for what they think is they're doing the right
 4 thing.
 5 So that probably does occur. It would not
 6 surprise me at all.
 7 The second piece of it was...
 8 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Cohesion.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Cohesion. Let
 10 me see if I can take that one on.
 11 I mean, one of the things that has to
 12 happen, and that is, you know, we've already talked about
 13 separate living — sleeping conditions. And so, in fact,
 14 you do have at a certain period of time half the platoon
 15 going or a third of the platoon going off sleeping in one
 16 area, the rest of the organization going off to their
 17 other bay and sleeping there. I mean, that's what safe
 18 and secure is all about.
 19 The fact, however, is that during the day,
 20 starting at PT in the morning, through all the events,
 21 men and women in gender-integrated basic training train
 22 together, meet the same standards together, build the
 23 teamwork together.

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1 And in fact, we have done some things to
2 even enhance teamwork. I don't know if you've seen some
3 of the obstacles. We've built some new obstacles. There
4 is now a leadership reaction course that we are — a
5 reaction course team-building exercise course at Fort
6 Jackson that we're working our way through now as part of
7 this new POI and using a course as opposed to instruction
8 to build team — to work team-building. And so as part
9 of the new POI, we are really emphasizing team-building
10 as part of the training requirements throughout the basic
11 training experience.

12 So I think they get a great understanding
13 of the teamwork necessary to succeed in the environment
14 that they're going to go to.

15 I'll give you an anecdotal view of this
16 over time. I commanded Jackson during a period of time
17 when we had all-male companies and all-female companies.
18 I think I'm already on record saying they train better —
19 the women train better when we have them integrated. I
20 mean, the statistical measures are better.

21 But more importantly, I don't think a week
22 went by that I didn't talk to a male company that the
23 accusation was "the women get over." "The drill

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Now, do we give
2 something up by not living in the same platoon bay?
3 Probably. Do we get something out of the integration of
4 training? I absolutely believe that.

5 DR. MOSKOS: Can I follow this up?

6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Sure.

7 DR. MOSKOS: I know the Navy's going to
8 respond to this, but — and the Navy has a particular
9 interesting situation in its basic — in its initial
10 entry training, but you have some all-male divisions as
11 well as the integrated divisions. Have you noticed any
12 of the issues that we've been discussing here vary
13 between the all-male divisions and the gender-integrated
14 divisions?

15 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Let me ask my
16 command master chief —

17 DR. MOSKOS: The only natural experiment
18 we have is the Navy, because in order to have a decent
19 percentage of women, you have to have all-male divisions.

20 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: I have my command
21 master chief from Recruit Training Center here and I'd
22 like for him to address that for you.

23 DR. MOSKOS: Well, the Navy — I'm

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1 sergeants aren't as hard on them as they are on us."
2 "They have it easy." "Well, how do you know?" "Well, I
3 saw it over there, 200 yards away. We looked over
4 there."

5 As soon as we integrated the platoons,
6 those kind of issues went away. I never heard that
7 allegation again. I heard a lot of times that, "Oh,
8 Private Melton shouldn't be here," but that was not a
9 gender issue. That was an issue of how hard you wanted
10 to work, how committed you were or how dedicated you
11 were, how you pulled your — how you were a part of the
12 team.

13 So it became not a gender issue; it became
14 a commitment issue at that point in time.

15 So I think that says more about the
16 process than sleeping together. I'm not sure how you —
17 you know, I'm not sure that we'll ever get around the
18 sleeping thing. The drill sergeants don't like it
19 because they've got to go to two places to make sure the
20 word gets out, but I think that's the price you pay for
21 building a higher quality soldier in training coming out
22 of basic training.

23 DR. MOSKOS: General Bolt, would you say,

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1 thinking of the all-male —

2 MS. POPE: Well, the Air Force has —

3 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: The Air Force says
4 the same thing.

5 MS. POPE: The Air Force has the same
6 thing because —

7 DR. MOSKOS: You have all-male —

8 MS. POPE: So does the Army.

9 DR. MOSKOS: All-male platoons?

10 MS. POPE: Yeah.

11 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: You have to, because
12 it's —

13 MS. POPE: Because of the numbers.

14 DR. MOSKOS: At Jackson?

15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: No, not at
16 Jackson.

17 DR. MOSKOS: Not at Jackson.

18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Not at Jackson.

19 Jackson and Leonard Wood, you have —

20 (UNIDENTIFIED): Fort Benning —

21 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah, leave Benning out.

22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: But Fort Knox,
23 for example, is all-male. Sill is all-male right now.

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1 though, there's a trade-off? I mean, so much of that
2 cohesion is the day is done, the banter that goes on in
3 the platoon, you know, sleeping quarters. That cannot be
4 integrated, so there is some loss of something along with
5 the gains on the other side. But, I mean, to say it's
6 just all a plus, it seems to me, is overstating it.

7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Let me give you
8 a view of cohesion. That term has been thrown around an
9 awful lot in terms of basic training. I don't think
10 cohesion, as we understand unit cohesion, has any place,
11 and you never get to that point inside of basic training.
12 There are people in, there's people out. There are some
13 guys trying — and gals, trying to get through the
14 process together, but it's not the same kind of cohesion
15 as a tactical unit.

16 What you see in basic training is
17 teamwork. You see people banding together as a team to
18 get through the process, and I think that's a different
19 concept as we work through here. And I think teamwork
20 can be emphasized both in the training process and does
21 not necessarily have to be integrated into the living
22 context.

23 DR. MOSKOS: Arrangements.

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1 DR. MOSKOS: But these people are training
2 together. Same cycle. This is quite — This is unique.

3 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: I could answer the
4 question, but Master Chief Sheridan is the master chief
5 petty officer of the command for the Recruit Training
6 Center. He is an RDC and he has pushed recruits on the
7 street, and I think he can give you a good picture.

8 MASTER CHIEF SHERIDAN: Good morning,
9 ma'am. I'm Master Chief Sheridan, Command Master Chief
10 for Recruit Training Command.

11 I think the Navy has had longer to go in
12 this process than any of the other services, because not
13 only did we integrate at the same time, we single-sighted
14 at the same time, and we single-sighted it to a
15 previously all-male boot camp. And I've watched this for
16 three and a half years and it's been very interesting to
17 watch.

18 I think the biggest success is Battle
19 Stations. Battle Stations has so many intangible things
20 that you can't measure. You ask a recruit in the first
21 week of training, "What do you need to get through Battle
22 Stations," they say "teamwork." And so they're working
23 on that now from day one for a "culminating event," just

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 110</p> <p>1 like the Crucible, I think, to work — to get together as 2 a team. 3 Now the goal is to start working as a 4 team. Whether they're all male up in their house, all 5 female up in their house, or they're now integrated, 6 going through training, they — everybody sees the 7 integrated divisions doing the exact same things as the 8 male divisions. 9 Everybody — All of the male recruits 10 interact somehow with the female recruits, whether that's 11 at service week or at various places around the chow 12 hall, those kind of things. That has been a huge thing 13 to get them going. 14 As far as the "don't talk, don't touch," 15 there are portions of boot camp where they're not allowed 16 to talk male-to-male or female-to-female, but this has 17 got them talking more than they ever used to before. 18 This has got them over the fear of, "Well, if I touch 19 you," "I'm going to have to touch you. I'm going to have 20 to help you get through Battle Stations. We're going to 21 have to carry you. We're going to have to lift you." 22 There's now a willingness. 23 And the RDC's, as they go through their</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 113</p> <p>1 how males and females should relate to each other 2 professionally; eliminate 'no talk, no touch' policies." 3 24, "Enforce policies to eradicate disparaging references 4 to gender as tightly as regulations are enforced against 5 racial discrimination." 25, "Teach consistent rules on 6 Fraternalization." 26, "Enforce tough punishment for false 7 accusations regarding sexual harassment and misconduct." 8 Those are all issues that are blending in 9 with our discussion about the barracks and the platoons, 10 so I just wanted to expand it a little bit so that we can 11 — 12 DR. MOSKOS: Move ahead. 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — move ahead. 14 MS. POPE: Can I ask just a quick question 15 on 23? 16 And, General Bolt, you already answered it 17 because you said TRADOC does not have a policy. Because 18 I certainly walked away thinking there was a policy, and 19 I may be the only — 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I'm not sure 21 what 23 is. 22 MS. POPE: I'm sorry. "No touch, no 23 talk."</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 111</p> <p>1 second and third time at Battle Stations now, they are 2 learning that, "Hey, we've got to do this Battle 3 Stations." And so it's been a great thing to watch. 4 DR. MOSKOS: But, Chief, I wanted to be 5 more specific. Is there any difference between the all- 6 male divisions and the integrated divisions in terms of, 7 say, Battle Stations? The teamwork is identical on both 8 sides? 9 MASTER CHIEF SHERIDAN: Yes, sir. 10 DR. MOSKOS: Or one is better than the 11 other? 12 MASTER CHIEF SHERIDAN: No, sir. We have 13 a competition — 14 DR. MOSKOS: The integrated is not — 15 MASTER CHIEF SHERIDAN: We have a 16 competition system and there's not much difference 17 between the competition system — 18 DR. MOSKOS: Between the all-male group 19 and an integrated? 20 MASTER CHIEF SHERIDAN: — in the all-male 21 group or an integrated group. It doesn't make — They're 22 doing the exact same thing all the way through boot camp. 23 And it took us a long time to make</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 114</p> <p>1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: No, there's no 2 policy. 3 MS. POPE: So there's no policy. 4 Does the Air Force, Marine Corps or Navy 5 have a policy anywhere on — 6 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: We have a 7 prohibition against it, a specific prohibition as a 8 result of Kassebaum, because we had the same experience 9 — 10 MS. POPE: So it's a result — 11 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Yeah. The 12 experience — 13 MS. POPE: — of Kassebaum Baker is what 14 you're saying. 15 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: The perception was 16 it was out there. We didn't have one. 17 MS. POPE: Okay. 18 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: But the instructors, 19 in order to ease the — 20 MS. POPE: Right. 21 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: — administration of 22 troops, the easy way to do it is — 23 MS. POPE: So it's the practice, not the</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 112</p> <p>1 everybody realize that. When I first got there, we had 2 only been single-sighted for about five months and there 3 were still a lot of male recruits that thought females 4 did a different boot camp and that the guys that were in 5 integrated divisions don't do the same thing that we had 6 to do, and it took a long time for that process to make 7 it around. 8 Thank you, ma'am. 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Let me break in and 10 expand the discussion a little bit. There are a number 11 of Kassebaum Baker recommendations that relate to some of 12 the things that we're talking about now, so I'll bring in 13 numbers 21, 23, 24, 25 and 26. 14 MS. POPE: I'm sorry, Anita. What — 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Basically, 21 through 26 16 — 17 MS. POPE: Okay. 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — with the exception of 19 22, which is done. 20 MS. POPE: Right. 21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: So if we sort of focus on 22 those issues, 21 is — Well, actually 21 belongs with 23 another set, but 23, 24 — 23 is "Improve instruction on</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 115</p> <p>1 policy. 2 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Yeah, that's exactly 3 right. So — 4 MS. POPE: But it's now — 5 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: There's a 6 prohibition against having that policy. 7 MS. POPE: Oh, against having the policy. 8 I thought there was against talking. 9 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: No, no, no, no, no, 10 no. No, against that other policy. 11 MS. POPE: Now wait a minute. Okay. 12 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: They cannot do that, 13 informally or any way, and we instruct them that that — 14 MS. POPE: Okay. 15 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: — distracts from 16 the training environment; not to do it. 17 MS. POPE: And did that occur as a result 18 of responding — 19 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Yes, ma'am. 20 MS. POPE: Okay. Marine Corps? 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: No. 22 MS. POPE: Okay. Navy? 23 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: The Navy does not</p>

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1 have a "no talk, no touch" policy.
 2 MS. POPE: And is there a practice among
 3 the instructors?
 4 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: We have taken that
 5 problem head-on —
 6 MS. POPE: Okay.
 7 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: — through the
 8 education of our RDC's. We stretched out their training
 9 from eight to thirteen weeks so that we could —
 10 MS. POPE: Right.
 11 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: — do a lot more in
 12 the way of giving them a tool bag to handle those sorts
 13 of situations.
 14 MS. POPE: Okay. Thank you.
 15 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: How about, if
 16 I may — Let me ask this question: Have you received any
 17 feedback — and you may not at your level — received any
 18 feedback from your trainers that as a result of this type
 19 of training, they spend a lot of time trying to police,
 20 if you will — In other words, instead of watching the
 21 conduct of the training, they're watching in case notes
 22 get passed or they're watching for private conversations
 23 that take place?

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1 Any feedback along that line to any degree
 2 that...
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: No, that has not
 4 been an issue at this point in time.
 5 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: No, I don't
 7 believe so.
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I have a question
 9 concerning item 24, "Enforce policies to eradicate
 10 disparaging references to gender..." And I'd just like
 11 to clarify whether it works both ways; whether it is
 12 enforced — And this also touches a little bit on the
 13 number 26, which is "Enforce tough punishment for false
 14 accusations regarding sexual harassment and misconduct."
 15 I guess to have a fair and level playing
 16 field, one would expect that females making disparaging
 17 comments about males, likewise false accusations, should
 18 be subject to the same kind of discipline as if it were
 19 the other way around.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Absolutely. I
 21 don't —
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: It may be a policy
 23 question, which is, is the regulation in gender-neutral

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1 terms?
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL MELTON: Yes, ma'am.
 3 It's the UCMJ, Uniform Code of Military Justice. Anyone
 4 that makes a false allegation against anyone on anything
 5 and it's proven, then you can take action against that
 6 person under the Uniform Code of Military Justice — take
 7 action against them. And that's why we looked at — We
 8 feel that our current policies that we have are
 9 sufficient to deal with that issue.
 10 Now, the enforcement of it, you know, is
 11 — it's always everything on a case-by-case basis.
 12 Disparaging remarks. You know, in the
 13 IET arena in my travels this past year, I think we've
 14 come a long ways there. Out of the operational Army,
 15 sometimes we do get a complaint. I know when DACOWITS
 16 visited Bosnia, there was a complaint by some of the
 17 women that periodically they heard disparaging remarks
 18 from some of those units that have no women in them, that
 19 have no association with women.
 20 So every once in a while we'll hear that,
 21 and so that's brought to the attention of the general
 22 during the report and he, you know, feeds that back down
 23 through the chain of command.

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1 But in IET, I think it would be a very
 2 isolated event today to hear — going either way today.
 3 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: We've addressed the
 4 problem of disparaging remarks throughout our training
 5 command. And this is one point where I can speak to the
 6 Navy outside of Great Lakes in that we addressed those
 7 policies, those problems, at sites where we do not have
 8 gender-integrated training, such as our SEAL training,
 9 some of our submarine training, which, of course, are
 10 all-male. So we've addressed that Navy-wide across our
 11 training installations.
 12 With respect to discipline and false
 13 allegations, we have a process for investigating
 14 allegations, period, and false allegations are dealt with
 15 with the UCMJ in the same process as a substantiated
 16 allegation would be, and we deal with it in a structured
 17 way like that.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: I have to follow it up, then.
 19 We asked this question yesterday of the JAG people. Do
 20 you know of any case in which a woman has been found
 21 guilty of false accusations?
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I know of one.
 23 Fort Jackson had one here two months ago, I believe, and

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1 it was a court-martial conviction.
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL MELTON: Sir, I have
 3 Lieutenant Colonel Gorzelnick here who is a battalion
 4 commander at Fort Gordon, and she had to deal with a
 5 case.
 6 LIEUTENANT COLONEL GORZELNICK: Yes, sir.
 7 Having spent my six weeks here in DCSPER, one of my
 8 experiences as a battalion commander was dealing with a
 9 female soldier who had in fact made false allegations.
 10 Now, the important thing to note is that
 11 in command, you deal with each case on a case-by-case
 12 basis. And as was expressed yesterday through the
 13 hearing, each commander looks at the individual
 14 circumstances of the case and addresses those to the
 15 point where necessary to deal with those commands.
 16 The allegations that the female soldier in
 17 my command made, for example, were found to be
 18 "unfounded" against the male soldier. The female soldier
 19 was handled in the appropriate manner, which, in this
 20 case of this particular female soldier, she had a number
 21 of other issues ongoing. She was eventually discharged
 22 under a medical-mental discharge, and that was how the
 23 case was dealt with.

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1 However, once again, each commander looks
 2 at each case individually, deals with the appropriate
 3 circumstances to the case, and takes appropriate action.
 4 And that is why we were selected for command.
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Comments from the
 6 other services about the...
 7 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: It's a very delicate
 8 balance you have to weigh in the equation. I'm a general
 9 court-martial authority and I haven't seen a case through
 10 legal channels. I have seen it through administrative
 11 channels, nonjudicial punishment areas, where someone
 12 will make an accusation maybe in sexual harassment cases.
 13 And we do investigate as the Navy and, you
 14 know, the other services do, and you get to the detail of
 15 it and you find witnesses, and you find out somebody is
 16 in fact making a false allegation for their advantage and
 17 you take corrective action. It may not be an Article —
 18 Well, it could be Article 15, but it may be a letter of
 19 reprimand, that type of thing.
 20 But you've got to be careful because of
 21 the nature of the circumstance.
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Other
 23 questions or comments from...

1 Okay. There are a group of
 2 recommendations —
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Could I say one
 4 thing about that?
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Sure.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Before we leave
 7 that subject, I think we ought to understand that
 8 although that was a high concern among the training
 9 trainers at one point in time, with 800 lines in
 10 Aberdeen, the instances of false accusations are
 11 extremely small, from my experience in the training base,
 12 and they are not quite as clean as you would try to make
 13 them; because in some cases the trainer has crossed a
 14 professional boundary, that does not make everybody
 15 smutty over the issue.
 16 So as was just reported, they are dealt
 17 with in a variety of reasons; certainly not condoned, but
 18 certainly not the large problem that maybe the report
 19 would have led you to believe as you go through this.
 20 They are very, very small, and they become smaller as you
 21 emphasize the professional conduct of the trainer through
 22 this process and as you start working the values piece
 23 inside of basic training.

1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. There is a series
 2 of recommendations which I will characterize as the
 3 operational side of basic training. Those are numbers 5,
 4 7, 9, 15, 16, 19, 27 and 28, and I'll review those real
 5 quickly.
 6 No. 5 is "Toughen basic training
 7 requirements, and enforce consistent standards for male
 8 and female recruits." No. 7, "Review initial entry
 9 training curricula to shift training into IET in order to
 10 reduce the training requirements of the operational
 11 units."
 12 No. 9, "End extended leave" — No. 9 was
 13 the Marine Corps. Sorry.
 14 No. 15, "Clarify trainers' authority."
 15 No. 16, "Increase support group staffing and enhance
 16 availability to recruits." No. 19, "Toughen physical
 17 fitness requirements and expand instruction on nutrition
 18 and wellness."
 19 No. 27, "Strengthen discipline continuum
 20 from basic training into advanced training in order to
 21 maintain high standards of discipline and military
 22 bearing throughout the training cycle; improve staff
 23 ratios."

1 And No. 28, "Prepare basic training
 2 graduates better for the lifestyle change in advanced
 3 schools and prepare advanced school graduates for the
 4 lifestyle change in the operational unit."
 5 Just for the information of our visitors,
 6 the Commission had adopted as its template for studying
 7 the things we need to study what we call the "continuum
 8 of training," extending from recruiting and accession,
 9 all the way through entry into the operational force, and
 10 so from our point of view it makes sense to break these
 11 out into that time frame.
 12 And I would invite commissioners to ask
 13 questions, if you have any at this point, or else just
 14 ask for a comment in general about the continuum aspects
 15 of taking a raw civilian and turning that person into a
 16 productive member of an operational unit.
 17 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I guess I'd
 18 start. The Navy has a program called "return to boot
 19 camp." I'm assuming that's still alive and well. I was
 20 wondering, in the other services, obviously there's
 21 opportunity for criticism from the operational force:
 22 "You sent me someone that was not..."
 23 Is there now a more open dialogue with the

1 operational force on — and I hate to refer to human
 2 beings as products, but as the product that you're
 3 putting out to them? And do they appear to be pleased
 4 with the standard of training that a recruit is achieving
 5 before they get to them?
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I can probably
 7 handle that from the Army perspective. And that is,
 8 first of all, I would tell you there is some open
 9 dialogue. We used to always do — I don't know if you
 10 remember this — a survey out of AIT and out of OSUT,
 11 into the units. "You got so many soldiers. Give me —
 12 "Rate their performance in some certain areas."
 13 Still do some of that. Most of that's
 14 done now inside of the annual return of operational units
 15 into the schoolhouse, and a couple things are done there.
 16 They re-scope the technical skills required for soldiers
 17 coming out of AIT's, into the operational Army, and they
 18 provide feedback as to the quality of soldier that's
 19 going.
 20 I attended one at Leonard Wood here
 21 recently in which you had operational commanders and
 22 sergeant majors back to the schoolhouse in a three-day
 23 symposium dealing with quality issues across the wide

1 range of products coming out of that service school and
 2 refocusing what should be taught by that service school.
 3 So I think we have an open dialogue and
 4 that's done in all the schools now. Plus, there's an
 5 awful lot of telephone calls that go on because of
 6 basically the smaller size of the Army that comes out.
 7 Now, to answer the second part of that
 8 question — is, what is the quality going out there? — I
 9 would tell you that if you asked sergeant majors, the
 10 battalion commanders, brigade commanders, people that
 11 operationalize these soldiers, I think they'd be very
 12 happy with the quality of soldier that comes out there.
 13 They're getting a soldier that's fit, a soldier that can
 14 be a member of a team very quickly and understands Army
 15 values. I think there's something there that they're
 16 very glad to get.
 17 On the other hand, if you survey squad
 18 leaders and platoon sergeants, they would tell you that
 19 the soldier that we're sending out isn't good enough.
 20 And you ask why, it's they'd like to have them know more
 21 skills. And they would like them to move into collective
 22 skills, and that is, be able to be a member of a fire
 23 team and know — or a squad — and go through a

1 collective training experience better.
 2 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: On the first
 3 day.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: On the first
 5 day. On the first day.
 6 In fact, I talked to a group of them not
 7 too long ago and they were shocked to believe that the
 8 only thing we taught out of — coming out of basic
 9 training was buddy team live fires, and that is, fire and
 10 movement as part of — as a part of a team and not as
 11 part of a squad or a squad live fire.
 12 We have drawn institutionally a fire break
 13 there, and that is, individual training and buddy
 14 training is done inside the institutional Army.
 15 Collective training, from squad up, is done inside the TO
 16 in the Army — the operational Army.
 17 As the operational Army gets busier,
 18 especially at the lower levels, they are not happy with
 19 that split as much as they were before. Less home
 20 station training time, those kind of things.
 21 Now, from a department standpoint, the
 22 argument would be you're better off to have those
 23 soldiers in the field training and keeping your TTHS

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1 account — that is, your school account — down so that
2 you have higher readiness in organizations than more
3 people inside the training base.

4 That's sort of the balance that we're
5 trying to spike right now. But the input over the last
6 year, and especially the input since we have really
7 started emphasizing values, we have been getting higher
8 and higher marks on the quality of soldiers that are
9 coming out of the training base.

10 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.

11 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: I'd like to address
12 that question of fleet feedback. In my experience at
13 Naval Training Center Great Lakes, it's been very
14 structured and very fruitful for us.

15 I mentioned the Naval Training Readiness
16 Review we did recently on basic military training in the
17 recruit side of the house. We did that review by
18 soliciting input from the fleet. We went directly to the
19 fleet units and asked them, you know, what they thought
20 of the sailors that were arriving at their ships and what
21 we could do to improve the process of training them.

22 Then we pulled together about sixty
23 people, most of whom were fleet master chiefs and force

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1 have, of course, Parris Island feeds all their folks up
2 to Camp LeJeune. They go through Infantry Training
3 Battalion, and most of those troops go on to Camp
4 LeJeune. In the West Coast, San Diego, all of them go to
5 School of Infantry, Camp Pendleton, and then most all the
6 troops end up in Camp Pendleton.

7 So I think the cross-pollination between
8 boot camp and SOI, and then into the actual fleet, is
9 probably pretty good.

10 I think with OPTEMPO-PERSTEMPO, never been
11 worse in the Marine Corps in my time. I think you're
12 going to see some incongruity of understanding about
13 where they are and where they should be. I think that's
14 understandable. And I don't think OPTEMPO's getting
15 better. I think it's getting worse. I think you're
16 going to experience that.

17 Where we have concerns and where the real
18 disconnect could easily be is those individuals who are
19 not in infantry or go to Marine Combat Training. That's
20 a seventeen-day syllabus both at Camp LeJeune and at Camp
21 Pendleton. From there, they go to another school.

22 As the example I used before, if you're
23 going to be an aviation enlisted, you could go to school

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1 master chiefs, our senior enlisted people from the fleet,
2 to review the training process to how we could better
3 deliver to the fleet what they want.

4 That's an excellent process. And as I
5 mentioned, the delta between what we're providing and
6 what the fleet is getting is relatively small. Sometimes
7 I think all the ships would like for us to send them
8 master chiefs and nothing else, but, in fact, we're
9 coming close to delivering what they're looking for with
10 some individual deviation.

11 And the other thing is, we do have this
12 "back to boot camp" program. Just last week we had the
13 senior enlisted academy from Newport, Rhode Island, at
14 Naval Training Center. They spent several days. They
15 went through an overview of the entire recruit training
16 process and came back with very favorable comments about
17 what they were seeing in terms of the training we were
18 doing.

19 So we have feedback from the fleet.

20 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: From the Air Force
21 perspective, we have a formalized program we've been
22 doing since 1992. It's called a "GASS survey." And you
23 may have been exposed to it already in some of your

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1 for a year and a half. We have aggressively developed
2 programs. We'll try to keep them on track for a year and
3 a half, but that's difficult.

4 If you're now in a syllabus where you're
5 now going through radar, you may be integrated with other
6 services and whatnot. Trying to keep that intensity and
7 that physical fitness and whatnot is difficult, so then
8 you may have some disparity of ideas about how the
9 individual arrives.

10 We have a bona fide program now — I'm not
11 sure about the bona fide results, but we have a bona fide
12 program now to oversee this and we have a standard
13 syllabus that we try to infuse in all of our schools.
14 But again, same example: you take an individual that's
15 going into radar from Pensacola, that's a year and a
16 half, the most difficult course they have.

17 They generally spend three or four nights
18 a week in remedial training, whatnot, just to keep up,
19 not even the folks who are getting behind, and so you try
20 to keep that level of instruction. To keep them at the
21 level where they leave boot camp is probably going to be
22 difficult. You've just got to do the best you can.

23 I think on the infantry side of the house

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1 travels, but it's a graduate assessment survey and we
2 send it out and it has two elements of it. One has to do
3 with the military training and background and
4 preparedness, and then the technical skill background.

5 And we have a five-point scale. The
6 standard for the command is at least a 3, which you would
7 expect, but we've been very successful on the military
8 side. The average has been 4.3 or higher. And the
9 technical side is 3.9, right around the 4 area, and we
10 constantly work at trying to, you know, improve that
11 number.

12 So it's a hundred percent survey, six
13 months after they get out in the field. It's been built
14 around this mission-ready training program that we have
15 where we've tried to do more training in our Air
16 Education and Training Command before they go out to the
17 field. Less OJT training initially so that the
18 operational commands can integrate them easier, and we've
19 been very successful in that regard. But we do track
20 that.

21 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.

22 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: I think for the
23 Marine Corps, from the infantry side of the house, we

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1 we're doing pretty well, but I think you've got to keep
2 in mind the OPTEMPO-PERSTEMPO and the demands on the
3 individual commander. I think he's going to probably
4 have concerns about how the — what the level is.

5 But the dialogue is definitely there.

6 And, of course, we have the advantage that all
7 individuals, you know, from infantry in Camp LeJeune, can
8 walk right across the rubber and see SOI. There's a lot
9 of dialogue between the commanders. They know each other
10 well. They live together. And that's the same thing on
11 the West Coast.

12 Our major concern, as I said, is those
13 folks who go off to different schools for varying lengths
14 of time.

15 MS. POPE: I just have a specific comment
16 on 27, which is maintaining the discipline. It's back to
17 Ms. Blair's comment about the continuum. Kassebaum Baker
18 talked about the continuum. And it's just a comment and
19 it's something that I've heard — some of us heard across
20 the services. Not all the time and not all instructors,
21 but a frustration in advanced training that there weren't
22 enough tools for discipline. It wasn't as much of an
23 issue at the basic.

1 And I understand — And I don't want this
 2 interpreted that I'm advocating more security or that
 3 prison mentality we've talked about, but when the
 4 individuals were in advanced schools, the tools — the
 5 discipline tools in particular — and this also applies
 6 for physical standards, to continue the momentum of the
 7 high physical standards — but when there were minor
 8 infractions or behaviors moving towards a major
 9 infraction, that the instructors didn't have as many
 10 tools as they would have liked to have dealt with it as
 11 they do in basic.

12 And I understand that part of the goal is
 13 to mature these individuals, but it was the instructors,
 14 not the individuals, saying that they would like more
 15 tools because part of their job is the product, you know.
 16 And I don't want — These are individuals, but turning
 17 out a product that they're proud of from their individual
 18 services. And so it was — This is just — It's my
 19 comment to each of you, you know, that there was a — it
 20 was a general frustration.

21 The other thing was — and I don't know if
 22 this is policy or is this practice again — that in some
 23 places — and it wasn't across-the-board and it wasn't

1 even in the same installations — that oftentimes the
 2 instructor — and this again is in advanced training —
 3 would deal with discipline issues, behavior issues, as an
 4 entire unit.

5 So you're teaching values and all of the
 6 services' basic values and — but at the same time
 7 discouraging being honest about behavior that they are
 8 aware of where individuals who are breaking the rules,
 9 because they are a tight unit, gets reprimanded or loses
 10 privileges, so that fine line between being mature,
 11 independence, development, and losing liberty/leave,
 12 because somebody in their organization/unit has broken
 13 some rules. And so there's — I know that's in part a
 14 maturing process, but sometimes it forces turning in
 15 those infractions undercover — you know, behind-the-
 16 scenes — because everybody gets punished.

17 So that's just — that's my comment. It's
 18 my observation. And it's all at advanced training.

19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Let me address a
 20 couple of the issues of advanced training because I think
 21 you hit some very, very valid points.

22 One of the really good things about
 23 Kassebaum Baker is, is that we went back and did a very,

1 very hard systematic review of AIT, our advanced
 2 individual training. Well, we started right after
 3 Aberdeen and then moved through with Kassebaum Baker, and
 4 what we really found was, is that we had non-uniform
 5 policies by phase; had grown that way in various schools.

6 And so as we — this last spring, we
 7 reviewed all our policy issues. We now have in place
 8 through TRADOC regulations standardized procedures,
 9 policies and controls by phase, by weeks of training in
 10 the AIT's, and that has been standardized across the
 11 place right now.

12 So I think that's a plus, and I think it
 13 addresses some of the issues that you probably saw out
 14 there.

15 The second thing is, is that the way we do
 16 business inside of AIT's is that there is a shared
 17 responsibility for the production of a soldier out of AIT
 18 between instructors and drill sergeants, and that is a
 19 very — And we had not addressed that before. In fact,
 20 we are addressing that and doing training as to the
 21 shared responsibilities.

22 So that what you had in some places was
 23 instructors dealing with discipline issues in one way and

1 drill sergeants in another, and in some places pitting
 2 the two against one another. Systemically, we are
 3 addressing that in the training of leaders, training of
 4 drill sergeants, in assistance visits, and all those kind
 5 of things, so that, in fact, we can build a team that
 6 says you've got to have instructors and drill sergeants,
 7 co-equal producers of an advanced corps graduate.

8 The third item I would tell you is, is
 9 that staffing in AIT has continually been an issue. We
 10 have gone back and validated over time and various means
 11 the ratios. 1 to 50 is our drill sergeant ratio to
 12 soldiers.

13 But you have large fluctuations in loads
 14 seasonally, and what we have found was that student-drill
 15 sergeant ratio is probably not the criteria, and so we've
 16 got another team out looking at what are the criterias:
 17 number of starts, size of class, numbers at graduations
 18 and pick-ups, length of course, shift work. Some places
 19 where the colonel over here commanded, they run three
 20 shifts: day, swing and a night. Drill sergeants do a few
 21 PT's.

22 So we are trying to address that issue at
 23 this point in time. Probably by spring we will have some

1 better looks at how we want to staff advanced individual
 2 training. And then it may be a resource issue. I don't
 3 know. But those are the kind of things inside of AIT
 4 that are being addressed right now.

5 In terms of discipline, in some cases
 6 there's team tasks that they all have to perform and
 7 there's team discipline at that point in time if the
 8 group doesn't — But in most cases it is individual and
 9 should be, and that's a leadership issue that we need to
 10 continue to address.

11 MS. POPE: Any comments from the other
 12 services?

13 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: I think the AIT
 14 is probably one of the most difficult points because we
 15 control them at boot camp for twenty-four hours, seven
 16 days a week, and we control them at MCT and SOI, School
 17 of Infantry. They're now at the first school. The ratio
 18 now is not 1 to 15. It may be 1 to 15 some times a year.

19 But as the general alluded to, the ebb and
 20 flow of recruiting, we're getting into the tough months
 21 now where the students — high school graduates — will
 22 come out to the school. You may go as high as 1 to 40,
 23 so trying to exact the same type of leadership to

1 ameliorate discipline problems is going to be a bigger
 2 challenge.

3 So I think we've got to be very careful of
 4 the individuals we put out there, and there are in fact
 5 challenges through the course of a year in meeting the
 6 instructor base because of all the other demands of
 7 OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO to meet the requirements.

8 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: The Navy has a self-
 9 imposed problem in our service school command, our
 10 advanced training, where we out-source so many of the
 11 instructor billets that we reduce the military presence
 12 in the schools, and we have gone back to address that by
 13 buying back instructor billets.

14 But over and above that, something I
 15 mentioned — I think this is the third time — our Navy
 16 military training program in the school, where we are
 17 buying billets to bring in military leadership, senior
 18 enlisted leadership, to conduct the Navy military
 19 training, which is both a continuation of basic military
 20 training and a continuation of the physical conditioning
 21 program, and providing role models for these people who
 22 are still in training.

23 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: In regard to the

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1 tool bag, as you called it, I guess, we have more of a
2 concern and more of a complaint at the MTI arena at basic
3 they didn't have enough tools. They had taken away a lot
4 of things in making the Air Force a gentler, more mild
5 place, I guess, but we've learned through the process we
6 need to go back and give them some more authority.

7 But one thing unique about the Air Force,
8 in advanced training, is we have this phased program that
9 we talked about where we actually give people liberties
10 based upon the fact that they've matured in the process.
11 And you can phase a person back, and that's very
12 effective for the MTL's. If you're doing something, you
13 take away liberties. Your curfew hours are affected,
14 whether you can drive in a car, whether you can — you
15 know, what kind of clothes you wear off-station, that
16 type of thing.

17 And we keep them in that controlled
18 environment all the way through their entire training
19 process. So you can be in phase five, which is really
20 almost total freedom, and get phased back to an earlier
21 phase, which really is effective.

22 The group discipline, I've been a
23 commander like — as most have around the table. That's

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1 implemented — for instance, the drill sergeants, the
2 values training, and all that — for specifically of
3 addressing should we continue gender-integrated training
4 or not.

5 That single issue is not being addressed.
6 The issue is that we will continue to train that way that
7 we've been training since '94 now. But I know of no
8 formal process that's being used to determine "yes" or
9 "no" in that area.

10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.

11 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: In the Marine
12 Corps, we certainly aren't looking now to change anything
13 about boot camp as far as separated training. We are in
14 fact looking very closely at things like the Marine
15 Combat Training, how we start the integration, how we
16 start the integration at the follow-on schools and
17 whatnot, which is very important for all of the things
18 we've talked about in the last three hours.

19 But I think we are satisfied. And because
20 of Kassebaum Baker, we went back, of course, and looked
21 at all aspects of our separated training, and I think we
22 are pretty much convinced that the product we're getting
23 for other reasons, and the socialization process, we're

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1 a mixed bag. You've got to be very careful how you do
2 that. You're right. If you don't do it in a proper way
3 — If it's a team effort, if the facilities aren't being
4 maintained, it's a group problem, then you work a group
5 solution, I think. If it's individual, you really ought
6 to target the violators and take care — but not hold
7 everybody accountable.

8 Because you're right, they'll go
9 subterranean on you and you'll never find what's going on
10 in the unit, and you can't afford to do that.

11 MS. POPE: Thank you.

12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I'd like to take a moment
13 to invite the commissioners to look at tabs 1 through 14,
14 which I think we've covered pretty much in our discussion
15 of the Secretary's priorities — they relate to
16 recruiting and training of trainers — and just see if
17 you have any additional questions.

18 And in the meantime, I just took a moment
19 to review our statute and I discovered one provision that
20 I think I may have the right people in the room to ask,
21 and that is a mandate that this Commission review
22 Department of Defense and military department efforts to
23 objectively measure or evaluate the effectiveness of

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1 on target there and we're very satisfied with that.
2 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: We're dealing in the
3 Navy with the given that you're heard before, that we
4 have a gender-integrated fleet, and so our focus has been
5 on training sailors to man that fleet. If we are
6 successful in doing that, then we are successfully doing
7 gender-integrated training, because we're running a
8 gender-integrated fleet.

9 And I think that's sort of an over-arching
10 statement. It's not down in the details, but I think
11 it's the best measure of success that we have. And, you
12 know, personally, I think we've got a great Navy, so I
13 think we're doing something right there.

14 Are we continually reviewing the process,
15 and that answer is yes. I've mentioned that several
16 times during the course of the morning. Our training
17 regime, all the way through until the sailor arrives at
18 the ship from his civilian status, is a process of
19 continuous improvement for us and we look at how we can
20 improve every piece of it.

21 Gender-integrated training, if you were to
22 look at the whole continuum of what we do, is a small
23 part of that training. Very, very important, and we

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1 gender-integrated basic training as compared to gender-
2 segregated basic training, particularly with regard to
3 the adequacy and scope of the efforts and with regard to
4 the relevancy of findings to operational unit
5 requirements.

6 I would just like to ask of each service
7 whether you have any formal or informal ongoing review of
8 whether you should be gender-integrated or gender-
9 segregated, whatever it is that you're not. Do you
10 continue to look into that issue in any way?

11 BRIGADIER GENERAL MELTON: Ma'am, you
12 know, a lot of this started at the completion of the
13 Senior Review Panel that we had and then the Kassebaum
14 Baker was a follow-on to that.

15 Our Chief of Staff has tasked our IG as
16 their — in their routine visits to the field, to take
17 the human relations action plan, which was kind of a
18 combination of the Senior Review Panel and the DEAIG —
19 and then a lot of things that were within the Kassebaum
20 Baker report was also already included in the Senior
21 Review Panel.

22 So the IG, in their visits now, have been
23 tasked to look at these areas of things that we've

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1 absolutely must get it right, but we look at that whole
2 process, including the gender-integrated piece.

3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Thank you.

4 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: From the Air Force
5 perspective, we've been an integrated force for a long
6 time. We've been doing integrated training for almost
7 twenty, twenty-five years. It's been evolutionary. And
8 as a result of that, we think we've been doing it right
9 and we've been successful.

10 As the Admiral said, we're pretty proud
11 about our Air Force. We probably think it's the best in
12 the world, and our service — our military service in
13 general in this country is probably the best. So we must
14 have done something right. I think the biggest pluses
15 are people and the quality of the folks who we bring in,
16 also the training that we've had over time.

17 We're unique in the Air Force in that 99
18 percent of our jobs are open to all genders, and we have
19 truly been gender-neutral and we have no backward look at
20 all in our approach. It's a forward one.

21 And to separate out and see how we're
22 doing, we look at people as airmen and assess from the
23 operational perspective how well they're doing. They

1 come out of training. And the GASS survey is not gender-
2 related. It's how well you do your job, and that's the
3 way we've focused.

4 But we have not done any norming to look
5 to see if in fact they do better or less. But overall, I
6 can tell you, anecdotally, there's no difference in the
7 quality when you talk about the training when they come
8 out the pipeline. If they succeed and they can do the
9 job as well as any other gender, that's all we're worried
10 about.

11 MS. POPE: I have two questions. One
12 deals with attrition and one deals with discipline. And
13 I don't know how much flexibility I'll have on time, and
14 we can spend the next couple of hours — There may be
15 some short answers —

16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Depends on what
17 the question is.

18 MS. POPE: The first one is dealing with
19 discipline, and one of the things we heard across — let
20 me say I heard in my visits — dealing with discipline
21 was that drugs, alcohol, and you categorize "other
22 behavior," came higher on the scope than the gender-
23 related issues. Whether it was consensual sex, whether

1 it was fraternization, harassment, that drug and alcohol
2 continued to be more of an issue. General disciplinary
3 problems.

4 I guess I would like a reaction from each
5 of you —

6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I would tell you
7 that drug and alcohol in basic training and the early
8 phase one through three of OSUT don't exist.

9 MS. POPE: Right. And what I want to say
10 is, I mean, the continuum. So thank you, that's —

11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: But I would tell
12 you that drugs in AIT are very, very small and discharges
13 are very small for that. Alcohol probably continues to
14 be the biggest discipline issue inside of AIT — as it is
15 across our country, I think — for that age group.

16 MS. POPE: And as it relates to gender-
17 related issues?

18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I would tell you
19 that commanders will tell you that alcohol is their
20 biggest discipline issue. That gender inside of AIT is
21 not a huge discipline issue. The fact —

22 MS. POPE: Consensual or otherwise?

23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Consensual or

1 otherwise.

2 MS. POPE: Okay.

3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: And, in fact,
4 attrition inside — If you look at discipline as an
5 indication — at attrition as also a discipline
6 indicator, we have been successful in continuing to draw
7 down AIT attrition over about the last three years.

8 So I think we have a success story in AIT
9 at this point in time with quality training, meeting the
10 training marks, and with low discipline problems inside
11 the AIT, and continuing the physical training process,
12 which failures just are very, very small inside that
13 population.

14 But I think you're right on the money. I
15 think alcohol is probably the major concern and it ends
16 up being first-pass binge drinking kind of issues that
17 they have to watch, they have the train to, and they've
18 got to have — You know, most places have pretty good
19 relationships with people around them, so, you know, you
20 now pick it up.

21 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Without
22 question, ma'am, alcohol is the biggest problem across
23 the continuum, well beyond AIT and the Fleet Marine

1 Force. I don't think consensual sex or any other issue
2 of gender is that big an issue in most, if not all units.

3 But alcohol is an ongoing issue. It has
4 been, and I think it will continue to be. We have made
5 improvements, but it still continues to be. If you look
6 at any instance of disciplinary problems, you can almost
7 bet they are going to be connected to alcohol and
8 whatnot. All violent crimes, almost categorically are
9 connected to some alcohol or drug use.

10 Drug use is not as bad as the norms would
11 have it, but alcohol is still very, very much a problem.

12 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: On behalf of the
13 Navy, I would agree. Our problems with inappropriate
14 sexual contact is a very, very small percentage of the
15 discipline cases that we deal with. And it's true that
16 in almost every one of those — I won't say every one,
17 but in the majority of those cases, alcohol is involved,
18 and alcohol is a catalyst for a lot of the other legal
19 problems that we have.

20 But the inappropriate behavior between
21 genders is not a large part of the problem in and of
22 itself.

23 MS. POPE: Okay. General.

1 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: I would agree. I
2 don't have the data to demonstrate, but I can tell from
3 my anecdotal experience that alcohol does play a factor.

4 I also think financial responsibility is
5 an issue; gets a lot of our troops in trouble because of
6 the pay differential and trying to raise families and
7 things. And using American Express, official government
8 cards for things other than what they should be, that's
9 an issue you have to deal with, but alcohol often is
10 related to even that issue.

11 The sexual issue, you know, you deal with
12 it, but it's not anywhere near the attention and time
13 we're spending on it now. I mean, I'll be very frank
14 with you, it's a lesser issue to most commanders, I
15 think.

16 MS. POPE: Does anyone else want to ask a
17 question before I ask my "attrition" question?

18 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I thought you
19 weren't going to ask your "attrition" question.

20 MS. POPE: Well, I — Okay. The other one
21 deals with attrition, and the services are all working
22 against recruiting goals, attrition from basic, attrition
23 from advanced training, and that balance between or among

1 all of those. And Kassebaum Baker, I think all of you
2 responded to what you're doing to try and tie recruiting
3 goals to basic to advanced training. It's a dynamic.
4 It's a moving target.

5 And I guess, based on time, it may be a
6 long question. But is it being watched closely enough
7 that you're not sacrificing one for the other, and you're
8 pulling them in and you're shipping recruits that ought
9 not to be — I mean — yeah, recruits to — and then
10 what's being lost in the DEP or — and I'll add to this
11 — but in holding and receiving?

12 I mean, I think the complaint we've heard
13 from — versus out —

14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Funny you should
15 ask that. I just was with the Chief on that one. You're
16 talking about a tremendously dynamic —

17 MS. POPE: Right.

18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: — issue. Let
19 me give you the experience over the last year —

20 MS. POPE: And as you do that, the
21 readiness component. That you're not sacrificing the
22 caliber, the training, skill, and the —

23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Let me say what

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1 I truly believe right off the bat. That today we're
2 turning out better soldiers because of values, rigor, and
3 the issues that we've just been all talking about today,
4 than we were a year ago, than we were two years ago, than
5 we were doing three years ago. We are turning out a
6 quality soldier today.

7 Now, what has been the cost of that?
8 Well, in OSUT we have almost — We used to have big
9 attrition problems in OSUT. We have put all of that into
10 OSUT and we have kept attrition at about the same level
11 that it has been historically. We have improved the
12 attrition — lowered attrition — in AIT, while
13 increasing the rigor inside of AIT.

14 Where we have started busting seams a
15 little bit is we have gone from an historic rate of about
16 15 percent attrition inside of — out of all of AIT, to
17 about 18 percent this past year. Where all that
18 attrition has been is in basic training.

19 Now, you ask me why is that, and that's
20 why I get into the issue of the dynamics of the
21 situation. Tough recruiting market. You leave soldiers
22 in the DEP a shorter period of time, and that says if you
23 recruit and ship in the same month, guess where buyer's

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1 historic levels and still produce a quality soldier.
2 I'm not sure that's what you asked, but
3 that —
4 MS. POPE: No — Yes, it was. Thank you.
5 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: I think, as I
6 mentioned earlier on, your success in recruit training
7 and your success in the fleet is inextricably tied to
8 your success in recruiting. If you see a recruiting
9 establishment is going to have problems, you're going to
10 have problems.

11 You can make preparations on the margins
12 in recruit training with attrition, but they're just on
13 the margin. If you've got a successful recruiting
14 program, you're going to have a chance to build up that
15 pool through preparation where they can get through with
16 a great chance of success.

17 And historically, you know, as I mentioned
18 before, I've had a chance to be a recruiter twice. It
19 almost goes without saying: the success you breed in
20 recruiting will be the byproduct of what you get in the
21 Fleet. I think all services experience it. That's not
22 unique to the Marine Corps.

23 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: We have looked at

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1 remorse is? It's not inside the DEP anymore. It's
2 inside of basic training.

3 If you in fact increase the number of
4 GED's that you bring into your service, they attrit out
5 at a little higher rate. They retain over time at a
6 higher rate, but they attrit out of basic at a higher
7 rate.

8 When you now put more hurdles to
9 graduation — we call that rigor — now you have to new-
10 start more people. More people have to make decisions
11 whether they want to take two more weeks of basic
12 training. The more decision points you get, the harder
13 the — So we've gone through a systematic review of that.

14 Have done it over the year, have worked
15 through these issues, and there are ways of reducing
16 attrition back to historic levels, I truly believe,
17 without sacrificing one soldier of competency that's out
18 there in terms of the quality of the soldiers that we're
19 putting out. I don't think the two are mutually
20 exclusive.

21 Control of injuries; continued motivation;
22 keeping soldiers in the same chain of command as long as
23 you can; doing remedial training as opposed to new-start;

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1 our attrition statistics from every viewpoint possible.
2 We follow the trends. We follow the trends inside of the
3 overall trends. What we come up with in every one of
4 those reviews is that we have set a standard against
5 which we measure the recruits and the sailors as they
6 pass through our advanced schools, and based on what we
7 have coming into the school system, we can either live
8 with the attrition that we have, which we think is the
9 right attrition because we're using the right standards,
10 or change the standards, which we're not about to do.

11 Some of these are uncontrollables. They
12 are psychological problems, medical problems, initial
13 entry drug-positive, those sorts of things. Maybe we can
14 control some of that on the front end, the recruiting
15 end.

16 We do have some evidence that we are
17 attriting the right people in the basic training because
18 our attrition in the advanced schools is going down. So
19 I can't make a solid correlation because I haven't
20 studied that enough yet, but that is the indication right
21 now.

22 We are also continuing to study that
23 problem through the first-term enlistment. The Center

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1 if you have to new-start, new-start later in the cycle
2 when they have more invested than early in the cycle; and
3 managing your fitness training units.

4 You know, we had talked about fitness here
5 last week. One of the things that I'm discovering as I
6 go through the analytics of this is that, yes, if you
7 take a bigger group of people into fitness, you can
8 ensure lower injuries and the same rate of graduation or
9 a higher rate of graduation. You also ensure a higher
10 percentage of attrition out of fitness training.

11 And so we're going through a systematic
12 review today with fitness professionals that says, what
13 are the right indicators of success? What should you
14 test and how long should you leave them in the fitness to
15 ensure that you get the maximum output out of that? And
16 we're working through that right now. That's the
17 dynamics of the thing.

18 So I guess in summary I would tell you
19 better quality soldier today. We're paying for it in
20 some attrition, I think because of all the turbulence
21 over the year. And we're still — now start seeing some
22 of the second and third order effects of policies — that
23 we can do some adjustment to bring us back down into

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1 for Naval Analyses is doing a study where they take our
2 input in terms of mental groups that we bring into the
3 service, bring into the Navy, tracking them all the way
4 through their first-term enlistment, so that we get a
5 better handle on attrition on the front end as opposed to
6 attrition later on in the fleet. We're looking very
7 closely at that as well.

8 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: It's a very fine
9 balance, as everyone said. You know, obviously I'm
10 worried about production. I have a production line. I
11 need the put the trainees through the process. So I get
12 the right aptitude, and I will give them the right
13 training and he has the right attitude, I should get him
14 out the end of that pipeline. It's not as easy as that.

15 Historically, through BMT, that's the
16 hardest part of our transition from civilian to military
17 life. It's been averaging about 9 or 10 percent, I
18 think, over the last fifteen, twenty years, and then that
19 hasn't changed any recently.

20 In the advanced side of the house, we're
21 having a harder time recruiting people with the right
22 aptitudes. The Air Force is always, you know, high tech.
23 The Navy, Army, we all have those requirements. But it

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 158</p> <p>1 seems as if we get our numbers and, historically, you 2 watch, our recruiters say we always meet our goal, but I 3 can tell you as a customer we're not always getting the 4 aptitudes in the electronic and mechanical areas. 5 Now, are we sacrificing the product? No, 6 but we're under-assessing it in some areas. We have 7 critical shortages in air traffic control, which is in 8 the heart of our envelope when you talk about flying 9 airplanes, but we're working on that production problem 10 and focusing our attention on recruiting those kinds of 11 people. There are other areas like that as well. 12 And we do have product skills in the Air 13 Force, as the other services have, which are a 14 combination of retention problems and then production 15 problems. Obviously I'm only part of the solution here. 16 But attrition is really a long-term process. If you try 17 and chase it near-term, you're going to go crazy, and 18 we've learned that over time as well. 19 But the bottom line is we don't sacrifice 20 standards for the requirement. And as we downsize, it 21 becomes more and more critical. In the other days when 22 we had — we were 40-percent larger, you could absorb a 23 lot more of that. Now it's critical that you have your</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 161</p> <p>1 (AFTERNOON SESSION) 2 (1:15 p.m.) 3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We'll go on the record. 4 It's Wednesday, November 18th, and the 5 Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender- 6 Related Issues is hearing testimony about physiology, 7 physical fitness and job requirements, and we have Dr. 8 Paul Davis to talk with us this afternoon. 9 Dr. Davis, I'll go around the table 10 quickly. Barbara Pope is going to join us momentarily. 11 Charlie Moskos (Indicating). Fred Pang (Indicating). 12 I'm Anita Blair. General Bill Keys (Indicating). 13 Command Sergeant Major Dare (Indicating). 14 DR. DAVIS: Okay. 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: The procedure we've been 16 following is to hear the prepared presentation 17 uninterrupted, and then we simply go around the table 18 from each commissioner with questions until we run out of 19 questions. So please go ahead. 20 DR. DAVIS: Great. Thank you. 21 You had requested earlier that I provide 22 by way of a short synopsis what my experience has been. 23 I had an educational background in liberal arts, and for</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 159</p> <p>1 people well qualified and trained in the areas that you 2 have them, so it's an issue we're very, very cautious 3 about. 4 In-strength management gets to be an 5 issue. Congress requires you to get to a certain number 6 and all of us deal with that, and sometimes what the 7 services do is recruit what you can recruit, meet your 8 minimum standards, but then you put them in areas you 9 don't need them. You can make a lot of admin people or a 10 lot of personnel people very quick. You know, I have a 11 six-week production line. But to make an air traffic 12 controller, it takes over a year. You can't get there 13 from here. 14 So we have to balance it very, very 15 carefully and make sure we don't lose sight of what we're 16 all about, and that's to make sure we have an effective 17 Air Force. 18 Thank you. 19 MS. POPE: Thank you. 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, we want to thank 21 you all very, very much for taking the time to come and 22 visit with us, and particularly recognize the folks 23 sitting around the room who I know had a big piece of</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 162</p> <p>1 six years taught physical education at virtually every 2 level, kindergarten through college. 3 I received my doctorate from the College 4 of Health and Human Performance at the University of 5 Maryland and was responsible for securing one of the 6 first-ever grants of its type to look at and investigate 7 what were the physical performance requirements for 8 structural firefighting, a topic in which I have a lot of 9 firsthand experience, both as a volunteer and paid 10 firefighter in Montgomery County, Maryland. 11 After leaving the university, I went on to 12 start a research/consulting group and we secured a number 13 of contracts for the United States military, including a 14 validation study for the Marine Corps, looking at all of 15 their environmental overlays for the MOS-0311. 16 We also developed a program of instruction 17 for the U.S. Navy for their Command Fitness Coordinator 18 Training Program and circumnavigated the globe putting on 19 these classes and certifying naval personnel to be 20 Command Fitness Coordinators. I also did a lot of work 21 for the military in looking at human factors and MOP4 22 scenarios, performance degradation in shipboard tasks and 23 the like.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 160</p> <p>1 this. Captain McWatters and Colonel Batten, Colonel 2 Pappa. 3 And I don't mean to omit the Air Force, 4 but it just seems like you don't have somebody local that 5 we bug all the time. 6 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAHR: I must do a 7 good job. 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah, you do. You 9 haven't come to my attention. 10 But we appreciate it very much. And, you 11 know, we've taken the opportunity this morning to 12 compliment folks on many aspects of what we've seen so 13 far and we do indeed mean that. And so we look forward 14 to continuing to work with you in meeting our deadline of 15 March 15th. And thank you again. 16 (Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the hearing in 17 the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at 18 1:00 p.m., the same day.) 19 - - - 20 21 22 23</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 163</p> <p>1 Our efforts also branched out into 2 designing and developing employment criteria for the 3 public safety sector, and validation studies for 4 employment include work for the border patrol, customs 5 officers, FBI, Secret Service, to name a few of the law 6 enforcement organizations, as well as hundreds of fire 7 departments across the country. 8 And in this capacity, I have been retained 9 as an expert in employment opportunity issues in some 10 fifty or so cases, most recently with regard to a case in 11 Philadelphia for the Philadelphia Transit Police, which 12 was a gender-related issue in an action that was brought 13 by the Department of Justice against the Philadelphia 14 Transit Police. 15 Most recently, I have been involved in the 16 management of a sports event marketing company that has a 17 program on ESPN and we provide play-by-play analysis for 18 those broadcasts. 19 And that is a fairly quick synopsis of I 20 guess why I'm here today. I put together an outline, and 21 I'm not going to read this to you but I will give you the 22 highlights. 23 The science of establishing work-related</p>

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1 standards is a fairly new phenomenon, basically came as a
2 consequence of wartime mobilization with large numbers of
3 individuals who were seeking employment in non-
4 traditional areas. So as a science, it is somewhat new.

5 There are four commonly employed
6 procedures for assigning individuals to jobs. One is, of
7 course, have no employment criteria; randomly assign
8 people. Number two is to re-engineer the job. Three
9 would be to train people to achieve the action limits of
10 what the job requires. Or four, to select people whose
11 capabilities exceed the minimum limits of the job.

12 There clearly are advantages associated
13 with each one of these. First off, if I don't have to
14 spend the time to design, develop and administer a test,
15 I save money. The consequences of that, of course, are
16 or can be considerable. And my comments are to be
17 singularly focused on issues related to physical
18 performance requirements.

19 If we assign people without consideration
20 to their capabilities, there is, of course, the
21 possibility of vicarious liability for the employer
22 wherein an employee ultimately fails to perform the
23 essential functions of the job.

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1 play a very large role in what will ultimately become the
2 upper limits of your performance.

3 So said another way, no matter how hard
4 you train, unfortunately most of us are never going to be
5 an Olympian, and, of course, we are captives of our own
6 gene pool. In other words, heredity is going to have a
7 very profound effect as to what we ultimately are going
8 to be able to achieve.

9 The fourth approach, which is choosing
10 your applicants whose capabilities exceed by a wide
11 margin the requirements of the job, is yet another one of
12 those kinds of approaches.

13 I wrote an article recently in Fire Chief
14 magazine wherein I sort of played the Devil's advocate in
15 taking issue with the amount of time that was being spent
16 in recruit training for physical training. And, of
17 course, this was sort of perceived by some people as a
18 heretic speaking: how could a proponent of physical
19 fitness be saying you shouldn't be spending this time on
20 physical training?

21 My point simply being that in the public
22 safety sector, we think people should arrive prepared to
23 do this job; that it should not be the government's

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1 Front page, The Washington Post today:
2 firearms training in D.C. responsible for damages now on
3 the area of something like \$4 million for incompetent
4 officers who are using lethal force and have not been
5 trained to do so.

6 Re-engineering the job is usually one of
7 the more preferable ways to go about this job-person
8 interface. And to cite a personal example, when I was in
9 college I worked as a laborer in the summers and I would
10 unload cement or cinder block trucks. I used to hate to
11 see these things come up on the job. There would be
12 fifteen, twenty tons of cinder blocks that all had to be
13 unloaded one at a time.

14 Well, today, the operator shows up with a
15 little joystick, works the hydraulic lift. Sets the
16 pallet down, bends over to pick up one of the broken
17 blocks and hurts his back. You know, this is one of the
18 consequences of automation — is as we take all the
19 effort out of the jobs, concomitantly the people
20 performing those jobs tend to deteriorate.

21 Some jobs are clearly modifiable; but in
22 the public safety sector, such tasks as grappling with a
23 suspect or in the firefighter scenario where you reduce

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1 responsibility to rehabilitate people to get a job that
2 they were seeking, and the amount of time that could be
3 saved if these people in fact were performing some
4 training on their own would in fact be considerable.

5 But, you know, when you start looking back
6 to what are some of the causative factors, I have to
7 point my fingers at our public school systems. And I'm
8 speaking, as I said, from the perspective of being a
9 former physical educator as well as a parent of two
10 varsity athletes, and our public school systems are
11 deplorable with regard to physical education.

12 We are raising a nation of wimps, of
13 individuals who are incapable of running around the block
14 or even performing a single pull-up. And in this sense,
15 the public safety sector shares the same kinds of
16 concerns that the military has, and that is, what is the
17 farm system for the military and for these arduous jobs?
18 And without any requirements for any type of physical
19 education in our school systems, the consequences are
20 pretty ordained.

21 In terms of looking at what has happened
22 historically in establishing job-related standards, we
23 have gone through a very interesting evolution in about

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1 the activity down to a one-on-one rescue scenario,
2 whether it be a fellow firefighter or a civilian, are
3 always going to require physical personal characteristics
4 that are beyond the grasp of a significant portion of the
5 population.

6 The third approach with regard to the
7 human-job interface is to train people. This falls under
8 the general guise of what's called the General Adaptation
9 Syndrome or GAS. And simply stated, it's a well known
10 physiological principle whereby if I impose a stressor,
11 the body responds and becomes stronger.

12 And basic training, of course, is such an
13 example where we take recruits and, over the span of some
14 several weeks, we prepare these people in terms of
15 training to follow and for the eventuality of combat.

16 There are, of course, finite limits to
17 what we can do as far as improving people's levels of
18 performance and there's a lot of factors that do
19 contribute to that. There's a lot of noteworthy examples
20 in the world of athletics of Herculean performance and
21 these kinds of accomplishments are noteworthy. And, of
22 course, we enjoy watching the exceptional athlete
23 perform, but motivation and your heredity are going to

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1 the last twenty years or so. Dr. Fleishman, who did some
2 of the first work as an industrial psychologist, used
3 best estimates and statistical correlations to show an
4 association between dimensions of fitness and performance
5 on the job.

6 We have migrated to our current situation
7 where we have work physiologists who are empirically
8 measuring actual energy costs of very specific activities
9 and can, with reasonable certitude, pinpoint what are the
10 physical performance requirements for a specific job.

11 However, there is a lot of confusion over
12 the methodology and the imposition of regulatory,
13 statutory and case law. In fact, the federal courts have
14 ultimately become a battleground as special interest
15 groups have carved up the turf and established skirmish
16 lines over who will get these jobs.

17 And, indeed, employment in the public
18 safety sector is viewed as an annuity. Case in point:
19 from a statistical perspective, getting into Harvard is
20 easier than getting a job on the fire department. There
21 are more applicants for the position in the fire
22 department than there are people to go to Harvard.

23 So when you take a job like the fire

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1 department, which ranks among one of the most admired
 2 professions, and the very generous working conditions,
 3 it's not surprising that we have applicants sometimes
 4 outnumbering the number of positions by thousands. New
 5 York City alone will have twenty-some-thousand applicants
 6 for their hiring in one year, which may run a hundred to
 7 two hundred people.

8 So it's really nice to have that kind of
 9 labor pool, but if you would think that there's a lot
 10 riding on the criteria for who gets these plum jobs,
 11 think again. Employing a lot of paradigms, the selection
 12 of your firefighter and law enforcement candidates
 13 frequently ignores the most obvious objective, which is
 14 saving life and property. In other words, the mission
 15 comes in a distant second place to the real reason the
 16 job exists in the first place.

17 And if you look at the history of Civil
 18 Service in this country, which has been quite
 19 interesting, we have moved from a reformation movement,
 20 where jobs were awarded on the basis of the political
 21 spoils system or by nepotism, to a meritocracy system.
 22 We now have a scenario where we've got the champions of
 23 mediocrity advancing an alternative agenda which is based

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1 Bible in the book of Ecclesiastes, and he said, "The Race
 2 is not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong,
 3 but that's the way to bet."

4 So that is my opening statement, and I'll
 5 be more than glad to entertain whatever questions you
 6 might have.

7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Great. Well,
 8 thank you very much.

9 We have had a lot of briefings on fitness
 10 and job performance — actually, more information so far
 11 on fitness — and one of our questions concerning job
 12 performance has been what, in fact, is involved in
 13 developing performance standards to qualify people for
 14 particular job specifications?

15 Can you give us an idea of the methodology
 16 that one would go through in determining what is
 17 necessary for a particular — and it doesn't have to be a
 18 combat job or anything, but just a job that involves some
 19 kind of physical performance?

20 DR. DAVIS: Okay.

21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: What would a scientist
 22 need to do — to study — to be able to develop for an
 23 employer the kind of tests the employer should be

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1 on "pass/fail," which actually dilutes the very desirable
 2 and distinguishable characteristics that we were using in
 3 the first place, to equate with productivity and job
 4 performance.

5 One of the legitimate government functions
 6 is to improve the quality of the workforce, and this
 7 unfortunately has not been the case as some of these
 8 special interest groups have advanced their own cause.
 9 Lowering standards is probably one of the poorest
 10 approaches and is in the best interests of no one. It
 11 casts doubt and suspicion on the very people who would
 12 like to have an equal footing with those people who are
 13 already incumbents, and it also exacts a very huge
 14 economic toll on the public.

15 The science of establishing job standards
 16 is fairly straightforward. It's an approach that has
 17 worked in a host of occupational settings. Evidence of
 18 its success is demonstrated in statistics that show that
 19 a more fit worker will suffer a rate of injury that is a
 20 fraction of the unfit individual. In fact, it's a
 21 quadratic function. If you take the most fit individual,
 22 their incidence of injuries on the job essentially is
 23 half of that of the mean group, which is again half that

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1 applying or should be using?

2 DR. DAVIS: The first step is what's
 3 called a job task analysis. And again, my remarks will
 4 be constrained to physical performance tasks. I pose no
 5 expertise in the social sciences.

6 When we did our Marine Corps study, one of
 7 the things that we wanted to know is what are the
 8 essential functions? And I know you can read the
 9 doctrine of the Marine Corps and you can get a pretty
 10 good idea of what it is that's expected, but what we're
 11 trying to do is divorce ourselves from the Hollywood
 12 impression or what you may have garnered as a consequence
 13 of the mass media.

14 We're interested in knowing the load
 15 factors. What are the expectations as far as distances,
 16 weights and measures? We're interested in looking at
 17 what the environmental overlays are. And in this
 18 particular case, under funding from the Navy Medical R&D
 19 Command, we visited and participated in four Marine Corps
 20 environments. These are schools that I attended, so that
 21 I was totally conversant with what a rifleman is expected
 22 to do.

23 So we look at what are the loads. You can

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1 of the poorest fit group.

2 The other unfortunate aspect of our
 3 championing of mediocrity is the litigation costs that
 4 are incurred when a job action is attempted to remove an
 5 individual or poor performer from the workplace. And I
 6 can vouch personally as to what the costs of some of
 7 these cases have been over just simply trying to do
 8 something with regard to quality.

9 I think that part of the confusion over
 10 the imposition of job-related standards arises from our
 11 misconception of what is in fact fitness. Fitness is a
 12 relative term; fitness relative to what? Yourself? Your
 13 peer group? Your kids? You know, it is a definition
 14 that exists in your own mind and it needs to be nailed
 15 down relative to some sort of a meaningful standard. In
 16 the military, fitness has a lot to do with closing with,
 17 engaging and killing the enemy. It's pretty blunt, but
 18 as they say, that is the job.

19 In this particular environment — and what
 20 I speak of is the military and the parallels that are in
 21 the public safety sector — death will care little for
 22 your age, your gender or your race. It was Damon Runyon
 23 who characterized, I think very nicely, a text from the

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1 look at what the doctrine says as far as what a rifleman
 2 is supposed to carry, and then we go out and measure
 3 what's really happening in the field.

4 Now, of course, we like to corroborate
 5 that. And there's a big difference between a tactical
 6 operation — You'll go out to the Mountain Warfare
 7 Training Center, for example, at Pickel Meadows, or
 8 perhaps the CAX at Twenty-Nine Palms, and be out there
 9 for a week in what's supposed to be a tactical
 10 environment.

11 And we recognize that this is not real
 12 war. I mean, the simulations are attempted to come as
 13 close as you could reasonably approximate. But we
 14 measure what are the loads, what are the distances, and
 15 as a consequence of our investigation — And we went to
 16 the jungle, we went to Fort Sherman in Panama and went
 17 through the jungle warfare school there.

18 It was our considered opinion that the
 19 most hostile environment, the most arduous, would be in
 20 weather, cold-weather operations, and that was what we
 21 essentially said. I mean, if you can do the hard part of
 22 the pyramid, then all the other tasks that would follow
 23 would be reasonably expected. And so it was the election

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1 to look at high-altitude/cold-weather operations that we
2 used to establish our benchmark.

3 Once we had a taxonomy of all these tasks
4 — Marching, for example, with snowshoes, carrying an
5 Alice pack, it ranks so far off the scale it is one
6 little footnote. In terms of protocol and what you
7 expect as far as infantry movement in this kind of
8 environment is a fraction of what a Marine could do on
9 dry land.

10 To give you an example, I had computed on
11 the basis of known data how many calories a minute a
12 rifleman would be expected to expend. In that kind of a
13 scenario, just trying to maintain a reasonable rate of
14 march, you're talking of a number ten to fifteen calories
15 per minute. That cannot be sustained for any period. I
16 don't care who they are. You can't sustain that for
17 prolonged periods of time.

18 So these data are all part of the process
19 of coming up with estimates of cardiovascular or aerobic
20 fitness and the other component, which is going to be
21 your muscular strength components. Muscular fitness, and
22 under that heading we have muscular endurance, strength
23 and power.

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1 But I think that what's important here to
2 keep in mind is, is that from a scientific perspective we
3 can do a fairly nice job statistically to fractionate.
4 In other words, I can slice up and I can say, "Here's a
5 profile of success back at Camp LeJeune," and hopefully
6 that would translate to success in this simulated combat
7 environment. I mean, to a statistical certainty we could
8 do that.

9 One other little interesting finding was
10 that the more fit Marine had better marksmanship skills.
11 We took a battalion of — This is an infantry battalion.
12 And one of the problems you have with the Marines — It's
13 not a problem. What it is, you have forced restriction.
14 In other words, as a group, they're very homogeneous as
15 far as their fitness level is concerned; so your
16 statistical treatment of that data is somewhat clouded
17 because you don't get these very strong correlations
18 because we don't have a lot of variance.

19 But what we found is that the more fit the
20 Marine, the less number of rounds that were required of
21 that Marine to acquire and put fire on the target. And
22 this came as a consequence of a day-long evolution of
23 having these Marines perform a whole sequence of events

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1 that would be similar to running about a half-a-marathon,
2 the energy equivalent of about a thirteen-mile run, which
3 is not out of the realm of the reasonable for combat
4 operations.

5 So, anyway — And I gave Steve a copy of
6 our technical report which had some fairly interesting
7 findings.

8 Bottom line was that the Marine Corps' PFT
9 is a valid predictor of combat performance. Could it be
10 better? Yeah, there's no question we could improve the
11 sensitivity of that instrument significantly, but at what
12 cost? Every time you add another test item and you have
13 to develop all of the other supporting documentation,
14 training or whatever, there's a payback on that. But as
15 far as the classic job task analysis, standards
16 development, our observation, our interviews.

17 And again, to corroborate that, we had two
18 panels of Vietnam veterans that we met at both LeJeune
19 and Pendleton in what's called a Delphi session, to
20 attempt to elicit from these veterans what were their
21 perceptions and what were the types of activities that
22 they were performing, and then overlay those on what we
23 had as far as our modeling was concerned.

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1 So the upshot of the whole deal was that
2 at the conclusion of this thing, we have a fairly simple
3 field expedient test that goes a reasonable distance in
4 terms of answering the question, "Can you do the job?"

5 Confounding variables are attempting to
6 adjust these scores. The Marines still do this. They
7 have age adjustment, and we found there was really no
8 basis for that. I could see a rank adjustment at the
9 level of O-6 and above, but for the most part, a
10 battalion commander is part and party to all the infantry
11 operations. He doesn't have a helicopter. He's going to
12 be out there pounding the ground just like the rest of
13 his men; so it's inappropriate, in my opinion, that you
14 would have an age adjustment.

15 As a matter of fact, interestingly — and
16 this is an area of sociology, but I noticed in two
17 battalions substantial differences in the personalities
18 in the commands. In the second battalion, just to tell
19 you the difference and how this is reflected in the
20 troops, the first guy out of the helicopter when we were
21 set up in our base camp to do the testing was the
22 battalion CO, along with the whole head shed.

23 All the battalion staff were there. They

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1 were not a part of the random selection, but they came
2 out and they participated in this very arduous testing,
3 and, interestingly, were performing — This is a forty,
4 forty-two, forty-three-year-old lieutenant colonel who
5 was performing at levels equal to or better than a lot of
6 the twenty, twenty-two-year-old kids that were a part of
7 this battalion.

8 So the age component of setting standards
9 I don't think really has much basis in fact and I don't
10 think it's — scientifically, it's not supportable.

11 MR. PANG: That's interesting.

12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. Let me just — One
13 follow-up, which I note that, in giving us an example of
14 a job task analysis, you go to a kind of life-or-death
15 type of job, and just to draw back to what you told us at
16 the beginning, there are various ways that you can match
17 people up with jobs. For example, if I'm hiring a
18 receptionist, it's not a life-or-death thing.

19 DR. DAVIS: Exactly.

20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: It probably isn't
21 worthwhile for me to go through the job task analysis.

22 DR. DAVIS: Right.

23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: But there may be other

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1 jobs on the continuum between simple, undemanding, to
2 life or death, that would call for different levels of
3 interest and intervention, if you will, on the part of
4 the employer.

5 DR. DAVIS: Exactly. And that — you just
6 touched on another very important point, and there is one
7 other rating component that we do use in the job task
8 analysis which is called criticality. And this is the
9 example that I like to use a lot because not infrequently
10 in litigation the plaintiffs will attempt to attack the
11 test on the basis of how often is this police officer
12 ever expected to do X, Y and Z?

13 And the point that I — or the example
14 that I like to use is that of a lifeguard. I would
15 venture that most lifeguards have never saved someone in
16 the water but that would not excuse their inability to
17 swim, so swimming would be a highly critical task.

18 Same with police officers and the use of
19 their weapon. I mean, society has adjudged that this is
20 pretty substantial and that it is critical that these
21 people re-qualify on an annual basis, but, again, our
22 surveys of law enforcement show that there's very little
23 use, other than maybe D.C., with regard to lethal force.

1 So the criticality component — What we do
 2 is when we massage the data, if you will, we've got the
 3 frequency with which the task is performed, the
 4 arduousness of that task, and, of course, the criticality
 5 of the task. So it's the interaction effect, if you
 6 will, of those that allow us to essentially define what
 7 will become then essential functions of the job. And the
 8 "essential function" rule is really part of a lot of the
 9 language of the Americans With Disabilities Act.
 10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: I want to — because I have
 12 to unfortunately leave shortly, but — By the way, I was
 13 once a railroad box car unloader. We used to dread
 14 books.
 15 DR. DAVIS: Oh, yeah.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: When those books came, that
 17 was the — that was the back-breaker. I don't know if
 18 they're heavier than cinder blocks or not.
 19 DR. DAVIS: Close. Yeah.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: But a question I have on your
 21 four possibilities on physical requirements for specific
 22 tasks: is there a fifth one, which is two people can do
 23 it instead of one?

1 DR. DAVIS: Yeah.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: And how does, you know — If
 3 you have to lift something, you know, work with the other
 4 four models first, but then there's a fifth model which
 5 is let's have two people do it.
 6 DR. DAVIS: And that's — getting help is
 7 always first — one of the first recommendations and I
 8 would concur with that. And in terms of our looking at
 9 these tasks —
 10 DR. MOSKOS: But I'd say the fire
 11 department thing, it might be possible. Maybe the police
 12 department, grappling — you know, I don't know; maybe
 13 that's categorically different.
 14 DR. DAVIS: Well, interestingly, the fire
 15 department now has moved into the doctrine of what they
 16 call "two in and two out." And if you look at
 17 firefighter deaths, first off, annually, unfortunately
 18 about 60 percent of those come from heart attacks, which
 19 is a medical screening problem.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: 60 percent?
 21 DR. DAVIS: Yes. The rest of them can be
 22 divided between vehicular accidents, and then the final
 23 is —

1 DR. MOSKOS: Is getting burned or
 2 something.
 3 DR. DAVIS: — is unfortunately the blunt
 4 force trauma and that sort of thing that does happen.
 5 And it does happen. I mean, any firefighter that loses
 6 his life is most unfortunate.
 7 But I make a habit of looking at the
 8 heroism awards. Fire House magazine publishes annually
 9 the scenarios of what happened in some of the rescues
 10 that are made. And there was a scenario in I think
 11 Philadelphia where a firefighter became lodged in a very
 12 unfortunately cumbersome sort of a place or position and
 13 it came down to being as not unusually the case that only
 14 one person essentially would have access to pull this
 15 person out.
 16 So, again, with regard to how we look at
 17 the public safety scenario, it is a worst case scenario.
 18 And so the "two in and two out" rule says you don't go
 19 into the burning building without a buddy, but there is
 20 the expectation if you got bumped on the head, that your
 21 buddy is going to be able to pull you out. So ultimately
 22 it does come down to a one-on-one sort of a scenario.
 23 And our methodology as far as the testing

1 is concerned essentially asks you to replicate that
 2 scenario absent the heated environment and super-charged
 3 smoke and all that other sort of stuff, meaning that if
 4 you couldn't do this here on the carpet, then the
 5 likelihood of ever being able to do that for real is not
 6 a likely outcome.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: You would have a
 8 lot more manpower costs if you do two on everything,
 9 though. You couldn't do that.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: Well, that is only in these
 11 extraordinary circumstances. Maybe two would have to do.
 12 You wouldn't have to have two people —
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I'm talking
 14 about a policeman or, you know —
 15 DR. MOSKOS: But two people could be
 16 around, but just as another option.
 17 DR. DAVIS: Well —
 18 DR. MOSKOS: The other question I had,
 19 which is related in a way, is — This is completely
 20 impressionistic. When I look at Chicago city garbage
 21 people, I don't see women lifting garbage cans. And I'm
 22 wondering, is this self-sorting?
 23 Is it — I don't know whether it's in

1 Washington or where other areas are, but — And a lot of
 2 this isn't that heavy sometimes. It's just really
 3 connecting a garbage thing with something else that lifts
 4 it up into the garbage truck. But I said, "Isn't this
 5 strange that I don't see protests about women not being
 6 garbage personnel at that location?"
 7 Sometimes there's a driver, yes, but not
 8 — I don't know. Are there garbage department tests like
 9 the firefighters?
 10 DR. DAVIS: There are, yes.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: There are garbage department
 12 tests? Okay.
 13 DR. DAVIS: Yeah. And we sort of
 14 facetiously were commenting about a colleague who
 15 designed a test for the sanitation department that
 16 everyone —
 17 DR. MOSKOS: Sanitation department.
 18 DR. DAVIS: — everyone passed.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Everybody passed.
 21 DR. DAVIS: So what was the utility of
 22 this test?
 23 But in some locations, though, the trash

1 collection is on contract, so it's like the faster you
 2 get done, the faster you get to go home. And there is
 3 definitely an ascendancy that begins to manifest itself
 4 in that situation.
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Fred.
 6 MR. PANG: You know, just a comment and a
 7 question. You know, from what I heard you describe, I
 8 come away with the idea that you're basically validating
 9 the way the military goes about testing its people. I
 10 mean, you know, because we've talked to some of the
 11 military people and basically what they've told us is
 12 that in our physical fitness standards and the way we
 13 test people and as we take them through basic training to
 14 qualify them so that they can take these tests and for
 15 the most part pass them, what we're doing is trying to
 16 raise these people and sustain them at a certain level of
 17 fitness to be a soldier, to be a Marine, to be an airman
 18 and to be a sailor, recognizing the fact that there are a
 19 wide variety of jobs; you know, some requiring great
 20 physical exertion and others not.
 21 But the bottom line is they may be placed
 22 in situations, you know — For example, a person who is a
 23 clerk, who would have to do — who would be in the field,

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1 who would have to carry a rifle, may have to go on a
2 march and so forth.
3 And the basic argument that they advanced
4 was the physical fitness testing regime that they have
5 adequately measures the ability of these people to
6 perform in those sorts of situations, and that with
7 regard to the specific jobs to which they are assigned,
8 they go through training to learn how to be, you know, a
9 heavy equipment operator or to be a warehouseman or the
10 like, and in the course of that training, that — you
11 know, people are going to be tested in the course of
12 training to be able to do the tasks that are associated
13 with that job, and it would be very expensive to design,
14 you know, physical requirements for every single skill —
15 okay? — that exists.
16 So, therefore, the argument goes, what
17 we've done is probably about the right — about as far as
18 we want to go given the amount of money that it would
19 take to do the other things. Is that kind of a valid
20 sort of approach?
21 DR. DAVIS: I guess I would concur with
22 the following exception. And that is, each branch of the
23 service has their own PT test or whatever it is. I would

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1 compromising the effectiveness of the unit.
2 MR. PANG: You know, you say that, you
3 know, the physical fitness tests excluded 20 percent of
4 both extremes, but is it fair to say — I mean, the
5 services — And I think this was asked of them but not in
6 a direct manner.
7 I mean, you know, the assertion always was
8 that if you're going to be a SEAL, there's a training
9 regime that you go through; and if you don't pass the
10 hurdles — okay? — that are established, you're not
11 going to become a SEAL. Same would be true of an
12 infantryman or somebody in the armor and the like.
13 You know, obviously, you know, when you go
14 to the other extreme — you know, like a yeoman in the
15 Navy or a clerk — I mean, I can't imagine, you know, of
16 what kind of physical requirement you would establish for
17 the job, but I think the physical fitness test that's
18 administered to even those people, you know, basically
19 says you may someday be placed in a situation where
20 you're not going to just be in an office typing but you
21 might be out in the field; you must withstand all the
22 rigors of being out in the field and being a soldier, you
23 know. And is that kind of a reasonable approach?

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1 say that, you know, that's pretty much middle-of-the-
2 road. It probably has a bandwidth that takes care of
3 about maybe 20 to 30 percent on either side, but there
4 are a lot of other MOS's and such for which that is
5 totally inadequate. I don't —
6 MR. PANG: Like SEAL's and, you know,
7 others.
8 DR. DAVIS: Exactly.
9 MR. PANG: Yeah.
10 DR. DAVIS: And I don't think that — And
11 I'm certainly not speaking for the military. I will
12 speak from a scientific perspective — that there are
13 clearly better ways to do this. As I said earlier,
14 you've got cost benefit analyses that you've got to do.
15 I don't think the military has ever
16 represented that these physical fitness tests are
17 predictive of much of anything other than your readiness
18 to engage in some form of training.
19 The project that we were working on for
20 the Marine Corps, the logical extension of that was to
21 look at some other MOS's, and mostly — Well, they were
22 entirely in the combat arms. And I'll tell you from
23 firsthand experience, there are a lot — Well, they're

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1 DR. DAVIS: Well, I mean, those are
2 management decisions.
3 MR. PANG: Yeah.
4 DR. DAVIS: And, you know, I would hope
5 informed people, you know, would be in the loop. My
6 understanding was, from talking to the Commandant on
7 down, that every Marine is first and foremost a rifleman.
8 We don't care if your primary MOS is being a cook or
9 whatever. I mean, you go back and look at the experience
10 in the Chosen Reservoir.
11 MR. PANG: Sure.
12 DR. DAVIS: Everybody out there became a
13 humpty.
14 MR. PANG: Absolutely.
15 DR. DAVIS: So, you know, if you're
16 looking for that kind of versatility, then the common
17 expectation I think is reasonable. On board ship,
18 ostensibly every single sailor becomes a firefighter when
19 you go to general quarters.
20 And to follow on your earlier comments —
21 And I don't know what the testimony has been from the
22 people here in the military, but I know that there's been
23 some very good research that's been done that got deep-

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1 not a lot. There are Marines out there who don't belong
2 in the infantry.
3 You know, case in point: we're at 9,000
4 feet; one of the tasks is you're towing an Ahkio. It's
5 loaded up with all your gear. And there's a Marine there
6 that has to weigh, soaking wet, 125 pounds, and he stops
7 in the traces. This thing freezes to the ground. He
8 absolutely could not move that. He runs; he does
9 everything he can to do this.
10 And the biomechanics of taking — And I
11 don't know why it seems to be that the radio operator is
12 always the littlest guy, but you give him this radio to
13 carry. It weighs about twenty-two pounds on top of all
14 his other stuff. And, you know, life is not fair.
15 Bigger guys can carry more stuff.
16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: He's a smaller
17 target.
18 DR. DAVIS: That's — There you go. I
19 knew there was a reason.
20 But, no, those smaller individuals will
21 hold up a unit. And a lot of times the guys will carry
22 stuff for him or whatever, but my personal opinion is
23 that they shouldn't be there. They're really

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1 sixed because people didn't like the results.
2 But what the Army did I thought was sheer
3 genius. They took three-hundred-and-some MOS's and they
4 found that there were five clusters that could explain
5 every job in the Army with either a high cardiovascular
6 requirement or a high strength requirement. And actually
7 they had gradations, so the permutations of that
8 essentially gave you five clusters.
9 And I was a member of this ad hoc
10 committee that was to study the whole issue of the AFEES:
11 when you got five minutes to sort people in these
12 pigeonholes and the guy comes in and says, "I want to be
13 an airborne Ranger. I want to live a life of danger,"
14 can he do it, and you've got five minutes to answer the
15 question, what could you do? And it's pretty amazing
16 what you could do in five minutes. You can answer with
17 reasonable certainty whether or not this person could do
18 that job.
19 But if you — I'll go back to my Marine
20 Corps example. I think we've got a pretty good handle on
21 what it takes to be a rifleman, but I can tell you like
22 that doesn't necessarily mean that you're going to be a
23 good artillery — Most of the people in the artillery are

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1 big, and there's a reason for that. I mean, you've got
2 to hump ammo. Those shells weigh a hundred-and-some
3 pounds a pop.

4 So, you know, whether or not they're using
5 a natural selection or whatever, I don't know, but I
6 don't think it's a terribly difficult job testing and I
7 don't think that you have to salami-slice this thing more
8 than, as I say, five gradations.

9 I mean, there's a — I mean, a lot of this
10 stuff that's come out — and I've read, you know, several
11 of the books on the Gulf War and I've talked to a lot of
12 the senior officers about their perspective of this thing
13 and a lot of them are saying, "Don't think that this is
14 somehow representative of the next type of conflict." I
15 mean, that was a turkey shoot. But a low-intensity
16 ground war that is basically putting people on the ground
17 is a whole different sort of a scenario.

18 But back to your point. And that is, it
19 is a management decision as to whether or not there is an
20 expectation to have the ability to put people in these
21 collateral kinds of positions.

22 DR. MOSKOS: May I interject and ask?
23 What was the reason those reports were deep-sixed?

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1 put it on. They'll just give you the narration — was to
2 take, if you will, a law enforcement scenario and put
3 this in the context of a representative set of criterion
4 tasks: these are things that agents would be reasonably
5 expected to do. Most of it has to do with a foot pursuit
6 and — This thing should be coming up. This is set up in
7 Quantico. We put this together. And this came in
8 response to Director Freeh's mandate that we — Well,
9 this thing's — There we go.

10 (Whereupon, a video presentation was begun
11 and the following occurred simultaneously.)

12 DR. DAVIS: Okay. The first thing was —
13 what we found is the requirement to scale obstacles. And
14 we're not so literal as it has to be this kind of a wall,
15 but the ability to handle your own body weight in
16 surmounting a barrier.

17 Okay. Next thing is then you've got to
18 run this little course here.

19 Now, as I said, Director Freeh had come
20 down to Quantico. He saw a class — We don't need the
21 volume on this thing if we can turn that off.

22 Okay. He saw this class of new agents
23 which were not selected the normal way. In other words,

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1 DR. DAVIS: Well, my understanding is
2 because it would have demonstrated the likelihood of
3 women going into some of these MOS's was almost
4 nonexistent.

5 DR. MOSKOS: What services are you
6 referring to?

7 DR. DAVIS: Well, the Army, and also the
8 Navy. The Navy had done a very brilliant study. It was
9 done by the Navy Personnel Command out in San Diego, the
10 research command, and, in essence, basically there were
11 five or so shipboard tasks with performance requirements
12 associated with it, and they were very real experiences.

13 I mean, just look at the after-action
14 report on the STARKE incident and what had to be done
15 with casualty management; talking about pump placement in
16 compartments and moving stokes, baskets, you know, up
17 your passageways and that sort of thing. And, you know,
18 I guess the question would come, are we willing to accept
19 the fact that we're going to put people on board ship
20 that cannot perform general quarters tasks?

21 I mean, this is pretty black-and-white
22 sort of stuff, as I see it, and as I say, people don't
23 like the results. You know, it's like — You know,

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1 they had a hiring freeze. And if you were already an
2 employee of the Department of Justice, you could put in
3 for a transfer or, you know, whatever — apply to become
4 a special agent.

5 So we had this class and he looks at these
6 people — just looking at them — and says, "We've got to
7 do something to fix this problem," because apparently
8 there were a lot of them that were very obese. So this
9 was the answer. We're going to have a physical ability
10 test. This is a little zig-zag course which would cover
11 a quarter of a mile, so you wind your way back and forth
12 across these cones.

13 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And that would
14 be — would that be the predictable speed? Or is she
15 simply doing that for the purpose of —

16 DR. DAVIS: No. For demonstration.

17 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. Okay.

18 DR. DAVIS: Yeah, exactly.

19 This test is to answer a simple question:
20 do you have physical abilities that would be consistent
21 with success in effecting an arrest in some small way?
22 And I'll tell you, some of these stories these — some of
23 these agents chase guys. Like one of the ten most wanted

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1 they're not paying me, so I don't — I mean, this is
2 free-ranging stuff here. So...

3 I have one other, you know, classic
4 example of this if I might. This is a physical ability
5 test we did for the FBI, and we did an interview of four-
6 hundred-and-some special agents and it was a survey that
7 we had completed from a whole bunch of field offices.
8 And then I asked each one of these special agents if they
9 would write for me a scenario describing the most arduous
10 thing that they had ever done as a special agent, and we
11 had for the most part a requirement that they had been on
12 the job at least five years.

13 Well, I still have all those narratives,
14 and I thought, "I've got enough here for a TV series that
15 could run a couple years." I mean, it was incredible
16 what some of these agents — I mean, we think of agents
17 typically, you know, wearing suits and coming to court.
18 But a lot of the agents did say the hardest thing they
19 did was carrying evidence boxes into court, but there are
20 agents who are out there doing raids and who are taking
21 people down, you know, and engaging in some pretty
22 unwieldy things.

23 So our point was — You can go ahead and

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1 felons: he chased this guy two miles, caught him. But,
2 you know, that's a little out of the ordinary, but it's
3 nice to know that you've got agents that can do that.
4 All right. So this is an out-and-back,
5 quarter-mile, zig-zag, back and forth across the cones.
6 And what we did is we video-taped about ten agents and we
7 asked them to act like actors. What they are doing is
8 giving me pace ranges that go from the very high end to
9 the ridiculous.

10 And what we did then is we mixed these
11 paces up and we brought in about twenty-some what we call
12 subject matter experts. These are special agents. And
13 we asked them to watch the video tapes and give us their
14 own independent opinion as to what, in their opinion,
15 would constitute acceptable performance.

16 Now, this is the next-to-the-last task
17 here. You pick this dummy up.

18 And this doesn't even approximate having
19 to wrestle with somebody. All we're saying is can you
20 take like 150 pounds and move it a distance of fifty
21 feet.

22 So she'll drag this dummy over the line.

23 All right. Then the last evolution, we

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1 have an inert weapon and you just squeeze off like thirty
 2 rounds in that circle without touching, and this is
 3 predictive of whether or not you're trainable to even
 4 engage in firearms training.
 5 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: After you've
 6 exerted yourself to some degree.
 7 DR. DAVIS: After you've exerted yourself,
 8 exactly.
 9 Okay. That's done.
 10 (Whereupon, the video presentation was
 11 concluded.)
 12 DR. DAVIS: All right. So this is
 13 probably, in my opinion, one of the tightest studies that
 14 we ever did. I mean, we got 400 subjects. We got
 15 twenty-some different iterations of speed and all that.
 16 So I'm talking to one of the women agents
 17 there and I said, "We'd like you to come back and do this
 18 again." She had already done it once. "Would you do it
 19 this time and add a minute," because we had marks and
 20 splits, and she engages me in this argument about what am
 21 I trying to do? And I said, "What we're trying to do is
 22 to give the viewer some ranges."
 23 She was incensed over the fact that we

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1 were somehow going to dummy this test down and I said,
 2 "That's not our intent at all. Our intent is to have a
 3 certain robustness with regard to the selection
 4 criteria." So, anyway, her objection was duly noted and
 5 she wouldn't do it, so finally we got somebody else.
 6 But, anyway, we got a wide variety of
 7 people to come and do this. We had the subject matter
 8 experts watch the video tapes. They voted. The
 9 concordance of agreement was amazing. We had like 85, 90
 10 percent of the special agents said that if you can't do
 11 this in three and a half minutes, you don't belong here.
 12 That was basically what they said. Male, female, it
 13 didn't matter. All right?
 14 So what happens is this thing goes up to
 15 Headquarters and, you know, it's getting staffed out and
 16 all that kind of stuff, so they're going to try this out
 17 on this new agents class.
 18 Well, the test ends up having a fairly
 19 substantial disparate impact on a lot of the women that
 20 were in the class.
 21 Well, interestingly, so did the current
 22 so-called general fitness test which was, you know, their
 23 usual pull-ups. They use — actually do a different

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1 pull-up and all that sort of stuff.
 2 So essentially it mirrored the same
 3 results that they were having, but this apparently was
 4 just too much of a hot potato for the Bureau and they
 5 canned it.
 6 So, anyway, there's a lot of police
 7 departments that are now using this. And in fact, we
 8 went over to Prince George's County. They're using it
 9 there. And we had a woman officer who couldn't — she
 10 couldn't do hardly anything, and finally couldn't get
 11 over the wall. Okay, walk around the wall.
 12 And my son, who was helping me at the
 13 time, who was I think thirteen, flies over, does all
 14 these sort of tasks, infuriating her. And I thought,
 15 "Well, this should be a wake-up call for somebody." You
 16 know, these are not unrealistic and unreasonable
 17 expectations for a person who would call themselves a law
 18 enforcement officer.
 19 So —
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Have you talked
 21 to anybody with like NYPD as to their number of
 22 incidents?
 23 DR. DAVIS: Oh, yeah.

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: They have a lot?
 2 DR. DAVIS: I had a very interesting
 3 experience with NYPD. My goodness, that was — We were a
 4 bidder to do their test for them. And essentially they
 5 were looking for the solution, and that is, the test that
 6 doesn't have a disparate impact. So why bother?
 7 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Doctor, I'd
 8 like to go back just a minute on the question that Fred
 9 asked you because I think I understood you to say that
 10 having looked at Marine Corps infantry —
 11 DR. DAVIS: Right.
 12 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: — and looking
 13 at the general Marine Corps physical fitness test.
 14 DR. DAVIS: Yes.
 15 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: The running,
 16 the pull-up, the sit-up, if you will. That that was a
 17 pretty good measure of predictability in that arena —
 18 DR. DAVIS: Right.
 19 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: — right?
 20 DR. DAVIS: Yes.
 21 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: So if that is
 22 the case, then the other services have pretty similar
 23 tests. I mean, all the services now are basically doing

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1 two- to three-mile run. They're doing push-ups and/or
 2 pull-ups, and they're doing sit-ups or curls.
 3 So, again, back to what Fred asked, would
 4 it be your opinion, then, that, generally speaking, when
 5 you're trying to administer to a large group of people
 6 and determine some degree of predictability of health and
 7 fitness, that that's a valid method of doing that?
 8 DR. DAVIS: Yes.
 9 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 10 DR. DAVIS: It is.
 11 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Then I'd like
 12 to go to the next thing. And I understand what you said
 13 about age-norming. I would also tell you that if you go
 14 to the light infantry in the Army and the Ranger regiment
 15 in the Army, they would totally agree with you. They
 16 don't get wrapped around the axle about gender, but they
 17 don't understand why the platoon sergeant doesn't have to
 18 do the same thing as the rifleman.
 19 DR. DAVIS: Especially when he's out there
 20 two steps behind him.
 21 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Exactly.
 22 DR. DAVIS: Yeah.
 23 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: But I would

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1 like to get your thoughts on gender-norming, because the
 2 military does gender-norm, and whether gender-norming
 3 makes sense and whether there can be a degree of fairness
 4 associated with gender-norming.
 5 DR. DAVIS: Well, first off, "fairness" is
 6 not a statistical term. Fairness exists in the eye of
 7 the beholder.
 8 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: That's right.
 9 DR. DAVIS: So, you know, there's no way I
 10 can really address the — Try to transpose that to a
 11 scientific term. "Objectivity" would be a better term.
 12 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 13 DR. DAVIS: In other words, I get the same
 14 results. You know, it's the same platform. That's as
 15 best I can do to say the test is fair.
 16 You can't make a task fair. All right?
 17 If I say, "You've got to take that hill and you're going
 18 to have to do it on snowshoes," I can't make that fair.
 19 The task will ultimately discriminate.
 20 So if we're talking about fitness relative
 21 to job performance, the norming approach is
 22 inappropriate. The task defines, if you will, or will
 23 dictate the outcome.

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1 So I can't say — I mean, firefighting is
 2 replete with this. The fire doesn't care what your
 3 gender is. If I put you in turn-out gear, a firefighter
 4 has to wear fifty pounds of equipment. That's their
 5 uniform. That's their business suit. That's what they
 6 have to wear in order to survive. They carry their own
 7 air supply with them.
 8 So I can't say to a female firefighter,
 9 "Well, because you're female, I'm going to somehow change
 10 the dynamics of the job." We don't give them a littler
 11 air supply or whatever. Their gear is going to weigh
 12 pretty much the same and all the equipment that they
 13 carry is going to be appropriate.
 14 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, could
 15 you then establish — Boy, this is probably a real tough
 16 question. But you have minimum standards for something.
 17 I mean, I think most people would accept there's got to
 18 be a minimum standard at which you have to work to move
 19 up. So could you establish a minimum standard, take out
 20 gender-norming, and feel confident that that would still
 21 be an objective test?
 22 DR. DAVIS: Oh, yeah.
 23 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Let me give

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1 you an example. For example, the two-mile run in the
 2 Army. I think the standard now is, for a seventeen- to
 3 twenty-one-year-old male, he has to run it faster than
 4 eighteen minutes. For a female, it's twenty-one minutes
 5 or quicker.
 6 If you were willing to say as an
 7 institution we're going to accept twenty-one minutes as a
 8 minimum standard for soldiers, put everybody into that
 9 category, you would still have an objective test, do you
 10 think?
 11 DR. DAVIS: Well, the test is still
 12 objective. Okay? As long as I've got numbers that come
 13 out of it and I'm testing everybody the same way, I've
 14 got an objective tool. The question that begs to be
 15 answered then is what does this tell me? All right?
 16 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: That's right.
 17 Okay.
 18 DR. DAVIS: So the ability to run two
 19 miles in whatever number of minutes has to equate to
 20 something.
 21 Now, it just so happens in the area of
 22 exercise physiology, we can take your time to run that
 23 and we can extrapolate that you have an oxygen uptake of

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1 X or Y or whatever, and what happens is that the
 2 distractors will try to dwell with these numbers.
 3 I call it the research design approach.
 4 That is, we control — If we can control for your weight,
 5 your gender, your age, and we can somehow look and say —
 6 And that's exactly what the PT tables do right now. You
 7 can get so many points; you're going to max the Marine
 8 Corps PFT, 300 points; and we have a scale and we can
 9 adjust this thing. See?
 10 And, you know, I do this as well. I mean,
 11 we have a sports event on ESPN called the "Firefighter
 12 Combat Challenge," and we have categories because it is a
 13 sports event, but, ultimately, in the real world, those
 14 differences do account for something. And when you take
 15 the world record right now, it's one minute and twenty-
 16 nine seconds for accomplishing it — and I do have a
 17 little press clip on that I could show you — you get a
 18 feel for the incredible variations that do exist as a
 19 consequence of what people possess as far as their
 20 natural abilities.
 21 And I think one of the clear distractions
 22 of the so-called gender-norming is that it does tend to
 23 demoralize people when you're trying to somehow say this

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1 person, who did half the amount of work that you did, is
 2 essentially at the same level as you are. And so it
 3 really has to go back to what is the purpose of a test?
 4 If you're going to a health club — You go
 5 over to Bally's or whatever and they'll do a fitness
 6 assessment on you. Your interest there is really, "Well,
 7 how am I relative to other people my same age and sex?"
 8 It's a natural — We all want to know. How are we
 9 clustered here around the mean, and how many standard
 10 deviations and all that sort of stuff? That's of a
 11 personal interest to me.
 12 But the problem is then trying to take
 13 that and then extrapolate and say, "Well, that means that
 14 you can do X, Y and Z." And here's — anecdotal: I'm in
 15 Denver. We're going out to dinner. There's a bunch of
 16 people from the fire department. One of the female
 17 firefighters is commenting.
 18 She's on a world class volleyball team.
 19 No question, she's quite an athlete in her own right.
 20 And she's complaining about the fact that in her
 21 department there is a physical performance test that they
 22 have to take, and by most any measure of fitness that you
 23 want, whether — I don't care — you want to talk about

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1 body fat or you want to talk about the aerobic capacity
 2 or how many push-ups or what her flexibility is or
 3 whatever, she is so far off the curve, you know, as to
 4 warrant significant recognition.
 5 So she says, "You know, this isn't fair."
 6 I said, "What's not fair?" She says, "This test." And I
 7 said, "Why is that?" She says, "Well, because there are
 8 guys in our department who don't do anything. They sit
 9 there. They watch the television. They're big; they're
 10 fat. But they come out there and they can go right
 11 through this test, and this test, for me, is very, very
 12 hard." And so, therefore, the test has got to be flawed,
 13 see?
 14 And I said, "Well, what's the test?" And
 15 the test is job requirements. Put on your turn-out gear,
 16 carry hose to the fifth floor, pull up a donut roll of
 17 hose, use this shop mallet to pretend you're chopping,
 18 drag a dummy.
 19 Okay. So the complaint is that the test
 20 is now biased against women because it has a disparate
 21 impact.
 22 Well, "bias," that is a statistical term.
 23 I mean, there is an outcome that is disproportionately

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1 disadvantaged for women as compared to men, but that is
 2 in fact the job. So you put this back in the context now
 3 of a real-life scenario where we've got a fire, and this
 4 is — We're on the ninth floor, which is going to be very
 5 hard for most ladder trucks to even reach up here. Okay?
 6 And so smoke is blowing out here, and we
 7 take this window out and we see this ladder coming up and
 8 we're looking down there. I don't — I'm not asking that
 9 firefighter, "How many push-ups can you do" or "What's
 10 your V02 max?" That becomes irrelevant at that time.
 11 The relevant thing is can you get my rear-end out of here
 12 and down that ladder, you see? And that's where — You
 13 know, you say that's not fair? That's life, life in the
 14 extreme.
 15 But the question is simply one where if we
 16 have a test that is supposed to measure something, what
 17 in fact does it measure? And as I said, just by knowing
 18 that a Marine can run three miles tells me an awful lot.
 19 And that's one of the reasons I always liked the Marine
 20 Corps, because they were not ambiguous about fitness.
 21 You know, it's like every time we come
 22 back from one of these operations and stuff, I mean, they
 23 want to know, how can we be better? It wasn't like, how

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1 close can I get to the point where the rivet breaks? It
 2 was like, where do I need to be?
 3 And my understanding was, when the Marine
 4 Corps was looking at an issue of running, they said,
 5 "We'll do three miles." And that's something you have to
 6 take kind of seriously, because a mile-and-a-half, you
 7 can sort of hold your breath. You know what I mean? You
 8 don't take that real serious. And I see a lot of guys go
 9 out there and they run through it, and then they throw up
 10 afterwards and say, "Well, I got that over with." But
 11 three miles, you know, you have to kind of work at that.
 12 But, anyway, all of this is going to have
 13 to be — as I see it, there should be some audit trail
 14 that takes you from the test, to extrapolate to some job
 15 function.
 16 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 17 DR. DAVIS: If I might just show you this
 18 one little piece, this is from Channel 4 in Boston. It's
 19 a little news piece which I think does a pretty nice job
 20 of putting this in the context of sort of the practical.
 21 And just by way of a little bit of
 22 background, the Firefighter Challenge grew out of a FEMA
 23 grant that we received when I was at the University of

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1 right now, but, essentially, everything that we have
 2 done, we've got a very nice audit trail as far as the
 3 background and the science.
 4 That's enough on that. Thank you.
 5 (Whereupon, the video presentation was
 6 concluded.)
 7 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Doctor, have
 8 you formed an opinion if law enforcement and firefighting
 9 — have they made concessions to accommodate women to the
 10 point that it has in some cases degraded the ability for
 11 that unit to safely perform?
 12 DR. DAVIS: Yeah, it has.
 13 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: It has?
 14 DR. DAVIS: It has. Indeed, yeah. It's
 15 unfortunate because in the sort of relentless pursuit for
 16 diversity, the mission unfortunately has come second. A
 17 bottom line orientation that we will throw away the
 18 obvious and substitute for that alternative selection
 19 criteria.
 20 A study done — survey study — in
 21 California, fire captains had a — like a 46-percent vote
 22 of "no confidence" for the women that were working under
 23 their command.

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1 Maryland. And the purpose was to design a test, but
 2 firefighters, being very competitive, soon turned this
 3 into a contest. And we now put on about eighteen, twenty
 4 of these events each year, the last of which is
 5 broadcast, and it will be shown on ESPN on January 2.
 6 But it's turned into quite a phenomenon
 7 and it's having a very positive effect as far as fitness
 8 is concerned. But I think one of the reasons why is it's
 9 high-fidelity to the job. It masks — It mimics very
 10 nicely the job.
 11 (Whereupon, a video presentation was
 12 played.)
 13 DR. DAVIS: I have one other short segment
 14 if you don't mind. This is just to show you some of the
 15 methodology that was used to look at what are the
 16 underlying dynamics — the kinetics, if you will — of
 17 energy, metabolism to performance.
 18 (Whereupon, a video presentation was begun
 19 and the following occurred simultaneously.)
 20 DR. DAVIS: We did a cooperate study
 21 between the cities of Saint Paul and — We don't need the
 22 volume on this one.
 23 Okay. What we're doing here is we've got

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1 There's clearly some prejudice that's
 2 probably operating there, but I know personally of some
 3 — several scenarios; one, in fact, that did happen in a
 4 city that we were doing some work for where the female
 5 could not open the hydrant and there were two children
 6 who were trapped in a building.
 7 A pumper will carry 500 gallons of water,
 8 which will last for a few minutes as far as the initial
 9 attack, and after that, you've got to have re-supply.
 10 The fire pump operator had to sprint down the 300 or so
 11 feet of hose that was on the ground. He personally was
 12 able to open the hydrant with one hand, while she was
 13 sitting there crying over her inability to do that, and,
 14 yet, she received a citation just as the rest of the crew
 15 did.
 16 And that's — you know, that does not
 17 advance the cause of women by any stretch of
 18 imagination, particularly when you do have competent
 19 women that can do some of these jobs. There are not a
 20 lot of them, but there are certainly some women that can.
 21 But I think what happens is, is that the
 22 women who are performing successfully resent greatly
 23 suspicions that are cast at their gender as a consequence

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1 — these are female firefighters from the City of Phoenix
 2 and we have rigged up a gadget that allows us to capture
 3 the expired air in those meteorological balloons.
 4 So, in essence, what's happened, she's
 5 doing the exact same thing that we were doing in this
 6 competition. And then those balloons, they'll fill up
 7 like one of those goats they use to clean up the parking
 8 lot.
 9 And we take those and we'll use an
 10 analyzer back at our lab to look at the percentages of
 11 carbon dioxide and oxygen, and that way, we can
 12 extrapolate. We know exactly how much energy or convert
 13 it into calories or liters per minute or whatever.
 14 Then the last thing that's done at the
 15 conclusion of this is then we will then take a little
 16 prick off the finger to get the blood lactate levels, and
 17 that is very important information because it does give
 18 us a very good picture as to what is the relative status
 19 of this individual pursuant to their personal level of
 20 fitness, and then in the aggregate, as far as
 21 establishing what the overall demands of the job are.
 22 You can do this for — You know, this is a
 23 bit involved. There are some easier ways to get to it

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1 of standards that are lowered. Just back to this one FBI
 2 agent who was just absolutely livid over the placation,
 3 if you will, of somebody's political agenda.
 4 MS. POPE: I just — I apologize for being
 5 late. But along Bob Dare's question, are there any of
 6 the fire departments that you've worked with that have
 7 started to fix that or address it, where well-meaning
 8 modifications have caused them — caused impact and are
 9 now correcting the standards so that it's — I forget the
 10 exact term used, but the actual job requirements?
 11 DR. DAVIS: Yes. This is a matter of
 12 public record. There's a case I'm involved in right now
 13 as an expert and Civil Service — This is the City of
 14 Spokane. Civil Service has a "pass/fail" for the fire
 15 department and it was — the line was specifically drawn
 16 to accommodate women. All right? So we have a recruit
 17 class and I think it numbered about eighteen, of which
 18 there were about maybe four — four or six of the class
 19 were in fact women.
 20 Well, there are marked requirements. In
 21 other words, the fire department is sort of at the mercy
 22 of Civil Service. They send us the people and then we've
 23 got sixteen weeks in which to try to make something of

1 these people and one of the females did not meet one of
2 the marked requirements, which is essentially a facsimile
3 of this particular test.

4 And if you look at her performance
5 records, consistently she's taking almost twice the
6 amount of time as the median of the class. So she failed
7 the requirements and now she's suing, and she's suing on
8 a gender — it's gender discrimination.

9 Well, I mean, statistically, what can you
10 make of one woman out of four? I mean, "We have three
11 others that could do it. What's your problem?" And I
12 guess, as a colleague of mine said, I mean, how low do
13 you want us to draw these standards to the point where we
14 say it's not our fault; it's actually your fault? And
15 therein lies the problem.

16 And as I said earlier — It's kind of
17 interesting. This will be a jury case. And in that
18 regard, I feel very confident because those are the
19 people that are paying for the service.

20 And in the deposition that went on
21 yesterday, the opposing expert's in there and he's trying
22 to give this cock-and-bull story about, well, the size
23 doesn't matter, and all that sort of stuff. And at the

1 hose up the stairs.

2 So, you know, that doesn't serve, you
3 know, any great benefit, you know, to women or to the
4 public to do those sorts of things.

5 MR. PANG: But I don't know of any service
6 where that would be the case. I mean, the military I'm
7 talking about now.

8 You know, when we talk about being able to
9 function, you know, I think there's a level — okay? —
10 which is what you would require everyone to reach. I
11 think there's a great danger of going to the highest
12 level and saying, you know, I mean, maximal performance.
13 I mean, there is no way — okay? — that you're going to
14 take the best Olympian, who's male, and the best Olympian
15 who's a female —

16 DR. DAVIS: And say that defines our — I
17 agree. Yeah.

18 MR. PANG: I mean, you can't do that. I
19 mean, you know, so that's — But there is — the valid
20 point is that, you know, if you're going to be a soldier,
21 a Marine, or an airman or a sailor, you need the meet
22 certain levels — okay? — and, you know, regardless of
23 gender. And if you can meet those levels, then you're

1 break, the court reporter says, "It sure does."

2 You know, I mean — And I had another
3 similar scenario. We had a case that's going on right
4 now in Miami, Dade County, and the NBC affiliate called,
5 would I do an interview here for them? So I said "fine."

6 So one of the news reporters at WRC is
7 taking me over there to the studio and she said, "What's
8 this all about?" And I told her, and she says, "You
9 know, I live on the twenty-second floor of this
10 building." And she says, "I'm probably as much a
11 feminist as anybody, but," she says, "I'll tell you, if
12 it comes down to this, I want the biggest, baddest-
13 looking firefighter that I can find coming up those
14 stairs."

15 So it's kind of interesting. When you put
16 this in the perspective of the consumer, which is going
17 to be the jury, I think the outcome is going to be pretty
18 straightforward. I mean, when you start messing with
19 people's lives, I think the social agenda is really out
20 of kilter.

21 MS. POPE: But some of the firefighters —
22 I mean, Spokane and — I don't know what will happen in
23 Miami, but are starting to look at holding that standard?

1 confident that this person can be, you know, a soldier, a
2 sailor, Marine, or an airman, recognizing the fact that,
3 you know, the job variation is enormous, I mean, with
4 regard to physical fitness and — not physical fitness,
5 but with regard to strength and endurance and, you know,
6 the fact that we're not at war all the time.

7 I mean, you know, so that's the dilemma
8 that I think the military finds itself in. I mean, you
9 know, how do you draw that line? I mean, you know, I
10 think I agree with you. I mean, when you — you know, if
11 you want to link physical — you know, the so-called
12 physical fitness tests to performance, then I suppose,
13 you know, you need to design tests that say that Fred
14 Pang, when he takes this test, can be a soldier under,
15 you know, most circumstances.

16 I mean, I don't think you can say all
17 circumstances because if you said all circumstances, then
18 I would have to do everything at the extreme. In other
19 words —

20 DR. DAVIS: Yeah.

21 MR. PANG: — you know, where I'm sleep-
22 deprived, in cold weather, heavy loads, under extreme
23 duress, and the risk of being killed and under fire and

1 DR. DAVIS: Well, Miami is a reverse-
2 discrimination suit. We have sixty males in a class
3 where the standard was lowered to eight minutes on a
4 test. In this news piece, which is five years old now,
5 the record there was 2.03, now 1.29, with an average time
6 of guys doing this now — We had a — This last year,
7 with a couple thousand competitors, I think two or three
8 hundred of them went under two minutes. Okay?

9 Our fastest woman is at 2.28. That's the
10 world record for women, which is pretty noteworthy. But,
11 I mean, statistically speaking, she's so far out. I
12 mean, you know, I would hardly think that, you know, you
13 could use her as the norm.

14 But what happened in Miami is that they
15 kept moving the number back. I mean, eight minutes is a
16 joke. It's a travesty. It's an insult. And then
17 there's evidence that there was fraud committed with
18 regard to them even passing.

19 I'll tell you another example, and right
20 here in Montgomery County. It became widely known that
21 if you couldn't pass the test, sit down and cry, and you
22 would get a job. This is a friend of mine who was — He
23 was told by Personnel "put her on." She couldn't get the

1 all that. I mean, and I don't — you know, so that's one
2 extreme. And you've got the other, which is just every
3 day life. And in order to sustain that level, that
4 extreme level, I mean, it would take an inordinate amount
5 of training.

6 DR. DAVIS: Yeah. You know, I think the
7 survey of the MOS's in the Army was — fully 25 percent
8 of those jobs had no requirements, just a warm body,
9 something a little bit above room temperature to do the
10 job.

11 MR. PANG: But, see, you can't use that as
12 a indicator either. I mean, you need to get it —

13 DR. DAVIS: No.

14 MR. PANG: You know, because these are —
15 people who do that are soldiers. I mean —

16 DR. DAVIS: And these are — I mean, they
17 are perplexing problems. And it goes back to what I said
18 earlier, and that is, unfortunately — or whatever — I
19 mean, the military is going to be a product of, for the
20 most part, our public school systems. And what are they
21 giving us? It's pretty deplorable. It's a pretty
22 deplorable product.

23 And so, you know, what are you going to

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1 do? Now you're going to take people whose, you know,
2 main function in life has been working the clicker or
3 working a joystick on some video game and saying, "Now
4 we're going to have to really put out and do some hard
5 physical work."

6 Yeah. I mean, you're always going to be
7 linked back to, you know, what you have as far as your
8 labor pool, and that's a dilemma.

9 MR. PANG: You know, I think, you know, as
10 commissioners, we've been out there witnessing what young
11 people go through, you know, at basic training, and it's
12 remarkable, I mean, you know, when you look at those
13 people who have been there just a few days and the people
14 who have been at — who are at the end of their twelfth
15 week or at the end of the sixth week.

16 I mean, it's remarkable what the human
17 body can do, you know. Because when you look at an
18 individual, how many, you know, pull-ups or sit-ups they
19 could do and how fast they can run at day one versus, you
20 know, fifteen days or, you know, thirty days later, I
21 mean, it's just — you know, I was pleasantly surprised,
22 quite frankly.

23 MS. POPE: I just want to comment on the

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1 some particular physical requirements.

2 DR. DAVIS: Right.

3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And I would like to know
4 if there's a scientific method for developing what those
5 predictors should be. And maybe I'm being a little too
6 abstruse in this question. The suggestion has arisen
7 that we add flexibility measures to the existing fitness
8 requirements in the services. And I wonder, how would
9 you go about deciding if flexibility means something or
10 not towards a particular end or any kind of factor like
11 that?

12 DR. DAVIS: Yeah, that — I mean, that's a
13 very good question. We did a study for AT&T and their
14 largest wire-works where they make more wire than
15 anywhere else in the world, and part of this was to try
16 to evaluate whether or not a measure such as flexibility
17 would have some predictive value on subsequent injuries.

18 And the data were promising, but not like
19 other measures would be. In other words, we're looking
20 for — What you do is you take and look at all your
21 worker's comp injuries, and then correlate that against
22 some of these other predictors. And we had data on
23 virtually two-thousand-and-some employees over multiple

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1 product of what's coming out of or going into the
2 military. I have kids in school. And I just need to say
3 that maybe Montgomery County is different, but in our
4 elementary school, for a one-mile race, I mean — And
5 this is not one or two kids. This is — You know, all
6 the kids are competing. The top five times were under
7 six and a half minutes for a mile, and the second time
8 was a female.

9 So I think the schools are responding to
10 the country's — not just the military — saying we need
11 to be physically fit. I mean, I'm seeing a lot of
12 emphasis in the school —

13 DR. DAVIS: Which school system would this
14 be?

15 MS. POPE: Montgomery County. I'm just
16 saying that it's not —

17 DR. DAVIS: You lucked out.

18 MS. POPE: Yes.

19 DR. DAVIS: I mean, you know —

20 MS. POPE: Maybe it's the D.C. area, but,
21 I mean, the times were well under seven-minute miles.

22 DR. DAVIS: Yeah. I was shocked. I mean,
23 I belong to the open, you know, school and all this

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1 years and the flexibility was not statistically
2 significant. But the trend, the trend was in there.
3 Now, when you want to talk about dollars,
4 it made a big difference. But from a simple "T" test or
5 whatever — in other words, trying to show you
6 statistically — I couldn't say. But, I mean,
7 management's more interested in the money than they are
8 in what at statistical correlate coefficient was.

9 So it was of some value. That's how you
10 would go about doing that. I mean, I've always sort of
11 believed that, you know, you should have a reasonable
12 range of hamstringing mobility as demonstrated by like a
13 sit-and-reach test or whatever. I just thought, you
14 know, it's not that hard to administer. It's probably
15 okay. But I wouldn't — you know, it's not one of these
16 career-ending kind of things that I would, you know,
17 rally behind.

18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: So, in effect, it would
19 be a mix of the science demonstrating whether there's a
20 correlation and, if you will, sort of the operational
21 people figuring — and the definition of the job,
22 figuring out whether —

23 DR. DAVIS: Yeah. And I —

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1 stuff, and I go into the — when my son was at middle
2 school, and this is the PE department. I'm looking at
3 these people, thinking, "What kind of role models are
4 these? They can't see their toes."

5 And what logically follows from that — I
6 think there should be mandatory fitness tests for PE
7 teachers, frankly. If you can't do — I mean, how could
8 you practice this stuff — or preach it if you can't
9 practice it?

10 But it is — you know, when you start
11 talking about high school, one year now of physical
12 education and that's it, unless you're in varsity. So I
13 think it's a big problem. The data says that we've got
14 kids more obese now than ever any time in our history.
15 If there ever was a mobilization for the draft or
16 whatever, I think we'd be in a hurt locker.

17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Dr. Davis — I was just
18 getting beeped. Sorry.

19 I have a couple of questions. One is you
20 referred a few minutes ago to certain predictors —

21 DR. DAVIS: Yes.

22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — that might be sort of
23 a shorthand for determining generally if somebody meets

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1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — whether it's kind of
2 worth looking into, and then the science can look into it
3 and confirm or reject the hypothesis that it may mean
4 something.

5 DR. DAVIS: Right. Yeah. I mean, it's
6 just the same way right now with regard to push-ups and
7 sit-ups and all those other sort of things. Every time
8 — Every single time that we have done a criterion-
9 related validity approach — in other words, we look at
10 performance on surrogate tasks — I mean, these are the
11 real tasks but they closely mirror.

12 When we look at performance on those tasks
13 and we correlate those against the fitness profile, there
14 is explained variance. In other words, I do have some
15 predictive value. But I'm able to predict about half of
16 the performance. That means half of it is not explained.
17 There are other factors.

18 And when I was talking about this thing
19 with the Marine Corps, one of the things that we found
20 sort of serendipitously was that I said — You know, I
21 worked on a couple of amphibious operations and sometimes
22 guys fall in the water with all their deuce gear on,
23 their Alice pack or whatever, you know, and what does

1 that mean from a practical perspective? So we asked, how
2 many Marines could do one chin-up with twenty-five pounds
3 on?

4 Now, there's a real job-related kind of a
5 deal because the idea was there you'd have to pull
6 yourself up over a mike-8 boat or something like that.
7 We had about a 33-percent failure rate on that task,
8 which means that they don't have the strength to move
9 themselves and their own body weight. So that's — I
10 think that's noteworthy.

11 So we move — In other words, doing a
12 chin-up, for example, is kind of a blend of a muscular
13 endurance-muscular strength item. When I add twenty-five
14 pounds, now I'm moving more in the dimension of strength,
15 and I find, hey, we've got a pretty high failure; we
16 should probably be focusing on this. It has some
17 diagnostic value.

18 And that's one of the benefits of tests,
19 of course, but unfortunately a lot of people view these
20 as sort of needless intrusion. I mean, "Why do I have to
21 do this?" You know, "What's this got to do with
22 anything?"

23 And, yeah, I mean, if you're sitting

1 advantage the military does have. Because it doesn't
2 have unions or outside advocacy groups, that if it sees
3 fit that it has to have a standard — and readiness is —
4 whether it's carrying fifty pounds, lifting fifty pounds,
5 marching fifty, seventy-five, whatever the number is —
6 if it's a requirement of the job, then the services are
7 unique in that respect that they can say, "You have to be
8 able to do this for this job."

9 DR. DAVIS: Right. I mean, that's very
10 reasonable.

11 MS. POPE: Right.

12 DR. DAVIS: That's a very reasonable
13 approach. I don't see anything about that being
14 capricious or arbitrary.

15 MS. POPE: Right.

16 DR. DAVIS: My understanding —

17 MS. POPE: I mean, I don't think it's
18 capricious or arbitrary on the part of the public sector
19 either, but it's — you've got groups who will — I mean,
20 whether it's the, you know, Arkansas teachers or whoever
21 that —

22 DR. DAVIS: Oh, yes. Very powerful, you
23 know, labor organizations that will, you know — Their

1 there, you're some data processor or whatever, yeah,
2 probably you don't see the relevance, and that's always
3 going to be the dilemma, you know, as you've pointed out.

4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I was struck in the video
5 of the firefighters competition at how — when you
6 mentioned that the world record had come down — what?
7 About forty-five seconds or so —

8 DR. DAVIS: Oh, yes.

9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — over a couple of years
10 during the competition.

11 DR. DAVIS: Yes.

12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I wonder, do you have
13 hopefully any studies or at least impressions of how a
14 competition-type of environment improves performance
15 versus a "pass/fail" type of environment? Has anybody
16 studied that as to whether people work harder when it's
17 A-B-C grades versus a "pass/fail" or not?

18 DR. DAVIS: Well, I have some up-close,
19 personal experience with what happens when — in response
20 to your question about trying to fix this — fix the
21 problem, the dilemma of the incumbents. And a couple of
22 years ago, we were picketed in Kansas City by members of
23 the local IFF there because the perception was that I

1 perception is that this is a God-given right, this job.

2 MS. POPE: Right.

3 DR. DAVIS: I call it the vaccination
4 theory. They go through recruit training and they get
5 vaccinated. That means I'm good to go for twenty,
6 twenty-five, thirty years. You know, I should never have
7 to ever demonstrate again that I possess the requisite
8 abilities to do the job. I mean, we know that's
9 fallacious, of course.

10 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I'd like — We
11 don't have a lot of time left, but I want to return to
12 gender-norming because I'm not sure — Do you know the
13 history of it? I mean, is that a relatively new thing as
14 we tried to level the playing field in society? Level
15 the playing field in the military, if you will? Or is it
16 logical to have gender-norming on certain physical tasks?

17 DR. DAVIS: No, I don't think so. Not on

18 physical —

19 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: It's not
20 logical.

21 DR. DAVIS: Not on physical tasks, no. It
22 has no relevance.

23 MS. POPE: Versus physical fitness. I

1 might somehow be expected to show or demonstrate some
2 kind of accountability.

3 I mean, these guys were looking over the
4 horizon and saying, "Oh, my goodness, standards are
5 coming." I mean, it's just like the Arkansas teachers
6 that don't want to take a literacy test. Man. You know.

7 And when you're talking about job security
8 being threatened, the champions of mediocrity are going
9 to be coming out of the closets. In the civilian sector,
10 that's a very real problem that you've got to deal with.
11 Every time you talk about a change in the work condition,
12 I mean, we're going to have arbitration or whatever
13 that's going to be involved in that.

14 One of the cases I testified in, in fact,
15 was in Michigan. You know, home of — you know, the
16 bastion of labor unionism. And we had an issue there
17 with regard to the Troy police department mandating
18 fitness requirements for incumbent officers, and we ended
19 up going to arbitration on that and they found — the
20 panel found that that was a reasonable expectation.
21 Management has a responsibility of putting competent
22 people out there.

23 MS. POPE: But that actually is an

1 mean, it's —

2 DR. DAVIS: Right.

3 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, okay.
4 Let me take the physical fitness —

5 MS. POPE: I guess we need to make —

6 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: — test as an
7 example.

8 MS. POPE: Yeah.

9 CHIEF SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And do push-
10 ups and the run because I think those two events would
11 probably show the greatest disparity between men and
12 women.

13 And there are some of the school of
14 thought that that creates animosity and anger. Although
15 that was never my experience, some have said that that
16 does create animosity and anger about, you know, "she got
17 a hundred points but she ran two minutes and forty
18 seconds slower than I did and was rewarded equally."

19 But does that make sense? Is there any
20 logic to that at all, given the physiological differences
21 between male and female?

22 DR. DAVIS: Well, there's logic in that in
23 the context of a general fitness test that is answering

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1 the question, fit relative to who? There's logic in
2 that. And just let me go back to sort of the etiology of
3 how this came about. You know, if you go back and look
4 at the literature, I mean, for the most part, our
5 discipline is, you know, like barely a hundred years old.
6 Okay?

7 So what happened is that, you know, they
8 started looking around and saying, "Hey, you know, there
9 are differences in people and we can measure, we can
10 design tests, and we can sort of somehow extrapolate from
11 this." And most of this has evolved out of secondary
12 school and college where we have classes and we're going
13 to test people on these motor fitness tests.

14 So let's assume I'm at Maryland and I
15 teach a class in personal fitness over there. And it's
16 appropriate, then, if I'm going to give a grade for a
17 class in personal fitness, that I do have gender-norming
18 because the outcome of that is relative to you.

19 We're essentially comparing you to
20 yourself at the beginning of the semester, at the end of
21 the semester, and then how do you rank relative to all
22 the other males and all the other females? And in that
23 sense, I think that's perfectly fit — fair, I mean —

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1 boogie on down to the next station.

2 So, anyway, we collected a lot of data and
3 a lot of these guys were expending some pretty serious
4 energy. So I said a mile-and-a-half run, twelve minutes,
5 that's it. And I alerted Judith Pierce, who is an
6 attorney, also to the fact that — I said, "This is going
7 to have a disparate impact on women but it is certainly
8 not out of the realm of the possible. Okay? It's only
9 an eight-minute mile pace."

10 So she said, "I don't really care about
11 that." She said, "I'm sensitive to it, but as far as I'm
12 concerned, this is the job. And if you say a mile-and-a-
13 half" — I said, "I could justify it should be 10.40,
14 frankly, but," I said, "twelve minutes is a reasonable
15 accommodation."

16 All right. So guess what? The Justice
17 Department sues.

18 Now, here's what we got. We've got a law
19 enforcement organization that went to the mat with the
20 union and the union basically was able to get their way
21 and say, "You're not going to be able to get rid of any
22 of our incumbent people if they can't meet these
23 standards." "But we can make sure from this point

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1 and it's a very logical way.

2 And as I said earlier, same thing: you go
3 to the health club, you know, you don't care about
4 teenagers or whatever. What do I care about them? What
5 I want to know is, see, at my age, I'm fifty-three, and I
6 want to know how many other fifty-three-year-olds can get
7 over here and do twelve chin-ups. Okay? And I want to
8 beat all those other guys, see? I mean, it's a lot of
9 ego that's wrapped up in this whole thing.

10 So, anyway, that is the natural
11 progression as I see with regard to its use in the
12 military. I mean, if we're just trying to answer the
13 question as to your general level of fitness, I mean,
14 gender-norming makes an awful lot of sense. But don't
15 think that then I can take that data and then try to
16 apply that in terms of explaining a job.

17 And I'll give you a case right on point.
18 I mean, this is like fresh out of the headlines. We went
19 to trial in Philadelphia over a mile-and-a-half run.

20 Now, I went out — I spent weeks out there
21 looking at what these cops do. And crime in the subways
22 was rampant. I mean, the numbers of Class 1 felonies was
23 incredible, and all the cops were doing was like order-

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1 forward that we're going to hire competent people that at
2 least can pass this test." So we had four women who are
3 charging parties, who couldn't pass the mile-and-a-half
4 run.

5 Well, we go through like two weeks of
6 trial.

7 Now, we went back and we got arrest data.
8 Now, this is the job. This is what you're putting these
9 people out for, and you want to talk about criterion-
10 related validity? In all the time in the past, the
11 plaintiffs have always been saying, "You can't prove that
12 being physically fit has any impact on job performance."

13 Well, I mean, just in your heart of hearts
14 you've got to figure out that if I've got one cop that
15 can run a mile and catch somebody and the other one can't
16 go but, you know, forty meters, hey, it sort of proves it
17 to me.

18 Well, what we did, we proved it. We got
19 all the arrest records and we looked and we correlated
20 those with who made the arrests and the fitness level of
21 those officers. Surprise, surprise. The more fit you
22 were, the most arrests that you were making and the more
23 commendations you got. I mean, just blew the Justice

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1 takers. You know, you get mugged, you come out, they
2 take a report.

3 And the assistant general manager at that
4 time, when she hired me, she says, "I do not want the
5 Philadelphia Transit Police to become the bone yard of
6 Philadelphia, the Philadelphia police department. We
7 want an active, aggressive, law enforcement
8 organization."

9 And these are squared-away guys. I mean,
10 they are spit-and-polish and they look like cops. I
11 mean, these guys really are. And there's a prohibition
12 against even sitting down on the job. You cannot sit
13 down on the train. You must be standing. And they walk
14 these beats. So they began this very proactive campaign,
15 and guess what? Crime started going down.

16 Now, concomitantly we had a fitness
17 program that was going along. And so when they asked me,
18 "One thing that we definitely want to do is not hire any
19 more incompetent people," and I looked at what these
20 people had to do and there's an awful lot of aerobic
21 activity that's expected. You've got these stairs you've
22 got to run up; you've got — If you miss a train — In
23 other words, you get a call for an assist, you've got to

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1 Department away. In fact, it got so bad, I mean, the
2 judge was just the most — you know, like sort of
3 ridiculing them.

4 I mean, think about it. Here we are,
5 we've got a riding public like in terror for their lives.
6 You come in; you clean up the act. You get this thing to
7 the point where we've got some real go-get-'em kind of
8 cops. And the Justice Department wants to take a real
9 bite out of crime, right?

10 Well, these four women, I mean, they get
11 up there. And we've got video tape of them taking — And
12 I told them beforehand. I said, "Make sure you get this
13 on video." And they're out there with their hands in
14 their pocket, wearing street shoes on the mile-and-a-half
15 run. The judge says, "Can't you run a little faster than
16 that? I mean, why didn't you wear sneakers?"

17 You know, I mean, this is the kind of
18 thing that, you know — I mean, a quarter-of-a-million
19 dollars spent in litigation over a really stupid, trivial
20 kind of an issue where somebody didn't have the gumption
21 to get up and train to get a job that they really wanted
22 to have.

23 So we got a 162-page opinion blasting the

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1 Department of Justice and giving high accolades to the
 2 Philadelphia Transit about what they've done, and all the
 3 scars they've got to show for it by trying to do the
 4 right thing.
 5 MS. POPE: And that's an excellent
 6 example. And I guess my question is, how many people
 7 like yourself can go in and look at a job like these
 8 policemen on the subway, I mean, and be able to say,
 9 "Okay. You've got to be able to run"? This is — I
 10 mean, I think a mile-and-a-half run, a twelve-minute-mile
 11 is very reasonable. I don't think — I haven't run in a
 12 long time and I could probably get to that with a little
 13 bit of training. But it's directly related to the job.
 14 DR. DAVIS: Yes. Correct.
 15 MS. POPE: Okay. How many people out
 16 there can do that and say, "Okay. This is my job. You
 17 need to be able to run a mile and a half. You need to be
 18 able to do the stairs in X-amount of time," and take a
 19 job apart and then put it back together with the right
 20 standards, you know? I mean, the example you gave a few
 21 minutes ago with the Marines as far as pulling yourself
 22 up, you know — Or firefighters. I mean, there are some
 23 very legitimate things that you can take the pieces of

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1 told me that his PE teacher's there smoking a cigarette
 2 while she's timing him, I hit the overhead on that one.
 3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Whoa.
 4 MS. POPE: And I have to — I mean, our PE
 5 teacher is out there running with the kids in every
 6 class.
 7 DR. DAVIS: Yeah. That's the way it ought
 8 to be.
 9 MS. POPE: Right. Yeah.
 10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, thank you very
 11 much.
 12 DR. DAVIS: Thank you.
 13 (A brief recess was taken.)
 14 Panel of Experts on Physiology, Physical Fitness and Physical Conditioning
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. As you all know,
 16 Dr. Segal's on the phone. Barbara Pope (Indicating).
 17 Fred Pang (Indicating). I'm Anita Blair. And we'll go
 18 ahead and go back on the record now and we'll start with
 19 Dr. Gebhardt.
 20 And, Mady, as I've already mentioned to
 21 them, that we're going to proceed with the presentations
 22 and then do our little around-the-board with questions,
 23

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1 it, dissect it and say, "You've got to be able to do this
 2 in some kind of combination," because whether it's life
 3 or death or just getting the job done.
 4 How many people can do that?
 5 DR. DAVIS: You mean what I do?
 6 MS. POPE: Yeah.
 7 DR. DAVIS: Well, I'd like to tell you I'm
 8 the only guy in the universe, but that's not the case.
 9 MS. POPE: Well, I know. But ego aside.
 10 I mean, because I think it's important to be able to take
 11 it apart and then put it back together with the right
 12 kinds of —
 13 DR. DAVIS: Well, I mean, you know, the
 14 universities are, you know, spewing forth, you know,
 15 every year exercise scientists who have this sort of
 16 expertise. You know, I'd like to think I've got a leg up
 17 on them. I certainly have a lot more experience than a
 18 lot of them.
 19 MS. POPE: You've been at it longer.
 20 Right.
 21 DR. DAVIS: But no. I mean, this isn't
 22 even rocket science, quite frankly, and the military have
 23 some of the best people and are noteworthy. I mean, in

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1 DR. GEBHARDT: Okay. My name is Debbie
 2 Gebhardt. I have a Ph.D. in biomechanics and anatomy.
 3 I'm a Fellow of the American College of Sports Medicine
 4 and the past Chairperson of the Occupational Physiology
 5 Group.
 6 For the past twenty — almost twenty
 7 years, I've been developing and validating physical
 8 performance, selection assessments, for both selection
 9 and retention of individuals into all different types of
 10 jobs. These have been in the public, private, and the
 11 military sectors. And during that time period, I have
 12 used physiological and ergonomic parameters in a job
 13 analysis technique to analyze the requirements of jobs,
 14 and then, in turn, use those same types of parameters to
 15 develop assessment procedures for people seeking or
 16 retaining those jobs.
 17 I was many years ago involved in the
 18 validation of the military enlistment physical strength
 19 capacity tests that are used by the Army at the MEPS
 20 station, and I have also analyzed and developed and
 21 validated assessments for jobs ranging from public safety
 22 jobs such as firefighters, law enforcement officers,
 23 emergency medical specialists, to public sector jobs that

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1 my circle in which I travel, which is a member and Fellow
 2 of the American College of Sports Medicine, the military
 3 laboratories are very well respected and widely published
 4 and highly emulated and frequently cited and I use their
 5 data all the time.
 6 So it's out there. We're not talking
 7 about real esoteric sort of stuff.
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We're a little bit over
 9 time.
 10 DR. DAVIS: Okay.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We sure appreciate your
 12 sticking around. Would you be amenable to answering some
 13 further questions? We've got a number of commissioners
 14 who aren't here, who will get the tape later on.
 15 DR. DAVIS: Yeah, sure.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We'd appreciate that very
 17 much.
 18 DR. DAVIS: Yeah. Well, one of the nice
 19 things is that I live here. So that makes it easy.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, you can move your
 21 kids over to Barbara's school district.
 22 DR. DAVIS: No, we're in — I'm in
 23 Montgomery County also. But when my son came back and

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1 involve manual materials handling, technician work,
 2 construction and repair jobs. These have been in the
 3 industries such as natural gas industry,
 4 telecommunications, electric industry, railroads,
 5 longshore freight, and various other manufacturing
 6 industries.
 7 I've worked with the Army, the Navy, and
 8 the Air Force, in addressing issues related to
 9 performance in various MOS's and also the determination
 10 of physical effort in a variety of different Navy jobs.
 11 Most recently I served on a committee for the Air Force
 12 to look at the assessments that they're using for
 13 firefighters presently in the Air Force.
 14 In addition to dealing with the physical
 15 performance aspects, I've also been involved in
 16 developing medical guidelines for a variety of
 17 organizations for selection and retention of individuals.
 18 Most recently, I completed a project for the U.S. Customs
 19 Service for their law enforcement personnel, and we're
 20 currently doing the same type of analysis for the FBI for
 21 selection and retention of special agents and for agents
 22 in special assignments.
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. All right. Dr.

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1 Farmer.
 2 DR. FARMER: Thank you.
 3 Good afternoon and thank you for inviting
 4 me. It's a great honor to be here and I hope to provide
 5 you with some useful information here. She has more
 6 professional things on her resume, so I'll talk a little
 7 bit about me here.
 8 My only direct experience with the
 9 military was ironically as a Peace Corps volunteer in the
 10 Philippines several years ago when one of the Filipino
 11 Army commanders invited me to join his unit in, of all
 12 things, parachute jump training; so I, being young and
 13 foolish, thought that would be great fun.
 14 So I completed five jumps, using very old,
 15 old, old, U.S. Army issue World War II parachutes, and
 16 miraculously managed to survive without hitting power
 17 lines or trees or anything else. The gist of this story
 18 is that I harbor great admiration for those soldiers who
 19 jump out of planes for a living.
 20 My only other experience with the military
 21 is growing up with my father, who served as a lieutenant
 22 in the Marine Corps during World War II, who was first in
 23 Guam and then later in China. His job was as a

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1 oxygen uptake up in the order of the seventies. To give
 2 you some basis for comparison, the average male that age
 3 might be around the mid to low forties. These were very,
 4 very fit people.
 5 Our staff also worked with some of the
 6 police academies during the summer there and primarily
 7 with those whom we affectionately termed the "special ed
 8 students." I believe one of the services termed them
 9 "remedial students." For women, we worked mostly on
 10 improving their strength. The men were about as flexible
 11 as a two-by-four, so we helped to work on their
 12 flexibility. And many of the people needed to lose
 13 weight with that, so we worked with them in that.
 14 Presently, my Ph.D. is in exercise
 15 physiology, and I received that at the University of
 16 Maryland. I teach a couple of upper-level courses:
 17 Scientific Bases of Athletic Conditioning and Biophysical
 18 Aspects of Wellness.
 19 I'm also the Director of the Wellness
 20 Research Laboratory, which is the wellness program for
 21 the university. We employ physicians and nutritionists
 22 and three graduate students, who all work for me. I have
 23 done a great deal of assessment testing in the area of

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1 demolitions expert. He was also a boxer. And between
 2 the two of those jobs, his face came back rearranged in
 3 such a way that my mother could barely recognize him.
 4 And I've got quite a history there.
 5 He also tells me stories, I'm afraid, of
 6 how the Marine Corps KO'd the other services frequently
 7 when he was a boxer with them.
 8 I received my undergraduate degree in
 9 physical education at the University of Wisconsin and
 10 played two intercollegiate sports there. This was just
 11 before Title IX came into effect. Hence, it was just
 12 before women received scholarships.
 13 It suddenly dawned on my father one day
 14 that while the neighbor boy was playing football at the
 15 University of Wisconsin and he was about eighth-string
 16 tackle, and I was captain of two teams, that the neighbor
 17 boy was getting a full-ride scholarship and my father was
 18 paying thousands of dollars for me to go to college. So
 19 I think that dragged him kicking and screaming into equal
 20 opportunity and feminism.
 21 Following Wisconsin, I joined the Peace
 22 Corps and I ended up teaching there. It's somewhat like
 23 the military: you join and then you never quite do the

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1 aerobics, muscular strength, muscular endurance,
 2 flexibility, and body composition.
 3 I'd like to thank Colonel Hodge for giving
 4 me some of the military's information. I understand that
 5 it is not easy to test thousands and thousands of people
 6 anywhere, anytime, with no equipment at all, and I
 7 certainly want to congratulate the services. It looks
 8 like they've done a fairly good job with all of that.
 9 Thank you.
 10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Finally, Dr. Bishop.
 11 DR. BISHOP: I'm Phil Bishop. I'm a
 12 Professor and Director of the Human Performance
 13 Laboratory at the University of Alabama, in Tuscaloosa.
 14 I graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in
 15 Annapolis in 1972 and served on a guided missile
 16 destroyer in the Middle East back when Iran was our ally.
 17 From there, I went to flight training in Pensacola. I
 18 was a naval flight officer and served with Tacamo over in
 19 Patuxent River. I served a tour there, got about 2,500
 20 hours of flight time with EC-130's.
 21 Went to Virginia Military Institute as an
 22 ROTC instructor, went to night school, got a master's
 23 degree in physical education. Wanted to go full-time

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1 job that you think you're going to do. I ended up
 2 teaching strength training and basketball officiating
 3 classes to all of the male coaches in a three-province
 4 area.
 5 I am very proud to say I was extremely
 6 well received by these men, but I've never quite been
 7 sure whether it was because of my superb confidence and
 8 competence or whether I was in fact taller than most of
 9 the Filipino men. Unfortunately, that height advantage
 10 disappeared when I came back to the U.S. here.
 11 I received my master's degree in exercise
 12 science at Northern Michigan University and had a very
 13 interesting job working with the entire spectrum of
 14 fitness. Much of my time was spent working with people
 15 in cardiac rehabilitation. I also worked as a fitness
 16 trainer for the men's non-revenue sports — that would be
 17 tennis, wrestling, swimming — and I worked as a strength
 18 trainer for world class speed skaters and cross-country
 19 skiers.
 20 I don't know if you're familiar with
 21 either of those sports, but certainly those people are
 22 the most aerobically fit people in the entire world. And
 23 in fact, we tested a couple of women that had a maximal

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1 into university teaching, so I got a Ph.D. from the
 2 University of Georgia in physical education.
 3 And then I began to work with the Air
 4 Force in 1986 on chemical protective clothing. Worked at
 5 Brooks Air Force Base, Armstrong Laboratory, for three
 6 different times. Worked at Fort Detrick with the Army
 7 Biomedical Research and Development Laboratory, and last
 8 year I was a visiting professor at West Point, at the
 9 Military Academy. Worked for Colonel LeBoeuf, who was, I
 10 think, in here a couple of weeks ago.
 11 I have some experience researching in
 12 gender differences, particularly gender differences in
 13 performance; published a few papers in that area. I've
 14 published extensively in protective clothing and those
 15 sorts of issues. I have some expertise in gender
 16 differences, physiology of gender differences; some
 17 expertise in protective clothing; some expertise in
 18 measurement of various physiological physical abilities.
 19 If I could just offer a couple of quick
 20 opinions here. Having spent time in the military as an
 21 officer and then having visited with the military over
 22 the last — well, since 1980, when I got out of the
 23 military — it has always seemed to me that the military

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1 has led the rest of the country in terms of equity
 2 issues. I think in terms of gender equity, you're more
 3 aware than I am of some of the mistakes that have been
 4 made, but I think also the military has been far ahead of
 5 the rest of our country in gender equity issues.

6 I do — We were given the packets from the
 7 Army, Air Force, and the Navy, and I think there's some
 8 things that might be worth discussing there of why the
 9 military does things the way they do. I think there are
 10 a couple — actually a couple of stones unturned. When
 11 we were invited up, I was afraid — The science here is
 12 fairly simple. I was afraid we would just be re-hashing
 13 the same things over and over.

14 I think there are a couple little areas
 15 that might be worth a little consideration. One is the
 16 cultural versus biological gender differences, and we can
 17 talk about it if you'd like. And then, finally, joint
 18 operations. We're probably still a hundred years away
 19 from having a single joint services in this country like
 20 Canada has.

21 On the other hand, I think that the
 22 different services, everybody's got a different physical
 23 standard; everybody's got a different test, including the

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1 flexibility is important for a variety of reasons. One
 2 branch I know included it, and I don't think that the
 3 others did. We know that if people are more flexible,
 4 they may be less likely to be sore after a workout.
 5 That's always a good thing.

6 And one of the important things that we
 7 forget about flexibility is that it may also increase
 8 deforce, and this can become important in either
 9 athletics or the military. If we know that force equals
 10 mass times acceleration, and if flexibility is the range
 11 of motion about a joint, if we are more flexible, we have
 12 more time over which to accelerate. Therefore, we
 13 theoretically could have greater force. I think that's
 14 an oft-forgotten facet of flexibility.

15 Body composition was measured, I think, in
 16 most of them, and muscular strength. It might be a good
 17 idea to include a lower body measure of muscular
 18 strength. Most of the things we do — even throwing
 19 activities — stem — there's our biomechanist here, Dr.
 20 Gebhardt — but they stem from things that we do in the
 21 lower body.

22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Dr. Gebhardt.
 23 DR. GEBHARDT: Dr. Farmer illustrated what

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1 Marine Corps, which wasn't — for some reason, the Navy
 2 neglected the Marine Corps when they talked about their
 3 physical fitness program.

4 But I think there's some issues there
 5 that, as a taxpayer, I'd like to see the services maybe
 6 get together and some of the research that the different
 7 services have used could be combined to come up with a
 8 single test that would be more equitable across genders
 9 and better for the services.

10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Mady, I'll go
 11 ahead and start with your two questions here which you
 12 previously submitted.

13 One is, in your expert opinion, what is
 14 overall physical fitness and what is the best way to
 15 measure it? And then a follow-up: how do the armed
 16 services' physical fitness tests measure up on this
 17 professional standard?

18 So Dr. Farmer, it looked as if you were
 19 ready to answer that, so —

20 DR. FARMER: I'm ready to answer any
 21 question at any time.

22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — why don't you start.

23 DR. FARMER: As in "please step in."

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1 the components of fitness are, as did the three responses
 2 from the military services.

3 From my going over the different tests
 4 that are used, they're using — they're addressing
 5 muscular endurance from push-ups, trunk strength from
 6 sit-ups, and aerobic capacity. Flexibility is not
 7 something that's required out of basic training or
 8 continued in AIT, in any of them.

9 The Navy is only using two of the
 10 components, if I read the materials correctly, which
 11 would be the 1.5 mile run and sit-ups. So upper body
 12 strength or any type of strength measure is not being
 13 included.

14 As Dr. Bishop said, all services are using
 15 a different approach. All services have separate
 16 individuals researching in these areas. Although they
 17 all speak to each other, policies I think dictate what
 18 those tests are. I think the missions of the services
 19 are basically the same and they probably should have a
 20 joint or one fitness standard.

21 But the question may be asked later, so I
 22 won't dwell on this. There's a major difference between
 23 what the components of fitness are and what is required

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1 I think the services define it fairly well
 2 in some of their responses. The thing that we would like
 3 to keep in mind is that it encompasses a variety of
 4 fitness components. And, unfortunately, we have a
 5 concept called specificity of exercise, which means that
 6 if we are very good at one component, it doesn't
 7 necessarily indicate that we would, therefore, be good in
 8 the other components. We usually need to test and
 9 measure them separately.

10 Those components would be aerobic fitness;
 11 the two-mile and three-mile run that the services have.
 12 They would be flexibility, body composition, muscular
 13 strength and muscular endurance. And I think most of
 14 them try to touch on each of those.

15 And I'm sorry, did you have a —

16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, I guess those are
 17 the elements of fitness. And then I think you started
 18 out stating, in your opinion, the armed services do a
 19 pretty good job of —

20 DR. FARMER: They do. There are a couple
 21 of areas that I noticed I think were lacking. And again,
 22 please feel free to jump in.

23 One of them was flexibility. We know that

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1 to do the different jobs or meet the operational needs of
 2 each service. So that may be a question later, so I'll
 3 hold any additional comments on that.

4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Dr. Bishop.

5 DR. BISHOP: Just a couple of brief
 6 things. It was hit in a couple of the presentations by
 7 the services, but I think it's worth emphasizing that
 8 there's really two aspects of this. One is health. If a
 9 soldier is on the sick list and he can't perform — he or
 10 she — then we've got a problem.

11 So there's abundant research to suggest
 12 that a good level of physical fitness is associated with
 13 better health, and people — the longer you stay in, the
 14 more important it becomes. So one of the goals is to
 15 keep people healthy, and not just in broken bones, but in
 16 terms of other aspects of health.

17 And then I think the other thing, of
 18 course, is to have them fit enough to endure the
 19 hardships of being in combat or — I spent a lot of time
 20 with a colonel who was in charge of logistics in Somalia,
 21 a very physically demanding job just getting the water,
 22 just getting the food, just getting the troops the things
 23 they need, unloading trucks, working in very difficult

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1 conditions.

2 So we're interested in preserving the
3 health because that saves money; it makes — We have a
4 smaller force than we've ever had in the past. We've
5 only got 175,000 Marines total, and everybody who's in
6 the hospital or sick is one less person to do the work.

7 The other thing, of course, is just — I
8 taught a course at West Point — put together a course
9 called the Physiology of Warfare, and the message that
10 came home to me — I hope it came home to some of the
11 cadets — physical fitness is just a fundamental — a
12 foundation for doing the job and whatever the job may be,
13 whether you're in infantry or artillery or aviation or
14 whatever.

15 For example, I think the Air Force has
16 anecdotal evidence that good muscular strength and
17 endurance is essential for G-tolerance. A real simple
18 example.

19 So it's going to relate two ways. One is
20 the health way, and the other is it's just fundamental
21 for doing the job. The jobs are often hours and hours of
22 very little sleep, very little rest, those sorts of
23 things.

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1 to, well, how does that link to performance? And the
2 basic answer was that, you know, for each one of the
3 services — in the case of the Army, you wanted to make
4 sure that you had a person who could become a soldier in
5 the training process and do all the soldiering tasks and
6 the sailing tasks and the Marine tasks and airman
7 tasks.

8 And, you know, then the question arose as
9 to whether or not there were strength-related or fitness
10 requirements regarding specific occupational categories,
11 and, you know, the answer was that there weren't and that
12 it would be too expensive to construct those kinds of
13 tests.

14 The services basically said they were
15 confident in the general fitness tests that they give
16 because people, as they go through these different
17 occupations, must go through training, and it's in the
18 course of that training, for example, as a heavy
19 equipment operator, warehouseman and the like, that you
20 would have to demonstrate your ability to do all the
21 tasks that are associated with that particular job.

22 And that seemed reasonable. You've
23 reviewed what they presented to you. Do you believe

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1 The one complaint, I guess, if we can deal
2 with that, it has been always a mystery to me how the
3 services came up with such arcane ways to measure body
4 composition. Often they're using high weight tables or
5 body mass index or circumferences.

6 Now, we don't teach any of those to our
7 students. We'll mention high weight tables. We have
8 undergraduate students that we teach to do skinfolds,
9 which are — I've heard that a couple of services tried
10 skinfolds and it didn't work; it was too complicated or
11 they had some kind of problem with that. But —

12 MS. POPE: I'm sorry. What are skin —
13 You're saying skinfolds?

14 MR. PANG: Yeah. The calipers.

15 DR. BISHOP: I'll let —

16 MS. POPE: Oh, okay.

17 DR. BISHOP: I'll let — Colleen can
18 explain it better in a minute.

19 MS. POPE: Okay.

20 DR. BISHOP: But I think there are better
21 ways to measure body composition and it's just been a
22 mystery to me. The ways they do it are at least as hard,
23 if not harder than the skinfold measurements,

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1 that's reasonable, or is there some other way of testing
2 people so that you can get a better measure of their
3 ability to be a soldier, to be a Marine or airman or
4 sailor?

5 DR. GEBHARDT: The baseline standards, for
6 example, that were cited in — I think it was either the
7 Navy or the Army report — that were acceptable levels,
8 in looking at that two-minute sit-up test for thirty-
9 eight sit-ups in two minutes, the testing that we do is
10 both men and women in all of these different types of
11 jobs like you mentioned — warehouseman, heavy equipment
12 operators — our people in those heavier jobs, the women
13 perform — in one minute performed thirty-eight sit-ups.
14 I found the standards that were listed there to be low in
15 comparison to the populations that have tested over
16 numerous years.

17 And in answer to your question do I think
18 that their basic fitness level that they're required to
19 meet on an annual basis will qualify them to perform all
20 of those jobs that are out there, I don't, because each
21 job has a different level of physical requirement. If
22 you're a combat engineer, that's a lot different than if
23 you're in telecommunications. And there are methods — a

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1 subcutaneous fat measurements, and they're not as
2 accurate.

3 And, you know, the Navy's approach of
4 doing a high weight table, if you make the high weight
5 standards, then we're not going to check you, that's
6 fine. It's very efficient. But then once you get people
7 who are borderline zone of concern, it used to be called
8 — ZOC — if you're in the zone of concern, then it seems
9 like we owe it to the service people to give them the
10 best measurement. And if they're too fat, then that's a
11 health problem; it's a readiness to fight problem.

12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.

13 MR. PANG: I'll defer to Barbara.

14 MS. POPE: No, go ahead.

15 MR. PANG: Do you want me —

16 MS. POPE: Yeah. Go ahead.

17 MR. PANG: Okay. You know, the services,
18 basically — when they briefed us and in the papers that
19 they gave you, I mean, basically, you know, lay out the
20 premise that you can use physical fitness tests or they
21 use the physical fitness tests just to measure the
22 general health of an individual.

23 And, you know, the question then arose as

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1 variety of methods to assess whether they are continuing
2 to meet the physical requirements of those jobs.

3 It, again, gets down — and I think you
4 hit it — what is the cost effectiveness of doing that?
5 And although they may go through and get their rating or
6 their MOS training in AIT at the end of AIT, I'm not
7 really sure — like the MEPS-GAT study. We saw them
8 have, men and women, just like was shown in one of the
9 articles here, great increases in fitness levels — push-
10 ups, sit-ups, and two-mile run — by the end of basic,
11 and then we saw a decline after AIT. And even time after
12 that, with a small cohort, there was a decline again.

13 So I would say that the level that's asked
14 for now would not qualify them to do all of those jobs.

15 MR. PANG: But, you know, then is that —
16 do the levels that exist now, are they adequate — are
17 they an appropriate measure, adequate measure, of just
18 overall fitness?

19 DR. FARMER: There's really three concepts
20 here. I put them on a continuum all the time: health,
21 fitness, performance. And generally speaking, usually
22 one subsumes the other. That which we need to do for
23 health is less than that which we need to do for good

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1 fitness, and you can be relatively fit or very fit, and
2 then we have performance up here, and that may or may not
3 be part of that.

4 Generally it assumes that we need to do a
5 little more and/or a little faster and/or a little more
6 flexibly, to get to that performance level. It does vary
7 and it's a difficult question, I think.

8 DR. BISHOP: I'd just offer that I don't
9 think it's practical to set a — or it's very difficult
10 to set a fitness level and say, "Well, if we achieve this
11 level of fitness, then we can do X." I don't think
12 that's true.

13 However, I think having the standards in
14 place, what I see in the military is — They didn't have
15 a standard when I left the Navy in 1980. The Navy did
16 not have a physical fitness test. They supposedly had a
17 program, but I never heard about it.

18 But the testing wasn't there. And, yet,
19 the Army presented data here saying that the injuries in
20 their basic training wasn't tied to gender; it was really
21 tied to fitness level.

22 And a lot of the research literature which
23 I deal with routinely were comparing men and women, but

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1 don't want to talk too long here, but the Army has just
2 gone through extensive revisions of their standards for
3 their physical fitness test, the APFT. With their
4 younger groups, they lowered the standard, but with their
5 older groups, they raised the standard.

6 I think that's great. They've recognized
7 that people coming in are getting worse with each
8 succeeding year. And some of the data that was presented
9 suggested that was wrong, but I think the Army has the
10 best data and they say people are getting less fit coming
11 in.

12 But now they've raised the standard for
13 their — The seventeen-year-olds have to do less, but the
14 — I think from twenty-four on up have to do actually
15 more. Old guys like myself, our standard really went up
16 and I think that's great. I think they put a lot of
17 effort into it and I think they've got a better standard.

18 They put a lot of attention to gender
19 equity. I think they have as equitable — and they're
20 still improving, but I think they're really trying to
21 have an equitable standard where equal effort, taking
22 into account biological differences and probably a little
23 bit of cultural differences — equal effort on the part

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1 we don't equate them on a level of fitness. If the men
2 are fitter, then we ended up comparing very fit men with
3 often less fit women. And so really we're not comparing
4 just gender; we're comparing gender and fitness.

5 So I think there's a lot of virtue in
6 having fitness standards. The higher they are, the
7 better.

8 Now, that gets to the point of diminishing
9 returns because the Army, one company will often compete
10 with another company and, you know, it will raise fitness
11 probably marginally. What it really does is it lowers
12 the standards for success, because push-ups, for example,
13 are one of the fitness components of the Army test, the
14 Marine Corps test and the Navy test — All three of those
15 services have push-ups.

16 Well, what's a good push-up? It depends.
17 If my company has to get a 280 average, we're going to
18 lower our standards on what's a good push-up. If — And
19 so it's a difficult — it's a difficult thing to raise
20 standards unless you do it in a very reasonable way.

21 Let me give you another quick example. We
22 — In the industry, we claim that a person can work at 40
23 percent of their maximal aerobic capacity for an eight-

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1 of a woman produces the same score as for a man.

2 I think — The revised standards, I think,
3 help the morale. I think the women feel like they're
4 doing better. I think the men feel like the women are
5 being more fairly treated and I think that's important as
6 an issue.

7 MR. PANG: You know, I might comment on
8 that, if I might. You know, the Army's argument was
9 that, you know, for the various — for men and women, and
10 for the various age groups, that there was — you could
11 measure maximal performance or whatever the appropriate
12 term is. And then what they did was they said, okay, if
13 this is the maximum, then what we ought to do is gauge
14 what the standard is less than max and make that, you
15 know, the same for each one of the groups that you're
16 establishing standards from, and that seemed to make
17 sense.

18 There has been a suggestion, though, the
19 other way — that basically — and we heard it before
20 from the last witness — that what you really ought to do
21 is have one minimum standard.

22 You know, a soldier must perform under a
23 variety of circumstances. You know, we're at peace and

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1 hour day. That's a tolerable work rate.

2 Well, if you take any sort of military
3 wartime scenario or even a peacekeeping scenario, you
4 don't work eight hours. You work twelve hours, fourteen,
5 sixteen, eighteen, twenty. You work how many hours it
6 takes to do the job. By our science, we would say the
7 higher the level of aerobic fitness, the longer the
8 person can continue whatever the work rate is, the longer
9 they're going to continue.

10 So as a taxpayer, I'm going to get most of
11 my money — I'm going to get the most money out of my
12 soldiers who are working for me, the higher their
13 cardiovascular fitness, because they can work longer
14 without fatigue. And it's essentially fatigue
15 resistance.

16 So I can't imagine going backwards and
17 saying we need to lower our standards. I can't imagine
18 going backwards and saying, "Well, we really don't need a
19 fitness test." If anything — Because I'm a fitness guy,
20 naturally I think fitness is the key element. But, you
21 know, I think we ought to, you know, keep upping the
22 standard.

23 And the Army has just gone through — I

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1 generally we are at peace. Therefore, you are not
2 engaged in real arduous types of duty requiring maximum
3 effort. And were you under fire, you're in cold and, you
4 know, having to carry out people who are wounded and the
5 like, I mean, I don't think, you know, that the standard
6 would be to say that everybody in the Army must be able
7 to survive under those circumstances equally.

8 But on the other extreme, you can't say,
9 well, I mean, you're a clerk in the Army. You know,
10 there's very little physical requirement with regard to
11 your job. Therefore, you don't have to participate in
12 physical training.

13 So that the dilemma is how do you pick
14 this line — okay? — that establishes a minimum for
15 everyone and say, "This is the line, and if you get above
16 this line, you can be a good soldier. You can do the
17 soldiering tasks that we would call upon you to do across
18 this wide spectrum of, you know, environment and, you
19 know, occupation."

20 So that's a dilemma. And I think, you
21 know, if you establish this one level and don't have, you
22 know, the gradations that you have now in the physical
23 fitness tests that are out there, that the tendency would

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1 be to just go to that minimum level and say, "Okay. I
2 made it and I'm done with it."
3 So how do you try to resolve that? I
4 mean, how would you go about resolving it and is there a
5 way of resolving it?
6 DR. GEBHARDT: Your last comment on "this
7 is the minimum level and I'm just going to go to it," we
8 have great data that we can tell exactly where we had set
9 the standard for an incumbent police population and
10 firefighter population because all of a sudden we're
11 looking — We wanted to review the data over a four- or
12 five-year period from one of our clients and we're going,
13 "They're all the same scores," and we went, "Wait a
14 minute. They went to exactly what they had to do and
15 quit," and that was it. There was no above or below. We
16 had very little data below. And so that's one of the
17 problems.
18 But if that serves your purpose, if that
19 is the minimum level and you've pulled out some criterion
20 soldiering tasks, military tasks that need to be
21 performed and everyone meets that level, you've achieved
22 your goal. And granted, some people will go above, but
23 you've achieved your goal if you've picked out those

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1 going to have peacetime again. We've got troops in
2 Bosnia right now. You try to tell them we're at
3 peacetime, they're probably not going to be interested in
4 hearing it. We had folks in Somalia being shot at. They
5 didn't think it was peacetime in Somalia when they were
6 there. You can go right down the line.
7 So I don't think you could ever make the
8 argument, "Well, we're at peacetime now, and so we're
9 really going to go for the minimum," because tomorrow it
10 might be Iraq. You know, next week it could be somewhere
11 else. And, you know, that's the way — that's the
12 philosophy, that's the history of our military. You
13 know, one week to the next, we don't know what we're
14 going to be doing.
15 The other issue is competence. You know,
16 if a guy is a clerk but he's in the Army, he's in the
17 Army. Or if a woman is a clerk but she's in the Army,
18 she's in the Army. And for her to have respect and for
19 her to be a functioning member and to be satisfied, she
20 needs to perform at a — she needs to be a soldier. He
21 needs to be a soldier.
22 If you're talking about combat, then the
23 stakes go up a lot higher, because if you're not fit and

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1 criterion tasks.
2 And to get to that minimum level that
3 everyone should meet, that's what the services, I feel,
4 would have to do — is what are criterion tasks that no
5 matter what specialty you're in, you may be called upon
6 to perform in a wartime situation? Then if you meet
7 those tasks, you have met the minimum.
8 DR. FARMER: I think the threshold
9 question is crucial. One of the things that's related to
10 that that I do want to bring out is the fact that we
11 train and train and train and we have six weeks or eight
12 weeks and we don't usually have long enough in these.
13 Most of these basic training camps are never really long
14 enough to see physiological adaptations. They generally
15 take about three months.
16 But we train and train and do the best we
17 can and then we stop, and what happens after we stop? I
18 think people are doing less and less. And if we have
19 these minimum thresholds, what happens after they stop
20 training and do these things? I assume they go below the
21 minimum but I don't know.
22 One of the suggestions that I wanted to
23 make was that people consider having a longer time period

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1 I'm fit, and you get hurt because you're not fit, then
2 that's going to jeopardize me because I've got to drag
3 your hurt body out of there. I've got to take care of
4 you now, which puts an additional burden on me, which may
5 put me at greater risk.
6 And so I think it sort of depends on what
7 level we're talking about. On board ship, you know, your
8 damage control folks — if the ship goes down, it doesn't
9 matter, you know, who you are. If you're the captain of
10 the ship, you're going down, too. And I'm depending upon
11 those guys down in the hold, those enginemen, who don't
12 have a very physically demanding job.
13 It's real hot down there; it's very noisy
14 down there. It's not physically demanding; but, boy, if
15 something goes wrong, now my life is in their hands. And
16 vice versa, you know, if I'm running the gun mount or
17 whatever.
18 So, you know, I don't know of many other
19 occupations other than maybe police work and firefighters
20 where, you know, fitness not only can cost you your life
21 or your health, but it can also cost me, because I'm
22 depending upon you to do your job to keep me alive.
23 And so my friend in Korea is the XO of a

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1 so that we could see better and more marked changes with
2 some of these physiological adaptations, and the other
3 one was making sure from both a health, fitness and
4 wellness perspective, that we continue along with some of
5 these programs.
6 One of the service branches had started to
7 do that — I believe it was the Army — and was really
8 looking at long-term wellness. Again, Dr. Bishop
9 mentioned the cost of that. It should keep our costs of
10 injuries and everything down.
11 DR. BISHOP: Setting an arbitrary minimum
12 is difficult and sometimes you can tie something to it.
13 I think for jump school for the Army, five pull-ups is
14 the — you have to do five pull-ups. Well, is five the
15 magic number? Probably not. But you have to have
16 sufficient upper body strength to safely do the movements
17 — we've got a parachutist here — to do the motions.
18 So sometimes you can set a minimum. As
19 has been pointed out, people are going to go to the
20 minimum. So regardless of the service, regardless of the
21 job, you need a minimum.
22 Now, people on the front lines, people who
23 are really doing the job and — I don't know, we're never

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1 battalion in Korea. They have PT every morning and they
2 take it seriously because they're only a few yards from
3 somebody who would...
4 MR. PANG: Well, you know, I think, you
5 know, that's the point, you know, that I was trying to
6 make. I mean, the dilemma for the military services is
7 where you draw the line. I mean, you know —
8 DR. BISHOP: The bottom line.
9 MR. PANG: You know, and — the bottom
10 line — and it is a challenging one because, you know,
11 the tendency — my tendency would be to draw it very high
12 because of the high risk that's involved in being in the
13 military even though, you know, today — okay? — the
14 likelihood of people — And now I'm talking about the
15 whole spectrum. I mean, the 1.4 million people we have
16 on active duty; the 800,000 that we have in the Reserves.
17 The likelihood of exposure — okay? — is not as great as
18 it was in Vietnam, not as great as it was in the Persian
19 Gulf and the like.
20 I mean, so, you know, the question is,
21 what is the appropriate fitness level that, you know, we
22 should hold people to generally? And, you know, the
23 question is are the standards that exist now the

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1 appropriate standards? And I don't know what the answer
 2 is.
 3 My tendency is to say I think they are,
 4 you know, because there haven't been documented failures
 5 as a result of poor fitness, you know, out in the field.
 6 And that's about all I, you know — I mean, that's a
 7 conclusion that I've come to. Is that a flawed reasoning
 8 or conclusion?
 9 DR. GEBHARDT: I think that fitness runs
 10 such a large gamut and I really draw a big dichotomy
 11 between — I'll leave the health end off — the just
 12 general fitness and "can you do the job." And part of it
 13 has to do with when we do our work; there's an economic and a
 14 people aspect to it.
 15 You mentioned injuries. We've done
 16 studies in different industries where when we set the
 17 cutoff score on a physical performance test, we have
 18 significant lost time from work, more so for the people
 19 below that cutoff when we look retrospectively at their
 20 days lost, injuries and so forth.
 21 A million dollars a year savings when you
 22 do a study on utility analysis. And one study for women
 23 — Since the whole thing here is the gender differences,

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1 we went back — We had put a test in — And the longshore
 2 industry has what they call a casual workforce, so they
 3 hire people and they're not really longshore workers.
 4 They're casuals.
 5 Well, in order to stay on as a casual,
 6 they felt they could impose tests. So we had a study
 7 group of 3,000. The women — And the cut on the test was
 8 set probably two years before they implemented that
 9 particular issue. The women who passed the test had 46-
 10 percent fewer injuries on the job. That's astronomical
 11 in terms of cost savings.
 12 So what Dr. Farmer and Dr. Bishop are
 13 saying, that baseline level of fitness will make big
 14 differences for any organization. And I don't know if
 15 anyone has the magic answer — I certainly know I don't
 16 — about where that level is for the military, you know.
 17 And so that dichotomy of "do that job" and "what is my
 18 baseline fitness," that's the real dichotomy.
 19 MR. PANG: You know, that's the reason I
 20 raised the question, because there's a quest for that
 21 kind of magic answer. You know, that "here's the line."
 22 And, you know, in fact, that's one of our charges, is to
 23 look for that and see whether or not there is.

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1 DR. BISHOP: It's just a question — I
 2 mean, it's just a basic economic issue. Because back in
 3 the Vietnam days, you could tell how hard it was to get
 4 into flight school by how many people were getting killed
 5 in Vietnam. If a lot of people were getting killed, it
 6 was a lot easier to get in flight school. If nobody was
 7 getting killed, it was a lot harder to get in flight
 8 school.
 9 And so, you know, if the economy is real
 10 good, then we can't get as many people in the military.
 11 If the economy is bad, then we can pick and choose. And
 12 so it seems to me it's a supply-and-demand issue. We
 13 want the best troops we can get fitness-wise and
 14 intelligence-wise and every other way you can think of to
 15 measure folks.
 16 DR. SEGAL: Anita —
 17 DR. BISHOP: We want the best we can get.
 18 The question becomes — you know, it becomes more of a
 19 pragmatic issue than a science issue. We'll take the
 20 top, you know, whatever percentage we need to fill our
 21 spots. And, you know, I'd like to raise the standard as
 22 high until we run out of folks, and then we'll — you
 23 know, we'll stop there.

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1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Mady —
 2 DR. SEGAL: Anita, is this a reasonable
 3 time for me to do some follow-up?
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Sure.
 5 DR. SEGAL: Okay.
 6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Are you finished, Fred?
 7 Yeah. Okay, Mady. Go ahead.
 8 DR. SEGAL: Okay. Because it follows
 9 along in the lines that Fred was talking about.
 10 As I understand it in terms of the
 11 components of physical fitness that you laid out in the
 12 beginning — and this is basically the services are
 13 measuring some of those components but not all — I'd
 14 like to know what the implications of that not measuring
 15 all the components are, especially as it relates to
 16 gender.
 17 And then I have another question about the
 18 gender-norming of the tests.
 19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. The question is
 20 the implications of not measuring all the components of
 21 physical fitness in the military's standard PFT, which is
 22 the sit-ups, pull-ups and run. It does not, for example,
 23 measure flexibility and body composition specifically as

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1 a part of that standard. So what —
 2 DR. SEGAL: And in terms of strength.
 3 There's no measure of leg strength that's used by any of
 4 the services.
 5 And as I understand it — I'm learning
 6 more than I ever wanted to know about this — there is a
 7 difference between muscular strength and muscular
 8 endurance and that both of those are components of
 9 physical fitness but that the measures used by the
 10 services don't measure them both.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Did you get all of
 12 that?
 13 Okay.
 14 DR. FARMER: I'll deal with the last part
 15 first. Muscular strength and muscular endurance are not
 16 the same. They certainly are related. And most of the
 17 tests that the services are doing really are measuring
 18 muscular endurance, which would be a repeated level of an
 19 activity again and again. Muscular strength, as it's
 20 technically defined, is one repetition, maximal. What
 21 can you lift one time in good form? What is the most
 22 that you can lift? They are more related than many of
 23 the other physical fitness components are.

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1 Again, by not measuring some of these
 2 things — We need to remember specificity because they're
 3 not always related. It's important to measure all of the
 4 components, particularly, I would think, in terms of
 5 readiness. We want to be ready in every way that we can
 6 be.
 7 DR. SEGAL: Do you see a flaw in not
 8 measuring lower body strength?
 9 DR. FARMER: I think that that would be
 10 the most — the more important measure, actually, because
 11 it's our body — We probably do more things with our
 12 lower body than we do with our upper body.
 13 But I would like to hear what Dr. Gebhardt
 14 and Dr. Bishop think.
 15 DR. GEBHARDT: From a gender standpoint,
 16 women will use their legs to perform tasks in a different
 17 way than a male will. Simple example: women will bend
 18 their knees to pick up a sixty-pound box; her male
 19 counterpart will bend over at the waist and pick up the
 20 box, using the back instead of the legs, and using the
 21 upper shoulder girdle to do the task.
 22 Not that that's proper, but that's reality
 23 when you see what's happening, especially when people

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1 start to get tired and they're moving lots of boxes. So
 2 I think that a measure of lower body strength would be
 3 advantageous to a better assessment of women in this
 4 situation.
 5 When you look across — If you look at
 6 these measures of strength, muscular endurance, aerobic
 7 capacity, and if you look at what women do as a
 8 percentage of men, in lower body strength women will
 9 perform at 70, sometimes 80 percent of men. In lower
 10 body strength, not muscular endurance. And in upper
 11 body, it ranges anywhere, depending — because sometimes
 12 you can get it at 40 percent, up to maybe 60 percent, so
 13 it's much less.
 14 And this is not hard science here. This
 15 is just basic stuff that's been around for years. When
 16 you look at muscular endurance, you find that now you're
 17 getting women doing the same task, performing at a higher
 18 percentage of men. They'll go up into the seventies, up
 19 into the eighties, depending on what that particular test
 20 you're using is.
 21 So it will vary and I think the assessment
 22 will probably be a little more complete than it is to get
 23 at some of the issues that have been addressed here today.

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1 MR. PANG: Can you test for body strength
 2 without use of equipment? I mean, you know, one of the
 3 arguments the services used for the construct that they
 4 have is that, you know, they are in a variety of
 5 environments and do not want to rely on any equipment.
 6 So I was just wondering whether or not there was a way of
 7 measuring lower body strength without equipment.
 8 DR. GEBHARDT: This is the big issue.
 9 Without putting some piece of equipment in there to
 10 measure lower body strength — There's a test where you
 11 could take barbells and put them on your shoulders and
 12 do, you know, the squats. Unless you're really very
 13 proficient at doing that, the chances of injury with non-
 14 weight-lifting type people are higher. So using some
 15 other type of equipment is better.
 16 The Army, in their study — the MEPS-GAT
 17 study — used lift to sixty, sixty inches upper body, and
 18 it involved — they were using your legs a little bit,
 19 too — and then they used a leg-lift test that NIOSH,
 20 OSHA's research arm, developed back in 1977, which was
 21 called the leg-lift test and it's a lower body static
 22 strength test.
 23 So I don't know of any particular tests

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1 that you could use without equipment, and that's always
 2 been a major issue. Not only for the military, but for
 3 private sector organizations also.
 4 DR. FARMER: I think it's important to
 5 remember that when we test this by only testing the upper
 6 body, the women are coming off looking a little worse
 7 than we probably are. And it's very important to
 8 remember that, okay, we want to do this because it's
 9 logistical and feasible, but, in fact, if we were to test
 10 the whole body, women would come off, I think, stronger.
 11 And, in fact, in everyday activities we are stronger than
 12 what's coming across in this one upper body test.
 13 MS. POPE: This is where I get confused.
 14 And, actually, your idea of the continuum helps me start
 15 to put it in perspective. But it seems that the lower
 16 body strength piece would be more relevant to the job
 17 standard piece where you say you have to look to weight.
 18 Fifty pounds.
 19 Okay. That's different than physical
 20 fitness. But I'm trying to come up with a standard for a
 21 job, and so I — Okay. You need to lift fifty pounds,
 22 seventy-five, a hundred, whatever. And so in some
 23 traditional parts of services, you said, where you've got

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1 to, you know, do push-ups, chin-ups, whatever, so you
 2 don't take into account the leverage and the total body
 3 use. Is it as relevant in just standard health or in
 4 physical fitness?
 5 And it's to Fred's point about being able
 6 to do this worldwide, you know. And I guess that's where
 7 I get confused and it really gets muddled — is I think
 8 it is really very, very relevant to a job standard as the
 9 services are trying to look at what are the real
 10 measurements in doing that job versus physical fitness.
 11 That, overall, for each of the services, even though they
 12 may be different, that being a member of a service, that
 13 I have to be physically fit, which is more than just
 14 being healthy.
 15 Where is it more relevant? In the
 16 physical fitness or towards physical standards?
 17 DR. GEBHARDT: I think it's definitely
 18 relevant on the job site.
 19 MS. POPE: Right.
 20 DR. GEBHARDT: We see this over and over.
 21 Women are able to perform tasks, that they're using the
 22 lower body strength to get these tasks done. You know,
 23 just a little bit different from a biomechanical

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1 standpoint.
 2 In general fitness, it goes back to what
 3 you want to measure. When you measure sit-ups, push-ups,
 4 and one-and-a-half or two-mile run, you're measuring
 5 aerobic capacity, upper body muscular endurance, and
 6 abdominal muscular or trunk muscular endurance.
 7 So you've said, "Okay, I'm deeming
 8 because" — And it's really, I think, a convenience. We
 9 don't have something to do the lower body. We're saying,
 10 "Well, their legs didn't get tired when they did the one-
 11 and-a-half-mile run." And so we've kind of combined it
 12 there and I think it is a section of like for muscular
 13 endurance, but it's left out from a convenience
 14 standpoint.
 15 It would be considered a piece of fitness.
 16 MS. POPE: Is the lower body — I mean,
 17 the run, is that a measurement of the lower body
 18 strength?
 19 DR. FARMER: No.
 20 DR. GEBHARDT: No.
 21 MS. POPE: Okay.
 22 DR. FARMER: No, it's definitely not.
 23 MS. POPE: Okay.

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1 DR. GEBHARDT: Yes.
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: But it would be of
 3 endurance?
 4 DR. FARMER: It's the measure for aerobic
 5 capacity.
 6 MS. POPE: Right.
 7 DR. FARMER: It's related to muscular
 8 endurance of the lower leg —
 9 MS. POPE: Okay.
 10 DR. FARMER: — but it's really very much
 11 specific to aerobic.
 12 MS. POPE: To aerobic. Okay.
 13 DR. FARMER: Yes.
 14 MS. POPE: Thanks. I think it's clearer
 15 now.
 16 DR. SEGAL: I've got another question with
 17 regard to the gender-norming issue. This is a hot potato
 18 issue that in the military there is some perception by
 19 the men that — even though we know that the gender norms
 20 are developed by looking at distributions of men to
 21 women's performance and what would be, as Dr. Bishop
 22 said, equal scores for equal effort, there is a
 23 perception — I think because of the confusion between

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1 fitness and performance on the job — that the gender-
 2 norming makes it unfair.
 3 And, Dr. Bishop, I read with great
 4 interest your article on “Sex difference in muscular
 5 strength in equally-trained men and women,” and let me
 6 see if I understand this conclusion correctly.
 7 Your conclusion says for occupations and
 8 sports activities where strength is important, FFW, which
 9 is the fat-free weight, and FFCSA, the fat-free cross-
 10 sectional areas, would be a more valid qualification
 11 criteria — they would be more valid qualification
 12 criteria than sex.
 13 So that given that 97 percent of the sex-
 14 related variance in strength was reduced by using these
 15 measures, could the services develop a measure of
 16 physical fitness that would apply to both men and women?
 17 That instead of having the standards specifically be
 18 gender and age-normed — and I don’t know about how age
 19 would fit in this, but certainly the gender — that you
 20 could use one standard for the two sexes but use the fat-
 21 free weight and the fat-free cross-sectional areas as
 22 controls in the other measures?
 23 DR. BISHOP: Well, Dr. Segal, you could do

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1 marathon than the women’s marathon unless you consider
 2 the physiology.
 3 So, you know, the troops that understand
 4 this — that it’s biologically impossible — I think are
 5 less bothered by the fact that the women get to run three
 6 minutes slower. There are women, of course — There’s a
 7 lot of overlap here and there’s women who beat the men,
 8 and certainly those men aren’t giving the women —
 9 hopefully they’re not giving the women any grief over
 10 this.
 11 So I don’t think we can beat the
 12 physiology; so having one standard on most items — sit-
 13 ups being the one exception — I don’t think is going to
 14 ever be —
 15 DR. SEGAL: Do all of you agree that you
 16 couldn’t come up with a gender-free test that would
 17 measure physical fitness? That you would be able to have
 18 equal standards if you measured different events than are
 19 currently used or you controlled for or divided the
 20 scores by things like fat-free weight?
 21 DR. FARMER: I’m mostly in agreement, yes.
 22 Yes, I would have to say so.
 23 DR. GEBHARDT: I don’t think you could

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1 that in a laboratory. We can do it. We have done it.
 2 The catch comes in trying to do it with 1.4 million
 3 active duty troops and 800,000 reserves.
 4 DR. SEGAL: Is that because of the
 5 difficulty of measuring these variables?
 6 DR. BISHOP: Yes, ma’am. The fat-free
 7 weight or fat-free mass, we probably can get that. We
 8 can get it with circumferences or we can get it better, I
 9 think, with skinfolds — I keep pitching that — but in
 10 terms of saying we’ll equate them, you can’t get around
 11 the biological differences on these other issues.
 12 For example, the Army. The Army standard
 13 for sit-ups now for women is exactly equal to men. If
 14 you look at the numbers — And one of the other services
 15 had the same thing — almost the same thing. The women
 16 have to do exactly the same number of sit-ups as men.
 17 Biologically, physiologically, that makes sense. They
 18 should have always been doing the same number, except for
 19 cultural differences which we’ll deal with some other
 20 time.
 21 As far as a mile run goes, I don’t see any
 22 way you can adjust that. We’ve already adjusted it de
 23 facto. The Army uses about a three-minute

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1 come up with a total fitness assessment that would be
 2 gender-free.
 3 DR. SEGAL: Okay. So what I’m hearing is
 4 that we’re left with the gender-norming for the physical
 5 fitness test. That that’s what we have to do in order to
 6 really measure physical fitness and have it be a fitness
 7 measure.
 8 That moves me to my other question, which
 9 has to do with the other component that’s often confused,
 10 and that is the performance that you talked about. You
 11 all are not confused about it. You’re talking about it,
 12 making those distinctions.
 13 Could and should the services develop job-
 14 specific performance measures? Or the arguments I think
 15 that they’ve been telling us seems to be that developing
 16 — doing systematic task analyses of military jobs and
 17 determining the kinds of performances that are required,
 18 and then the selection criteria that you could —
 19 selection characteristics that you would use to meet
 20 those criteria, would be prohibitively expensive and
 21 labor-intensive.
 22 And I’m actually talking about more than
 23 just the physical, but for now let’s talk about the

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1 differentiation. The Air Force and Navy use anywhere
 2 from two minutes to about four minutes. Depends on age.
 3 They have sort of — I don’t know if it’s random or if it
 4 was planned or based on some algorithm I don’t
 5 understand.
 6 But they’ve already got a differential;
 7 because the women are going to be on average 10 percent
 8 fatter, they’ve got to carry that in a mile-and-a-half
 9 run. The women are going to have about two grams or so
 10 less hemoglobin, which means that’s going to make a 4-
 11 percent deficit in their run performance.
 12 So, you know, the standard — you know, I
 13 agree with the Army that they actually do have a fair
 14 standard, although the numbers aren’t the same. Unless
 15 we can defeat biology — and I’m always arguing to senior
 16 military officials you can’t beat physics or physiology
 17 — but unless we can figure a way to defeat that, there’s
 18 always going to be a difference.
 19 If you look at Olympic competition, the
 20 very best athletes in the world, the men’s standard in
 21 every event except open ocean swimming, which isn’t an
 22 Olympic event — the men’s standard is higher. It’s not
 23 fair that a guy has to run faster to win the men’s

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1 physical. Would that be too difficult to do?
 2 And I know Dr. Gebhardt, you’ve done a lot
 3 of work for civilian employers and other kinds of
 4 paramilitary organizations in terms of the development of
 5 physical performance measures for specific jobs. Would
 6 that be feasible given the great range of military jobs?
 7 DR. GEBHARDT: It’s feasible. It gets
 8 down to dollars and cents to really decide whether you
 9 want to.
 10 You could probably cluster jobs together.
 11 There are a lot of similar tasks. Although the tasks
 12 would not be identical across the different occupational
 13 specialties, there’s a lot of similarities across those
 14 tasks.
 15 So that you could now cluster certain jobs
 16 together. The Army, the Navy, the Air Force, have done
 17 this for years. They’ve clustered them. They did it by
 18 the Department of Labor classifications back in, oh, the
 19 late seventies, early eighties. The Army did a big study
 20 on that and reclassified a lot of their jobs.
 21 And if you do some clustering by your job
 22 analysis data and get some ergonomic data related to the
 23 demands, you could then develop some job-related

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1 standards — physical standards — that would be
2 appropriate.
3 DR. SEGAL: And could — So that it would
4 make sense to approach those jobs that required more than
5 the minimum level of physical fitness, the ones that
6 people are always talking about as requiring more
7 capabilities — that maybe those would be the ones that
8 the services should focus on so that they could ensure
9 they're not putting people into those jobs who don't meet
10 the more — the stricter criteria.
11 DR. GEBHARDT: That's exactly what private
12 industry does. We don't go out and look at secretaries
13 and administrative assistants when we're looking at the
14 physically demanding jobs. And in some studies — For
15 example, in telecommunications, the jobs vary from
16 putting the poles in the ground, climbing the poles and
17 putting up the lines and everything; an outside plant
18 technician who a frame attendant who walks up and down
19 where there are many lines that connect your phones. We
20 found that the only really physically demanding tasks
21 when we did the job analysis for the frame attendant was
22 moving the ladder and climbing the ladder.
23 Now, does that job require the funds to do

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1 snuff; it was strongly encouraged and strongly
2 recommended that they meet certain guidelines even before
3 coming in or at least to try and reach that; if the
4 training programs themselves were a little bit longer,
5 and that they should probably be in a little bit more
6 progressive manner.
7 I'm guessing here, but I think they
8 probably start out pretty intensely and stay pretty
9 intensely, and that can be conducive to injuries.
10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Actually, I think at
11 least a couple of the services are looking at the
12 progressive-type training.
13 DR. FARMER: Good.
14 DR. SEGAL: And they've already started
15 that.
16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Dr. Gebhardt, you
17 mentioned an interesting phenomenon when you looked at
18 the scores that were all the same which people were
19 training or exerting effort just to reach the standard in
20 a "pass/fail" kind of situation. Do you see any
21 parallels with the specific standards that we have for
22 certain kinds of performance in our fitness in the
23 services?

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1 the pre-testing on those individuals? It was dropped
2 from it because it didn't have adequate physical demands.
3 So your money would be best spent on the jobs of concern.
4 DR. SEGAL: Thank you.
5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. I would like to
6 turn to a slightly different subject, which I think Dr.
7 Farmer raised in her introductory remarks, which is
8 training regimens.
9 You mentioned that you've been involved in
10 helping to train people for, for example, cross-country
11 skiing and so forth, and I'd like to get your views about
12 good, better and best, and worst ways of training groups
13 of people.
14 In the military, of course, we get large
15 groups of people coming through and, in some respects, in
16 some services, we see that, for example, they will move
17 people into ability groups during running. In other
18 areas, it appears that the physical training is done in a
19 group, you know, based on fulfilling a certain number of
20 activities in the time given.
21 And I wonder if you could comment about
22 whether there are different accepted ways of bringing
23 people up to their highest potential.

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1 DR. GEBHARDT: In your fitness? I would
2 imagine if you did look at the data from different units,
3 that you would find that there were a lot that just met
4 — they knew what they had to do and they just do thirty-
5 eight sit-ups or forty-five sit-ups, and that you will
6 see that phenomenon.
7 Because when we implement fitness
8 programs, whether it be in the private sector area or in
9 the public sector area, we find that — Let's take a
10 remedial, because one of the biggest things we face is
11 we're looking at physically demanding jobs. Our adverse
12 impact is always gender-adverse impact. It is never
13 racial-adverse impact.
14 And so we design fitness programs for
15 people to do in a remedial setting and we find that the
16 — we're much more successful with those programs if they
17 have company while they're doing it, other people with
18 them — so, you know, lots of people help — but you also
19 have to treat the person as an individual.
20 And the people that are at the lower end
21 — if you just take one level and that's where you start,
22 the people at the lower end tend to drop out of the
23 program. They don't finish. So we find that we're more

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1 DR. FARMER: The public schools, several
2 years ago, decided to mainstream and everybody was very
3 interested in what that would do with physical education.
4 It did not appear to bring down the top, so to speak.
5 Those who were at the top tended to stay at the top. It
6 did tend to have some positive effect with those people
7 that were in the middle and we were trying to make them a
8 little bit better.
9 The only problems that were incurred by
10 that which one sometimes hears about is those people who
11 were disabled to begin with and when those people are
12 mainstreamed, but those people are not joining the
13 military with that.
14 One of the suggestions I might make that I
15 think would help considerably, we see a lot of injuries,
16 for example, in the university. Someone comes into the
17 fall athletic program and the coach has been very good in
18 giving him or her a summer training program and he or she
19 didn't do it. So they come in and now they're behind the
20 eight ball to start with and they've got six weeks to get
21 in shape and this is problematic.
22 I would say that a lot of this could be
23 gotten around if somehow people were a little more up-to-

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1 successful if we individualize the program and give them
2 goals that they need to meet.
3 Not saying that "you will get the job if
4 you complete this program," because that's not
5 necessarily true — some of the people are very low —
6 but the individual goal-setting has been helpful in
7 raising people's fitness levels.
8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Mady?
9 DR. SEGAL: Yes.
10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We pass to you.
11 DR. SEGAL: Is everybody winding down? Is
12 that what's happening?
13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I think it's got
14 something to do with our hemoglobin.
15 DR. SEGAL: I think that I've had all of
16 my questions answered. The ideal world obviously is not
17 out there for what I would prefer, but I think that I've
18 had the questions answered. Maybe our panelists would
19 like to have some last comments.
20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Is there anything that
21 we've sort of failed to ask that you would like to be
22 asked?
23 DR. BISHOP: One point of clarification.

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 302</p> <p>1 This issue of strength versus endurance, it's a very rare 2 situation where strength — Strength is maximal power, 3 maximal force generation. There's very few situations in 4 military or in civilian occupations where maximal force 5 is the issue. 6 Most of the time it's repetitive force. 7 If a person's working an artillery emplacement, they've 8 got to move the ammunition from wherever it's located, 9 load it in the gun and fire it at a very high repetition 10 rate. 11 DR. SEGAL: So lifting a large object 12 once, a very heavy object, is not where we go. It's 13 lifting objects that weigh less but continuing to do it. 14 DR. BISHOP: That's more the rule. I 15 mean, there are exceptions where you could find that 16 somebody has to, you know, raise a very heavy weight one 17 time, but mostly — most tasks, it's a question of, you 18 know, we're loading an aircraft or loading an artillery 19 piece and it's repetition. 20 And so I think it would be dangerous. It 21 wouldn't be cost-effective or health-effective to have a 22 strength test, even if we had one without equipment. If 23 we could do it, if we could do it very cheaply, I still</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 305</p> <p>1 DR. GEBHARDT: The women will usually — 2 If they're strong in the upper body, they're strong in 3 the lower body, because they're into fitness. And so it 4 kind of blends over. We don't see as much 5 differentiation. 6 The men, we will see more differentiation 7 between their upper and lower body strength. 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Dr. Farmer, any... 9 DR. FARMER: I'm fine. Thank you. 10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Mady? 11 DR. SEGAL: Yes. 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: One last chance. 13 DR. SEGAL: No, I don't have any other — 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I've never known you to 15 turn down a question. 16 DR. SEGAL: I just would like to thank our 17 panelists. They've been very informative. I really 18 appreciate it. 19 MR. PANG: Well, you know, I just want to 20 thank you all. I mean, you have — 21 MS. POPE: Yeah, this has been very 22 helpful. 23 MR. PANG: It was very helpful.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 303</p> <p>1 would be opposed to it because I think it's dangerous and 2 I really don't think that the benefit matches the cost in 3 terms of injury risk. 4 So I think the endurance issue is still 5 the issue. I like — I mean, I wouldn't mind having a 6 better leg endurance task, but, in fact, the weakness 7 tends to be in the arms. If we want to find a weakness, 8 that's where we would look. Women are disadvantaged 9 there. 10 You know, the other papers were on muscle 11 distribution and women do have a greater muscle 12 distribution in the lower body than upper body. But, you 13 know, I think we're trying to be economical here in terms 14 of time and injuries and those kind of things. You know, 15 the upper body endurance is really probably the smartest 16 way to go, at the present time, at least. 17 DR. GEBHARDT: I'd like to add to what Dr. 18 Bishop said. When we assess both men and women in the 19 industrial setting in jobs that are just like military 20 jobs, we find that this so-called specificity really 21 doesn't exist to the point that it does in lots of the 22 studies because, in the studies, a lot of elite athletes 23 or physical education majors years ago were used when</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 306</p> <p>1 DR. FARMER: Thank you for inviting us. 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And thank you for joining 3 us, Mady. 4 DR. SEGAL: Thank you for having me, if 5 only by phone. This is a way that I could participate 6 and I really appreciate it. 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Great. 8 Okay. Well, we appreciate your coming 9 very much. 10 (Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the hearing in 11 the above-entitled matter was concluded.) 12 - - - 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 304</p> <p>1 this specificity came up. 2 We find correlations between muscular 3 endurance and muscular strength tests in the same part of 4 the body is .7 to .8. They were very high. So what is 5 the utility of giving both of those at that point? And 6 actual statistical analysis says there isn't any utility. 7 And I would agree that it's the muscular 8 endurance — the ability to keep doing the job — that 9 really makes the difference, and our studies would really 10 bear that out because of muscular endurance types of 11 tests — and we do use equipment in them — bear that out 12 because those are the ones that are predictive of job 13 performance. 14 DR. SEGAL: What's the relationship 15 between — I hear what you're saying about strength and 16 endurance are related regardless of where they are in the 17 body. What's the relationship between upper body 18 strength and lower body strength? 19 DR. GEBHARDT: We will get correlations, 20 .6 and .7. So they're pretty related. They're not .8's. 21 And there is a difference between the men and women on 22 those correlations also in that relationship. 23 DR. SEGAL: What is the difference?</p>	

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CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES

Tuesday, December 1, 1998

1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 940

Arlington, Virginia

DEC. 1, 1998

1 Those present:
 2 Anita K. Blair, Esquire - Chairman
 3 LtGen George R. Christmas, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner
 4 LtGen William M. Keys, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner
 5 Thomas Moore - Commissioner
 6 Charles Moskos, Ph.D. - Commissioner
 7 The Honorable Barbara Spyridon Pope - Commissioner
 8 Mady Wechsler Segal, Ph.D. - Commissioner
 9 ---
 10 Stephen C. Fogleman, Esquire - Executive Director
 11 Susan L. Fry - Executive Assistant
 12 Hank Hodge - Staff Liaison
 13 James Renne, Esquire - Staff Counsel and Secretary
 14 Kathleen M. Wright, Ph.D. - Research Director
 15 Janice Laurence, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 16 Charles Johnson, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 17 Capt J.S. Snyder, USN - Service Representative
 18 LtCol Brenda L. Harris, USA - Service Representative
 19 Maj R. Scott LaShier, USMC - Service Representative
 20 ---
 21
 22
 23

1 Those present:
 2 General Accounting Officer, National Security
 and International Affairs Division,
 3 Military Operations and Capabilities Issues Group
 4 Mark E. Gebicke, Director
 5 William E. Beusse, Ph.D., Assistant Director
 6 Colin L. Chambers, Senior Evaluator (DoD Combat Exclusion
 Policy)
 7
 8 George Delgado, Senior Evaluator (Review of the Study
 Methodologies)
 9 John W. Nelson, Senior Evaluator (Physical Fitness and
 Body Fat Standards)
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1 PROCEEDINGS (9:00 a.m.)
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: This is the Congressional
 3 Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related
 4 Issues, meeting on December 1st, 1998, and this afternoon
 5 we are going to hear some reports from the GAO. And I
 6 will turn it over to Mark Gebicke, the head of this
 7 group, to go ahead and introduce the group and make a
 8 preliminary statement.
 9 MR. GEBICKE: Okay, great. Thank you very
 10 much, Madam Chairman and other members of the Commission.
 11 And I guess Fred is not going to be with
 12 us today. I guess he's in Honolulu, I understand.
 13 MR. FOGLEMAN: He's on his way back today.
 14 MR. GEBICKE: On his way back. Okay.
 15 MR. FOGLEMAN: He'll be here tomorrow.
 16 MS. POPE: Tough Thanksgiving.
 17 MR. GEBICKE: Well, we're extremely
 18 pleased to be here once again and to be here more
 19 formally as part of this hearing to talk about our work
 20 on gender-related issues. As this Commission is no doubt
 21 aware, the increasing role of women in the military today
 22 has surfaced a number of controversial issues.
 23 Based on a number of congressional

1 requests that we have received, we've reviewed the
 2 treatment of both military men and women in a variety of
 3 areas of military life and our efforts have been aimed
 4 primarily at providing dispassionate and fact-based
 5 analyses to assist the Congress in its oversight
 6 responsibilities. I know that's exactly what you all are
 7 about here as well.
 8 And as you've asked me to do, Madam
 9 Chairwoman, what I'm going to do is to talk about three
 10 reports that we've recently put out. The first deals
 11 with the methodologies that were used in three prominent
 12 reports to DoD officials regarding gender-integrated
 13 basic training. The second report deals with DoD's
 14 policy regarding women serving in ground combat and
 15 related positions, and the third, on gender differences
 16 in the services' physical fitness and body fat standards.
 17 Since we have provided you with copies of
 18 all those relevant reports, what I thought I'd do is just
 19 briefly summarize each of those reports and then leave
 20 the bulk of the time to respond to questions that you may
 21 have.
 22 With me here today is Bill Beusse, to my
 23 immediate right. Bill's Assistant Director and he's been

1 responsible for all of this work that we've done in the
 2 gender area as well as reports that we have in production
 3 as well. And to his right is George Delgado. To my
 4 immediate left is Colin Chambers, and to his left is John
 5 Nelson.
 6 Now, contrary to the appearance, we did
 7 have gender-integrated teams on every report that we put
 8 out.
 9 Now, I say that a little bit facetiously
 10 but it's true. We were very concerned about having —
 11 Unfortunately, all of the women who were assigned to
 12 teams happen to be travelling this week, either in Europe
 13 or vacation or other places. So I wanted to set the
 14 record straight on that because there obviously — when
 15 we get into talking about focus groups and the proper
 16 format and facilitating the use of both genders,
 17 depending upon the groups that you're working with, it's
 18 very important to getting good responses.
 19 The first report I'll turn to is the one
 20 on the three reports and the methodologies used in those
 21 reviews on integrated basic training. And if you recall,
 22 between July of '97 and January of this year, there were
 23 three prominent reports which examined issues affecting

1 initial entry training. And these included the Army's
 2 Senior Review Panel's report — and I'm just going to
 3 refer to them as the "Army Panel" — on sexual
 4 harassment, the report of the Federal Advisory Committee
 5 on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues, and
 6 I'll refer to that as "Kassebaum Baker," and the report
 7 of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the
 8 Services, and I'll use the acronym "DACOWITS" to refer to
 9 those.
 10 Now, because these reports produced
 11 somewhat different results, we were asked to report on
 12 four key areas. We were asked to describe how the groups
 13 conducted their work; second, determine how well the work
 14 supported making conclusions and recommendations; third,
 15 to assess the availability of documentation supporting
 16 the reports; and fourth, determine the extent to which
 17 the final reports described the study methodologies and
 18 disclosed any limitations in the methodology.
 19 Now, the three studies all had different
 20 objectives and they were conducted somewhat differently,
 21 although each relied to some extent on the use of focus
 22 groups.
 23 Now, we compared the methodologies of the

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1 three studies with the principles of focus group
 2 methodologies as set forth in the social science
 3 literature, and a primary aim in doing this work was to
 4 assess whether the research methods included in the
 5 reports were sufficiently rigorous to support drawing
 6 conclusions and also making recommendations.
 7 Now, first with regard to the Army Panel.
 8 That most closely followed the accepted methodology for
 9 conducting focus groups. Its use of focus groups to
 10 augment several other methods of data collection, the
 11 rigor with which the various methods were conducted, and
 12 the publication of the data in the report provided ample
 13 support in our opinion for making conclusions and
 14 recommendations.
 15 The Kassebaum Baker Committee used focus
 16 groups as its primary method of data gathering. However,
 17 the study did not provide adequate support for making
 18 conclusions and recommendations, for a number of reasons.
 19 The committee did not systematically collect the same
 20 information from all groups; it did not document the
 21 information generated in each of the interviews and focus
 22 groups, did not explain how what was heard in the
 23 interviews and focus groups led to their conclusions and

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1 recommendations.
 2 Now, in addition, the relatively short
 3 length of the focus group sessions, the relatively high
 4 number of participants in each session, and the large
 5 number of questions may not have provided enough of an
 6 opportunity for each of the participants to have their
 7 opinion heard. Lastly, the committee's report did not
 8 address the limitations of their work or attempt to
 9 reconcile their findings with those of other reviews.
 10 Now, the DACOWITS report also relied
 11 extensively on focus groups as their main method of data
 12 collection and had many of the same limitations as those
 13 conducted by Kassebaum Baker. However, while the
 14 DACOWITS report summarized the opinion and perception
 15 data obtained from the focus groups, it did not attempt
 16 to make conclusions or recommendations on military
 17 training based on that information.
 18 I'm going to turn now to the second report
 19 that you asked us to comment on, and it's the DoD's
 20 policy excluding women from direct ground combat.
 21 Now, unlike the exclusion of women from
 22 naval and air combat, the exclusion of women from direct
 23 ground combat has always been a matter of policy rather

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1 than law. In the early nineteen-nineties — in fact, I
 2 think it was 1992 and '93 — when the legislative
 3 restrictions were being lifted to allow women to serve on
 4 combat ships and in combat aircraft, DoD adopted the
 5 primary elements of the Army's ground combat exclusion
 6 policy as the DoD-wide assignment rule.
 7 Now, DoD policy specifically prohibits
 8 women from serving in assignments and units below the
 9 brigade level whose primary mission is direct ground
 10 combat. In addition, DoD permits positions to be closed
 11 to women if any of the following four conditions exist.
 12 One, if the units and positions are
 13 required to physically collocate and remain with the
 14 ground combat units; two, the cost of providing
 15 appropriate living arrangements for women is prohibitive;
 16 and three, the units are engaged in special operations
 17 forces' missions or long-range reconnaissance; or
 18 finally, job-related physical requirements would exclude
 19 the vast majority of women.
 20 Now, approximately 221,000 of DoD's 1.4
 21 million positions are closed to women. About 46 percent
 22 of those positions are closed due to the ground combat
 23 exclusion policy, 41 percent due to the collocation with

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1 units engaged in direct ground combat, 12 percent due to
 2 prohibitive cost of housing women, and the final 2
 3 percent due to the involvement in special operations.
 4 Now, at the time we completed our work,
 5 which was in September of this year, DoD had no plans to
 6 reconsider the ground combat exclusion, primarily for
 7 three reasons. One, they told us that there was no
 8 military need; two, that there was no congressional or
 9 public support; and three, that most servicewomen were
 10 not supportive of that change.
 11 The final report that I'd like to
 12 summarize for you is the one we did on Gender Differences
 13 in Service Physical Fitness and Body Fat Standards.
 14 Now, as you all are aware, physical
 15 fitness is a fundamentally important part of military
 16 life for both men and women and each year thousands of
 17 servicemembers are denied promotions, schooling, or other
 18 benefits for failing to meet fitness standards. Now,
 19 despite remedial programs, personnel are forced to leave
 20 the military for continued failure to meet these
 21 standards.
 22 Now, researchers have found a widespread
 23 perception that the existence of lower physical fitness

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1 standards for women amounts to a "double standard."
 2 However, the physical fitness program is intended only to
 3 maintain the general fitness and health of military
 4 members and physical fitness training or testing is not
 5 designed to assess the capability to perform specific
 6 missions or military jobs. There's a big difference
 7 between the two.
 8 So, consequently, it is appropriate to
 9 adjust the standards to account for physiological
 10 differences between the sexes and DoD guidance clearly
 11 requires the services to make those adjustments where
 12 warranted.
 13 Thus, the mere existence of different
 14 standards for each gender does not constitute a double
 15 standard. General physical fitness standards can be
 16 different for men and women without necessarily being
 17 inequitable.
 18 Although each of the services adjusts its
 19 standards for gender, the degree of adjustment varies.
 20 Inconsistent and sometimes arbitrary adjustments to the
 21 standards have contributed to questions concerning the
 22 fairness of the standards.
 23 Researchers have found that many men and

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1 some women believe that the women's standards are much
 2 easier for women to meet than the men's standards are for
 3 men to meet. However, it is not possible for us or
 4 anybody else at this point in time to assess the accuracy
 5 of this perception because the services have generally
 6 not used a scientific basis to set physical fitness
 7 standards for women.
 8 While the physical fitness standards for
 9 men have usually been based on actual test performance
 10 data, the female standards were often estimated, inferred
 11 from male data, or based on command judgment. Women from
 12 all the services expressed concerns about the fairness of
 13 the services' body fat standards, seeing them as
 14 unrealistic, biased, and unfairly enforced.
 15 We found four possible reasons for those
 16 concerns. One, some of the services used a different
 17 basis for setting female body fat standards than what was
 18 used to set the male standards; two, differences in each
 19 service's equations for estimating body fat allowed for
 20 wide variation in estimates; three, outdated measurement
 21 approaches did not account for racial differences in bone
 22 density; and four, the equations used were not based on
 23 today's changing female ethnic military population.

1 Information such as the proportion of men
 2 and women unable to meet the various fitness standards,
 3 initial body fat screening, and body fat measurement
 4 could provide some insights into whether the standards
 5 have been set at equitable levels. Similarly,
 6 information on the proportion of men and women discharged
 7 for failure to meet fitness or body fat standards could
 8 provide insight into whether the standards are being
 9 selectively enforced by gender. However, these kinds of
 10 information are not currently being collected uniformly
 11 across the services because of inadequate DoD oversight,
 12 we reported.

13 We recommended in this report that the
 14 Secretary of Defense establish a clear DoD-wide policy
 15 and approach for gender-based adjustments to general
 16 fitness and body fat standards, requiring all the
 17 services to derive them scientifically. We also
 18 recommended that DoD define the statistical information
 19 needed to monitor physical fitness trends and ensure
 20 program effectiveness, and require that all this
 21 information be maintained by the services and provided in
 22 the required annual reports.

23 Now, we believe that the implementation of

1 these recommendations will do two things. It will not
 2 only improve the effectiveness and fairness of the
 3 fitness program, but also help to dispel the
 4 misconceptions that fitness standards measure a
 5 servicemember's ability to perform in the military and
 6 that different standards for men and women constitute a
 7 double standard.

8 In this report as well as other gender
 9 reports which I haven't talked about yet, we've made a
 10 number of recommendations. DoD has concurred with all
 11 those recommendations and, as we understand it, is in the
 12 process of taking appropriate corrective action.

13 Madam Chairwoman, that was a brief
 14 overview of those three reports. And as we talked about
 15 before we started, we'd be glad to stay here as long as
 16 necessary and respond to any of the questions that you
 17 may have about these reports or other work that we have
 18 under way as well.

19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, we thank you very
 20 much for your coming here today and for your continuing
 21 assistance. This is not the first time at least some of
 22 you have visited and consulted with us.

23 And I would also just like to say that

1 these are excellent reports, extremely helpful. I only
 2 wish we could have had a look at these last April or so
 3 when we were getting started.

4 MR. GEBICKE: We wish we could've had them
 5 out last April.

6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: As I mentioned to you,
 7 the procedure we've been using for questions is to just
 8 simply go around the table. If a commissioner doesn't
 9 have a question at the time, the commissioner may just
 10 pass, and we keep going until we run out of questions.

11 DR. MOSKOS: Anita, I just wanted to ask
 12 a point of clarification.

13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Sure.

14 DR. MOSKOS: You mentioned three reports.
 15 Are these — the gender issues on physical — on fitness
 16 standards and the one on service perceptions of gender
 17 equities — were these summarized in the last one?

18 MR. GEBICKE: Well, the one that you have
 19 closest to you on perceptions is —

20 DR. MOSKOS: Yes.

21 MR. GEBICKE: That's the overall — the
 22 mandate report.

23 Right, Bill?

1 DR. BEUSSE: Right.

2 MR. GEBICKE: Yeah, that's the one that
 3 really summarizes the fitness/fatness standards as well
 4 as talks a little bit about the combat exclusionary
 5 policy. It's kind of a summary report that was required
 6 by law. It was mandated by law.

7 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you.

8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: So just to clarify for
 9 the record, the report numbered 99-9, dated November '98,
 10 "Improved Guidance and Oversight," is a predecessor to
 11 the one numbered 99-27, "Information to Assess
 12 Servicemembers' Perceptions"?

13 MR. GEBICKE: Exactly.

14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, I'll go ahead and
 15 start the questioning to take off from the last point
 16 that you made which concerned the DoD review. I noted
 17 that DoD did concur in the recommendations in these
 18 studies, but I would like to know if you had contact with
 19 the individual services in connection with that review
 20 and concurrence.

21 And, also, if you could just sort of
 22 characterize whatever give-and-take there may have been,
 23 whatever comments they may have had about your findings

1 and so forth, just so that we could have a little
 2 information about how that process went.

3 MR. GEBICKE: Okay. Bill, I think you and
 4 John were probably at those meetings. You would probably
 5 be better than I to take that question.

6 DR. BEUSSE: Okay. I think John has
 7 talked more to the service people. Let me kind of just
 8 give you the DoD perspective on the three methodologies.
 9 There DoD concurred with our findings. We didn't have
 10 any recommendations in that report. Of course, that was
 11 also the position that they were taking in terms of which
 12 reports they felt had more credibility.

13 MR. GEBICKE: Were you asking about the
 14 physical fitness report?

15 DR. BEUSSE: Or all three?

16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, all three, to
 17 include both the Kassebaum Baker or the methodologies and
 18 —

19 MR. GEBICKE: Okay. Because the only one
 20 — just to clarify, the only one where we had
 21 recommendations was the one on physical fitness and fat
 22 standards. But Bill can talk to the reaction that we
 23 received from the others as well.

1 I'm sorry, Bill. Go ahead.

2 DR. BEUSSE: Yeah.

3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. It was reviewed?

4 DR. BEUSSE: Yes.

5 MR. GEBICKE: Well, our procedure —

6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: They were given an
 7 opportunity to review it —

8 MR. GEBICKE: Sure.

9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — before it was
 10 published in fact?

11 MR. GEBICKE: Absolutely. Yeah, our
 12 normal practice — and it's a required policy on our part
 13 — is to provide all of our draft reports to any agency
 14 for review before we go final, and then their comments
 15 are incorporated in the report, in the final version.

16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Are all
 17 their comments incorporated into the final version, or
 18 where there's — Because there are some obviously that a
 19 service may not necessarily agree with completely what
 20 you've said, so there's got to be some kind of
 21 adjudication there.

22 MR. GEBICKE: Well, what happens in that
 23 case is that — It's kind of a roll-up process. Each of

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1 the services will comment on our report and then they'll
 2 meet with a DoD official, and then the DoD official will
 3 — along with the servicemembers, will decide which
 4 comments become part of the official response to GAO.
 5 So there are instances — not necessarily
 6 on these reports that I'm aware of, but on others —
 7 where I know the service might adamantly disagree with
 8 something we say but that would not be reflected
 9 necessarily. So you're exactly correct.
 10 So if you hear something to the contrary,
 11 it might be that we're not aware of it or it might not be
 12 part of the official comments from the DoD.
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And just to assist
 14 answering my question, that's essentially what I'm
 15 getting at, which is to try to get the degree to which
 16 the services heartily concur or —
 17 MR. GEBICKE: Okay.
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — whether these were
 19 negotiated results or whether the results were things
 20 that you just simply felt scientifically you had to go
 21 with even though there may have been some disquiet about
 22 it from the DoD side.
 23 MR. GEBICKE: Sure.

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1 DR. BEUSSE: Now, on that analysis of the
 2 methodologies of the three reports, that report was
 3 issued in an expedited fashion, so that we didn't have
 4 enough time to get written comments from DoD. They did
 5 review and we got their oral comments, as we did from the
 6 authors of the three reports. We got their comments as
 7 well and those were incorporated, and again, I don't
 8 think there were any real big disagreements in terms of
 9 the facts that we had laid out.
 10 Probably the area where there was the most
 11 kind of differences by service, I think, would be with
 12 regard to the physical fitness, and I think John Nelson
 13 can probably summarize that best.
 14 MR. NELSON: I'm John Nelson, Madam
 15 Chairwoman.
 16 There was a fair amount of agreement among
 17 the services, surprisingly. The concerns that came up
 18 had to do more with preserving their own ability as a
 19 service to make variations in the standards to meet their
 20 mission or various perspectives they may have had.
 21 Perhaps the reason for the agreement that
 22 we did get could be related to three things. One,
 23 concerns about the fairness of the standards as people

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1 get drummed out of the service and lose promotions and
 2 things like that were probably increasing. As gender
 3 issues hit the newspaper, people think about them more
 4 and then there's increased concerns there.
 5 The second thing was that DoD had asked
 6 for a National Academy of Sciences study back in '95, I
 7 believe — '96 — and that study just came out this
 8 spring, and that had to do with body fat and the science
 9 behind the body fat standards. The science there is
 10 pretty complex. There wasn't a lot of agreement among
 11 many of the research findings and the National Academy
 12 did a pretty good service in kind of summarizing that and
 13 separating the wheat from the chaff there and that helped
 14 a lot.
 15 The last part was our own work.
 16 Apparently we were the first ones to look at the physical
 17 fitness part of the standards as well as the body fat.
 18 And all those things seem to coalesce to a fair amount of
 19 agreement, but now was the time to maybe change this.
 20 There had been a lot of sentiment to change it in past
 21 years but it just never really coalesced.
 22 So I think we just came in at a good time
 23 and there was a fair amount of agreement. And they'll be

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1 studying that. They're coming out with a new written
 2 policy at the end of 1999 and these issues that we're
 3 talking about here are supposed to be in those.
 4 MS. POPE: Can I follow-up?
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Sure.
 6 MS. POPE: John, you lost me just a second
 7 in your first comment that said the services' concern was
 8 when they wanted — and I don't know the exact word, but
 9 to modify it to meet mission. But we're talking about
 10 physical fitness.
 11 MR. NELSON: Right.
 12 MS. POPE: Okay. So that is what you
 13 said?
 14 MR. NELSON: That's right.
 15 MS. POPE: So can you expand on that,
 16 because that's where you lost me.
 17 MR. GEBICKE: There's confusion there.
 18 MR. NELSON: As we point out in our
 19 report, there's some confusion as to what the objectives
 20 should be.
 21 MS. POPE: Right.
 22 MR. NELSON: We found that, going back to
 23 1981, when President Carter asked for a study, there was

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1 discussion about mission, there was discussion about
 2 occupation, there was discussion about health, there was
 3 discussion about fitness, and they were all sort of
 4 thrown in the regulation.
 5 In the early nineties — and Bill can
 6 speak more to this — there were some studies done I
 7 believe at the behest of Congress, if I'm not mistaken
 8 here, that looked at the same issue: what should the
 9 objectives be? That study found that probably they
 10 should be focused on health and fitness, as I think that
 11 was — may or may not have been a stated policy, but it
 12 was clearly the intent at the DoD level.
 13 What I found as you go down below that
 14 level, though, it still had not come out clearly in
 15 policy that what we want to do here is health and
 16 fitness. So one of the things we did was really focus on
 17 that issue and lay out the point that maybe we're
 18 confused here.
 19 MS. POPE: So this was across the services
 20 that servicemembers — commanding officers who were
 21 responsible for physical fitness and mission issues were
 22 confused?
 23 MR. NELSON: Yes.

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1 MS. POPE: And that was across the
 2 services?
 3 MR. NELSON: Yeah.
 4 MS. POPE: And that still exists?
 5 MR. NELSON: Yes.
 6 Now, it's been clarified now. DoD, at our
 7 recommendation, looked at the issue. There is a joint
 8 services working group that's looking at many of these
 9 issues. This issue they've looked at and they've decided
 10 that, yes, health and fitness should be the objectives
 11 and we're going to state that clearly, and state also
 12 that mission and occupation are not a part of these
 13 standards.
 14 DR. SEGAL: I'd like to follow-up —
 15 MR. GEBICKE: Well, I mean, just to
 16 elaborate, one thing that really drove this point home to
 17 me was when John was out conducting his interviews, the
 18 word "appearance" came up often. We set the standards
 19 because people would appear to be too heavy.
 20 MS. POPE: Right.
 21 MR. GEBICKE: I mean, that —
 22 MS. POPE: Right. How can you define
 23 that?

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 26</p> <p>1 MR. GEBICKE: I mean, you know, very 2 judgmental. 3 MS. POPE: Right. 4 DR. SEGAL: I'd like follow-up on this 5 because we have heard testimony previously from the 6 services. We've been — I've been learning more about 7 physical fitness standards than I ever wanted to know. 8 And it's clear to us that there's confusion between these 9 two different goals of physical tests. One is the 10 physical fitness and health on the one hand, and the 11 other is the physical performances required for specific 12 occupations or jobs within occupational categories. And 13 the services themselves, the fitness experts themselves, 14 are, to my mind, guilty of this when they justify the 15 particular tasks that are in their physical fitness tests 16 by referring to mission, by talking about which are more 17 related to the performance of jobs without any systematic 18 examination of that. 19 So I'm not sure if you're prepared to 20 answer this question, but I would ask you a set of 21 interrelated questions, actually. On the basis of your 22 examination — And I agree with Ms. Blair that these 23 reports are extremely informative and I'm jealous at your</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 29</p> <p>1 adjustments, and they don't seem to question the age 2 adjustments. I guess as we all get older, we come to 3 believe that that's more and more justified. But there 4 is that questioning on the gender side and, yet, it's 5 really the same issue. 6 MR. GEBICKE: If I could add, too, Bill, I 7 recall when we were doing that work several years ago 8 that it becomes very involved and very expensive to 9 determine what the correlation would be between the 10 standards that you set and the ability to perform in that 11 particular job. 12 And the military, at the time we were 13 talking to them about it, said this would be very 14 expensive and take a very long period of time for us to 15 go through these occupations and to actually make sure 16 that the correlation scientifically existed. 17 So it would be a great undertaking. 18 DR. BEUSSE: Now, at the time that we did 19 that work, only the Air Force had — was screening people 20 for physical capability to perform jobs that they had 21 identified as requiring moderate to heavy lifting. But 22 they tested only at the military entrance processing 23 stations. They did not test thereafter.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 27</p> <p>1 ability to do such high quality work in short periods of 2 time. 3 What would you recommend on the basis of 4 this examination that the services do, both with regard 5 to physical fitness testing and especially with regard to 6 the gender issues? That's one big question. And the 7 other big question is, is this also perhaps the right 8 time for them to start developing separately and making 9 clear of the distinction physical performance 10 requirements and doing a task analysis with specific 11 jobs? 12 So those are two very big questions 13 that... 14 (Unintelligible.) 15 DR. BEUSSE: Let me start probably from 16 the second of those two questions. I think the absence 17 of a program really aimed at looking at job-specific 18 physical requirements is at least partly responsible for 19 people assuming that it then must be covered by these 20 others. 21 Now, there was a law passed in the early 22 nineteen-nineties that looked at or laid out some 23 requirements for job-specific requirements. In</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 30</p> <p>1 The Army had also classified some of its 2 positions on the basis of whether they required 3 physically demanding capabilities, but they used that 4 only for counseling people as to what the demands of a 5 particular occupation were. 6 DR. SEGAL: Have you looked at the 7 methodology that they used to establish those? 8 DR. BEUSSE: We looked at the 9 instrumentation. What they were using was something 10 called the incremental lift machine, which is basically 11 — looks like a piece of Nautilus equipment, with handles 12 on it, and you would — they would measure how much you 13 could lift, and you had so many lifts or so many tries at 14 it. 15 There are concerns about whether that 16 accurately represents how any human being would actually 17 approach a lifting task. It's not the way I learned to 18 lift and not the — 19 DR. SEGAL: What is your field of 20 expertise? Are you in physical performance? 21 DR. BEUSSE: By training, I'm an 22 industrial organizational psychologist. 23 DR. SEGAL: Okay. So —</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 28</p> <p>1 particular, that if they are established, that they would 2 have to be gender-neutral. But it did not require in the 3 view of DoD that they necessarily have job-specific 4 physical performance standards. 5 But they recognized that if they did have 6 those or if the Secretary of Defense believed that there 7 were occupations which have specific physical demands 8 which were critical to performance, that the Secretary 9 would have to proscribe standards of performance for 10 those jobs and those standards would have to be gender- 11 neutral. 12 Now, by extension, we presume that those 13 would also have to be age-neutral. In other words, if 14 they are establishing a minimal level of physical 15 capability to do the work, then there would be no basis 16 for adjusting that for physiological differences, not 17 just due to gender but also due to aging. That if that's 18 an absolute lower limit of what somebody needs to 19 possess, then that's what they need to possess. 20 And it's interesting that that distinction 21 doesn't seem to kind of arise in the minds of a lot of 22 the critics. They don't see that age adjustments are 23 essentially the same justification as the gender</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 31</p> <p>1 DR. BEUSSE: I'm a Ph.D. in — 2 DR. SEGAL: Right. So in terms of the 3 methodology by which you would go about establishing what 4 the requirements would be for a job, did you look at the 5 methodology that the Army used to come up with which of 6 their jobs were classified as heavy and very heavy? 7 DR. BEUSSE: They did not have that 8 documentation, nor did the Air Force. It had a much more 9 kind of longstanding program to do that. They could not 10 produce the historical documentation that had been lost 11 or disposed of. 12 DR. SEGAL: The Women in the Army Policy 13 Review Group went to the proponents of each of the jobs, 14 which would be the schools that trained the people, and 15 their request went to those schools and they were asked 16 to rate how heavy the job would be, so it was a 17 subjective judgment on the part of generally a senior 18 NCO. 19 That's the methodology that they used. 20 Would that be the kind of methodology that you, as a 21 specialist, would recommend? 22 DR. BEUSSE: Well, I think that you would 23 have to augment it with more than that. I think you</p>

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1 would also want to make sure that these are regular and
2 recurring parts of the job, not things that may happen,
3 you know, one percent of the time.

4 I think you would also have to examine how
5 the jobs are actually done in the real world. And it's
6 been my observation that most of military work is really
7 the result of teamwork; very little individual kind of
8 work for those kinds of tasks. It's a team that's tasked
9 with doing things.

10 And, therefore, I think they come up with
11 — in the field, as any organization would — things that
12 are aimed at getting the job done with whatever resource
13 they have available to do it.

14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: That leads
15 into my question, then. This question is really going to
16 ask for an opinion as well as the basis of your study in
17 the area of physical fitness and conditioning.

18 I think you should know the Army has
19 already established some unit orientation as far as
20 physical conditioning is concerned. The Marine Corps,
21 the same, in that type of thing. And you've just alluded
22 to the teamwork aspect.

23 Is it time for DoD and the armed services

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1 to take what is a health physical fitness program,
2 understand that there's a requirement for physical
3 conditioning and that is a continuation of a health
4 physical fitness program based on this teamwork, unit
5 proficiency, which kind of ties into the performance
6 oriented aspect of physical fitness, and in fact, clearly
7 enunciate and have a program that is continuous?

8 That is, you still have your health
9 physical fitness program, but you also have, for lack of
10 a better way of saying it, a unit physical conditioning
11 program that builds from that health physical fitness so
12 that you in fact are covering both of the concerns —
13 that is, health fitness as well as whether or not there's
14 performance fitness — from your studies and what you've
15 seen?

16 DR. BEUSSE: I think to some extent that
17 capability exists now and we find that individual unit
18 commanders do have their own programs that are geared
19 toward what they see as the demands of their mission or
20 their unit's activities, and I think there's a danger in
21 trying to mix the two under the same roof because
22 eventually people are just going to become confused by
23 it.

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1 Now, I think from a development stand,
2 it's probably going to be easier to develop some set of
3 mission-related requirements for broad categories of jobs
4 than it would be for specific job-related standards.
5 You're just going to have fewer different types.

6 But one of the concerns that I think
7 people are going to have is one of the concerns that has
8 existed throughout the area of concern with equal
9 employment opportunity. And that is, sometimes
10 objectives or standards are set that are seemingly
11 neutral on their face but ultimately have the impact of
12 screening out more of one group than another.

13 And when that happens, I think there's a
14 need for some close scrutiny to ensure that those
15 standards are actually good, firm, validated requirements
16 and not something just being proposed that is going to
17 have the effect of screening out one group because people
18 believe that that group maybe isn't as proficient in that
19 area.

20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Just a
21 follow-up on your comment concerning it would become
22 confusing. And I have difficulty with that. I have
23 difficulty with it being confusing. If this is the

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1 health physical fitness test that I take and this is the
2 unit physical conditioning program that I run, you know,
3 each week as part of my organization, I don't understand
4 why that would be confusing.

5 DR. BEUSSE: It probably isn't going to be
6 confusing to the people running it. But to the people
7 who may be observing it — For example, on the health and
8 fitness part of it, there are links required by DoD
9 policy to — If people are unable to perform to required
10 levels, there's a remediation period; but if they still
11 can't achieve the standards, then they can be drummed out
12 of the service.

13 On the other hand, if you've got people
14 who can't handle physically maybe the requirements for
15 that mission, then they shouldn't be drummed out of the
16 service. There should be other military occupations
17 available to them which are within their capability.

18 So I think you'd have to clearly delineate
19 the two programs to ensure that people weren't being
20 kicked out of the service because of inability to perform
21 a particular mission which may be a very physically
22 demanding mission when there are other jobs that may be
23 available to them that could capitalize on other skills

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1 that they might have which may not be physical; may be
2 mental.

3 MS. POPE: But to follow-up on what you're
4 saying and what General Christmas is saying, if they
5 can't do the job in that unit, whatever the service is,
6 then they ought not — then you've got a readiness — a
7 mission impact, so they ought not to be part of that
8 unit. And I don't think you were implying that they
9 ought to be kicked out of the service.

10 DR. BEUSSE: No.

11 MS. POPE: But they ought not to be moved
12 — they ought not to be continued in that unit.

13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: But what if you
14 have no other place to put them? I mean, you're assuming
15 there's a job for everybody.

16 MS. POPE: Well, right. But you're
17 assuming if there is within that service. But, I mean,
18 let's just say if there's not a job, then there's no
19 place, and then there's a lot of reasons to leave.

20 DR. SEGAL: Well, one of the things — I'm
21 going to make —

22 MS. POPE: Wait, before you — because I
23 want to follow-up on what Ron was saying because I think

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1 that's a really interesting thought. And I actually
2 agree with you. I think it's less confusing. That
3 what's currently — and it leads into my question, is
4 that based on where we are today, it's very confusing,
5 and I'm a little concerned that the services were as
6 confused by appearances in physical fitness and mission
7 requirements as what all of you heard. I mean, that's
8 concerning but it gives us some feedback on that.

9 And the other extreme of having to do very
10 expensive testing which, in the reality of tight budgets,
11 probably isn't an option. It may be for certain kinds of
12 jobs, but it's probably — And so, I mean, General
13 Christmas' line of thinking was how do you move from
14 where we are today to an optimum world, which we're not
15 going to get to?

16 And if you could categorize skills — I
17 mean, physical fitness, it sounds like DoD's attempting
18 to finally define that. So the next step is to look at
19 what are the requirements of a unit, of a mission, and be
20 able to appropriately define those skills that any
21 service needs to perform a mission.

22 And have you looked at that and have you
23 discussed — had discussions with DoD and the services

1 about how you begin that process to move...
 2 MR. NELSON: John Nelson.
 3 I had some discussions about that. It's
 4 early on and there's some policy decisions that DoD has
 5 to make in this area. You alluded to one of them. It
 6 has to do with how you look at the requirements of an
 7 occupation.
 8 MS. POPE: Right.
 9 MR. NELSON: Do you have a team that
 10 performs that? You're carrying a hundred-pound crate of
 11 ammo, or do you break that ammo down into twenty-five-
 12 pound boxes? Alternatively, some view that as having a
 13 requirement for one person to be able to carry that ammo
 14 box fifty yards across a battlefield in twenty seconds.
 15 I don't know that there's agreement yet on
 16 which of those approaches you should take. There seems
 17 to be budding agreement that the teamwork approach is
 18 probably the best one. I think the Marine Corps believes
 19 that. The Army has done some studies that are moving
 20 into that area.
 21 The other part — and you've alluded to
 22 that — is validation. Which of these do you validate?
 23 MS. POPE: Right.

1 MR. NELSON: It's a very expensive
 2 proposition.
 3 The USARIEM — and I'm not sure of the
 4 acronym. It's United States Army Research — And I'm not
 5 sure what the rest of the acronym means there, but it's a
 6 research group in the Army. USARIEM.
 7 What they've done is to actually take some
 8 of the occupational standards and validate them; look at
 9 them completely anew and say, "Is this a real
 10 requirement?" They've done five or ten of those to my
 11 understanding, and they've stopped doing that work, I
 12 think, now and are waiting for policy guidance and
 13 funding to do more of that. But what do you do next?
 14 And the staff discussed one option of just
 15 funding those heavy-lifting type jobs and just doing it
 16 at that level, which would handle some of the cost. To
 17 my knowledge, that's about as far as it's gotten. There
 18 needs to be some policy guidance and decisions made there
 19 and they're very difficult questions.
 20 DR. SEGAL: And that may in fact be one of
 21 our jobs in terms of our in-depth exploration of this,
 22 what we recommend to Congress in terms of what the
 23 services should do, and that's why we're looking to you

1 for guidance about what you think would be feasible.
 2 Would it be too expensive to do all the different
 3 occupational specialties in the military and do a good
 4 validation study?
 5 MR. NELSON: It would be extremely
 6 expensive.
 7 MR. GEBICKE: But there's probably a lot
 8 of them. It wouldn't be one to —
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But would
 10 it be expensive to take like units?
 11 MS. POPE: Right.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: You know,
 13 all of these occupational specialties perform in
 14 organization.
 15 MS. POPE: Right.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Would it be
 17 expensive to take a basic maintenance battalion or a
 18 basic aircraft squadron or whatever and evaluate in fact
 19 what are the minimum team physical conditioning standards
 20 that that organization should have?
 21 MR. NELSON: I think it would be more
 22 expensive if you did it functionally than if you did it
 23 with more of the strength focus. That seems to be the

1 cutting edge between genders. It's just the upper body
 2 strength is the determining factor there in many, many
 3 cases.
 4 DR. SEGAL: What do you mean by
 5 "functional"?
 6 MR. NELSON: Functional would be
 7 maintenance versus combat requirements or something else
 8 like that. The job versus the actual strength or
 9 determining factors between genders as to their ability
 10 to do that job.
 11 DR. SEGAL: So it's looking at whether
 12 people can actually perform the job; looking at the tasks
 13 on the job rather than the individual characteristic that
 14 might be related to that.
 15 MR. NELSON: Right. Right.
 16 DR. SEGAL: Okay.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Let me
 18 follow-up, if I might, because both of these studies
 19 really come together. And you've made the comment that
 20 general physical fitness standards can be different for
 21 men and women without necessarily being inequitable.
 22 Yet, in the perception aspect, you know, you imply that,
 23 you know, "gee, this is a real problem."

1 Is the real problem that the Department of
 2 Defense and the services just haven't had a very good
 3 information program — and I'll call it information
 4 operations because that's the vogue type operation today
 5 — throughout the services? Is that —
 6 MR. GEBICKE: I think that's part of the
 7 problem. Absolutely. That's the first recommendation we
 8 made, is they need to get the information out that we
 9 really do not have mission standards. We have physical
 10 fitness standards.
 11 DR. BEUSSE: And I think part of it is
 12 compounded by the point Dr. Segal made before. They
 13 don't have the job-specific standards. And, yet,
 14 everybody recognizes that's really the most important
 15 thing when you talk about the military accomplishing its
 16 mission, is can they do their job.
 17 So people are inclined then, in the
 18 absence of having any job or mission-specific standards,
 19 to say, "Well, that's the only thing we're measuring."
 20 That must be in some way related to that capability."
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I may have
 22 read into this, but I got the impression that — what I
 23 was hearing you saying — that maybe this perception

1 issue isn't really as great as it's being made out to be.
 2 That perceptions are really — That perceptions are not
 3 as great a problem as was implied. I thought that in at
 4 least two of these areas — two of your studies I've read
 5 that. Am I correct?
 6 DR. BEUSSE: I think we would say that the
 7 perceptions are very important. Those are essentially
 8 reality for the people who hold them.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Perceptions
 10 held by all or a few?
 11 DR. BEUSSE: By enough that it becomes an
 12 issue in terms of relationships between the gender. And
 13 there's quite a bit of unrest and kind of feeling that
 14 you're not being fairly treated on both sides, which is
 15 interesting. They're both looking at the same physical
 16 reality and coming away with different impressions of it
 17 as to who is disadvantaged by it.
 18 DR. SEGAL: I'm a little less sanguine
 19 than General Christmas or you are about the degree to
 20 which just educating the folks out there about what the
 21 physical fitness standards are supposed to be for and
 22 distinguishing them from job and mission requirements,
 23 and I say that for a number of reasons. I won't go into

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1 all of them, but one of them has to do with the
2 differential interpretation of the age and gender-
3 norming.

4 So there's something going on with regard
5 to the gender perceptions that's not going on with regard
6 to the age perceptions, and just education alone in terms
7 of the differences — It's not going to be successful
8 unless there's a very consistent message sent by the
9 services, and when their own physical fitness experts
10 wash over into mission in explaining some of the
11 performances, I'm sure it's going to — it's bound to
12 happen out there when the explanation is at the level of
13 the people who hold the perceptions. There's a problem.

14 And so what do you recommend in terms of
15 the actual methodology by which the services should look
16 to see how to measure physical fitness? Have they —
17 They've been making some changes but they've been
18 sticking to the same tasks. Does that make sense to you?
19 Or should they perhaps consider a fuller range of
20 measures of physical fitness?

21 DR. BEUSSE: I think they're measuring the
22 key things that the experts in those areas say that
23 should be measured, such as cardiovascular endurance,

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1 Marines, for example, had no muscular strength and
2 endurance standards at all. They weren't testing for
3 that, and they've agreed to do that now and are working
4 that out.

5 So some of the gender issues we didn't
6 fully get at, but we did get at a number of the others
7 and we brought — we were trying to bring a lot more
8 consistency which will help in that whole area. It, as
9 you say, may not satisfy all of that, but it would help
10 some.

11 MR. GEBICKE: This whole area is an area
12 that everybody in the services are very concerned about,
13 just general physical fitness. And we've done a lot of
14 work in the recruiting area and we've been very concerned
15 about the number of recruits that drop out before they've
16 served their first term and, specifically, there's a high
17 percentage that drops out in basic training.

18 And one of the recommendations we made in
19 the past — and the services are moving towards this —
20 is to better prepare recruits in the delayed entry
21 program, both physically and mentally, for the rigors of
22 basic training before they get there.

23 The Marine Corps seems to be doing a

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1 muscular strength and endurance, and body composition,
2 more coming from the health standpoint than the
3 conditioning standpoint.

4 DR. SEGAL: Now, we had some experts in
5 here who said they're not measuring flexibility, which is
6 another component to fitness, and they're not measuring
7 leg strengths to the extent that they measure upper body
8 strength, both of which are measures on which women
9 proportionately do better than men. They don't
10 necessarily do better than men, but the differential
11 would not be as great.

12 And in fact, on some kinds of flexibility
13 women perform better than men, so the norming would
14 actually then be in the other direction where the norms
15 for the men would be lower than the norms for the women.
16 Does this make sense in terms of including?

17 DR. BEUSSE: Again from a fitness
18 standpoint, yes. But one of the things that the research
19 has found is that those kinds of exercises are part of
20 the problem in terms of finding no relationship to
21 mission and job performance; because in most situations,
22 things like unloaded distance running is not something
23 that military people are called upon to do in the

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1 pretty good job of that right now. They have a very
2 structured program. And if you go out to any recruiting
3 command in the Marine Corps, they've got their recruits
4 coming in periodically and doing exercises and
5 participating, and they're getting them ready to go to
6 basic training. But the other three services have been
7 somewhat negligent in that area and really need to do
8 more.

9 The reason being is that when you talk to
10 recruiters and you talk to commanders in the field who
11 get recruits after they finish basic training, to a
12 person they will tell you that people coming in today are
13 less physically fit generally than they ever have been in
14 the past.

15 So we have a — And I don't know how many
16 times I've heard the term "mouse potatoes." We used to
17 hear the term "couch potatoes." But now you're sitting
18 on the couch playing with a mouse, so it's "mouse
19 potatoes."

20 DR. SEGAL: Are they in fact less
21 physically fit than they were?

22 MR. GEBICKE: Well, we've talked about
23 that and that's really — We had a discussion about that

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1 performance of their duties. That's just not a part of
2 the job.

3 DR. SEGAL: You're saying the tasks that
4 they're actually measuring now are not related to mission
5 performance?

6 DR. BEUSSE: Right. And so there — But I
7 think they are or are at least in that area. And they
8 don't necessarily measure everything that there is to be
9 measured or fully kind of cross the area of fitness, but
10 there are other areas where they could measure muscular
11 strength and endurance, such as lower body, which has an
12 effect on lifting. If that's the concern, that's the way
13 they teach you to lift, then that's the thing that
14 perhaps they ought to be measuring as well.

15 MR. NELSON: Dr. Segal, let me add this to
16 what Bill was saying. One of the things we tried to do
17 is just to get a scientific basis for the standards they
18 were using. The other thing was we heard a fair amount
19 of confusion and concern about differences among the
20 services: why do the Air Force people not have to do
21 push-ups?

22 So that was another part of our
23 recommendation, is to get some consistency there. The

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1 just this morning and that's — scientifically, we don't
2 know. I mean, we don't — we don't know that. I'm just
3 — Did you want to comment on that, Bill?

4 DR. BEUSSE: Well, I don't know. I wanted
5 to ask —

6 DR. SEGAL: What are the standards now
7 compared to what they were twenty years ago?

8 DR. BEUSSE: I was just going to ask —

9 MR. GEBICKE: Well, in some places
10 standards are more stringent today.

11 DR. BEUSSE: The runs are longer, for
12 example, than they were when I was in the military.
13 Longer distances. You know, in that kind of measure,
14 then yes, they're harder.

15 MS. POPE: I wanted to comment on that
16 because I was having a conversation with some Navy folks
17 and twenty years ago there were no standards. If you
18 breathed, you could get in the Navy. I mean, literally
19 there were no physical requirements. I mean, you had
20 folks to swab decks and you had folks that you needed the
21 intellectual capability. They didn't care. And so they
22 — Literally, twenty years ago there were no standards.

23 DR. SEGAL: And I was told — and I

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1 haven't been able or had time to check it out and I
 2 wonder if maybe you know — that the physical standards
 3 that the women have to pass at West Point now are more
 4 stringent than the men in the classes in the fifties and
 5 sixties had to pass.
 6 MR. GEBICKE: I do know that at least a
 7 few years ago the standards that West Point had were more
 8 stringent than the Army's standards. In other words,
 9 there were people who were denied graduation because they
 10 could not meet the West Point standard, who, had they
 11 been commissioned by any other source, would have gotten
 12 a commission in the Army.
 13 DR. MOSKOS: Anita, can I just follow-up
 14 on some of this?
 15 This business that they're dropping out —
 16 you know, we have this — if they are less physically fit
 17 today — Well, we don't know that. That's an unknown
 18 question. But, say, on body fat, which is kind of a
 19 measurable thing, leaving aside physical fitness. How
 20 many people who were in the World War II Army, today
 21 could get in under today's fat requirement standards, do
 22 you think? Do you have any sense for that?
 23 MR. NELSON: John Nelson.

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1 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah, John. Right.
 2 MR. NELSON: The body fat standards that
 3 the military uses didn't come into play until 1981.
 4 Prior to that — And the reason was, as you probably
 5 know, they were concerned with drumming people out of the
 6 service who were very strong and appeared to be fat, who
 7 really weren't. They were just strong people.
 8 Prior to that, there were body fat
 9 standards, but they were concerned more — This goes back
 10 to the late eighteen hundreds. They were concerned with
 11 people having too low a body fat. People were having
 12 tuberculosis, those sorts of diseases, so they watched
 13 for that as opposed to having too much, which is the
 14 problem now.
 15 So the modern standards didn't come in
 16 until 1981. So we don't have an answer to your question
 17 specifically.
 18 DR. SEGAL: Do we have height and weight
 19 distributions, for example, for —
 20 MR. NELSON: You do have height and weight
 21 distributions.
 22 DR. SEGAL: — for back then?
 23 Do we know what they were and could they

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1 be in some sort of estimate? Could you do an estimate of
 2 how fat they were?
 3 MR. NELSON: Yes, ma'am, I can. There is
 4 a book put out by Carl Friedel from the Army and he
 5 traces these standards all the way back, and I can get
 6 you a copy of that if you'd like.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: But don't you
 8 think people were smaller than? I mean, look at the old
 9 uniforms. You can't get in them today. They were — No,
 10 really. I mean, talking in the Civil War. I mean, way
 11 back.
 12 DR. SEGAL: Well, and people have gotten
 13 taller because nutrition has improved.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Absolutely.
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And they were just coming
 16 off of a depression then when they didn't eat that well.
 17 DR. MOSKOS: The other question: when did
 18 age-norming — Did that develop simultaneous with gender-
 19 norming or was that —
 20 MR. NELSON: John Nelson.
 21 I'm not sure. I believe that came in with
 22 the 1981 policy change, and that was DoD-wide. At that
 23 point, they said everybody should be tested for physical

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1 fitness, regardless of age. Prior to that, the Marines
 2 and the Navy were allowing older folks not to be tested,
 3 and the Army and the Air Force, I believe, were testing
 4 throughout a person's career. And that 1981 policy
 5 change just established the policy that everybody would
 6 be tested regardless of age.
 7 DR. MOSKOS: I just have one other item on
 8 this dropping out. Do you think that it's got nothing to
 9 do with physical fitness? This is another hypothesis.
 10 During the draft era of the peacetime years, 10 percent
 11 of draftees who served a two-year term dropped out,
 12 period — I mean, from day zero to day 770 — and now
 13 it's much — you know, it's 30 percent, approximately.
 14 Not just in basic, but I mean over a three-year
 15 enlistment or what have you.
 16 I mean, maybe it's the organization that's
 17 changed rather than the physical fitness of the soldiers.
 18 That you couldn't drop out. We had fat guys, we had
 19 skinny guys, and that was it. You were in. Just what —
 20 as Barbara was saying here.
 21 MS. POPE: If you breathed, you could stay
 22 in.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: And they didn't drop out.

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1 Now, maybe it isn't a physical question
 2 but a social one, rather than an organizational one.
 3 MR. GEBICKE: I think you're exactly
 4 right.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 6 MR. GEBICKE: I mean, we heard often in
 7 our work "easy in, easy out" today. Pretty easy to get
 8 into the service, pretty easy to get out if you want to
 9 get out. We've seen some instances where that might be
 10 changing a little bit.
 11 But if you go back to when we had a draft,
 12 I mean, people were always looking for ways out and the
 13 military was trying to deny them that avenue out of the
 14 service because they wanted to be fair to the extent that
 15 they could.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: So this is kind of a — maybe
 17 a false detour, looking at the physical business as the
 18 dropping-out problem rather than organizational and
 19 social changes as being the real cause of what's
 20 happening.
 21 MR. GEBICKE: It may be.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Is that a
 23 valid comment —

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1 DR. SEGAL: Before you move from the —
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — "easy
 3 in, easy out," based —
 4 DR. BEUSSE: Well, I think —
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: If, in
 6 fact, the entry standards have been raised as far as high
 7 school graduation is concerned, mental group, and that
 8 sort of thing, can you make that comment or is that a
 9 valid comment that it's easy in? Or for a large — or at
 10 least a portion of the population, we're now denying the
 11 opportunity to serve in the armed forces those who in
 12 past years in fact were prime members or candidates to be
 13 members of the armed forces.
 14 DR. BEUSSE: It may not be so much "easy
 15 in, easy out," as "volunteer in, volunteer out."
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 17 DR. BEUSSE: In other words, they find it
 18 very difficult to impose the kind of penalties that they
 19 did in a draft-induced era if somebody finds that they
 20 are just a square peg in a round hole.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: You're right, Bill. Yeah.
 22 MS. POPE: Yeah. Because before they
 23 would have —

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1 DR. SEGAL: Before we leave the physical
 2 fitness issues, I read with great interest in your report
 3 where you say that the services have not established the
 4 physical fitness requirements for women with the same
 5 degree of scientific rigor that they did for men by
 6 looking at whole populations, and I was especially
 7 interested in this statement that because the ethnic
 8 distributions have changed, especially among the women.
 9 That I gather what you were saying — and
 10 this is why I want to make sure I get clarification —
 11 that they should be norming the physical fitness
 12 standards to the population of military women today,
 13 which would include the ethnic distribution, especially
 14 — we're talking about the body fat requirements — that
 15 there's a different bone density between African American
 16 women and Caucasian women.
 17 Could you expand on some of this?
 18 MR. GEBICKE: Go ahead, John.
 19 MR. NELSON: I'm glad you asked that
 20 question. There is a science that's evolving in the
 21 establishment of these standards. And let me focus on
 22 body fat. That's where those particular issues reside.
 23 The way this is done — There are two

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1 because I hear you saying that the standards should be
 2 developed on a population representation — and that
 3 makes sense to me, I'm okay there — but then I hear that
 4 there are differences by ethnicity, so we have to make
 5 sure that we've got the same ethnic distribution in the
 6 populations we're using to set the standards as in the
 7 one being measured.
 8 Now, if there are these differences by
 9 ethnic group or body type, why not have a more
 10 sophisticated measurement that in fact takes into account
 11 for each individual their ethnicity or body type?
 12 Wouldn't that be a much better measure of fitness?
 13 MR. NELSON: We've recommended that and
 14 the services are moving towards that. What happened in
 15 the past — and again, it's the evolution of science —
 16 the underwater weighing techniques were focused on so-
 17 called two-compartment measures, and all that means is
 18 that — at least the way I understand it, all that means
 19 is it's the way you look at the body and set up your
 20 equations afterwards.
 21 And the two-compartment measures did not
 22 account for differences in bone density, protein
 23 differences, those sorts of things. What it did is it

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1 ways. One are expedient methods that are used in the
 2 field, and these are things like skinfold thickness,
 3 things like that. That used to be used. That's gone by
 4 the boards now and what they use now are circumferential
 5 measures of various sites on the body. The other part
 6 are so-called reference or criterion methods, and these
 7 are much more scientific methods such as underwater
 8 weighing and things like that.
 9 So what you do is you take a population of
 10 people and you measure various body sites — and this is
 11 done by service — then you compare it to the criterion
 12 measure, the underwater weighing, to see how close it
 13 came. And then you narrow it down to, you know, wrist
 14 plus neck, you know, minus waist, equals a certain amount
 15 of body fat. That's the way it's generally done.
 16 Each service is allowed to do that on
 17 their own, and as a result, you have widely varying
 18 results from their estimates. And we did one estimate —
 19 using all four services — on one woman, and we came out
 20 with a range of estimates from 27 to 42 percent for the
 21 same exact woman.
 22 MS. POPE: Same person.
 23 MR. NELSON: The same person.

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1 assumed that that was all equal among people. What they
 2 found since that time is that, "Wait a minute, that
 3 assumption is not valid. There are many, many
 4 differences here."
 5 And so they've tried to start developing
 6 measures of them, and they've come a long way now to the
 7 point where they've evolved a so-called four-compartment
 8 measure which includes a specific measure of bone
 9 density. And it's one that's — the numbers are fairly
 10 accessible to them and then they can just use it in a
 11 practical sense now.
 12 So they knew they weren't getting all of
 13 the measures, but there was just no way in science at
 14 that time to really get the specific measure. So they're
 15 still learning. And the Marine Corps was the first to go
 16 to the four-compartment measure, and the others, the
 17 Naval Health Research Service is now developing the
 18 equations for the other services to handle that.
 19 DR. SEGAL: Is this difficult for them to
 20 measure in the field? One of the arguments we have heard
 21 is that, "Well, there are much better measures of fitness
 22 that they could use." The Army in particular says, "We
 23 have to be able to measure our people all over the world

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1 Why does that happen? It's partly because
 2 of some of the things you mentioned. Each service,
 3 again, is doing its own thing.
 4 What the National Academy of Science found
 5 — and recommended that this be completely redone — is
 6 that the populations used by each service really are not
 7 representative of the current service makeups in terms of
 8 the percentage of women as well as the degree of
 9 ethnicity. So the National Academy of Science
 10 recommended that they just redo these with new
 11 populations, and make sure they're representative.
 12 Part of the reason for that, a good
 13 example is the Army. When the Army — And the Army had
 14 started out with a good population that had good
 15 ethnicity; it was — the female population was
 16 appropriate and all those sorts of things. But when they
 17 tried to do the underwater weighing, there was a lot of
 18 concern because some of those women couldn't swim and it
 19 was pretty terrifying, so they dropped out.
 20 So what the Army was left with was sort of
 21 a population full of Caucasians and males, and that just
 22 doesn't suit the Army anymore.
 23 DR. SEGAL: Now, I'm a little confused

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1 with no equipment." Do these more sophisticated measures
 2 that you're talking about require any equipment?
 3 MR. NELSON: Oh, yeah. The underwater
 4 weighing requires a large set of tanks and things like
 5 that, which is probably not practical in a field setting.
 6 Now, some Air Force bases obviously could
 7 do that and that sort of thing. But if you're talking
 8 about Bosnia, you can't do it there.
 9 DR. SEGAL: So you're recommending that
 10 they develop their actual standards that they would use
 11 on the basis of testing those standards against the
 12 criteria which is used in more sophisticated measures.
 13 MR. NELSON: Well, they were using that
 14 approach, but we said do it in a scientific basis and use
 15 the most updated scientific methods, which would have
 16 been the four-compartment or whatever is the best at that
 17 point.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But is that
 19 really of concern? That the physical fitness test,
 20 that's a pretty valid comment. I have to be able to do
 21 the physical fitness test worldwide, wherever I might be.
 22 But if I'm checking for body fat content, I'm doing that
 23 for a very specific reason. That is, the individual is

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1 perceived as being overweight and not within weight
 2 standards. And then after a medical officer has weighed
 3 and looked at, the individual in fact is, at least by the
 4 tables, over weight standard. Now and only then is when
 5 one would go to the body fat content.
 6 MR. GEBICKE: That's right.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: So I'm not
 8 sure that that would be a valid — you know, a valid
 9 argument. That individual would be — somewhere else,
 10 would be — you know, you're not going to worry about
 11 that in Bosnia, as an example. That would be done at a
 12 base somewhere.
 13 DR. SEGAL: So I hear what you're saying
 14 and maybe let's talk about this. Maybe what should
 15 happen in terms of being fair to people who do have
 16 different body types and/or who are from different ethnic
 17 groups, that before they have some sort of negative
 18 personnel action taken against them because of being over
 19 the allowed body weight, that we use the more
 20 sophisticated measurements for them. Is that what you're
 21 recommending?
 22 MR. NELSON: Yeah. And that's the current
 23 approach now, that you have to do immersion. It's the

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1 way they've the immersions, though, and the calculations
 2 underlying that. They are now being based on a more
 3 sophisticated methodology.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: But the trouble is, it
 5 doesn't get — Unfortunately, Mady — I know where you
 6 want to get to, but the fact is there may be — there's
 7 different body fat composition racially no matter what
 8 measure you're going to use, and then you're stuck with
 9 what do you do then?
 10 DR. SEGAL: Yeah. What do you do? Is it
 11 —
 12 DR. MOSKOS: I mean, it would be nice to
 13 say, "Oh, yeah, we could try the most sophisticated and
 14 it's going to norm it out," but it probably won't.
 15 DR. SEGAL: Well, I guess the —
 16 DR. MOSKOS: There are physiological
 17 differences. Bone density, et cetera, and body fat.
 18 DR. SEGAL: Could an African American
 19 woman be as fit —
 20 DR. MOSKOS: But heavier.
 21 DR. SEGAL: — and healthy —
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 23 DR. SEGAL: — but measure as a higher

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1 proportion of — with a higher proportion of body fat?
 2 MR. NELSON: That's the concern now. But
 3 if you go to these more sophisticated measures, that
 4 increased bone density would be accounted for and that
 5 person would be — should be measured accurately.
 6 MR. GEBICKE: And I should point out, too,
 7 that we were talking about the weight and height
 8 standards, which is the first kind of cut. I mean, those
 9 are also not consistent across the services. I don't
 10 know if you're aware of that.
 11 DR. SEGAL: Right.
 12 MR. GEBICKE: Okay.
 13 MS. POPE: The services —
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I didn't
 15 see that in your recommendation.
 16 MR. GEBICKE: No, we didn't make that —
 17 we didn't make that recommendation.
 18 MS. POPE: But I want to — I think I got
 19 lost again. Did you say that the services were looking
 20 at going towards a standard that would accommodate
 21 ethnicity or —
 22 MR. NELSON: Yes.
 23 MS. POPE: So they are moving. And at one

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1 point — Is there a date that they've given you that they
 2 are — So before someone leaves the service — I'm not
 3 talking about worldwide deployable, but before somebody
 4 is actually drummed out of the service, that they're —
 5 MR. NELSON: The Marine Corps has been
 6 using this since last year. That's sort of a test case.
 7 MS. POPE: So it's already in place for
 8 the Marine Corps?
 9 MR. NELSON: Pardon me?
 10 MS. POPE: It's already in place with the
 11 Marine Corps?
 12 MR. NELSON: It's already in place.
 13 DR. SEGAL: It's the four-compartment?
 14 MR. NELSON: It's being tested sort of by
 15 the Marine Corps.
 16 MS. POPE: Right.
 17 MR. NELSON: The Navy — The Naval Health
 18 Research Service is developing equations for the
 19 remaining services.
 20 What we recommended is one body fat
 21 standard across all services — one for DoD — and that
 22 would erase some of these problems that we saw with
 23 circumferential measures. They're all different among

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1 the services. You know, some use — and this is a
 2 precursor test —
 3 MS. POPE: Right.
 4 MR. NELSON: Some use wrist and forearm
 5 minus neck. They're all different and we frankly saw no
 6 reason for those differences. You're measuring the same
 7 thing in all people. So our recommendation, which
 8 they've agreed to, is one body fat test for men and one
 9 body fat test for women across — DoD-wide.
 10 DR. BEUSSE: Also, the body fat test is
 11 aimed at achieving that objective of health. And we
 12 didn't see anybody putting forth an argument that said
 13 one service had a requirement for healthier people than
 14 another service. They all had a requirement for healthy,
 15 well-conditioned people.
 16 DR. SEGAL: Have the services not resisted
 17 this attempt to have a one-size-fits-all, appropriate in
 18 this case? Because we have seen — Well, we have seen in
 19 the Commission, we also see it historically, a resistance
 20 by the services to have the imposition of a standard
 21 across-service to make things standardized.
 22 That they argue that there are different
 23 missions and their different environments they operate in

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1 might necessitate different standards. But this is one
 2 place where you don't see it and you don't think the
 3 services see a necessity for having a different standard?
 4 DR. BEUSSE: Well, I think the services
 5 are still inclined to want to have the flexibility, but
 6 it may be more related to their image of their service
 7 and wanting to have tougher standards than, say, another
 8 service, and that rank ordering of which services line up
 9 next to each other can be different if you're talking
 10 about mental capabilities or educational requirements.
 11 It's, again, how they view their service
 12 and what they see as perhaps their advantage in a
 13 recruiting environment of what kind of people are they
 14 appealing to bring in.
 15 MR. NELSON: I think in this arena,
 16 though, DoD understood that we were pushing a leadership
 17 role on their part and I think they accepted that.
 18 DR. SEGAL: Now, you said one body fat
 19 standard for DoD, but then you said one for men and one
 20 for women. Would this also be age-normed?
 21 DR. BEUSSE: That's, again, an issue that
 22 is really up in the air. There's some research that
 23 indicates that increasing fat content is just inevitable

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1 with age, no matter what you do to try to delay it.
 2 There's been some work that came out last summer that
 3 essentially found that if somebody is running ten miles a
 4 week to maintain their weight at age thirty, that they
 5 might have to run twenty-four miles a week to maintain
 6 that same degree of conditioning at age forty.
 7 So at some point it becomes — you're
 8 fighting nature and — But DoD, unlike their policy with
 9 regard to gender, has not required that these things be
 10 age-normed. They have allowed it if the services have
 11 opted to do it but have not required it.
 12 Isn't that the —
 13 DR. SEGAL: That's for the body fat?
 14 DR. BEUSSE: — the distinction?
 15 MR. NELSON: That's correct. The National
 16 Academy's recommendation was that the body fat standards
 17 not be age-normed. The reason was you do lose muscle
 18 mass as you grow older and that's replaced sometimes with
 19 extra weight gain, but it's not clear why that happens.
 20 Is it sedentary lifestyle or physiological changes?
 21 So in the absence of any compelling
 22 evidence that, you know, there's a real physiological
 23 change here, they've recommended they not be age-normed.

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1 But no decision has been made, as Bill indicated.
 2 DR. SEGAL: Speaking of nature, one of the
 3 issues has to do with both body fat and physical fitness
 4 standards for women postpartum after they've had babies,
 5 how long they have to get back. I seem to recall that in
 6 one of your reports you talked about that the services
 7 differed in terms of how much time women were allowed
 8 after having a baby to meet the standards. Would you...
 9 DR. BEUSSE: I think three of the
 10 services, as I recall, allow a full year to recover and
 11 one of the services only six months, and I think it's the
 12 Army that only allows six months. And I think that was
 13 also something that the National Academy pointed out and
 14 they were recommending that it be a full year because
 15 it's just harder than other people think to take the
 16 weight off and to do it in a healthy way.
 17 That's a concern. Again going back to
 18 some of the things John talked about before, they don't
 19 want to trigger eating disorders or those kinds of
 20 problems in order to make their annual or semiannual
 21 test.
 22 DR. SEGAL: Has any research been done to
 23 establish how many of the personnel actually go on a

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1 strict regimen just before their tests in order to pass
 2 the tests and then change — go back?
 3 MR. NELSON: I'm not aware of any. I'm
 4 not.
 5 DR. SEGAL: We know this goes on, we've
 6 seen it, but there's been no research that actually asks
 7 people on surveys or such?
 8 MR. NELSON: None that we're aware of.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: That argues
 10 for a unit physical conditioning program.
 11 MS. POPE: Yes, which are there all the
 12 time.
 13 DR. SEGAL: Ah, speaking of the unit
 14 physical conditioning programs, one of the things that I
 15 hear a lot in some of my research and in focus groups is
 16 that — and I'm actually going to be Bob Dare now because
 17 — I'll try to — because he's been concerned about —
 18 You talked about commanders, how you thought it was a
 19 good thing for commanders to develop a physical
 20 conditioning program within their own units.
 21 He has a concern that commanders are
 22 establishing higher norms than are necessary or make
 23 sense, and giving awards to people for maintaining higher

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1 levels of fitness, and that's affecting a lot of what
 2 happens when it's not job-specific and required.
 3 Do you want to comment on that?
 4 DR. BEUSSE: Well, I think that gets back
 5 to what I had mentioned earlier — that you can set
 6 standards which might sound neutral on their face but
 7 actually have a discriminatory impact.
 8 And again, I think that commanders do need
 9 some latitude to do what they think makes sense. They're
 10 ultimately responsible for accomplishment of their
 11 mission. But they can't do that in the total absence of
 12 checks and balances. There needs to be some type of a
 13 methodology check on how they develop the standards and
 14 some opportunity to question those and to see if it does
 15 make sense given the objective that they have.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: This is
 17 what, in my judgment, argues for a physical conditioning
 18 program. You're absolutely right, there's — Let's just
 19 take the physical fitness program. There is a minimum
 20 set of standards.
 21 Now, what a good commander, through their
 22 leadership, does, standards are like a ladder. You've
 23 got a bottom rung of the ladder. Their job is to get

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1 everybody on the bottom rung, and they're going to have
 2 other people higher up on the rungs, but what their
 3 eventual job is from a team aspect is to get everybody to
 4 rise on that.
 5 It's the same with physical conditioning
 6 of the unit, the organization, whether it be through
 7 marching, whether it be running as a unit, whether it be
 8 all those things. If you in fact have a minimum set of
 9 standards similar to what you have in the physical
 10 fitness program — and I think the Army's done that
 11 basically in these new manuals they've come out with as
 12 far as combat orientation — is then what you're able to
 13 do, it seems to me — and I would ask your comment on
 14 this — it seems to me, yeah, leadership will always try
 15 to move people up the ladder; but if you've established
 16 the minimum level, then the individual can't be hurt by
 17 being chucked or being — you know, other things done,
 18 but they have an incentive to move up that ladder's
 19 standards just like the rest of the organization.
 20 But it comes down to leadership. The
 21 leadership has to understand what the minimum set of
 22 standards are of where you begin.
 23 DR. BEUSSE: And I think also perception

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1 that that standard is somehow logically related to what
 2 they are asked to do on the job. If it were to be
 3 dominated by things such as unloaded distance running,
 4 people would begin to question that and they say, well,
 5 that's just going to be an award that's always going to
 6 go to a male, and probably a male of a specific kind of
 7 physical makeup that may not be the best type of person
 8 to have in a unit; that may not be the kind of body type
 9 that you really need for the mission of that unit.
 10 So again, I think it has to make sense.
 11 And in the field of social science, they'll a lot of the
 12 times make a concern about face validity, and that's what
 13 ultimately these things need. They need to make sense to
 14 the people who are being asked to achieve a certain level
 15 as well as have that scientific validity that it actually
 16 is related. People need to believe that it is in order
 17 to feel that they're being treated fairly.
 18 MR. NELSON: Let me say each of the
 19 services, although the regulations encourage this and —
 20 none of the services will allow these commanders to have
 21 a person drummed out of the service for not meeting them,
 22 so there is that backstop.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: We don't

1 drum people out of the service anymore.
 2 DR. SEGAL: We have them selectively
 3 removed.
 4 DR. BEUSSE: Rip off their buttons, break
 5 their saber.
 6 DR. SEGAL: I don't know if it's
 7 appropriate to raise some other issues that you all might
 8 be able to talk about. We've been talking specifically
 9 about the physical fitness issues.
 10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, if we're about to
 11 change subjects, I think this would be a good time to
 12 take a break. Are there any follow-ups to follow-ups on
 13 this subject right now?
 14 Okay. Let's take a break now and resume
 15 at 2:30. And they've kindly promised to stay as long as
 16 we have questions.
 17 (A brief recess was taken.)
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. We're back on the
 19 record. Were there some more questions to follow-up on
 20 the subject we were talking about before the break?
 21 DR. MOSKOS: I have just one last —
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Sure.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: I wanted to address it

1 perhaps to John. I mentioned it to Bill during the
 2 break.
 3 John, this test of — I think it was
 4 called maxwack in the seventies, which broke down Army
 5 jobs into heavy labor, medium labor and light labor.
 6 DR. SEGAL: That wasn't maxwack.
 7 DR. MOSKOS: It wasn't that. What was
 8 that one called?
 9 DR. SEGAL: That was part of the Women in
 10 the Army Policy Review Group.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: And it probably had an
 12 acronym.
 13 DR. SEGAL: It was WITAPRG.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: What was it?
 15 DR. SEGAL: WITAPRG. W-I-T-A, Women in
 16 the Army Policy Review Group.
 17 DR. MOSKOS: That was a fairly extensive
 18 thing. Is that reference available? This WITA study?
 19 MR. NELSON: I don't know, but I can check
 20 for you.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: When was it, Mady? Middle
 22 seventies? Late seventies?
 23 DR. SEGAL: No, it was —

1 DR. MOSKOS: Early eighties? What?
 2 DR. SEGAL: It probably came out in '80,
 3 '81, somewhere in there.
 4 MR. NELSON: My assumption is you could
 5 dig and find it. And if you'd like, I can —
 6 DR. SEGAL: I have a copy of it on my
 7 shelf somewhere.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Oh. Well, we can dig it up
 9 there, then.
 10 MR. NELSON: That'll be fine. If not,
 11 we'll look it up for you.
 12 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you. That's it.
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.
 14 DR. SEGAL: It should be available through
 15 DPIC, I would think.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Well, I always — No, I have
 17 a bigger concern that a lot of that material is lost as a
 18 record for political reasons. That's on the record.
 19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: It will be lost.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Tom, it's your turn.
 22 MR. MOORE: Ah, it is.
 23 DR. SEGAL: I'm sorry.

1 MR. MOORE: Well, I'd like to change the
 2 subject and talk about this report which is your analysis
 3 of the methodologies of the three reports which you had
 4 briefed to us at the outset.
 5 I guess I'm interested in the methodology
 6 of your analysis of methodologies, to put it succinctly.
 7 One thing obviously that we are concerned about is that
 8 whatever findings and recommendations we offer be
 9 authoritative and that we're not just wasting everybody's
 10 time.
 11 Clearly, just to review the history, when
 12 the Kassebaum Baker report came out, it did, I think,
 13 surprise a lot of people, both the content and even the
 14 unanimity with which it was reported, and then your
 15 critique followed right on the heels of it. And in many
 16 ways, because you did have some clearly valid concerns
 17 about their method, your report was then used essentially
 18 to impeach the findings of Kassebaum Baker.
 19 And I notice that you really don't quarrel
 20 with — There's nothing in this report that really takes
 21 issue with Kassebaum Baker, DACOWITS, or the Army Review
 22 Panel findings. You simply have pointed out some
 23 shortcomings in their methodology, and I guess the most

1 critical thing that you say is that it limits the
 2 usefulness of those reports.
 3 MR. GEBICKE: Right.
 4 MR. MOORE: So, you know, we're concerned
 5 about that. Obviously we don't want to make some of
 6 those same errors and I'm sure we will benefit from their
 7 mistakes and from your critique of those mistakes.
 8 So I want to talk about that a little bit
 9 and I guess basically talk about — forgive me for using
 10 a 64-dollar-word, but the epistemology, which is really
 11 the science of knowledge: how do we know what we know —
 12 or how do we know what we think we know might be a better
 13 way to put it, because clearly there are limits to what
 14 we think of as empirical approaches.
 15 First, just to review, what triggers a GAO
 16 report or investigation or study? Someone comes to you
 17 from the Congress, as I understand it, and actually
 18 requests that you look at an issue?
 19 MR. GEBICKE: Yeah. Right now, about 90
 20 percent of the work that we do is congressionally
 21 requested. The bulk of that would come from a committee
 22 chair or a subcommittee chair, although we do work from
 23 — requested by members.

1 MR. MOORE: By individual members.
 2 MR. GEBICKE: And quite frankly, that
 3 percentage has increased over the last several years. It
 4 wasn't too long ago that we maybe had 70 percent of our
 5 work was congressionally driven and about 30 percent was
 6 self-directed.
 7 In other words, these were issues that we
 8 felt were important enough to invest some of our
 9 resources and there might have been reasons why somebody
 10 could not request that we do the work for political
 11 reasons or what have you, or there were things that were
 12 not yet on the radar screen of the Congress but it's
 13 going to take us a year and a half or two years of an
 14 investment to get up-to-speed so we could make
 15 contributions with the facts.
 16 But for the most part, you're exactly
 17 right. It's congressionally driven.
 18 MR. MOORE: So how — let's say a member
 19 or committee chairman comes and says, "We want you to
 20 look at X." How, then, is the — How is the issue framed
 21 so that you avoid what I would call a tendentious
 22 approach?
 23 MR. GEBICKE: Well, the first thing we do

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1 is we will — if somebody calls me, initially what I'll
 2 try to do is I'll sit down and talk with them, along with
 3 the staff, as to what it is they want us to accomplish.
 4 And we try to mutually agree upon what the objectives of
 5 the study should be so that they're stated in an
 6 unbiased, objective way, because you've got to have
 7 neutral research questions to begin or your study is
 8 going to be flawed.

9 Sometimes, however, letters come in
 10 unsolicited and just arrive on my desk and, quite
 11 frankly, the questions are not worded the way that we
 12 would like to have them worded. So we'll have to have a
 13 series of conversations and a dialogue with the
 14 requesters to make sure the questions are reframed in
 15 such a way that they are neutral.

16 Because as you know from that report and
 17 from the testimony that we've given, I mean, we don't
 18 have a position on whether basic training should be
 19 integrated or segregated. We feel that that's really a
 20 policy call and we're not in the business of making
 21 policy decisions for the Congress. We're in the business
 22 of kind of laying out the facts.

23 So what we did with regard to that

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1 particular study is, you know, we wanted to know what the
 2 three methodologies were. And when we looked at the
 3 three studies — And the way that we did that is that we
 4 first got hold of the studies; we read them in detail; we
 5 contacted the authors or the groups; we got their
 6 supporting information or had access to that supporting
 7 information; we interviewed key people.

8 One of the things that came through that
 9 was a consistent methodology in the three studies was the
 10 use of focus groups. So pretty quickly we said, "Well,
 11 the social science literature is pretty clear with regard
 12 to the use of focus groups."

13 For instance, your participation in your
 14 focus group should be like six, no more than twelve
 15 participants. They all should come from about the same
 16 walk in life. In other words, in this case, you wouldn't
 17 want to have instructors and students in the same focus
 18 group. You — generally they run ninety to 120 minutes.
 19 You want to cover five to six researchable questions.

20 So there's fairly strict — And you want
 21 to document. That's one of the things that we had the
 22 real problem with the Kassebaum Baker study. Not in that
 23 area, but in all areas. The documentation was very —

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1 And we talked with Ms. Blair about that earlier when we
 2 came over — is whatever you all did, please document
 3 what you do in case somebody has to come back later.

4 So really we couldn't — we couldn't
 5 really reconstruct how — to use Kassebaum Baker as an
 6 example, how they got to the bottom line because the
 7 documentation was not there. And we do know through
 8 interviews that some of the more controversial
 9 recommendations that they made were not made collectively
 10 by that whole group.

11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Would you
 12 repeat that last comment?

13 MR. GEBICKE: Yes. We know through
 14 interviews that we conducted that some of the more
 15 controversial recommendations made by that committee were
 16 not cleared by all members of that group when they
 17 appeared in print.

18 DR. SEGAL: Can you tell — Are you free
 19 to tell us, for example, how many of the members of that
 20 group supported the segregated sections of basic
 21 training?

22 MR. GEBICKE: Oh, gosh. Do we even know
 23 that?

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1 DR. BEUSSE: No.

2 MR. GEBICKE: I don't think we know that.

3 DR. BEUSSE: We just know basically they
 4 had made a decision to want to come out with unanimous
 5 findings and they had people who went along with some
 6 findings who were not totally convinced that that was the
 7 way to go. And had they had the option of submitting a
 8 minority report or a minority position on some of those
 9 issues, they would have preferred to do that.

10 DR. SEGAL: So they did not have the
 11 option of submitting a minority report?

12 DR. BEUSSE: They didn't meet as a final
 13 committee of the whole to adopt the report. That was
 14 done in a series of telephone conversations, some of
 15 which were one-on-one, almost a "star" type of
 16 communication pattern rather than something where
 17 everybody was involved in the decisions.

18 MR. MOORE: This is interesting. I don't
 19 think this is generally known. This is the first time
 20 I've —

21 MR. GEBICKE: George, go ahead.

22 MR. DELGADO: If I may add — George
 23 Delgado is my name.

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1 If you have access to the hearing in which
 2 the presentation was made, I think you will be able to
 3 see the reaction of some of the members to some of the
 4 more controversial recommendations.

5 MR. GEBICKE: George is referring to the
 6 hearing on the House National Securities Committee
 7 Subcommittee on Personnel, Congressman Buyer.

8 MR. DELGADO: That's correct.

9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And when you say —
 10 Excuse me. When you say "members," you mean members of
 11 the panel, not members of the commission.

12 MR. DELGADO: Members of the panel, yes.

13 MR. MOORE: Not members of Congress, is
 14 that right?

15 MR. DELGADO: No.

16 MR. GEBICKE: No.

17 I'm just going to mention, too, now, we
 18 spoke as part of our review, and also in soliciting
 19 comments once we had a draft, with Ms. Kassebaum Baker.

20 And, George, why don't you — You were at
 21 that meeting, and just go ahead and characterize for them
 22 the conversation that you had.

23 I mean, generally when we have a draft, I

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1 mean, we're going to publish this eventually, so we'll
 2 pretty much lay it out as what we found and what our
 3 views are and give the opportunity to the person to
 4 challenge or to tell us we missed something or there's
 5 something else we need to review or there's somebody else
 6 we need to talk to, and I think it's fair to say that she
 7 decided to run that particular committee more as a
 8 congressional oversight panel as opposed to a rigorous
 9 methodological research group.

10 So she was not really concerned — too
 11 awfully concerned about the fact that there wasn't
 12 documentation or things weren't done exactly the way —
 13 And, really, that's the way congressional groups
 14 sometimes do their work as well.

15 MR. DELGADO: George Delgado again.

16 One of the examples of what occurred was
 17 there is some mention in that report about problems with
 18 discipline in gender-integrated, I think, living quarters
 19 even though there are separations, either floors or
 20 because there are walls. But we asked if they had any
 21 information collected by the services as to what types of
 22 discipline problems, what were the occurrences, and none
 23 of that information was obtained.

1 DR. BEUSSE: And getting back to the
 2 question of epistemology or how do we know what we know,
 3 I think we have a bias in the sense of if you can come at
 4 something through a triangulation of a variety of
 5 methods, that you can have more confidence in that
 6 finding than if you used a single method, particularly if
 7 that single method is something like focus groups, which
 8 is basically a qualitative technique.
 9 MR. MOORE: That sort of sets up my next
 10 question. I mean, we are relying obviously on focus
 11 groups. On the other hand, we're doing — we've got a
 12 very outstanding research team over here which is doing
 13 some extensive research through documentation as well as
 14 using surveys. I think we're doing a variety of things.
 15 I guess what I'm about to ask calls to
 16 some extent for an opinion or subjective judgment, but as
 17 you well know, very often a military commander, for
 18 example, will attempt to assess some of the same things
 19 that we're looking at — discipline, readiness of his
 20 unit — simply by walking around and, you know, talking
 21 to his subordinate commanders and noncoms, and then he
 22 will — that will be part of his formal readiness
 23 reporting.

1 How useful would you characterize
 2 something that perhaps doesn't fall strictly into an
 3 empirical methodology as a way of knowing something
 4 useful about the state of readiness of a military unit?
 5 MR. GEBICKE: What I would encourage you
 6 to do is a technique that we used, is we'll often ask the
 7 same question many different times and we'll ask it at
 8 many different levels vertically in the organization.
 9 The first place we usually start with any
 10 review is we'll go over to the Pentagon and we'll meet
 11 with the top officials and we'll get their view and their
 12 perspective, and that view and that perspective may be or
 13 may not be what you actually find when you go out to the
 14 lowest levels in the field.
 15 So what I would encourage you to do as you
 16 go out to the field is meet vertically with those groups.
 17 I think the commander's assessment is very important. I
 18 mean, he or she has a lot of experience and I think I
 19 would value their judgment. But I think they also have a
 20 bias. I think the people at the very bottom also have a
 21 bias, and you just need to sort through all that.
 22 I was going to mention, Bill had
 23 suggested, too, on focus groups, that it is more of a

1 qualitative than a quantitative. But if you have
 2 documentation of a focus group, whether it would through
 3 a transcript or meticulous notes, you can do content
 4 analysis and you can move towards a quantitative
 5 assessment with a qualitative tool.
 6 And a lot of the things that concerned us
 7 about the Kassebaum Baker is they would say "many people
 8 told us," "most people told us." And we have a very
 9 rigorous — And we didn't try to hold any of these
 10 studies to our methodology because it wouldn't have been
 11 fair, quite frankly.
 12 But we have to go through and we have an
 13 independent person that comes in when we do our studies,
 14 before they're published, and if we say "most," I mean,
 15 we've got to show that here's 108 people that we talked
 16 to and here are the fifty-seven that said yes, and that's
 17 why we can say "most." I mean, it's that rigorous. And
 18 if it doesn't match up, then we have to change the words,
 19 whatever.
 20 MR. MOORE: Final question and then I'm
 21 through. I'm not even sure I want to — I'm not even
 22 sure I want to go here, but, anyway...
 23 One thing I keep encountering on our

1 visits — And you yourself, when you started out,
 2 mentioned that these issues are very controversial that
 3 we're dealing with. I guess what I'm concerned about is
 4 how to detect and either filter out or factor into our
 5 findings the problem of command pressure to toe the party
 6 line and to say what is expected of subordinates even
 7 though they themselves may differ with policy.
 8 And this is not scientific, but very
 9 often, you know, when you get pulled aside by a senior
 10 noncom who's a drill sergeant, a drill instructor, and
 11 says, "you know, I'm not allowed to say this because my
 12 career will be ruined, but this just ain't working," you
 13 know, and that's a fairly common phenomenon.
 14 But there is accession in which much of
 15 this issue is not allowed into the light of day to be
 16 discussed openly for fear of retribution and career
 17 damage. Have you encountered that? And if so, what
 18 recommendations do you have for dealing with it?
 19 MR. GEBICKE: We haven't encountered that.
 20 I mean, I have found when we've gone out to the field and
 21 we've sat down with a group of people, that they have
 22 been very honest and very open, not always what you would
 23 expect them to have said. So I don't think you're going

1 to find that to be a problem.
 2 Now, we generally will — you'll have a
 3 focus group and it might be a focus group of E-2's, 3's
 4 and 4's. You wouldn't want to have the supervisors
 5 sitting around the wall, of course. But I found them to
 6 be very honest, very refreshing; just tell you the way it
 7 is.
 8 So I hope you don't experience that. I
 9 don't think we have in any of the work we've done. Not
 10 just in this area, but in —
 11 DR. BEUSSE: Not at that low level of data
 12 gathering. I think when you get into the command
 13 structure, you are going to get more of the politically
 14 correct party line.
 15 MR. MOORE: Well, I tend — to the extent
 16 that I have encountered it — and again, it's not that
 17 widespread but it is a noticeable phenomenon — tends to
 18 be, you know, at the middle manager level. Either junior
 19 commissioned officers or senior noncommissioned officers.
 20 MR. DELGADO: If I may add, I run focus
 21 groups as part of our work and one of the things that
 22 Mark described is one of the ways in which you can
 23 eliminate some of that problem, which is to segregate the

1 groups by the different levels.
 2 The other thing that we always do is the
 3 point of contact assigned to us is kept out of the room,
 4 and that way, we feel there is a lot more openness in the
 5 people that we deal with.
 6 But you are correct. I think some of the
 7 higher levels, particularly the officers, there is going
 8 to be a little more caution in what they say and how they
 9 say it. It helps if the facilitator has a way of trying
 10 to bring them out, but you may or may not —
 11 MR. NELSON: Let me add one thing to it.
 12 It's fairly basic. One of the things that we always get
 13 asked when we go in for these studies is, "How are you
 14 going to use what I tell you?"
 15 Well, we're not going to say George
 16 Delgado told us that, you know — And once they
 17 understand that, they're much more comfortable, I think,
 18 and more candid.
 19 DR. SEGAL: Do you have some standards for
 20 the questions that could get asked — if I could just
 21 follow-on — in terms of how the questions are worded?
 22 MR. GEBICKE: For focus groups?
 23 MR. DELGADO: Yes, ma'am. We tried to —

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1 Well, we stay away from “yes” or “no” questions. Open-
2 ended questions, questions that are going to generate
3 discussion. We work them through our processes also
4 within the office. We have folks that are methodology
5 experts that help us with generating those questions,
6 too.

7 So value questions, value judgments, we
8 tried to eliminate that. Unbiased, no “yes” or “no.”
9 That sort of question.

10 DR. SEGAL: How do you balance the need
11 for probes that get at issues and problems and people’s
12 perceptions where there might be some values involved
13 versus wanting to avoid leading questions? How do you
14 balance that?

15 DR. BEUSSE: Well, we try to get the probe
16 in there but not do it in a way that indicates that we
17 have a position on one side or another of the issue.

18 DR. SEGAL: So the question has to get
19 asked in a neutral —

20 DR. BEUSSE: But you’re right, you do have
21 to — sometimes you have to give a very specific probe to
22 get them to deal with a particular aspect that you’re
23 interested in.

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1 asked to do is to probably go that extra distance and to
2 use some of your own judgment and to use your opinions
3 and to make some recommendations where all the data is
4 not on one side of the scale or not. We generally don’t
5 do that.

6 There’s nothing wrong with that. I think
7 it’s just a difference in the roles. I mean, we work for
8 the Congress. We’re in the legislative branch of the
9 government, and, quite frankly, we’d be chastised if we
10 suggested that Congress act in certain ways when the
11 information was on both sides of the scale.

12 MS. POPE: Can I follow-up on —

13 DR. BEUSSE: I think one of the other —
14 just to kind of follow-up on it, too — one of the other
15 things that we do is we try to follow-up on testimonial
16 evidence by gathering documentary evidence.

17 So, for example, some of the kinds of
18 conclusions that Kassebaum Baker made about there being
19 less discipline, less respect, less military bearing, we
20 would want to go in: “Well, how do you know?” “What is
21 your evidence of that?” “Where could we find some source
22 of information that would allow us to quantify that?”
23 And that’s part of the way of kind of

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: If I could
2 follow-on to...

3 DR. MOSKOS: Go ahead, Ron.

4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What you’ve
5 really done, it seems to me, you started to lay out for
6 us some of the things that we should consider as we lay
7 out our report, and I’d like to kind of summarize what I
8 heard and then ask you to comment or advise us as to what
9 else could be there.

10 What I heard is you’ve indicated
11 documentation; you’ve indicated clear all recommendations
12 with every member; you’ve indicated use more than a
13 single method; and you’ve indicated a clear statement of
14 the methodologies that were used. Are there some other
15 things that really are key elements that will make our
16 report — using your words — useful?

17 MR. GEBICKE: One thing that I can think
18 of would be typically in our reports you’ll note — I
19 know you’ve read many of them — we’ll have an
20 “objective, scope and methodology” section which clearly
21 lays out all the methodologies that we used, where we
22 went, how we conducted the methodologies, and also would
23 expound on any limitations that we felt we had in the

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1 chipping away at what they believe or their perception
2 versus what is in reality actually out there.

3 DR. SEGAL: So when we hear someone say in
4 a focus group or taking us aside that something’s going
5 on, we don’t report that as fact. We have to then
6 follow-up to see what we can find about what this person
7 says is happening.

8 MR. GEBICKE: Or what we’ll frequently do
9 is we’ll attribute that statement to that individual.
10 We’ll say, “According to —”

11 DR. BEUSSE: Not to them personally.

12 DR. SEGAL: Category of a person. Right.

13 MR. GEBICKE: “According to one company
14 commander” —

15 DR. SEGAL: Some enlisted, some
16 commanders.

17 MR. GEBICKE: — et cetera, et cetera.

18 But the weakest form of evidence, we
19 believe, is testimonial. So we’re always looking behind
20 the testimonial evidence to find out, okay, has the rate
21 of disciplinary actions in that unit actually gone up
22 over the last few years? What do the statistics say and
23 who has the numbers? So we’ll ask more penetrating

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1 work that we conducted.

2 And I think that’s fair to the reader. It
3 just cautions the reader where you’ve got some
4 limitations or you couldn’t get as much factually based
5 information as you would like to have.

6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What about
7 the difference between opinions and conclusions, and how
8 do you go about identifying them? Or should you?

9 MR. GEBICKE: Well, what we try to do in
10 conclusions is where the preponderance of the evidence
11 leads us to a certain position is we will make that
12 conclusion. Where we really draw the line is whether or
13 not we make a recommendation, and what we have to ask
14 ourselves, which I assume you don’t, is whether or not
15 we’re entering the policy arena.

16 I mean, is this an issue where we should
17 just lay out the data and let the policy-makers decide
18 because the data’s not clear-cut? Sometimes in policy
19 issues the data all falls on one side or the other and
20 we’ll feel comfortable, quite frankly, in making maybe a
21 strong conclusion or maybe even stepping over the bounds
22 and making a recommendation.

23 It would seem to me that what you’ve been

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1 questions to get actual facts.

2 DR. BEUSSE: Because it may very well be
3 that the perception of the drill sergeants is that they
4 are spending a lot more time with gender-related
5 disciplinary issues and that may be an inaccurate
6 perception because maybe those are more difficult for
7 them to deal with because they haven’t been used to
8 dealing with those in the past or they haven’t been
9 trained to do them, so they think they’re spending more
10 time than they actually are.

11 And to us, that sounded like something
12 that is an empirical question. There should be some data
13 available that would allow us to confirm or refute that
14 perception. And that’s where we saw that that group
15 didn’t go. They kind of accepted the testimony as
16 “that’s what they’re telling us, that must be what is.”

17 MR. DELGADO: Can I add one additional
18 item for General Christmas — is to have a clear
19 statement of the purpose of the study, based on your
20 question.

21 DR. SEGAL: For us, that would be of each
22 thing that we do, because we’re going to have — we have
23 multiple studies.

1 MR. MOORE: We have a lot.
 2 MS. POPE: I'm going to follow-up on
 3 General Christmas and that was — and you may not be able
 4 to answer this or not. I think you know kind of what
 5 we've done. We've done visits; we've done some focus
 6 groups; we're following that with a survey; we're going
 7 to follow-up with some more formal focus groups.
 8 Actually, two different surveys.
 9 Is it appropriate for you to look at —
 10 Have you looked at like our focus groups that are going
 11 to be conducted, the questions that are going to be
 12 asked, and our questionnaire, and to give us feedback
 13 before it's all run, or if there's things that are sent
 14 — Have you done that? Is it appropriate to ask you?
 15 MR. GEBICKE: We met a couple months ago
 16 with —
 17 MS. POPE: Right.
 18 MR. GEBICKE: — the principal researchers
 19 and they went through the methodology that they were
 20 planning to use and we offered some advice and some
 21 observations at that point in time. We did not get into
 22 the specifics.
 23 Well, we were here for three hours. So we

1 didn't — you know, there was a lot of detail —
 2 MS. POPE: Right.
 3 MR. GEBICKE: — in the discussion but I
 4 wouldn't say that we — The only observation that we have
 5 at this particular point in time was when we looked at
 6 the number of questions that were planned to be asked in
 7 the focus group, they seemed extremely long to us. I
 8 think there was in excess of twenty-plus questions.
 9 MR. DELGADO: Twenty-seven.
 10 MR. GEBICKE: Twenty-seven questions. And
 11 to us, that — unless they are to be —
 12 MS. POPE: Right.
 13 MR. GEBICKE: — you know, maybe
 14 consolidated so that you've got some sub-questions under
 15 general topics, it seemed to be more than — Because if
 16 you think about it, if you have maybe an average of ten
 17 people in a room and you want to run ninety to 120
 18 minutes, and if you're talking about twenty-five specific
 19 questions, you can do the math and figure out how many
 20 seconds per person that leaves.
 21 MS. POPE: Right.
 22 MR. GEBICKE: And it's not a lot.
 23 MS. POPE: That's helpful. I mean, I just

1 — This is —
 2 MR. GEBICKE: But generally we came away,
 3 to be honest with you, impressed with what it was that
 4 this Commission was planning to do: the use of various
 5 methodologies, not relying on one; the fact that you were
 6 committed to complete documentation; the fact that you
 7 had discussed and thought about how you were going to
 8 build consensus, that you might have minority or
 9 dissenting views.
 10 So all of that seemed to us that you
 11 really had it together and you had started to think about
 12 and formulate a policy, if you will, as to how you were
 13 going to handle anything that came up.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Is it worth
 15 mentioning that we sought your advice as part of our
 16 methodology? A paragraph?
 17 MR. GEBICKE: Sure.
 18 MS. POPE: And as Tom mentioned, I don't
 19 — I think we — for all of us, we've got a lot of time
 20 — and so if there's a flag that goes up that we're
 21 missing something, you know, we would — if we haven't
 22 asked the right question that says — I mean, this is
 23 helpful that we've got too many questions in focus groups.

1 DR. SEGAL: I think they've been revised
 2 since then.
 3 MS. POPE: Yeah.
 4 MS. LAURENCE: They have been. The rough
 5 draft, that was just a — if you will, a question bank.
 6 MR. GEBICKE: First start. Right.
 7 MS. POPE: Right. Right.
 8 MS. LAURENCE: And from there, it has
 9 really been weeded down and it is much shorter and there
 10 are various sections of key issues. I think you would be
 11 amazed with the changes.
 12 MS. POPE: Maybe the question is would you
 13 be willing to look at it one more time.
 14 MS. LAURENCE: The focus groups were
 15 started yesterday.
 16 MS. POPE: Okay. All right. I think that
 17 is helpful.
 18 DR. SEGAL: Are you — Charlie, I think,
 19 wants to speak, and then I'd like to follow-up on
 20 something.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Well, maybe Bill wants to say
 22 something.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: No, I

1 don't.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. I just had — Well, my
 3 question was — I wanted to ask a general one first.
 4 But, Bill, when we met the other month in Evanston, you
 5 mentioned — and I don't want to put words in your mouth.
 6 I'd like you to say it — whatever reservations one might
 7 have on Kassebaum Baker's methodology, and then you said
 8 something right after that, which was they may be right.
 9 DR. BEUSSE: Oh, correct. Our focus —
 10 DR. MOSKOS: It wasn't — yeah.
 11 DR. BEUSSE: — was not to look at the
 12 validity of any of their conclusions or recommendations.
 13 We looked at whether you could get there from what they
 14 showed in their report or what they had done. Even if it
 15 wasn't in their report, did they still have it that we
 16 could look at it and trace it.
 17 And that was where our concern was. It
 18 wasn't that we felt that they were necessarily wrong in
 19 their conclusions. We just felt that you couldn't get
 20 there from what they had done and what they could show to
 21 us.
 22 I think the other concern that we had —
 23 and again, it's a professional research issue — is that

1 to us, if you come out with findings that differ from the
 2 findings of other studies, there's an obligation in our
 3 minds to reconcile how those differences could come
 4 about.
 5 And typically that's argued from the point
 6 of a greater methodological rigor or some intervening
 7 event that has created a different kind of environment or
 8 the passage of time, but there should be some attempt to
 9 not conclude, "Well, we found something different from
 10 what others have found and we're right." There needs to
 11 be some way of kind of linking that or trying to explain
 12 the differences and why the findings of one research
 13 would be different from the findings of another.
 14 And I think whenever you take on something
 15 that is entrenched in the status quo, there's probably a
 16 greater burden of proof because you're trying to move
 17 something that's already in place. And because of the
 18 costs of doing that, it would take, I think, to my mind,
 19 a heavier weight of findings, more rigorous findings, in
 20 order to move — particularly move the military from what
 21 they feel they're doing if — where they feel that it's
 22 working. Then I think that's a heavier burden.
 23 MR. GEBICKE: You've got to make a

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1 compelling case is what Bill was saying -
 2 DR. MOSKOS: And the other question I want
 3 —
 4 MR. GEBICKE: — to get somebody to
 5 change.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: On the methods issue, while
 7 we've been hitting Kassebaum Baker for poor methodology
 8 — And you were most generous to the Army Panel, which
 9 had the most rigorous methodology of the DACOWITS,
 10 Kassebaum Baker — of that triage there — "Trio" I guess
 11 is better than "triage."
 12 It was interesting to me — which had
 13 great press, I might add, as well as your sort of
 14 endorsement on the methodology, generally speaking.
 15 But, you know, the issue, for example, of
 16 false sexual — false accusations of sexual harassment,
 17 which is an issue, it was never — I mean, here's
 18 something that did it one way, yet they missed the big
 19 point, which were false accusations, leading to the ill-
 20 fated hotline, which was one of the things that came out,
 21 which turned out to be a fiasco.
 22 So, I mean, here you have something that
 23 was "methodologically better" than Kassebaum Baker, but

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1 we typically — we pride ourselves, at least in my group,
 2 in working very closely with the services in DoD to
 3 actually craft the recommendation in such a way that it,
 4 one, solves the problem; two, it's not going to be unduly
 5 burdensome on the agency to implement it; and three, that
 6 it's not going to be very expensive.
 7 And, you know, sometimes we'll go in with
 8 a certain mindset for a recommendation and, after talking
 9 with the people who have to implement it, say, "Well,
 10 we're probably being a little unrealistic here. We can
 11 back off a little bit and find some common ground." But
 12 if we can't present a compelling case, like I said, it's
 13 up to them.
 14 Now, sometimes the Congress or one of the
 15 committees or subcommittees might pick up on one of our
 16 recommendations where there's been a "non-concur" and can
 17 use the hammer, you know, up on the Hill, but, you know,
 18 we don't usually, you know, try to track...
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But that's
 20 based on — those recommendations may be concurred in by
 21 DoD but may not be totally —
 22 MR. GEBICKE: Yeah, you're exactly right.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — have the

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1 also left out a huge issue on the problem that they were
 2 addressing. So, I mean, methods — there's something
 3 else that has to be put in, too. Some conceptual work.
 4 MR. GEBICKE: Yeah.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: Either been around or
 6 listened to people who were asked another — different
 7 type of question or what have you.
 8 MR. DELGADO: Yeah. The purpose of our
 9 study, though, was not to get into the issues
 10 specifically, and that's why you won't see that there.
 11 DR. BEUSSE: In fact, we had done a report
 12 a couple of years earlier where we did look at what the
 13 available evidence was regarding the effectiveness of
 14 single-gender or gender-mixed basic training and found
 15 there were only two studies that had any kind of
 16 empirical measures. And basically the results of those
 17 studies indicated that women tended to perform better in
 18 a mixed-gender environment and the men did not experience
 19 any fall-off in performance. They did about the same in
 20 both groups.
 21 Now, we recognized that that was just two
 22 studies, they were a very limited set of measures, and
 23 wasn't really enough for us to conclude that one way was

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1 total consensus of each one of the services.
 2 MR. GEBICKE: You're exactly correct.
 3 DR. SEGAL: Can I follow-up on that? We
 4 have a really complex set of tasks in front of us.
 5 MR. GEBICKE: You sure do.
 6 DR. SEGAL: We're dealing not only with
 7 the issue — you sympathize with us, I hope — with the
 8 gender-integration/segregation issue in basic training,
 9 but we have the other cross-gender relation issues as
 10 well as to evaluate basic training.
 11 Now, we're not going to go out and design
 12 whole new research projects because we haven't got time,
 13 but in terms of if you were given this task, with your
 14 objective approach and your methodologies and your
 15 triangulation, looking at it from different
 16 methodologies, what source of data — for the evaluation
 17 of basic training and for the recommendations and
 18 analysis of the gender-integrated versus gender-
 19 segregated basic training, what kinds of information
 20 would you look at?
 21 And especially what kinds of criteria
 22 would you set up in terms of judging the performance of
 23 either gender-integrated versus segregated or just basic

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1 better than another way, and our recommendation, which
 2 DoD concurred with, was to begin collecting more
 3 systematic data for a longer period of time so that there
 4 would be some empirical base to at least assess the issue
 5 of effectiveness on at least whatever measures are most
 6 objectively measurable.
 7 Now, there are some issues that were
 8 raised in Kassebaum Baker, such as less respect, less
 9 military bearing. Those are more difficult things, much
 10 more subjective measures. And I'm not sure how you can
 11 get at that in kind of routine data gathering that they
 12 would do as part of their administrative system, but are
 13 clearly things that ultimately are study-able and I think
 14 researchable, but they're more difficult to get at.
 15 MR. GEBICKE: Another point that I just
 16 wanted to clarify for you, because sometimes there's a
 17 misconception about the weight of our recommendations —
 18 our recommendations really carry no weight with the
 19 agency. In other words, we have to present a compelling
 20 argument for them to concur and agree with us. If we
 21 don't do it, they can just say, "We non-concur and we're
 22 not going to implement that recommendation."
 23 So where we make a recommendation — and

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1 training in general? You've all done a lot of work, I
 2 know, on gender issues in the military beyond these
 3 reports. You've done a lot of work on national security
 4 issues more generally in the military and evaluating
 5 readiness and such.
 6 So what sorts of things would you look at
 7 as criteria to judge whether something's working or not
 8 within basic training, be it gender-integrated and
 9 gender-segregated basic training, that issue, as well as
 10 just in general? Is initial entry training producing the
 11 kind of servicemember that our services need?
 12 MR. GEBICKE: Well, I think — Let me
 13 start, and then I'm sure Bill has something to add on
 14 this. I would think of it in terms of two different
 15 populations. I mean, one population or one group would
 16 be those people who are involved in basic training that's
 17 segregated, and the other group would be those people who
 18 have been involved in basic training that's been
 19 integrated.
 20 Okay, so you've got two populations. The
 21 extent to which you could get performance data —
 22 comparable performance data on the two populations and
 23 then compare and contrast would be the way you'd want to

1 go.
 2 Now, the question is what are those
 3 particular items that you'd want to try to obtain
 4 information on? And I guess it could be the success rate
 5 of the individuals in each group — and help me out here,
 6 guys — I mean, how many people actually passed and
 7 succeeded. And I guess you could — disciplinary actions
 8 that had to be taken. I mean, I guess there's some cases
 9 where people have to repeat certain elements. I don't
 10 know if they have to repeat.

11 What else?
 12 DR. BEUSSE: Well, generically, whenever
 13 we go to evaluate a program, our typical starting point
 14 is what are the objectives of that program? In other
 15 words, we don't want to substitute our judgment as to
 16 what the successful outcome ought to be from initial
 17 entry training.

18 So what we're going to do is go to their
 19 objectives and then we're going to look to see what are
 20 measures of whether or not they're successful in
 21 achieving those objectives and try to find measures that
 22 are objective enough that there's very little that people
 23 could do to try to impose perhaps their agenda on the

1 function again as a team.
 2 MR. GEBICKE: But you could look at — I
 3 mean, some more specifics I was thinking of, you could
 4 look at basic — the physical fitness test, how many
 5 passed in each type of unit; the marksmanship
 6 qualification, what percent passed — I mean, so there's
 7 got to be some quantifiable things. And I think if you
 8 go to the basic training units and you ask for what their
 9 measures are, as Bill said, those are the things you'd
 10 want to be able to compare and contrast.

11 Now, the report that we did two and a half
 12 years ago basically said — except for the two studies
 13 that Bill referenced — is that you don't have
 14 information that you've retained. The services concurred
 15 with our recommendation and said at the beginning of
 16 fiscal year 1998 that we will start capturing that
 17 information.

18 I don't know how far along they are and I
 19 don't know how much information you'll find, but fiscal
 20 '98 is now over and we're into '99. So it could be that
 21 you could at least get the first two or three quarters of
 22 fiscal '98, which would give you the type of information
 23 that we're talking about for the all-male and the

1 outcome.
 2 So that's typically where our starting
 3 point would be, and I think some of the things that Mark
 4 has mentioned would be things that would pop out. That
 5 you do want people to be able to successfully master
 6 whatever skills they have set out in basic training to
 7 have people learn, and that would be, I think, our
 8 starting point.

9 Now, some of those things are going to be
 10 more difficult to measure than others and that's where it
 11 becomes more of an art, perhaps, than a science, and I
 12 think you need to be concerned about kind of questions
 13 that maybe go beyond the basic training experience
 14 itself.

15 I think, for example, the question of what
 16 kind of message does it send when you have separated or
 17 segregated training? Not so much what message does it
 18 send to the women, but what message does it send to the
 19 men?

20 In other words, in effect, in my mind, it
 21 kind of says that we believe that women are going to hold
 22 you back in training to such an extent that we're going
 23 to separate you out so that they don't — so that women

1 integrated units.
 2 MS. POPE: Did all the services say they
 3 were going to start capturing it?

4 MR. GEBICKE: Yes.
 5 And, Bill, you made an inquiry, so why
 6 don't you pass along what we heard yesterday.

7 MS. POPE: Okay.

8 DR. BEUSSE: DoD did require that the
 9 services do that. And as I understand it, the Air Force
 10 misunderstood the direction and went further than DoD was
 11 really asking them to do. And, whereas, typically the
 12 Air Force had kind of semi-integrated basic training —
 13 In other words, they were integrated at higher
 14 organization level but segregated at the lower level, and
 15 it's my understanding that the Air Force had actually set
 16 up some flights that were going to be totally integrated
 17 in order to gather this kind of data.

18 But, again, you're going to have the
 19 Marine Corps that has not changed anything. So there's
 20 nothing for them to —

21 DR. SEGAL: If you were to evaluate —
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: See, that's
 23 a misnomer in its own right. And, you know, we talked

1 don't have that negative impact on you. But by the way,
 2 when we go to actual operations in war, the women are
 3 going to be right there beside you, you know, doing the
 4 same skills that you are in the combat support and combat
 5 service support kinds of occupations.

6 So I think in those kinds of questions of
 7 not just what are they achieving in the program but what
 8 kind of impact are they having beyond that program.
 9 There's been a lot of concern in some of the issues
 10 raised in Kassebaum Baker about kind of cohesiveness of
 11 the basic training units.

12 Well, cohesiveness really is more of an
 13 issue when you're actually out there in operational
 14 units. That's what you're really concerned about, so you
 15 don't want to do anything that is going to have a
 16 negative effect on that ultimate thing that the military
 17 is in business to do just to make more cohesive basic
 18 training units. That's not your ultimate objective.

19 In fact, you could argue that cohesiveness
 20 isn't really a big issue in basic training because you
 21 want to get across the notion of replace-ability; that
 22 people can be plucked from one unit, put in another unit,
 23 and they become a member of that team and they have to

1 off to the side here about we all have biases and
 2 whatever. One of the things that this committee has
 3 agreed to do is look at the continuum of training,
 4 because each of the four services has a very specific
 5 continuum. And if you look along that continuum, that
 6 integration, if you will, takes place at certain levels
 7 and it's based on certain objectives of each one of the
 8 services.

9 So I think you'd have to be very careful
 10 about what we have just expressed here as far as what
 11 you're looking for from the operational unit. First you
 12 have to make sure that their expectations are correct;
 13 that they fully understand what it is that this basic
 14 soldier, sailor, airman and marine, coming out of their
 15 basic training and "A" school, really should have,
 16 because usually the expectations in the operational level
 17 are higher than what is actually a fact, and should be.

18 But, secondly, that it's very important
 19 that when we judge that, that you judge it across the
 20 entire continuum of that training until delivery of that
 21 individual, male or female, you know.

22 So I think you have to be — we
 23 collectively have to be very, very careful about that.

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1 DR. SEGAL: When you were talking about
2 the information in terms of passing and scores on skills
3 that the services actually collect, would you actually
4 look at their measures and evaluate their measures?

5 So, for example, in some of the squishier
6 areas like — excuse me, more subjective areas like
7 values, the ones that can be measured but the measures
8 would be kind of different — but values, as well as some
9 of the things like their knowledge tests, measurements of
10 the history of the service and such, would you actually
11 look at the tests they use to see whether you do your own
12 evaluation on how effective the —

13 MR. GEBICKE: How effective the test was
14 in measuring —

15 DR. SEGAL: Right. Right.

16 MR. GEBICKE: Usually not, unless it just
17 became obviously apparent to us that it was flawed or
18 unless somebody tipped us off that this is not a good
19 measure. But usually not.

20 I mean, another thing to keep in mind,
21 too, is that if it is flawed, it's flawed for both groups
22 that you're comparing. So, I mean, even though it's
23 flawed, you're comparing apples and apples.

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1 DR. SEGAL: Well, if —

2 MR. GEBICKE: But it might have a bias,
3 depending on how it's flawed, towards one of the two
4 groups. But I understand your question.

5 DR. SEGAL: Well, that's if you're
6 comparing — if you're looking specifically at the
7 gender-integration issue. But we also have the issue of
8 evaluating basic training itself. So if we're going to
9 sue the services' own evaluation measures, we have to
10 evaluate the evaluation as well.

11 MR. GEBICKE: I think you do. In order to
12 satisfy that objective, you would have to do that, yes.

13 DR. SEGAL: Right. Then we would have to,
14 and that would be different.

15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Could I
16 follow-on to what Mady said? One of the areas we have —
17 and this is one I'm really wrestling with as to how we
18 really determine the impact of — We have two new
19 policies, if you will, that we have to evaluate. One
20 policy has to do with fraternization, and that has been
21 changed by the Department of Defense and been announced,
22 but it really hasn't taken its full effect.

23 We have a second policy that has not been

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1 announced, and that's the policy on adultery and
2 recommendations of guidelines to be put into the Manual
3 for Courts-Martial.

4 How do we go about or what kind of
5 methodology other than opinion — what kind of
6 methodology do we have available to try to even measure
7 the impact of one that's just become effective and one
8 that's not even there yet and a lot of folks don't know
9 about it?

10 MR. GEBICKE: That's tough. That's
11 probably —

12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can I put
13 that in the report?

14 MR. GEBICKE: It's probably too premature.

15 MR. MOORE: We'll just say that and leave
16 a blank space there.

17 DR. SEGAL: But we could — Well, one of
18 the things we've talked about is for those kinds of
19 studies that we would have liked to have done had we had
20 more time, that we could make recommendations on what
21 should be done. So perhaps we could come up with —

22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Now,
23 follow-through, though. That what kind of study would

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1 you do, and over what time period, to in fact really try
2 to measure the true impact of these two.

3 DR. BEUSSE: I think again —

4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Through
5 perception, through actuality, all those kinds of things.

6 DR. BEUSSE: I think again you'd want to
7 go back to the objectives. What was the objective of the
8 change? Was it just to create a uniform policy across
9 all four services? That would be something that's
10 probably pretty measurable even in the short run of
11 whether you're now charging people in one service where
12 you didn't used to charge them and so on.

13 But as far as what is the ultimate reason
14 for having a policy and a part of the UCMJ that prohibits
15 fraternization, that's a more value-laden kind of issue
16 that we would try to avoid. We're not going to take a
17 position as to whether the military should be less
18 rigorous with regard to issues of marital fidelity than
19 society at large. I mean, that's not an empirical issue
20 that GAO has any expertise to bring to bear on that.

21 I mean, we can gather people's opinions
22 and I think you could gather people's opinions on those,
23 and then perhaps deal from there of what impact is it if

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1 a large portion of the population holds this view or this
2 perception about this policy, whether they feel they're
3 being treated unfairly or so. That may have an impact
4 that you can look at. But we would try to stay away from
5 that value-laden end of it.

6 MR. DELGADO: That's where a survey could
7 come into play. After education, lots of information and
8 a period of time for things to happen, then a survey.

9 DR. SEGAL: With regard to values, you
10 talked about the kind of message that it sends when you
11 have either segregated or integrated training and what
12 the potential repercussions are on the experiences in
13 basic training in terms of the cohesiveness of
14 operational units.

15 What kinds of measures would you use to
16 get at some of these issues of values or attitudes
17 towards others, like men towards women and women toward
18 men? What sorts of measures would you use in either
19 focus groups or surveys to get at those issues.

20 DR. BEUSSE: I mean, there are people who
21 have devised questionnaires, you know, attitudes-toward-
22 women scales and so on. I'm not sure that there's any
23 that has enough of a following in the scientific

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1 disciplines that you would want to use that because
2 everybody says, well, that's a good measure of that
3 construct.

4 And essentially that's what cohesiveness
5 is, is some kind of a construct that we have. We can
6 articulate what we think it is, but as to, you know,
7 being something that we can touch and feel and taste, it
8 doesn't have those kinds of qualities.

9 I think what you are using — and that's,
10 I think, one of the strong uses of focus groups, is it
11 lets people put into their words their feelings about
12 these issues. And while you can't make claims to the
13 representativeness of that, you can get some very clear
14 messages about the depth that those feelings are held,
15 the intensity of those feelings, and the kind of impact
16 that people are saying that it's having on their lives.

17 DR. SEGAL: So we should use our focus
18 group results on these kinds of attitudes and then relate
19 that to whether the particular people in the group came
20 through integrated or segregated training?

21 DR. BEUSSE: If you can get large enough
22 numbers to feel that you can — that your focus groups
23 are going to be representative of the people that came

1 through — And I guess one of the reasons I'm hedging for
 2 that is one of the things that all three of those studies
 3 agreed on and I think everybody intuitively agrees on is
 4 the importance of leadership. And leadership is then
 5 going to, in effect, make different sub-units, a
 6 different environment, because you've got different
 7 quality of leadership in one unit than you had in
 8 another, maybe even on the same installation.

9 So when you're trying to kind of measure
 10 something that's going to represent all of that, it gets
 11 very complex. So that's really the reason why I think in
 12 this case focus groups, it's a real uphill battle to try
 13 to find something that you would portray as being
 14 representative of the population even that went through
 15 one type of training or another.

16 MS. POPE: Can I — I want to follow-on on
 17 Mady's question, and that is leadership. I mean, it's an
 18 issue that we've all been struggling with. Have you
 19 looked at ways of capturing leadership — you know,
 20 recruit trainers, command — I mean, have you used
 21 climate surveys? Is there a tool out there that gives
 22 you some feedback that says this unit, whatever service
 23 it is, feels it has good leadership?

1 I mean, are there any tools that you all
 2 have used that you feel confident in and that gives you
 3 some kind of indication on — And I'm not talking about
 4 rating the leader — you know, who's good and who's bad
 5 — but the impact overall on exactly what you were just
 6 saying, the leadership — that ties all these things
 7 together?

8 MR. GEBICKE: Are you aware of any?

9 DR. BEUSSE: No. I mean, there's lots of
 10 instruments that measure leadership style, but —

11 MS. POPE: Right, yeah. No.

12 DR. BEUSSE: — they've found that those
 13 don't relate to effectiveness because it depends on the
 14 situation.

15 MS. POPE: So not even the climate surveys
 16 — none of those that the commands do —

17 DR. BEUSSE: Well, we haven't really —
 18 that hasn't been the objective of any of our studies to
 19 do it.

20 MS. POPE: Okay.

21 DR. BEUSSE: But in our own kind of
 22 professional backgrounds, there's none that I'm aware of
 23 that gets at the thing that you're trying to get at.

1 MS. POPE: Okay.

2 MR. NELSON: You can look at it, though,
 3 and go through the questions, and the Defense Manpower
 4 Data Center can pull out and statistically analyze that
 5 for you if you said that on the question. We have not
 6 done that, but you could use that.

7 MS. POPE: Right, right. So if you looked
 8 at theirs and then DMDC could — Okay. That may be a
 9 place to at least ask the question.

10 MR. GEBICKE: Yeah. And I was thinking,
 11 too, I mean, when you talk about leadership, you're
 12 talking about the leadership of a unit setting the tone.

13 MS. POPE: Right.

14 MR. GEBICKE: And to the extent that you
 15 could survey people within that unit concerning the tone
 16 that has been established concerning gender issues within
 17 that unit, whether it's positive, neutral or negative, I
 18 mean, that would go a long way towards telling you how
 19 it's perceived throughout the unit.

20 I mean, if you've got somebody that, you
 21 know, for instance, off-the-cuff says, you know, "women
 22 can't cut it," then that says a tone for the rest of the
 23 males and the women throughout that unit. If you've got

1 somebody that doesn't say that, then it's neutral. And
 2 if you've got somebody that says, "well, she can do just
 3 as good a job as the guy can," then that sets a different
 4 tone. And those comments are made.

5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What you're
 6 really talking about is command climate.

7 MS. POPE: Right.

8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And command
 9 climate is a reality. The only problem is that you have
 10 to be very, very careful when you judge command climate.

11 And that is, if you judge a command climate in a short
 12 period of time after a commander has arrived, you know,
 13 that isn't necessarily the best time to do it, you know,
 14 because that commander is still evaluating what has to be
 15 done and —

16 MR. GEBICKE: What he might have to
 17 change. Right.

18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: So it has
 19 to be done at the appropriate time.

20 The current command climate questionnaires
 21 that DEOMI and the like have put out are extremely
 22 helpful, you know, and they do identify for a commander.
 23 And if the commander is smart when they take over, they

1 do that survey up front and they can identify.

2 But it still comes down to the commander.
 3 You know, the commander has to determine what of these
 4 things — and then by his or her own experience and
 5 their, you know, moving up, which of those areas are the
 6 most important to address, if any or all, or whatever.

7 MR. GEBICKE: And the other thing —

8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: So, you
 9 know, you don't take the art of command out of it. And
 10 there is a difference between science and art. And we
 11 can do a great deal in the way of science, but it still
 12 comes down to there's a certain art of command that comes
 13 through many things — through experience; some people
 14 are a little more natural at it than others. All of
 15 those kinds of things. And that's where you really get
 16 into the subjective area that gets very difficult to
 17 measure, if it can be measured at all.

18 MR. GEBICKE: And you triggered a thought,
 19 too. And that was that, you know, we have turnover at
 20 the command level, and the first maybe trimester, if you
 21 will, maybe there won't be a whole lot of change, maybe
 22 there's a lot of change in the second, and maybe the
 23 third, everything's running smoothly.

1 If you decided to do something, I would
 2 make sure that you captured just basic demographic
 3 information on the respondents such as how long they've
 4 been in the unit, because you also have a lot of turnover
 5 within the unit and you would want to maybe discount
 6 those folks who have only been there one, two, or three
 7 or four months, that wouldn't know really what the
 8 climate is and maybe has not been exposed to the command
 9 emphasis.

10 DR. BEUSSE: And, also, as kind of a
 11 general finding that you'll have is that it was always
 12 better back when. I don't care who you talk to or what
 13 you talk to them about —

14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Back in
 15 1776...

16 DR. BEUSSE: Yes.

17 DR. SEGAL: Just like the recruits were
 18 always better back before — yeah — and they're not as
 19 good as they used to be when I was —

20 MR. GEBICKE: The snow was always deeper
 21 and it was always a longer walk to school. Yeah.

22 DR. SEGAL: Right. Uphill both ways.

23 But I do hear you saying that — leaving

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1 aside the issue of the effects of the command, that you
 2 can measure in terms of individual people's attitudes
 3 their receptivity to working with others of, say, a
 4 different gender or a different race, and that this would
 5 be something that was — certainly in terms of the
 6 potential positive impacts of gender-integrated training,
 7 that you — that is something that you would want to
 8 measure to see if there are — I know attitudes towards
 9 women skills, there may be a problem, but other sorts of
 10 willingness to work with members of the other gender.
 11 DR. BEUSSE: And that, I think, is
 12 basically the theory of integration — is that if one
 13 holds kind of views that are stereotypical, that it's
 14 harder to hold those in the face of conflicting data.
 15 And that integration then shows people that, hey, you
 16 know, she's a woman and she can do it, or she may not be
 17 able to do this aspect of the task as well as I can but
 18 she brings something else to the table, and that's the
 19 idea, I think, in terms of the theory of it.
 20 Now, how do you measure that is — That's
 21 a very difficult thing and it's something that I don't
 22 know of any off-the-shelf kinds of instrument that would
 23 be available.

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1 MR. NELSON: Rand did a study — and this
 2 was on existing units after basic and that sort of thing.
 3 It did a study on the impact of integration on morale. I
 4 believe readiness was another issue. And that study was
 5 issued in '97. If you'd like, I can give you the site on
 6 it.
 7 DR. SEGAL: You're not talking about —
 8 DR. MOSKOS: That's the Harrell and Miller
 9 study?
 10 DR. SEGAL: The Harrell and Miller study?
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Yeah. It's
 12 mentioned in the —
 13 MR. NELSON: Right.
 14 DR. SEGAL: Okay. Okay. Yeah, I know it
 15 well.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: It's a good study.
 17 DR. SEGAL: But that didn't look at the
 18 impact of integration in training.
 19 MR. NELSON: No. It was after —
 20 DR. SEGAL: No. See, that — So what we
 21 have is — the concern is we're doing a lot with the
 22 folks who are just coming out of basic training and we
 23 can see what's happening in terms of gender-integration

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1 and segregation in other aspects of training there. We
 2 can look at existing units. There's a lot of information
 3 that looks at that. What we don't have is the data that
 4 link the two.
 5 DR. BEUSSE: Right.
 6 MR. DELGADO: Right.
 7 DR. BEUSSE: And you're also concerned, I
 8 think, in trying to make that linkage with a time lag.
 9 In other words, do you survey — which is really
 10 essentially the only way you can do it in realtime —
 11 people who are in that program? Well, it may be that the
 12 benefits of the program don't accrue until they're
 13 actually out in the operational world for some time.
 14 DR. SEGAL: I'm a firm believer in you
 15 can't ask people who are just finishing basic training
 16 "is basic training doing what it's supposed to be doing
 17 for you," because they don't know what it's supposed to
 18 be doing for them because they're not out in the service.
 19 So it really is only later, just like you
 20 can't ask people who are in college "is college preparing
 21 you for life," because they're not prepared yet and they
 22 don't know what life is yet.
 23 So it really has to come later. We

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1 actually do — in universities, we do surveys of our
 2 graduates to find out.
 3 DR. BEUSSE: But I think — in kind of
 4 getting back to the measurement issue, I think a personal
 5 bias that I have is if you can, use instruments that have
 6 been used before.
 7 So if you can find a way of adapting the
 8 questions that have been used, for example, in the Rand
 9 study — those have been subjected to a professional
 10 review and now you've got some base to compare to that —
 11 you're always better off than trying to craft your own
 12 questions; because one of the things in doing research I
 13 find most difficult is trying to compare when the same
 14 questions weren't asked or they were asked in different
 15 ways that —
 16 DR. SEGAL: Sometimes we — I always
 17 prefer to use ones where you have some known validity and
 18 reliability, but you do have problems where the only
 19 research that has been done before, the questions do not
 20 meet those kinds of standards.
 21 DR. BEUSSE: Right.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I'm going
 23 to change the pace on you here. You've made considerable

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1 comment on the ground combat definition and the possible
 2 need for change, and I wonder if you would go ahead and
 3 please explain that.
 4 MR. GEBICKE: Sure. What we found in
 5 terms of the definition was that the battlefield — and
 6 that's what you're referring to, I guess, is the
 7 battlefield has changed over time. Some people would
 8 argue that maybe the change hasn't been that recent.
 9 Some people would argue maybe it changed with the Persian
 10 Gulf War. And that is, that there's a line, there's a
 11 forward, there's a rear and there's a middle area.
 12 When Colin was doing that work, what he
 13 heard in his conversations was that the battlefield is
 14 changing; it definitely is changing. If not, it has
 15 completely changed and will never be what it was, you
 16 know, years ago.
 17 We pointed out in our report that if the
 18 definition — And we've pretty much put it back on DoD.
 19 We said, "If you agree and if the definition is no longer
 20 warranted, then you ought to consider changing the
 21 definition."
 22 We didn't make a recommendation because we
 23 didn't feel like we had enough information or enough

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1 evidence at this point to make such a recommendation.
 2 And we weren't sure, quite frankly, of the relationship
 3 between the definition and the positions that were
 4 involved, which is something that would have to be
 5 considered also.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Is the key
 7 to your concern well forward? That seemed to be what
 8 came out to me.
 9 MR. GEBICKE: Yeah. Wouldn't you say,
 10 Colin?
 11 MR. CHAMBERS: Yes, well forward on the
 12 battlefield was our concern. The way I approached that
 13 particular issue was to determine not necessarily the
 14 validity of the definition but perhaps the reliability:
 15 how accurately does it correspond to real-world
 16 conditions.
 17 Given the resources I had available and
 18 the time, I looked at who in the services is best
 19 situated to answer that type of question, and I went to
 20 the doctrine experts at the Marine Corps Command
 21 Development Center down in Quantico and the Army's
 22 Combined Arms Doctrine Director at Fort Leavenworth to
 23 get their views on does this definition correctly

1 correspond to real-world conditions.
 2 In both cases, the “well forward on the
 3 battlefield” was what they came up with. They said the
 4 way that the battlefield was moving, not necessarily the
 5 tasks of the individual soldier but the environment in
 6 which that soldier fights, is changing to a nonlinear
 7 type of battlefield configuration where you go after the
 8 enemy’s centers of gravity. You may not want to own all
 9 of the real estate or all the land up and to that point,
 10 but be able to control — to hit that center of gravity
 11 and control access to that.
 12 So both in the Marine Corps and the Army,
 13 they felt “well forward” was kind of an outdated notion.
 14 MR. GEBICKE: Do you agree with that?
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Yeah, I
 16 think the “well forward” is outdated. What I don’t
 17 disagree with is deep, close and rear is a reality. What
 18 I would tell you is that what the armed forces is now
 19 faced with is a continuum, if you will, of conflict from
 20 a major regional conflict, which can in fact, and clearly
 21 will be, very linear in nature — a la Korea, a la the
 22 desert — okay? — all the way down to fighting a forest
 23 fire on this far end of this continuum and all that falls

1 in-between.
 2 And yes, there are those areas that fall
 3 in-between that close and rear may become rather
 4 together. There will be where deep — deep objectives
 5 taken singly, you know, becomes all of deep, close and
 6 rear. You know, that sort of thing.
 7 And I think we’ve made a great deal of
 8 this asymmetric battlefield, but I think when you go back
 9 to it, you carve up battlefield geometry; you carve up
 10 battle space in much the same way. There are going to be
 11 rear, there’s going to be close, there is going to be
 12 deep, in —
 13 MR. CHAMBERS: And I tried to convey that
 14 message in the report that the functions of the deep or
 15 functions of the rear and the close are still
 16 appropriate.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And there
 18 may be times, because of the asymmetric battle, that in
 19 fact close and rear become one or deep becomes close.
 20 MR. CHAMBERS: Right. They may not be
 21 contiguous, depending on the —
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: That’s
 23 right. That’s very possible.

1 DR. SEGAL: Okay. I’d like to follow-up
 2 on this to try to understand this. So they may not be
 3 contiguous. And the functions, though, of the three
 4 would still hold: the deep, close and rear.
 5 MR. CHAMBERS: Right.
 6 DR. SEGAL: But I presume that the
 7 probability of lethality, for example, is not linear. Or
 8 is it? It’s not a — That is to say, are you more likely
 9 to — is it more dangerous to be in the deep? Is that
 10 always the case? I mean, given that our own doctrine has
 11 us going after rear areas of hostile forces, right? And
 12 presumably that will happen — could happen to us.
 13 DR. BEUSSE: That kind of goes back to the
 14 Risk Rule, which the current policy replaced, and risk is
 15 no longer the explicit issue that they’re dealing with.
 16 DR. SEGAL: So it’s no longer a criterion
 17 for whether women should be assigned because of the —
 18 partly because of the recognition that risk is not
 19 linearly associated with that battlefield.
 20 DR. BEUSSE: And that even goes with the
 21 way in which, for example, the integration of women into
 22 Navy ships went. The first ships were the tenders and
 23 the supply ships, which our doctrine and the doctrine of

1 every other navy said those are the things you go after.
 2 The combatants are just going to be floating out there
 3 useless if they can’t get supplies.
 4 DR. SEGAL: And, indeed, when the British
 5 decided to put women on ships, they — instead of
 6 deciding to go for supposedly noncombat, they said “all
 7 of our ships are combat ships,” because their experience
 8 in the Falklands War was that they had higher casualty
 9 rates aboard those that would have been considered
 10 support ships rather than as a combat ship.
 11 So as I understand it, the rationale for
 12 the exclusion of women from the ground combat has to do
 13 with congressional values and public opinion.
 14 MR. GEBICKE: And the fact that they do
 15 not see a need to have women in combat. They feel that
 16 they have enough men at this particular point in time and
 17 they see no advantage to readiness to including women.
 18 And, also, that many servicewomen are not supportive.
 19 And I guess there’s a delineation there between officers
 20 and enlisted. I guess the officers are supportive and
 21 the enlisted are less supportive.
 22 And then there was an issue that came up
 23 of maybe it could be done on a volunteer basis. Well,

1 that would be a different standard than men. I mean, men
 2 don’t volunteer always to go into combat. So —
 3 MS. POPE: Well, I think the other issue
 4 is that, you know, until the country decides as a country
 5 that you’re going to draft women, you know, you can’t put
 6 women in combat. And you can’t say, “Excuse me, I’m not
 7 going.” I mean, if we ever had to come to a draft and
 8 you have to go to war and you’re going to call on people,
 9 if you go towards putting women in combat, then you’ve
 10 got to have men and women equally deployable.
 11 And so as a nation, until we decide that,
 12 you can’t, you know, decide “I want to go” and “I don’t
 13 want to go,” and allow women to —
 14 MR. DELGADO: It’s interesting you mention
 15 that because it’s sort of a circular argument.
 16 MS. POPE: Right. Right.
 17 MR. DELGADO: Women are not in the draft
 18 or registration at this point because supposedly they’re
 19 not in combat.
 20 MS. POPE: Right.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: She’s making a different
 22 point.
 23 DR. SEGAL: That was the — That’s the way

1 the Supreme Court decided. That the male-only
 2 registration was constitutional for that reason.
 3 DR. MOSKOS: The point is, you can’t have
 4 a draft and exclude women from combat. She’s saying if
 5 you — What Ms. Pope is saying is if you let women into
 6 combat and the draft, that’s when the troubles arise.
 7 MS. POPE: Right. And if you let women
 8 into —
 9 DR. MOSKOS: Like Israel has a draft for
 10 women but no combat.
 11 MS. POPE: If you let women into combat,
 12 you have to — if we ever go to a draft — draft men and
 13 women.
 14 DR. SEGAL: Well, we have a standby
 15 gender-neutral medical draft.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: You could draft men and
 17 women, but you’d have to put women in combat even with
 18 the draft —
 19 DR. SEGAL: I mean, the medical draft is
 20 gender-neutral —
 21 MS. POPE: Right.
 22 DR. SEGAL: — and it’s a standby draft.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: — if you have women

1 excluded.
 2 MS. POPE: Right. If you have women
 3 excluded.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Excluded.
 5 MS. POPE: Right.
 6 DR. SEGAL: And we almost drafted women in
 7 1945. Had the war in Europe not ended, we —
 8 MR. DELGADO: And again in — President
 9 Carter, I'm trying to remember...
 10 DR. SEGAL: That was the draft
 11 registration.
 12 MR. DELGADO: Right. Registration, not
 13 the draft.
 14 DR. SEGAL: Had the war in Europe not been
 15 over, we would have drafted civilian nurses in 1945.
 16 MR. GEBICKE: As an aside, George recently
 17 did some work, too, on the Selective Service System. We
 18 were asked a question for a different study as to what it
 19 would take if women were included for registration.
 20 And, George, if I remember, it was like
 21 what? \$26 million additional or something?
 22 MR. DELGADO: Oh, no. It was a lot less
 23 than that.

1 MR. GEBICKE: Oh, less than that?
 2 MR. DELGADO: Much less than that.
 3 Somewhere around \$5 to \$6 million.
 4 MR. GEBICKE: Oh, \$5? Okay.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: Over what, George?
 6 MR. DELGADO: Excuse me?
 7 MR. GEBICKE: Per year?
 8 MR. DELGADO: Over the current budget.
 9 DR. MOSKOS: What is it currently?
 10 MR. DELGADO: Somewhere around \$23
 11 million.
 12 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 13 MR. GEBICKE: Yeah, that's what it was.
 14 MS. POPE: Selective Service.
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: That's today's
 16 registration, which is going to the Post Office, right?
 17 MR. DELGADO: Or you can do it over the
 18 Internet now.
 19 MR. GEBICKE: Yeah. Starting yesterday,
 20 you can do it through the Internet.
 21 MS. POPE: Through the Internet?
 22 MR. DELGADO: Yes.
 23 MR. GEBICKE: Online.

1 MS. POPE: You've got more mouse potatoes,
 2 right?
 3 MR. GEBICKE: And that would just be
 4 registration, not cost.
 5 MR. DELGADO: Right, that's registration.
 6 That's the only thing they're doing at this point.
 7 Interesting, I think, to mention is
 8 they've got 13 million names of men between eighteen and
 9 twenty-six, so that is a continuing pool. Not that I
 10 think the Department of Defense has said that they would
 11 go towards that direction, but it's a pool available if
 12 it ever became that.
 13 If women were drafted, then you would see
 14 — I believe the number was somewhere around 14.4
 15 additional million names between eighteen and twenty-six
 16 added to that.
 17 MR. GEBICKE: But, I mean, given the types
 18 of battles and wars that we think we'd be involved in,
 19 that will run a relatively brief period of time — we're
 20 thinking of 120 days or such — and given the fact that
 21 we have a guard and reserve, we have the IRR —
 22 Individual Ready Reserve — and given the time that it
 23 would take to institute a draft and to get people

1 trained, we'd have to be in big trouble to go back to a
 2 registration, unless we came to the situation where we
 3 could not get enough volunteers into the military, and
 4 then that becomes —
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I would
 6 fail if I didn't make an editorial comment here.
 7 MR. GEBICKE: Okay. Please do.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And I've
 9 read very well placed in your study and what DoD's
 10 rationale and the like for this is, but nowhere is
 11 addressed what is the reality of close combat, and
 12 perhaps it's those who can't articulate what true close
 13 combat is. And when close combat comes, real close
 14 combat, that is done by those infantrymen and their
 15 immediate support. It is a very nasty, a very dirty, a
 16 very animalistic business.
 17 Now, we don't want to say that. We don't
 18 want to say that for the mothers of America. We don't
 19 want to say that for quite anybody, but that's the
 20 reality. We may have been able to shoot a silver bullet
 21 in Desert Shield/Desert Storm; you know, that was very
 22 fortunate. I'm afraid those kinds of silver bullets just
 23 don't exist or won't exist in this asymmetrical-type

1 conflict that one might fight, in the Somalia-type of
 2 situation, in the potential of what might occur in a
 3 Bosnia or whatever, when it comes down to close combat,
 4 and that's what the American people have to wrestle with.
 5 My opinion would be that the American
 6 people do not want to see its daughters in that
 7 particular role.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: I can't —
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I know.
 10 And I don't —
 11 DR. SEGAL: Some people would rather see
 12 my daughter go than their son.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I know
 14 you're going to say —
 15 DR. MOSKOS: I know what this gets me.
 16 Somebody else's daughter, but not my son.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I know.
 18 When I say "daughters," they don't want to see their sons
 19 in that role either.
 20 And you're absolutely right about that,
 21 Charlie.
 22 But the reality is no one wants to address
 23 what real close combat is. And until that reality is

1 addressed, you know, we're going to play with this issue
 2 forever.
 3 MR. GEBICKE: You had a definition in —
 4 DR. SEGAL: I'd like to say that
 5 fortunately for us, that is one issue that I don't
 6 believe our Commission has to deal with.
 7 MS. POPE: Thank goodness.
 8 MR. GEBICKE: I was going to just say that
 9 we have a definition —
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What we say
 11 in our Commission will lead to — will find its way into
 12 other discussions, so we have to, you know, at least be
 13 very concerned about those issues.
 14 MR. GEBICKE: We had a definition of close
 15 combat in the report but it's a very puritanistic
 16 definition, not as eloquent as you and as realistic as
 17 you've expressed.
 18 DR. SEGAL: I think what's really relevant
 19 for this is the understanding that we have of what
 20 positions are open to women currently, the position that
 21 they're in and the ones that they're not in as a result
 22 of the current law. But, fortunately, we are not asked
 23 to make policy recommendations on this one. I think we

1 have consensus on that in the Commission.
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yes.
 3 DR. BEUSSE: One of the questions I think
 4 that's sometimes raised in looking at the results of
 5 Colin's study is that there is one other criterion, that
 6 we found no jobs excluded because they involve physically
 7 demanding tasks that would screen out the majority of
 8 women. And people said, "Well, why is that?" And we
 9 said, "Well, because they are already being screened out
 10 for those jobs by the direct combat exclusion policy and
 11 the collocation policy."
 12 And I think also DoD was concerned that if
 13 they were to use that criteria, they would run afoul of
 14 that requirement that they have set job-specific
 15 standards of performance for those jobs and they don't
 16 have those.
 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Relative to that, I'm
 18 looking at the latest report which is the "Information to
 19 Assess Servicemembers' Perceptions, No. 99-27. There
 20 were a couple of statements that really piqued my
 21 interest.
 22 One is on page 10, and it's near the
 23 bottom of the page: "The Secretary of Defense is required

1 have to be things that are not related to gender. And I
 2 think there was a third —
 3 MR. GEBICKE: Scientifically derived?
 4 DR. BEUSSE: Scientifically derived,
 5 again.
 6 So they are not things that somebody says,
 7 "Well, I think somebody, you know, in this kind of
 8 occupation ought to have these characteristics." That
 9 there needs to be some linkage back to a specific job
 10 analysis.
 11 Now, in our work, we had found that while
 12 DoD's position is "we haven't heard anything from
 13 commanders," that "commanders would tell us if they were
 14 having problems," we also heard from the informal network
 15 out there that there are problems but that they were not
 16 necessarily gender-related.
 17 That it maybe is more related to this
 18 issue of people being less physically fit now than
 19 before, but that commanders are not really free to report
 20 that on their readiness reports because that has a
 21 negative career impact on them. Plus, they view that as
 22 their job. If they've got those kinds of problems, it's
 23 their job to figure out work-arounds to make it work.

1 by law to prescribe physical performance standards for
 2 any occupation for which the Secretary determines
 3 strength, endurance, or stamina are essential to
 4 performance."
 5 Another statement that — And I'm just
 6 going to ask you for whatever background you can provide
 7 me that would illuminate this a little bit more, if you
 8 have anything — any such background to add.
 9 The second statement is on page 39, and
 10 it's in the first paragraph: "DOD believes that there is
 11 no need to develop such [physical performance] standards
 12 because there is no evidence that servicemembers are
 13 unable to do their jobs due to a lack of physical
 14 strength."
 15 And if you have any background that you
 16 can add about the "required by law" or the belief at DoD
 17 that there's no evidence that people are unable to do
 18 that, I would just like to hear about it as a matter of
 19 partly curiosity and partly to see whether there are
 20 additional questions that we should pose back to DoD or
 21 the services on these subjects.
 22 MR. GEBICKE: John, do you want to take
 23 that?

1 That's what they do. That's their role.
 2 So the official DoD position is that they
 3 don't have any problem. I believe that we recommended
 4 that they gather some information and I think they
 5 concurred with that, and the last I heard, they got a
 6 very low response rate on whether or not they had people
 7 who physically could not perform their job.
 8 And it's something that probably merits
 9 more in-depth kind of study because, again, it depends on
 10 how you configure those jobs. If they're configured as a
 11 team job, then they're probably right. They probably
 12 don't have a problem. That they are able to deal with
 13 it. But if there are individuals' jobs that — or people
 14 over time or over the kind of intense operation that you
 15 can get in a battle, that they're not going to have the
 16 stamina to keep up, then that's something that commanders
 17 need to know at the high level.
 18 MR. NELSON: Let me follow-up on that, the
 19 survey part. I spoke to DoD's representatives following
 20 that and it might be instructive for you to talk to them
 21 about the construct of that survey and the status of it
 22 now.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: By whose office was that

1 MR. NELSON: Bill's better at answering
 2 part of this. I do have one comment.
 3 DR. BEUSSE: In terms of what's required
 4 by law, that was the gender-neutral standards work that
 5 we had done a couple of years ago and we found that the
 6 law is in place, as it's described there. That if the
 7 Secretary believes that there are specific physical
 8 requirements that are essential for performance in
 9 certain occupations, then it's incumbent upon the
 10 Secretary to recommend the standards and develop
 11 standards for that. And that that law specifically
 12 prohibits gender-norming. It doesn't — It's silent on
 13 any other kind of norming, but gender-norming is
 14 specifically prohibited.
 15 Now, the DoD general counsel took the
 16 position that that law does not require DoD to have
 17 standards for specific jobs; but that if they did have
 18 standards for those kinds of jobs, they would have to
 19 live up to certain criteria that was actually specified
 20 in the law.
 21 And that is, that they would have to be —
 22 I don't think we've got them listed here, but they would
 23 have to be things that are common to the job; they would

1 done, John?
 2 MR. NELSON: It's Dr. Jane Arabian, who is
 3 the point of contact. She is in Accessions Policy.
 4 DR. BEUSSE: Yes.
 5 MR. GEBICKE: Yeah.
 6 DR. SEGAL: Yeah. But I actually talked
 7 to her about this. There was a great deal of concern;
 8 because of the low response rate, that they didn't feel
 9 it was very good.
 10 MR. NELSON: I think there were some
 11 questions about the construct of the questions, some
 12 things like that as well.
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I think you've just
 14 mentioned generally the words "it's DoD policy" or
 15 something. Is it a formal policy or is it — you know,
 16 is it something written down somewhere or is this kind of
 17 what the general counsel says? Can you give me a little
 18 more idea of how formal this belief on the part of DoD
 19 is?
 20 DR. BEUSSE: It is their position — It
 21 was not just articulated to us. It was included in a
 22 report that was mandated by this law to go back to the
 23 Congress and they actually put it into words that DoD

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1 believes that they don't have a problem in this area.
 2 We asked, again, what the underpinning of
 3 that was. We wanted to know where is their evidence that
 4 there is or is not a problem. And their answer was, "If
 5 commanders were having a problem, we'd hear about it."
 6 Now, the problem with us trying to sell
 7 that answer on the Hill is they go around to
 8 installations and they talk to people and people
 9 informally are telling them that there is a problem. So
 10 there is that gap in trying to get at, you know, where is
 11 truth. It's a difficult issue.
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And to your knowledge,
 13 this survey that we've referred to was a response to this
 14 criticism. Do you know of any other action either that's
 15 been taken or is planned or under consideration?
 16 You don't have to know. I'm just asking
 17 do you know.
 18 DR. BEUSSE: I don't know.
 19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. Okay.
 20 MR. NELSON: This whole issue feeds back
 21 in again to some of the studies on the demands of
 22 occupations that we talked about later, so there's sort
 23 of a group of things here that are linked together to

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
1 may be one of the few unanimous things we have on this
 2 Commission.
 3 MR. GEBICKE: Maybe the first of many,
 4 right?
 5 MS. POPE: That's right. It's a start.
 6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, we appreciate your
 7 coming very much, and we probably will take advantage of
 8 your kind offer to answer some questions in the future.
 9 And we'll go off the record now. Thank you very much.
 10 (Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the hearing in
 11 the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at
 12 9:00 a.m., the following day.)
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1 some degree.
 2 DR. SEGAL: If you wanted to know if
 3 people who are incumbents in a job could have performed
 4 their job, you wouldn't go after only the physical
 5 issues. You'd go after other sorts of skills and
 6 knowledge and abilities that they needed to have.
 7 Go back to — right — what do they really
 8 need to be able to do to perform the mission of the unit.
 9 DR. MOSKOS: And even their attitude.
 10 DR. SEGAL: And their attitudes. That's
 11 right. Their willingness to...
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We've come to four
 13 o'clock and I'd just like to check with our reporter.
 14 Are you okay for a few minutes?
 15 MR. SCOTT: Yes, ma'am.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay, fine. So we can
 17 continue.
 18 DR. SEGAL: Is there anything else that
 19 you think we ought to know in accomplishing our mission?
 20 MR. GEBICKE: In terms of the work that we
 21 have done and the work that we would have available in
 22 time for your study, I think we've pretty much discussed
 23 it in quite a bit of detail. Which we appreciate, by the

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1 way, having this opportunity, because I was telling
 2 somebody at the break, when we testified before the
 3 Congress, it's usually not at this level of detail and
 4 there's not as much participation.
 5 DR. SEGAL: We need all the help we can
 6 get.
 7 MR. GEBICKE: So we very much appreciate
 8 being able to discuss these things at this level of
 9 detail with you.
 10 DR. SEGAL: Could we — I pursue — I just
 11 wanted it on the record that if we have some additional
 12 questions for you, is that okay — if, in the future, we
 13 come to you with some of our questions?
 14 MR. GEBICKE: Sure. No problem at all.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And we're
 16 going to quote you freely.
 17 MS. POPE: This has been very helpful.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Yes. Thank you so much.
 19 MS. POPE: Thank you.
 20 MR. GEBICKE: Thank you.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: It's a great organization.
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Any other questions?
 23 Well, I will just make that unanimous. It



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CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES

Wednesday, December 2, 1998

1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 940

Arlington, Virginia

DEC. 2, 1998

1 Those present:
 2 Anita K. Blair, Esquire - Chairman
 3 The Honorable Frederick F.Y. Pang - Vice Chairman
 4 LtGen George R. Christmas, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner
 5 LtGen William M. Keys, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner
 6 Thomas Moore - Commissioner
 7 Charles Moskos, Ph.D. - Commissioner
 8 The Honorable Barbara Spyridon Pope - Commissioner
 9 Mady Wechsler Segal, Ph.D. - Commissioner
 10 ---
 11 Stephen C. Fogleman, Esquire - Executive Director
 12 Susan L. Fry - Executive Assistant
 13 Hank Hodge - Staff Liaison
 14 James Renne, Esquire - Staff Counsel and Secretary
 15 Kathleen M. Wright, Ph.D. - Research Director
 16 Janice Laurence, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 17 Charles Johnson, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 18 Capt J.S. Snyder, USN - Service Representative
 19 LtCol Brenda L. Harris, USA - Service Representative
 20 LtCol Mary Street, USAF - Service Representative
 21 Maj R. Scott LaShier, USMC - Service Representative
 22 ---
 23

1 Those present:
 2 GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, USA(Ret), President, AUSA
 3 John Molino, Director, Government Affairs, AUSA
 4 ---
 5 William J. Gregor, Ph.D., Study on Gender-Integrated
 Training
 6 ---
 7 Brian Mitchell, Author, Women in the Military: Flirting
 8 With Disaster (Regnery, 1998) and Weak Link: The
 Feminization of the American Military (Regnery, 1989)
 9 ---
 10 Presentation of Federal Bureau of Investigation
 11 John O. Loudon, Chief, Investigative Training Section,
 12 FBI Academy, Quantico, VA
 13
 Thomas Lyons, Chief, Physical Training Unit, FBI Academy,
 Quantico, VA
 14 Kevin J. Crawford, Supervisory Special Agent, FBI Fitness
 15 Program Manager, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA
 16 Edward T. Daerr, Supervisory Special Agent, FBI Defensive
 Tactics Program Manager, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA
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1 PROCEEDINGS (9:00 a.m.)
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: This is the Congressional
 3 Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related
 4 Issues. It's Wednesday, December 2nd, and we are going
 5 to hear this morning from General Gordon Sullivan, who is
 6 a retired General of the Army and currently President of
 7 the AUSA.
 8 General, thank you very much for coming.
 9 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Thank you very much. I
 10 appreciate the opportunity to be here. And what I'd like
 11 to do is just say a couple of things before you ask me
 12 some questions, if that's all right, to kind of set the
 13 stage.
 14 I was the Chief of Staff for the United
 15 States Army from June of 1991 until June of 1995. In
 16 1992, the then-TRADOC commander, General Fred Franks,
 17 came to me one day after another topic was discussed in
 18 my office and he said to me that he felt it was time that
 19 we revisited the integration of initial entry training.
 20 I told him fine, that I thought he should.
 21 That based on my reading of what was going on in the
 22 Presidential Commission on Women in the Armed Forces, my
 23 own observations of Just Cause and the performance of

1 women there, but, more importantly, the Gulf War and the
 2 early phases of Somalia — we were just getting into
 3 Somalia — and his own views — this was a discussion we
 4 had — that it was appropriate to take a look at it.
 5 Although my guidance to him at the time
 6 was that I didn't want some willy-nilly view, somebody
 7 showing up a week later telling me it was — yeah, it was
 8 a great idea and this is what we were going to do, that I
 9 thought we should do a series of experiments —
 10 "Experiments" maybe is a word that I have in my head now.
 11 I'm not sure that was the exact word I used then — but
 12 that I wanted to do some evaluation of various options
 13 and that they should come back to me with a
 14 recommendation.
 15 And what happened then was TRADOC and the
 16 Army Research Institute did conduct a series of
 17 experiments at Fort Jackson and Fort Leonard Wood,
 18 beginning in January of '93 and ending in '94. And as
 19 you know, the bulk of the effort was devoted towards the
 20 mix of male-female in basic training environments.
 21 Now, what we learned from the experiments
 22 — And General Steve Siegfried, by the way, was General
 23 Franks' lead horse in this effort.

1 Now, what we learned from the experiment
 2 was that physical fitness and basic marksmanship scores
 3 were just as good or better in gender-integrated training
 4 companies, end-of-cycle proficiency scores were better,
 5 success factors such as sick call rates were down, and
 6 morale and teamwork were higher in this 75/25 mix than
 7 they were in all-female units. Similar results were
 8 noted at both Leonard Wood and Jackson.
 9 And by the way, at Leonard Wood there was
 10 noted increased pass rates for both men and women in
 11 physical fitness training and M-16 qualification.
 12 Now, in the fall of '93 — And I want it
 13 understood because I know it's an item of interest, at
 14 that time I was the Acting Secretary of the Army. Okay?
 15 I was the Acting Secretary of the Army as well as the
 16 Chief of Staff of the Army. I decided to integrate IET
 17 for those combat support and combat service support MOS's
 18 which were gender-neutral.
 19 Now, remember, this is the fall of '93, so
 20 what started in '92 carried — you know, you've got a
 21 long history of this and I had been all over the world.
 22 Dr. Moskos and Laura Miller had done a number of things
 23 for me and I was looking at women in units in places,

1 such garden spots as Somalia and elsewhere, and I had my
 2 own views about all of this.
 3 Young men and women entering the Army from
 4 an environment where genders are mixed and operating in
 5 very close proximity to each other, in my view, didn't
 6 benefit from a brief period of artificial separation. In
 7 other words, what I had picked up since the seventies
 8 when I had started to deal with women soldiers in large
 9 numbers was that, first of all, they wanted to be treated
 10 as soldiers up front, soldiers with a capital "S," and
 11 they didn't want to get into all of this other stuff, and
 12 I felt that mixing them in gender-integrated training
 13 made sense.
 14 Now, I didn't write words as eloquent as
 15 Senator Kassebaum Baker's report to the Secretary of
 16 Defense, but I think her words probably capture how I
 17 felt about it: "The principal objective of the military"
 18 — and this is a quote — "of the military's training
 19 program is to produce an effective, efficient, and ready
 20 force. The initial entry training programs' other
 21 primary objectives are to produce self-confident,
 22 physically fit, and technically competent graduates who
 23 are trained in the skills and teamwork necessary for the

1 success of the unit's mission."
 2 My job as the Chief of Staff of the Army
 3 was to give the Army and the combatant commanders
 4 competent soldiers who could in fact produce results —
 5 desired results at day one, and that was what I was
 6 trying to do. And I felt then, when I made the decision,
 7 that it was the right one to make, and I feel that way
 8 now.
 9 I don't know if there's any — Why don't
 10 you — You know, I would say that I'm an ROTC graduate.
 11 Norwich University integrated it's ROTC program in 1973-
 12 74. OCS was integrated in '76. I mean, West Point was
 13 integrated. You had a lot of programs in the Army that
 14 were integrated. The Air Force and the Navy. My own son
 15 is a command chief in the Navy. His initial entry
 16 training was integrated. So it seemed like a logical
 17 decision.
 18 Now, was execution perfect? Of course it
 19 wasn't, and you'd think I was living in a dream world if
 20 I told you that execution was as I wanted it to be. But,
 21 you know, that's why we have rules and regulations. If
 22 people violate the rules, boom, they're either in
 23 Leavenworth, in the disciplinary barracks, or they're out

1 on the street, and I think General Reimer has certainly
 2 sanctioned people who act inappropriately, in my view.
 3 As I said, it was a proper decision in '93
 4 and I think it is today. And it's really a readiness
 5 issue. It's not a gender issue.
 6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, thank you, General.
 7 Just to familiarize you with the process
 8 we've been using, which is we simply go around the table
 9 with each commissioner and anyone who doesn't have a
 10 question at the ready at the moment may pass. And we
 11 keep going around the table —
 12 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Fine.
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — until we're finished
 14 with all our questions.
 15 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Okay.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And I will go ahead and
 17 start.
 18 General, you mentioned the 75/25 mix. Is
 19 that 75/25 at company level or in a platoon or...
 20 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yeah. Whatever. It's
 21 75 percent male, 25 percent female, in either company or
 22 platoon. If it's more than — If you start drifting
 23 above 25 percent, what you'll find is you get degradation

1 in performance of both males and females. At least
 2 that's what the data showed me, whether it was company or
 3 platoon.
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. So a platoon —
 5 Even at a platoon level the ideal —
 6 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes.
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — mix would be 75/25?
 8 GENERAL SULLIVAN: 75/25.
 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Fred?
 10 GENERAL SULLIVAN: What you want to do is
 11 stretch them. And you don't want strange behavior. In
 12 other words, you don't want the males trying to mirror
 13 female behavior, and you want the females to stretch
 14 themselves and you want the males to keep pushing
 15 themselves.
 16 I didn't say it but I know you know it.
 17 I'm only talking here now about combat support,
 18 appropriate MOS's. I'm just presuming you know all of
 19 that.
 20 MR. PANG: Well, General Sullivan, I just
 21 want to thank you for joining us today. You know, I know
 22 you're going to bring a tremendous perspective to our
 23 deliberations.

1 I think, you know, what I've heard over
 2 the course of our deliberations thus far is that — from
 3 the services, is that each one of them has a mission
 4 that's unique to themselves. All wear the uniform but,
 5 yet, are unique, and, therefore, they train to meet that
 6 unique requirement.
 7 In the case of the Army, you know, you
 8 have a very large combat support and combat service
 9 support element as compared, for example, to the Marine
 10 Corps. And when you talk about the Army — and this is
 11 kind of a point of clarification that, you know, I'd like
 12 to hear your views on — the situation is — the way I
 13 hear it described is mixed. Instead of gender-integrated
 14 training in that, you know, there is an element of the
 15 Army — large element of the Army that is not integrated
 16 to combat arms in basic training.
 17 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yeah. Infantry, armor,
 18 artillery, field artillery, that's not. In those MOS's
 19 where women do not serve, that's still male-only.
 20 MR. PANG: And it makes sense to do it
 21 that way?
 22 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes.
 23 MR. PANG: Okay.

1 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes, it does. It's
 2 appropriate to do it that way.
 3 And, you know, the ones where it's done, I
 4 mean, you look at the numbers, 71, the career field
 5 administration, just in broad terms, you've got 26,000
 6 people; 42 percent of that career field is female.
 7 Petroleum, 26 percent; transport, 21 percent.
 8 And these women, by the way, are driving
 9 trucks and assistant drivers — male-female — and I just
 10 felt it was inappropriate to have them separated. Why
 11 would I have them separated? Hell, I've got two — had
 12 two of them captured in — Now, admittedly, they took the
 13 wrong turn and drove into Iraq, you know, when they got
 14 themselves captured, but it was male-female.
 15 And, you know, Fred, I know you have done
 16 it yourself. I went to Haiti — whenever. I mean, you
 17 have males and females sleeping in the same warehouse,
 18 just boom, boom, like cigars in a box. Head, toe, head,
 19 toe, and they're right next to each other. Why — It
 20 just didn't seem logical for me to separate them.
 21 MR. PANG: The other question I had has to
 22 do with a point other than, you know, directly related to
 23 the gender-integrated training or gender-segregated

1 training. And that has to do, you know, with the
 2 perception among some that in cases involving cross-
 3 gender relationships where there's a feeling that there's
 4 a perception of unequal treatment between seniors and
 5 subordinates and between the genders.
 6 You know, for example, if there was a case
 7 of unprofessional conduct between a senior and a
 8 subordinate, regardless of gender, there's a perception
 9 that there might be misapplication — okay — of the
 10 rules and not fairness.
 11 What's your view on that?
 12 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Maybe. I'm sure some
 13 of that goes on. I mean, when we were trying to get
 14 ourselves sorted out after Vietnam, you saw the same —
 15 you heard the same kind of things with regard to race, as
 16 Dr. Moskos certainly is more qualified than I to talk
 17 about, you know. Or you say, "yeah, this guy is from
 18 Boston and the other guy is from Boston," so you get that
 19 kind of behavior.
 20 But, in general, I don't — I'm sure some
 21 of that goes on but it's not pervasive.
 22 MR. PANG: You know, one of the — I guess
 23 the criticisms that I've heard and then we've discussed

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1 here has to do with allowing senior people — senior
2 officers or senior noncommissioned officers — to retire
3 in lieu of punishment, other types of punishment.

4 And that's — you know, among the junior
5 people, when they see that, they presume that that is
6 unfair treatment because they go to Article 15 or they
7 get some other kind of punitive action applied against
8 them. And I think what we've heard is that really, you
9 know, that's a pretty severe punishment when you ask
10 somebody to terminate their careers.

11 And I was wondering how that process
12 played out in your mind as you had to deal with issues
13 like that as Chief.

14 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Oh, boy, you just —
15 yeah. Look, you had my brain in one place and now you're
16 asking me something completely different.

17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well, don't you
18 think a lot of that was perceptions, Fred? I mean —

19 MR. PANG: I think so. But I think —

20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I mean, you
21 couldn't get them to give you name or time or place. It
22 just was "oh, we know they've done more than we are."

23 MR. PANG: Yeah. You know, I just wanted

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1 MR. PANG: Thank you, sir.

2 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Okay. It's a good
3 question, and certainly it's, you know, a hot topic
4 around town, but you take them as you see them and you
5 punish them as you see them. But they all don't come to
6 the chief or even the vice.

7 DR. SEGAL: General Sullivan, I too would
8 like to thank you for coming and sharing your experiences
9 and your insights with us. I want to go back to the
10 issue of gender-segregation/integration in basic
11 training.

12 We're going to be hearing later today from
13 a couple of men who, in their published writings, have
14 indicated the position that they believe that, over the
15 past twenty-five years, decisions that have been made to
16 increase the numbers of women in the military and to
17 increase the jobs that women are allowed to hold and
18 decisions such as the one that you made to integrate
19 basic training, to have men and women training together
20 in the Army, have been made primarily because of
21 political pressures from feminists and without regard to
22 readiness.

23 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Don't believe it.

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1 to get that on the record because, you know, there is a
2 sense — When I was out talking to the operational
3 commanders and how they deal with issues, they said, you
4 know, "We're not going to do it the same for everybody."
5 I mean, you know, "If somebody has a senior-subordinate
6 relationship problem, you know, you're not going to just
7 say it's an Article 15, thirty days."

8 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Well, I didn't — Look,
9 I'm the same as anybody else. I didn't do it the same
10 for everybody either. Okay? But there were very few
11 cases that came to me as the chief. I mean, you're
12 dealing here now as the chief. Some of them were taken
13 care of by the vice, who is the disciplinarian in the
14 Army. I did it as the vice and the chief would know what
15 I was doing, but generally I was doing it as the vice
16 chief.

17 And then some cases it was — One case in
18 particular was a man on the promotion list to brigadier
19 general, so I called him in and I looked him in the eyes
20 and I said, "Now, look here, Jack. You've got two
21 choices. You've got two choices. I'm going to give it
22 to you straight. I know this. This is what I think I
23 know. Okay? I can investigate it or you can retire,"

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1 DR. SEGAL: So I have two —

2 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Don't believe it.

3 DR. SEGAL: I have two questions for you.
4 One is, do you consider yourself to be a radical
5 feminist?

6 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Me?

7 DR. SEGAL: Yes.

8 GENERAL SULLIVAN: No.

9 DR. SEGAL: Okay.

10 GENERAL SULLIVAN: No.

11 DR. SEGAL: And the second is —

12 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Look, I had a job to
13 do, okay? I had a job to do. I took it very seriously.
14 And I was trying to prepare young men and women to be
15 soldiers in America's army, to do the jobs that they had
16 to do out in the field that they were being asked to do.
17 I felt that it was my — it was an appropriate venue for
18 me to be in.

19 I was receiving no pressure from
20 "feminists," whatever that may mean. I was actually
21 receiving very little pressure from anybody on the issue.
22 As a matter of fact, I don't think anybody even knew that
23 I made the decision. To tell you the honest-to-God truth

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1 and he chose to retire.

2 Now, is that — I don't particularly care
3 to get in a dialogue with a colonel who's dealing, you
4 know, with his subordinates because it's a different kind
5 of thing. I kept — In that case, a man didn't get
6 promoted to brigadier general. That's a pretty serious
7 — So it's different levels and it just depends on — I
8 know that's a funny thing to say but it does. It depends
9 on the case.

10 So that's how I would answer that.

11 And I think you have got to trust your
12 senior — your senior leaders. And most of all of this is
13 done with the knowledge of the senior civilians. You
14 know, the Secretary of the Army or whatever the case may
15 be.

16 And I want the record to be very clear,
17 too. When I said I was the Secretary of the Army, there
18 was a policy established that I would see Dr. Perry every
19 day I was in Washington and every day he was in
20 Washington. So I met with him almost everyday so that no
21 one could ever say, you know, that there wasn't civilian
22 control. There was. And I'd talk to him on the phone,
23 too, if I wasn't here.

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1 — And Charlie went all over the world with Laura Miller,
2 and I'd bet if I went back and looked at the reports that
3 he gave me — he and Laura gave me, this subject didn't
4 even come up. It was a non-issue.

5 DR. SEGAL: So you made the decision on
6 the basis of what you saw were the jobs that men and
7 women were performing at the time.

8 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I made the decision
9 based on — It seemed like a good idea at the time when
10 Freddie said to me — And I saw him this morning. He was
11 out running up the street, or sort of running up the
12 street, and he told me that he had talked to somebody
13 over here and he might come over and talk to you.

14 He said, "Hell, it was an appropriate
15 recommendation for me to make to you." Then we looked at
16 it. I told him I didn't want to do it based on some
17 willy-nilly idea or some fuzzy-headed idea that someone
18 had. We needed to look at the facts, and that's where
19 the 75/25 came out.

20 And there are data on this. This is not
21 some pipedream here.

22 So at any rate, I wasn't getting any
23 pressure from anybody.

1 You know, in 1994, I know there were some
 2 people that jumped on the bandwagon and took credit for
 3 it, but this thing was already going.
 4 DR. SEGAL: Thank you.
 5 MS. POPE: General Sullivan, I want to say
 6 thank you, too, for giving up your time.
 7 I guess I'd like you to expand a little
 8 bit — and I know I'm asking you to recall — on
 9 readiness, you know, because I think that's real key.
 10 It's part of our mandate and charter. And you've already
 11 addressed it, but I guess my question is to expand it
 12 just a little bit.
 13 You know, what were some of the issues?
 14 Not just that you had some data or successes with women
 15 actually in situations in men and women, but what were
 16 some of the readiness issues that were driving this
 17 decision? You know, recruiting, retention, skills. Were
 18 there any of those?
 19 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I don't think there
 20 were readiness issues driving it.
 21 MS. POPE: Okay.
 22 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I don't think there
 23 were readiness issues. Readiness issues, to me, are

1 issues such as deployability, those kind of issues, but
 2 that didn't play in this equation.
 3 MS. POPE: And what about as it was being
 4 — during the trial periods and as it was being
 5 implemented? Were there readiness concerns? And if so,
 6 how were they addressed?
 7 GENERAL SULLIVAN: No. No, no. Not
 8 readiness concerns. There was no — The readiness
 9 concern was that I was giving them soldiers who could
 10 operate in the environment that they would operate in.
 11 And that is, that they felt as if they were soldiers and
 12 not women. They felt as if they were soldiers from day
 13 one and not segregated, and then all of a sudden put back
 14 together.
 15 You know, nineteen-year-olds in America
 16 are hardly socialized at all. You know, I mean, I'm a
 17 father and I used to be nineteen years old, too. And I
 18 think that's all a part of it. It's giving to the
 19 commanders a soldier who is trained at an appropriate
 20 level.
 21 Now, we don't train — and I'm not sure
 22 how the other services do it, but the Army doesn't train
 23 to all skill level one tasks in its initial entry

1 training. There's just not enough time to do it. For
 2 instance — Well, that doesn't make — You all know what
 3 the facts are and I don't need to go into them.
 4 Now, that might be a readiness issue but
 5 that didn't impact on my decision at all.
 6 MS. POPE: Thank you.
 7 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I was more interested
 8 in giving the commanders a soldier who understood that
 9 treating people with dignity and respect and, you know,
 10 soldierly values, which General Reimer has really
 11 sharpened a great deal and I think appropriately.
 12 But, anyway, that's really the readiness
 13 concern I was worried about. It's not readiness in the
 14 traditional sense.
 15 Yes.
 16 MR. MOORE: Well, my question is similar
 17 to Commissioner Pope's. It's trying to get at the
 18 background of the decision. Let me see if I can be a
 19 little more precise.
 20 Was there some condition or some concern
 21 that prompted General Franks to come in and make the
 22 recommendation to you? I mean, was there a manpower
 23 shortage perhaps? There wasn't a recruiting —

1 GENERAL SULLIVAN: No, I think — No. As
 2 I recall, what he said to me was, "Chief, I think we
 3 ought to revisit this." I mean, that's just about what
 4 he said.
 5 MR. MOORE: Okay. I mean, I can
 6 understand the logic after-the-fact, but I wondered what
 7 might have been prior to the fact that would lead him
 8 to...
 9 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Oh, I think he — Steve
 10 Siegfried was running Fort Jackson, which is the largest
 11 training center. I think Siegfried probably had views on
 12 the subject. I'm sure he did. He may have voiced those
 13 views to General Franks, who took advantage. He knew he
 14 was going to see me. I talked to him a lot anyway. And
 15 he just said, "Hey, I think we ought to look at this."
 16 And it was not so out of the realm of
 17 reality because we had had — Of course, he had a lot of
 18 women with him in the Gulf and I think the Army generally
 19 felt — I certainly did — pretty good about it. You
 20 know, we had a couple of women decorated for valor in
 21 Operation Just Cause. They were slick pilots. They had
 22 flown the 101st into an LZ.
 23 I mean, this is not a Vietnam kind of LZ.

1 I don't want to overstate this, although it was hot.
 2 Some people got wounded. And a couple of women performed
 3 admirably there and were decorated for valor.
 4 So all of these things were playing, I
 5 think, in his mind that, "okay, we're moving and let's
 6 take a look at it."
 7 MR. MOORE: In your discussions with
 8 General Siegfried or General Franks, did the issue of the
 9 prior gender-integration experiment at Fort Jackson come
 10 into those discussions? I mean, we tried this from —
 11 what? — '77 to '81, I guess, at Fort Jackson.
 12 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes, it did, although
 13 — Yes. Yeah, it did. And that's why I told him that I
 14 wanted facts. I didn't want ideas; I wanted facts, and
 15 that's when we got ARI into it. And I can't — I'd have
 16 to go back into my papers and really do some research.
 17 And ARI probably remembers it. They actually came to me
 18 two or three times and I kept sending them back.
 19 MR. MOORE: So there was —
 20 GENERAL SULLIVAN: This is not something
 21 that was done — I want everybody to understand, this is
 22 not something that was done, you know, "okay, Freddie,
 23 terrific; sounds good; feels good; let's do it." This

1 was serious stuff. Because I knew that the Army had
 2 backed off, although it's hard to determine — And I see
 3 you've got Shy Meyer coming. It's hard to determine from
 4 the record why they did.
 5 But, you know, this is a social — The
 6 Army is a microcosm of America, and often when things are
 7 looked at over an eighteen-month period I would hear from
 8 all sorts of constituents. I actually heard very little.
 9 There was one gent down at Columbia — in
 10 Columbia, who was opposed to it, and he was writing to
 11 Benny Pea, who was the vice. And I know he was opposed
 12 to what we were doing, but he's about the only one. I
 13 forget his name but Benny would know it.
 14 MR. MOORE: So from 1981, then, till the
 15 fall of '93, I think, when the decision was made to —
 16 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yeah.
 17 MR. MOORE: Would it be safe to say, then,
 18 that circumstances in society had changed sufficiently to
 19 then justify the move back to —
 20 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I don't know that
 21 circumstances in society. The Army — Most of the ROTC
 22 graduates — You know, the West Point Class of '80 was
 23 the first female class. Those women had about ten years

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1 or so in the Army and the Gulf War. They were coming up
2 on major — I mean, there were a lot of things that had
3 happened within the Army as an institution. I don't
4 think I was necessarily thinking about America because
5 the Army was doing gender-integrated training at ROTC,
6 OCS, West Point.

7 And, you know, even then VMI and the
8 Citadel were not on anybody's screen. A lot of that
9 energy was not there. This was a very quiet — This is
10 just sort of business in a big institution. That's about
11 the way I looked at it.

12 MR. MOORE: Thank you.

13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Sir, looking
14 back on it, would you have done anything different in the
15 education system to prepare for this, NCO-wise or —

16 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yeah, probably. Yes.

17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: — in the
18 schools and everything?

19 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yes. And that's a good
20 question. I think Denny's doing that now.

21 I think what I would have done is — I
22 mean, we now know that the drill sergeants — some of
23 them — were probably not prepared to do this, and

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1 certainly NCOES or the drill sergeants program — prep
2 the battlefield, create the conditions for success —
3 yes.

4 Of all the problems I thought I had as the
5 Chief of Staff in the Army, in a very difficult period
6 when we took 600,000 people out of the organization — of
7 all the problems I thought we had, Bill, this was not the
8 major problem I thought I had. Okay?

9 Now, in retrospect — you know, in the
10 light of day in 1998 — yes, yes. And I think that's the
11 execution piece.

12 And, look, I can't duck my
13 responsibilities in this and I'm not going to duck my
14 responsibilities. Execution was spotty. Yeah. I mean
15 — And I'm sorry about it but, you know...

16 DR. MOSKOS: General Sullivan, I'm so
17 grateful for you to be here and all the support. It's
18 always been a pleasure to know you personally as well as
19 professionally.

20 My question — I have two questions. One
21 deals with looking — You know, we've argued with Laura
22 and ourselves: actually having gender-integrated units in
23 Somalia enhanced performance. It wasn't just, you know,

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1 an equal.

2 But the question could be raised: If,
3 though, good performances of gender-integrated units in
4 the Gulf, Somalia, Just Cause, and other places like
5 this, all of them were products of separate enlisted
6 basic training, you know, what was broke, since it was
7 working pretty well with the separate enlisted basic
8 training? And decent things. And so why —

9 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Why? Yeah. I mean,
10 you know, "Okay, Sully, you know, what the hell did you
11 do that for? I mean, you could've just said, 'Freddie,
12 get out of my life; I don't want to talk about it
13 anymore'."

14 DR. MOSKOS: Right.

15 GENERAL SULLIVAN: You know? It's not my
16 nature. I guess it's not my nature. I could have said
17 that. Didn't seem appropriate for me to do so since, as
18 I've said — I'd just be repeating myself. I felt that I
19 owed the commanders in the field my best shot or the
20 institution's best shot at preparing young men and women
21 for what they would get into.

22 You know, Tom Montgomery issued a number
23 — I don't know what the number is — a number of Purple

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1 Hearts in Somalia to female truck drivers. But, now —
2 DR. MOSKOS: These were, you know, gender-
3 separated trainees, though.

4 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Well, yes, they were.

5 But, now, I want you to — "Okay, General." I mean, here
6 I am standing up in front of an audience and I felt I
7 owed it to these people who would ask me a question: "Are
8 you telling me that it's okay for me to go out and get my
9 rear-end shot off over there in Mogadishu and it's not
10 okay for me to train beside a soldier that I'm sleeping
11 beside and driving a truck with?" And I wasn't prepared
12 to do that until I wrung — I had it wrung out.

13 DR. MOSKOS: Right.

14 GENERAL SULLIVAN: So I told Freddie to
15 wring it out.

16 Listen, you had three HMMWV's in Mogadishu
17 on a Sunday. MP's. They went down the street. A
18 command detonated mine. The lieutenant was in the third
19 HMMWV. The middle one was blown up against a building or
20 down an alley. She went doctrinated as you go through
21 the ambush site, secured the ambush site, get everything
22 under control. Hell, you couldn't find a piece. I mean,
23 the pieces were this big. She had that thing under

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1 control.

2 Listen, I felt I owed it to the women in
3 the Army. Soldiers. I owed it to them to take a shot at
4 it and I took a shot at it.

5 DR. SEGAL: Could I just follow-up on
6 that? These were MP's. Now, the MP's in fact were
7 products of gender-integrated training.

8 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yeah. In some cases,
9 yeah. Not everybody was segregated, as Charlie said.
10 OSUT MP was.

11 DR. SEGAL: So these MP's you're talking
12 about —

13 DR. MOSKOS: That's a good point.

14 DR. SEGAL: These are a product of gender-
15 integrated training.

16 MS. POPE: That is a good point.

17 DR. MOSKOS: That's a good point.

18 MR. MOORE: Since the seventies, right?

19 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Forever. Yeah, since
20 the seventies.

21 MS. POPE: That is a good point, a good
22 example.

23 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yeah. Look, it's a

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1 question of execution and I — I mean, Bill, he's at the
2 heart of the matter: execution.

3 DR. MOSKOS: General Sullivan, you
4 mentioned, too, which was new to me, that you felt that
5 if the number of women was above 25 percent, you know,
6 something happened. Do you want to expand on that?

7 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Well, it's 75/25. What
8 the ARI study showed is if you get more than 25 percent
9 women, then you start — the males start performing at a
10 lower level.

11 Now, why is that? I don't know. You're
12 the sociologist here and Mady's the sociologist. Why is
13 that? Males start behaving like — funny. Okay? I'm
14 just going to leave it at that.

15 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Thanks very much.

16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: General, I
17 also thank you for being here. I've got two questions.

18 One's out in left field and one's out in right field.

19 GENERAL SULLIVAN: That's okay.

20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: So we know
21 where we are.

22 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yeah.

23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And it

1 really asks for opinion.
 2 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Okay.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: One of the
 4 — We've got three basic tasks, and the first of these
 5 basic tasks is to look at the new fraternization policy
 6 of DoD, and, secondly, to comment on the adultery
 7 provisions that are —
 8 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Which is this? Left or
 9 right? Is this left field or right field?
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Well, I
 11 don't care which way you put it, sir — are the adultery
 12 guidelines that would go to the Manual for Courts-Martial
 13 in an executive order signed by the President. We've
 14 been asked to comment on that.
 15 The fraternization policy obviously
 16 impacts the Army more than it does the other services.
 17 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Right.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And I
 19 wondered if you'd comment on that, and if you'd care to
 20 comment on the adultery guidelines; whether they're, in
 21 your judgment based on your experience, required, and the
 22 fact that an executive order would put them into
 23 existence in the Manual for Courts-Martial.

1 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Ron, I thought adultery
 2 was in the UCMJ.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What
 4 they've done, sir, is the Department of Defense has
 5 drafted a set of guidelines for a commander as to when or
 6 when not, if you will, you might charge someone under the
 7 Manual for Courts-Martial with adultery. These
 8 guidelines would then go into the Manual for Courts-
 9 Martial by executive order, which they must, and
 10 basically give further guidelines to commanders as to
 11 when or when not to charge adultery.
 12 I think I've stated that pretty —
 13 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Let the record show
 14 that I know what adultery is. Okay? I know what we're
 15 talking about. At least I think I do. I'm not sure that
 16 — And this goes back to a previous question. I'm not
 17 sure I'm in favor of specific guidelines because I don't
 18 know how you write guidelines for command decisions.
 19 So I don't know that we need further
 20 guidelines. I mean, you've told the commander that he or
 21 she is charged with good law, order and discipline, and
 22 this is — adultery means what it means. You know,
 23 you're having a sexual relationship with someone who is

1 married to someone else. Seems fairly straightforward to
 2 me. And you've got to decide when it's appropriate to
 3 punish them.
 4 Okay. Now, the other question is on
 5 fraternization. Frankly, I'm not an expert on what
 6 happened. I didn't even know there were four different
 7 interpretations of fraternization. Or two, I guess. The
 8 Army had one and the other services — the other three
 9 services had another was a surprise to me. And now
 10 they're all the same.
 11 I was fairly comfortable with the Army's
 12 interpretation of it given that a lot of people I know
 13 are married to — they're commissioned officers and
 14 they're married to warrant officers, and vice versa. And
 15 I don't know how you get into all of that. I don't know
 16 how — You're like a cop. You cannot have an affair —
 17 Disregard what — You can't have a relationship with a
 18 woman or a man who is in the chain of command. Seems
 19 fairly straightforward to me.
 20 Now, as I understand it, the way — and
 21 you correct me if I'm wrong. As I understand it, the
 22 regulation now is — and the Marines are this way, I
 23 guess, and the Navy — is you can't fall in love with

1 someone who's in the Navy. Is that right?
 2 DR. MOSKOS: That's officer-enlisted.
 3 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Huh?
 4 MR. PANG: That's officer-enlisted.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: Across officer-enlisted. You
 6 can fall in love with another officer.
 7 GENERAL SULLIVAN: In other words, I can't
 8 —
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: No, not a
 10 colonel and a second lieutenant, you can't.
 11 GENERAL SULLIVAN: No, you can't. If
 12 you're a colonel, you can't fall in love with a second
 13 lieutenant.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: Is that right?
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Sure. That has
 16 to do with the rank.
 17 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Okay. Look, this is
 18 just G.R. Sullivan, a guy from Boston, Massachusetts.
 19 That sounds to me like it's going to be hard to — And
 20 for God's sake, don't give them any more guidelines.
 21 Leave it up to the commander to determine what it is he
 22 or she has got on his hands. Don't try to write any
 23 guidelines for that policy.

1 MR. PANG: Could I follow-up on your
 2 question?
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: It's your
 4 general area, so...
 5 MR. PANG: Yeah. You know, what this
 6 really has to do is with degree of specificity in service
 7 rules. I mean, it's really interesting because all of
 8 them basically are founded on the principle that any
 9 activity that prejudices good order and discipline is
 10 prohibited, and that's left up to commanders —
 11 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Well, that's Article
 12 134.
 13 MR. PANG: That's right. You know —
 14 GENERAL SULLIVAN: That's what you pay me
 15 for.
 16 MR. PANG: That's exactly right. I mean
 17 —
 18 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Well, not me anymore.
 19 That's what you pay the guy for.
 20 MR. PANG: Yeah. You know, so that's the
 21 Army way of explaining or spelling out its regulation.
 22 The other services have more degrees of specificity with
 23 regard to what types of relationships are prohibited.

1 For example, in I think the other three
 2 services officer-to-enlisted relationships, overfamiliar
 3 relationships — and these are cross-gender
 4 relationships, romantic relationships — are explicitly
 5 prohibited in their regulations. Okay? So the question
 6 is, how much more specificity do you want in your
 7 regulations, or are you willing to accept just a general
 8 rule which is —
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: But I don't
 10 think that always was true. I think, you know, Article
 11 134 was in fact for years all you needed.
 12 MR. PANG: Right.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Until recently.
 14 MR. PANG: Right. So the question is, is
 15 that all you need? Or do you need all these other
 16 specific rules?
 17 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Well, I think 134 is
 18 fine. I would tell you that even though the Army said
 19 what it said, if Colonel So-and-So was squiring some PFC
 20 around — nineteen-year-old, okay? — I can tell you any
 21 commander worth his salt would have said, "Hey, look,
 22 Buddy, let me tell you how things are operating here at
 23 my unit." Okay? And I didn't need anybody from

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1 Washington to tell me how to sort that out.
 2 Okay? That's about where I'm coming from.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Well, that
 4 was my left-field question.
 5 GENERAL SULLIVAN: That's a pretty good
 6 question, though. I guess I'm surprised we got down into
 7 all the, you know, build-me-a-watch. Look, I think they
 8 know, and I wouldn't want — I had enough problems doing
 9 what I had to do in the Army without worrying about any
 10 other service. I don't know how good Marines or the Navy
 11 or the Air Force interpreted those guidelines. It's one
 12 thing to have the policy. How was it actually being
 13 interpreted?
 14 I mean, I've got — My next-door neighbor,
 15 you've got a Marine — a Marine colonel and a Navy
 16 admiral. Been married for years. I don't know what —
 17 How would you sort all of that out?
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Let me hit
 19 you with my right-field question. And this is really —
 20 One of the things as we've gone out to training — to all
 21 the basic training installations and visits to Jackson,
 22 visits to Benning and whatever, all have really come on
 23 with increased physical fitness, defining events, et

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1 cetera, et cetera, all — you know, there's some very
 2 positive things.
 3 And this is an opinion question. It seems
 4 to me — and I'm really kind of asking your opinion —
 5 that the decision has been made that a soldier is a
 6 soldier from day one when they came in, and I just wonder
 7 what your opinion might be on earning the title "soldier"
 8 through successful completion of basic.
 9 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yeah, that's — Yeah.
 10 If you go to — That's a great — Look, if you go down to
 11 Fort Lee, go talk to Jimmy Wright. He commands the
 12 quartermaster — He's the quartermaster guy. What you're
 13 going to be impressed with there is that that's really
 14 what he's doing. Okay? And you've got some of them who
 15 are. I don't have any problem. That's why, you earn it.
 16 I'm making the presumption that the 85
 17 percent or 95 percent — When I talk about "soldier from
 18 day one," I'm talking about the ones who graduate. Okay?
 19 It's a rite of passage to graduate. And I think the
 20 Marine Corps does it very well. And my own — as I said,
 21 my own son is a command chief. Hell, he went through
 22 initial entry training in the Navy in '86 and it was a
 23 rite of passage.

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1 So, you know, I don't have any — It's my
 2 opinion — In my opinion, that's the right way to do it.
 3 It's interesting. One of the rites of
 4 passage down there is he takes you to the museum and
 5 there's a flag in there that the 10th Quartermaster —
 6 It's in a frame. It's the flag that was at Corregidor.
 7 When the Japanese took Corregidor, an Army nurse said to
 8 the commanding officer of the battalion, "Give it to me.
 9 I'll keep it." She took it into captivity with her for
 10 three and a half years.
 11 When she was released by the Japanese, she
 12 found the senior member of that battalion still living
 13 and gave him the flag. So I said to myself, "I can't
 14 believe this. Here's an Army nurse who's captured.
 15 Three and a half years in captivity, and gives it back to
 16 him."
 17 That's part of the rite of passage, okay?
 18 — and that's what you're getting at. And, of course,
 19 the Rangers — I mean, that's — Okay. So I agree.
 20 Enough said. Good stuff.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. General, among the
 23 many things we're asked to look at under our statute is

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1 basic training generally. And I think that a lot of the
 2 discussion concerning basic training today centers on
 3 whether it's rigorous enough, whether it's meeting the
 4 demands of the services.
 5 I'd like to hear from you your opinion as
 6 to whether in the Army and in the other services, if you
 7 can talk to it, basic training gets too little, too much,
 8 or just about enough attention, and what can we
 9 legitimately and practically ask of the basic training
 10 process?
 11 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Oh, I think
 12 legitimately you can ask that — I'll go to the last part
 13 of that first. I think you can legitimately ask that a
 14 young person is generally aware of what it means to be a
 15 soldier, sailor, airman or Marine; is proud of their
 16 service; can do some initial entry skills, whatever the
 17 service may have designated as those skills; can perform
 18 those to standard; and that they are aware of the
 19 behavioral norms of the organization and what is
 20 acceptable and what is not.
 21 Now, remember, however long it is, it's a
 22 relatively short period of time, so that has to all be
 23 reinforced, but you are giving to the commanders in the

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1 field a person who has successfully met the gates, and I
 2 think that — General Christmas' point — that he or she
 3 has earned the — earned the right to be called a
 4 soldier, sailor, airman and Marine, in the United States
 5 military.
 6 Now, I certainly think since Aberdeen
 7 you've got a heck of a lot of energy being devoted to the
 8 subject in the Army. I'm all over the Army now. Next
 9 week I've off the Korea. Today I'm going to El Paso. I
 10 mean, I'm all over the Army. I can tell you, this topic
 11 — if it's not number one — Number one is retirement,
 12 health benefits and stuff like that. Certainly in the
 13 top five is initial entry training.
 14 So there's lots of energy being devoted to
 15 it.
 16 I don't know in the other services. I
 17 think the Marines are comfortable with where they are. I
 18 really don't know about the Air Force and the Navy to
 19 comment.
 20 But yeah, there's a lot of energy going.
 21 I know the Chief of Staff of the Army has added a week to
 22 it. You've got a three-star now in charge — We had one
 23 and then we pulled — we did away with that position. It

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1 was actually done — I don't know when it was done. It
 2 was done back in the early eighties, before I arrived.
 3 So yeah, there's a lot of energy being
 4 devoted to it.
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, do you think it's
 6 appropriate to —
 7 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yeah.
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Or, you know, would it be
 9 a good thing for this Commission to say to everybody,
 10 "Kick back a little bit. There's more —"
 11 GENERAL SULLIVAN: No, no.
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: "— to the service than
 13 just —"
 14 GENERAL SULLIVAN: No.
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: "— IET"?
 16 GENERAL SULLIVAN: No. I think IET is
 17 critical.
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.
 19 GENERAL SULLIVAN: And it's certainly
 20 critical today when — Charlie and I were talking about
 21 it. There was an OP-ED piece written about movies — it
 22 was in USA TODAY — on how movies portray military
 23 officers. And the writer commented that because very few

1 people serve, it's okay to characterize a military
 2 officer as a dufus because the people out there really
 3 don't know what truth is, so there's no reaction from the
 4 public; it's acceptable to portray military officers in
 5 an unflattering light. That is unacceptable. That's not
 6 acceptable behavior and we all know that.
 7 Well, these young people are coming to us
 8 from an environment like that where there are no positive
 9 role models. And I think emphasis on initial entry
 10 training is appropriate because you're taking these
 11 people off the streets of Quincy, Massachusetts,
 12 Cincinnati, on and on and on, and you're trying to make
 13 them success-oriented — you know they're drug-free when
 14 you get them, or at least you presume they are. Let's
 15 just make the — stipulate that they're drug-free — and
 16 they're high school graduates for the most part, and
 17 you've got somebody to work with. Some don't work out
 18 and you release them.
 19 But I guess what you really can do now is
 20 reinforce — Look, this is an important aspect of
 21 America, this initial entry training, and you've got —
 22 you know, it's got to be emphasized, and I don't have any
 23 problem with that.

1 As I said, look, I just didn't — I've
 2 gone back in my mind and looked at it. I would venture
 3 to say in the four years I was the chief, all told, I
 4 spent a little bit over a month in days physically in a
 5 training center — Fort Benning, Fort Sill, Fort Knox —
 6 actually out on the ranges and so forth.
 7 Well, you know, what do you mean, "a
 8 little bit over a month?" I don't know as I could total
 9 it up, but somewhere around thirty-five, forty days.
 10 Well, you know, that may not seem like a
 11 lot, but even then it is a lot. I'll bet General Reimer
 12 has spent more than that, and maybe I should have spent
 13 more. But I've already told you how I feel about
 14 execution, so that — But I know General Hartzog did and
 15 I'm sure General Abrahms is.
 16 MR. PANG: Well, I just want to thank you
 17 again, sir, for joining us. I think your comments are
 18 going to be very, very helpful to us.
 19 I don't have any other questions to raise
 20 with you. I pass to Mady.
 21 DR. SEGAL: I have some.
 22 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Okay.
 23 DR. SEGAL: Big surprise, right?

1 General Sullivan, what do you think would
 2 be the effects on the Army and its ability to accomplish
 3 its multiple missions if Congress at this point were to
 4 mandate segregated — gender-segregated training?
 5 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Oh, I would recommend
 6 that we not walk the cat back. I don't see how — I
 7 wouldn't walk the cat back. I just wouldn't do it.
 8 DR. SEGAL: Do you think it would —
 9 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I can't quantify it.
 10 It's like General Christmas asked me an opinion. He's
 11 asked me opinion questions. I mean, I'm giving you my
 12 opinion. My opinion is that I would not walk the cat
 13 back.
 14 I think it's a bad signal. I think it
 15 would be a bad signal. It would say you're different;
 16 you're different; you're enough different — you're so
 17 much different that we can't do this.
 18 DR. SEGAL: Say that to women?
 19 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yeah.
 20 DR. SEGAL: Okay.
 21 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Right. I mean,
 22 somebody like me is going to have to walk out there and
 23 tell them. Like me, General Reimer or his replacement is

1 going to have to go out and say, "Well, not so fast here,
 2 ladies." You know.
 3 Yeah, that's my opinion.
 4 MS. POPE: I guess — to follow-on, Mady
 5 — is what does it say to the men when you expect them to
 6 serve side-by-side after you say that.
 7 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Well, it's — yeah,
 8 right. And I think it says the same thing.
 9 DR. SEGAL: You said that perhaps more
 10 attention should be paid to initial entry training. One
 11 of the issues that we've been dealing with is what's the
 12 impact on careers of —
 13 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Well, I didn't say —
 14 DR. SEGAL: — of those people that —
 15 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Myself, I might have
 16 paid more attention to it. I think it needs to be
 17 highlighted as an important aspect. The Chief is at it a
 18 week. I think General Reimer probably spends more time
 19 in it than I did. I think that's appropriate.
 20 DR. SEGAL: In terms of assignment of both
 21 drill instructors and officers to the initial entry
 22 training, is it your sense that being a commander, for
 23 example, at the training base, is as good for an

1 officer's career as being a commander in a field
 2 operation in the Army? And what do you think it ought to
 3 be?
 4 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Look, you know what the
 5 facts are as well as I do. Okay? The facts are, with
 6 the minor exceptions of Carl Steiner — There's some
 7 notable exceptions. Carl Steiner, for one — you're not
 8 going to find many senior Army generals who have
 9 commanded in the training base. That's a fact. I think
 10 you've got more now than you did. The Army values
 11 command of combat units. I can't speak for the other
 12 services.
 13 So when — John Frost would lean on me a
 14 lot about this, and Freddie did, too. The problem is the
 15 Chief doesn't control the selection. It's a board of
 16 officers. It's like you. And the files come in here and
 17 you take a look at the files.
 18 Look, these are real people and you take a
 19 look at the files. You've got a guy who commands the
 20 16th Infantry in the 1st Infantry Division and people
 21 say, "Okay, so I've got this guy in command of the 16th
 22 Infantry, in the big red one. They fought in the Gulf
 23 War. And then I've got this person over here..."

1 Now, what would the Chief — The Chief
 2 would like certainly what I would like. You've got —
 3 Take down here at the thing called the Soldier and Family
 4 Support Center, a guy named Craig Weldon. Craig Weldon
 5 is the first — one of the first generals who was a
 6 garrison commander. He did not command a brigade. He
 7 was a garrison commander. You're starting to change
 8 perceptions.
 9 Although, Mady, don't kid yourself. There
 10 are people out there who, when they hear what I just
 11 said, will write articles in The Washington Post and The
 12 Wall Street Journal about the warrior ethos. This is
 13 serious stuff you're into here now. Okay? Serious
 14 stuff. And whether some of these guys — Some of these
 15 — I don't want to go into all — You didn't ask me. I'm
 16 not going to go down that rat hole. But this is serious
 17 business.
 18 DR. SEGAL: Okay. One other question, if
 19 I might. We are going to be hearing from someone later
 20 who has given us some written information that — where
 21 he says that the fact that ROTC training is gender-
 22 integrated has resulted in inferior physical performance
 23 and that that has a detriment to readiness. Do you have

1 a comment about that?
 2 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I don't have any
 3 comment about that. That's clearly his opinion or her
 4 opinion, or whatever. I don't think it has any validity.
 5 What does he mean — You know, readiness? I don't know
 6 what he's talking about.
 7 Readiness? I just don't know what he's
 8 talking about. Readiness of what?
 9 DR. SEGAL: Well, he says to be able to
 10 perform the tasks in a real field situation would be —
 11 GENERAL SULLIVAN: What does he mean by
 12 "real field situation"? Like what? Driving a truck?
 13 Flying a helicopter? What's he talking about?
 14 DR. MOSKOS: We'll ask him.
 15 DR. SEGAL: Well, thank you. We'll ask
 16 him.
 17 GENERAL SULLIVAN: I don't know. Ask him
 18 what he's — I don't know what he's talking about, okay?
 19 Because I happen to know that the thirteenth-ranked woman
 20 in the world in triathlons was a West Point graduate.
 21 Now, she isn't the thirteenth-ranked now
 22 because she — you know, because she's getting older, but
 23 she was at one point. Hell, I don't think I could be

1 thirteenth.
 2 I just don't know what the guy is talking
 3 about.
 4 DR. SEGAL: Okay. Thank you.
 5 MS. POPE: General Sullivan, I have one
 6 question and it's an opinion question, and it's — You
 7 mentioned the effect of drill sergeants. And as we've
 8 been out looking — and this is my personal opinion,
 9 Barbara Pope — is that the single critical element
 10 across the services has been the caliber —
 11 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Right.
 12 MS. POPE: — of that drill sergeant.
 13 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Right.
 14 MS. POPE: Regardless of what's above that
 15 individual, he or she —
 16 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Right.
 17 MS. POPE: — in their commitment to the
 18 soldierization process.
 19 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Right.
 20 MS. POPE: I guess I'd just like a comment
 21 back from you on whether I'm off target, whether I'm
 22 seeing something different —
 23 GENERAL SULLIVAN: No, you're not off

1 target. I was asked the other day what the most — I am
 2 an ROTC graduate, as I've said, and I had in my — I
 3 graduated from Norwich in 1959. The noncommissioned
 4 officers there were World War II men. They probably had
 5 more impact on me than anybody, as did my noncommissioned
 6 — the noncommissioned officers.
 7 When I went to summer camp, it was at Fort
 8 Knox in 1958, and most of the instructors were
 9 noncommissioned officers, World War II-Korean War people.
 10 And looking back on it, I think one reason I really
 11 stayed in the Army — because as a lieutenant, you're
 12 really with noncommissioned officers and soldiers.
 13 You're not with lots of officers — it was the NCO's. It
 14 was the NCO's.
 15 And I think General Reimer's — he's got
 16 it. You know, he's — "Yeah, you may be a volunteer to
 17 be a drill sergeant, but we're going to take a look at
 18 you to make sure that we want you to be a drill sergeant
 19 because this is critical."
 20 It's like West Point, the tac. Hell, if
 21 you have a West Point graduate anywhere, you can ask him
 22 who's the most important person; it was their tac, some
 23 captain.

1 Yeah, the drill sergeant's key.
 2 MS. POPE: Thank you.
 3 GENERAL SULLIVAN: And at Aberdeen — You
 4 don't need me to say this, but at Aberdeen that was the
 5 issue. There were a couple more, but that was the issue.
 6 MS. POPE: Okay. Thank you.
 7 MR. MOORE: General, please forgive me, I
 8 would like to go down that rat hole.
 9 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Which one?
 10 MR. MOORE: That you didn't want to go
 11 down.
 12 Well, this idea of a whole military
 13 culture, warrior ethos, is a serious thing and I concur
 14 with you that we need to take it seriously. One thing I
 15 have observed — and I think some of my colleagues would
 16 concur — in our many visits to training bases and posts
 17 in the Army in particular, we almost seem to be creating
 18 a dual Army.
 19 You've got an integrated Army where the
 20 military culture clearly has had to change to encompass
 21 what is essentially a revolutionary social change in at
 22 least that part of the Army. On the other hand, you
 23 still have your combat Army. Your training post at Fort

1 Benning exemplifies sort of the traditional warrior
 2 ethos, but we've had to create a new ethos at integrated
 3 training posts.
 4 I wonder if you have any concern that
 5 somehow in this process we're going to lose those key
 6 elements of the military culture that are essential for
 7 success in the organization.
 8 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Not necessarily. I
 9 mean, the Soldier of the Year at Fort Benning was a
 10 specialist parachute rigger who is now a black cat at the
 11 M-1 school at Fort Benning. And if she weighs 130 pounds
 12 — And I can tell you, she's tough as nails and she's
 13 respected. There's no more, you know, warrior ethos kind
 14 of crowd than that crowd out there at jump school. The
 15 Rangers, probably.
 16 What bothers me is that I read these
 17 articles by guys about the warrior ethos — okay? — most
 18 of whom I know. And this guy in particular who wrote the
 19 article in The Wall Street Journal commanded in Berlin
 20 during the Cold War. One of the battalions he commanded
 21 was the 18th Infantry — a couple of battalions of the
 22 18th Infantry.
 23 The 18th Infantry is now in Macedonia.

1 And when he wrote that article, the lieutenant colonel
 2 commanding the 18th Infantry had men and women in his
 3 unit because it was a task force, and he was interviewed
 4 along with a sergeant and a lieutenant. And one of them
 5 said, "Yeah. Well, we'll torch our camps and we'll fight
 6 our way out or we'll get reinforcements," because at this
 7 time there were problems in Krusevo.
 8 So I said to myself as I was sitting
 9 there, "Okay, so this is the same 18th Infantry that was
 10 in Berlin, right? This is the same 18th Infantry who was
 11 in the wheatfield at Gettysburg, fought in the
 12 Philippines, fought in World War II, Korea, Vietnam?
 13 Same 18th Infantry." And I've got this guy telling me
 14 they're not warriors? Get a grip. Get a grip. Are
 15 these guys and gals in Macedonia any less of a warrior
 16 than they were in Berlin? Of course not.
 17 This is America. This is America.
 18 Soldiers, Marines, sailors, airmen, do what they are told
 19 by the American people. Warriors? I don't get it,
 20 folks. I don't get it. There are various opinions on
 21 how you get them to the passage point to be called
 22 Marines or soldiers, yes, admittedly, but, hell, you've
 23 got to get them out there and don't get all tied up in

1 the semantics of it.
 2 That's all I — Do I have strong feelings
 3 about it? Yes, I do have strong feelings about it. Let
 4 me tell you what I wanted to do with that guy. I wanted
 5 to put him on an airplane and send him to Skopje and say,
 6 "Okay, you go tell those kids they're not warriors. You
 7 go tell them because I'm not."
 8 MR. MOORE: Thank you. That's all I have.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: No, I don't have
 10 any questions, sir. But I think the fact that you talked
 11 earlier when you were emphasizing the role of the
 12 commander and all that that entails, that's really the
 13 key in my opinion to 90 percent of these problems.
 14 GENERAL SULLIVAN: You've got it. You've
 15 got it. Look, I don't want to go into Aberdeen or any of
 16 that other stuff. Look, we all know what we're talking
 17 about here. It's somebody saying, "Now, look here,
 18 Barbara, I am flat fed-up with this kind of stuff —
 19 okay? — and we're not going to tolerate it. Next
 20 subject."
 21 This is — You know the movie, "An Officer
 22 and a Gentleman"? There's a lot wrong with that movie,
 23 but one of the things that stuck in my brain was Lou

1 Gossett jerks up our hero, Richard Geer, and he says to
 2 him, "Now, look here, son. Around here we're not talking
 3 about flying airplanes. We're talking about character."
 4 There it is. How do you define character?
 5 We all know what it is. And we're talking about men and
 6 women who treat each other with dignity and respect,
 7 who'll take the fight to the enemy. And if they won't,
 8 get rid of them. And some of them can be gotten rid of
 9 in initial entry training.
 10 And I like where General Christmas was
 11 going and I like what Jimmy Wright and some of the other
 12 people are doing. It's a rite of passage. "You are now
 13 a soldier," capital "S." A Marine, capital "M." An
 14 airman, woman, whatever. Coast Guardsman.
 15 Sometimes I think people forget about the
 16 Coast Guard. There's probably some kid jumping out of a
 17 helicopter fifty miles off the coast of Massachusetts,
 18 rescuing some turkey who shouldn't be there in the first
 19 place, today. Are they warriors? Sounds like a warrior
 20 to me.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you. I have no
 22 questions.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I have none

1 either, sir. Thank you.
 2 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Okay, folks. Thanks
 3 for what you're doing. And I think you're doing the
 4 right thing. I don't know how — you know, who knows how
 5 your work is —
 6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We'll invite you to the
 7 coin flipping and have you —
 8 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Yeah, lots of luck.
 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much,
 10 General. This is very helpful.
 11 GENERAL SULLIVAN: Okay. Thanks.
 12 (A brief recess was taken.)
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We'll go back on the
 14 record now. And we have to talk to us today Dr. William
 15 Gregor, who is currently the Associate Professor of
 16 Social Science at the School of Advanced Military
 17 Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
 18 And I understand Dr. Gregor is speaking in his personal
 19 capacity today and is here to talk to us about physical
 20 standards.
 21 We thank you very much, Dr. Gregor, for
 22 coming, and please begin.
 23 DR. GREGOR: Well, thank you, Madam

1 Chairman and ladies and gentlemen. I'm pleased and
 2 honored to have the opportunity to present this evidence
 3 with respect to the issue of training and basic training.
 4 First, I must repeat what you've already
 5 stated — that these are my views and are not the views
 6 of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army,
 7 the United States Army Command and General Staff College
 8 or the School of Advanced Military Studies.
 9 The issue that I presented in my written
 10 testimony refers to first specifying the purpose of basic
 11 training, and I have specified that to me, basic training
 12 must fit into the system of mobilization and replacement.
 13 And by that, I mean these individuals are recruited to
 14 fill positions within the force and the purpose of basic
 15 training is to prepare them for the type of training
 16 they'll receive next, and, finally, their replacement.
 17 And as I said in that paper, I see three
 18 purposes for basic training when we're referring to
 19 training that's designed for those that are going to be
 20 combat support or combat service support arms. The first
 21 of which I alluded to was that men are always seen as
 22 general service replacements.
 23 That is, the standards set for them should

1 enable them upon completion of basic training to be
 2 classified into any occupational specialty that the
 3 service might need. That means from the start that the
 4 assumption is that men in basic training are going to be
 5 prepared for the very heavy occupational specialties.
 6 Now, that doesn't mean that they all have
 7 enlisted for that purpose, but historically we have had
 8 basic-trainees and, in periods of mobilization, trainees
 9 classified after completing basic training. At that
 10 time, of course, with the smaller role of women in the
 11 service, it was basic combat training. So that there's
 12 an assumption at least in the structure and the physical
 13 standards that are set for both entrance and completion,
 14 that the man is going to go to the very heavy
 15 occupational specialties, whether he is going to or not.
 16 Secondly, we have now a population of
 17 women who have been designated to go into very heavy
 18 physical occupational specialties for which they must be
 19 prepared to enter that training.
 20 And lastly, we have the other occupational
 21 specialties for which individuals will be further
 22 trained. In this regard, I always get involved in
 23 discussing Army physical fitness data because it is the

1 only data that allows us to reasonably compare
 2 populations of training people. And I briefly stated in
 3 my paper that there is some very good evidence of a
 4 correlation on the two-mile run with aerobic fitness,
 5 which is related to stamina and duty performance, and
 6 there's a lesser relationship in the literature as to the
 7 importance of the push-ups.
 8 But I don't want to get involved in
 9 justifying the Army's current physical fitness test.
 10 What I want to allude to is the fact that since 1976,
 11 study after study, commission after commission, and acts
 12 of Congress have required the services to design physical
 13 tests related to performance of duties.
 14 1976, GAO report, FPCD 76-26, "Job
 15 Opportunities for Women in the Military," recommended
 16 that each service develop physical standards for its jobs
 17 and standards for measuring strength, stamina and other
 18 requirements.
 19 1978, "Final Report of Evaluation of Women
 20 in the Army": "Current lack of established performance
 21 standards, invalidated critical tasks and the absence of
 22 a system for measuring potential against standards,
 23 precludes reliable determination of physical capacities

1 for soldiers of either sex.”
 2 Recommendation from that study: “Establish
 3 specific strength requirements for each MOS, develop
 4 tests that would be administered at the Armed Forces
 5 Examination Station to determine the strength of
 6 potential enlistees, and the Army must include in MOS
 7 training and skill qualification tests, tests of physical
 8 capabilities to perform critical tasks for the MOS and
 9 skill.”
 10 November 1982: Women in the Army Police
 11 Review created the military enlistment physical strength
 12 capacity test, which I’ll allude to in its provisions
 13 because it relates to the APFT or the — “The scores of
 14 that test to be administered at the examination station
 15 will provide a predictive level of physical work capacity
 16 by the end of basic training and advanced individual
 17 training. The goal,” as stated then, “was to improve
 18 Army combat readiness as soldiers will do better at jobs
 19 for which they have the requisite capacity.”
 20 The 1992 Presidential Commission on the
 21 Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces issued a
 22 unanimous finding that there should be established for
 23 all occupational specialties that were open to women

1 gender-neutral performance standards. And Congress, in
 2 1994, in its appropriations bill — and I believe it was
 3 Section 854 — directed the services to set such
 4 standards.
 5 I’m going to discuss the physical
 6 performance of heavy occupational specialties, but we
 7 have had twenty-two years and the work of the Army
 8 Fitness Center — and prior to that, the Master Fitness
 9 Center — and we have had the work of Natick Laboratories
 10 and other Army Research Institutes’.
 11 If the — My position here is if the APFT
 12 is not related to physical performance and the capacity
 13 to do a job, then we’ve invested an awful lot of research
 14 time in designing a test that doesn’t tell us what we
 15 need to know before we pass a soldier on to the next
 16 level of training.
 17 So what’s the relevance of the APFT in
 18 what I have to say today? My data dealt with ROTC
 19 cadets. This is a population of men and women destined
 20 for military service that is better than the Army at
 21 large. It is demonstrably better in aerobic fitness,
 22 arguably better in strength, clearly better than the Army
 23 at large, and way better than anything that you’ll see in

1 entry level training in basic training; partly because
 2 part of the population’s older, partly because they have
 3 a lot longer time to train before they actually take the
 4 test in advanced camp.
 5 And so what it does is it gives you a
 6 measure of what’s possible in the population. And that’s
 7 important because the 1998 fitness standards, which are
 8 now, I guess, going to be the 1999 fitness standards, are
 9 based upon a survey by the Army Fitness Center that
 10 determined what the performance was of the relevant
 11 populations by age group and by sex. And so if you
 12 compare my cadet populations with those standards, not
 13 the ’87 standards, you get an idea of how much better my
 14 population is than you find in the Army in general.
 15 And as I cited in the paper, whereas 10
 16 percent of the Army population might be expected to
 17 exceed the 1999 standard for the two-mile run, 30 percent
 18 of the cadet population exceeds that. And the graphs
 19 that I display in the report show the very large
 20 difference in the population potential of males and
 21 females when compared to each other.
 22 Now, that has an important implication for
 23 training because if we mean by training that you overload

1 the individual to 50 to 80 percent of their capacity for
 2 the period of training, and you have two very diverse
 3 populations, you cannot in a group properly load the
 4 trainees.
 5 So if you look at basic training, fitness
 6 training is done by breaking down into individual ability
 7 groups, but all the other activities in that short period
 8 ought to contribute to overall physical training. So
 9 when you start getting into issues like road marches with
 10 rucksacks in order to do additional aerobic and strength
 11 load-carrying training, you get into issues as to what
 12 the load should be for the population and how you should
 13 compose the group if men and women are together.
 14 Now, the studies that I referenced in the
 15 back as well as in my own statements mention that in
 16 basic training, since you’re bringing in a novice
 17 population, you have to be careful. You have to limit
 18 your number of training injuries while, at the same time,
 19 you’re loading a population in a limited amount of time.
 20 You cannot, in the space allotted, place the maximum load
 21 on the male trainee to improve his performance and assign
 22 the same load to the female trainee in the same
 23 formation.

1 Similarly, you cannot configure that
 2 formation to march at the same rate that you would if it
 3 was male-only, because one of the things that you have is
 4 the consideration of orthopaedic injuries, which tells
 5 you from previous studies that you must place the
 6 smallest people up front. And by stature, 95 percent of
 7 all the women in the Army are five-feet and smaller, and
 8 the mean male is five-nine.
 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Five feet?
 10 MS. POPE: Five feet?
 11 DR. GREGOR: Five feet tall.
 12 DR. SEGAL: Five feet tall?
 13 MS. POPE: Five feet?
 14 DR. GREGOR: Correction.
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Sixty inches.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Correction.
 17 DR. GREGOR: Five feet, nine inches tall.
 18 DR. SEGAL: Oh, okay. And the women?
 19 DR. GREGOR: And the women, five-foot-
 20 eight is the 95th percentile. The mean is five-foot-
 21 four.
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Five-four and five-nine.
 23 DR. GREGOR: The maximum allowable

1 entrance weight for a woman in the United States Army at
 2 five feet, eight inches tall, which is the 95th
 3 percentile, is 154 pounds at entrance, and to be
 4 retained, it’s 150 pounds. And as I cite in my paper, if
 5 you place a male in the same formation who is five-foot-
 6 nine — that’s the mean male — his retention weight is
 7 179 pounds.
 8 So the training standard is that you’re
 9 going to carry a 20-percent — on your first road march
 10 — on your very first road march, you should start out
 11 with 20 percent of your body load.
 12 So that converts, as I said in my paper,
 13 to the male carrying a thirty-five-pound ruck, and the
 14 female would probably carry a thirty-five-pound ruck if
 15 she’s five-foot-eight, even though it’s a little bit over
 16 the 20 percent, which would be a thirty-pound ruck, but
 17 what are you doing with the 100-pound woman that’s in
 18 that formation? You can’t start her with the same load
 19 and not overload her.
 20 Similarly, as I’ve pointed out before, the
 21 five-nine male is the mean. So 50 percent of your male
 22 population is going to be under-loaded through these
 23 activities while most — almost 95 percent of your female

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1 population is going to be overloaded during those
2 activities. So what I'm discussing is the problem of
3 trying to design a training regime where men and women
4 are together, doing the same tasks in the same
5 formations.

6 Now, if we mean by "training together"
7 that we have people training in the same location but
8 doing different tasks, then we can say we're training
9 together. But what it points out to in the data is that
10 you're not getting the maximum amount of training value
11 for the males in the period that you've allotted,
12 although I think the data suggests — but I've got some
13 "I doubts" — the data suggests that some of the women
14 are trained better because they're overloaded in that
15 period.

16 Now, there are a number of studies dealing
17 with improving the load-carrying capacity of women in
18 basic training, and I'm going to refer to the two — I
19 mentioned them in my — just in passing in the paper.

20 The Natick study does not provide enough
21 data about the population — all forty-two — correction,
22 forty-one women — to make any firm conclusions about its
23 implication, except for me to note — and I have the

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1 they enter that advanced individual training, and that
2 seems to me a suggestion that you are not providing the
3 training necessary for the next stage, which is then you
4 are not serving the function of the recruitment and
5 replacement system.

6 Now, I want to allude — and I brought —
7 The issue of body fat and lean mass always arises when
8 referring to PT test scores and I'm going to bring it up.
9 I have some — If the commissioners would like, I have
10 some slides and other data to illuminate the following
11 statement.

12 We have known since the 1982 study that I
13 mentioned, that there is a high correlation to aerobic
14 efficiency to the individual's body fat content. There
15 is a relationship between body fat and aerobic
16 efficiency, both in men and women. Similarly, although
17 body fat is irrelevant to strength, lean mass is directly
18 related to an individual's potential strength.

19 So the one physical difficulty in training
20 women to do heavy occupational specialties is that you
21 must have sufficient lean mass to achieve the strength
22 necessary to do the heavy work, and women, unlike men, do
23 not add muscle mass quickly through training. And I cite

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1 slide here if you'd like to — from the study — that the
2 mean height and weight of the women in that study would
3 not permit them to enlist in the United States Army.

4 And as a consequence — And the body fat
5 percentage of them also exceeds the body fat standard of
6 those who are permitted to enlist in the United States
7 Army.

8 So the study deals with a population of
9 only forty-one, nine of whom attrit, thirty-two who
10 complete, but it does not look like a population of Army
11 enlistees.

12 The second thing about the study which I
13 do allude to in my testimony is that it notes that this
14 additional twenty-four weeks of training was necessary to
15 prepare women for very heavy occupational specialties.
16 It admits that basic training does not prepare women for
17 very heavy occupational specialties.

18 And referring back to my opening comment
19 about the numerous studies about capacities for
20 occupational specialties, eight weeks is insufficient to
21 take a novice woman who has not been classified before
22 she enters basic training and prepare her to go into a
23 heavy occupational specialty.

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1 in the report that in twenty-four weeks of training at
2 Natick, the average muscle mass gain of the women
3 training was .9 kilograms, which was about one pound.

4 What that means is that the individual
5 woman who starts training and the individual man who
6 starts training must have a lean mass of about 110
7 pounds, 50 kilograms, to be trainable. That is, you have
8 to have 50 kilograms of lean mass to have a reasonable
9 potential to achieve the strength necessary to do the
10 heavy occupational specialties.

11 50 kilograms of lean mass, 110 pounds, for
12 an average woman who is 27-percent body fat, is a woman
13 of 154 pounds. And so we go back to my five-foot-eight-
14 inch woman who happens to be the 95th percentile of women
15 in the Army, and only women larger than that have the
16 potential — statistical potential of being trainable to
17 those standards.

18 Now, the charts I have, if you'd like to
19 see, come from the work of Natick and Dr. Vogel, who is
20 now retired, but obviously in any population there's a
21 scattergram and the scattergram shows some variation.
22 It's not an absolute that you have to have 50 kilograms,
23 per se, but you have to be pretty darn close.

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1 In this regard, I'm going to talk about
2 MOS 12C, bridge crew member. It's my favorite, because
3 in the description that's in Army Regulation 611-201,
4 dated 30 April, 1992, of the Occupational Specialty, a
5 12C10 bridge crew member loads, unloads, assembles,
6 disassembles, repairs, and maintains bridges, rafts, and
7 bridge anchoring systems.

8 He also emplaces explosives and
9 demolitions, breaches obstacles for bridge site
10 preparation, installs, arms and disarms mines for bridge
11 site preparation and security, constructs overhead bunker
12 cover and hasty and deliberate shelter and emplacements.

13 It says within the regulation that the
14 physical requirements of the bridge crew member is that
15 the crew member must frequently lift 125 pounds and carry
16 it twenty-five feet, and occasionally lift, push or
17 carry, or pull, eighty-three pounds for fifteen feet.
18 That heavy-lifting capacity is not to be found generally
19 in the female population and not to be trained in eight
20 weeks of basic training.

21 So if there is no effort to classify the
22 strength capacity of women entering heavy occupational
23 specialties, there is essentially no preparation before

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1 It turns out, though, when you look at the
2 scattergrams of males and females, the reason we've never
3 really had to classify it is that just about every male
4 that meets the entrance height-weight standards of the
5 United States Army has that lean muscle potential, so
6 we've not had to worry about it.

7 The fact is, though, that 95 percent — at
8 least from the anatomical data on the United States Army,
9 95 percent of the women are not — do not have the
10 physical potential to occupy those specialties, and we
11 know that eight weeks of basic training is insufficient
12 to produce that strength.

13 So the question is, if you're going to get
14 more out of the training, you're going to have to design
15 the training to meet the needs of that particular
16 population. Those needs are different from the needs of
17 the male population in basic training.

18 The data that I have presented on ROTC
19 cadets, I have brought in to show that 25,500-some-odd
20 machine-readable records — 27,800 records — that you
21 have a well-defined range of potential for men and women
22 which shows relatively little overlap between men and
23 women; which shows that if you're going to achieve the

1 potential in the male population, at some point in that
 2 training process you're going to have to separate the
 3 male population from the female population if you're
 4 going to train them well.
 5 So in conclusion, if we are about training
 6 men and women to have the capacity to serve as
 7 replacements — that is, men to be general service
 8 replacements; some women to occupy very heavy
 9 occupational specialties — men and women cannot be
 10 lumped together during basic training for physical
 11 training events. It's the physics of the problem.
 12 Are there any questions?
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I don't know if I got to
 14 review with you before, but what we have been doing is
 15 just kind of going around the table. The questions may
 16 be a little bit random, but we just keep going until we
 17 have finished. And I want to thank you for taking the
 18 time to prepare the materials for us and everything, and
 19 give us your thoughts.
 20 I'm curious to know how the — if you
 21 know, how the ROTC population that you've described in
 22 your charts here compares with the population in general.
 23 DR. GREGOR: Oh, sure. And I can show

1 that. That's why I brought the slides.
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.
 3 DR. GREGOR: This slide is in your
 4 testimony —
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And, also, if you have
 6 such information, how it would compare with the
 7 population that is able to enlist.
 8 DR. GREGOR: Certainly.
 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.
 10 DR. GREGOR: This is the two-mile run
 11 score here (Indicating).
 12 MS. POPE: One's pink and one's white.
 13 And the pink is —
 14 DR. GREGOR: The pink are the female
 15 population and the white or the yellow is the male
 16 population.
 17 DR. SEGAL: And those are numbers, not
 18 percentages, on your vertical axis?
 19 DR. GREGOR: The vertical axis is —
 20 DR. SEGAL: Numbers.
 21 DR. GREGOR: — number of cadets.
 22 Now, fortunately they did the '95 physical
 23 fitness studies to revamp the PT score.

1 Now, even though I have quarrels with the
 2 new table, the nice thing about the new table is that
 3 when you have the minimum score on the 1999 table, that
 4 says 8 percent of the Army population is below that. And
 5 when you have the maximum score, only 10 percent is above
 6 that. Okay?
 7 So the women in the total Army population
 8 have a maximum score of 15.56, which is right here
 9 (Indicating). Only 10 percent of the women are above
 10 that line. They have a minimum score of 18.54.
 11 Actually, it's almost — correction — 18.54. Nineteen
 12 minutes. So the Army population of women is roughly in
 13 this area here (Indicating).
 14 The male minimum score is 15.54, which
 15 corresponds almost with the female maximum score. So
 16 only 8 percent of the males in the Army at large are in
 17 this area (Indicating). And although the Army maximum
 18 score has been moved to thirteen minutes, which is up
 19 here (Indicating), you can see that the cadet population
 20 is much better.
 21 So the curves are shifted — in this case,
 22 because it's actual run scores. The curves are shifted
 23 somewhat more to the lower times, but there is no —

1 there's hardly any overlap between the two populations.
 2 Now, if you'll look at the — During the
 3 development of the new fitness test, the went back to
 4 Fort Jackson in 1996 and did a study, and 58 percent of
 5 the women were unable to achieve the minimum score on the
 6 female test of sixty. So only 42 percent of the basic
 7 trainees — only 42 percent of the basic trainees —
 8 DR. SEGAL: Is that on entry?
 9 DR. GREGOR: At the exit week. Only 42
 10 percent of the basic trainees are above this line
 11 (Indicating).
 12 DR. SEGAL: Which line?
 13 DR. GREGOR: Down here (Indicating).
 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And just for the written
 15 record, that line reflects the minimum Army standard for
 16 people in the Army —
 17 DR. GREGOR: Correct.
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — for female —
 19 DR. GREGOR: For females in the Army.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: The female standard.
 21 Okay.
 22 DR. GREGOR: So they're down in this —
 23 The basic trainee population is in this area

1 (Indicating).
 2 In contrast, though — And I've got to
 3 make sure because Benny would get on me.
 4 56 percent of the women did not achieve a
 5 sixty. 38 percent of the men did not achieve a sixty.
 6 That means that 62 percent of the men are above the male
 7 minimum, which is right here (Indicating).
 8 So most of the males are above this line;
 9 some of them are below, but they don't go up to — they
 10 don't make it to thirteen. So in other words, they get
 11 clumped in right in here (Indicating); the women get
 12 clumped in down here (Indicating).
 13 And I think the importance of aerobic
 14 efficiency is that when you convert that — and the slide
 15 — I've also done that for you in the testimony packet.
 16 When you convert this to actual aerobic capacity, you
 17 have the same phenomena, and there you have an absolute
 18 measure of what their aerobic capacity is rather —
 19 Because there is a difference. A woman and a man who run
 20 a two-mile run in the same time do not have the same
 21 aerobic efficiency.
 22 So in my cadet population, about 19
 23 percent of the women can achieve the male minimum. In

1 the Army population, we have fewer than 10 percent.
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Fred, do you want to...
 3 MR. PANG: Yeah. You know, I just want to
 4 go back to, you know, the premise that you stated, which
 5 I agree with — you know, that — because men are general
 6 replacements in the Army. And I think men are general
 7 replacements in the Marine Corps as well, and that's by
 8 policy, you know, because the combat arms are closed,
 9 obviously, to women. Women, on the other hand, must be
 10 general replacements I believe in the Navy and the Air
 11 Force because relatively small segments of their
 12 populations are closed to women.
 13 So I just wanted to make sure that was on
 14 the record, you know, so — And I think the other thing I
 15 wanted to get on the record is the fact that, you know,
 16 when you talk about physical training — And I think
 17 physical training is important. And when we heard
 18 testimony from previous witnesses, I mean, you know, the
 19 argument was that the PFT's — okay? — are all aimed at
 20 bringing people up to a general level of health and
 21 fitness so that they can move on into specialized
 22 training.
 23 If you're going to be a warehouseman,

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1 you're going to go to AIT. If you're going to be a
2 supply person or a mechanic where, you know, you're going
3 to have to deal with heavy loads and stuff like that,
4 then presumably you will be exposed to that — and I
5 think you are — in follow-on training.

6 So that, you know, people who are going
7 into these fields, I mean, you have to assume that they
8 have some understanding about what it is they're going to
9 be involved in. If they're not physically capable or
10 don't think they have the physical strength to do it,
11 that they wouldn't go to those fields.

12 So I think what we need to do is probably
13 go back as a commission and look at the populations —
14 okay? — in these fields where there is a huge demand on
15 upper body strength and lifting and the like to see
16 whether or not there are huge numbers of women in those
17 populations. My guess is there won't be —

18 DR. MOSKOS: Too many.

19 MR. PANG: — very many in those fields.

20 The other point that I think I wanted to
21 make was the fact that, you know, in basic training, I
22 mean, we're not — basic training's not only physical
23 activity. I mean, it involves a whole series of other

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1 that minimum.

2 In other words, what they're doing is
3 they're — You have to cross this hurdle — okay? — and
4 I've crossed that hurdle. I've made it through. So if
5 there's a failure, you know, in the — you know, failure
6 rate of 32 percent or whatever the figure is, I mean,
7 that's not because of basic training I failed. I mean,
8 it's the training that followed on after that that's
9 failed, because I don't think the standard changes any.

10 DR. GREGOR: Well, it's very difficult for
11 me when you're dealing with heavy occupational
12 specialties to understand how anyone can perform the
13 tasks that one is training to in advanced individual
14 training if you are unable to meet that standard.

15 MR. PANG: Yeah. But, you know —

16 DR. GREGOR: In other words, if you're
17 tasked in —

18 MR. PANG: No, I understand what you're
19 saying. I mean, you know, I understand there's a huge
20 range — okay? — of activity out there in the Army that
21 ranges all the way from relatively light work, you know,
22 with very little physical demand, to very heavy work, I
23 mean, and I think the Army understands that.

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1 things. Okay? When we look at the syllabus, I mean, I
2 was struck by the fact that huge blocks of time really
3 are set aside for other types of training that build unit
4 cohesion, values, and, you know, those kinds of things.
5 Socialization into the military. So, you know, I was
6 struck by that.

7 I think the other thing is, you know, when
8 you were talking about the bridge crew member, I just was
9 wondering to myself. I mean, I wonder how many bridge
10 crew members are women in the Army.

11 DR. GREGOR: Well, right now, I believe
12 there are twenty-nine women who are classified as bridge
13 crew members.

14 MR. PANG: Yeah. I would assume that if
15 they — for their doing that job, they must be capable of
16 doing it. I don't know. Okay? I mean, twenty-nine out
17 of the whole United States Army, that seems like a small
18 number.

19 DR. GREGOR: Well, I wouldn't make that
20 assumption. The survey done by the Fitness Center — or
21 I call it the — They keep changing the name. It's the
22 Army Fitness School now at Fort Benning. They've
23 established the new PT test standards — showed that 37

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1 I mean, you have OSUT, you know, for the
2 combat arms because the combat arms really involve very
3 heavy demands physically, so there's a separate training
4 regimen for men. They're separated from women in the —

5 DR. GREGOR: Which is the curiosity about
6 basic training, because basic training has the range of
7 goals of going from the general service replacement and
8 the heavy occupational specialty for women and a standard
9 light duty replacement, and it's all lumped into one
10 training period.

11 MR. PANG: Well, what you're saying is
12 that you don't agree with — See, the premise that we've
13 been educated on, you know, by witnesses thus far, the
14 premise is that all they're doing in basic training is
15 getting you, you know, to a general level of fitness and
16 health so that you can succeed in the Army, I mean, is
17 what we were told.

18 I mean, you know, there's very little
19 linkage from the testimony I've heard with regard to that
20 and the duties that you're going to be expected to
21 perform in whatever field you choose. You know, the
22 presumption is that you will get training — if I'm going
23 to be a mechanic, a track mechanic, you know, I'm going

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1 percent of — let me make sure I get it right or they'll
2 kill me — showed that 32 percent of the females in the
3 Army at large failed the PT test and 27 percent of the
4 males.

5 So the assumption that people who have
6 gone through basic training and advanced individual
7 training have arrived in the field ready to do their
8 duties is not the case.

9 MR. PANG: I think that's true. I mean,
10 you know, I agree with you. I mean, you know, what
11 happens is that when people graduate from basic training,
12 they've met the — they've got to pass the PT test, okay?
13 So they pass the thing and then they go into AIT. If
14 there's a failure, then it would be a failure in the
15 other — you know, the follow-on training — okay? — to
16 sustain that level.

17 I mean, it doesn't — I have a hard time
18 understanding what you're trying to get at. I mean, if I
19 go through basic training and I'm a female — okay? —
20 there's a standard fitness I have to — level I have to
21 pass. The same is true of a male. When I complete that,
22 you know — and I've got to do that in order to graduate
23 and move on. So what's happened is that I have sustained

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1 to go to AIT. I'm going to have to remove the track and
2 do all these sort of heavy-duty sort of things. And if I
3 can't do that, I'm out, or they'll reclassify me or
4 something else, I mean.

5 But you're not going to learn that or
6 train everybody — See, the question is do you train in
7 basic training to a maximum level and get everybody up to
8 the maximum capacity and sustain that capacity all the
9 time, or is there some sort of minimum level of fitness
10 that you're striving for? And that's all I'm trying to
11 draw out on this discussion.

12 DR. GREGOR: Well, in response to that, it
13 is certainly true that people have argued that it's a
14 fitness-oriented program and there is a need to produce
15 general fitness, if simply to reduce attrition from
16 disease and injury.

17 On the other hand, the function of
18 training is to perform tasks related to readiness. There
19 was a time when these tests were not called fitness
20 tests. They were called performance tests, and they
21 related to actual performance.

22 MR. PANG: But doesn't that occur in AIT?
23 I mean, you know, if you're here and I've got to go down

1 and lift something up and —
 2 DR. GREGOR: As I referred to earlier, we
 3 have had twenty-two years in which to identify critical
 4 tasks and tests to determine the appropriate capacity in
 5 order to perform a task. There is no standard set.
 6 And it is if the APFT is inadequate for
 7 determining fitness for purpose, then I'm suggesting here
 8 that they design a different test for determining
 9 retention and separation, because under the current
 10 regulations, you are not separated for failing to lift
 11 the bridge bulk. You are separated for failing to get
 12 sixty points on the APFT.
 13 MR. PANG: Yeah. But, you know, see, I've
 14 been getting confused because, you know, if I flunk the
 15 APFT and I'm a bridge person, I must be horrible at my
 16 duties. I mean, you know, I'd be out. I mean, I
 17 couldn't perform my duties because the requirements, see,
 18 in these heavy-lifting skills —
 19 DR. GREGOR: But what I'm suggesting, sir,
 20 is you can pass the PFT, particularly if you are a woman,
 21 and be unable to do the bridge duties —
 22 MR. PANG: So if —
 23 DR. GREGOR: — and you will not be

1 separated.
 2 DR. SEGAL: I think what Mr. Pang is
 3 saying is that we've heard from a number of experts
 4 physiology and job performance task measurement, and they
 5 have all told us that there is a distinction between
 6 physical fitness and its measures — and the physical
 7 abilities and other abilities, but in this case physical
 8 abilities to perform specific tasks on specific jobs, and
 9 that the kinds of measurements you use for those two
 10 would be entirely different.
 11 And that for measuring fitness, it is
 12 appropriate to gender and age-norm the tests because they
 13 have a different purpose, and what's defined as fitness
 14 in terms of general health and conditioning would be
 15 different depending on people's gender and upon their
 16 age.
 17 I understand what you're — What I hear
 18 you saying is that we shouldn't — We are trying very
 19 hard, actually, not to use the physical fitness tests to
 20 measure the abilities of people to perform their jobs.
 21 We're told that there's a very poor correlation between
 22 performance on physical fitness tests and abilities to
 23 perform jobs. That they are not intended to do that.

1 That that is not their purpose.
 2 What I hear you saying is that the
 3 services ought to develop physical requirements and
 4 measure that for incumbents of especially those jobs that
 5 require a very high level of ability to do tasks that
 6 require high levels of physical strength. We have heard
 7 that to do it for all military occupational specialties
 8 would be extremely expensive and that's why the services
 9 haven't one it, but that they have started to focus on
 10 those that are very heavy.
 11 Am I correct in basically what you're
 12 saying is you're concerned that you don't want people
 13 getting into jobs they can't perform? Your understanding
 14 of what basic training is is somewhat different from what
 15 the services have told us and what other experts have
 16 told us.
 17 DR. GREGOR: That's why I'm not speaking
 18 for them.
 19 DR. SEGAL: Okay. But I hear — But am I
 20 correct in hearing you say that there ought to be
 21 physical performance tests required for particular jobs
 22 that require frequent heavy lifting?
 23 DR. GREGOR: Yes and no. Yes, I agree

1 there ought to be. No, in the sense that the argument is
 2 made that the fitness test does not relate to physical
 3 performance. This is a — I would like to say with most
 4 charity the kinesiology dodge.
 5 The reason I say that is if you'll look at
 6 my testimony at the back, I cite some references. In the
 7 period between 1980 and 1990, there was a lot of effort
 8 on the part of the military to justify the APFT as a good
 9 measure of performance, and so there were a number of
 10 studies published by the very same laboratories that now
 11 say we're just measuring general fitness.
 12 And so in citing those — For example,
 13 Joseph Knapik's "The Army Physical Fitness Test: A Review
 14 of the Literature," June 1989, in Military Medicine, and
 15 citing also Margarete DiBenedetto's "Experience with a
 16 Pre-Basic Company at Fort Jackson" — there is a strong
 17 argument for a relationship between the measures that are
 18 associated with the fitness test and the measures that
 19 are associated with performance — namely stamina and
 20 strength — and that is because they are related to the
 21 two physical factors that I alluded to earlier; that
 22 they're related to lean body mass and body fat.
 23 And so any job that requires aerobic

1 efficiency, the people with higher aerobic efficiency
 2 will be found to have a leaner body, less body fat. And
 3 I'll show you a —
 4 DR. SEGAL: There's a correlation between
 5 the two.
 6 DR. GREGOR: There's a correlation between
 7 the two. And guess what? The Army's male PT two-mile
 8 run score is set by the VO max for a person that has 20-
 9 percent body fat. That is, your entrance standard for
 10 the United States Army for the male of 20-percent body
 11 fat is set on the notion that he will achieve a VO max of
 12 46.44 milliliters of oxygen per kilogram per minute.
 13 So there is a direct correlation in the
 14 actual entrance standards to the PT test standards which
 15 correlates to aerobic efficiency.
 16 DR. SEGAL: Yeah. That's because there's
 17 considered to be a minimum level of fitness required.
 18 DR. GREGOR: But if fitness is required,
 19 then why would the male — and I'll put that — Well, I
 20 have this chart up here.
 21 All these males here in this ROTC specimen
 22 are here because they failed the test.
 23 MS. POPE: Can I interrupt a second?

1 Because we're at a distinct advantage here because we
 2 heard testimony from GAO yesterday that you haven't heard
 3 and I don't know if anyone has briefed you on that —
 4 that basically said that the Department — all the
 5 services are in agreement with part of what you're
 6 saying, the confusion between mission readiness and
 7 physical fitness, and that DoD is about to come out and
 8 say "this is physical fitness," "this is physical
 9 wellness," and that they have agreed, and GAO now has
 10 said it is too expensive to do all of the testing for all
 11 jobs.
 12 But the services are now looking at those
 13 heavy-lift jobs, those jobs that require specific
 14 physical standards, to look at categorizing those and
 15 coming up with criteria to do those.
 16 DR. GREGOR: Well, let me respond to that.
 17 "The services are in agreement." The services were in
 18 agreement in 1982 about having physical standards.
 19 MS. POPE: But I think GAO has also said
 20 it is — Part of it is where do you start because of the
 21 dollar amount, and GAO has said it is too expensive to do
 22 it across-the-board.
 23 DR. GREGOR: Well, two things about

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1 fitness. If fitness is the matter, then males who are
2 more than 20-percent body fat, males whose VO max exceeds
3 the minimum — the maximum standard of women, who are
4 separated, ought not be separated. That the standards
5 for fitness have nothing to do with actual fitness.

6 That's the first point.

7 DR. SEGAL: But we've heard from all the
8 experts that fitness is related to body type, gender,
9 age, ethnicity, which is related to the body type, and
10 that if you want to check to measure an individual's
11 fitness, you would actually really need to take all of
12 that into account.

13 The services use a shortcut by only using
14 age and gender and norming them, but that an individual's
15 fitness is different from a performance. That you would
16 expect a different level of performance from equally fit
17 men and women and equally fit in terms of what is
18 reasonable to expect of a twenty-year-old and a fifty-
19 year-old.

20 DR. GREGOR: Let me go historic for a
21 moment. If you go back to the 1916 testimony on the
22 National Defense Act for that period —

23 DR. MOSKOS: 19-when?

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1 DR. GREGOR: '16.

2 DR. MOSKOS: '16.

3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: '16?

4 DR. GREGOR: — the discussion about
5 military service and what purpose it ought to serve and
6 whether there ought to be conscription prior to World War
7 I, you will see a litany of professors of physical
8 training or whatever they called it at the period —
9 physical education — appearing before the Congress,
10 talking about the physical benefits of military training
11 and how it'll improve their wellness, and they'll all be
12 better and they'll be returning to society with better
13 standards of personal hygiene and all the other benefits
14 that accrue from military service.

15 I recognize that in the United States
16 there has always been a desire to show a civic importance
17 to military service and the civic relationship of
18 military training. But when it comes to a mobilization
19 and replacement system, fitness is an issue of long-term
20 consequence, not short-term.

21 Every person who enters the military has
22 probably a twenty-year life cycle, possibly thirty for
23 some military members. What you're looking for in the

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1 mobilization and replacement system is providing people
2 to fill positions. The question that this Commission
3 has, is basic training providing the base upon which to
4 fill that system?

5 In 1991 — November 1991 — the Army
6 changed its physical entrance standards. For the male
7 who was five-foot-eight, his entrance standard — if I
8 can get it right — it's five-foot-eight or five-foot-
9 nine — his entrance standard at that time was 209
10 pounds, and they dropped his entrance standard to 179
11 pounds. Dropped it thirty pounds. That same year they
12 increased the body fat content of women by 2 percent so
13 that you could be 30 percent, and at the same time they
14 increased the entrance weight from 150 to 154.

15 All of that was done in recognition of the
16 fact that you needed to increase muscle mass if you were
17 going to get greater physical performance out of women,
18 and you sacrificed by doing that aerobic fitness; because
19 by going to a higher body fat content, you admitted that
20 you were going to trade off aerobic fitness.

21 Now, given that this population of men and
22 women is so different because of the body composition —
23 recognizing that — when you increase body fat percentage

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1 allowable for women and you increase body weight total,
2 you are trading off strength for fitness.

3 I don't understand but I will recognize
4 that there is a hash of policy out there with respect to
5 training and fitness, but I will hold personally not to
6 be associated with the School of Advanced Military
7 Studies or any other military institution that this hash
8 has more to do with trying to meet other objectives in
9 the military than training.

10 It's a part of the function of the
11 Commission to decide how high you trade off training with
12 other social objectives. A fit Army is nice, but
13 performance is what's required, and the studies that I
14 have cited in my paper cite the fact that the Army's
15 military readiness was a function of absolute fitness,
16 not relative fitness.

17 DR. SEGAL: Okay. I want to ask two
18 questions that seemingly are unrelated but I think
19 they're related, and they have to do with your
20 perceptions of and views on gender and individual
21 differences within genders.

22 The first is I have read some of your
23 previous writings and I — I assume you still stand by

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1 your previous writings.

2 DR. GREGOR: Of course.

3 DR. SEGAL: Okay. So I take it from those
4 that —

5 DR. GREGOR: Right from the beginning.

6 DR. SEGAL: It's been a long time, but
7 I've read your earlier work and I take it, unless your
8 views have changed, that you oppose having women in the
9 military, in some of the positions that they currently
10 fill. Is that correct?

11 DR. GREGOR: I think the best statement
12 would be that if you look — if you were to say to me,
13 "Can I find twenty-nine women in the United States Army
14 who could perform as bridge crew members," I will say
15 yes.

16 DR. SEGAL: I'm not talking necessarily
17 about the physical performance issue. I'm talking about
18 you opposed —

19 DR. GREGOR: Let me finish my statement.

20 DR. SEGAL: Okay.

21 DR. GREGOR: If you were to ask me can I
22 find twenty-nine women in the United States Army to fill
23 a heavy — very heavy occupational specialty, the answer

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1 is yes. If you tell me I can fill every occupational
2 specialty that's listed as very heavy with women, the
3 answer is no.

4 And what I am suggesting in terms of a
5 policy is that we need to decide — And I'm saying the
6 Army because I'm not concerned about the other services.
7 The Army needs to decide what occupational specialties it
8 can reasonably fill with the women that are available in
9 sufficient quantities to provide a legitimate replacement
10 pool.

11 DR. SEGAL: So you're considering only
12 physical performance in your opposition to women in
13 certain positions; is that correct?

14 DR. GREGOR: I'm only interested in those
15 occupational specialties for which physical performance
16 is a high component of overall performance.

17 DR. SEGAL: So it's okay if women are in
18 other combat specialties that don't require physical
19 performance?

20 DR. GREGOR: We're not discussing combat
21 arms yet. I thought we were discussing combat service
22 support and combat support arms.

23 DR. SEGAL: Well, there are women in

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1 combat jobs in the other services, like women fly — can
2 fly helicopters. They can fly fighter planes. They can
3 be on combat ships in the Navy.

4 But I take it from your previous writings
5 that you opposed women going into those positions. Is
6 that correct?

7 DR. GREGOR: I oppose any — This seems to
8 be wandering here, but let me make a —

9 DR. SEGAL: Well, I agree with that.

10 DR. GREGOR: Let me make a clear statement
11 about this. I oppose any scheme of military service that
12 does not place the individual in subordination to the
13 will of the state. And second, I oppose any military
14 system that does not take into account whether that
15 person has the capacity.

16 Now, I will restate what I said in the
17 Presidential Commission in '92. No man would ever say
18 that he wouldn't use women in a fight. If I'm at
19 Stalingrad and I have to throw people into the fire in
20 order to survive, I'll throw in anything I can get my
21 hands on, and no professional soldier should ever say
22 anything different because the survival of the state is
23 the imperative, not the individual.

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1 What I am interested in here, though, is
2 we seem to have a policy that compromises the
3 requirements of the state for the druthers of the
4 individual.

5 DR. SEGAL: Okay. Now let me show how
6 it's related to my next question. Your differentiation
7 on the basis of performance is based on gender, and
8 you're showing us the difference in the distributions of
9 men and women on these physical capacities; whatever they
10 measure, I mean. And we are obviously in disagreement as
11 to what we think they measure.

12 Your own data — And if you could — Do
13 you have a slide for your — the run times, for example,
14 for your cadets? I think you had one before.

15 Your own data show considerable variance
16 within men and within women, and we know that. But on
17 any of these physical performances you have enormous
18 variation between the men and the women.

19 DR. GREGOR: Oh, I wouldn't say it's
20 enormous.

21 DR. SEGAL: You have — Within the men and
22 within the women, there's a substantial difference in the
23 performance times across them.

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1 DR. GREGOR: Yes.

2 DR. SEGAL: Obviously most of them tend
3 towards the middle of the distribution. But if you
4 designed a system — And I sympathize with your concerns
5 in how do you operate a training program that is trying
6 to deal with people with different ranges of abilities.
7 I mean, it's something that as an educator I deal with
8 all the time.

9 So one of the things that we do is we
10 ability-group, and, indeed, that's what the Army is doing
11 in basic training. But it doesn't gender-group. It
12 ability-groups. And what it says is, we can then divide
13 people up on the basis of their current performance in
14 things like runs and we're going to train them in groups
15 so that they are relatively homogenous within those
16 groups.

17 Now, obviously in the run, for those
18 groups that are at the two ends, the very fast and the
19 very slow, you're going to have a gender difference. So
20 in the very slow groups, you're going to have mostly
21 women and a few men. And as we heard from one of our
22 experts from West Point, who is a physiological expert,
23 in the slow group at West Point, the slow — what you

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1 have is mostly women and the linebackers from the
2 football team — okay? — because they have a heavy —
3 they're high in that lean body mass and they're high —
4 And so they will tend to be slower and there's a
5 relationship there.

6 At the upper end of — Actually, it's the
7 reverse here because it's times. You know, your upper-
8 enders are slow and the lower-enders are people who are
9 really fast. People who are really fast are going to be
10 mostly the men and a few women, and I see you actually
11 have a very few women in some of those faster groups.

12 But the big group in the middle is going
13 to have both men and women: in the faster ones, more men
14 than women; in the slower ones, more women than men. But
15 from what you have said in terms of building people up to
16 their maximum, it makes — sounds as if the best thing to
17 do then is to ability-group, to have people by their
18 current levels of performance and not do it by gender.

19 Yes, gender is related to performance and
20 on some characteristics it's very strongly related, but
21 the important thing is not the person's sex but the
22 person's performance.

23 If the real goal is what you say it is,

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1 which is to improve the ability of the Army to do its
2 job, and if we wanted — which I don't — the services
3 won't grant, and I don't know that we will — that the
4 purpose of basic training is to produce people who are
5 ready to go on to the job and perform at their utmost
6 capability — That isn't what the services aim for in six
7 or eight or ten weeks, but even if they did, it would
8 still make more sense to do it by the grouping —

9 DR. GREGOR: No.

10 DR. SEGAL: — by the performances rather
11 than by sex.

12 DR. GREGOR: Allow me to disagree.

13 DR. SEGAL: Okay.

14 DR. GREGOR: I'm going to disagree for
15 three —

16 DR. SEGAL: Okay.

17 DR. GREGOR: — three reasons. First,
18 every man on this chart that is below the minimum score,
19 which is right here at 15.5 (Indicating), will be
20 separated from service. So I'm not interested in
21 ability, but it doesn't meet the standard that I have
22 set.

23 DR. SEGAL: That's at the end of training,

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1 not at the beginning of training.

2 DR. GREGOR: This is at the end of
3 training. My point is that I'm retaining all these other
4 people. So I think what we've decided here is that
5 certain fitness is okay and other fitness isn't.

6 The second thing is when I start looking
7 at .25 percent of women achieving the male mean, that
8 means when I set out to do training for the average
9 group, I'm starting to worry about two standard
10 deviations above the mean for females. I don't want to
11 design an Army for anything that's two standard
12 deviations above the mean.

13 DR. SEGAL: Don't you have trouble with
14 your men who are at the extreme? I mean, if you design
15 for the male mean —

16 DR. GREGOR: No.

17 DR. SEGAL: — then your men who are
18 better are not going to be challenged either.

19 DR. GREGOR: No, because the issue is not
20 whether they achieve self-actualization. The issue is
21 whether — And in most cases when you're talking about
22 going way, way up here (Indicating), you're talking about
23 individuals who have gone and specialized for one reason

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1 or another.
 2 That's why when you train armies, you
 3 train — you ought to have a training system that's
 4 designed for the mass of the material, because every
 5 example of where the Army has dealt with special
 6 populations that are thought to be reasonably trainable
 7 for various reasons — And I'm not going to go into a
 8 litany because then I'll be castigated for making
 9 comparisons between men and women in those groups. Every
 10 time you try and design a training system for the
 11 exceptional, you'll spend a lot of money and get very
 12 little manpower. So it's an issue of efficiency.
 13 The second thing is we keep talking about
 14 having designer armies, and I'm going to be pleistocene
 15 in my views on this. In World War I, there was no
 16 advanced individual training. World War I was the first
 17 time we classified manpower and the first time we
 18 actually created training bases, because the previous
 19 system of training was that individuals were brought
 20 directly into the units and trained by the units.
 21 When we brought in — When we trained
 22 individuals in World War I, they went through their basic
 23 training which varied between eight and twelve weeks, and

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1 they went directly to the front. Okay?
 2 Now, there are particular times in our
 3 history where individuals were immediately reclassified
 4 and sent forward as replacements. What I have to have is
 5 some expectation out of the training base that I can
 6 reassign that individual to a particular need. And if I
 7 don't have that expectation, then what I'm going to end
 8 up doing in a time of actual "let's train as we fight,"
 9 is I'm going to redesign my training system on the fly
 10 because it's not meeting my needs.
 11 Now, I'll give you a recent example.
 12 1991, Gulf War: low casualties, no crisis. But had there
 13 been casualties, the plans were quite different than how
 14 it came out.
 15 Where I was, ROTC would have been shut
 16 down immediately. All those who had completed basic camp
 17 would be commissioned and sent forward to the officers
 18 course and then reassignment. The whole program would
 19 shut down and we'd be — and the cadre and its equipment
 20 would all go into the training base. Individuals in
 21 basic training would be reclassified to meet whatever the
 22 filler requirement was for the follow-on training.
 23 One of the things —

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1 MS. POPE: Can I just stop a second?
 2 Because for the — And I'm following your train of
 3 thought and I agree with it up to a point that — and I
 4 think Fred said this earlier — is that the majority of
 5 those backfills will be combat and women are not in those
 6 combat.
 7 DR. GREGOR: But that's why I'm getting at
 8 this issue of where you're mixing the men and women in
 9 basic training. Those men have to be ready to be general
 10 replacements.
 11 MS. POPE: But the men who were going into
 12 combat are trained in places like Fort Benning that are
 13 segregated, and they would continue to be trained to go
 14 — So that's where you're losing me, because —
 15 DR. GREGOR: I beg to differ with you. In
 16 —
 17 MS. POPE: Well, where do you differ? I
 18 mean, the combat —
 19 DR. GREGOR: I differ — When you're in
 20 the mobilization situation —
 21 MS. POPE: But combat training is
 22 segregated. It is segregated. I mean, what's there to
 23 debate?

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1 DR. GREGOR: No.
 2 MS. POPE: No what?
 3 DR. GREGOR: In the current system of
 4 recruitment, we send people to installations for one
 5 station training and to basic training. That is correct.
 6 However, in the mobilization —
 7 MS. POPE: But all that training is
 8 segregated.
 9 DR. GREGOR: In mobilization situations,
 10 individuals who complete basic training, wherever they
 11 complete it, are reclassified into wherever the need is.
 12 In other words, the replacement that's at Fort Jackson,
 13 who is going to be combat service support, becomes
 14 available for reassignment and is sent on to other
 15 training.
 16 DR. SEGAL: I think our recent experience
 17 is we'd go to our reserves before we'd start pulling
 18 people out of basic training and sending them to combat.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: We did it in
 20 Vietnam. We didn't go to reserves.
 21 DR. SEGAL: Well, but more recently we've
 22 gone to the reserves. We have much more of a total Army
 23 situation.

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1 DR. GREGOR: I have some data —
 2 MS. POPE: But we also intensify the
 3 training. I mean, none of the services are going to send
 4 people out that aren't trained. And the training — the
 5 men and women coming out — the men coming out of Jackson
 6 are not significantly different than the men coming out
 7 of Benning. I mean, that are meeting Army standards.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well, you didn't
 9 suffer any casualties in that sense.
 10 MS. POPE: Yeah.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: So you really
 12 don't know. I mean, the casualties —
 13 DR. GREGOR: (Inaudible)
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: That's exactly
 15 right.
 16 DR. GREGOR: I'm going to —
 17 MS. POPE: But I'm just saying the combat
 18 is segregated, so I'm kind of losing —
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: The training,
 20 but not the actual combat itself.
 21 DR. SEGAL: He's talking about that people
 22 who are in MOS's who are classified as —
 23 MS. POPE: Are reclassified.

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: They're going to
 2 be — They're going to be killed the same as anybody
 3 else.
 4 MS. POPE: But they're going to be
 5 reclassified. But it's only the men at this point who
 6 are going to be reclassified because women aren't allowed
 7 into combat.
 8 DR. GREGOR: Let me make an empirical
 9 point and a normative point. Okay? I'm making a
 10 normative point that is I want basic training to produce
 11 a stream of general service male replacements so that in
 12 exigencies I may reclassify.
 13 Now, if that is unlikely right now, I'm
 14 going to have to admit the point that that's unlikely
 15 right now. What I want to maintain in the structure for
 16 mobilization and recruitment is the notion that basic
 17 training becomes the base upon which I get a general
 18 service male replacement for any occupational specialty I
 19 need.
 20 Now, I have some data that I'll refer —
 21 The second point, though —
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Bill, let me just — just
 23 before you move the slide. What Barbara is saying here

1 is, okay, we have the — looking at the Army-only case
 2 now — All right. This guy goes through Jackson, and in
 3 the case of mobilization and something real serious
 4 develops, they'll just classify him as a combat soldier.
 5 So what? I mean, how does that pertain to
 6 anything? He's basically a trained soldier in physical
 7 stuff, and a few more weeks of infantry training and
 8 that's it.
 9 DR. GREGOR: That's my empirical point. I
 10 want to make an empirical point that relates to that.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 12 MS. POPE: Okay.
 13 DR. GREGOR: What I'm suggesting is — and
 14 it may be true at Benning, too, and it's certainly shown
 15 by my slides — we're not getting a lot out of the
 16 training dollars that we're putting into the basic
 17 training in terms of transformation of people into
 18 potential.
 19 If you look at the 1995 study that was
 20 done on gender-integrated training at Fort Jackson, 77
 21 percent of the — correction — 71 percent of the males
 22 who started already met the minimum physical standard for
 23 the two-mile run.

1 MS. POPE: And the Army's just upped the
 2 standards.
 3 DR. GREGOR: Oh, I can go into the other
 4 — Let me finish this before we go into the new
 5 standards.
 6 MS. POPE: Okay.
 7 DR. MOSKOS: I still don't understand.
 8 DR. GREGOR: What I'm suggesting here is
 9 if 71 percent of the males who entered basic training in
 10 '95, in the gender-integrated companies, during their
 11 initial diagnostic already passed the requirement for the
 12 program, and you then show me a slide that says 90
 13 percent passed at the end — okay? — I have essentially
 14 only added 19 percent of the population to the trained
 15 population, which means I've only really trained or
 16 additionally trained half.
 17 What I'm getting at is if you really want
 18 to look at whether training occurs in the training base,
 19 the studies need to show you whether you are actually
 20 training.
 21 MS. POPE: Yeah. But, I mean, the Army
 22 says it doesn't. It's the first stop — I mean, as
 23 General Christmas said, we talked about this continuum.

1 For the Army, they've been very up-front and said, "This
 2 is the first stop." We're not sending out soldiers who
 3 are ready — you know, that the next step is advanced
 4 training.
 5 DR. SEGAL: They're not ready to go to a
 6 unit.
 7 MS. POPE: I mean, the Army's the first —
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well, they're
 9 ready to go to a unit. They're not ready to do the
 10 specific job until they get to the unit.
 11 MS. POPE: Right. But that's the next
 12 follow-on training.
 13 DR. SEGAL: No, they have to go to their
 14 specialty training.
 15 MS. POPE: I mean, they have said that
 16 that's their policy.
 17 DR. GREGOR: But how do you —
 18 MS. POPE: They're not saying that they're
 19 trained.
 20 DR. GREGOR: That's right, they're not
 21 saying that they're trained.
 22 MS. POPE: I mean, they're saying that
 23 that's the first step.

1 DR. SEGAL: Okay.
 2 DR. GREGOR: I mean, I'll admit the Army
 3 can have a policy that says, "We're not going to train
 4 them to do their job in the follow-on phase."
 5 MS. POPE: But they're not sending them to
 6 that job without an interim stop.
 7 DR. SEGAL: And you seem to be saying —
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Nobody is.
 9 MS. POPE: Right, nobody is. They're all
 10 saying it's a continuum —
 11 DR. SEGAL: And you seem to be saying that
 12 physical training is the only thing that's important. I
 13 mean, if you really want to look at performance, you look
 14 at those skills that the Army says it wants people to be
 15 able to do. So look at marksmanship and what proportion
 16 of men and women or people from the north and people from
 17 the south can shoot their weapons properly.
 18 DR. GREGOR: But the difference I'm
 19 suggesting here when I refer to heavy occupational
 20 specialties is that you don't build a bridge with
 21 marksmanship. You build them with bulk.
 22 And what I'm getting at here is if you
 23 don't — You have to do two things if you're going to

1 actually intend to train people. First of all, you have
 2 to classify them. And what I suggested —
 3 DR. SEGAL: Yeah. But do you need the 71-
 4 limas to be able to build a bridge?
 5 DR. GREGOR: No. You have to classify
 6 your manpower. And if your manpower is not classified at
 7 the entrance station, which was proposed in 1982, you
 8 don't have any idea of what that capacity of that
 9 individual is when they get to the next stage of
 10 training.
 11 And if that next stage of training is
 12 heavy physical, then either you're going to waste part of
 13 that training trying to produce that strength — But what
 14 I'm saying is that the female population is quite
 15 different than the male population. You cannot produce
 16 that level of strength in a short period of training, so
 17 you will not be trained at the end of AIT to that
 18 standard.
 19 DR. SEGAL: No, but would a man who is at
 20 the lower level of ability be able to train up for the
 21 heavy job — do the very heavy job?
 22 MS. POPE: I mean, I can't imagine that a
 23 female without some of the potential to do that — I

1 mean, already with a lot of the skill — would go into
 2 that, nor would they let her.
 3 Let me ask you a quick question and it's a
 4 data question, and you may have it and may be able to
 5 leave it. On the 32 percent of women that failed the PT
 6 test, is that broken out by years in service and MOS?
 7 DR. GREGOR: I'm sure they have it.
 8 MS. POPE: But you don't?
 9 DR. GREGOR: I do not have it.
 10 MS. POPE: Okay. Because I would be
 11 interested to see years of service and MOS, because I
 12 think it gets back to Fred's point that says what's the
 13 failure out of basic, what's the failure out of AIT. And
 14 if you're in admin/clerical support, I would bet that
 15 there's a lot of those people who aren't — there wasn't
 16 a lot of rigor once you're in your MOS if you're in
 17 administrative support/clerical support.
 18 DR. GREGOR: This slide comes from an
 19 article published by James Vogel in September of '92.
 20 It's referenced in the back of my paper. I brought these
 21 two slides. This is a scattergram and it refers to this
 22 issue of strength. And it has on the lower axis — you
 23 have fat-free mass, and in the vertical axis you have

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1 weight that you can lift. And we're talking about —
 2 heavy category — being able to lift over a hundred
 3 pounds, 125 pounds, and this is the male scattergram.
 4 And if you'll look at the height-weight
 5 standards for males, males cannot enter the military more
 6 than 20-percent body fat. And that means that the
 7 average male enters at about 134 percent — I mean, a
 8 lean mass of 135 pounds, which is about 60 kilograms.
 9 And what you see is that the bulk of the male population
 10 has the innate strength to be trained to do that heavy
 11 occupational stuff.
 12 If you'll look at the scattergram of
 13 female lifting capacity — This is VO max.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: I'm wondering, Madam Chair,
 15 because of the time, should we —
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah.
 17 DR. GREGOR: I don't have —
 18 DR. MOSKOS: — run around quickly?
 19 DR. GREGOR: I don't know whether I have
 20 it.
 21 Here we go. If you look at the
 22 scattergram of women, I've trained men and women and I've
 23 trained them in units that you know, are gender-

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1 integrated and, you know, you do certain things and other
 2 things to try and manage the problem.
 3 But what I'm looking at here is if you
 4 have — This is a scattergram of women and you can see
 5 that fat-free mass below 50 kilograms, you have hardly
 6 anybody that meets the nominal standard of lifting a
 7 hundred pounds.
 8 And so if you have an entrance standard
 9 that's set, that says a five-foot-eight woman who weighs
 10 154 pounds can enter and she's got to be — she has got
 11 to have a fat-free mass of fifty pounds before you can
 12 start to train her.
 13 DR. SEGAL: Or him. I mean, wouldn't you
 14 —
 15 DR. GREGOR: What I'm saying is the
 16 scattergram of males shows me that if they meet the
 17 nominal entrance standard, they already met the
 18 qualifications. That's why we have to differentiate
 19 populations, is because the previous population, you
 20 can't make that assumption. You can't even come close to
 21 that assumption. So if you don't take that into account
 22 when you classify in the difference in performance, how
 23 are you going to load that population during training?

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1 Now, you leave one — Since I run the
 2 website at Sam's, I get things faxed to me, and I got a
 3 — There is at — I think it's Fort Drum — an IG
 4 complaint about the load for women during road marches in
 5 the 10th Mountain Division. But they're trying to
 6 resolve the issue, and the issue is that there was a
 7 general standard of a thirty-five-pound pack and a
 8 twelve-kilometer road march.
 9 Now, these are people who have already
 10 completed basic, they've already completed AIT, and they
 11 have been assigned to their duties. And the issue is
 12 that that's too much, that they should be "normed for the
 13 individual."
 14 And the question has got to be raised —
 15 MR. PANG: Is that an official Army
 16 request? I don't understand this. I mean —
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: No. That's a
 18 complaint, IG complaint.
 19 DR. GREGOR: A complaint by a woman at
 20 Fort Drum.
 21 Now, the point I want to make by this is
 22 —
 23 MR. PANG: Then they ought to — you know,

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1 if you can't meet the standard, you're out.
 2 MS. POPE: Right.
 3 MR. PANG: I don't understand it.
 4 DR. GREGOR: Sooner or later the Army —
 5 and I can only speak for the Army — the Army is going to
 6 have to face the issue of criterion-based standards
 7 versus relative standards. This is a natty subject among
 8 physiologists and policy-makers, and the reason is that
 9 the Army has a need to recruit women.
 10 And there is a large difference between
 11 male and female populations. And so you need to recruit
 12 women, but if you're going to make them effective, you're
 13 going to have to do it judicially and you have to have
 14 criterion-based standards.
 15 What I have alluded to today, although the
 16 PT test is not my idea — the physical combat proficiency
 17 test that preceded the APFT may be more to the point.
 18 But at some point the Army is going to have to decide to
 19 have a criterion for performance.
 20 And so long as you separate and select
 21 people based upon these APFT scores and you set your
 22 physical performance standards for entrance — that is,
 23 body fat content — by the requirements set in the APFT,

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1 there is a direct correlation in terms of how we retain
 2 and recruit people to this test.
 3 I don't think the test is that bad, but I
 4 think people don't want to use the test as a measure of
 5 performance simply because the data is available to
 6 compare performance.
 7 I'm going to leave the Commission with
 8 this last note. If you go through all these studies, you
 9 get the impression after a while that there is a hash out
 10 there.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: What does a hash mean, Bill?
 12 What do you mean by that?
 13 DR. GREGOR: A hash? Well, a mixture of
 14 potatoes and carrots and chopped-up peppers.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Oh, that.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Literally hash.
 17 DR. MOSKOS: And what do you mean?
 18 Figuratively, what does it mean to you as a hash? I
 19 mean, covering up? Do you mean —
 20 DR. GREGOR: No. A jumble of studies,
 21 none of which try to be immediately comparable in their
 22 standards so you can compare them. I want — you know, I
 23 don't want to disparage studies of other government

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1 employees, just like I don't want them to disparage mine,
 2 so I want to be careful here.
 3 But if you go back and you look at these
 4 studies and you try and compare things, physical
 5 performance studies ought to have distribution diagrams
 6 or scatter diagrams and they ought to have some
 7 relationship to standard Army measures.
 8 If the purpose of these studies is to
 9 inform policy-makers on how you decide entrance and
 10 retention standards or promotion standards, and if it's
 11 tied to the PT test, then it ought to be a measure of
 12 performance. If it is not a measure of performance, then
 13 they ought to drop it.
 14 But I will tell you, your PT test score
 15 will get you points toward promotion; it will get you
 16 separated from the service; it will bar you from
 17 reenlistment. Your body fat content will do the same.
 18 So if these aren't measures of performance, then we are
 19 doing ourselves a disservice by separating people who are
 20 fit for their duties and retaining people who are not fit
 21 for their duties based upon these standards.
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Dr. Gregor, we have just
 23 a couple minutes before you need to go; so I'd just like

1 to say right now I hope you won't mind if we could send
 2 you some questions later that you might just —
 3 DR. GREGOR: Sure.
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — furnish a reply to,
 5 because I think there are probably more questions but
 6 we're going to be time-barred.
 7 Talk fast, Charlie.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Real fast.
 9 I want to thank you, Bill, for giving us a
 10 counter-interpretation to what we've generally been
 11 hearing and we can adjudge that.
 12 Two quick observations, and I think you
 13 have to stress, too, Bill, all males can't be general
 14 replacements either. I mean, you have the kind of
 15 assumption here only women can be —
 16 DR. GREGOR: My experience in Vietnam says
 17 all males are general replacements. They show up just
 18 the same.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: The other is our views. You
 20 know, based at Jackson — And we have differential views,
 21 but this great difference between males and females
 22 didn't seem to apparent to us. I mean, people do
 23 perceive double standards and all, but it wasn't as

1 testing.
 2 Did I — from everything that was said
 3 here, is that — did I gather what you —
 4 DR. GREGOR: That's true.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 6 DR. GREGOR: You're accurate.
 7 And one last comment because it just
 8 popped into my head and I meant to mention it earlier.
 9 You know, the cadre that train these people come out of
 10 these populations. And so if you're going to — I have
 11 no objection to males and females leading female
 12 companies, as was the case in the seventies, because
 13 you're going to have a hard time selecting from the
 14 population to ensure that they're in the position to
 15 train those people.
 16 On the other hand, you're going to have a
 17 difficult time and have a relatively small population to
 18 draw from if you're going to have women and men as cadre
 19 together.
 20 So you have to have a consideration of
 21 what — how many people are you going to pull out of the
 22 pool and what criterion must they meet before they're
 23 selected for this kind of duty? And the fact that they

1 graphic, I thought, as what you've described.
 2 And the last and third very small
 3 question: are you saying in the ROTC cadet system men can
 4 be removed from the program for physical standards that
 5 women would be maintained — kept in the program?
 6 DR. GREGOR: Absolutely.
 7 DR. SEGAL: Of course. They're not as
 8 fit.
 9 DR. GREGOR: Absolutely, without a doubt.
 10 DR. SEGAL: They're not as fit.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Well, no. I mean, somebody
 12 — a male and a female scoring exactly the same, it's
 13 possible the male will be kicked out and the female would
 14 be kept in?
 15 MS. POPE: For PT.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: For PT.
 17 MS. POPE: Because they're gender-normed.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 19 DR. GREGOR: Yeah, they're gender-normed.
 20 Sure. If a male does less than the minimum required —
 21 DR. MOSKOS: And body weight and all that
 22 stuff, yeah.
 23 DR. GREGOR: Oh, yeah. I've separated

1 have a 250 on their own physical fitness test doesn't
 2 tell you whether they're ready to do that kind of
 3 leadership.
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We have a question from
 5 the staff, and I'd like to at least get it on the record
 6 and there may or may not be enough time to answer.
 7 MR. FOGLEMAN: It's from our Army
 8 representative, Lieutenant Colonel Brenda Harris.
 9 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRIS: Yes, sir. In
 10 reference to your earlier slides, you were talking about
 11 the fact that soldiers could be separated from basic
 12 training for failing to meet the PT minimum.
 13 DR. GREGOR: No. No, I didn't mean that.
 14 I referred to ROTC cadets.
 15 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRIS: Okay. Well,
 16 is that, then, what you mean when you talk about basic
 17 training? In reference to ROTC cadets? Because my
 18 concern is, is that basic training soldiers are not
 19 required —
 20 DR. GREGOR: No. They're —
 21 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRIS: — to meet the
 22 Army's standard —
 23 DR. GREGOR: No. The standard —

1 them. Sure.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Thank you, Bill.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I just need
 4 to summarize this for my own edification and see if I
 5 have what I think you're saying.
 6 If I understand — I'm going to base this
 7 on what I thought you concluded and what I think your
 8 recommendations are, and then I'd ask that you correct me
 9 or whatever.
 10 DR. GREGOR: Okay.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: If I
 12 understand it, your conclusion is that if men are going
 13 to meet their full capacity for general service and women
 14 for assignment to heavy MOS requirements, that you need
 15 an entirely different physical fitness program and,
 16 therefore, they cannot be trained together. Okay?
 17 Therefore, the recommendations, as I think
 18 I heard you say, was that, first of all, the Army had to
 19 decide what MOS's that women should fill based on
 20 physical performance requirements; two, that there should
 21 be separate mixed-gender basic training; and three, that
 22 you needed a performance-oriented or criterion-oriented
 23 fitness program for proper sustainment. And maybe that's

1 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRIS: Please —
 2 DR. GREGOR: — for basic training is
 3 fifty — They're not — I'm not referring to basic
 4 training separation with that comment. If that was
 5 understood to mean that, I didn't mean that.
 6 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRIS: So just for
 7 the record —
 8 DR. GREGOR: For the record, basic
 9 trainees are not separated for that.
 10 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRIS: And if I may,
 11 basic trainees are required to meet a fifty-point
 12 requirement in each event, whereas the AIT and the OSUT
 13 soldiers are required to meet the same as the regular
 14 portion of the Army, which is the sixty points per event.
 15 DR. GREGOR: Correct.
 16 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRIS: Thank you.
 17 DR. GREGOR: Absolutely. Positively.
 18 ROTC cadets who don't pass the PT test are
 19 not assessed.
 20 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRIS: Based on which
 21 point value, please?
 22 DR. GREGOR: Sixty points per event.
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. I think we'll be

1 able to get you on your plane.
 2 Thank you very much, Dr. Gregor. And as I
 3 mentioned —
 4 DR. GREGOR: You're welcome. As always, I
 5 have no views. I wasn't here.
 6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Great. Thank you.
 7 (Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the hearing in
 8 the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at
 9 1:30 p.m., the same day.)
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(AFTERNOON SESSION)

(2:00 p.m.)

1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. This afternoon we
 2 have Brian Mitchell, who is currently with the Investor's
 3 Business Daily paper, and he's written two books: Women
 4 in the Military: Flirting with Disaster, and Weak Link:
 5 The Feminization of the American Military.
 6 And I have particularly asked Mr. Mitchell
 7 to address for us some of the questions about historic
 8 rationales for changes because those are areas that he
 9 has researched in connection with his books, and, you
 10 know, other comments he may have for us.
 11 Thank you very much for coming, and please
 12 go ahead.
 13 MR. MITCHELL: Thank you.
 14 Thanks to the Commission for allowing me
 15 to come. It's been a pleasure seeing some of you again
 16 and meeting others for the first time.
 17 I come to you as a journalist. As Madam
 18 Chairman mentioned, I write for Investor's Business
 19 Daily, covering military and foreign affairs. I also in
 20 the past have written for Navy Times. And before that, I
 21 was an Army officer for seven years, both infantry and

1 counterintelligence, so I saw a bit of both the
 2 integrated Army and the non-integrated Army.
 3 For a time as well, I was — as a cadet, I
 4 went through an integrated airborne school and then
 5 integrated ROTC training, advanced camp, and then worked
 6 for a short time with drill sergeants at Fort Jackson,
 7 South Carolina, in '79, when it was briefly integrated.
 8 And I have written about the issue, "women
 9 in the military." The first book appeared in '89. It
 10 grew out of a research project I had done for an Army
 11 school. The topic of the project was the Defense
 12 Advisory Committee on Women in the Services.
 13 In coming upon the topic, I realized not a
 14 whole lot had been written about it. There had been a
 15 few newspaper articles, but no one had looked in-depth
 16 into the issue and certainly no one had taken a critical
 17 view of it, which, of course, I did.
 18 My experiences in the Army had shown me, I
 19 think, that there were problems and certainly in the
 20 early eighties that were recognized. There was — the
 21 Army leadership at the time had done some reevaluation of
 22 the policy and had made some changes, so it was at least
 23 a time when we could still at that point recognize that

1 there were some issues to be settled, some problems to be
 2 handled, and so my own opinions at the time were not all
 3 that unusual.
 4 The course of the book — both books —
 5 essentially take an historical view of — with the issue
 6 of women in the military in explaining how things came
 7 about from essentially the beginning of the formal use of
 8 women in the military in this century.
 9 I do touch upon some of the legends, the
 10 stories that happened before that, but it really is a
 11 Twentieth Century phenomenon and it really gets its big
 12 boost in the early seventies with both the transition to
 13 the all-volunteer force coinciding with the Equal Rights
 14 Amendment.
 15 Before that, actually, the services had —
 16 well, they had never really wanted women in the military.
 17 They were pretty much obliged to take women during World
 18 War II. They were again obliged to take them in the
 19 Korean War. There was interest in both wars from
 20 different women in government, including the First Lady,
 21 Eleanor Roosevelt, for World War II.
 22 There was question as to whether or not
 23 they were really needed then, but the services took them

1 and kept them, although in fact their role in the
 2 military had been declining since the Korean War, to
 3 reach its lowest point in the late sixties. But then you
 4 had the transition to the all-volunteer force, a lot of
 5 concern that the services might not be able to make the
 6 all-volunteer force work.
 7 You also had the Equal Rights Amendment
 8 and, of course, the general sort of growing national
 9 consensus that women ought to be treated equally with
 10 men, and that led to the inclusion of women in the
 11 planning for the all-volunteer force.
 12 Interesting, though, in that case, that
 13 the Gates Commission that had been set up by President
 14 Nixon to look at the possibility of transitioning to an
 15 all-volunteer force never actually addressed the issue of
 16 women in their report, certainly; and in my interviews
 17 with some of the members of the Commission, they said it
 18 never even came up in their discussions that they might
 19 be able to make more use of women in the military and,
 20 therefore, relieve some of the need for men. In fact, I
 21 also — as I mentioned in the report, there was no
 22 mention of them; virtually none at all.
 23 I did, however, talk to a few staffers who

1 worked for the Commission and they held a very different
 2 view. To them, it was that this was something that was
 3 assumed; that, of course, in order to make the military
 4 work, they would make more use of women. And some of
 5 them saw that — indeed, saw it as an opportunity that
 6 had — its time had come as a result of the push towards
 7 the all-volunteer force. And certainly in the first few
 8 years there was a great need and the Army brought in a
 9 lot of women, much more than it had in the past.
 10 The issue of women, to relate it directly
 11 to your charter, in looking at the reason why basic
 12 training was integrated in the services first during the
 13 Carter administration really can only be seen in view of
 14 the integration of the service academies in 1976.
 15 The services, as I said, had never really
 16 been keen on having women in the military, had always —
 17 and were using them in more limited roles until the early
 18 seventies, and they were really forced to integrate the
 19 academies in 1976 by Congress.
 20 All of the services had testified against
 21 integration of the service academies. The
 22 superintendents of the service academies had also
 23 testified against it. The House Armed Services Committee

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1 had actually voted against it. They had not taken action
 2 on it, but it was done — a bill was — An amendment to
 3 the bill was submitted on the floor of the House and that
 4 was eventually voted on and became the law of the land.
 5 So in a sense, the country at that time
 6 made a political choice that having women in the service
 7 academies was important enough to override any concerns
 8 the military had for preserving the academies as they
 9 were before that.

10 There was a lot of attention generated
 11 around putting women in the service academies. A lot of
 12 attention. And in a sense, what it served was to prove
 13 at least to the world that women could undergo the same
 14 — what appeared to be, I'd say, the same military
 15 training with men, as men — same standards — without
 16 either failing through higher attrition rates, although
 17 there were higher attrition rates, or reeking such a
 18 change upon the organization that it would be seen as an
 19 obvious failure. So it was, in a sense, proof of a
 20 success or proof of a principle that men and women are
 21 exactly the same.

22 So that when the Carter administration
 23 came in with some very key members of the administration

1 And it wasn't long after I was
 2 commissioned and then after General Meyer, who I
 3 understand will come to speak to you also, came in as
 4 Chief of Staff of the Army, that he made a change. Very
 5 quickly and very quietly.

6 I had interviewed him for my book, and the
 7 story he gave me — and he can probably tell you the same
 8 thing — is that he apparently had asked a friend of his,
 9 another general — I believe his name was Arthur Collins
 10 — to look at the military, all different parts of it,
 11 and just to report on what he found; what conditions, the
 12 state of the military.

13 I don't know if this was before he came
 14 out with his proclamation that it was a hollow military,
 15 but one of the things that General Collins came back to
 16 say was that integration — integrated basic training had
 17 not worked, that it had lowered standards, and without
 18 much fanfare or adieu, or much concern really, Meyer
 19 ordered basic training to be re-segregated.

20 He had also instituted the Women in the
 21 Army study, or WITA, as it was called. They looked at a
 22 number of different issues. They ended up focusing
 23 mostly on the MEPS SCAT or the tests of physical ability

1 at the time, very interested in advancing the position of
 2 women in the military, in the Defense Department, and
 3 made the change towards the integration of basic training
 4 — although there had been no public support or demand,
 5 no groundswell at all of concern for integrating basic
 6 training, nevertheless, it seemed a logical next step —
 7 that if you can have women at the service academies, then
 8 of course it would make no difference to have them in
 9 basic training.

10 As I say, I did a few weeks as a cadet at
 11 Fort Jackson where they were undergoing basic training,
 12 which was integrated. It was integrated at the squad
 13 level. The only distinction they made or at least the
 14 only separation they had was they had women all on one
 15 floor of the barracks, the top floor. Otherwise, they
 16 were going through everything the men were doing, right
 17 alongside with the men.

18 Of course, the standards weren't the same.
 19 And from my view, and I think in the opinion of some of
 20 the other recruits who were going through it at the same
 21 time that I was there as a pseudo-drill sergeant, they
 22 could obviously see that the standards were either not
 23 the same or had been significantly lower.

1 for recruits, and they, in fact, devised a complicated
 2 system of both testing recruits for physical ability and
 3 then rating different jobs for what ability was required.

4 Meyer ordered it implemented, but then he
 5 retired. And his successor, having not as much
 6 institutional clout invested in the study, and DACOWITS
 7 bringing the study and its recommendation to the
 8 attention of Casper Weinberger at the time, ended up —
 9 the result was that the whole thing was, well, I would
 10 say thrown away.

11 Actually, what they did was they began to
 12 use it as a recruiter's counseling tool, but ultimately
 13 what you had was you didn't have physical standards set
 14 for individual recruits. That was the one big
 15 achievement of the Women in the Army study. They also
 16 closed a few other jobs to women as a result of a
 17 complicated classification of combat roles for women.
 18 But much of what they did, probably their most
 19 significant contribution — what would have been a
 20 contribution to the policy of Women in the Military was
 21 not taken after Meyer left.

22 I approach this issue — even though the
 23 book, of course, is a chronology, I would approach the

1 And I remember vividly one morning run
 2 where as the formation of men and women — Of course, the
 3 object is to keep the formation together. You do that by
 4 putting the shorter people up front. In this case, there
 5 were shorter women up front. We had some very tall male
 6 recruits in the very rear who occasionally would — just
 7 to show their contempt or disregard for the standards
 8 that they were under, would just break out into a walk,
 9 and in a quick walk could keep up with this formation of
 10 running women. I don't think at that point that they
 11 were very impressed with what the Army was making them
 12 do, and certainly what I saw didn't encourage me to
 13 believe that this was a good thing to do either.

14 It was a time when there were a lot of
 15 changes going on in the Army. At that time, they had
 16 ordered also — they had ordered the Army to stop using
 17 the use of the term "drill sergeant." They were supposed
 18 to be called just "sergeants." They also were told at
 19 the time to stop calling recruits trainees because that
 20 was supposedly demeaning. There were some very
 21 frustrated drill sergeants, and I remember one throwing
 22 his drill sergeant's hat away at one point in disgust at
 23 the things that were going on.

1 issue the way we'd approach any other issue: it's a
 2 simple matter of costs and benefits. If we assume that
 3 you can get the men to do the job or you can get enough
 4 women to do the job, it doesn't matter. The question is
 5 why should we substitute women for men? And if you weigh
 6 the costs and benefits, that should give you an answer.

7 There's really only one benefit, however,
 8 to using women in the military, and that's that generally
 9 women are better behaved. They cause fewer problems,
 10 fewer disciplinary problems; lower rates of drug and
 11 alcohol abuse.

12 The costs, however, are many, and I won't
 13 go into them in any detail. I'm sure you've heard many
 14 of them before. But they do lack physical strength to
 15 perform a lot of military jobs. They require a lot more
 16 medical care than men; about twice as much medical care
 17 according to some studies.

18 They are harder to recruit. You spend
 19 more time and money to recruit them. They have higher
 20 attrition rates, which means you lose the investment
 21 you've made in training them. They have lower rates of
 22 deployability, even in time of war. We saw that in the
 23 Gulf War. They are more likely to be single parents.

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1 There are problems with fraternization and sexual
 2 harassment that do cause problems with unit cohesion.
 3 And generally, having them in the military
 4 means you have to have a less military military. You
 5 have to relax standards. You have to lower standards.
 6 You have to double standards. You have to do away with a
 7 lot of military traditions that really keep the military
 8 together as an inspired, functioning, disciplined force,
 9 and that's certainly what's happened over the years.
 10 Now, even then, I would say obviously that
 11 these disadvantages or these costs outweigh the one
 12 advantage or the one benefit. I don't know how anybody
 13 can come out with a different conclusion, laying them all
 14 out. But what will happen is that people will, besides
 15 trying to — Well, generally, the only thing they really
 16 can do is simply deny all the costs, deny all the
 17 disadvantages, and that's what they'll do.
 18 Now, they themselves I think would
 19 recognize that these costs exist, but the reason they are
 20 intent upon denying them is that there's another value
 21 here which they are asserting ahead of the value of
 22 having the most effective military, and that's the value
 23 of having women in these jobs. Just having them in

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1 double standards.
 2 The troops on the ground can see that
 3 things aren't equal and they can live with that to a
 4 degree, but they sure as heck don't like being told that
 5 things are equal and then being promoted as if they're
 6 equal, knowing that there are different standards for men
 7 and women.
 8 And that, I think, is the most corrosive,
 9 longest-term effect, because it will destroy the
 10 integrity of the armed forces. It is destroying the
 11 personal integrity of many men and women who serve in the
 12 military and have to live with that policy. It's an
 13 Orwellian policy.
 14 As I've heard recently, John Hillon, with
 15 the Council on Foreign Relations, another veteran — he
 16 said that we're not mature enough as a country to have
 17 women in the military because we can't stand for them to
 18 fail. If we're going to have women in the military in a
 19 more mature way, we would have to keep the standards
 20 higher and allow them to fail, allow them not to be or
 21 not insist that they be in all the places that they're in
 22 or in all the numbers that they're in.
 23 That's the problem, I think. If the

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1 positions as admirals and generals and on down the line.
 2 That to them is more important than having the most
 3 effective military.
 4 And that's a political choice the American
 5 people could make. If the American people thought that
 6 it was so important to have women in these jobs that it
 7 was worth the costs that are involved, the American
 8 people could make that choice. But the American people
 9 have never been offered that choice, at least not that
 10 choice honestly.
 11 The American people have in fact been
 12 misled. They have been told that these costs don't
 13 exist, that there are no disadvantages; that, in fact,
 14 the integrated force is better than the force we had
 15 before — even better, as some have said, than the force
 16 we had during World War II.
 17 They've been told that having women in the
 18 military makes no difference at all; that they meet the
 19 same standards and that they perform as well, and that
 20 the force is overall better for having them there. And
 21 based upon that information, they have made the choice
 22 that, indeed, this is a good thing to integrate the
 23 military to the degree we have.

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1 American people were to make that decision based upon the
 2 truth being provided to them about the actual impact of
 3 integration, I certainly would have no trouble living
 4 with it. And I think actually they'd make a very
 5 reasonable choice if that's what they were offered, but
 6 it's not what they've been offered.
 7 That's about all I'm prepared to say and
 8 I'll certainly take your questions.
 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. I think I
 10 mentioned we just go around the table.
 11 And with your permission, Fred, I'll start
 12 this way (indicating) because I know Charlie has to leave
 13 a little bit early today. But just to let other people
 14 think of their question, I'll start.
 15 Have you any background to offer us about
 16 the decision in approximately '92-93 to return to gender-
 17 integrated training? You kind of left off in the early
 18 eighties when they dropped or at least a couple of the
 19 services dropped gender-integrated in favor of
 20 segregated, and then '92-93 era they went back again.
 21 Have you any insight about rationales for that change?
 22 MR. MITCHELL: Well, as we saw as a result
 23 of the Gulf War — And that was an interesting case

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1 Now, I would even say that there are
 2 places in the military where if you weigh the costs and
 3 benefits, the benefits outweigh the costs. Particularly,
 4 we can see that in the medical professions where the
 5 services have a hard time getting doctors and nurses and
 6 other medical technicians; some of the specialists in
 7 other fields where the skills required are such that they
 8 are worth putting up with any costs involved. There,
 9 indeed, we should use women.
 10 By and large, however, for the vast
 11 majority of military jobs, especially those most closely
 12 related to combat jobs, what we consider combat, the
 13 costs are going to outweigh the benefits. The
 14 disadvantages are going to mean that having women in the
 15 military means a less effective, more costly, less
 16 efficient, less trustworthy force.
 17 And I'd have to say the worst impact —
 18 worst effect of the present policy is that we do all that
 19 denying; we do all of that pretending that — which
 20 ultimately is dishonest. It's a dishonest institution we
 21 create when we force it to live with things that people
 22 can see are not true: when we shave the heads of men but
 23 not women and tell them they're equal, or when we have

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1 because the Gulf War was the first time we had ever faced
 2 a real deployment, a serious wartime deployment of large
 3 numbers of women, and the amazing thing was there were
 4 some interesting reports coming out of the press.
 5 Before the ground war in December and
 6 January of that year, they pointed to obvious problems.
 7 We had separated a lot of young families. We had
 8 separated a lot of women from their children, some
 9 children as old as six weeks old. I remember the famous
 10 picture of the one woman from Fort Benning where she's
 11 saying goodbye to a newborn baby, basically. She's going
 12 off to war. She didn't see that baby for another six
 13 months. And that was happening all over the country.
 14 We were calling up reservists. Women who
 15 had left the Army or left the military in order to have
 16 children and care for those children on a full-time
 17 basis, we were calling them up to send them to war and in
 18 some cases they didn't want to go. And as it turned out,
 19 we had higher non-deployability rates for women.
 20 The strange thing happened was that
 21 despite all the concern — There was quite a bit. Sally
 22 Quinn was writing in The Washington Post with a statement
 23 that — drawing on her own experience as an Air Force

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1 brat, that even the evil Saddam Hussein doesn't send
 2 mothers to fight his war but the United States did.
 3 Despite all that concern, as soon as the
 4 ground war was over, there was this rush to victory and
 5 laurels given out to everyone, including all of the
 6 women, and all of those concerns about separating young
 7 children from their mothers, all the other concerns about
 8 what had gone on in the Gulf — and there were quite a
 9 few problems over there — all of that was just forgotten
 10 in the media rush to portray the experience or the
 11 participation of women in the military as a great
 12 success.
 13 And that set up the concern or raised the
 14 proposal that came out on Capitol Hill for revisiting the
 15 issue of the combat exclusions. There was a commission,
 16 of course, and eventually the results of the commission
 17 actually hardly mattered because about the time the
 18 commission finished its work, Clinton was elected
 19 president, and then it was a foregone conclusion that
 20 this was the interest of the Clinton administration that
 21 these things would happen.
 22 The laws barring women from certain combat
 23 jobs were repealed. I'm not aware of any public debate

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1 by any means on integrating basic training. It was just,
 2 again, a part of the assumption that men and women are
 3 exactly the same and ought to be treated the same; and,
 4 therefore, if they can do it at the service academies,
 5 they certainly should be doing it everywhere else.
 6 That's the thinking, that's the
 7 motivating, that's the philosophy of the etiology,
 8 whatever you want to call it, of the administration. And
 9 so they, just as a matter of default, went back to it.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I really
 11 only have one question. You talked about the Gates
 12 Commission in the seventies and what was said publicly
 13 and what might have been said by staffers and the like.
 14 The question that I have in your research and the like
 15 that you have done is how much, if at all, has
 16 demographics played in this?
 17 In other words, when in the nineteen-
 18 seventies the all-volunteer force was looked at and in
 19 the succeeding decades beyond, were demographics looked
 20 at as far as the base population of male-to-female? And
 21 what impact might that have had on a number of these
 22 decisions?
 23 MR. MITCHELL: Interesting thing: they did

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1 look at demographics and the amazing thing was that they
 2 were always wrong, it turned out. They were always wrong
 3 about the demographics.
 4 There had been another commission before
 5 the Gates Commission — I believe it was called the
 6 Marshal Commission — and they had made certain
 7 assumptions about demographics which the Gates Commission
 8 then refuted as having proven to be wrong; and about the
 9 time of the mid-seventies, it became apparent that the
 10 Gates Commission's own demographic assumptions were
 11 wrong.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And what
 13 were those assumptions?
 14 MR. MITCHELL: If I can recall, they had
 15 not looked for — not taken account of the drop in birth
 16 rates, as I can remember. I'm not sure. I'd have to
 17 refer you to my book on that.
 18 But what I would argue in that is no doubt
 19 it did appear that the services could use — could
 20 alleviate the need for men by recruiting women. The
 21 problem is, is that by recruiting women, you sacrifice a
 22 certain pull that you have upon potentially men that you
 23 might recruit and you convert it into a different

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1 organization that many men would not be a part of.
 2 The Gates Commission never considered that
 3 an all-male military would do better at recruiting than
 4 an integrated force. There's no record, as I say, that
 5 the Gates Commission even thought about — no public
 6 record that they even considered the impact of recruiting
 7 women in the military, although this had been a part of
 8 the earlier commission that I had mentioned.
 9 And I would suspect that one reason why
 10 they kept it out of the final report was that they were
 11 afraid — since the services were opposed to going to the
 12 all-volunteer force, they were afraid that if they had
 13 made the use of women a part of their final report, that
 14 the services would have used that to oppose — to argue
 15 against the transition to the all-volunteer force.
 16 So they kept any mention of women out of
 17 their final report and, to my knowledge, did not, either
 18 — from either side, the commissioners or some of the
 19 staffers, did not look at the results of any of the
 20 problems or what impact that might have had on
 21 recruiting.
 22 I do think that what we're seeing today is
 23 that young men growing up, since they do not aspire to be

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1 women, they don't look to women as people to emulate,
 2 they don't look to women as role models, and, yet, we put
 3 women in virtually every recruiting commercial we have —
 4 every four pictures of a servicemember has a woman in it
 5 — what we're showing them is the military is really not
 6 the place for them; that it's really not much different
 7 than civilian life.
 8 So I would expect that it would have a
 9 very negative influence upon the recruiting for men.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: That's all
 11 I have.
 12 DR. MOSKOS: I want to thank you, Brian,
 13 for especially pointing out some of the self- — I don't
 14 know. What's the word? — deceptions that sometimes
 15 occur when we hear these things. But I want to
 16 understand the advantages side. Perhaps — I have just
 17 two questions, and I'll give them both out to you.
 18 On the advantages side, I wonder if the
 19 picture is not so one-sided: the only advantage is that
 20 women are smarter or less trouble. I think, you know,
 21 that the — leaving out combat and all of that, but, I
 22 mean, there's a role of women certainly in support roles
 23 and particularly in peacekeeping deployed missions. Our

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1 research indicates that, you know, it's an improvement on
 2 a peacekeeping mission, not just a wash.
 3 And I wonder if you might strengthen the
 4 case by saying there are more advantages besides the
 5 obvious disadvantages that occur when you have mixed-
 6 gender units; that those are certainly there, too. So I
 7 don't know. It may make the case a little stronger; more
 8 pluses, I think, than just one plus and a bunch of
 9 minuses.
 10 The second question — and you can respond
 11 to these in a minute. Today, Gordon Sullivan told us
 12 that the decision to re-integrate basic training was an
 13 internal decision made, in the Army case, and you're
 14 suggesting a different interpretation. I don't — So two
 15 points, not related to each other.
 16 MR. MITCHELL: All right. I admit there
 17 may be other advantages, and I certainly say it depends
 18 upon the job and what you're having them do when there
 19 are skills involved. Certainly the need for the skill
 20 may outweigh any disadvantage, as well as the employment
 21 if you're using them in a certain way or certain kind of
 22 unit.
 23 Certainly the peacekeeping duties are

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1 something very different than a military —
 2 DR. MOSKOS: Right. Which is my — if you
 3 take the university world, leaving aside the physical
 4 stuff — but certainly if you have men and women going to
 5 college together, sexual harassment, gender, hanky-panky,
 6 all of that appears as well.
 7 MR. MITCHELL: Right.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: And you can — you know, I
 9 don't know if you want to stretch your argument to say
 10 you should have, you know, separate-gender universities,
 11 too, to get into those kind of minuses. Obviously a
 12 single-sex college has probably got fewer problems of a
 13 certain sort, but it also gets added advantage by having
 14 women in it, and I think there are parts of the military
 15 which may be analogous.
 16 MR. MITCHELL: Well, the military,
 17 however, we start with certain assumptions, and the one
 18 is that war — In which case, peacekeeping duties are not
 19 quite wartime.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: Right.
 21 MR. MITCHELL: But war is a matter of life
 22 and death, and in a matter of life and death, you have a
 23 certain moral obligation then to field the most effective

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1 risk their careers or whether they're going to go along
 2 with things.
 3 The study actually ended up — and the
 4 admirals accepted this and brought it to Webb —
 5 recommending more women aboard ship than Webb himself
 6 would have liked, and Webb said this at the time when I
 7 interviewed him. He also said it just a couple of weeks
 8 ago when he spoke at the Naval War College. He deferred
 9 to the admirals. He thought it was important at that
 10 time to go along with their recommendation.
 11 Did he believe that they really wanted
 12 more women aboard ship? That this was really the outcome
 13 of a fine deliberation and for the good of the Navy? I
 14 don't think, although you can ask him — I don't think he
 15 thought that it had really come up with the right answer,
 16 and I don't think it did.
 17 And I don't think in this case that if
 18 there had been any proposal to integrate the basic
 19 training, that that would have been made even internally
 20 with the interests of the Army in mind. There are
 21 ideological concerns there driving some of those people,
 22 both the men and the women, and certainly that's the way
 23 things are going.

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1 force possible, which means that you have to put that
 2 value ahead of the value of providing — and as I should
 3 have said before — a few jobs to a few women.
 4 Because we're really not talking about
 5 equality here. We're not talking about fairness because
 6 it's manifestly unfair to put women in the military as we
 7 have them today with all of the double standards and all
 8 the catering that goes on. This is not equality. This
 9 is just having some women do some jobs, and largely for
 10 political or ideological purposes.
 11 But there may be more jobs, indeed, where
 12 it makes sense to use women, where the advantage of
 13 having them there — and that's one I hadn't thought of
 14 because it hadn't been a part of the military's duties
 15 for a long time — but it may be that when the military
 16 comes to doing what are really more civil military
 17 duties, civil military operations, that indeed it makes
 18 more sense for the military to have a force or a unit
 19 that is more civilian in a sense to do those jobs. And
 20 that may mean —
 21 DR. MOSKOS: More civil.
 22 MR. MITCHELL: More civil, and that may
 23 mean that indeed having women there —

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1 The military's had this issue shoved down
 2 their throats for thirty years now. There's nobody left
 3 standing who's going to stand up to it. And since it
 4 happens in an incremental way, no admiral or general is
 5 going to sacrifice his career by going off into
 6 ignominious retirement over just the latest inch given
 7 up.
 8 So I'm not surprised at all that really
 9 something like that might have happened internally. That
 10 was certainly the expectation that that's the direction
 11 things were going and certainly there are a lot of men
 12 who are willing to go in that direction.
 13 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I just have one
 15 question. The information in your book relative to the
 16 Gulf War, did you get most of that from unit histories or
 17 interviews or...
 18 MR. MITCHELL: A lot of it was taken from
 19 the research done by the President's Commission on the
 20 Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces. They had heard
 21 testimony from a number of people. There were also quite
 22 a few press reports that were based upon interviews with
 23 people who served over there. I certainly had talked to

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1 (UNIDENTIFIED): Won't hurt you.
 2 MR. MITCHELL: Yes. And may be more
 3 appropriate. So that's quite a possibility.
 4 Now, the problem, of course, is — and you
 5 will still have to put up with any problems it causes.
 6 We can't simply just deny the fact that they exist.
 7 So I'll grant you your point there.
 8 The other thing with regard to Sullivan,
 9 I'm not surprised that he would say that or that it would
 10 even be true, because the winds have been blowing in one
 11 direction for an awfully long time and anybody who wants
 12 to sail along in the services is going to hoist his sails
 13 with those winds.
 14 This has happened before. Jim Webb, when
 15 he was Secretary of the Navy briefly, had instituted a
 16 study of women aboard ship. The study was handled by the
 17 Navy staff. The staff was, of course, mixed male and
 18 female. You know, with these things, you have to be
 19 careful to have an equal number, and immediately you set
 20 it up so that one half of the staff people involved in it
 21 have almost a vested interest in its outcome and the
 22 other half, well, it's a question as to whether or not
 23 they're going to stand up to that vested interest and

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1 a number of people, including my brother — he served
 2 over there with a Special Forces unit — and a number of
 3 others.
 4 So it's based upon, as with anything,
 5 personal interviews, interviews done by other people, and
 6 then also some of the studies that the services
 7 themselves had done which were, of course, made available
 8 to the Presidential Commission.
 9 MR. MOORE: I'm interested in the
 10 evolution of the distinction or the definition of combat
 11 as it relates to the combat exclusion policy. At least
 12 it's a policy with respect to the Army. There's no
 13 statutory prohibition —
 14 MR. MITCHELL: Right.
 15 MR. MOORE: — with respect to the Army.
 16 How has that evolved and how do you see
 17 that factoring into this changing dynamic that you
 18 described?
 19 MR. MITCHELL: It's, I think, a big point,
 20 and the one thing that will set me apart from so many
 21 people who might argue this issue is that I'll never
 22 argue against women in combat. I'll argue against women
 23 in the military. The military services are combat

1 organizations. They are created for that. That's what
 2 they do.
 3 When you start talking about civil
 4 military affairs, we're talking about another kind of
 5 organization. In fact, there are some people — and I
 6 talked to one recently — who are actually proposing to
 7 make the military another kind of organization, one that
 8 does more civil military things.
 9 But if the services are what they have
 10 been in the past, they are combat organizations.
 11 Everything they do contributes to the ability to perform
 12 in combat. And the services themselves have not
 13 historically made a hard-line distinction between what is
 14 combat and what is noncombat, and the reason is, is you
 15 can't. There's just not a clear line drawn on the ground
 16 or in the sea or in the air that separates the noncombat
 17 from the combat.
 18 And I think it at least sounds to me a
 19 little silly to talk about noncombat soldiers. The
 20 emphasis on combat/noncombat has largely arisen as a
 21 result of the military's needs to say where women could
 22 not be. Since they were forced to take women, they had
 23 to then decide where they would not put women; so then

1 they began to put more emphasis or attach more
 2 significance to this designation of combat.
 3 And they'd actually go through and
 4 identify certain units as combat units, and then with the
 5 Women in the Military — Women in the Army study in the
 6 early eighties, go through with this complicated
 7 probability coding to decide the probability of combat.
 8 And the military has struggled with
 9 definitions of combat over the years and it seemed that
 10 every year the definition of combat was understood to
 11 include more women than it did before. There was a
 12 question as to whether or not combat exclusions were
 13 intended to protect women or to protect the military, or
 14 were we protecting combat units by keeping women out of
 15 combat or were we protecting women from combat?
 16 Well, the advocates of more women in the
 17 military would argue both ways. They'd argue any way
 18 that would work. They would argue that certain units
 19 were not combat units and, therefore, we can put women in
 20 those; and then they would look at other units that had
 21 women and they'd say, "See, these units are already in
 22 combat. They're under fire. So this distinction doesn't
 23 make any sense."

1 And ultimately it's true, the distinction
 2 didn't make much sense. It was an arbitrary way of
 3 drawing the line between where women would serve and
 4 where they wouldn't, and it distracted attention and
 5 thought away from the real bottom line of the policy,
 6 which is when you weigh the pluses and the minuses, which
 7 one outweighs the other?
 8 So I, in all of my talking, will say that
 9 the talk about combat/noncombat is a waste of time. It's
 10 been a loser for those people who would argue against
 11 women in the military because year after year those who
 12 have argued against women in combat have given ground to
 13 now combat is just an infantryman and a tanker, and a
 14 submariner, apparently. But women are everywhere else,
 15 and certainly they are in combat.
 16 You still run into people who — Americans
 17 who assume that women are not in combat. That's what
 18 we've done. We've confused people. We've blurred the
 19 lines. We've talked about things that don't matter,
 20 always under pressure to just make room for women.
 21 MR. MOORE: Well, the irony of your
 22 position is that, on this point at least, you would
 23 converge with certain staunch advocates of more

1 involvement of women in the military who argue the same
 2 thing: that the nature of modern warfare makes this
 3 combat/noncombat distinction meaningless and, therefore,
 4 they would argue from that basis that there ought to be
 5 fewer restrictions. So on that point, it seems that you
 6 sort of converge.
 7 MR. MITCHELL: Yeah. And that's because
 8 the opponents of women in the military have adopted an
 9 indefensible position. They have set their lines of fire
 10 in the final line of defense and ultimately they've been
 11 overrun because, indeed, there is not a clear line
 12 between combat and noncombat. And with missiles, even
 13 intercontinental ballistic missiles, everybody can be a
 14 combatant, so absolutely I would agree with them in that.
 15 Now, I have other reasons for, of course,
 16 arguing against a large role for women in the military,
 17 and that's because I don't choose what I think is an
 18 indefensible position: that we ought not have women in
 19 combat but they can serve anywhere else. That to me
 20 makes no sense at all.
 21 MR. MOORE: One more question and then
 22 I'll pass on.
 23 MR. MITCHELL: Now, if I might, just —

1 MR. MOORE: Yeah. Sure.
 2 MR. MITCHELL: Just one other point, is
 3 every argument you use against women in combat can also
 4 be used against women in noncombat jobs. Every noncombat
 5 job. Morale, esprit de corps, unit cohesion, lack of
 6 physical strength — all of those things apply to some
 7 degree in noncombat jobs. And, yet, we have this idea
 8 that, well, we can tolerate inefficiency, we can tolerate
 9 ineffectiveness, you know, the lack of unit cohesion in
 10 support units, but we can't tolerate them in combat
 11 units, as if the effect of one is not going to affect the
 12 other.
 13 MR. MOORE: This question I'm sure will be
 14 seen as a sort of leading question or softball. I
 15 suspect I know what you're going to say but let me ask it
 16 anyway just because I'm wrestling constantly with the
 17 intangible elements of military effectiveness.
 18 Typically there's a bias towards
 19 empiricism and towards quantifiable data, and I'm not
 20 saying that's not important. That is highly important.
 21 But there's — as a historian, I suspect that sometimes
 22 the intangible elements of military effectiveness are
 23 more decisive than in some of the things you just

1 mentioned: cohesion, morale, quality of leadership; you
 2 know, the fighting elan of the forces.
 3 And what I have heard primarily from, I
 4 would say, junior and O-5-and-above officers who are in
 5 the training base, who have enthusiastically embraced not
 6 just integrated training but a large role for women in
 7 the forces, and typically when some of these objections
 8 that you have brought up are raised to them, they dismiss
 9 them as a sort of retrograde cultural bias.
 10 And they're fairly explicit about saying
 11 — So part of our role in making this work is to subdue
 12 this sort of archaic culture and to inculcate a new
 13 military culture in the organization.
 14 Now, I'm sure based on what you've said,
 15 and having a little familiarity with your work, that you
 16 would disagree with that. But historically, is there any
 17 way that these two impulses can coexist? Can a military
 18 organization exist and be militarily effective in combat,
 19 in warfare, without what we would call, you know, the
 20 warrior ethos, to use a term that we discussed with
 21 General Sullivan this morning?
 22 And if so, what constitutes a warrior
 23 ethos and how can that be replaced with something else

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1 and still maintain combat effective organizations?
 2 MR. MITCHELL: I'm reading actually the
 3 Conquest of Mexico by William Prescott, written 150 years
 4 ago, and he talks about the Aztecs, the Aztecs being the
 5 ruling power in Mexico that Cortez conquered. The
 6 significant thing about the Aztecs is that they were more
 7 warlike than their neighbors and that's why they ruled.
 8 And generally that's the law of nature — that the more
 9 warlike a people are, the more success it will have on
 10 the field.

11 Now, in our own society, we don't wish the
 12 society to be all that warlike, but we certainly should
 13 insist that our war-making agencies be warlike. What
 14 we're seeing in fact is that we're insisting that our
 15 war-fighting organizations be just like our society:
 16 peace-loving, egalitarian, non-hierarchal, non-
 17 authoritarian, open to all of the latest trends in social
 18 thinking. And I can only believe that that will destroy
 19 the effectiveness of the services as war-fighting
 20 organizations.

21 The very fundamental values of the
 22 military organization are antithetical to these modern
 23 values that are being forced upon it. As I've said, the

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1 officer tell me, "What I say in public as Chief of Staff
 2 of my service is one thing. What I believe privately is
 3 another."

4 They really believe that what they say
 5 publicly and what they do publicly in their office is
 6 their duty, and that's quite distinct from what they
 7 might personally feel or believe. So they are doing
 8 their duty, which is an honorable thing to these men, by
 9 going along with the policy. And —

10 MS. POPE: Basically you're saying that
 11 across the services there isn't a general flag officer
 12 with integrity to match his personal and his
 13 professional?

14 MR. MITCHELL: There is not one with
 15 enough to want to end his career abruptly, as it would be
 16 if he spoke out against it —

17 MS. POPE: Okay.

18 MR. MITCHELL: — by speaking out against
 19 the policy. And partly that's because, yes, there's this
 20 incremental nature that everybody, like the frog in the
 21 hot water, gets used to things as they are and they don't
 22 want to be around when things get really hot. "Not on my
 23 watch," as they always say.

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1 military is hierarchal and has to be. It's
 2 authoritarian. It demands selfless service. It demands
 3 a sacrifice of all civil rights if necessary.

4 They don't have to let you go to church.
 5 They don't have to let you dress the way you want. They
 6 don't have to allow you any freedom of speech. All of
 7 those can go away when necessary, and that's because they
 8 deal with the life and death not only of the soldiers,
 9 but of the nation.

10 Of course, those things are just what our
 11 modern society's rebelling against. It's rebelling
 12 against hierarchy, against honors for some and not for
 13 others, against the double standards that, you know, the
 14 military has used for a long time. It makes great sense
 15 that you treat the individual — you punish them
 16 appropriate to their standing because what's punishment
 17 to one is not punishment to another. All of these things
 18 just don't make any sense to our civilian world.

19 So what we're seeing here is that the
 20 culture, the society, is basically saying that war-
 21 fighting itself is against our culture and, therefore, we
 22 can't do it and we're not going to do it; and instead,
 23 we're going to, I think, really rely upon the mechanics,

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1 Some of the admirals and generals that
 2 retired in the last ten years couldn't imagine, certainly
 3 didn't want to see the things we see now, and if it had
 4 been forced upon them then, they might have done that,
 5 but they didn't because things just didn't get quite that
 6 bad. So, you know, they just went with the flow.

7 And do I think they're compromising their
 8 personal integrity by going along with the flow and just
 9 saying things they don't believe? Yeah, absolutely. I
 10 think it's a terrible shame that we have admirals and
 11 generals who go out there and basically say things they
 12 don't believe. That's the definition of a lie, I'd say,
 13 and, yet, that's what they've done.

14 They ultimately, because it's of great
 15 personal cost to them, have misled the American people
 16 with regard to this entire issue, and it is becoming
 17 quite commonly believed and acknowledged by members of
 18 the ranks that indeed they've done it on this issue and
 19 they may be doing it on others as well.

20 MS. POPE: I just want to say for the
 21 record that I have worked with a lot of general flag
 22 officers and men and women in uniform who possess the
 23 integrity to stand up for things that they —

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1 the technology, to simply do our slaughtering for us,
 2 which might have serious consequences.

3 We see a trend. I would say some
 4 strategists would see a trend towards using large, heavy
 5 volume, stand-off weapons now with the Cruise missiles so
 6 specific. It's just a matter of how many you use. But
 7 we use stand-off weapons that allow us to accomplish this
 8 war-fighting without ever actually being warlike. That
 9 may suit us well, but other people around the world may
 10 suffer as a result of it.

11 MR. MOORE: Thank you.

12 MS. POPE: I just have one question, and I
 13 think I understood you and please correct me: In
 14 reference to the all-volunteer force and since there's
 15 been the increase of women across the services, that
 16 there hasn't been a general flag officer who has had the
 17 integrity to stand up if they thought this was wrong?

18 MR. MITCHELL: No, not a one. And —

19 MS. POPE: So I'm saying — what you're
 20 saying is that there's not a general flag officer in the
 21 four services who has the integrity, if they believe that
 22 this was wrong, to have stood up?

23 MR. MITCHELL: I had one general flag

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1 MR. MITCHELL: They don't often do it.

2 MS. POPE: I'm just saying that there are.

3 That's all. That's my experience.

4 MR. MITCHELL: The curious thing is, if

5 you look at the way the services responded to the
 6 integration — forced integration of the service
 7 academies, you had a flip-flop basically. You had
 8 general officers who were arguing before Congress against
 9 it one year, who were declaring it an unmitigated success
 10 the next year.

11 And that flip-flop wasn't missed by the
 12 cadets at the academy, these young idealistic men who
 13 don't have nearly as much invested in the Army or other
 14 services. They saw the change —

15 MS. POPE: Okay. I understand.

16 MR. MITCHELL: — and it's a very
 17 unnatural change.

18 DR. SEGAL: I have a desire to respond to
 19 each of these points, including your last one, but I'm
 20 not going to do that because we'll be here all afternoon.
 21 Actually, beyond the afternoon.

22 So just for the record, I feel that of the
 23 points that you have made, I probably agree with maybe

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1 two of them, and the rest I could refute, but it would
 2 keep us here much too long for me to do that.
 3 I appreciate the fact that you've come
 4 here and you've been honest about your views. It's very
 5 clear that you oppose women in the military and that
 6 other things that you're saying are based on that.
 7 Just for the record, in terms of costs,
 8 men have more dependents than women do. They eat more;
 9 their clothing is larger and takes more cloth. We have
 10 to build things bigger to fit them. I mean, there are a
 11 whole lot of other things that you have left out.
 12 You are very articulate. I have read your
 13 books. They read very well.
 14 MR. MITCHELL: Thank you.
 15 DR. SEGAL: You very cleverly and
 16 selectively present points to support your views. But I
 17 want to bring us to some of the issues that are relevant
 18 for our Commission.
 19 In pointing out differences between men
 20 and women, including in costs, you have been treating men
 21 and women as if all men are alike — like each other and
 22 all women are like each other, as opposed to looking at
 23 the differences between and among individuals within

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1 I don't think it's possible. We do have the choice of
 2 having an all-male military.
 3 And so that's why I phrased the question
 4 of what are the costs and benefits of substituting the
 5 woman for the man — a woman for a man? And in that
 6 case, yes, we look at the costs of the woman and the
 7 benefits of the woman. And while the benefits are worth
 8 noting, nevertheless, I cannot see that they outweigh the
 9 many costs.
 10 Now, with regard to these other groups
 11 you've mentioned, I don't see quite the imbalance in
 12 those cases that I see with regard to men and women. I
 13 mean, when you list the long list of problems that go
 14 along with having women, the obvious physical disparity,
 15 and then also the attempts to just deny it — just to
 16 deny that these things even matter. That tells you that
 17 something's wrong here that we cannot tolerate even the
 18 open admission — the public admission that these things
 19 exist.
 20 DR. SEGAL: Well, we could have a long
 21 discussion on what the differences actually are. I
 22 believe that you see things in terms of the differences
 23 between men and women and see the costs greater for women

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1 those groups.
 2 So I want to ask you if you think that we
 3 should treat groups if we find that there are differences
 4 between groups — statistically significant differences
 5 on things that are of interest to the military — should
 6 we treat all the members of those groups as if they
 7 represent the average for their group?
 8 For example, blacks score lower on the
 9 ASVAB than whites do. So by your reasoning, since you
 10 find a difference in the groups, perhaps we should
 11 exclude all blacks from the military since we know that
 12 it costs more to train people and to cross-train them if
 13 they score lower on the cognitive tests.
 14 Similarly — and it's one that works the
 15 other way — white men have lower reenlistment rates than
 16 black men in the Army, and so the turnover that white men
 17 cause creates more of a problem for us. Should we
 18 exclude white men on that basis?
 19 My position is that if you find
 20 differences on average between genders or races or people
 21 with other sorts of differences, that they have to be so
 22 great, given our society with our — I agree that the
 23 individual is not what we focus on, but we cannot draw

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1 because of your views and the way that your views color
 2 the way that you examine evidence.
 3 So that's all.
 4 MR. MITCHELL: We all have our views.
 5 MR. PANG: You know, I just — in thinking
 6 about this, you know, I guess I come to this point. You
 7 know, Congress, under the Constitution, has a
 8 responsibility — and I'll paraphrase — to raise armies
 9 and maintain navies. In other words, they have — that
 10 body has the responsibility, that very same body that
 11 created this particular Commission.
 12 And although the debate may have been
 13 truncated, maybe all the facts weren't laid on the table,
 14 the truth of the matter is that Congress, you know,
 15 mandated an all-volunteer force. It might have been a —
 16 It was a political decision in 1973 to do that, when it
 17 did away with the draft.
 18 So the other thing it did was repealed the
 19 combat exclusions that existed in law. I mean, at one
 20 time Congress said no women can fly combat aircraft; they
 21 cannot be assigned permanently to combat vessels. And
 22 Congress held hearings; may not have heard all the facts
 23 bearing on the issue — I believe it did — but made a

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1 group distinctions unless they are based in reality in
 2 terms of all people in the group are like this and all in
 3 the other group are like that.
 4 So I want you to tell us what you think in
 5 terms of — I have two questions. One is what you think
 6 in terms of this group versus individual. And to use an
 7 example, I hate to pick on her but Lieutenant Colonel
 8 Barbara Harris is a living example of a woman who is in
 9 the military and who in fact was in the combat arms
 10 because she's a field artillery officer. Do you think
 11 that our military would be more ready without her?
 12 MR. MITCHELL: Yes, absolutely.
 13 With regard to generalizations and
 14 treating people as groups or individuals, we can't know
 15 anything without generalizing. The human mind cannot
 16 conceive of each individual as an individual without
 17 drawing similarities with other individuals, and the same
 18 thing goes for every other item of existence. That's the
 19 only way we know things. That's the only way we know
 20 what is a woman or what is a man.
 21 With regard to the comparative
 22 differences, we don't have the choice of having an all-
 23 female military. At least I've heard no one argue that.

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1 decision. And, again, it's by vote, so it's a political
 2 decision and it voted to repeal those laws.
 3 So that, in your view, may be a flawed
 4 process. I mean, the American people did speak, I mean,
 5 you know, through our elected lawmakers, and they did do
 6 that. So that leads me to this question.
 7 Do you believe, given that track record —
 8 I mean, an all-volunteer force, repeal of the combat
 9 exclusion laws, the integration of more women into the
 10 military, and now in the highest numbers ever — that the
 11 clock can ever be turned back and we can go back to an
 12 all-male military? Is that possible in your view?
 13 MR. MITCHELL: I think it's —
 14 MR. PANG: Easily?
 15 MR. MITCHELL: I think it's certainly
 16 possible. You know, the French have a saying that if you
 17 throw nature out the door, she'll find a way of sneaking
 18 back in through the window. And I think that the
 19 differences between men and women are so obvious that
 20 they're not going to go away; that they'll continue to be
 21 a problem.
 22 And it's possible that people may come to
 23 their senses. I think the more likely outcome is that

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1 we'll just get used to having a military that's not so
2 military anymore and not so efficient and not so
3 trustworthy. We'll have a military that's a lot more
4 like the U.S. Postal Service: people wear uniforms and
5 they do their job, but that's it. And that's — We will
6 just end up tolerating these problems and expecting less
7 from the military.

8 Now, I don't see that a law passed by
9 Congress is, of course, set in stone. I mean, they can
10 obviously change their mind. And I don't think that
11 we've had just an imperfect hearing of this. What we've
12 had is an overwhelming denial of certain obvious facts
13 and really a deceit of the American people, largely
14 perpetrated by the media.

15 And speaking as a member of the media, I
16 have to say that there are an awful lot of people in the
17 media who just have an interest in advancing one
18 ideological side in this and they will go out of their
19 way to do that. And they'll deny the biggest problems in
20 order to do that.

21 And on the other hand, we have an obedient
22 service. Everybody likes to trot out the admirals and
23 generals. And the admirals can say what they want, but

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1 of wrestling after we received the report.

2 You know, it was reviewed in great depth
3 in the committee, you know. And I hate to say this but
4 it's true. I mean, you know, when your side doesn't win
5 — And I'm not saying your side. I mean when a side —
6 okay? — doesn't win its argument, then it always says
7 that, "well, not all the truth came forward," I mean, you
8 know.

9 But this thing is all in the public
10 record, I mean, so it's out there. I don't think, you
11 know, you need to get a referendum in this country on it.
12 I mean, you know, the place where it's going to be
13 decided is going to be the field of battle in the
14 Congress.

15 And everybody's got their way of talking
16 to the Congress. I mean, the military has its way of
17 doing it on the record and, you know, off the record, and
18 in many other ways, and the American public has a way of
19 expressing itself.

20 But one thing I agree with you on is the
21 fact that our military is only — you know, in the active
22 component these days is 1.4 million. And when you look
23 at the reserve component and — you know, which has less

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1 the fact of the matter is those admirals and generals are
2 men under orders and they're responding to their
3 leadership and the orders that are being given above.
4 And perhaps it's too much to expect from them to be as
5 candid and as honest since, after all, we expect
6 obedience from them.

7 But as a result of having both the media
8 on one hand and the admirals and generals on the other
9 being expected to say what they're told to say, the
10 American people haven't been given the truth on this.
11 They've been given a lie, and that's why they've made the
12 political choice they have. I think the political choice
13 can be made the other way and I certainly think it would
14 be made the other way if the American people were told
15 the truth.

16 And I have to say what would seem to me to
17 be the real duty of this Commission is to come up with
18 what is the truth, the hard truth, and then to say,
19 "Well, if this is a value to us, if this is something we
20 really want to do, it's worth the cost, then we're going
21 to do it." But, unfortunately, what we'll end up with —
22 what often ends up is that we'll just deny the costs, and
23 we'll say that people who argue against the costs or even

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1 than a million, you know, drilling people — I mean, in
2 context of the entire population, you know, the mission
3 itself, the people, really — sometimes I wonder really,
4 you know, whether or not they know what the military is
5 about at all. I mean, so that's a question I have in my
6 mind which is a larger issue.

7 But, you know, getting back to telling the
8 truth, I mean, some of these guys did tell the truth. I
9 mean, they got up there. They stood up and it's on the
10 record, okay? Painful though it was. I mean, I remember
11 that. I mean, some of them did. Some may not have. I
12 don't know what motivated them.

13 MR. MITCHELL: I certainly salute the
14 integrity and courage of General McPeak for doing that,
15 and also those members of Congress who did take a — just
16 weren't led along in things.

17 And the Congress, unfortunately, I think,
18 in a sense, passed the buck on that because they gave it
19 off to a commission. And, of course, what happens in a
20 commission is — well, the battle is fought by picking
21 the people on the commission.

22 And even then, it didn't much matter.
23 When Clinton won the election in '92, it was a foregone

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1 take note of the costs, they're biased.

2 In response to Dr. Segal's comment about
3 personal views, I like to quote a line from an Italian
4 historian when he says, "Impartiality is a dream and
5 honesty a duty. We cannot be impartial. We must be
6 intellectually honest." I don't think our leaders and a
7 lot of the people involved in pushing the issue of women
8 in the military have been intellectually honest. Not in
9 the least. They've been dishonest.

10 MR. PANG: You know, having sat through a
11 hearing myself on the issue of repeal of the combat
12 exclusion law — and this — you know, I might take issue
13 with you with regard to at least one individual who was a
14 general who spoke up and said that he would prefer not to
15 have the combat exclusion law repealed, and I believe
16 that person is General McPeak, who is Chief of Staff of
17 the Air Force.

18 I mean, so, you know, to say that the
19 Congress was not fully informed I think is inaccurate. I
20 mean, you know, there was debate I think on both sides of
21 the issue. I think — I worked for a boss, Senator Sam
22 Nunn, you know, who had a lot to do about creation of
23 this Presidential Commission and there was a great amount

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1 conclusion that whatever the commission had done, things
2 were going to go a certain direction. So in a sense,
3 that's how the American people spoke.

4 But I'd still have to say that the
5 American people only see things through the media, and
6 the media are a self-selective group and they are not at
7 all representative of the American people, and there are
8 plenty of studies to show this.

9 And I have seen egregious examples of
10 journalists who have gone out and portrayed this issue in
11 the way that they wanted it to come out, which is
12 generally the most feminist, most egalitarian way
13 possible. And many of these journalists were women. Not
14 all of them, by any means, because, again, too, they live
15 in a certain milieu where it's just advantageous to be of
16 a certain ideological stride.

17 But I have no doubt that while there have
18 been — truth has been expressed in some forums, in some
19 places and times, nevertheless, the American people have
20 largely heard too much of one side and not enough of the
21 other.

22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Brian, part of our
23 statute asks us to review DoD and military department

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1 efforts to objectively measure or evaluate the
 2 effectiveness of gender-integrated basic training as
 3 compared to gender-segregated basic training. That's
 4 subparagraph B(j) of the relevant section of the statute.
 5 We've posed the question and I think the
 6 answer from all four of the services is essentially that
 7 "we consider the issue closed at this point; we believe
 8 we're doing the right thing and we plan to continue doing
 9 it."
 10 I ask you as an investigative reporter:
 11 are you aware of any such measurements or anything like
 12 that that, by asking a more specific question to the DoD
 13 or any of the military services, there might be in fact
 14 any kind of studies or evaluations out there ongoing at
 15 this time?
 16 MR. MITCHELL: What I have heard is that,
 17 instead, the word has pretty much gone out that now one
 18 side has won; they're not interested in looking at the
 19 issue anymore and they don't do studies anymore.
 20 And I think there have been people quoted
 21 on record saying that we don't look at that because that
 22 only causes problems for women in the military because it
 23 raises doubts; you know, it brings the whole issue up

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1 again and they don't want to hear that. The policy has
 2 gone one way and so they're not going to be collecting
 3 statistics that are going to make that policy look bad.
 4 That's just the nature of any organization.
 5 During the Gulf War, I know that there
 6 were press reports in the New York Times and elsewhere
 7 about a high number of women being redeployed from the
 8 Gulf because of pregnancy. I called and asked CINCHAN if
 9 they were — what the statistics were, were they tracking
 10 that. Well, no, apparently, they were not tracking
 11 deployments as a result of pregnancies.
 12 You can bet they were tracking every other
 13 medical action, every other deployment for any other
 14 medical reasons. They would have been derelict in their
 15 duty had they not been doing that. But at the time —
 16 Now, it turned out later on they did have statistics on
 17 the number of women redeployed.
 18 DR. SEGAL: Did they have statistics on
 19 self-inflicted wounds among the men?
 20 MR. MITCHELL: I didn't ask that. And I'm
 21 sure they did.
 22 DR. SEGAL: Okay. I would.
 23 MR. MITCHELL: I'm sure they did. I'm

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1 sure they had those statistics. I'm sure they had them,
 2 and as it turns out, they did have them on pregnancies.
 3 They didn't tell me that. They lied to me because it was
 4 convenient to do so.
 5 And it's a "see no evil, hear no evil,
 6 speak no evil." They're not going to look at things that
 7 obviously are going to reflect badly upon the current
 8 policy or the current people who are responsible for the
 9 policy.
 10 MS. POPE: I just have to comment on that
 11 one. And that is, that the Department of Navy looked at
 12 Navy and Marine Corps — all medical returns during the
 13 Gulf War from day one. I can speak for Navy and Marine
 14 Corps. We had that data.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well, I knew
 16 they had the stats because I had twenty-five get
 17 pregnant.
 18 MR. MITCHELL: They had — yeah, had the
 19 stats.
 20 MS. POPE: Right.
 21 MR. MITCHELL: And wouldn't release them
 22 to the press —
 23 MS. POPE: But I had —

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1 MR. MITCHELL: — when the press asked.
 2 MS. POPE: But I'm just saying — You said
 3 they weren't collecting them. I'm just saying that —
 4 MR. MITCHELL: Same thing happened —
 5 MS. POPE: — Department of Navy, we had
 6 all medical —
 7 DR. SEGAL: They also didn't release to
 8 the press the numbers of self-inflicted gunshot wounds
 9 among the men.
 10 MR. MITCHELL: They may not have. And
 11 they may have had military reason for doing that, as they
 12 may have had military reason for not mentioning the
 13 number of pregnancies. But that's what happens and
 14 that's why you're not going to hear things that are going
 15 to make the present policy look bad.
 16 You know, another instance with regard to
 17 what was withheld from the press was when the two women
 18 were captured and the question was asked were they
 19 sexually molested, and the Army said no. Well, as it
 20 turned out, they were.
 21 DR. SEGAL: So were the men.
 22 MS. POPE: Right. So were the men.
 23 MR. MITCHELL: And that should have all

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1 been answered if the question had been asked, but it
 2 wasn't. That information was hidden. It had to leak out
 3 later. That's the kind of thing we're dealing with.
 4 This is dishonest. This is dishonesty. I've just given
 5 you two examples of it.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I, too,
 7 appreciate your candor. I don't appreciate my integrity
 8 being questioned because I can tell you before the
 9 Congress, in many, many times that I testified, I have
 10 never lied. And I know most of my colleagues, if not all
 11 of my colleagues, have never lied.
 12 And, in fact, there's a very special thing
 13 that you sign when in fact you are to testify before
 14 Congress or you become a flag or general officer, and
 15 that is, that you sign a piece of paper that says if the
 16 Congress, in the form of a senator or a congressman, asks
 17 you your personal opinion, that releases you — that
 18 releases you — from your bond to the Department of
 19 Defense or the administration that may have driven a
 20 given requirement, whether it be budgetary or the like.
 21 And I think Mr. Pang will tell you that I
 22 personally —
 23 MR. PANG: Absolutely.

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — have
 2 testified, much to his chagrin, on issues that were not
 3 in fact —
 4 MR. PANG: Not to my chagrin.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — the
 6 Department of Defense nor the Department of the Navy's
 7 policy.
 8 MR. PANG: Never to my chagrin.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But the
 10 point that I'd like to make is there may be — there just
 11 may be a larger body of flag and general officers who see
 12 a role, in fact, for women in the armed forces and see
 13 that role based — as you based on history, see that role
 14 based over time.
 15 Now, I'm not talking standards now and
 16 where and that kind of thing, but I'm talking about a
 17 role. So I think from your perspective it's important to
 18 perhaps take that into consideration.
 19 I think another factor to take into
 20 consideration is — and unfortunately this is not
 21 necessarily always the case or doesn't appear to be the
 22 case — is true military professionals are apolitical and
 23 they make their best judgments and try to follow those

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1 best judgments and state accordingly.

2 But our nation is based on a nation of
3 citizen soldiers, whether we be an all-volunteer force or
4 not. That came home very loud and clear in the Gulf War
5 as the reserves were brought aboard. And they are all
6 citizen soldiers, if you want to qualify those who have
7 stayed in the service for thirty years as careerists and
8 only in a military elite or whatever. So we are still
9 based on the premise of the citizen soldier.

10 And then I would turn around and I'd ask
11 for perhaps your opinion, and I think you gave parts of
12 this to Mr. Pang. Do you really believe today, as we
13 evolve toward the Twenty-First Century, that this nation
14 would in fact see an all-male armed service?

15 MR. MITCHELL: Let me take that one first.
16 Yes, it's possible. I didn't say it was likely, but it
17 is possible, and we have only to look at several of our
18 NATO allies to see that there are in fact many modern
19 militaries today, some with as much experience with war
20 as we have, that still use very few women. So it's not
21 all that unthinkable.

22 And in fact, the ones that do use large
23 numbers of women are typically the northern European

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1 have improved from a proficiency — from a professional
2 combat arms type force, from what it was in the
3 seventies, which was — and late sixties, which was not a
4 very good one, to what it was when the Desert went down
5 and what I see daily as I go out and train.

6 MR. MITCHELL: Well, see, the problem is,
7 as with any kind of historical comparison like that, you
8 can't control all the variables. In this case, you can't
9 control everything that doesn't relate to gender. There
10 are technological advances. There are differences in
11 policy with regard to drug and alcohol abuse that make a
12 difference.

13 I would argue that if we had gone to an
14 all-male military, we'd have an even better force today
15 than we had back in the seventies. So —

16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Well, I
17 said we had a horrible force in the seventies.

18 MR. MITCHELL: That's what I mean. We'd
19 have an even better force than we have today.

20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.

21 MR. MITCHELL: There's no doubt that we
22 have a less effective force today because we have women
23 in the military, and you have only to look at the

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1 countries that have gone the way domestically that we
2 have. So this is not something that countries around the
3 world have done because it's militarily effective.

4 So I do see that, indeed, there is some
5 hope there that people will recognize this. I don't
6 think that it's likely because I see generally the
7 direction of history.

8 I certainly didn't mean to call you a liar
9 and don't think I did because you can't call somebody a
10 liar unless you actually know what they believed, and I
11 do believe as you say, indeed, that most men who testify
12 to a large degree believe the things that they testify
13 to.

14 One of the frustrations I've had in
15 dealing with some very senior military officers is that
16 they're quite willing to accept the way things were when
17 they came into service, which was a presence for women in
18 the military doing certain jobs; and they just can't
19 believe me when I say, "Well, but if you'll look at that
20 from the standpoint of cost and benefit, that doesn't
21 make sense either."

22 They're willing to tolerate that. That
23 doesn't bother them. They're even willing to tolerate

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1 statistics with regard to attrition and the recruiting
2 that we spend — We spend twice as much to recruit women
3 as we do men. Any number of other measures.

4 The very fact that they lack physical
5 strength means we have ships with women that are less
6 survivable than they were before because these women
7 don't have the physical strength to perform many common
8 damage control tasks. And when a ship takes a hit,
9 that's going to mean life or death for individual sailors
10 and the ship itself. So we have — yes, absolutely — a
11 less effective Navy, less survivable Navy, as a result of
12 having women aboard them.

13 Now, of course, that doesn't mean we'll
14 lose the next war, because in any victory or defeat there
15 are plenty of things you can blame it on.

16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
17 Trustworthy.

18 MR. MITCHELL: Trustworthy. I don't trust
19 the U.S. military in many ways today. When I see the
20 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs go up and say laughable
21 things, literally, to the U.S. Congress there when they
22 say, "Well, our role in Bosnia will take one year."
23 Nobody believed that. Nobody believed it at all. Or

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1 women in many more capacities, but that's because largely
2 they haven't dealt — they don't see what the lower ranks
3 see and women aren't a threat to them in that they're not
4 working side-by-side with female admirals and female
5 generals. Now they are. They're getting to that point.

6 But a lot of military men have been quite
7 comfortable where they were at later stages in their
8 career, again, always expecting, "well, things may get
9 worse after I leave, but while I'm here, it's all right.

10 It's fine. You know, we can do this." And there's —

11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I would
12 only counter your thought, is that many military — and
13 I'm one of them — have sons and daughters who in fact
14 carry on in the military service, whether it be officer
15 or enlisted. So I think there is an investment and there
16 is an interest. So it's not necessarily — I would
17 follow-on.

18 There were two words that you used that
19 really — I don't understand your meaning, and that —
20 You implied that the armed forces was less trustworthy
21 and less efficient today. And I would like you to define
22 that based on the success that I see in the military, the
23 armed forces, and how the armed forces, quite frankly,

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1 when they say, "Oh, our biggest problem with readiness
2 now is retirement." Nobody believed that. But these
3 were very political things to say. It was very "politic"
4 to say those things at those times before Congress.

5 DR. SEGAL: I have just one last question.
6 Are there other occupations in American society that you
7 think are functioning less well because there are women
8 in them?

9 MR. MITCHELL: Obviously with regard to
10 the obvious differences between men and women, it means
11 that jobs that require a lot of physical strength are
12 going to be more inclined to hire men; that men are going
13 to do better in those jobs than women.

14 DR. SEGAL: So do you think that —

15 MR. MITCHELL: Police and fire
16 departments.

17 DR. SEGAL: — women should be excluded
18 from those?

19 MR. MITCHELL: If the interest is life and
20 death, yes. Actually, I believe in the freedom. I think
21 employers ought to have the freedom to hire who they
22 want, largely, especially in the case of men and women
23 because the disparities are so great, far greater than

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1 any disparity of race or ethnic background or anything
 2 else.
 3 And people can see this. This is not —
 4 It's not not-obvious. All you have to do is look at the
 5 average woman and look at the average man.
 6 DR. SEGAL: I don't have any more
 7 questions.
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Thank you
 9 very much for coming. We appreciate it.
 10 (A brief recess was taken.)
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. We'll go back on
 12 the record, then.
 13 Thank you very much for coming to talk to
 14 us this afternoon. What I'll do, Mr. Louden, is let you
 15 introduce your fellows here and go ahead and make an
 16 initial presentation, and we'll follow it up with
 17 questions.
 18 MR. LOUDEN: Okay. Thank you. I'm John
 19 Louden. I'm the Section Chief, Chief of Investigative
 20 Training for the FBI down at Quantico. Within my
 21 section, one of the purviews is physical training for new
 22 Agents. Also, our FIT program for the Agents who are in
 23 the field.

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1 I've brought with me today my Unit Chief
 2 for the Physical Training Unit, which is Tom Lyons; then
 3 two Supervisory Special Agent instructors, Kevin Crawford
 4 and Ed Daerr. Mr. Crawford and Mr. Daerr are directly
 5 involved with New Agents' training. They are assigned
 6 classes. They oversee and evaluate our personnel in
 7 various fitness venues, which includes the physical
 8 fitness and defensive tactics, which defensive tactic is
 9 a mandatory passing venue that the FBI has.
 10 Mr. Lyons also oversees our nursing staff
 11 which we have at Quantico, to oversee — Our whole
 12 population down in our daily base is about 3,000 people.
 13 It just doesn't include New Agent trainees. We also have
 14 the National Academy, which is approximately 270 police
 15 officers, part of the laboratory, part of our engineering
 16 research facility, which also use our facilities down
 17 there in the gym and everything.
 18 The physical training program for the New
 19 Agent trainees is not a requisite — passing that is not
 20 a requisite to become a Special Agent. It has to do with
 21 job-relatedness. And that battle was fought in courts
 22 several years ago. We're still looking at that and
 23 reviewing that. We have recently implemented a Pre-

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1 Quantico Entrance mile-and-a-half run, which Agent
 2 applicants now are required to take and pass. That's the
 3 only physical exercise that New Agent trainees are
 4 required to pass at this time.
 5 Once the trainee arrives at Quantico, the
 6 second day there we give them an initial FIT test — and
 7 I'll let these gentlemen explain to you the protocols
 8 that we go through — and then we give an evaluation of
 9 their physical fitness during that time.
 10 Though the raw score and passing our FIT
 11 test with the minimum score of fifteen points and at
 12 least one point in each exercise is not a requisite to
 13 get your credentials as an FBI Agent, what we do use that
 14 for is to evaluate certain characteristics which have
 15 been defined as being characteristics in which are needed
 16 to become a Special Agent, and they go desire, judgment
 17 issues, commitment to duty. Those kinds of things are
 18 what we evaluate the New Agent trainees on.
 19 Unlike academics, where a New Agent — if
 20 a New Agent fails two of the nine major tests, they're
 21 dismissed, all New Agent trainees basically come in at a
 22 similar baseline — all have at least a four-year degree
 23 — so they're expected to have certain things with them.

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1 That's not required with physical
 2 training, and physical training is one of those venues
 3 where we can look at these people and see what kind of
 4 sweat equity they're going to put into the organization;
 5 if they're going to get out of their comfort zone. It's
 6 an area we get to see how they react, how much do you
 7 really want this job. That's sort of what it comes down
 8 to, and that's one of the areas that we can look at with
 9 them.
 10 Also, the physical training and defensive
 11 tactics issue is tied in with several other things,
 12 including firearms, practical applications and so forth.
 13 So with that, I'd like to turn that over
 14 to Tom — if you would like to follow-up with that — and
 15 then Mr. Daerr and Mr. Crawford.
 16 MR. LYONS: The mission of the Physical
 17 Training Unit is to integrate the principles of fitness
 18 training and defensive tactics into a curriculum that
 19 ensures New Agent trainees can safely and efficiently
 20 perform in a tactical, law enforcement environment, and
 21 to apply those same principles to our national defensive
 22 tactics and physical fitness programs.
 23 Special Agent Daerr is in charge of our

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1 defensive tactics program Bureau-wide. He has oversight.
 2 Supervisory Special Agent Crawford is in charge of our
 3 fitness program nationwide.
 4 In each one of our field offices we have a
 5 defensive tactics coordinator who Mr. Daerr keeps in
 6 touch with the newest techniques, the problems that we're
 7 developing, that we're seeing in regard to both training
 8 and in attacks on our Agents and how to overcome them.
 9 Special Agent Crawford keeps up with the physical
 10 fitness, the regimen, the program, the protocols, and
 11 I'll ask them in just a moment if they'll just describe
 12 their programs for you.
 13 While our mission is one of training these
 14 New Agents in defensive tactics and fitness, what we
 15 really do and what our philosophy is, is that we try and
 16 teach our New Agents from the moment that they arrive
 17 that physical fitness is their responsibility. It is not
 18 our responsibility; it's their responsibility. They take
 19 this on as part of their career in the FBI.
 20 What our responsibility is there at
 21 Quantico is to teach them defensive tactics so that they
 22 can defend themselves, so that they can properly treat
 23 the people that they arrest, using only the force

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1 necessary to control them, and so that they can protect
 2 any citizen who happens to get in the way.
 3 In addition to that, when they end up in
 4 the field, the Bureau offers every Special Agent the
 5 opportunity for three hours of on-duty physical fitness
 6 training. And at the present time, we require that they
 7 be tested twice yearly — every Agent in the FBI — to
 8 see what their physical standard is, what their personal
 9 fitness standard is. There is no pass-fail for this.
 10 And Mr. Crawford, who is in charge of that
 11 program, will explain it in a little further detail, but
 12 the important part is that we teach them fitness is not a
 13 — it's not a training subject at the FBI Academy. It is
 14 something that they must do for their entire career
 15 because it's so important to the organization.
 16 And with that, at the end of the
 17 presentation I have an as yet unpublished article that
 18 was just approved for publication. It was written by Mr.
 19 Crawford in regard to some of the issues involving —
 20 gender issues involving fitness in the FBI, and we have
 21 some bootleg copies of that. It's been approved for
 22 publication, but you may have it.
 23 So, Mr. Crawford.

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1 MR. CRAWFORD: Okay. Good afternoon.
 2 Like Tom said, that article is top secret, so guard it
 3 with your life.
 4 DR. SEGAL: We'll use these defensive
 5 tactics if anybody tries to get it from us.
 6 MR. CRAWFORD: Yeah. Ed will give you
 7 some defensive tactics and we'll be good-to-go.
 8 I've been involved with the physical
 9 fitness program at the FBI for the last four years. And
 10 we have a program for our incumbent Agents who are in the
 11 field. They test twice yearly. And our test is more of
 12 a health-and-wellness type test. It's not — There
 13 aren't any enforceable standards. Participation is
 14 mandatory by our manual, although there is some debate
 15 currently going on whether or not that will be changed to
 16 a voluntary test. I personally would like to see it
 17 remain mandatory. I feel that it's very important for
 18 our Agents in the field to participate in the program.
 19 That test includes a medical screen. The
 20 medical screen includes a body fat assessment, body fat
 21 composition. We do blood pressure and we do a step test,
 22 a three-minute step test.
 23 And I don't know if you all are familiar

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1 Special Agent trainee. We do tests on three occasions.
 2 We test the second day that they arrive, we test in the
 3 seventh week of training, and approximately again in the
 4 fourteenth week of training. We're looking for an
 5 improvement.
 6 We have a test. It's gender-normed. The
 7 test is gender-normed and it's been — As Tom said, I've
 8 just completed an article and there's been some legal
 9 opinions which have come out lately which are current in
 10 favor of gender-norming.
 11 Four years ago, if you were to ask me when
 12 I first came down to the Physical Training Unit in the
 13 FBI, would I support gender-norming, did I think it was
 14 viable, feasible for law enforcement, I would have said
 15 no: same job, same standard. Four years later, after
 16 witnessing most of the trainees who have come through for
 17 the last four years, which is approximately 4,000
 18 trainees, I would say that I am now — I have gone 180
 19 degrees. I am a supporter of gender-norming.
 20 The reason being, again referring to the
 21 article, many people who — Dr. Tom Collingwood, who is
 22 associated with the Cooper Institute — many people have
 23 come out — he's cited in the article — have come out —

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1 with the step test. What that does is the individuals
 2 step up onto a platform for three minutes and then we
 3 measure their heart rate at the conclusion of the
 4 activity, and then after a three-minute time period we
 5 again measure their heart rate.
 6 Now, if the heart rate escalates to 130
 7 beats, for instance, after three minutes, we like to see
 8 it return to eighty or ninety beats. Now, if it doesn't
 9 return, now that might be an indication that there's some
 10 coronary blockage or there's a problem with the heart.
 11 We had an Assistant Special Agent in
 12 Charge who died approximately a year and a half ago. He
 13 was from the Minneapolis division. He was down on an
 14 inspection in the Miami division and he was about fifty-
 15 two years old and he was doing an inspection. And the
 16 last anybody saw him was Friday afternoon, when he went
 17 to his hotel room; wasn't feeling well. They found him
 18 Monday morning on the bed, still in the clothes that he
 19 was wearing Friday, and he was dead. And the number one
 20 sign of coronary heart disease in people over ages of
 21 forty, as many of you know, is sudden death.
 22 So that's why the three-minute step test
 23 is important. And people who go to a physical, their

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1 And it's not fair to — if we're testing fitness alone,
 2 it's not fair to the females because of the physiological
 3 differences to include body mass, lean body mass, and
 4 body fat — to test them on equal footing with the males.
 5 Now, if we're talking about a job-specific
 6 task, to include firearms, defensive tactics, academics,
 7 absolutely, people, whether male or female, should be
 8 tested on equal footing. But when we're talking about
 9 fitness, if we're using fitness solely, I think that
 10 gender-norming is the way to go.
 11 As an illustration of this, in New Agent
 12 training we — about two and a half years ago, we
 13 developed a job-related test, JRT — And again, it's
 14 referred to in the article. And what that test involves
 15 — It was developed by an individual named Dr. Paul
 16 Davis, who some of you might be familiar with, and Dr.
 17 Davis developed this test and it involved going over a
 18 six-foot wall, climbing over or jumping over a six-foot
 19 wall, running a serpentine course of a quarter of a mile,
 20 through cones, up and down the gym floor, jumping over a
 21 simulated five-foot culvert, and then coming to a dummy
 22 which was 150 pounds, dragging it fifty feet, discarding
 23 it, coming over to an eight-inch in circumference ring,

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1 blood pressure might be fine but they might have
 2 problems. That's why we do that three-minute step test.
 3 After we finish that screen, that medical
 4 screen, we do sixty seconds of sit-ups; one minute time
 5 on that, as many as a person can do. Then we do push-
 6 ups.
 7 We do a flexibility test, which was
 8 developed by the Cooper Institute in Dallas, Texas. It's
 9 a sit-and-reach test. Personally, I don't feel that that
 10 test is very valid. It measures hamstring flexibility
 11 and recently it's come under fire. It's included in — A
 12 lot of law enforcement agencies include that in their
 13 testing battery and it's very hard to support in court if
 14 it comes down to that.
 15 And then we do a mile-and-a-half walk/run,
 16 whatever the individual is capable of.
 17 We do that twice a year. And I think the
 18 program is important. We have fitness coordinators, and
 19 their job during the year is to — as the year
 20 progresses, to provide fitness information, wellness
 21 information, to our employees.
 22 As far as our New Agent training goes, as
 23 has been stated before, fitness is a requirement of the

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1 holding an inert weapon out with the shooting hand —
 2 left or right, whatever the case might be — and then
 3 pulling the trigger twenty-nine times. There is a three-
 4 minute-and-thirty-second time limit on that.
 5 Before we used that test as a hiring
 6 standard and before we used it as a New Agent testing
 7 instrument, we did research on it and we tested over 300
 8 individuals just to get the data to see if the test would
 9 be feasible.
 10 And what happened was that we had
 11 individuals, males, who could not score a point on our
 12 standard fitness test, which is pull-ups, push-ups, two
 13 minutes of sit-ups, 120-yard shuttle run and a two-mile
 14 run — and that's a test that's gender-normed — on the
 15 male standards, they could not score a point. We never
 16 had a male fail the job-related test. Never ever. Okay?
 17 With the females, however, it was a
 18 different case. We had — I think it was 46 percent of
 19 them failed upon their first attempt during their second
 20 week of training. And then we went further to test again
 21 in the twelfth and thirteenth week, and I think it
 22 dropped to 24 percent of them failed.
 23 And some of these females who were failing

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1 were very fit, but because of their body size of going
 2 over the six-foot wall, pulling the dummy which was 150
 3 pounds — and some of them may have weighed 110 pounds —
 4 and putting them on equal footing with the males for the
 5 three-minute-and-thirty-second time limit, it was not
 6 fair to the females if you were measuring fitness and we
 7 had to subsequently — we did away with the test. We're
 8 not utilizing it.

9 And the reason that it was done away with
 10 is our Office of General Counsel said that — they opined
 11 that if we had to support it in a court of law, we might
 12 be able to, but then again, we might not be able to; and
 13 the reason being that the rule of four-fifths states that
 14 if 80 percent of a protected class or gender cannot pass
 15 your testing instrument, then the testing instrument —
 16 you have to prove job-relatedness to your testing
 17 instrument, and then you have to go a step further and
 18 prove that it's not biased toward that protected class or
 19 gender.

20 And our OGC, which is our Office of
 21 General Counsel, decided that they would not — they
 22 could in fact go to court with it, but let's not
 23 institute the test and use the test.

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1 Another problem with a test like that is
 2 that if you're going to use it as a pre-hiring instrument
 3 and you needed it in all fifty-six of our field offices,
 4 you have to build fifty-six six-foot walls; you have to
 5 have fifty-six 150-pound dummies; you have to have fifty-
 6 six gymnasiums to run the test in, and it gets quite
 7 costly.

8 And when you use a standard fitness test,
 9 the costs are minimal, and if you gender-norm it — Our
 10 test is gender-normed. The sit-up portion of our fitness
 11 test for New Agent trainees — the sit-up portion is not
 12 gender-normed. Every other event is. As a matter of
 13 fact, the females do a — Have you guys seen the tape yet
 14 or —

15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We were just about to
 16 look at it when you came in.

17 MR. CRAWFORD: Yeah. We'll go to that
 18 right after I finish here. I'll be done in like two
 19 minutes.

20 The female pull-up is actually different
 21 than the males'. It's done on a bar which is three-foot
 22 off the floor surface and it's done like an upside-down
 23 push-up, while the males do the standard pull-ups, palms

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1 facing out. And you'll see all that on the tape. And
 2 everything else is gender-normed.

3 As Mr. Loudon mentioned, we have gone to a
 4 pre-Academy test, and that's a mile-and-a-half run. And
 5 that, too, as you'll see in the article, is also gender-
 6 normed — when you get your article — and the physical
 7 readiness test, as that pre-Academy test is called, the
 8 cut-offs are twelve minutes and forty seconds for the
 9 mile-and-a-half run for the men, and for the females,
 10 it's fourteen minutes and ten seconds.

11 And, again, those are gender-normed. But
 12 the basis of this article is on pre-Academy fitness
 13 testing and its place of importance in law enforcement
 14 and we needed — we needed a pre-Academy test badly. We
 15 had one — Just briefly, we had one in place up until
 16 about 1993, and then we suspended the use of it. And we
 17 found that the fitness level of the New Agent trainees
 18 arriving for training had decreased greatly without a
 19 test, a pre-Academy test. It was then a pre-employment
 20 test. Now, legally, we can't term it as a pre-employment
 21 test. Now it's a pre-Academy readiness test and the
 22 results have been dramatic just from the one event, the
 23 running event. The fitness levels have picked up

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1 significantly, and our New Agent trainees are in much
 2 better physical condition. And as this article sets
 3 forth, many of the problems that we incurred because of
 4 the poor fitness level, most of those have now been
 5 eliminated.

6 And that's briefly what we do. I'm sure
 7 you'll have some questions later, but if you want to
 8 start the tape, we can view the tape. Or if you want to
 9 talk about the defensive tactics first, we can do that.

10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Let's do the tape.

11 (Whereupon, the Commission viewed the
 12 video tape presentation.)

13 MR. CRAWFORD: Tom Hanks wanted to do that
 14 part on the physical fitness part but I beat him out for
 15 the job.

16 MR. DAERR: Good afternoon. As Mr. Lyons
 17 alluded to earlier, the mission of the defensive tactics
 18 program is threefold. One is to provide training to New
 19 Agents at Quantico, a second is to provide ongoing
 20 training to our Agents in the field, and the third is to
 21 provide training to state and local law enforcement
 22 agencies.

23 The program itself, getting down to the

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1 meat and potatoes, it's an integrated program in which we
 2 train our Agents to function effectively at all levels of
 3 force, in the force continuum, effectively. In doing so,
 4 we have certain technique-and-procedures selection
 5 criteria, one of which is factors inherent to law
 6 enforcement, and one of those is the size of our Agents.

7 So in taking that into consideration, we
 8 select techniques and procedures which are what we call
 9 forgiving, and what that translates to is all of our
 10 techniques have to have the ability to allow the Agent to
 11 either escalate or extract himself or herself from the
 12 situation.

13 In the curriculum, as the tape alluded to,
 14 we have various drills, some of which allow the New
 15 Agents to extract themselves from the situation or
 16 escalate. In some, we force the issue. We take away the
 17 escape clause, so to speak. We force them to stay in
 18 there and fight at all three levels of a fight, those
 19 being standing, entangled, and finally to the ground.

20 When we do that, we recognize that we've
 21 taken the option away, so then we make allowances for
 22 size, and a lot of times that translates to gender just
 23 because most of our female Agents are smaller. So we

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1 will not stick a small Agent, whether it be male or
 2 female, with one of our big guys, 250, 260 pounds,
 3 because we've taken that option of escape away from them.

4 At the conclusion of the sixteen-week
 5 program, we test the New Agents in the area of defensive
 6 tactics, where they must demonstrate both proficiency and
 7 effectiveness in the techniques and procedures that they
 8 have learned, as well as tactics.

9 They take what they have learned,
 10 hopefully, and also integrate that into the other areas
 11 of the Academy, to include our Practical Applications
 12 Unit, where all of the different things that they've
 13 learned in firearms, legal, and defensive tactics, all
 14 come together in practical applications: arrest
 15 scenarios, mechanics of arrest.

16 And, basically, the tape explained the
 17 rest of it, so I'll just leave it at that.

18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, thank you very
 19 much. As I mentioned, we usually go around and ask
 20 questions, one after another, but I'd like to start with
 21 a little more information for us about how one becomes an
 22 FBI Agent. Is it a competitive process, first of all?
 23 And then, secondly, what does your sixteen-week training

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1 program look like? I would be interested to know if it's
 2 a residential program, if everybody stays at Quantico.
 3 One of the things that our statute asks us
 4 to look at is to compare civilian agencies with the
 5 military to see whether there are similarities and
 6 differences that might make a difference.
 7 So I'd like to hear a little bit about how
 8 one applies for and gets selected to come to Quantico,
 9 and then how do you live, how is your time split up
 10 between legal, firearms and defensive tactics, during
 11 your sixteen weeks there.
 12 MR. LOUDEN: I can address most of that, I
 13 think.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Do you have a
 15 waiting list? I mean —
 16 MR. LOUDEN: There are all kind of numbers
 17 that get thrown out about how many raw applicants are out
 18 there, those with the basic qualifications, and we sort
 19 of stick with the number of 70,000. This year, my
 20 numbers for FY-99 will be 678, I think. The year before,
 21 it was 780, and then two years prior to that, we did
 22 almost a thousand each, which is really stretching us as
 23 a training —

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1 DR. SEGAL: This is the number of people
 2 you've trained?
 3 MR. LOUDEN: Yes, ma'am.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Per year, right?
 5 MR. LOUDEN: Yeah, per year. It really
 6 stretched us to the nth degree, both logistically and in
 7 training the cadre and so forth.
 8 The selection process: the training
 9 division really has nothing to do with the selection
 10 process. That's handled through Personnel. However, the
 11 minimum age for an FBI Agent is twenty-three. The
 12 maximum age is thirty-seven.
 13 Every Agent must have at least a
 14 bachelor's degree. Over the last — I've been there two,
 15 two and a half years, in my present position. Generally
 16 we see over half the class of, say, thirty, thirty-five
 17 to fifty students, have at least a master's or a JD or
 18 some advanced degree.
 19 The average age generally goes from
 20 twenty-nine-and-a-half to thirty, thirty-one years old.
 21 Very few twenty-three-year-olds that we see. The only
 22 cases really where we'll take someone of that age is
 23 generally that they're a CPA and we have a need for it;

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1 they have a specific language ability or they may be an
 2 attorney.
 3 The overall background that we look for is
 4 at least three years work experience, with some
 5 supervisory responsibility in that. What we're seeing,
 6 we get a fair number of former military; we get a fair
 7 number of — and generally from the officer ranks, police
 8 officers, and a fair number of — we're seeing a fair
 9 number of attorneys: local prosecutors and one or two
 10 assistant U.S. attorneys.
 11 We look for this life experience and we
 12 look for a maturity in these individuals, exposure. You
 13 have to take a specific cognitive test to get in and then
 14 you're ranked there. Then after that, you go through a
 15 — depending on your ranking, you go through then an
 16 interview process. You're required to take a polygraph
 17 examination, a drug test examination, and then obviously
 18 the extensive background investigation.
 19 When all that's done, depending on how
 20 much money Congress has given us for the year, then we
 21 divide up the classes and then they start the hiring
 22 process.
 23 It is a residential program. It's sixteen

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1 weeks. They're required to live at Quantico. The only
 2 thing that they pay for are their uniforms. The uniform
 3 is really a golf-type shirt, with khaki pants and shoes
 4 and so forth. We really supply everything else: the
 5 food, board, and so forth.
 6 DR. SEGAL: Are men and women housed
 7 together?
 8 MR. LOUDEN: Yes. Yeah. Of course,
 9 they're not in the same rooms, but on the same floors,
 10 dormitory floors.
 11 And likewise with the National Academy.
 12 And I don't know how many of you are familiar with NA,
 13 but NA's the same way. They're an eleven-week program
 14 for the police officers.
 15 It's a sixteen-week curriculum. During
 16 that time, we really have — we have firearms, period of
 17 time, academics, and practical applications. The largest
 18 block of instruction out of that sixteen weeks is really
 19 firearms. It's about 120 hours of that. And it's just
 20 not — with firearms, it's just not learning the skill
 21 and so forth of a weapon, but it's also deadly force
 22 policy judgment scenarios that we go through. It's very
 23 involved. We do a tremendous amount of that.

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1 The academic portion — Now, you must pass
 2 firearms. That's a requirement. If you fail firearms,
 3 you don't get your credentials. It happens that since
 4 1991, we've only had one individual not get through our
 5 firearms training.
 6 And it's the only training where we have a
 7 remedial portion to it. And we give the remedial because
 8 we have people who have never fired a weapon, who have
 9 never really held a gun and there's a fear, a legitimate
 10 fear of weapons, so we understand that. And there's what
 11 we call a two-week recycle, which is an intensive one-on-
 12 one.
 13 The academic portion of it, as I said
 14 earlier, we have nine major academic tests that you take
 15 and they're in behavioral science, ethics, law. If you
 16 fail two major tests, you're removed. That's the other
 17 side. The other dismissal is failure of the defensive
 18 tactics test.
 19 You get re-tests. We just don't throw
 20 people out. There is a re-test process. And if you fail
 21 the re-test, then you're out.
 22 The sixteen-week program may seem short in
 23 the scope of what the FBI does and the number of

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1 investigative classifications that we get involved in as
 2 compared to what police officers — I'm a former
 3 policeman and I went twenty-six weeks to a school, but I
 4 was twenty-one years old and I didn't have a college
 5 degree at that time.
 6 We're hiring people at an older age, more
 7 mature, who have a life experience, who have experience
 8 in the world. We can begin our training at a higher
 9 level and it goes very quickly. It's intense. It's not
 10 a de-selection process at all. There are people who
 11 don't make it, but it's a small — and I don't know the
 12 percentage, but it's very few don't make it.
 13 What we do find in the first two or three
 14 weeks is we'll have resignations, and the resignations
 15 will generally come in the sense of when they're faced
 16 with the dilemma of a deadly force policy, those kinds of
 17 moral issues that they really can't reconcile.
 18 And we don't get involved with that.
 19 That's a demon, as I call it, that they have to take care
 20 of themselves. We have EAP that we can refer people to
 21 and so forth, but we don't convince people about our
 22 deadly force policy. They have to come to grips with
 23 that on their own.

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1 After the sixteen weeks, the Director
 2 comes down, they get their credentials, and they are then
 3 assigned to one of the fifty-six field divisions.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Do they go back
 5 for any kind of refresher training?
 6 MR. LOUDEN: We have what we call our in-
 7 service training that is ongoing. Right now, we have in-
 8 services that are going through at the same time down at
 9 the Academy. I don't know if you all have ever been down
 10 there, but it's a very large facility. We're over 600
 11 acres in the middle of Quantico.
 12 Yes, to answer your question, we do have
 13 some required courses in the area of major case
 14 management, interrogation, informal development. These
 15 are courses in which Agents will come back during their
 16 career and be honed up on new developments and so forth.
 17 Likewise, specialized training in everything from white-
 18 collar crime to forensics to behavioral sciences, those
 19 kinds of things.
 20 But always ongoing, constantly going.
 21 Hundreds of courses. To answer your question, yes,
 22 that's the short answer.
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thinking back to the TV

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1 shows of my childhood, I have in mind kind of a
 2 stereotype, if you will, of an FBI Agent. How strong
 3 would you say the culture is, if any, that you're
 4 inculcating? You mentioned that you have more mature
 5 candidates coming along. They not be as malleable as,
 6 for example, an eighteen or a nineteen-year old who is
 7 enlisting in the Marine Corps.
 8 So I wonder, is that a big part of your
 9 training to become an FBI Agent or is this —
 10 MR. LOUDEN: Culturization of the FBI
 11 family?
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Really
 14 socialization.
 15 MR. LOUDEN: Yes.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah.
 17 MR. LOUDEN: And it's — I don't want to
 18 say it's a big — It's an important part and it really is
 19 underneath all the training. When a class comes in,
 20 they're just not thrown out there. We have a staff
 21 counselor who is a permanent member of our staff, just as
 22 these gentlemen are.
 23 Then we bring in field counselors from

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1 field offices, and these Agents are Senior Agents who
 2 volunteer to come back for sixteen weeks and to work with
 3 these classes, to live with these people, because in most
 4 of the cases they really have never met an FBI Agent or
 5 really been involved in law enforcement and so they do
 6 have some different — their conception about what we do
 7 and about what law enforcement is sometimes is a little
 8 skewed from what real life is. So what we try to do is
 9 have the street Agent live with them for sixteen weeks
 10 and begin that process, and that's an ongoing process.
 11 Now, Agents have a one-year performance-
 12 related probationary period, during which time, in
 13 probationary status, they can be fired for cause and
 14 without appeal process. There's also a two-year
 15 probationary process for suitability, in which during
 16 that process they're constantly evaluated as to whether
 17 they're going to be suitable to continue on in law
 18 enforcement.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What's the
 20 ratio of street Agent to student during that sixteen
 21 weeks?
 22 MR. LOUDEN: In the class? We'll have a
 23 staff —

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: In the
 2 class, as far as going through the class with them.
 3 MR. LOUDEN: For a class of thirty-seven
 4 — that's what our average this year is going to be —
 5 we'll have a staff counselor and at least one field
 6 counselor, but we like to have two field counselors with
 7 them. And then obviously instructors, main instructors
 8 for each of the core curricula that we go through.
 9 And there's constant interaction with the
 10 New Agent trainees. They're not cadets. We refer to
 11 them as New Agent trainees or Special Agent trainees.
 12 And there's constant interaction with the staff, with the
 13 instructional staff that we have, with the field
 14 counselors, for the whole sixteen weeks. We're a
 15 seven/twenty-four, twenty-four/seven operation and it
 16 keeps on going.
 17 The latest thing I had to do is do a
 18 survey to find out who's going to be there over Christmas
 19 because we're concerned about that, whether we shut down
 20 the cafeteria and everything. So we're working on that.
 21 MR. PANG: I had a question with regard to
 22 your physical fitness training regimen. You know, I
 23 understand from the briefing that you don't test — you

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1 don't have a physical fitness test for entry. Is that
 2 correct?
 3 MR. CRAWFORD: Well, we do now.
 4 MR. PANG: You have — Let's see. There's
 5 —
 6 MR. LYONS: That's the mile-and-a-half
 7 run.
 8 MR. CRAWFORD: Yeah, we have the physical
 9 run and steps.
 10 MR. PANG: Okay, the mile-and-a-half run.
 11 MR. CRAWFORD: Mile-and-a-half run.
 12 MR. PANG: But all the rest of it — the
 13 pull-ups, the sit-ups and the like — are just to
 14 maintain your general health and fitness?
 15 MR. CRAWFORD: They're tested in weeks
 16 two, seven and fourteen. And again, as Mr. Louden
 17 alluded to earlier, they're tested, and we're looking for
 18 maximum performance in all those events. And we're
 19 looking for commitment and dedication to duty, and we're
 20 looking for people to improve their fitness level from
 21 day two, when they take their first test, to day
 22 fourteen, when they're about to conclude their training.
 23 DR. SEGAL: But there's no minimum

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1 standard.
 2 MR. PANG: But there's no minimum
 3 standard?
 4 DR. SEGAL: Yes, there is.
 5 MR. CRAWFORD: Yes, there is.
 6 MR. PANG: There is? Okay.
 7 MR. CRAWFORD: The standard is — For
 8 instance, the test is fifty — we call it our fifty-point
 9 test. Fifty-point is max. Like in the Marine Corps, it
 10 would be a 300-point max.
 11 MR. PANG: Yeah.
 12 MR. CRAWFORD: And fifteen is a passing
 13 standard, with a point scored in each event.
 14 MR. PANG: I see.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Now, you do this
 16 before they come in, right?
 17 MR. LOUDEN: No.
 18 DR. SEGAL: No, this is —
 19 MR. LOUDEN: No. The raw score itself,
 20 getting a minimum of fifteen points, if you fail to get
 21 that, that does not mean you won't receive your
 22 credentials. It's not a requisite to graduate.
 23 What we do, as I had said earlier, is that

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1 we look at these other dimensions and physical fitness.
 2 And the things that they go through aren't difficult. As
 3 I said, we're not a de-selection process. It's a way for
 4 us to look at them other than in a classroom environment
 5 and their static environments to see certain things.
 6 MR. PANG: But the other part, the
 7 defensive training, that you must pass.
 8 MR. LOUDEN: Yes.
 9 MR. PANG: There are standards and you've
 10 got to pass that.
 11 DR. SEGAL: If someone doesn't meet the
 12 minimum —
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: How do you weed
 14 70,000 down to 600?
 15 MR. LOUDEN: That's not my job.
 16 They do, and they go through a whole
 17 process. And I would be speaking out — I wouldn't even
 18 venture to guess how they do it. It's like how do we
 19 transfer —
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Are you
 21 satisfied with the ones you get?
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We'll subpoena Louis
 23 Freeh.

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Are you
 2 satisfied with the trainees you get?
 3 MR. LOUDEN: Yes. I was the Assistant
 4 Agent in Charge for New Mexico before I came to the
 5 Academy and we would get New Agents, and I'll tell you,
 6 they've been outstanding.
 7 MR. PANG: Do you see much friction —
 8 MR. LOUDEN: Energetic, ingenuity. I
 9 mean, they're ready to go.
 10 I'm sorry, sir?
 11 MR. PANG: You have male and female
 12 trainees?
 13 MR. LOUDEN: Yes.
 14 MR. PANG: Do you see much friction in the
 15 fact that they don't have to go through the same physical
 16 fitness training? They must go through the same —
 17 MR. LOUDEN: No, because it hurts them
 18 both the same. I guess I'm being sort of facetious in
 19 that. It takes the same amount of effort but it's a
 20 different —
 21 MR. PANG: But you don't —
 22 DR. SEGAL: Do they see that?
 23 MR. PANG: You don't see any kind of

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1 perception problem? You know, for example, in the
 2 military, when we were talking to people in the military,
 3 there was a perception — okay? — the women get it over
 4 on the men.
 5 MR. LOUDEN: No, I don't see that.
 6 MR. CRAWFORD: Can I address that?
 7 MR. LOUDEN: Yeah.
 8 MR. CRAWFORD: When we're talking in
 9 realms of the physical fitness test, gender-norming is
 10 present. But when we're talking in the arena of
 11 classroom activities, such as a class run, any kind of
 12 class physical activity, males and females are doing the
 13 same activity. So they're in it together and, as Mr.
 14 Louden said, there's a certain amount of effort. They're
 15 leaving their comfort zone. I don't want to say slash-
 16 pain. They leave their comfort zone, and they do that
 17 together.
 18 So I always tell the class that, you know,
 19 you can eat with someone, you can correspond with
 20 someone, you can talk to someone, but you're really not
 21 close with someone until you go out and sweat with them.
 22 And they go out and run together and they sweat, and that
 23 builds a bond.

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1 DR. SEGAL: How do you run them in
 2 formation? Do you have the shorter people in the front
 3 or do you have them just run at their own pace or...
 4 MR. CRAWFORD: No. We run columns of two
 5 and —
 6 DR. SEGAL: Do the women hold the men
 7 back?
 8 MR. CRAWFORD: In the occasions where
 9 there's a slow runner with the group, they're told that
 10 no matter how long the run is, to keep on running. And
 11 what we'll do is we'll double back. We'll double the
 12 group back, pick them up on several occasions.
 13 And to be quite honest with you, on many
 14 occasions it may be that that particular individual is a
 15 female, but also on other occasions we do go back and
 16 pick up some males who are just having trouble staying
 17 with the group also.
 18 So you see a little bit of both.
 19 DR. SEGAL: What percentage — I'm sorry.
 20 Go ahead.
 21 MR. PANG: Yeah. I just had a question on
 22 a different line because this is part of our charter as
 23 well.

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1 What are the rules with regard to
 2 relationships — romantic relationships between male and
 3 female Agents? Is there a rule?
 4 DR. SEGAL: You're smiling. You get to
 5 answer.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Let's start
 7 out in training and then move from there.
 8 MR. LYONS: Well, he's smiling because he
 9 knew he would have to answer the question.
 10 MR. LOUDEN: We don't encourage that, but
 11 it does happen. New Agent trainees have become
 12 romantically involved and some of them have gotten
 13 married and so forth.
 14 Again, they're adults. We don't encourage
 15 that on the facility. However, they have free time on
 16 their own on the weekends. After the fourth week, I
 17 believe, they're allowed to leave, and we really can't
 18 "police" them in that kind of atmosphere.
 19 DR. SEGAL: Do you allow sex in the rooms?
 20 MR. LOUDEN: No.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What if it
 22 were an adulterous relationship and it became known to
 23 the staff?

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1 MR. LOUDEN: That would come to — We have
 2 no administrative prohibition with that. If in fact it
 3 did come to the staff, then those people would be
 4 counseled. If it was occurring in the facility, a high
 5 probability they'd be removed.
 6 DR. SEGAL: What percent women do you have
 7 among your trainees generally?
 8 MR. LOUDEN: Oh, gee. That changes with
 9 each class.
 10 DR. SEGAL: Each class.
 11 MR. LOUDEN: Yeah, it really does.
 12 DR. SEGAL: Have you got a range? A
 13 ballpark?
 14 10? 15? 25? 50?
 15 MR. LOUDEN: No. Some classes we've had a
 16 third. Some classes we've had a quarter.
 17 Again, we're not — I don't say we're not
 18 concerned with it, but I'm not concerned with it because
 19 our job is to — If I can have our staff produce a fully
 20 successful GS-10, Step 1 Agent at the end of sixteen
 21 weeks, that's my goal.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Do you know what
 23 the percentage of the women is in the Bureau?

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<p style="text-align: center;">Page 230</p> <p>1 MR. LYONS: Currently, no. 2 MR. CRAWFORD: It's between 12 and 15 3 percent. 4 MR. LOUDEN: Yeah. I want to say about 13 5 percent. 6 MR. CRAWFORD: Between 12 and 15 percent. 7 DR. SEGAL: But it's growing because your 8 incoming class — 9 MR. LOUDEN: Oh, yeah. 10 DR. SEGAL: So you don't have any sort of 11 quota or goals for numbers of women? You're just... 12 MR. LOUDEN: No. We deal with what comes 13 through the door. 14 DR. SEGAL: And, of course, you don't deal 15 with the selection process. 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What about 17 — A further question. What about from the Agency? 18 MR. LOUDEN: I'm sorry, sir? 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What about 20 from the Agency? Is there a quota or a goal as far as 21 numbers of males and females — 22 MR. LOUDEN: No. 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — across</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 233</p> <p>1 follow-up that question? 2 DR. SEGAL: Sure. 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: One of the 4 things that we have seen as we've talked to the so-called 5 physical fitness experts in the military is if you look 6 from a period of the fifties to the sixties to the 7 seventies and whatever, there has been a movement of 8 constant change in what physical fitness really is and 9 should be. 10 I wonder if you at the Academy have had 11 that same kind of impact. Obviously you've come together 12 now with the program and the test, but my guess is that 13 if you went back — Have you gone through this same kind 14 of evolution where the physical fitness gurus have said, 15 well, you ought to have this, now you ought to have that, 16 now you ought to have that, and then made changes 17 accordingly? 18 MR. CRAWFORD: Yeah, in a sense we have. 19 That's when we went to our job-related test. In law 20 enforcement, the issue is always job-relatedness, and 21 that's something that's always paramount when you're 22 developing a testing instrument. And so we tried to go 23 with the job-related test.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 231</p> <p>1 the Agency? 2 MR. LOUDEN: I'm not aware of it. I've 3 never been involved in that, never been told that. 4 MR. LYONS: I don't believe so. But I 5 think we can probably — we could get those numbers for 6 you that we have currently on board. That would be no 7 problem. 8 MR. LOUDEN: Yeah, that's not a problem. 9 DR. SEGAL: How did you choose — 10 MR. LOUDEN: We break down that with 11 gender, race, across. We can show that. 12 DR. SEGAL: How did you choose the 13 particular events that you would use in your physical 14 training program and testing? 15 MR. CRAWFORD: The events — the pull-ups, 16 the push-ups, the two-mile run — those were all adopted 17 from different military tests. The Marine Corps, the 18 United States Army, what is used at service academies, 19 and also from the Cooper Clinic located in Dallas, Texas, 20 which does a lot of research. 21 If you break the events down, the pull-ups 22 are a test of upper body strength, forearm strength; 23 push-ups are a test of upper body endurance, muscular</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 234</p> <p>1 That's when we put our males and females 2 on equal footing — what we thought was equal footing. 3 But again, because of body size, body mass, the 4 differences — the physiological differences in body 5 composition, we weren't really putting them on equal 6 footing. We were putting the females at a disadvantage. 7 DR. SEGAL: Aren't you concerned, then, 8 that your women are not going to be able to perform on 9 the job up to — 10 MR. CRAWFORD: No, because — Again, 11 that's a question where people say same job, same 12 standard. But my mindset is that I would rather test 13 males and females with gender-normed tests and have the 14 fittest males and the fittest females, because I don't 15 feel that it's fair to test on — Now, if you're talking 16 a job-specific task — firearms, defensive tactics — Mr. 17 Daerr's department — and you're talking along those 18 lines, they damn well better be up-to-speed. 19 MR. PANG: Yeah. 20 DR. SEGAL: So that tests that included 21 going over the six-foot wall was supposed to be for 22 fitness, not job-relatedness? 23 MR. CRAWFORD: It was supposed to be job-</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 232</p> <p>1 endurance; the sit-ups are a test of abominable 2 endurance. And the 120-yard shuttle run is not used in 3 the military but it was brought forth in the law 4 enforcement test to simulate a pursuit of a subject, and 5 that's where that had its origin. 6 And the two-mile run, although the Marine 7 Corps uses a three-mile run, the two-mile run has kind of 8 fallen out of favor by fitness consultants and people 9 involved in the field of fitness. They're more inclined 10 to think that the 1.5-mile run is the way to go as far as 11 testing, but that's for aerobic endurance. That tests 12 aerobic endurance. 13 So those were the components. 14 DR. SEGAL: Did you consider tests of 15 lower body strength or — You mentioned a flexibility 16 test earlier. 17 MR. CRAWFORD: The flexibility test is for 18 our incumbent Agents. The sit-and-reach test. And 19 again, that test has fallen out of favor. That's solely 20 a test of hamstring flexibility, and to prove the job- 21 relatedness of hamstring flexibility in law enforcement 22 would be a difficult task. Very difficult. 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Mady, can I</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 235</p> <p>1 relatedness and fitness. And we tried to tie that 2 together. And when you try to do that, it's very 3 difficult to be fair to everyone. 4 And the reason — if I could just take a 5 minute to illustrate that — is if you were in a court of 6 law and I was — and you were the jury and I was the 7 attorney for Susie Smith, and we had used that test as a 8 job selection process and Susie had failed, and she was 9 five-foot tall, 95 pounds, and was very, very fit, 10 however, she could not pass that job-related test because 11 she had to go over a six-foot wall, in my first statement 12 to the jury I would say, "Susie Smith is five-foot tall. 13 The wall was six-foot. It's a foot over her height. The 14 males who tested were five-foot-eleven on average height, 15 so they had to go an inch over their heads. By the way, 16 the average height of a fence in the United States of 17 America is three-foot, seven inches," which is factual. 18 Okay? "Why are we testing going over a six-foot wall 19 when the average height is three-foot-seven? And why are 20 we putting Susie at a disadvantage?" 21 DR. SEGAL: So why was that test developed 22 that way? 23 MR. CRAWFORD: That's the way it was</p>

1 developed by the founder, Dr. Paul Davis. Okay?
 2 DR. SEGAL: Did he have a rationale for
 3 it?
 4 MR. CRAWFORD: Yeah. Well, what that test
 5 is, it's a combination of a fireman's test and a law
 6 enforcement test, and his rationale was that this could
 7 be utilized as a job-related instrument.
 8 And Dr. Davis, when he authored the test
 9 or when he invented the test, he wanted to make the time
 10 constraint more strict. Instead of three minutes and
 11 thirty seconds, he wanted it to be two minutes and forty-
 12 five seconds, and, therefore, he thought it would
 13 discriminate equally. There would be males who failed
 14 the test. And all that's true, but now you'd have even
 15 more females failing the test and it wasn't a fair
 16 testing instrument.
 17 Another illustration is the dummy-pull,
 18 which was the hardest part for the females. "Susie Smith
 19 weighs a hundred pounds, and that dummy-pull, she had to
 20 pull a 150-pound dummy. Your males who were taking the
 21 same test weigh an average of 165-170 pounds and they're
 22 pulling a 150-pound dummy, which is less than their body
 23 weight. How many people in the court present today

1 subjective test at the end. They need to demonstrate
 2 effectiveness and proficiency in the skills that we have
 3 taught them, and that's basically what it's limited to.
 4 We currently do not have a confrontation-
 5 based test. We have plenty of drills. And during those
 6 drills, if someone demonstrates — or fails to
 7 demonstrate the ability to adequately protect themselves,
 8 we can bring into play the different characteristics and
 9 intangibles, saying, why isn't this person — they are
 10 not demonstrating the want to protect themselves; they're
 11 turning their backs. And now we look into more
 12 suitability issues with that.
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: So just to make sure I
 14 understand, it's the instructor's subjective evaluation,
 15 having observed the candidate. And at the end, the
 16 instructor says, "This person can be an FBI Agent,
 17 defensive tactic-wise," or "This person is not kind of up
 18 to my standard as I understand" — or "not up to the FBI
 19 standard as I understand it."
 20 MR. DAERR: That's correct. There are
 21 certain ways that they need to perform the technique, and
 22 failure to do so results — during the test results in
 23 failure.

1 weight 150 pounds?" And you'll see that a lot of people
 2 weigh more than 150 pounds.
 3 "Okay. Why don't we pull a dummy that
 4 weighs 180 pounds? Why aren't the males required to pull
 5 a dummy that weighs fifty pounds more than they do, just
 6 like Susie does?"
 7 And so that's why those kind of tests —
 8 those job-related tests — run into trouble or
 9 adversarial action in a courtroom setting.
 10 DR. SEGAL: So you have to be able to
 11 demonstrate, especially if it has a differential pass
 12 rate, that it really is job-related.
 13 MR. CRAWFORD: Right. You have to be able
 14 to show job-specific task and job-relatedness, and that's
 15 very difficult to do sometimes.
 16 And that's why when we get back to
 17 fitness, I really, truly believe gender-norming for
 18 physical fitness — not job-specific task — is very
 19 appropriate.
 20 DR. SEGAL: How do the women do at the
 21 defensive tactics?
 22 MR. DAERR: They do well. You know, the
 23 impact that the gender issue has is in our technique,

1 DR. SEGAL: So that's subjective to the
 2 same extent that, for example, watching the sit-ups and
 3 making sure that the iterations are done in the
 4 appropriate technique. Is that equivalent in terms of
 5 the defensive tactics, or is it more subjective and room
 6 for interpretation?
 7 MR. DAERR: Although subjective, there are
 8 certain ways that technique needs to be accomplished.
 9 And looking for certain markers or certain ways of
 10 performing the technique, and a knowledge and an
 11 understanding more so.
 12 Just taking an arm and knowing how to bend
 13 it the way it doesn't bend is good enough for us. And as
 14 long as they stay, say, at the elbow during a certain
 15 technique rather than a shoulder; because we know if you
 16 stay at the elbow, you can utilize principles of leverage
 17 which overcome the size differences, which enables a
 18 smaller person to beat a bigger person.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: To follow-
 20 up on that same issue —
 21 MR. DAERR: Yes, sir.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And it
 23 wasn't quite clear. I understand that you practice self-

1 procedure, and selection, again, with the ability to
 2 escape or evade a situation. When they're asked to
 3 perform the techniques, they're proficient.
 4 But again, if they were asked to go one-
 5 on-one with someone Mr. Crawford's size, their
 6 effectiveness — You know, a fight, many things happen in
 7 a fight. And again, we try to have a strategy and
 8 tactics that sit above techniques. And the strategy and
 9 tactics are that we will always try to have superiority
 10 of manpower and firepower, and that's built into our
 11 program. We train that.
 12 That doesn't mean that they're going home,
 13 to 7-Eleven, and, you know, if something's taking place,
 14 they may find themselves one-on-one, and in that case
 15 they do the best they can.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Let me just follow-up on
 17 the defensive tactics. Can you describe what's the
 18 nature of the — on what the grade is based?
 19 Essentially, do they have to kind of go one-on-one with
 20 somebody and win, or do they have to demonstrate correct
 21 procedure? Or is it just the instructor's assessment of
 22 performance over the course time?
 23 MR. DAERR: No, it's based solely on the

1 defense techniques by size. You basically pair your
 2 partners. Does that mean that male and female will in
 3 fact, if they are the same size, practice the techniques
 4 together?
 5 MR. DAERR: That's correct. From the
 6 first day we encourage all individuals to move — not
 7 move, but have different partners every training session.
 8 Just select a different partner. When it comes to
 9 drills, where we take away the option of escaping from a
 10 bad situation, we then pair it by size, which also means
 11 that we will have during a confrontation drill, where
 12 they have to stand there and fight, males and females
 13 fighting each other.
 14 DR. SEGAL: What's your injury rate like?
 15 Did I just push a hot button?
 16 MR. LOUDEN: No.
 17 MR. LYONS: No, not at all. Not really.
 18 MR. LOUDEN: It's not bad.
 19 MR. CRAWFORD: There are always injuries
 20 incurred in training. It's part of training. Of course,
 21 your goal is to minimize those injuries. And as Ed is
 22 saying, there's no sense having a 110-pound individual
 23 grapple with a 250-pound, where there's no escape

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1 technique available. It's a confrontation drill. That
 2 would be, you know, foolish in your training.
 3 But there are always injuries, but I would
 4 say our injury rate is fairly low.
 5 DR. SEGAL: I thought of that when you
 6 were saying something about bending an elbow the way it's
 7 not supposed to go. I mean, if you have somebody doing
 8 that, one trainee to another —
 9 MR. DAERR: Within reason. We have safety
 10 precautions that we outline early on.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: To follow-
 12 on, though, if you have an injury, is that candidate
 13 Agent recycled to a new class or —
 14 MR. LOUDEN: It depends on the nature of
 15 the injury and the recovery period. And to answer your
 16 question, if it's going to go more than two weeks and
 17 there are critical things coming up, we'll recycle.
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Are there more questions?
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Yeah, I
 20 have one more.
 21 And obviously we're here looking for
 22 similarities and that sort of thing. And it seemed to me
 23 — and I may be reading into this — that you determined

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1 have pressure concerning attrition and not attriting
 2 certain numbers?
 3 MR. LOUDEN: No, not at all. I've never
 4 had that kind of pressure put on me about that. That has
 5 never come up about it.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Is the —
 7 And obviously, except for the academics, some of these
 8 things are subjective determinations that need to be made
 9 by those in the class — by those who are in the
 10 instruction field. Are they looking for — I'm trying to
 11 put this in a way — what is best for the FBI? "Yes, I
 12 see this individual and this individual would be a good
 13 FBI Special Agent"?
 14 MR. LOUDEN: When the trainee shows up at
 15 Quantico, they sign a document we call a requirements
 16 document. And in that, it lists sixty-seven KSA's that
 17 have been determined and valid, what is expected of a
 18 Special Agent in the FBI. This is — That's the core to
 19 our whole training venue. When they sign on with that,
 20 they make a commitment to follow-through with the
 21 training that we have in that regard. Some don't make
 22 it.
 23 We have an instrument called a NARB, a New

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1 that there was a need to create the video to go out to
 2 the — out in the field so that those candidates who were
 3 selected in fact understood what they had to do to
 4 prepare themselves for the Academy.
 5 Is that a safe assumption? And if that
 6 is, could you give us some history? Because we're, quite
 7 frankly, wrestling with the same aspect with delayed
 8 entry pools and should all the services, in their delayed
 9 entry pools, have a similar type of preparation program?
 10 MR. CRAWFORD: Along the lines of the
 11 video, originally we made a physical fitness video
 12 because of the fact that New Agent trainees were showing
 13 up at our Academy. We didn't have a pre-employment test
 14 with push-ups, pull-ups, and sit-ups, and what some
 15 people think is a push-up is not a push-up to us.
 16 And so the trainees would arrive thinking
 17 that they had a certain level of fitness and they would
 18 find out that the protocol that they had practiced, the
 19 protocol that they had used, the protocol that they
 20 thought was acceptable, was not acceptable.
 21 And without a pre-employment test in
 22 place, we thought it was a necessity to produce the tape
 23 so that they — in their processing field offices, three,

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1 Agent Review Board, and this is made up of a unit chief
 2 and two supervisors that are on a wheel rotation for
 3 this. When an instructor in any of the training venues
 4 — or instructors — has observed certain suitability
 5 issues in a New Agent and they document that — I beat
 6 the drum big on documentation: you've got to document;
 7 you have to be able to explain why we do things.
 8 They document this and submit a request
 9 that a NARB be convened to further explore the
 10 suitability in regards to these particular
 11 characteristics or KSA's that this Agent — New Agent
 12 trainee has failed to demonstrate.
 13 So we do that process, and then — That's
 14 a fact-finding process. Then a report is generated and
 15 comes to me, and I make a recommendation to the Assistant
 16 Director, my boss, for dismissal, retention, remedial
 17 process. That's how it really evolves. And it's really
 18 based on their observations of the sixty-seven knowledge,
 19 skills and ability requirements that we have.
 20 So it's just not an arbitrary assumption
 21 on the part — "Well, I don't like this person." It
 22 won't happen that way. It can't happen that way. There
 23 are too many checks and balances involved.

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1 four months before they arrive at the Academy, they would
 2 have the opportunity to review the tape.
 3 Then it was decided that we would add the
 4 small part of the defensive segment — defensive tactics
 5 segment — on to the end. Jim Collaudid, who was the
 6 unit chief, who was in Tom's position at that time,
 7 decided that he would put a little defensive tactics
 8 portion on the end. Of course, we teased him that he
 9 just wanted to get on the video tape, but he —
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Not a bad
 11 idea.
 12 MR. CRAWFORD: Yeah. He added that and he
 13 put the defensive tactics in so that they would be
 14 prepared mentally. Not that they would practice
 15 defensive tactics before they arrived; just so that they
 16 would have an idea, kind of like a training tape that the
 17 military would utilize before acceptance.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My second
 19 question may be a left-fielder, so, you know — Do you
 20 find that because the Justice Department has screened
 21 30,000 applicants, narrowed them to 600 — and there's
 22 obviously a great expense involved in putting these
 23 potential Special Agents through the Academy — do you

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1 Documentation's the key.
 2 DR. SEGAL: Can I follow-up with some
 3 other questions on the similarity and relationship
 4 between military and the FBI?
 5 Do you have a sense — You said that a
 6 fair number of your Special Agent trainees who come
 7 through are military veterans.
 8 MR. LOUDEN: We have a fair number from
 9 the officer ranks that come —
 10 MR. LYONS: Four or five a class.
 11 MR. LOUDEN: At least. I've seen it as
 12 high as ten or a third of a class sometimes. And I don't
 13 know why. I have no idea.
 14 DR. SEGAL: Is there a difference between
 15 men and women in the proportion who are military vets?
 16 MR. LOUDEN: You mean in the proportion
 17 that we get?
 18 DR. SEGAL: I mean, do you get women who
 19 are military veterans as well?
 20 MR. LOUDEN: Oh, yes. Oh, yeah.
 21 DR. SEGAL: Okay.
 22 MR. LOUDEN: Yeah, we do.
 23 DR. SEGAL: Do you have a sense of how the

1 folks who are military veterans do compared to those who
 2 are not?
 3 MR. LOUDEN: Yeah, I have a sense about
 4 that. It's my own personal opinion, if you would like to
 5 hear that.
 6 They're quicker — They understand chains
 7 of command. They understand regimen. They understand
 8 that you need to follow-through and do things. There are
 9 different things that, for us who have been in the
 10 military, when you go into an organization, that you're
 11 faced with rules, regulations and so forth, that perhaps
 12 the private industry isn't — doesn't have that.
 13 DR. SEGAL: How many of you are military
 14 veterans?
 15 (A show of hands.)
 16 DR. SEGAL: Two. Okay.
 17 Do you have a sense of — Well, it's
 18 probably been too long since you — How difficult is this
 19 training compared to, say, military basic training?
 20 MR. LOUDEN: Oh, my. I don't think it's
 21 — My opinion: I don't think it's difficult.
 22 MR. LYONS: Well, it's really —
 23 MR. LOUDEN: We don't throw —

1 does. And that's the other thing that we try to get
 2 across. And you get hurt out there, you get shot, the
 3 better physical condition you are in, the higher your
 4 chance to survive that.
 5 So that's very critical to us. Safety is
 6 big.
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I have one last loose end
 8 which I think I can ask quickly. You sort of alluded to
 9 specialties within FBI Agents such as a need for an
 10 accountant or something like that. Are there in fact
 11 what you might call occupational specialties, and how
 12 fluid are they? Is it possible for somebody to start out
 13 as a — I don't know — criminal securities investigator
 14 and go to organized crime and domestic terrorism and this
 15 and that?
 16 MR. LOUDEN: The rule of thumb is that
 17 everybody comes out of the FBI Academy as a Special Agent
 18 investigator. We will have people who were specifically
 19 recruited because of specific abilities — a
 20 metallurgist, a DNA — a chemist, something like that —
 21 but they will do three years as a street investigator.
 22 We train investigators. That's what we
 23 do. We have a lot of these little special pockets of

1 MR. LYONS: It's really apples and
 2 oranges.
 3 MR. LOUDEN: Yeah.
 4 MR. LYONS: Because we're hitting people
 5 at different parts of their life.
 6 MR. LOUDEN: We don't have bivouacs. We
 7 don't have twenty-mile hikes. We don't have, you know,
 8 fifty-pound packs.
 9 DR. SEGAL: It's actually fairly more like
 10 officer basic, because you're getting people who are
 11 college graduates and...
 12 MR. LOUDEN: Yeah. It's an academic
 13 atmosphere. We're a training facility, but it's an
 14 academic atmosphere.
 15 MR. PANG: But I think it's crucial, maybe
 16 this point that sometimes — a thought I almost missed,
 17 is the fact that, you know, whatever training — physical
 18 fitness training you have, if you're going to test on it,
 19 I mean, it's got to be job-related. Otherwise, you're
 20 subject to suit. Whereas, in the military, you aren't.
 21 I mean, you can sit down here and say, you
 22 know, "I'm going to put you through training that may
 23 have no relevance — okay? — to the job, but you have to

1 expertise in the FBI, but the broad brush is we're
 2 investigators and that's what we train.
 3 And so all Agents are that — are, in
 4 fact, investigators, and then you begin to specialize.
 5 And you can specialize in the forensic side; you can
 6 specialize in organized crime, LCN, Asian, Russian
 7 organized — white-collar crime, BF — bank frauds —
 8 embezzlements.
 9 So there are chances to specialize as you
 10 go through the system.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And those choices are
 12 driven by ability, preference, and the Agency's needs,
 13 basically?
 14 MR. LOUDEN: And which office you're
 15 really in, because each field division — their analysis
 16 of the crime with that specific division may be different
 17 than what it is to a neighboring division, so that the
 18 SAC in Charge there is going to put the resources to
 19 that.
 20 And so you may be — I had a fellow
 21 working for me in Albuquerque who never let anybody know
 22 he was a writer — programmer for computers and
 23 everything, and he ran the fugitive task force. He

1 do it anyway."
 2 MR. LOUDEN: The fitness test that we give
 3 really is self-motivated, and that's what we're looking
 4 at. Do you want to just do the minimum? We're only
 5 asking them to do one-third of the maximum of this test.
 6 We see great strides in people who come in
 7 and score miserably on the initial test. And we watch
 8 this number grow at the seventh week and then the
 9 fourteenth week, and all of a sudden they're doing things
 10 — The last time they worked out was in junior high
 11 school. They're getting back — It's a wellness issue,
 12 and we also preach that. And health and so forth.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But it's
 14 more than that, though, isn't it? It's a wellness issue,
 15 but it's a gauge of motivation that's one of those —
 16 MR. LOUDEN: It is a gauge. In my
 17 opinion, it's a very big gauge.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Yes.
 19 MR. LOUDEN: Also, it's a huge stress-
 20 reliever. There's a lot of self-induced stress that
 21 exists there. It's a good outlet.
 22 Also, physical fitness has direct
 23 relationship to survivability in a crisis. It really

1 didn't want any — He loved chasing fugitives. He kept
 2 that quiet. But he's back at Headquarters now, working
 3 computers.
 4 DR. SEGAL: They found out.
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, we're pushing it a
 6 little bit with our reporter here and I know it's the end
 7 of the day for you guys. We appreciate very much all the
 8 materials you've given us and the information and taking
 9 the time to spend with us. We're very grateful to you.
 10 Thanks.
 11 MR. LOUDEN: Thank you. It's our
 12 pleasure.
 13 (Whereupon, at 4:34 p.m., the hearing in
 14 the above-entitled matter was concluded.)
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DEC. 2, 1998

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CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES

Monday; December 21, 1998

1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 940

Arlington, Virginia

DEC. 21, 1998

1 Those present:
 2 Anita K. Blair, Esquire - Chairman
 3 The Honorable Frederick F.Y. Pang - Vice Chairman
 4 LtGen George R. Christmas, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner
 5 CSM Robert A. Dare, Jr., USA(Ret) - Commissioner
 6 LtGen William M. Keys, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner
 7 Thomas Moore - Commissioner
 8 Charles Moskos, Ph.D. - Commissioner
 9 The Honorable Barbara Spyridon Pope - Commissioner
 10 Mady Wechsler Segal, Ph.D. - Commissioner
 11 ---
 12 Stephen C. Fogleman, Esquire - Executive Director
 13 Susan L. Fry - Executive Assistant
 14 Hank Hodge - Staff Liaison
 15 James Renne, Esquire - Staff Counsel and Secretary
 16 Carolyn F. Duke - Staff, Budget
 17 Kathleen M. Wright, Ph.D. - Research Director
 18 Janice Laurence, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 19 Charles Johnson, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 20 Capt J.S. Snyder, USN - Service Representative
 21 LtCol Brenda L. Harris, USA - Service Representative
 22 LtCol Mary Street, USAF - Service Representative
 23 Maj R. Scott LaShier, USMC - Service Representative

1 Those present:
 2 General Michael E. Ryan, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
 3 Barry Graham, SAF/LLX
 MAJ Mike Morris, SECAF/LLP, USAF
 4 LTCOL Brian Yolitz, USAF
 COL Lisa Belu, USAF
 5 COL Sandy Rufkahr, USAF
 MAJGEN Paul Hester, USAF
 6 ---
 7 History of Gender-Integrated Training
 8 LTG Claudia J. Kennedy, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for
 9 Intelligence, U.S. Army
 10 MAJ Yvete Nonte, USA, XO, DCSINT
 LTCOL Gregory King, USA
 11 ---
 12 RADM Thomas J. Barrett, USCG, Director of Reserve and
 13 Training
 14 CAPT Sally Brice-O'Hara, USCG, Commander, Training Center, Cape May, New Jersey
 15 ---
 16 MG Richard Siegfried, USA (Ret), Chairman, Sexual
 17 Harassment Senior Review Panel (1996-1997); Former
 Commander, Ft. Jackson, SC (1991-1994)
 18 Panel
 19 BG Myrna H. Williamson, USA (Ret), Chief, Enlisted
 20 Education Department Staff and Faculty, U.S. Army Women's
 21 Army Corps School and Training Center, Ft. McClellan, AL
 22 (Integrated Male/Female Committee Trainers) (1974-1979),
 Former Commander, 1st Battalion, Training Brigade, U.S.
 23 Army Military Police School/Training Center, Ft.,McClellan, AL (1977-1979)

1 COL Karen Frey, USA (Ret), President, KLF Group; Former
 2 Commander, Gender-Integrated Training Company 1974)
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1 PROCEEDINGS (8:02 a.m.)
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: This is the Congressional
 3 Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related
 4 Issues. It's Monday, December 21st, and we are very
 5 happy to have as our first guest today General Michael
 6 Ryan, Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
 7 General, we thank you very much for making
 8 time to come and visit with us, and I'd like to invite
 9 you to say anything to us that you would like to say for
 10 starters.
 11 GENERAL RYAN: Thank you for inviting us
 12 over.
 13 I know the Commission has traveled
 14 extensively and looked at the training that the services
 15 do. From the Air Force perspective, we believe that
 16 because 99-plus percent of the jobs in the United States
 17 Air Force are open to both male and female, we think that
 18 our training should be integrated from the day a person
 19 walks onto an Air Force base, and that includes Lackland
 20 Air Force Base or the Air Force Academy or Maxwell.
 21 That our entrance training ought to
 22 integrate the males and females in the way we will do
 23 business in the Air Force. And it shouldn't be after

1 several weeks or after several months or after a year, it
 2 ought to be immediately, so that we set the correct tone
 3 and tenor of the interfaces between the genders and to
 4 make sure that every person in the United States Air
 5 Force understands that there is zero toleration for any
 6 discrimination with respect to sex.
 7 We have been doing this for about twenty
 8 years, to some extent or another, and we have continued
 9 to evolve, I think, in our training to the point where we
 10 think we have it about right for what the United States
 11 Air Force needs to do.
 12 As you saw last week, we began deployments
 13 — well, last month we began deployments overseas. We
 14 have continued to do deployments to the Gulf, to Turkey,
 15 to Bosnia, and we integrate our forces into the
 16 operations there in the same way that we train at home.
 17 And that is, when we go forward, we operate in the same
 18 way as we would if we were at home station.
 19 So from our training continuum, we think
 20 that the integration should begin at the very beginning
 21 because in the very end that's how it would operate.
 22 That having been said, I look forward to
 23 any questions you have about how we do it and why we do

1 it. If I don't have the answer today for you, I'll make
 2 sure that the Commission gets the answer.
 3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much. We
 4 thank you again for coming.
 5 As I mentioned, what we do is rather than
 6 attempting to figure out who had a hand up first, we
 7 simply go around the table, and so I will go ahead and
 8 start.
 9 And I'd like to start, General, by
 10 complimenting the folks at Lackland whom we visited,
 11 particularly with the FTX project. That, as was
 12 described to us, was kind of the skunk works project by a
 13 few NCO's that had tremendous results and I personally
 14 was very impressed by that and by the people who were
 15 running it.
 16 And that brings me to my question. We
 17 have heard recently about the change of the Air Force to
 18 what is termed an expeditionary Air Force, and I wonder
 19 if you could describe for us what is foreseen for the
 20 expeditionary Air Force versus what we have today and in
 21 the recent past, and if those changes may indicate
 22 further changes in your initial training regimen.
 23 GENERAL RYAN: Since the Gulf War, if you

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1 look at the Optempo that we've had in the United States
2 Air Force, it has quadrupled compared to what we did in
3 the Cold War. We have made a commitment to reorganizing
4 the Air Force in a way that allows us to address the
5 Optempo we think will be there on a day-to-day basis, and
6 that's called expeditionary aerospace force. That's what
7 we are and what we think we do. And if you look back
8 over the last eight years, we thought that after Desert
9 Storm, all this would kind of go away or be back to the
10 Cold War paradigm and that the forces would return home.

11 Well, they didn't and won't. And if you
12 look at the engagement strategy that is part of the
13 national security strategy, part of that is continual
14 outreach in both peacetime and in crisis, and, therefore,
15 you cannot expect to be a garrison-type force as we were
16 in the Cold War.

17 We have been doing expeditionary
18 operations since the inception of the United States Air
19 Force, and, in fact, before that. Most air power has
20 always been expeditionary. Go back to World War I. It
21 was even called an expeditionary force in World War II,
22 in Korea and Vietnam. It was only during this Cold War
23 period where we kind of hunkered down and were not

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1 expeditionary, and what we're doing is going back to our
2 roots because that's what the nation demands of us, I
3 think.

4 And so what we have planned is to take the
5 Air Force and separate it into about ten piles called air
6 expeditionary forces, and then schedule those forces on a
7 routine basis to fulfill the known requirements we have
8 — and you can look at them today — for forces to go
9 expeditionary: Bosnia, Southwest Asia, Turkey. You can
10 look around the world in the drug-ops business.

11 We have a certain Optempo that's driven on
12 a day-to-day basis, that requires our forces to go
13 forward in an expeditionary manner and live on
14 expeditionary bases. We've opened I-don't-know-how-many
15 bases since the Gulf War in Tuzla and Tazsar, Brindisi,
16 and walk your way through Peasab and through Southwest
17 Asia. In most of those cases our forces have bedded down
18 in a very temporary way, and for force protection
19 reasons, they're often segregated away from towns and
20 away from, in some cases, utilities.

21 And we have evolved over the last about
22 eight years in being able to do expeditionary operations
23 very effectively. We just never organized for it. And

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1 so what we are doing now is an acknowledgement of the
2 demands that have been put on us and see if we can put a
3 little order into the lives of our folks.

4 When I go out and talk to our young people
5 in the field, their biggest complaint to me is that they
6 don't have predictability in what happens next to them on
7 a day-to-day basis. Not when the big one comes, not if
8 we have a major theater war. They understand completely
9 that we have to respond to those. It's the day-to-day
10 business, the demand on our forces, the rotational
11 demands, that they're asking for stability.

12 We did one other thing during this time,
13 and that is, that we never put out into the field the
14 amount of support that you need to rotate the forces.
15 And that is, that our forces were well designed in their
16 unit sizes to go forward and do the operations that we
17 ask them to do, but we had never taken our support side
18 and packaged it in a way that would allow us to do the
19 expeditionary business and open all these bases.

20 So what happened to us is we'd send a
21 forty-four-man security forces unit, say, to Aliasolem,
22 to bed down the forces that we've brought in there.
23 Their unit back home would go on twelve-hour shifts,

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1 they'd be on twelve-hour shifts, and then we'd switch
2 them. That lack of support force enhancement to meet the
3 requirements that we've had over the last few years is
4 one of the things we're addressing right now.

5 We're going to put about five to six
6 thousand more folks into our support base so that when we
7 go on routine expeditionary missions as we have over the
8 last eight years, we will not strip the support
9 mechanisms from the home ports.

10 In Navy parlance, when the Marines send
11 out a MEU, they are not taking the support structure away
12 from the home base that supports those who remain behind
13 to train nor those families that remain behind. So we're
14 trying to put some order and predictability into our day-
15 to-day operations.

16 Where does that lead us with respect to
17 this issue that you all are addressing? And that is, I
18 think it even makes it more important that we integrate,
19 because as we go forward, as we just went forward in
20 Doha, as we started the flow this last week of
21 reinforcement forces into Southwest Asia and opened
22 another base, made another warm base to accept our forces
23 coming in in Doha, in Gutter, that is a completely

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1 integrated operation.

2 They're intense. They're expeditionary.
3 They're setting up. If we need to flow the forces,
4 they'll go. And you look all around Southwest Asia where
5 we bedded down forces from Oman, up through Saudi Arabia
6 and on up into Kuwait, all of that is integrated; living
7 together, working together, on unbelievable shifts and
8 under unbelievable stress these last couple of weeks.

9 So the first time we would integrate folks
10 shouldn't be when we go forward in an operation. In
11 fact, it shouldn't be the first time we train. It ought
12 to be the first time we walk on an Air Force base, and I
13 think it even strengthens our case of integrated training
14 from the very get-go.

15 You asked for the time. I gave you a
16 watch.

17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.

18 MR. PANG: General, I want to join the
19 Chair in thanking you for coming here today to talk to
20 us. You know, I must commend the Air Force because the
21 Air Force has been very responsive and supportive of our
22 efforts, and I think all the people that we've met have
23 responded very, very well.

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1 You know, to follow-up on the Chair's
2 question — and this is kind of like a two-part question
3 — you know, the first is as you deploy forces and just
4 recently, I mean, do you think about the fact that you're
5 sending women out there, or is this pretty much, you
6 know, natural now and you don't think about it; you just
7 send the unit? That's number one.

8 And the second has to do with a charge
9 that we have as a Commission to look at good order and
10 discipline. And the question has to do with the
11 fraternization and adultery policy that the Defense
12 Department just came out with with regard to the effect
13 that that would have on the Air Force, if any, and, you
14 know, the question about how punishments or how
15 leadership deals with these instances when they occur;
16 whether or not it's fair or not — the perception, you
17 know, of fairness between, for example, treatment of an
18 officer versus an enlisted or even within the officer
19 corps, a senior officer versus a junior officer.

20 GENERAL RYAN: First of all, I don't think
21 we think about it anymore and we do nothing consciously
22 to change the flow because we have females on board in
23 the Air Force. I think today nine percent of the forces

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1 that are deployed are female — Bosnia, Southwest — at
 2 least in Southwest Asia — and that's under some more
 3 restrictions that apply in Southwest Asia, as you know,
 4 from some of the countries in which we go.
 5 So I don't think there is a conscious
 6 decision of who's in what unit when we sent them, and
 7 they go. That's what they signed up to do and that's
 8 what we expect them to do.
 9 The fraternization policy has always been
 10 fairly clear in the Air Force, and that is, that
 11 fraternization, whether it is male-female or male-male,
 12 female-female, is an officer-enlisted domain — in the
 13 officer-enlisted domain, and that anything that would
 14 lessen good order and discipline through fraternization,
 15 even apparent — the appearances of fraternization, are
 16 frowned upon by the United States Air Force. And we've
 17 been fairly consistent in that policy.
 18 One of the problems that the
 19 fraternization policy addressed, I think, was the fact
 20 that we had mixed communities out there — that is, Air
 21 Force, Navy, Army, Marine Corps — forces living together
 22 in our base structures, more so than we have ever in the
 23 past.

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1 You go to Germany, to the Ramstein area,
 2 and you'll find that we have a fairly substantial Army
 3 force there. And it could have been that an Army officer
 4 would be dating an enlisted Air Force member, and that
 5 would, from an Army's perspective, be okay because they
 6 weren't in the same unit. But an Air Force officer
 7 dating an enlisted Army would be an offense and that
 8 would not be fair. And in fact, the Air Force would
 9 pursue that and try and either dissolve it or punish the
 10 member who — the officer member who did it.
 11 So we had some real disparities with
 12 respect to fraternization.
 13 I think the adultery policy is fairly
 14 clear, and the changes that were made to the adultery
 15 policy, which you're well aware of, were, quite honestly,
 16 reiterations of what was in other parts of the Manual for
 17 Courts-Martial and the guidance given to our commanders.
 18 They were pulled directly from other places and just put
 19 into a better layout. There was some move to lessen the
 20 punishment and that was overcome.
 21 So I think those two policies are now
 22 fairly clear.
 23 MR. PANG: Thank you.

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Follow-on,
 2 please. What about, General, from the adultery side?
 3 We're about to get these new guidelines that will be
 4 placed within the Manual for Courts-Martial. I guess my
 5 follow-on question is, are they really needed?
 6 GENERAL RYAN: Most of them are derived
 7 from what is already in the Manual and just pulled from
 8 different places and arranged differently. So I don't
 9 see a big change. I don't see any change, in fact, in
 10 the policy, per se. The guidelines are fairly
 11 straightforward. I don't find that detrimental in any
 12 way to good order and discipline. I think in some cases
 13 it makes it a little more clear.
 14 MR. PANG: You know, would you address the
 15 perception issue? You know, there's a perception; and
 16 we've traveled around and talked to some people with
 17 regard to the application of the rules to senior people
 18 versus junior people, and even within, you know, the
 19 officer and enlisted grades, on how we treat people.
 20 You know, there are some people who
 21 perceive that when an officer is asked to retire early,
 22 that that is not the same as, for example, getting a
 23 junior airman and giving him an Article 15, making him

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1 forfeit pay, et cetera and so forth, you know, and I
 2 think we need to get your views on the record with regard
 3 to that issue of perception.
 4 I mean, is it, you know, real? And if it
 5 is, how do you deal with it? Or how should we deal with
 6 it?
 7 GENERAL RYAN: You know, I really ought to
 8 be asking you that question, given your background.
 9 I don't know whether there is, in fact, a
 10 difference. There is a factual piece that says any
 11 punishment you give to an officer ends that officer's
 12 career, for all practice purposes. Upward mobility.
 13 Punishments given to our enlisted force don't necessarily
 14 end the career. They can still progress.
 15 But I have never delved into the factual
 16 basis of what happens in cases such as this. I know that
 17 in the cases where it has to do with chain of command,
 18 that we are fairly harsh on officers. In fact, we have
 19 some folks who have gone to Leavenworth for adultery
 20 involving the chain of command.
 21 So I think those are fairly stiff
 22 punishments for officers, particularly where it comes
 23 down to their leadership positions where it actually, in

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1 fact, in a very detrimental way, involved the issue of
 2 good order and discipline within the unit.
 3 But I don't have facts that say that there
 4 is a disparity. I've never seen facts that say there's a
 5 disparity between what we do to officers and what we do
 6 to the enlisted for similar offenses.
 7 MR. PANG: Okay.
 8 DR. SEGAL: If the Congress were to
 9 require the Air Force to segregate the sexes in basic
 10 training, what would you anticipate would be the
 11 consequences of that?
 12 GENERAL RYAN: I think then that we would
 13 put a much larger burden on our technical training
 14 schools because at that point we would have to integrate.
 15 It would call into question the way that we do our
 16 business at our academies.
 17 And that is, in fact, most of the people
 18 who enter our academies are of a younger age than those
 19 who enter our basic training. So if it is wrong to do it
 20 for our enlisted force, then is it wrong to do it the way
 21 we do it at the Academy? And then we have to look at
 22 OTS, if that is considered a basic training. Then our
 23 officer training schools, when would we integrate the

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1 sexes there?
 2 So I would have — It would put a great
 3 burden on the next layer of command in the next layer of
 4 training because we get — in our basic training, both at
 5 the Academy, OTS, ROTC, for that matter, and at basic
 6 military training, are very, very straightforward about
 7 what we expect the integration to be and how the sexes
 8 should treat each other with respect.
 9 I think that would be a great step
 10 backwards and a very large burden on our next layer of
 11 training.
 12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thanks for
 13 being with us, sir. We appreciate it. I'm sure there's
 14 a lot of other places you could have been today, so it's
 15 nice for you to be here.
 16 I'd follow-up with what Mady said. And
 17 understanding the part that you just described, would it
 18 also have an impact on the staffing at Lackland if
 19 Congress mandates that males are with males, to include
 20 trainers, females with females, to include — And
 21 separate barracks as well. I would imagine there would
 22 be a logistical and staffing impact.
 23 GENERAL RYAN: Yeah. Let's back up on the

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1 barracks. We currently segregate the sexes by bay, and I
2 think you all have been down there and seen how we do
3 that. And while we have the luxury, we do it by floor,
4 but that's only luxury. Policy is by bay, not by floor.
5 And then we have mechanisms that we've set up for the
6 security of the females. And males, for that matter.
7 So to have us segregate by building would
8 require us to outlay funds to do that and that would be a
9 burden. We'd have to go build some additional
10 capability.

11 The question is, where do you stop with
12 segregation? Is it at — Because ours is a six-week
13 basic military training; then we roll into our technical
14 training, which is actually an extension of our basic
15 training. We go through phases as they go through that
16 training and slowly rewarding performance and maturity by
17 fewer and fewer restrictions on them until they finish
18 their tech training and are out into the field.

19 I think from a — Not all the services are
20 the same with respect to what is basic military training,
21 where it begins and where it ends; so you have to give me
22 a definition of where basic military training begins and
23 ends for me to tell you what the overall outcome of that

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1 would be.

2 I mean, are we going to declare it's
3 fifteen weeks? Six weeks like the Air Force? Nine weeks
4 like some of the other services? We've got to declare
5 how long that is and then I can tell you what the impact
6 of where we segregate and where we integrate the
7 training.

8 But if it's just basic military training
9 as we define it, for the first six weeks, then we would
10 have a bill for building barracks that aren't really
11 needed.

12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.

13 DR. SEGAL: There was another question —

14 GENERAL RYAN: The second part of your
15 question was would it increase our need for our trainers,
16 and it would because of the overhead that would be
17 required for separate-living kind of training. Yeah.

18 All of our trainers are volunteers. We
19 don't — We would have to go out and get more volunteers.
20 In fact, what we're trying to do right now is increase
21 our trainer-to-trainee ratios from one-to-fifty-eight to
22 two-per-forty-eight and try and recruit more women to
23 come back into our training pool, and we just upped that

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1 this last year fairly substantially.

2 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.

3 MR. MOORE: Many thanks for coming. I'd
4 like to ask you one question right up front.

5 Of course, the Air Force has been
6 successfully conducting integrated training and actually
7 operating on an integrated basis for twenty years. You
8 said that 99 percent of all the Air Force billets or 99-
9 plus are open to females. Could you just review those
10 that aren't? That half-a-percent or whatever that —

11 GENERAL RYAN: All right. On the officer
12 side, from an Air Force — And you have to understand
13 there are policies that deal only with the Air Force and
14 then policies that deal with the force that is other than
15 the Air Force. So DoD policy, for instance.

16 MR. MOORE: Right.

17 GENERAL RYAN: But on the officer side,
18 the specialties that are precluded are SOF helicopters
19 for one. And then from a DoD standpoint, those forces
20 that would go into close — could be subjected to close
21 combat and serve with Army units or other units at the
22 battalion and below level. And that would be —

23 MR. MOORE: Forward air controllers.

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1 GENERAL RYAN: Forward air controllers.
2 It would be our combat controllers, some weather, AFSE's
3 for the officers. So those are the — that is the small
4 percentage and I think it's about .6 percent of positions
5 that are not open to females by policy.

6 Within the Air Force, we have said all
7 positions are open — flying positions are open to
8 females, but the SOF forces have said that no, not rotary
9 wing SOF. We're going to have an interesting dilemma
10 coming up here, and that is, when the B-22 comes in. Is
11 that rotary wing or is that fixed wing? And we allow
12 fixed wing SOF pilots.

13 I think those are the only pieces of our
14 Air Force that are not — or positions that are not
15 integrated. The rest — 99.4 percent of the rest of the
16 force is integrated.

17 MR. MOORE: So F-15 pilots?

18 GENERAL RYAN: Oh, yeah. Sure.

19 MR. MOORE: Are B-1's flying in the Gulf
20 now?

21 GENERAL RYAN: You bet. You bet.

22 MR. MOORE: Are they crewed — Are women
23 crews on those?

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1 GENERAL RYAN: Right.

2 MR. MOORE: Okay.

3 GENERAL RYAN: We have — In fact, I was
4 looking at some statistics of how many female pilots we
5 have. We have twenty-seven fighter pilots and eight
6 WSO's in the force. We've got eight bomber pilots and
7 seventeen weapons systems officers in the bombers. In
8 the airlift, 123 and twenty-four navigators. In tanker
9 pilots, we have 120 female tanker pilots and forty-one
10 associated crew. In command control, we've got eight
11 pilots and eleven others in the rear of the airplane.

12 So our force across-the-board is
13 integrated with female members integral to our crews.

14 MR. MOORE: One more question. When you
15 deploy — Let's say the troops that are in Southwest Asia
16 now and specifically Saudi Arabia. How do they train
17 when they're on deployment? Do you run into cultural or
18 diplomatic problems when you are deployed in certain
19 countries that restrict your —

20 GENERAL RYAN: Yeah, we do.

21 MR. MOORE: — on-the-job training in
22 units? And how do you handle that?

23 GENERAL RYAN: And sometimes we're

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1 restricted from bringing in women into particular career
2 fields. Like we had deployed some females to Southwest
3 Asia to work with the AETC, air traffic control, and the
4 host government would not allow them to do that job, so
5 we had to take them back. They just kind of said, "No,
6 we won't do that with females on board in our tower."

7 But our training is normally either in the
8 air or on the base. So in most cases where we deploy, we
9 don't have a restriction. We don't have — We seldom
10 have the need for the kinds of training that we do in the
11 Air Force, to do it on the ground outside the base. It's
12 normally done in the air outside the base, and that's
13 fairly neutral territory with respect to the sovereign
14 sensitivities that we run into over there.

15 So training is not complicated for us by
16 the inclusion of females except in those rare instances
17 where we have to integrate with the host nations, where
18 they have policies and procedures that prohibit and we
19 have to recognize their sovereignty, the sovereignty of
20 the nation, and their cultural biases that won't allow us
21 to do all of the mission if we push back too hard on the
22 female side. So we have to play those individually, one-
23 on-one.

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1 We have not had a lot of problems in the
2 Gulf with that, and that's where you would expect to have
3 the most.

4 MR. MOORE: The most, right.

5 GENERAL RYAN: Yeah. But that's because
6 of the nature of the way we do our business, and that's
7 normally on the base or in the air.

8 MR. MOORE: Thank you.

9 DR. MOSKOS: Well, thank you. Again, in
10 light of all the action that's going on, we're very
11 grateful for your time here.

12 I have two questions, and they're not
13 related to the other. One question is, since the Air
14 Force gender-integration has been relatively — it's the
15 longest standing, the most smoothly operating. Why has
16 there been this — the introduction of what some of us
17 thought was extraordinary security? Cameras and things
18 of this sort. What was — Why were these things
19 introduced when the system seemed to be working pretty
20 well? What was broke that had to be fixed?

21 GENERAL RYAN: Well, we rolled into that
22 after the Aberdeen incidents came up. When we went back
23 on our security, we found that it was fairly good. As

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1 heard some senior Defense Department officials say that
2 the original impetus to change the adultery rules came
3 from within the services. Some of us looked at that with
4 a little bit of skepticism, but we're wondering if you
5 would react to that.

6 And the follow-on question is, in light of
7 the fraternization being uniform, would you feel — I
8 mean, say, just hypothetically, if the Commission says
9 the Air Force can have gender-integrated, the Marines can
10 have gender-separated, which isn't uniform, is that a
11 disconnect or not? We want uniform fraternization rules
12 but we might not come up with uniform basic training
13 gender rules.

14 And the other one, too, about where did
15 the adultery impetus come for lightening the punishments?

16 GENERAL RYAN: I don't know where it came
17 from. Maybe Fred knows. I don't know. Ask Rudy de
18 Leon.

19 You know, these things —

20 DR. MOSKOS: He said it came from the
21 services.

22 GENERAL RYAN: — were kind of presented
23 to us as "here is the negotiated position." Lots of

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1 most of you know, we didn't have a lot of outgrowth out
2 of that as we went back into our system and checked, but
3 I don't think you can ever be too careful.

4 Moms and dads have entrusted with us the
5 youth of the nation and we ought to take every precaution
6 we can to make sure that nothing untoward happens to
7 them, particularly when they are initially with us and
8 being culturized, being absorbed into our system.

9 I think the only extraordinary thing we
10 did was put the cameras up. That also has saved some
11 manpower, quite honesty. We still have the bay orderlies
12 that are sitting there. We have the two folks who are
13 listening to the squawk boxes and monitoring the doors.
14 I don't think that's extraordinary. It's working.

15 DR. MOSKOS: But it was working before,
16 too, though.

17 GENERAL RYAN: It was working before, too.

18 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.

19 DR. SEGAL: How much —

20 GENERAL RYAN: But sometimes you —

21 DR. SEGAL: Let me just follow-up. How
22 much of that was actually in response to the Kassebaum
23 Baker report and recommendations?

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1 lawyers were in there looking at every word, and the real
2 issue came down to is there going to be a lessening of
3 punishment for adultery — maximum punishment for
4 adultery, which we, quite honestly, in the Air Force, had
5 never used, that anybody could ever recall or our records
6 would show.

7 So from a practical application
8 standpoint, there was not a problem on that one
9 particular aspect.

10 From a policy standpoint, though, it
11 sounded as if we were lowering the moral goal. And
12 because of the amount of time that we, the military, are
13 deployed and the separation of the families, adultery has
14 a real corrosive influence, particularly with our
15 families who are expected to be kept safe and sound. The
16 member can go forward and do their job, knowing that
17 their family is safe. And vice versa, the family knowing
18 that the member is safe from relationships that are
19 untoward.

20 So it was the implication that we were
21 going to lower the bar in some way that got the hackles
22 up with some of our folks.

23 MR. PANG: You know, maybe I can help here

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1 GENERAL RYAN: In fact, we were doing it
2 ongoing before we even knew what the Kassebaum Baker
3 reports were going to say. We had already started into
4 it because we wanted to make dang sure that our training
5 was the safest we could provide.

6 In fact, I was surprised by that Kassebaum
7 Baker report. We sat with her with the chiefs a month
8 and a half before it came out and a lot of the things
9 that were in it or some of the things that were in it we
10 were surprised by.

11 DR. SEGAL: What things surprised you?

12 GENERAL RYAN: Oh, segregating the
13 buildings and segregating the training. That was a
14 surprise to me. None of that was — kind of came forward
15 in our meeting.

16 DR. MOSKOS: Well, that makes — I have
17 two more. Since we talked about adultery —

18 GENERAL RYAN: Maybe I wasn't listening
19 carefully when she was talking to us that month-and-a-
20 half before, but I certainly didn't hear those two items
21 come out.

22 DR. MOSKOS: In your general view, you
23 were talking — following-up on Fred Pang's remarks, we

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1 because — I wasn't part of the review in my previous
2 job. And quite frankly, it came out of General
3 Shalikhshvili. He was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
4 of Staff and he raised the issue with regard to uniform
5 policies in the joint arena.

6 DR. MOSKOS: This is fraternization now,
7 Fred?

8 MR. PANG: This is fraternization, yeah,
9 you know.

10 DR. MOSKOS: Fraternization.

11 MR. PANG: And not the adultery piece.

12 DR. MOSKOS: Not the adultery.

13 Fraternization.

14 MR. PANG: You know, fraternization. You
15 know, should there be common rules that govern behavior
16 among all military personnel? It was a legitimate
17 question and was raised very early on. And it was, I
18 believe, pre-Aberdeen, as I recall, because the J-1 at
19 the time called me up and he said, you know, "The
20 chairman's interested in this matter. Would you join us
21 in conducting a review at OSD?" And we said yes, we
22 would.

23 And then the word got out. And as I

1 recall, there was an article written by Dana Priest in
 2 which I was quoted, in which I got into a lot of trouble
 3 on — I mean, this is the honest-to-God truth, I mean,
 4 because the Secretary said, "Why are you doing this?"
 5 And I said, "Well, it was part of the normal review
 6 process that we already have, you know, with all the
 7 services and that's the reason we're doing it." "Well, I
 8 don't think this is a good idea, but, nonetheless, you
 9 can go ahead and proceed."
 10 So it was kind of — you know, that kind
 11 of guidance is what I received. This is the honest-to-
 12 God truth. I mean, Secretary Cohen was upset. He called
 13 me up on a Saturday and said, you know, "Why are we doing
 14 this?" And I said, "Because General Shalikashvili wanted
 15 to do this."
 16 So we continued on in doing that. And
 17 then there was all this furor that followed, and it
 18 seemed like that's where it stemmed from, but it's not
 19 the truth. I mean, if you go back and look, it was
 20 before that.
 21 And he said, you know, that he had
 22 received comments, you know, from his commanders out in
 23 the field. They understood — okay? — that if an Air

1 Force person or an Army person got into some sort of
 2 difficulty with another person, either of the opposite
 3 sex or not — okay? — in a fraternization case, that
 4 those would be referred back to the component commanders
 5 for adjudication, and he was concerned that, you know,
 6 the results could be different and it would create
 7 problems. And that was the reason for it, you know.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: I was thinking more of the
 9 adultery case, where that originated.
 10 MR. PANG: Yeah. The adultery piece came
 11 from Kelly Flinn. I mean, you know, the Kelly Flinn
 12 case. You know, the fraternization process that had
 13 started way here, you know, and had now come forward, was
 14 expanded, you know, as a result of that. I mean, that's,
 15 frankly, the situation.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But coming
 17 back to what both of you said, and it comes — the
 18 original follow-in here — if I understood, General, what
 19 you said is that obviously adultery guidelines, as they
 20 previously existed, are very important to the force,
 21 especially a deploying force.
 22 GENERAL RYAN: Yeah.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Yet, the

1 new policy leads to a perception that standards will be
 2 lowered. If that be —
 3 GENERAL RYAN: No. I think — No, I think
 4 —
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: If that be
 6 the case, then, in fact, you know, is this policy really
 7 required?
 8 GENERAL RYAN: Ron, I think that it was
 9 the lowering of the maximum punishment for adultery that
 10 really was the issue. The guidelines I don't think are
 11 substantially different from the — or perceived as
 12 different from the past. It was a lowering of the
 13 maximum punishment.
 14 To get back to your question, Charlie,
 15 which I didn't finish, and that is, can you have a
 16 different training scheme for services and still hold to
 17 the same fraternization, and I think the answer to that
 18 is yes, those are two different things.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Right.
 20 GENERAL RYAN: One is — in some cases is
 21 how you need to do your business to be prepared for the
 22 operations you're going to do, and the other has to do
 23 with misconduct, and those are I think in some ways

1 separable.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: It's good to get that on the
 3 record. Yeah.
 4 Barbara.
 5 MS. POPE: I just want to add my thanks
 6 for your coming and taking time out. It's an extremely
 7 busy period.
 8 My only question is the Air Force has been
 9 at this — "at this" — at integration for twenty years.
 10 Is there anything that you wish you had known at the
 11 beginning as some of the other services are more junior
 12 or just beginning or expanding? That you wish you had
 13 thought about?
 14 GENERAL RYAN: I think as we've changed —
 15 We have changed because we thought there were good
 16 reasons to change over the years. I can't think of a
 17 specific instance of what we'd change — I can give you a
 18 good one.
 19 Before, we used to train outside the
 20 classroom in segregated flights; we then would mix for
 21 classroom. But we didn't do that at the Air Force
 22 Academy. From the very beginning at the Air Force — In
 23 fact, we made some mistakes at the Air Force Academy when

1 we first brought females in and in some ways segregated
 2 them during parts of our basic military training part of
 3 the Air Force Academy scheme. And we shouldn't have done
 4 it and we found that that didn't work as well as
 5 integrated, and it was almost protecting them from
 6 nothing.
 7 So at the Air Force Academy, we had fairly
 8 substantial integration of our females for a long, long
 9 time, more so than we did in BMT, and I think it was more
 10 of a convenience in BMT than it was for the effect. And
 11 we said, "Well, heck, we need to — "We do at the Air
 12 Force Academy like that. We do it at OTS like that. Why
 13 don't we do it at BMT like that?"
 14 So these were a series of decisions that
 15 were made in increments, not made in revolutionary ways,
 16 and so there were a lot of those decisions that have been
 17 made over the last twenty years that lead us to where we
 18 are today and I can't think of any specific that I would
 19 advise the other services on. I think the other services
 20 are very capable of making decisions like that on their
 21 own.
 22 MS. POPE: I just want to say that I had
 23 an opportunity to look at Air Force basic training back

1 in the early nineties and what we've seen this year was
 2 very impressive — I mean, the changes, the intensity —
 3 and the Air Force deserves to be complimented.
 4 GENERAL RYAN: Thank you.
 5 MS. POPE: It's really impressive. Not
 6 that it wasn't in the past, but...
 7 GENERAL RYAN: We learn.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Last, but
 9 not least. It's great to see you and I, like everybody
 10 here, really appreciate you being here.
 11 GENERAL RYAN: Thank you, Ron.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I really
 13 only have two questions. When we went to basic training,
 14 we found the new field training exercise to be really
 15 quite rewarding for, you know, the trainees and the like.
 16 And I wonder if there's any intent on the Air Force's
 17 part to enhance that, because what we did see was we saw
 18 some great sergeants who put that together, quite
 19 frankly, from whatever they could find.
 20 GENERAL RYAN: We are pushing very hard to
 21 get the FTX part of basic training expanded and we will
 22 get there by next year to a five-day exercise as part of
 23 the six weeks.

1 We think it's important because that's
 2 what we're doing day-to-day. If you go to Doha today,
 3 you'll see our folks that are erecting the tents and
 4 setting up the tent city, setting up the perimeter guard
 5 and setting up the interface with the locals for
 6 security, setting up field kitchens and getting ready to
 7 operate out of Doha.

8 If you go up to — at Camp Snoopy there
 9 where — that we're just setting up, if you go to Diego
 10 Garcia or Kuwait, this is part of our — has been in the
 11 past and will be part of the way the Air Force operates
 12 for the future.

13 So we think that it's very important to
 14 put the kids in that field condition early on so that
 15 they know how to put up a tent, know how to eat an MRE,
 16 understand that it isn't all — you know, when the lights
 17 go out or the generator fails, that the world doesn't
 18 come to an end. You can operate in these conditions.

19 So we're pushing very hard to get that
 20 expanded to the five-week point.

21 We're also doing a similar thing for our
 22 officers. We do it at the Academy and at OTS to a
 23 certain extent, and in ROTC a bit, but we've instituted

1 standpoint. And so I have the doctors coming back to me
 2 to tell me to go back to push-ups and sit-ups or crunches
 3 for our force and what are the standards that we should
 4 set for push-ups, sit-ups, and the aerobic piece, because
 5 upper body strength, lower body strength and tone, I
 6 think are important for the kinds of exercises we do in
 7 the field.

8 And that is, if I'm going to send them in
 9 to Doha, as we just sent them in, I'm expecting everybody
 10 to pull their own weight when it comes to setting the
 11 camp up and getting ready to go. And if we have a
 12 security incident, in fact, fighting with the camp.

13 So yes, we are looking at that and we will
 14 change. We are going to put in push-ups and some kind of
 15 sit-up requirement on an annual test basis along with the
 16 bike. I think the bike's the right thing to do for the
 17 aerobic side, but it is not the right thing to do for the
 18 physical strength side that we need in our force.

19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My final
 20 question is probably more a statement than a question and
 21 it deals with the security issue at Lackland. I
 22 personally am concerned about having to put so much money
 23 into cameras and monitors when that same amount of money

1 what we call the aerospace basic course, ABC, which I
 2 freely admit I stole from the Marine idea of having a
 3 basic course when everybody comes in. And we take
 4 officers from Army, Navy; we have some cross-over there,
 5 the ideas that they have on how this basic course should
 6 work in the Marines, and we put it into what we think our
 7 basic course ought to be.

8 And part of that is also a field training
 9 exercise that also runs an air operation, and that takes
 10 ROTC, OTS, and the Academy, and throws them together at
 11 the beginning of their career; and does about the same
 12 thing we do at BMT, only at a little bit higher level
 13 because we're dealing now with graduated officers.

14 Similar kind of field training exercise: MRE's, run an
 15 air operation.

16 So I see more of that, not less of it,
 17 because it's, quite frankly, the way we have to operate
 18 in the future.

19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My second
 20 question deals with physical training, another thing that
 21 we've had to get into. At recruit training, you've
 22 expanded it to six days a week.

23 GENERAL RYAN: Right.

1 could go to field training or whatever.

2 My concern is, is that we create a lock-up
 3 mentality if we have young folks there — And I fully
 4 understand the Kassebaum and all of that that came down,
 5 but I would hope that we, you know, remember that, as you
 6 all do, you're building a team out there and we don't
 7 need a lock-up mentality.

8 So I'll leave that statement with you.

9 You know I always do that to you.

10 Thank you very much for coming here today.

11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, I can see we still
 12 have a few questions. I have a brief question, General,
 13 which is that among the things that our statute asks us
 14 to assess is what I'll generally call today's youth. We
 15 have been asked to look at demographic and other
 16 characteristics of young people today to see whether it
 17 might suggest either changes in military training or
 18 perhaps a different approach towards recruiting young
 19 people.

20 And I would like to ask whether the Air
 21 Force has any current plans to change its recruiting
 22 program in order to meet needs, and also whether the Air
 23 Force is looking at the issue of moral and opportunities

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But as you
 2 follow the continuum, after one has graduated from that
 3 continuum of all training, really all of a sudden there
 4 is no physical fitness requirement other than a test a
 5 year on the bicycle, that type of thing.

6 GENERAL RYAN: Right.

7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Are there
 8 any plans in the Air Force to change that?

9 GENERAL RYAN: Yes. In fact, I have the
 10 doctors coming back to me to talk to me about it. One of
 11 the reasons that we went to the bike — We used to have a
 12 two-mile run or mile-and-a-half run, and before that, we
 13 had five BX. We've had schemes throughout the Air Force.

14 They went to the bike because it was a
 15 scientific measure of aerobic capability. And, quite
 16 honestly, we were losing folks in some of these, you
 17 know, people who just came in and didn't exercise on a
 18 day-to-day basis and would die on us when we ran then a
 19 mile-and-a-half in, you know, fifteen — thirteen minutes
 20 or whatever. So we went to the bike because you can
 21 measure cardiovascular capability on the bike.

22 But what we lacked there, I thought, was
 23 fitness from a strength standpoint rather than an aerobic

1 for existing lower level enlisted people, to include
 2 NCO's, who are not getting the same kind of pipeline
 3 coming up underneath them. That is, that they may be
 4 missing opportunities to lead because of fewer young
 5 folks coming along or fewer young folks staying in the
 6 service.

7 This is not specific to the Air Force, but
 8 I just wonder whether the Air Force is looking at those
 9 kind of almost demographic issues.

10 GENERAL RYAN: Clearly the propensity to
 11 serve — the pool is not lowering but the propensity to
 12 serve is. I don't know why. You know, I sometimes
 13 surmise that it may be that when we ended the draft,
 14 about that long ago, where the young folks of the
 15 seventies — sixties and seventies are now the parents of
 16 the young folks that are coming in, that generation is
 17 starting to wane off where you don't have the same
 18 involvement or personal knowledge of how services operate
 19 coming from the parental side. And demographically, I
 20 think that fall-off is occurring to us now.

21 Those who did serve during the Vietnam era
 22 are about through, the kids are done and gone, and we
 23 have a generation of parents who were not subjected to

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1 the draft or who were not involved in the military in any
2 way, and I think part of that is included in the
3 propensity to serve.

4 We also bring graphically to our people in
5 uniform today any operational issues that we have out
6 there. You're going to get an absolute stark display of
7 it on the tube. I think that those kinds of things lead
8 us into that propensity to serve category that continues
9 to fall off on us.

10 Given that, the Air Force has put a bunch
11 of money in our newest budgets to go out and get on the
12 recruiting trail again. The Air Force had always lived
13 off kind of the recruitment of others. I mean, if you
14 asked young people what was "Top Gun" about, you know,
15 early on, they'd say, "Oh, that was an Air Force show."

16 Well, thank you very much, but the Navy
17 helped a lot on "Top Gun." But we got a bounce off "Top
18 Gun."

19 We had not put a lot of money into
20 recruitment and image-managing out in the field because
21 we were getting a fairly high quality individual off of
22 the bounce from the other services. We think that that's
23 changed now, fundamentally changed, and we're going to

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1 do, and their air force is much smaller than we are. But
2 the Marines only want to keep 17 percent or so — 17 to
3 20 percent of their first-terms and we want to keep 55.

4 The Marines want them to go out and —
5 having served their country, young, strong, tough, go out
6 and become congressmen and senators. We want ours to
7 stay with us.

8 DR. MOSKOS: Or even commissioners.

9 GENERAL RYAN: Yeah, or even

10 commissioners.

11 MS. POPE: Anita, can I follow-up —

12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Sure.

13 MS. POPE: — on this?

14 Because one of the things I've been
15 surprised — and I guess probably the puzzling surprise
16 — and it's not just the Air Force, but across the
17 services, basically — is the positive impact on new
18 entrants of some military figure. You know, uncle, aunt,
19 mom, dad, grandparent.

20 And obviously the Air Force is facing —
21 not quite to the extreme of the other services, but
22 having to get more aggressive. Is there any look at —
23 we were having this conversation before — the impact of

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1 have to go out and set the image and recruit in the big
2 markets. We're going to have to put bucks against it to
3 be able to get on TV.

4 So yes, I think there is an issue here on
5 propensity to serve and also identification with a
6 particular service, and we upped our budget substantially
7 this year to do that, and next year substantially again.
8 So I think it's needed.

9 I don't find that the individuals we are
10 getting in are any different than the last generation. I
11 think there's a myth there. On one side, they're very,
12 very competent; much more competent than the previous
13 generations on computers and technical capability. I
14 mean, they grew up with it, where some of us are analog
15 folks in a digital world. They seem —

16 DR. SEGAL: I like that.

17 GENERAL RYAN: They seem to understand it,
18 you know, just like that (Indicating).

19 So that's good. From the United States
20 Air Force standpoint, that's good, because we need a very
21 technical force.

22 One of the things that we're concerned
23 about is we have always had a first-term, second-term and

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1 alum, you know, in colleges, but the impact of alum in
2 the services — retired, reserves. I mean, there's a
3 wealth of people who have served — as far as recruiting
4 tools.

5 And I don't know whether the services are
6 looking at —

7 GENERAL RYAN: We are. In fact, our
8 Junior ROTC program is one way we can outreach to the
9 high school kids and that has been very successful for us
10 in recruiting in some ways or at least giving knowledge
11 of folks. Where we have retired officers and enlisted
12 who, having served, go out and go into these positions in
13 these high schools that help us bring the Air Force to
14 them.

15 DR. SEGAL: Are you aware that there are
16 many high schools that launch Junior ROTC —

17 GENERAL RYAN: Oh, I know.

18 DR. SEGAL: — that don't have it?

19 GENERAL RYAN: Oh, I know. I know. And
20 we want to support as many as we can. Our policy is
21 support as many as we can, often finding competent folks
22 that want to do that for us. Most of our folks find it
23 more lucrative to go into other arrangements, but we have

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1 career reenlistment rate that was substantially higher
2 than the other services. We want to keep 55 or so
3 percent of our first-term airmen into second term because
4 we've invested heavily in them, and we want to keep 75
5 percent of our second-term airmen who have stayed with us
6 because now we have a huge investment in them from a
7 technical standpoint.

8 We are seeing a fall-off on both first-
9 term, second-term, and career enlisted retention. First
10 time since 1981, when we increased the pay, have all
11 three categories fallen below our goals, except for one
12 time in 1991 when we wanted them to fall because we were
13 turning the force over. That's a great concern.

14 I think that the efforts that we put
15 forward in recruitment also have an internal payback.
16 That is, image of ourselves as an institution; image of
17 Air Force people of themselves are bolstered by seeing
18 these kinds of images portrayed in national public for
19 us, and gives us a bounce in retention also.

20 We're greatly concerned about the
21 retention. We, as you know, actually bring in very few
22 people. We bring in fewer people into the Air Force a
23 year because of our retention standards than the Marines

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1 some wonderful people who do that for us and bring a
2 great image.

3 The others that we're working hard right
4 now on but it's tough, is how our Guard and Reserve
5 interface with the local communities, and they do a
6 wonderful job at that but we need to do more there.

7 And the third area is the Civil Air
8 Patrol, which is an auxiliary of the United States Air
9 Force, but our control and oversight of them is in
10 question right now due to monetary and other reasons and
11 we're trying to get that back together. So we're teamed
12 with the Civil Air Patrol as part of our outreach.

13 But I think all of those initiatives have
14 to work together along with the advertisement to bring
15 the recruit home. We're seeing a fall-off for the first
16 time in our entrants. Our DEP is down this year and
17 we're — I'm concerned that we won't make it in '99 on
18 our recruitment because we don't have as much in the
19 bank.

20 We're also seeing a fall-off, not on high
21 school — we're 99-percent high school graduates coming
22 into the Air Force Academy — but on the entrance test.
23 We normally had — 80-percent of the entrants that we

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1 brought in scored in the top 50 percent of the OQT, and
 2 this year we're seeing that fall off for the first time
 3 and we're down to 75 percent or something like that.

4 DR. SEGAL: 75 percent in the top 50?

5 GENERAL RYAN: Yeah. 80 percent in the
 6 top 50, and I think it's down to — It's fallen off 80,
 7 anyway. But that's a slow march.

8 And we are normally — and this is not
 9 based on fact, but in my recollection we are normally the
 10 one that will see the last indicator of falling off due
 11 to the nature of the business.

12 MR. PANG: General, even in our
 13 operational visits — and we've conducted two already —
 14 of the Navy and Marine Corps, when we talked to the
 15 people — the leadership about, you know, the quality of
 16 people they're getting and how well they're able to
 17 socialize in the military, what comes out is the fact
 18 that some people say the training establishment is not
 19 doing a good job because a lot of the people we get
 20 aren't really ready to go; and we know that we need to do
 21 OJT, but we really need to start from day one.

22 And as we explored that, what we found was
 23 that in the Navy, they have something they call First

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1 Lieutenant, and in the Marine Corps they have something
 2 they call FAP, and what was happening was a lot of people
 3 who were coming out of tech training, you know, when they
 4 first arrived at the unit, because of demands to support
 5 the base, they sent these people off to do work not
 6 related with the skill in which they were trained.

7 So what happens is they go off and they do
 8 this for ninety days and sometimes for longer periods of
 9 time, and when they come back, you know, they've
 10 forgotten all the stuff that they learned in an intensive
 11 training phase.

12 And I'm just wondering, you know — And,
 13 of course, you know, the question is, you know, why is
 14 that so? And basically what we heard from leadership is
 15 that we have a TO — a table of organization — that
 16 demands a certain level of manning but we don't man to
 17 that level because we are resource-constrained, so we're
 18 below that by some percentage. And then some other units
 19 demand a hundred-percent manning, so, therefore, we're
 20 even further below.

21 And this is causing problems with regard
 22 to the people coming in and with regard to retention
 23 because people get frustrated because they don't have the

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1 people to do their job.

2 So there appears to be a mismatch between,
 3 you know, the strength levels that are needed — and I'm
 4 now generalizing, okay? — and the force structure. And
 5 I was wondering whether or not this has come to your
 6 attention at all.

7 GENERAL RYAN: We get a little bit of it
 8 but I don't think as much as the other services. We went
 9 through a program about five years ago that looked at our
 10 training from top to bottom to make sure that we produced
 11 ready airmen, and we had to resource a lot of it, too, so
 12 that when the airmen came out of tech school, they were
 13 ready to go on the flight line at least at the three
 14 level.

15 What we're finding, however, is that
 16 because our retention is falling in our second-term
 17 enlisted, we have, in some very critical skills, lacking
 18 five levels. So then the seven level is having to work a
 19 lot longer hours because we're over-manned in three
 20 levels, under-manned in five levels, and that second-term
 21 enlistment rate has to do with that.

22 I have not heard the cross-flowing of
 23 folks except where we absolutely have to do it for force

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1 protection reasons, and we do that with a lot of our
 2 folks who are cross-trained into being able to help with
 3 the force protection business as we backfill some of
 4 these critical AFSE's that we had sent forward but
 5 couldn't sustain at the base.

6 So we have a little bit of that and we're
 7 trying to fix that with this upping of five to six
 8 thousand folks into those skills that we send forward and
 9 kind of strip the base of.

10 So we have some of that, but not to the
 11 extent that it is a training issue. It's more of a
 12 retention issue and a structure issue in Optempo.

13 MR. PANG: Thank you.

14 DR. SEGAL: I've got several questions.
 15 One, you alluded earlier to the sleeping arrangements in
 16 the field when you send personnel on the kinds of
 17 missions they've been going on. What are the sleeping
 18 arrangements like on some of these field —

19 GENERAL RYAN: Normally by tent, female
 20 tent.

21 DR. SEGAL: Female — There would be a
 22 female tent and a male tent?

23 GENERAL RYAN: Yeah. You go to Bosnia,

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1 you'll find a female tent; if you go to Southwest Asia, a
 2 female tent. By tent.

3 DR. SEGAL: But you'll have a male tent
 4 and a female tent right next to each other?

5 GENERAL RYAN: Going to have, yeah.

6 DR. SEGAL: Okay. What do you see as the
 7 impact of a training assignment on career of both NCO's
 8 and officers in the Air Force? Do you think that being
 9 someone who's either a training instructor as an NCO or a
 10 commander as an officer — What sort of impact does that
 11 have on their careers?

12 GENERAL RYAN: On the NCO side, we see no
 13 change. In fact, they are promoted at comparable levels,
 14 as best I know. I've never heard of a complaint that our
 15 trainers are promoted at a less degree, and the times
 16 I've asked, people have said no, they're fine because of
 17 how we do WOFS in the Air Force.

18 On the officer side, I don't think there's
 19 any degradation. We have command opportunities in the
 20 training business that allow people to command who would
 21 not otherwise command, so in some ways it's healthy for
 22 us.

23 DR. SEGAL: But is the command in the

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1 training base as good as an operational command?

2 GENERAL RYAN: It depends on the career
 3 field that the person's in. I think I'd have to answer
 4 that in that way. Enlisted, not a problem. There may be
 5 some differential in officers. I've never seen
 6 statistics that told me that. But for the most part, we
 7 rotate our folks into the training field and back out.

8 We don't have professional trainers and
 9 have tried to get away from that in the Air Force. And
 10 that is, for instance, for our rated force, we call it or
 11 used to call it an alpha tour. That is, that they had to
 12 go in to do training for a certain amount of time and we
 13 tried to spread that across the force and then come back
 14 out.

15 So I don't feel there's a — There's not a
 16 downer to go to our training command. In fact, with the
 17 Optempo that's out there right now, in some ways, that's
 18 the place they rest. Even though it's really hard,
 19 they're resting, and then they're back out to the field
 20 to do the deployment.

21 DR. SEGAL: One last question and it's a
 22 big one. We have been tasked not only with looking at
 23 the issue of whether basic training should be gender-

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1 integrated or segregated, but we have the task of
 2 evaluating basic training generally in the services. And
 3 so how do you think basic training in the Air Force is
 4 doing for the Air Force, and part of that is what would
 5 you want us to tell Congress about basic training?
 6 GENERAL RYAN: First of all, does your
 7 mandate say that it has to all be the same? I would
 8 think that would be something you ought to tell the
 9 Congress.
 10 DR. SEGAL: You mean that the services
 11 could have different —
 12 GENERAL RYAN: Could have different
 13 schemes because they have different requirements. They
 14 have a different force, have a different — That's why
 15 we're four different services, because we have a bit
 16 different cultures in the service; we have a bit
 17 different objectives and requirements and
 18 responsibilities.
 19 So there is no — I don't think there's a
 20 driving need to make the basic training similar for all.
 21 So I think that would be the message that I would like to
 22 see go back to Congress.
 23 There are good and valid reasons why each

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1 of the services do the things they do. I won't speak for
 2 the other services because I'm not intimately involved in
 3 their training schemes, but I can tell you why we do what
 4 we do and there is good rationale for it. And I'd like
 5 that message passed to the Congress.
 6 DR. SEGAL: How is basic training doing
 7 for the Air Force?
 8 GENERAL RYAN: I think it's doing great.
 9 I do not get complaints in the field from my enlisted
 10 force folks who take these kids under their wings when
 11 they first come out of tech school, nor the commanders.
 12 I think we produce a fairly ready — The problem is, we
 13 don't have enough of them in the right skills right now
 14 because of retention business.
 15 DR. SEGAL: So it's recruiting and
 16 retention that's your major issue right now.
 17 GENERAL RYAN: That's why I think —
 18 DR. SEGAL: Do you have any other wish
 19 list in terms of where you could use more resources with
 20 regard to training?
 21 GENERAL RYAN: Absolutely. In the
 22 recruitment advertising budgets. I think that we need to
 23 get out there and be competitive from an Air Force

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1 standpoint. I think that the road we're on with respect
 2 to pay, retirement, and fixing the redacts system is the
 3 right way to go because that will heighten the awareness,
 4 I think — not only within our services, but outside the
 5 services — that this is a very demanding but a
 6 fulfilling way of life, and that there is compensation
 7 for service to your country that both Congress and the
 8 leadership of the services acknowledge and are pushing
 9 hard to fix.
 10 So I think there's some good-news messages
 11 that are about to come out about that. In fact, there's
 12 supposed to be a press conference today at the Pentagon
 13 where we're going to roll out the pay and redacts
 14 business. So if you ask me is there something you could
 15 say back to Congress on that side, I'd say it's needed
 16 badly for both retention and for recruitment.
 17 DR. SEGAL: Sounds like we also need some
 18 films about service and military life that —
 19 GENERAL RYAN: We could use —
 20 DR. SEGAL: — paint a realistic but
 21 attractive picture.
 22 GENERAL RYAN: Realistic and truthful.
 23 DR. SEGAL: Thank you.

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1 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I don't have
 2 any questions.
 3 MR. MOORE: Just to follow-on to your last
 4 point, General, I understand that the Air Force is going
 5 to get about \$2.2 billion in FY-2000 add-on, which I
 6 guess is a part of that exercise from your contentious
 7 hearing last September with the other chiefs.
 8 GENERAL RYAN: Our love-in? Yeah.
 9 MR. MOORE: So clearly there seems to be
 10 some budgetary relief on the horizon given what you had
 11 in '99 and then this additional add-on. Is that enough
 12 to take care of some ads to retention, recruiting, pay,
 13 and some enhanced training, plus all the other things you
 14 want to do? Or is that just a Band-Aid, given the needs
 15 that you have?
 16 GENERAL RYAN: The chiefs went to Congress
 17 — went to the President first, then to Congress last
 18 September, and some in Congress pretended like this was
 19 new news. It was not. You go back and look at the
 20 testimony in February of what the chiefs said then and
 21 some of that was warped to fit I guess a political
 22 construct.
 23 But what we said in September and what

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1 we're about to say this 5th of January will be the same
 2 story. And that is, that readiness is down, retention is
 3 down, the United States Air Force has an aging fleet that
 4 we need to fix and recapitalize, if not replace in some
 5 instances, and that, to be able to do that over the next
 6 — over the five to — I said we needed four to five
 7 billion dollars a year plussed. If the number is \$2.2 —
 8 don't know whether it is or not because we're not an end-
 9 game yet.
 10 If it's \$2.2 or more than that, that's a
 11 good start, but it's not the finish, and that would be my
 12 message if asked. And that is, that you don't turn this
 13 — it does not — readiness and retention do not fall off
 14 the cliff rapidly. It takes some years of under-funding.
 15 It's going to take some substantial years of plussed
 16 funding to turn it back around. Not only from a real
 17 sense — that is, from an equipment sense — but from a
 18 training sense and from an image sense; that these are
 19 world-class outfits and that people will want to be part
 20 of them instead of where we've been over the last few
 21 years, and that's "let's just continue to shave it until
 22 we're down to bone," and we're down to bone.
 23 We're down to bone. If they don't turn it

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1 around — And it can't just be this year. It's got to be
 2 next year and the year after and the year after and the
 3 year after. You don't turn this around in one year. It
 4 didn't get here in one year.
 5 MR. MOORE: Thanks.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: I don't have any questions.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Based on
 8 the many contingencies right now, is there a need to
 9 increase the size of your in-strength?
 10 GENERAL RYAN: No.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: You can do
 12 it with the in-strength, but with the resources that
 13 you've asked for?
 14 GENERAL RYAN: Right. The resources and
 15 what we're trying to do with this air expeditionary force
 16 concept is leverage the capabilities of our Guard and
 17 Reserve.
 18 They have given us a lot over the past few
 19 years. They take almost 10 percent of our Optempo for
 20 us. We think we can get a little more out of them if we
 21 give them enough time to prepare their employers and we
 22 can tell them exactly when they're going to be needed,
 23 and then use them during that needed time.

1 We think we have plenty — we're right-
 2 sized for two MTW's and we're about right-sized for our
 3 Optempo. And actually those two are pretty much coming
 4 together. The size you need for the two MTW's is about
 5 the size you need for the Optempo we're running.
 6 Now, is that coincidence or just using
 7 everything that we have? I think it's the latter. We're
 8 using everything we have in this engagement policy,
 9 forward deployment policy.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Mady?
 12 DR. SEGAL: I'm done.
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, General, you've
 14 done such a good job, we've finished early.
 15 General, before you go, I think on behalf
 16 of the entire Commission —
 17 MR. PANG: Absolutely.
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — we want to thank you
 19 particularly for coming. And we'd also like to let you
 20 know of the wonderful experience we've had with the Air
 21 Force people that we've dealt with, particularly our own
 22 Lieutenant Colonel Mary Street, who is a very valued
 23 member of our staff, and the other folks on the

1 congressional and Pentagon side who have dealt with us.
 2 We would all like to thank the Air Force
 3 for its wonderful cooperation in helping us do what we
 4 have to do.
 5 GENERAL RYAN: Great. I think you all are
 6 doing a very important job, that we need to come to a
 7 conclusion and get on with what our training
 8 responsibilities and the way we do our training is done,
 9 and your report will be very important in setting the
 10 agenda for the future.
 11 So thank you for what you're doing. I
 12 know a lot of you are taking a lot of time off from
 13 important work, but this is really important to our
 14 nation and I think most importantly to our young people
 15 who are going to be coming into our services in the
 16 future with the hope of serving their nation and being
 17 trained to the tasks they need to be trained to so that
 18 they can do that work.
 19 So thanks for what you do.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.
 21 (A brief recess was taken.)
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Let's go back on
 23 the record.

1 And we're very pleased to have General
 2 Claudia Kennedy join us just a little bit early this
 3 morning, which we appreciate. And I understand you have
 4 an opening statement, General Kennedy, and so we'll
 5 proceed with that, followed by questions. Thank you.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Okay. Great.
 7 Well, Madam Chair and members of the
 8 Congressional Commission, good morning. I'd like to
 9 thank you for the opportunity to address the Commission
 10 and present my views on military training and the impact
 11 of gender-integrated training on the force.
 12 In my thirty years of military service, I
 13 have seen the Army undergo many changes. I was in the
 14 Army when we had the draft. In 1968, I enlisted in the
 15 Women's Army Corps and a year later was commissioned in
 16 the Women's Army Corps. This was a segregated corps
 17 composed entirely of women. We trained separately, our
 18 assignments were handled separately, and we were promoted
 19 separately.
 20 In the early nineteen-seventies, the Army
 21 transitioned to an all-volunteer force. Women were
 22 integrated into the rest of the Army and WAC branch was
 23 disestablished. From 1973 to '75, I commanded a company

1 of men and women who comprised the staff and faculty of
 2 the WAC Training Center and School.
 3 Twenty years later, as a brigadier
 4 general, I served as the Assistant Commandant of the
 5 Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
 6 At this point, training had long been gender-integrated
 7 with respect to both students and cadre. This included
 8 advanced individual training, the basic NCO course, the
 9 advanced NCO course, in addition to officer courses.
 10 I've experienced the integration of women
 11 into the Army from a unique perspective, one that I
 12 believe you haven't heard yet — that of a woman on
 13 active duty and someone who has had some leadership
 14 experience and training.
 15 I'd like to share my observations with you
 16 and give you the perspective of someone who has been
 17 there. I was there when women were trained separately
 18 and were trained by an all-women cadre, I was there when
 19 women were trained separately and trained by integrated
 20 cadre, and I was there when integrated trainees were
 21 trained by integrated cadre. I firmly believe that the
 22 way we do training now in the Army is the right way for
 23 us. Now let me tell you why.

1 I know you've already heard all about how
 2 we conduct training from General Bolt. I trust he's
 3 answered all of your specific questions about training
 4 because what I want to talk about is some of the issues
 5 associated with gender-integrated training and some
 6 issues that have been falsely associated with gender-
 7 integrated training. I will clarify the differences
 8 between these.
 9 First, some reflection about the end
 10 product of Army training. We have the best soldiers we
 11 have ever had in today's Army. I am very proud of these
 12 soldiers. We undoubtedly have the greatest fighting
 13 force in the world today. It is an Army that is trained
 14 and ready to fight anywhere, at any time.
 15 Over the last thirty years, I watched the
 16 Army evolve our training philosophy and shape our
 17 concepts and doctrine as it learned from each successive
 18 deployment. The experience of Vietnam certainly shaped
 19 our Army, as did the lessons learned in Grenada, Panama,
 20 Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia.
 21 Good, solid training programs are
 22 responsible for producing these soldiers, soldiers who
 23 are technically proficient, fit, and have the self-

1 confidence that stems from Army values and having the
 2 skills necessary to perform their missions.
 3 The army evolves in response not only to
 4 experiences of operational deployments, but also to
 5 experimentation conducted as part of our ongoing study of
 6 how to conduct future operations. The Army is constantly
 7 evolving concepts and doctrine based on what it learns
 8 and, yet, finds stability in its firm foundation of Army
 9 values and leadership principles.
 10 The leadership of the Army over the years
 11 has made clear, conscious choices to change. These
 12 choices were a response to what we learned about
 13 ourselves and the society we protect, and the choices
 14 reflect the recognition of Army leaders that there are
 15 better ways for the Army to accomplish its mission.
 16 This approach of acknowledging the need to
 17 change has worked. I've seen its success in the
 18 assimilation of women from the WAC corps, in the
 19 introduction of the all-volunteer force and of the all-
 20 recruited force.
 21 With all of the successes of gender-
 22 integrated training and the success of its end product —
 23 today's great soldiers — why has there been an impulse

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1 to turn back to the earlier training approach of separate
2 training? It is because of the way our society reacted
3 to the events of Aberdeen.

4 As one of many deeply concerned Army
5 leaders and as a member of the Secretary of the Army's
6 Task Force on Sexual Harassment, I view the Aberdeen
7 incidents as abuses of power for the most part. There
8 are those who tried to construct a legal defense by
9 framing the issue as one of fraternization, thereby
10 unleashing the opposing political forces who made women's
11 presence in training an issue rather than putting the
12 focus on proper leadership and appropriate uses of power.

13 The basic issue at Aberdeen is that
14 established Army leadership standards were not upheld.
15 Since then, we have worked hard to reinforce Army values
16 and appropriate leadership standards. I do not believe
17 that an artificial gender separation of soldiers during
18 basic training is connected to the issues we dealt with
19 at Aberdeen or in its aftermath.

20 An erroneous connection was made between
21 the debate about Aberdeen between sexual harassment and
22 fraternization. Although sex is the instrument of both,
23 the agenda in each case is very different. The agenda in

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1 sexual harassment is power, control and dominance. Its
2 agenda in fraternization is affection, desire and so
3 forth.

4 An additional difference is that the
5 activity in sexual harassment is non-mutual and
6 unconsenting. In fraternization, it is mutual,
7 consenting activity, however inappropriate.

8 When we characterize Army training, it is
9 important to remember that the Army conducts both
10 integrated and segregated training. About 40 percent of
11 recruits are in training with men only and 60 percent are
12 in integrated basic training. This reflects the Army
13 training philosophy that we train as we fight. Combat
14 arms soldiers train separately because they operate in
15 all-men occupational specialties.

16 Why do I think it's important for soldiers
17 to train at integrated units when they will serve in
18 integrated specialties? Because first impressions are
19 lasting and strong. Basic training provides the
20 soldier's first impression of his or her place in the
21 Army. It is their first experience of learning to be a
22 soldier.

23 Basic training is a safe, intensely

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1 supervised experience. It is important to start off all
2 soldiers learning how to work with each other, to trust
3 that all of them have had the same preparation and meet
4 the same standards. Basic training builds trust; trust
5 in one's self, trust in one's buddies, trust in the team.
6 This fosters teamwork, discipline, and Army values.

7 There is no logical connection between the
8 events at Aberdeen and the gender-integrated training
9 debate. Aberdeen was about abuse of power, non-
10 consensual activity. Gender-integrated training
11 opponents focus on consensual activity that good
12 leadership can contain.

13 I view the gender-integrated training
14 debate as a way to question the role of women in the
15 Army, and the problem with that is that it addresses the
16 wrong problem. It makes women the problem when it is
17 abuse of power that is the problem. It polarizes the
18 Army when what we want is cohesion.

19 Army women have made huge contributions to
20 the successes of the U.S. Army. The Army has
21 successfully integrated men and women. Research since
22 1992, conducted by the Army Research Institute, has shown
23 increasingly harmonious teamwork among Army men and

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1 women.

2 We need to be proud of our Army team and
3 reinforce their great team effort. Training and values
4 are the key. Our leaders and our soldiers depend on
5 teamwork, discipline and values, to promote mutual
6 respect and the highest professional behavior.

7 In closing, I ask you to make your
8 recommendations in such a way that you express confidence
9 in the Army's ability to train our soldiers based on the
10 Army leadership's best judgment and long years of
11 experience.

12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much. As
13 I mentioned, our habit is to simply go around the table
14 with questions and traditionally I start.

15 General Kennedy, you do bring to us a
16 magnificent and perhaps unique perspective on the history
17 of training which is something that we're very interested
18 in here, and I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit
19 on what training was actually like in the WAC corps and
20 during the years when training was gender-integrated for
21 females.

22 Anecdotally, I —
23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Gender-

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1 segregated?

2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Pardon?

3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Gender-
4 segregated?

5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Gender-segregated, I'm
6 sorry.

7 Anecdotally, I understand that things in
8 the old days were kind of comparable to training
9 stewardesses in the old days and that it seems for a long
10 time there was no serious effort to attempt to train
11 women to the same or nearly the same physical and other
12 operational standards as men.

13 I would like to know about when that
14 effort began and how gender-integrated versus gender-
15 segregated training may impact the ability to train the
16 two to — in the Army's words — be all they can be.

17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Well, I was
18 not in a leadership position, clearly, in the late
19 sixties and early seventies when it came in. So just as
20 a corporal/E-4 in the college junior program in the
21 summer of '68, then in the basic corps as a second
22 lieutenant in '69, I would say that there was certainly
23 no physical training. I mean, there was no rigor

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1 attached to this in a physical viewpoint. We had a lot
2 of classroom study and written tests, and that's very
3 much what the climate was for officer training.

4 And I was with college graduates. The
5 college junior program was people who — all women — who
6 were considering making the Army at least their first
7 job, if not a career later on, and we were all women who
8 were between our junior and senior years in college. So
9 it was pretty much academics rather than — you know,
10 lectures and academics rather than being judged on the
11 basis of any of this, what we would call common soldier
12 tasks today.

13 Now, for enlisted women at that time, I'm
14 not sure it was terribly different — that they were
15 learning — they were just learning the skills kind of in
16 the classroom. And, of course, for the whole Army at
17 that time, there wasn't a lot of hands-on training. It
18 was only later — what, in the late seventies — that I
19 think we got conscious of the need —

20 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: '75.
21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: '75, and
22 after that — where we started saying, "Well, let's do
23 our testing of MOS's. Other than just using written

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1 tests, let's have them perform a skill — the 'be, know
 2 and do' approach."
 3 So for the entire Army, it was very —
 4 relatively passive compared to today's very robust,
 5 physical demand put on soldiers.
 6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: So you would say about
 7 1975 is when —
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: The Army in
 9 general turned the philosophy from teaching in a
 10 classroom, a rather sterile environment, to getting
 11 people out and handling the equipment they were training
 12 on and, you know, doing things, doing something action-
 13 oriented.
 14 Then my next brush with Army training
 15 would have been a couple of years later — '73 to '75 —
 16 and I was the commander of a company that had assigned to
 17 it the staff and the faculty of the WACs Center and
 18 School.
 19 The WACs Center and School was in the
 20 throes of two major kinds of changes, maybe three if you
 21 count them another way. One was we were expanding the
 22 number of women who were coming into the Army, and so the
 23 second change was that we were also — we were expanding

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1 from training women at Fort McClellan, Alabama, and
 2 creating an additional women's training base at Fort
 3 Jackson, South Carolina. That was a brand new thing, to
 4 divide it and do it in two different locations.
 5 And then the third thing was that we were
 6 integrating men into the cadre that trained the women,
 7 and there were men who were instructors and a lot of men
 8 in the support roles. You know, the cooks and truck
 9 drivers and supply points and that kind of thing.
 10 And then I wasn't really involved with
 11 training until much later, until the '94-95 time frame
 12 when I was the Assistant Commandant. And by then, of
 13 course, what was happening in '94 was pretty much what's
 14 happening today in terms of the integration. Fully
 15 integrated as students. And, of course, Fort Huachuca is
 16 an advanced individual training base, not basic training,
 17 and fully integrated cadre.
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.
 19 MR. PANG: General, thank you for joining
 20 us.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Sure. My
 22 pleasure.
 23 MR. PANG: I think your contribution is

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1 going to be very valuable to our proceedings.
 2 One of the things that we were asked to
 3 look into is the issue of good order and discipline as it
 4 relates to gender — relationships between the genders
 5 and senior-subordinate relationships. And as you know,
 6 the Defense Department recently came out with some new
 7 rules with regard to that, you know, that should make
 8 these more uniform across the services.
 9 I think it's probably fair to say that the
 10 biggest impact would be on the Army, and I was just
 11 wondering, you know, what your thoughts were with regard
 12 to the new policy that was issued.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Well, gosh.
 14 I've heard the discussion and the debate, but I'm mostly
 15 familiar with how things worked under the old rules.
 16 We have had a very disciplined Army, I
 17 believe, and where relationships spring up between people
 18 of different ranks, there are ways that people deal with
 19 that. In other words, you try to keep people from being
 20 in the same chain of command. And for the most part,
 21 they do spring up from people outside the chain of
 22 command, so you try to keep that separate.
 23 I think the new policy is — there's a lot

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1 of work still to be done to clarify that, to help people
 2 understand what it means and what are the guidelines, and
 3 try to figure out how you deal with relationships that
 4 are already ongoing — marriages that already exist — on
 5 the basis of the old rules.
 6 MR. PANG: Are you involved in that
 7 discussion?
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Not really.
 9 Not really. The DCSPER pretty much handles that.
 10 But I think it's an important thing. You
 11 know, I think what's important here is to think about how
 12 people relate to each other real-world, and then think
 13 about whether that's healthy or not.
 14 And I think that the way — that the
 15 issues that we've had to deal with in the last couple of
 16 years that came out of Aberdeen had nothing to do with
 17 consensual relationships. Those things had to do with
 18 abusive relationships, one in which one person was not
 19 consenting, one in which there was abuse of power by one
 20 person, and I don't think we should frame that as a
 21 gender issue, to tell you the truth.
 22 I know that the newspapers turn it into
 23 the men and the women, but that grabs headlines but it

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1 doesn't really reflect the case. The case is that based
 2 on research done by DMDC and somebody else — it'll come
 3 to me — that men are sexually harassed at the rate of
 4 about 7 percent and women are harassed at about the rate
 5 of 21 percent. This is based on expressions of answering
 6 surveys for the last twelve months of a given soldier's
 7 experience.
 8 And when you look at the fact that the
 9 Army has 85 percent men and 15 percent women, and you do
 10 the math on that, figuring even just an easy number like
 11 500,000 total in the active component, it comes out to
 12 something — I did this and it's roughly twice as many
 13 men are sexually harassed as women in terms of raw
 14 numbers. Something like, you know, 15,000 women and
 15 30,000 men in that given twelve-month period.
 16 So to frame the debate about gender is to
 17 misunderstand the problem. The problem is not that this
 18 is something men do to women or that women do to men in
 19 the sense of one group is the perpetrator in every case.
 20 In fact, it is when people do not obey the rules about
 21 the uses of power that we get in trouble.
 22 MR. PANG: What is your assessment of the
 23 general climate in the Army with regard to gender

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1 relationships? I mean, you know, I think the Army is
 2 composed of — what, 17? 18 percent women?
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: I think it's
 4 about 15 percent women, although —
 5 MR. PANG: 15 percent.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: — right now
 7 we're bringing in a much higher percentage. I think
 8 we're bringing in 20 or 21 percent this — you know, in
 9 the last few years. But because of years ago, ten or
 10 fifteen or twenty years ago, that lower percentage
 11 changes the average overall. But we have in the Army
 12 about 15 percent women and we're bringing in the Army
 13 about 20 percent each year.
 14 MR. PANG: What's your perception of the
 15 climate? You know, the relationship? Is that an issue,
 16 or is it just pretty much taken for granted a soldier's a
 17 soldier? Or is it high on the radar screen, in your
 18 perception?
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Well, my
 20 perception is that it goes through cycles. When you've
 21 got a huge amount of news reporting going on and some
 22 dramatic event like the different events that have
 23 occurred in the last couple of years, then you have much

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1 more discussion and rancor can be a little bit more
 2 prominent than at other times.
 3 But when we look at the research data that
 4 Army Research Institute has generated, they have a survey
 5 that they do — I think it's every two years, and they
 6 pick a huge sample of soldiers and they ask — Many of
 7 the questions are the same questions asked each year.
 8 From '92 to '97, there's been a steady
 9 improvement in the harmonious relationship between men
 10 and women, that there is an improvement in the attitudes
 11 of both about the other gender. So I think that over
 12 time, it's a steady improvement, and I think what fosters
 13 that is to have people know each other well.
 14 When people create a barrier and get each
 15 on either side, then you have polarizing occurring; you
 16 have suspicions spring up about, "Well, the women weren't
 17 trained to the same standard as the men because they were
 18 put in a different place due to the training. We don't
 19 really know that they were trained, and we men are going
 20 to have to bear most of the burden." And the women often
 21 are suspicious that they weren't trained to such a hard
 22 standard as well, and they're like, "Oh, young people
 23 coming in the Army."

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1 One of the big reasons for coming in is to
 2 test one's self and to become an adult, and the process
 3 for becoming an adult is to be treated like one. It's
 4 very important that they be challenged.
 5 MR. PANG: Okay.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Is there a goal
 7 percentage in the Army to reenlist or to enlist to?
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: To enlist?
 9 I'm not sure whether there's a specific goal or not. The
 10 DCSPER would know that. It's been on the increase over
 11 the last couple of decades.
 12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Do you mean
 13 specific to gender, or do you mean —
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I mean are they
 15 going to enlist 20 percent females as a goal.
 16 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: The only
 17 thing that I'm familiar with is a commander is given an
 18 objective each month and each quarter to retain, and I've
 19 never ever — and I don't think it would ever come to the
 20 day where they're told get so many Hispanics, so many
 21 women, so many this. It's specific to the unit numbers.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Well, now, in
 23 U.S. Army Recruiting Command, they do have a goal for men

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1 and women, for the numbers that they recruit. They do
 2 not do it — Oh, they don't?
 3 I'm getting a head nod.
 4 Not anymore? I'm out-of-date.
 5 Okay. I'm out-of-date on that.
 6 Well, General Ohle's the DCSPER. Don't
 7 ask me, ask him. Clearly I haven't got that one.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Is there
 9 anything that you would change? Would you change
 10 anything today, the way it's going today?
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Oh, I guess I
 12 would — you know, like a lot of us, I'd like to see a
 13 little bit more warm fuzzies thrown our way instead of
 14 always being criticized. I wish we would get praise for
 15 all the good that we do in the Army. I mean — and I
 16 think all the services are like that. We do great things
 17 for America and I don't think we get a lot of credit for
 18 it.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Are you talking
 20 about the Army or females?
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Oh, Army.
 22 The whole Army. I mean, I think that we're a very
 23 successful Army and we're successful because we've taken

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1 in talent based on who's talented, who's got the high
 2 education, who's got the good mental qualifications. We
 3 kind of do it on a competitive basis. We pick out people
 4 based on merit, and I think that makes us a stronger,
 5 better Army.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: But there's
 7 nothing relative to gender training you would change? I
 8 mean, are you satisfied the way it is now?
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Yes, I am. I
 10 think it's very appropriate to have people trained in a
 11 segregated way when they're in the infantry, the armor
 12 and the artillery. And I think it's very appropriate
 13 when they're not in the combat arms and they're going to
 14 serve with men and women, that they be trained with men
 15 and women.
 16 Otherwise, their first impression, that is
 17 such a strong one, is that my place in the Army isn't
 18 some kind of a separateness and we don't meet each other
 19 and there's this huge mystery attached later when we
 20 finally meet in AIT.
 21 DR. SEGAL: I guess that follows along on
 22 that. What would you see as being the consequences if
 23 the Congress decided the mandate segregated training in

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1 the Army — gender-segregated training? What do you see
 2 as the consequences from that?
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: I think it
 4 would be demoralizing. I think it would demoralize women
 5 and men both because it would look like we didn't trust
 6 the men either. It's not that it would just focus on
 7 women. I think men soldiers would feel that someone now
 8 doesn't trust them to behave in a professional manner
 9 with women soldiers. And for the most part, men and
 10 women have been very professional in their dealings with
 11 each other.
 12 I don't think it solves the issue that
 13 generated the debate. I think that the issue that
 14 generated the debate was the events at Aberdeen. This
 15 doesn't deal with that. This deals with a whole
 16 different question.
 17 Now, some people have speculated about
 18 what would it do to recruiting, what would it do to
 19 retention. It's hard to say with certainty about that.
 20 I think there would probably be some sort of a reaction
 21 but I doubt that it would be long-term. I think things
 22 would even out. But I don't think it would be a positive
 23 reaction.

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1 I think there would be a sense that the
 2 work of the last twenty or thirty years to bring men and
 3 women into a more integrated environment was now being
 4 under some kind of attack and being criticized. And
 5 we've had our periods where we've done this very well and
 6 there have been times where we've been pretty clumsy, but
 7 I think overall we've been on a positive trend line and I
 8 think it would be too bad to undermine that.
 9 DR. SEGAL: You said in your statement
 10 that you thought that this raising of the issue of
 11 gender-integration and segregation in training was
 12 actually a way to question the role of women in the Army.
 13 Would you elaborate on that?
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Well, I say
 15 that because it was unrelated to — the question of
 16 gender-integrated training is unrelated to abuse of
 17 power.
 18 And I think that there are people who
 19 still say that it's better for the Army not to have women
 20 in it or that women's roles should be very carefully
 21 circumscribed; and that most of the time when you hear
 22 how it should be circumscribed, it is to put women in a
 23 much more traditional position, one of simply of support,

1 but not mainstream Army.
 2 And I think that that is not a good
 3 precedent, I don't think it's one that would be healthy
 4 for the Army, and I think it's a very negative reaction
 5 to women who have made great contributions and have
 6 proven themselves. Women have proven themselves over and
 7 over to be very valuable.
 8 For a while there, we mostly valued women
 9 for the numbers that they brought to the Army. When we
 10 were first doing a volunteer Army, the numbers of women
 11 recruited was increasing to fill the gap because men were
 12 not volunteering in the numbers that were needed to have
 13 an Army of the size that it was. And it was a much
 14 larger Army at that time than it is today.
 15 And then around the early nineteen-
 16 eighties, the number of women being brought in, the plans
 17 for expansion that were being discussed in the late
 18 seventies suddenly were drawn down quite a bit, and much
 19 of that was probably because the number of men — the
 20 size of the Army was being brought down and the number of
 21 men that were not coming in didn't have that same impact.
 22 So I think it's very important to
 23 recognize that the contributions of women have been a

1 positive thing for the Army, not a negative thing in any
 2 way.
 3 DR. SEGAL: Thank you.
 4 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, I too
 5 would thank you for being here. I know it's real busy
 6 over in the building.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Yeah, it's
 8 wild. It's wild.
 9 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Your opening
 10 statement and your follow-on statements have answered my
 11 questions, so I appreciate your being here.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Okay. Thank
 13 you, Sergeant Major.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: Again, we all know this is a
 15 busy day for you. Weeks. We're very grateful for you
 16 being here.
 17 I just want to ask you the question about
 18 the sexual harassment issue. Some recent interviews
 19 among women enlisted soldiers report that false
 20 accusations of sexual harassment are as much of a problem
 21 as genuine sexual harassment. These are enlisted women
 22 reporting this.
 23 Do you have a reaction to that kind of —

1 In the Sexual Harassment Panel, false accusations were
 2 not raised. But, you know, then the hotline was
 3 established, which turned out to be not such a good idea
 4 and that was eventually closed down relatively early. Do
 5 you have any commentary on that?
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: About false
 7 accusations?
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Because I
 10 don't really know what their specific circumstances are.
 11 I think it's — I think if you make
 12 something a huge issue, then it is possible for people on
 13 both sides, and even maybe a third or fourth position
 14 somewhere around that issue, to turn it into something
 15 and to make use of it. So I think it is possible.
 16 I think we've had examples of false
 17 accusations. But in general, the consequences of making
 18 a report of being sexually harassed, even if you are
 19 proven to be telling the truth, are very damaging. Not
 20 only to your career, but also to your peer relationships,
 21 because you've separated yourself from the team. You're
 22 not playing ball. You're not part of the crowd and kind
 23 of cooperating.

1 You know, we have this cooperate-to-
 2 graduate mentality and it's a very good one; it helps
 3 promote teamwork. But it also can be very damaging to a
 4 man or a woman who reports sexual harassment. Even when
 5 people believe that they are telling the truth, they
 6 report that they get considerable grief from their buds.
 7 DR. MOSKOS: It's probably true, too,
 8 though, that false accusation damages your career, too,
 9 though, and maybe even more so.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: And the worst
 11 part of it is that some people — I had a lieutenant
 12 telling me about some sexual harassment that occurred to
 13 her and she hadn't reported it. And one of the things I
 14 said was, "Well, why didn't you report it?", because she
 15 was telling me for the first time, two years after it had
 16 happened, and only because she had told her mother and
 17 her mother told her father. Her father, who is a
 18 National Guard general, called me and said, "Fix this."
 19 And he was right. You know, it needed to be dealt with.
 20 The reason she didn't tell was because
 21 there had been two other incidents in her battalion
 22 involving women accusing men. One of them she believed
 23 to be a false report. And she said that woman sergeant

1 who made the false report made all the women look bad
 2 because most people didn't believe her, and that she had
 3 single-handedly destroyed the other sergeant's career.
 4 That was the belief of the group.
 5 The other incident that had occurred was
 6 one that she did believe had occurred to the woman and
 7 not very much was done.
 8 And so she thought, "I can't win in this
 9 deal. I don't want to be associated with those other
 10 two. I don't want to hurt my career. He's not actually
 11 touching me now. I have an escape route. You know, one
 12 of us is going to PCS soon. It's better not to say
 13 anything," because the institution doesn't have a good
 14 way to deal with the issue and not have it reflect on
 15 you, at least in the immediate time frame.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: In your own judgment, then,
 17 what would you say? Not reporting genuine sexual
 18 harassment is more of a problem, or false accusations are
 19 more of a problem?
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Oh, I don't
 21 know. I'd have to really —
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Or are they both equal
 23 problems?

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: That requires
 2 — I don't think they're equal. I mean, I tend — I am
 3 predisposed — I can tell you where I'm coming from. I'm
 4 predisposed to believe —
 5 DR. MOSKOS: Sure.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: — that false
 7 accusations are a much smaller number than correct ones.
 8 You know, that study I referred to about
 9 that 7 and 21 percent gives you a number in there that,
 10 when you do the math, you see that it would be thousands
 11 of reports — tens of thousands of reports — and, yet,
 12 when you look at the data that shows how many reports
 13 were made — and the DCSPER's of most of the services
 14 collect this in some form — that's only in the hundreds.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: So tens of
 17 thousands of reports when it's not attributable to them,
 18 when it's anonymous, there are only a few hundred for
 19 actual reports. So it tells you that people are very
 20 intimidated or don't know or just feel like it's too
 21 overwhelming.
 22 DR. MOSKOS: The other question, General
 23 Kennedy, is that the Aberdeen case — none of the women

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1 trainees who misbehaved were punished, and there was some
2 misbehavior on the part of a few of the women as well,
3 and that creates a perception — By the way, the
4 punishment for the person in power versus the person out
5 of power obviously is not symmetrical, as it shouldn't
6 be. But should — One thing we've been quoting here is
7 should women in subordinate ranks also be punished in
8 cases of sexual activity?

9 Well, men or women. By the way, just for
10 record, I find the fact that more men have been sexually
11 harassed in the Army than women — I'm finding that hard
12 to believe.

13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: This is
14 survey data.

15 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah, I know. I know. It's
16 a little bit —

17 DR. SEGAL: It's the proportion who have
18 experienced the behavior, not necessarily the proportion
19 who view it as sexual harassment, if I am correct.

20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Well, you
21 would know better — You're a researcher. I am —

22 DR. MOSKOS: But leaving that aside — I
23 mean, I just put it for the record. I find that — you

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: The remainder
2 is —

3 DR. SEGAL: Among enlisted women.

4 DR. MOSKOS: Among enlisted women.

5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Enlisted
6 women.

7 DR. SEGAL: Enlisted women.

8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Okay.

9 DR. MOSKOS: It's about 20 percent black

10 among female officers, which is higher than the black
11 male officer level.

12 White women attrit — that is, they leave
13 the service before their first enlistment — at about a
14 55-percent rate. In black women, it's down there in the
15 30 percent, which is about the same for males of any
16 race. Do you have an observation on why there's such a
17 racial disparity between white women and black women?

18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: I would be

19 speculating, but I've sat in the discussions about this

20 and my impression would be that it has to do with

21 opportunity outside the Army. That whoever has the

22 greatest opportunity outside the Army would tend to

23 attrit a little bit higher rate — at a higher rate, just

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1 know, that makes me question the survey that so many men
2 are reporting being sexually harassed.

3 DR. SEGAL: It's the type of — The type
4 of harassment that they experience is of the minor forms.
5 It's not the quid pro quo or the aggressive acts or
6 people repeatedly asking them for dates. It's more the
7 foul language and —

8 DR. MOSKOS: Well, that makes sexual
9 harassment kind of, you know, nebulous when you start
10 saying foul language. "A woman using foul language is
11 sexually harassing me." I mean, that —

12 MS. POPE: Well, it —

13 DR. SEGAL: It's all —

14 MS. POPE: — leads to a hostile
15 environment. Legally, it's the hardest of definitions.

16 DR. SEGAL: And that's just one example.

17 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. But — yeah. We can
18 debate that at another point.

19 DR. SEGAL: Well, you can look at the
20 data.

21 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. I just wanted to get
22 my own views on the record here.

23 But that's really — Well, there's one

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1 because they've got some offers.

2 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. It's almost double,

3 though. It's not just — And between the males, the
4 attrition rate is about the same, black or white.

5 So, anyway, I just — Thank you very much.

6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Do you have a
7 theory about why?

8 DR. MOSKOS: Well, black women say it's
9 because they're tougher. They don't use the
10 "opportunity" argument.

11 DR. SEGAL: I had another explanation.

12 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.

13 DR. SEGAL: And that is, that black women
14 have always worked while having their families, whereas,
15 white women often see it much more as a choice between
16 one or the other. So the point at which they decide to
17 actually have children is when they will often leave.

18 DR. MOSKOS: So there.

19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: It's
20 complicated.

21 MS. POPE: I wanted to thank you, too.

22 And this may not be a question that you

23 can answer unless on the gender and Sexual Harassment

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1 other item, too, I might as well ask you, General
2 Kennedy. That in the — If you look at the percentage of
3 white women compared to black women — As you know, in
4 the military today the predominance in the enlisted ranks
5 are black over whites. There are more black women
6 soldiers than there are white women soldiers.

7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: I guess I did
8 not know that. I thought that blacks represented about
9 16 or 18 percent of whites in the enlisted force.

10 DR. MOSKOS: Well, for the women.

11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: For all. For
12 both genders.

13 DR. MOSKOS: Well, blacks are about 30
14 percent of the enlisted force across both genders.

15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Are they?

16 Okay.

17 DR. MOSKOS: And then approximately 48, 49
18 percent for women, and something like 40 percent for
19 white women, and the remainder being other, you know,
20 racial or ethnic groups.

21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: So what was
22 it again? 45 percent black? 40 percent white?

23 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah, approximately.

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1 Panel. One of the services — And I now have forgotten.
2 I've got to go back to my notes — have complainants sign
3 a statement — and I don't know whether the Army does
4 this — that says that "I am making this statement
5 knowingly and in good conscience and" — that basically
6 says "I am not lying, and in fact I am..." — There's
7 a difference between false accusations and
8 unsubstantiated, and I think a huge difference.

9 Some services have complainants sign a
10 statement saying that, "To the best of my knowledge,
11 these are" — I'm sorry?

12 MR. PANG: I think the Navy does.

13 MS. POPE: Yeah. Does the Army do that?

14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: I'm not sure.

15 MS. POPE: Okay.

16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: But I think
17 you're completely correct to make a distinction between
18 false accusations and unsubstantiated ones.

19 MS. POPE: And I think sometimes the two
20 get put together.

21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Yes. Just

22 because it's unsubstantiated does not mean it was false.

23 MS. POPE: Right.

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: And here's
2 the other thing that we thought about in the Task Force
3 on Sexual Harassment, and that was, we treat it very
4 privately in the Army. You don't post the results.

5 MS. POPE: Right.

6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: So the
7 soldiers don't quite know what the outcome was, and that
8 works to our disadvantage because then you don't have the
9 effect of understanding that if you do this, this is the
10 sort of thing in the path that has occurred as a
11 deterrence.

12 And, also, you don't have a sense that the
13 institution supports good behavior when all you know is
14 what the troops are all talking about and they don't know
15 what happened behind closed doors with an Article 15 or
16 with a verbal reprimand or whatever it was. And that
17 probably ought to be made a little — that process ought
18 to be opened up a little bit.

19 MS. POPE: Is the Army continuing to look
20 at that, or is it —

21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: I'm a little
22 out-of-date.

23 MS. POPE: Okay.

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: You know, the
2 Task Force ended a year-and-a-half or so ago and —

3 MS. POPE: Right.

4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: — and I
5 really don't know exactly.

6 But in general, we have had a policy in
7 the past where you posted Article 15's or Captain's Mast
8 results on a bulletin board.

9 MS. POPE: Okay.

10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: And I think
11 that's a very useful tool.

12 MS. POPE: Okay. Because I know it's also
13 the issue with other EEO complaints, is that you get
14 "accused" and "substantiated," or a commander, whatever
15 the charges are, are proven to have acted appropriately.

16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Right.

17 MS. POPE: And the grapevine is at work

18 and —

19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Right.

20 MS. POPE: — there's no closure.

21 Okay.

22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Yes, sir.

23 MS. POPE: Thank you.

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I've got a
2 couple-three questions. The first one deals with sexual
3 harassment, which certainly some of the goings-on in the
4 Task Force in that — and it has to do with
5 rehabilitation. And that is, rehabilitation of the
6 sexual harasser.

7 One of the things that seemed to me that
8 came out of that was that the sexual harasser did not
9 rate rehabilitation, and I have yet to find in any of the
10 services that in fact rehabilitation is now available as
11 it might be available for the drug abuser or the alcohol
12 abuser or the like. I wonder if you could comment on
13 that.

14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Well, I had
15 not thought of it as a disease that needed to be treated.
16 I think of it as a behavior that needs to be retrained.

17 So I'm not sure I would ever buy into
18 rehabilitation, but I would definitely think that the
19 training and education thing — And, you know, the people
20 that do the best in their relationships are the people
21 who have had a lot of experience. We often find that the
22 likelihood of someone being a harasser is someone who's
23 just never served with women colleagues or men

1 colleagues.

2 If they've been separated, they start
3 treating them like men and women rather than fellow
4 soldiers. And if you can build up a model for "this is
5 my fellow soldier, I have to go somewhere else to find
6 Friday night's date," then you've got a better chance at
7 people treating each other as professionals. And then
8 that behavior has to be modeled.

9 And I think that we've made so many
10 improvements in the last three decades. I just can't
11 tell you what an improved climate it is today compared to
12 what it was even ten or twenty years ago, and we forget
13 the great progress that's been made.

14 I'm reminded of it whenever I'm around
15 retired soldiers who have been retired quite a while.
16 They take me right back to that time frame. Whenever
17 they retired, that was the — You know? And it's just
18 breathtaking sometimes what will be said that you and I
19 would never accept today, but they don't realize that
20 time has moved on and behavior has improved and mutual
21 respect is better.

22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My second
23 question really goes — It's not in your area of

1 expertise but it's a comment you made and then a comment
2 that came from back here. And that was, that you
3 indicated that the Army had gone from 15 percent level of
4 women to recruiting 20 percent of the force.

5 And that is a very substantial number,
6 especially in the years of '96-97 — well, '97-98, when
7 the force that has to be recruited is larger based on the
8 downsizing prior to this time. That's a very substantial
9 number. And I heard back here that there is no quota.

10 So, therefore, the reality is I could
11 recruit more than 20 percent women and the like, if
12 that's what I'm hearing, based in a climate where
13 recruiting is difficult. And if I'm a recruiter, I'm
14 looking for whoever I can get that's qualified and the
15 like.

16 The potential down side of that or
17 unintended consequence of that, if I have a force where
18 not quite half are in the combat arms that are closed and
19 I have then the rest of the combat service support force,
20 a little bit over half, which is open, do I potentially
21 run the risk of changing the balance in those combat
22 service support organizations to the detriment of the
23 Army?

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: There's
2 probably a pretty technical way to tell you the answer to
3 that question, sir, because the — First of all, I think
4 it's two-thirds of the force or the combat arms and one-
5 third is support in one form or another, which is much
6 improved over what it was in the seventies.

7 The reason I said it could be a technical
8 answer that you need to get on this is because when an
9 applicant goes into the MEPS, the military processing
10 station, they get shown a series of screens, and on each
11 screen there are about eight or nine MOS's, occupational
12 specialties. And depending on what their qualifications
13 are, those screens show different ones, depending on
14 whether they're male or female and what their mental
15 attributes are.

16 You know, they take a qualification test
17 that shows aptitude in certain areas, so they're not
18 going to be shown jobs for which they're not qualified.
19 They have to have the minimum score in these different
20 skills, and most of the time they pick from the first
21 couple of screens. So the MEPS and the recruiting
22 command can control what gets offered to men and women,
23 and that's how, I think, there is a control mechanism to

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1 keep the number of — the percentage of women to a
2 certain level.

3 Now, whether or not that is thought out
4 and precisely how they guide it, I just can't tell you.
5 But General Ohle is the DCSPER; he's responsible for the
6 recruiting crowd. And, of course, I think General Gaddes
7 could tell you a whole lot about that, but it's really
8 the DCSPER that kind of manages that.

9 But, you know, some jobs are just not open
10 to women. I can remember now — Of course, let me just
11 caveat this. I was in recruiting twice. Once in the
12 early seventies — '71 to '73, in New England — and then
13 later as a battalion command of a recruiting battalion in
14 Texas from '88 to '90.

15 And at that time, you could have a well
16 qualified woman, one with a high school diploma, in the
17 upper half of the mental category, and some pretty good
18 talent, but she couldn't get the job she wanted because
19 we were controlling the input of women that way. And so
20 she'd wait till the beginning of the next recruiting
21 month, when they had more openings, and then she'd get in
22 that way.

23 Now, some of that was her personal

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1 preference, too. She may not have wanted to do heavy
2 mechanic, whatever it was. Heavy equipment.

3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My final
4 question has to do with the adultery policy or guidelines
5 which we are told will be published by executive order
6 and go to the Manual for Courts-Martial.

7 I guess it's really a basic line question.
8 And that is, are such guidelines needed, or is the
9 current Manual for Courts-Martial and Uniform Code of
10 Military Justice system which the Manual supports more
11 than sufficient to take care of that particular problem?

12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: What I know
13 is what I've read in the Early Bird, so let me just tell
14 you it's my personal opinion. And I'd have to get some
15 advice from the Army lawyers and the DCSPER about what's
16 the position, but in my personal opinion, the guidelines
17 we have now are sufficient to deal with the question;
18 because we have dealt with it in that way and I think
19 that — I'm not sure why we would need additional
20 charges.

21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.

22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Yes, sir.

23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: This follows on a little

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1 bit to General Christmas' first or second question. I'm
2 not sure which. But, General, you mentioned in your
3 statement that we have learned from each of our
4 engagements: Kuwait, Haiti, Somalia, et cetera.

5 Speaking as a civilian who reads the
6 papers, it seems to me one of the things that we have
7 learned is that the old line of battle such as Napoleon
8 and Duke of Wellington lined upon doesn't exist anymore.
9 We do find that the folks who may have signed up for
10 combat support or combat service support could very well
11 find themselves in a bad situation.

12 One of the recurring comments that I have
13 heard in all of the services, actually, is that in some
14 ways we may not be challenging the young men who are not
15 in the infantry, armor or artillery divisions when they
16 are being trained alongside women. That in order to
17 bring a group along together, what is extremely
18 challenging for some part of that group that may be the
19 less physically able is simply not challenging at all for
20 the other end of the spectrum.

21 My question to you is, is anybody looking
22 into the value of our current methods of training in
23 terms of this non-linear battlefield or situation? Not

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1 even war operations, but just the kind of things that our
2 services are called upon to do today. Is anybody trying
3 to match up the initial training that's being given to
4 the actual ways in which that training will be put to use
5 later on?

6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: General
7 Abrahms is the Commanding General for Training and
8 Doctrine Command. He can give you chapter-and-verse,
9 because not only is he responsible for training, but he's
10 also responsible for looking at future wars, and so he
11 does a lot of lessons learned on past wars. So General
12 John Abrahms would be a great choice for you to have come
13 tell you in detail.

14 My understanding is that when men and
15 women do physical training together, that men's
16 performance does not change and that women's improves.
17 And that's about the only data point I can throw out here
18 that I've consistently seen.

19 But I think we do learn from the way our
20 operations have evolved over time, given different kinds
21 of adversaries to deal with; and I think it's reflected,
22 but I think that General Abrahms would be probably your
23 best bet for giving you some precision in that answer.

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1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.

2 MR. PANG: Thank you very much.

3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: I might make
4 one comment to you, sir. There is a great article that
5 you might find interesting. It's written about race, but
6 when I read it, I was reading it through the lens of
7 gender. And it's called The Three Paradigms of Diversity
8 and it's in the Harvard Business Review from two years
9 ago.

10 I just, you know, came across it wandering
11 in front of a magazine stand two years ago. September-
12 October issue. And I can get you a copy if it's —

13 DR. MOSKOS: That would be right nice.

14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: It's not
15 beautifully —

16 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you.

17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: — xeroxed.

18 But it is a real good one and it talks
19 about the three paradigms. And the first paradigm is
20 assimilation, the second is differentiation, and the
21 third is integration, and it kind of talks about what
22 does a minority group deal with in each of those
23 paradigms.

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1 And I would say that the Army has three
2 paradigms operating right now simultaneously. And I
3 think that when you read the article — It's only about
4 ten pages; it's very readable and I get a lot out of it.
5 Every time I read it, I get something additional out of
6 it.

7 It's fairly well done. By someone named
8 Thomas and someone named Ely.

9 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you.

10 DR. SEGAL: In addition to the issues of
11 cross-gender relations and the gender-integration and
12 segregation in basic training charge that we have from
13 Congress, we've been given a broader mission to look at
14 and evaluate basic training more generally.

15 Now, I know you're not in the basic
16 training field right now and you're not in the DCSPER.
17 And I understand that actually recruiting has gone over
18 to TRADOC, that that's been moved from the DCSPER to
19 TRADOC.

20 But I wondered if you had any other
21 comments you wanted to make to us about basic training in
22 general, about how you think it's working and what you
23 think we ought to tell Congress more generally about

1 basic training in the Army and changes taking place.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: I would just
 3 say that one of the first things you learn when you're a
 4 second lieutenant in the basic course is that you give
 5 mission-type orders. And I think that this Commission
 6 could really help the services if they would promote the
 7 idea that — let these four-stars who are chiefs of our
 8 services conduct the training mission as they see best.

9 I mean, these are people of long
 10 experience, usually about thirty-five or thirty-eight
 11 years of experience. They know what they're doing.
 12 Their soldiers have huge confidence in them. The
 13 generals just junior to them have a huge amount of
 14 confidence in them. We've all contributed to the world
 15 we're in, and tell us to get the job done and we'll do it
 16 the way we need to.

17 I think it's really a mistake to think
 18 that each service is exactly alike. There is no Marine
 19 in this world who would say that the Marines are like the
 20 Air Force or the Army or the Navy, and no soldier is
 21 going to say that they're like the airmen, sailors and
 22 Marines. We all have very interesting differences and
 23 this is our strength.

1 This is part of the strength of joint
 2 operations, that you bring to bear lots of different
 3 weapon systems, different service cultures that are based
 4 upon our missions, and let's be giving mission orders,
 5 from the top, all the way down, and this to me would be a
 6 violation of that very basic leadership principle.

7 Don't tell the chief of a service exactly
 8 how to do his job. If he's not doing it right, work him
 9 over a little bit, but don't tell him how to do it.

10 DR. SEGAL: Thank you.

11 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I guess the
 12 conversation has created a question for me, then. In
 13 your assessment out in the operational force, if you
 14 will, judging from what you said, the incidents may have
 15 been caused by a training — abuse of power, but also a
 16 training inculcation in the leader's mind of what right
 17 behavior is accepted and not. Is training in the
 18 operational force, the day-to-day training, formal and
 19 informal, getting better in the Army?

20 Having spent most of my career in the
 21 infantry, it wasn't until my last few years that we even
 22 discussed gender issues at all and we did not handle them
 23 well. I'm wondering if you have a comment on that.

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: I'll tell
 2 you, Sergeant Major, I think that we can say — we can
 3 make a complicated intellectual argument about whether or
 4 not the noncommissioned officers and the junior officers
 5 that were real closely associated with the Aberdeen
 6 incidents — whether they needed more training or not;
 7 but I'll tell you, there were a whole bunch of real fine
 8 NCO's that never did a wrong thing and had had no more
 9 training than the ones who were the wrongdoers. So it
 10 all basically comes to character.

11 And it comes down to were they treated
 12 badly when they were growing up and have people abused
 13 them in ways — maybe not sexual, but there's been abuse
 14 of power enacted on them, so then they turn around and
 15 they abuse power. I mean, there are a lot of different
 16 tools. Sex is not always the tool, and there's a lot of
 17 abuse of power in same-gender that has nothing to do with
 18 sex.

19 But there are a whole lot of people that
 20 go through a bad experience and they don't reenact it for
 21 younger ones. And there are people who have had the same
 22 limited experience with women, that they behave with the
 23 greatest decorum and the highest professional standard of

1 behavior.

2 And so I think it had to do — I'll tell
 3 you what I think it boiled down to. I think it had to do
 4 with some NCO's who were more loyal to each other than
 5 they were to their own institution. And that's one
 6 reason we went straight to the question of values and
 7 said, "Let's make sure people understand that they are to
 8 be loyal to their Army, not — "That is the higher —
 9 "That's the higher loyalty requirement than loyalty to
 10 your buddy who's engaged in wrongdoing." And so we just
 11 have to keep reinforcing that.

12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.

13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Yes.

14 MS. POPE: Thank you.

15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you
 16 very much.

17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Thank you,
 18 sir.

19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Last call.

20 Great.

21 DR. SEGAL: Thank you so much.

22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, thank you very
 23 much, General Kennedy.

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNEDY: Well, I
 2 enjoyed talking to you. I appreciate your giving me a
 3 chance to express my views.
 4 (Whereupon, at 11:29 a.m., the hearing in
 5 the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at
 6 1:00 p.m., the same day.)

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1 (AFTERNOON SESSION)
 2 (1:00 p.m.)

3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I'd like to now welcome
 4 Admiral Barrett and Captain Brice-O'Hara from Coast
 5 Guard. We thank you very much for coming today and look
 6 forward to hearing from you with your statements and then
 7 asking a few questions.

8 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: That's great. As
 9 stated, I'm Admiral Barrett. I'm Director of Training
 10 for the Coast Guard. And I have with me Captain Sally
 11 Brice-O'Hara, who is the Commanding Officer of our
 12 Recruit Training Center at Cape May, New Jersey. And
 13 with your permission, I'll just give a short statement
 14 and then we'll take your questions.

15 I certainly appreciate the opportunity to
 16 appear before the Commission and offer the Coast Guard's
 17 perspective on some important gender-integrated training
 18 and other issues that you're considering. I'll give a
 19 short description of our overall perspective and then
 20 Captain Brice-O'Hara can describe our specific training
 21 approach at the Recruit Training Center, and then we'll
 22 respond to any questions or address any other issues you
 23 have.

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1 As you know, the Coast Guard is a multi-
2 mission, maritime service. We take great pride in our
3 character as an armed force and our ability to be "Semper
4 Paratus," or "Always Ready" to execute the many different
5 missions America expects of us on a daily basis.

6 And whether it is interdicting migrants or
7 drugs, protecting fisheries or the environment, operating
8 with the Navy in the Persian Gulf or the Pacific,
9 enforcing U.S. laws and treaties, conducting
10 international training for the CINC's or the Department
11 of State, or saving lives at sea, we face daily a
12 multitude of demanding missions that often must be
13 carried out under difficult and sometimes dangerous
14 conditions.

15 To succeed requires well trained, in our
16 term, "totally prepared" people. And because of our
17 small size, every one of these people must be ready to
18 take up their responsibilities from the first day they
19 arrive at their units.

20 Coast Guard missions and the way we must
21 perform them drive our training. In terms of gender-
22 integration, no other service is more integrated across
23 the spectrum of its operations as the Coast Guard is.

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1 importantly, there were strong sentiments supporting
2 integration since all follow-on assignments would be in
3 gender-integrated units.

4 The first two women assigned as company
5 commanders did not arrive until 1978. Today, the
6 training staff that has direct interaction with recruits
7 is about a hundred and it has a much improved gender mix
8 at about 18 percent female. In fact, of the fifty-one
9 company commanders, seven of ours are women.

10 Coast Guard Training Center, Cape May,
11 trained 4,000 recruits last year. Approximately 13
12 percent of our graduates were women. In the coming year,
13 we anticipate higher numbers of students, perhaps as many
14 as 5,400 recruits. Our mission is to graduate motivated,
15 entry level enlisted men and women, ready and able to
16 serve with a sense of pride and commitment in the world's
17 premier maritime service and to proudly provide quality
18 services to our people and others throughout the Coast
19 Guard.

20 Three words describe the goal of our
21 military training program: discipline for development. A
22 challenging environment, constant performance evaluation
23 and feedback, reinforcement of desired behavior, and

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1 Therefore, the personnel we graduate from the Recruit
2 Training Center must be ready for the environment and
3 responsibilities they face at their units, including the
4 reality that men and women work side by side every day
5 doing the business of the Coast Guard.

6 Unlike the other services, most of our
7 recruits go directly from Training Center, Cape May, to
8 operating units. Many of them do not go to follow-on
9 schooling as is the model in the other services, although
10 some of our people do. But that makes it even more
11 essential that these men and women be ready for gender-
12 integrated environments aboard ships and stations that
13 they report to from the first day that they arrive.

14 As the Kassebaum Baker report also noted,
15 effective gender-integrated training requires more than
16 simply assigning men and women to the same training
17 company. It requires a training regimen that enhances
18 team-building and cohesiveness. We strive to provide
19 that spirit and instill our core values, which are honor,
20 respect and devotion to duty, to every young man and
21 woman who passed through Cape May.

22 We believe that team spirit and core
23 values are best built for our service from training that

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1 correct use of disciplinary action for improper or
2 incorrect behavior, combine to create an environment that
3 is ideal for achieving the objectives of the recruit
4 training program.

5 Those nine objectives of our training are
6 self-discipline, military skills, marksmanship,
7 vocational skills and academics, military bearing,
8 physical fitness and wellness, water survival-swim
9 qualifications, esprit de corps, and core values.

10 Gender-integrated training is critical to
11 achieving esprit de corps, which is what I would define
12 as being the spirit of the Coast Guard that inspires
13 enthusiasm, loyalty, teamwork, pride, initiative,
14 determination, integrity, camaraderie, and the desire to
15 work with and for others towards excellence.

16 Our training program is a short eight
17 weeks in length. The recruits arrive on Tuesday evening,
18 and Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and early Friday, are
19 really devoted to the administrative in-processing. They
20 meet their company commanders the afternoon — Friday of
21 that first week, and then have seven full weeks of
22 training. So it's about seven and a half weeks. It's a
23 cycle that is gender-integrated from start to finish.

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1 is as fully integrated as we can safely provide it by a
2 gender-integrated approach. It may or may not be the
3 best model for every armed force, but it is a model that
4 has worked well for us since 1976 and a model we would
5 hope to continue and enhance.

6 I would now like Captain Brice-O'Hara to
7 describe for you the structure of our training at Cape
8 May.

9 Sally.

10 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Good afternoon,
11 Chairman Blair and Commissioners. Let me start by just
12 sketching a little bit about the initial transition to
13 coeducational training in Cape May.

14 We don't have very many written records
15 that I was able to go back to but I have staff members
16 still with us today in Cape May who can recall what the
17 transition had been like. And from what we've been able
18 to unearth, we had at least two early companies that were
19 formed up entirely of women and they are remembered as
20 being problematic.

21 They were problematic because oversight
22 and discipline were difficult, and that was in part due
23 to the lack of women on the training staff. But, more

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1 We have some differences, but I would call
2 them minor exceptions in the way that men and women
3 recruits are trained, and we are actively pursuing
4 reducing those training differences even more. And those
5 would be differences in haircut policy, some physical
6 fitness standards, sex education classes, and watch-
7 standing procedures. And I can go into detail later if
8 you're interested.

9 I think the bottom line is that quality
10 leadership is the key to achieving the objectives of our
11 training program. Our most challenging responsibility is
12 to teach our young adults how to make the right choices.
13 It's difficult to quantify why the Coast Guard has
14 successfully integrated recruit training, but the fact
15 that the Coast Guard has led the other armed services in
16 generating policies to improve the integration of women
17 has to be a factor.

18 Our organization emphasizes teamwork. Our
19 trainees at Cape May regard each other as shipmates or
20 team members rather than just simply a female or men
21 Coast Guard person. By anticipating, preventing, and
22 responding appropriately to training problems, we can
23 accomplish much during our entry level course.

1 Separating recruits during training will
 2 prevent gender-related problems while the young adults
 3 are being trained, but, quite honestly, we do not have
 4 the problems that would warrant such a move.
 5 Furthermore, if we force control by
 6 gender-segregated training, recruits will not learn to
 7 master being in control. Recruits will not have the
 8 opportunity to develop the self-control, skills and
 9 habits necessary to work together in a diverse workforce.
 10 This alternative only delays potential
 11 gender problems for when the apprentices arrive at their
 12 first units, which are going to be gender-integrated.
 13 What better place to teach the critical philosophy than
 14 in recruit training, which is that we firmly believe it
 15 should remain gender-integrated.
 16 As we continue to train our Coast Guard
 17 recruits, we reinforce the importance of esprit de corps
 18 and begin their careers with the clear message that
 19 teamwork is the synergy that means together we will
 20 achieve more.
 21 Thank you.
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.
 23 As I mentioned, we just go around the

1 squad bay is in the front half, and then there is a short
 2 passageway to then reach the women's squad bay, which
 3 right now is in a smaller configuration because we have
 4 smaller numbers of women.
 5 There are movable partitions in the male
 6 squad bay so that we can change the size on that. And in
 7 fact, we may eventually flip-flop. We may find that we
 8 have enough women to need to go to the large one that the
 9 men are currently in. That allows for ready access by
 10 the company commander to all of the company members.
 11 We have another barracks building that has
 12 all of the men in squad bays on the second or third
 13 floors, and the women's squad bays are on the main floor,
 14 and so there is either a one or a two-floor-removed
 15 distance from where the women are.
 16 That's an older barracks that has not been
 17 renovated. Our plans are to look at how we might be able
 18 to renovate that so it matches the other two newer
 19 barracks.
 20 DR. SEGAL: And the newer barracks are
 21 working better in terms of — you're saying that
 22 configuration —
 23 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: In terms of

1 table with questions. And I will take the bait and ask
 2 you about your policies concerning watch, which you
 3 mentioned was one of the differences between men and
 4 women.
 5 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Currently, we have
 6 the men and women in segregated squad bays. And the men
 7 stand watches that include a roving patrol that checks on
 8 each of the squad bays, and our policy is for men only to
 9 be checking on the male squad bays, and we have a
 10 parallel watch so that the women recruits are checking on
 11 the women in the female squad bays.
 12 All recruits sleep in physical fitness
 13 gear or sweat gear, and we are going to begin studying
 14 whether or not we want to have an integrated roving
 15 patrol at night whereby we would have teams that would go
 16 through all of the squad bays without regard for whether
 17 the watch-standers are male or female and the squad bay
 18 is male or female.
 19 And, in fact, that would mirror what is
 20 currently done in the field now when there are roving
 21 patrols, both at our shore stations and on board cutters
 22 that have gender-integration.
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: A quick follow-on: do you

1 accessibility, they are much better. When we are at
 2 lower numbers, we're able to put everybody into the two
 3 renovated barracks. But if we go to the surges that we
 4 expect this year, the 5,400 as opposed to 4,000, it will
 5 force us during the busy summer months to use the older
 6 barracks that has not been improved.
 7 And what we find is that when there is a
 8 level of removed distance between the male and female
 9 members of the company, oftentimes part of the company
 10 falls out for something and forgets to go get the other
 11 half. It's a problem with communications. It's a
 12 problem with building teamwork. It's a problem with
 13 simple logistics.
 14 And usually there's a company office.
 15 That means it's more remote from where the other part of
 16 the company is, so it's not an ideal situation.
 17 DR. SEGAL: The movable partitions, how
 18 easily moved are they?
 19 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: They're very easily
 20 removed.
 21 DR. SEGAL: Can the recruits remove them
 22 and get through?
 23 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: No, it's something

1 have any policies regarding the assignment of male or
 2 female instructors and what they do at nighttime?
 3 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: No, we have no
 4 limiting factors on the staff that stands duty.
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Do you have any
 7 MOS's that are gender-restricted?
 8 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: No, sir, we do not.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: So anybody can
 10 do anything in the Coast Guard?
 11 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Yes, sir.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: All MOS's?
 13 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Yes, sir.
 14 DR. SEGAL: Would you describe — because
 15 I've had the advantage of being at Cape May and seeing
 16 this last summer. Would you describe how the recruits
 17 are housed in the training? Because I think that the
 18 Commissioners would be interested in that.
 19 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: We have four
 20 barracks, and they are not all the same. We have two
 21 barracks that have recently been renovated. The
 22 renovation allows for the entire company to be berthed in
 23 squad bays immediately adjacent to one another. The male

1 that the engineers would need to come in and modify.
 2 DR. SEGAL: So knowing how many men and
 3 women you have, you're able to move those partitions —
 4 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Yes, ma'am.
 5 DR. SEGAL: — to set up for the company.
 6 And there are head facilities at both
 7 ends; is that right?
 8 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Well, there are
 9 head facilities in the two separate sections, yes.
 10 DR. SEGAL: There's fewer in the women's
 11 side than the men's; is that right?
 12 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Yes.
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Mady, just to clarify, is
 14 this somewhat like the barracks we saw at Fort Jackson —
 15 DR. SEGAL: No.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — where they did have
 17 the moving partitions down the hall?
 18 DR. SEGAL: This looks much more
 19 permanent. Once the partition is actually set — It's
 20 not like a door that's been barred or something. It's a
 21 wall that actually is able to be moved and then anchored.
 22 And so it doesn't look temporary, and, yet, access is —
 23 You have to go around to get access from the men's to the

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1 women. I thought it was a very intriguing solution that
2 might —

3 MS. POPE: Can we get for the record a
4 picture or maybe a description? A layout?

5 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Sure, be glad to.

6 MS. POPE: Because I think when you say
7 "movable," it's confusing. You know, we've seen movable.
8 It defined a lot of things, including removable
9 partitions.

10 DR. SEGAL: Yes, that would be helpful.

11 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Yeah. These were
12 designed — They really do look permanent. They are
13 designed so that we can adjust based on the numbers we
14 have, but it takes a facility engineer to go in and make
15 the change.

16 MS. POPE: And is — I'm a little
17 confused, and that's what a picture for the record or
18 some photograph — Is the area in-between office space,
19 or is that part of the bays themselves? I mean, I kind
20 of — I thought you had said there was some kind of
21 office or something between the two bays.

22 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: There's a short
23 passageway. The modifications were done in a tower at

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1 one end of the barracks — well, actually, both ends of
2 the barracks. So the physical layout of the building,
3 it's a dead wall between the two, and it's just because
4 we had to work within the confines of what was there when
5 we modified the existing —

6 MS. POPE: And what's in the passageway?

7 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: It's just a short
8 hallway. There's nothing.

9 MS. POPE: Okay. So when you move — So
10 the walls are just moved within a bay?

11 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Yes. Yes.

12 DR. SEGAL: They go from one end to the
13 other.

14 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Exactly.

15 MS. POPE: Okay. That's what I was trying
16 to understand, if the passageway was somehow incorporated
17 into the bay or not.

18 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: No.

19 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: No.

20 MS. POPE: Okay.

21 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: No, it doesn't go
22 through.

23 MS. POPE: Great. So that we don't

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1 misunderstand, you know, for the record, that would be
2 great.

3 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: And we'll send you
4 the material.

5 DR. SEGAL: Admiral Barrett also said that
6 anyone who wants to visit Cape May, that the Commission
7 would actually be —

8 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: You're certainly
9 welcome to come.

10 DR. SEGAL: — welcome to go and visit if
11 you wanted actually to see that.

12 A question about physical fitness. Would
13 you describe how you measure physical fitness in basic
14 training? I think it's very individualized, if I recall.

15 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: We would like to
16 think that we emphasize health and wellness as part of
17 our physical fitness program. Recruits are tested in a
18 couple of different areas. The actual physical part
19 looks at push-ups, sit-ups, and a one-and-a-half-mile
20 run, and there are different standards for men and women.

21 We will take a hard look at that in the
22 future in trying to determine whether we are having them
23 tested in the right areas and whether we want to continue

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1 having different standards. We would like to see that
2 linked more to job requirements when the apprentices get
3 to the field. So that's something that's going to bear
4 some further scrutiny over the course of the next six
5 months.

6 We also have a swim portion of physical
7 fitness which is the same for men and women. They must
8 go off a one-and-a-half meter platform. They must swim a
9 hundred meters in five minutes. They must tread water
10 for five minutes and they must don exposure gear in the
11 water within five minutes. And as I said, men and women
12 meet the same standards when they're in their swim tests.

13 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Unlike the other
14 services, too, we do not have regular physical testing of
15 our personnel. The emphasis is on a health-and-wellness
16 approach. In other words, addressing things like smoking
17 cessation, general cardiovascular health. But it's to
18 try and build a wellness ethic, diet and such, with our
19 folks.

20 But what Sally is talking about is we're
21 looking to get it to be more performance-related, if we
22 can do that.

23 DR. SEGAL: And relate it to the specific

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1 jobs.

2 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Yes.

3 DR. SEGAL: It was my understanding when I
4 made the visit to Cape May last summer that in terms of
5 the actual physical fitness regimen during basic
6 training, that it's done inside, in the gym, with
7 individualized — Everyone's tested individually. And
8 then a program is laid out for them individually in order
9 to increase their performance, and then they work out
10 individually with a card. Is that — Am I remembering
11 correctly?

12 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: That's correct.

13 And much of our focus is on aerobic activity. You
14 probably saw the exer-cycles. We have a huge number —
15 several hundred exer-cycles that the recruits go and do
16 their workouts on.

17 We have a phased build-up in the physical
18 fitness program because we have so many different levels
19 of fitness when recruits arrive, from the couch potato to
20 somebody who's in great shape, and we want to try and
21 target, to bring everybody up to a higher level. But,
22 quite honestly, most of the attention has to go into
23 those who are at the weaker end of the performance level.

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1 We also do not allow recruits to smoke
2 during training and give them support — give the smokers
3 support during the training program in the hope that they
4 will not return to smoking when they graduate. We do not
5 allow recruits to chew tobacco either.

6 DR. SEGAL: I have one other question with
7 regard to the evaluation of basic training. As you know,
8 we're looking at the issue of gender-integration and
9 segregation of basic training, but we have a broader
10 mission to evaluate basic training in each of the DoD
11 services.

12 And as I understand it, the Coast Guard
13 has recently gone through a careful evaluation of basic
14 training, so I think it would be instructive for the
15 Commissioners to hear about that.

16 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: I'd be glad to.
17 And we can certainly provide some follow-up information
18 to the extent you're interested.

19 But we've taken an approach in the
20 organization basically leveraging what's known as human
21 performance technology. It's a performance-based
22 approach to the way we do our training and the way we do
23 our business, if you will.

1 And on the enlisted side, we decided to
 2 look at our enlisted development, our enlisted career
 3 development, all the way from the time we go out to try
 4 and recruit somebody until the time they reach E-8/E-9
 5 level in the enlisted workforce.

6 And we did several pieces of that, but one
 7 that we looked at early on was a non-rate structure
 8 study. That is, we looked at the non-rates; we looked at
 9 our chief petty officers that transition from E-6 to E-7.
 10 Right now, we're looking at junior officers and senior
 11 petty officers.

12 But the approach goes something like this.
 13 It's a data-driven approach, but we go out and we decide
 14 what the ideal non-rate in this case should be. In other
 15 words, what is it that the organization wants to show up
 16 on the deck of a cutter, what skills do we want, what
 17 knowledge do we need, what attitude do we need, and
 18 describe, if you will, the ideal individual in terms of
 19 those requirements. And then we analyzed what we are
 20 actually delivering. In other words, what type of
 21 skills, qualities, abilities, attitudes, do our people
 22 have when they show up.

23 We surveyed all our non-rated personnel

1 who have been out on our units for six months or more.
 2 We surveyed their supervisors and the commanding
 3 officers, and we identified, if you will, what we felt
 4 were the gaps between what we would ideally like to have
 5 and what we're actually delivering. And then we're
 6 backing down into the recruit training curriculum to
 7 close those gaps, if you will, and Captain Brice-O'Hara
 8 will actually be reworking our curriculum a bit over the
 9 next year to do that.

10 We've done the same thing with chief petty
 11 officers. We basically recast the curriculum at our
 12 chief petty officers' academy and we located the academy
 13 to a new Leadership Development Center at the Coast Guard
 14 Academy at New London. We're actually the first service
 15 to do that.

16 At the Leadership Development Center now
 17 in New London, we have a military college, the corps of
 18 cadets. We also have our OCS, our chief petty officers'
 19 academy, our officer-in-charge, prospective commanding
 20 officer, prospective executive officer school, and our
 21 warrant officer indoc, to try and get more integration
 22 between the leadership skills we are providing across the
 23 spectrum.

1 But it's a performance-based approach.
 2 It's data-driven. But this front-end analysis is to ask
 3 what is it you'd like to have, is the first question, and
 4 then survey what you're getting, and then back that down
 5 against what we can do to move closer and close the gaps.
 6 We did that for non-rates. And what it turned up would
 7 be I think the other services, to some extent.

8 Obviously what goes on at the training
 9 center is only part of a process. Who we recruit, what
 10 skills and abilities they come to us with, what we do at
 11 the training center, how we link that to follow-on
 12 training or, very importantly, what goes on at their
 13 first unit, and then additional development becomes a key
 14 in the process.

15 So what you'll see our training center
 16 become, the Recruit Training Center, is much more a piece
 17 of an extended process that starts from recruiting and
 18 works through petty officer and senior petty officer
 19 development rather than simply a train-them-to-some-
 20 standard-and-send-them-on-their-way. It's a much more
 21 integrated approach and I'll be glad to provide some
 22 information on that.

23 The other piece that may be of interest to

1 you in light of what you're doing, it's very performance-
 2 based, and when we look at performance issues, frequently
 3 in our organization — and I can't speak for others, but
 4 training is always — is often put up as a solution when
 5 training is not the root cause of the problem.

6 Performance is affected by a number of
 7 things. Training can be a piece of it. It can go to the
 8 — as well, to doctrine; it can go to leadership; it can
 9 go to equipment; it can go to a number of other things
 10 that affect performance and many of which are not
 11 training-related. If it doesn't have to do with the
 12 skills and knowledge, you come up with a different
 13 answer.

14 Perhaps — Let me give you an
 15 illustration. It's the most recent one on my mind. We
 16 had a tragedy about a year-and-a-half ago at Quillayute
 17 River in Washington where we had a surf boat capsize and
 18 we lost three people on a SAR case. And as is typical in
 19 those cases, they did an immediate investigation, an
 20 investigation to find out what happened.

21 Immediately after that, there was kind of
 22 "do our people need more training to operate in heavy
 23 surf," was the question posed. And when we did this

1 analysis, this performance review, this human performance
 2 approach, how do people fit, what we actually found was
 3 that the people were quite well trained, and we had some
 4 substantial problems in other areas.

5 In terms of our doctrine: what conditions
 6 require surfmen to go out there. In terms of
 7 assignments: were we assigning people with the right
 8 skills to the right units? We had people in the
 9 organization with the skills and they weren't being
 10 placed against the problem. The equipment became an
 11 issue: were the harnesses that we strap people in the
 12 surf boats with strong enough to withstand the stress
 13 that they were put under? And they were not, so we've
 14 got new safety harnesses.

15 But the point being, there was a range of
 16 problems that contributed to the tragedy. Ironically or
 17 interestingly, training was not one of them; yet, that
 18 was the immediate reaction of the organization to say we
 19 need to train these folks better in order to avoid
 20 situations like that.

21 And that's what we're trying to do now at
 22 Cape May with the non-rates, is — there are some
 23 training issues there for us, obviously, but to take a

1 broader approach to that. And I'll be glad to send some
 2 stuff over on that.

3 DR. SEGAL: Thank you very much. That
 4 could be very useful.

5 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: So a hundred
 6 percent of Coast Guard occupations are open without
 7 regard to gender?

8 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Yes, sir.

9 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And, of
 10 course, probably one of the most critical tasks is water
 11 rescue. So is the — And I would assume, knowing a
 12 little bit about water now, that that is a physical task
 13 that's pretty difficult. Do you assess the water
 14 survival capabilities of your individuals on an annual
 15 basis? I mean, do they have to meet a standard?

16 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Depending upon the
 17 unit to which they are assigned, if that's something
 18 that's part of their normal duties. For instance, if
 19 they were assigned to a Coast Guard station and a member
 20 of a boat crew and a rescue swimmer as part of that boat
 21 crew, they would meet some requirements actually on a
 22 semi-annual basis.

23 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.

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1 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: We also have a
2 different level of rescue swimmer in the aviation
3 community and you might have seen that on television.
4 There's been a lot of coverage recently of the rescue
5 swimmer who goes out of the helicopter, into the water,
6 and that is a very physically demanding task and they
7 have very rigorous qualification and then continuation-
8 type of training.
9 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And are
10 there any women serving in those positions that you're
11 aware of?
12 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Yes.
13 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: There are?
14 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Yes.
15 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Very few.
16 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: That's right.
17 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: In aviation
18 survival, we've had probably less than a half-dozen women
19 qualify, but it's open to them. In fact, many men fail
20 to qualify as well. It's very —
21 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Very
22 demanding.
23 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Very demanding.

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1 DR. SEGAL: So are there selection
2 criteria or training performance criteria?
3 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Both.
4 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Both.
5 DR. SEGAL: Both.
6 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Both.
7 MS. POPE: But they're the same for men
8 and women. Gender-neutral.
9 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Yes, gender-
10 neutral.
11 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: So if you
12 measure up to the standard, you're allowed to do the job.
13 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: To enter the
14 program. And you can — we've had — I'm sure it's less
15 than a half-dozen women successfully complete it, but
16 we've had several.
17 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
18 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: I only know of two,
19 but...
20 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: It may well be two.
21 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: I'll give you your
22 half-dozen.
23 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: I'd say it's less

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1 than a half-dozen.
2 DR. SEGAL: He said less than six.
3 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: It's very few. But
4 it is gender-neutral in terms of application.
5 DR. SEGAL: How did you determine what —
6 if I could follow-on, how did you determine what the
7 standards were —
8 DR. MOSKOS: Excuse me. Before we — How
9 many are there totally in this group? We're talking
10 about a half-dozen —
11 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Aviation
12 survivalmen? Less — Probably have about — I would
13 guess less than 200. About 200.
14 DR. MOSKOS: About 200. Okay. Thank you.
15 DR. SEGAL: So it's about — less than
16 three percent, within there. One to — Somewhere between
17 one and three percent are women.
18 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Very low number.
19 DR. SEGAL: How did you determine what the
20 standards were for that specialty?
21 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: I don't know.
22 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: I'd have to just
23 say generically it's got a lot to do with swimming. The

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1 swimming requirements are much more extensive than like
2 Sally described at Cape May. I don't — They would have
3 been job — They would have been generally job-related,
4 but it would have gone to distance, endurance, and
5 strength in the water.
6 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: A lot of upper body
7 strength, and then certainly all the rigors of any
8 aviation-related assignment. You have to be fit for
9 aviation duties as well, which puts another tier of
10 qualifications on top of that.
11 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: So they would have
12 to go through a dunker, be able to get through that
13 successfully as well as meet the physical requirements.
14 DR. SEGAL: Basically I was asking about
15 the methodology of how you determine what the
16 requirements are and how you decide what's required in
17 the specific specialty.
18 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well,
19 whatever it is, it must be somewhat accurate because it's
20 a phenomenal job those folks do.
21 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Thank you.
22 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I mean,
23 their story doesn't get told very often.

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1 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: They do extremely
2 well and sometimes under very, very adverse conditions.
3 DR. MOSKOS: What's that called again?
4 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Aviation
5 survivalmen.
6 DR. MOSKOS: Aviation survivalmen.
7 Do you have another question, Bob?
8 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: No. Thanks.
9 DR. MOSKOS: I'd like to ask — Thanks
10 again for coming. A question — I don't know. Perhaps,
11 Captain, you can help this. Are there recruitment
12 problems or non-problems in the Coast Guard?
13 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Well, we have —
14 DR. MOSKOS: We've been hearing a lot
15 about the other services and we just wonder how —
16 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: We have problems, a
17 number of problems. Certainly our recruiting budget is
18 much smaller than the DoD services. We are not as well
19 known. We're not the common household word that we would
20 like to be. That's a problem.
21 We've got a very strong economy competing
22 for the same work pool that we're interested in, and so
23 that's a problem. And then we have our sister services

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1 competing for the same work pool that we're interested
2 in.
3 So from all of those aspects, it has been
4 difficult to recruit the numbers that we're interested
5 in. This year, we have dramatically overhauled the
6 training that our recruiters go through. We have put an
7 increased emphasis on marketing and salesmanship tools so
8 that they are better equipped and skilled when they go
9 out and have contacts with suitable candidates.
10 We've also dramatically increased by I
11 guess a third the number of recruiters and we are
12 repositioning where they're located throughout the United
13 States. As part of the non-rate workforce structure
14 study, we did an analysis of our recruiting efforts and
15 it helped us see that we didn't have people in exactly
16 the right locations to find the young people for our
17 service.
18 DR. MOSKOS: Now, is there a shortfall or
19 not?
20 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Yes, there is a
21 shortfall.
22 DR. MOSKOS: There's a shortfall.
23 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: We're short about

1 800. What I was going to add to the comments Sally gave,
 2 we have —
 3 DR. MOSKOS: That's 800 out of about 5,000
 4 you recruit a year?
 5 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: No, our shortfall
 6 is 800 out of our enlisted workforce, which is about
 7 27,000 right now.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Oh, okay.
 9 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: So we're —
 10 DR. MOSKOS: 27,000.
 11 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: What I was going to
 12 say is what we have not done is compromise our standards.
 13 We're very pleased with the quality of young men and
 14 women we get. Our standards are quite high and the
 15 people that meet those standards are succeeding quite
 16 well when we can get them.
 17 So I know that has been discussed with the
 18 other services, but we have been very reluctant to do
 19 that and I don't see us doing that anytime soon.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: A follow-up
 21 on that. First-term attrition, what would that be?
 22 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Our overall
 23 attrition from the time we get somebody till the end of a

1 first enlistment is pretty close to the other services.
 2 About 30 percent.
 3 DR. SEGAL: And the other — some of the
 4 other services would like to be at 30 percent right now.
 5 They're edging up to like 38 percent.
 6 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: You know, one of
 7 the problems is we all count it a little differently. It
 8 depends on what you count in and count out and where you
 9 attrit and what you count in that number. But I think
 10 we're pretty comparable to the other services.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Captain, is there any data on
 12 injury rates in the basic training state between men and
 13 women? Comparisons?
 14 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: There is data.
 15 I'll have to be honest, I don't have the figures on the
 16 top of my head. But we looked in particular at lower leg
 17 injuries. And we had problems with both men and women,
 18 but it seemed to be a more pronounced problem with women,
 19 and that has caused us to take a look at how we were
 20 phasing in the wear of the hard-sole military-type shoes,
 21 so we have now gone to a phased progression through
 22 training. They wear tennis shoes for a certain number of
 23 hours and wear the harder-sole shoes a certain number of

1 hours. We have our physical therapist doing evaluations
 2 of the recruits when they do their initial PF tests so
 3 that he can look for poor performance. If somebody is
 4 running improperly, he can help get that corrected early
 5 on. And we have just gone to or are starting as of the
 6 first of the year to go to an initial issue of a recruit
 7 running shoe. We're going to use the shoe that's on
 8 contract with the Air Force, the same one that the Air
 9 Force issues to its recruits. So it's been thoroughly
 10 evaluated, has been a very successful model for the Air
 11 Force, and we feel that that will get our recruits in the
 12 best running shoe to give them the support that they need
 13 during recruit training. Right now, our recruits arrive
 14 with shoes they've bought themselves. We find a whole
 15 range. Some aren't appropriate for running. Some are in
 16 terrible condition, shouldn't be used. And so this
 17 initial issue puts everybody at the same level so we
 18 don't have to worry about status-conscious people, and it
 19 also gets us in the best shoe for the recruits' feet. It
 20 will come in a number of sizes and widths, male and
 21 female versions of the shoe, so that we feel that that's
 22 really going to help us to continue to decrease — But
 23 based on the interventions we've taken, we have brought

1 the injury rate down to very low numbers.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 3 MS. POPE: I'm sorry, but is it a running
 4 shoe or is it a boot?
 5 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRIS: Brooks, Brooks
 6 running shoe.
 7 MS. POPE: Oh, it is a running shoe.
 8 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HARRIS: They have done
 9 immense testing.
 10 MS. POPE: Okay. I just wasn't sure if it
 11 was a type of boot or it was a shoe. So two of the
 12 services are using running shoes.
 13 LIEUTENANT COLONEL STREET: The Air Force
 14 is — they've done extensive testing over about a twelve-
 15 year period of testing shoes.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Another question. This is in
 17 contrast to the Navy. I'd like to know, does the Coast
 18 Guard have any service-wide policy on sex on ships?
 19 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Yes, we do.
 20 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Yes.
 21 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: It's prohibited.
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Service-wide? Not a — Okay.
 23 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Yes, sir.

1 DR. MOSKOS: Thou shalt not have sex on
 2 ships.
 3 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: We have a —
 4 DR. SEGAL: Is it written or is it —
 5 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: It's written.
 6 DR. SEGAL: Is it written?
 7 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: I even brought a
 8 copy in case someone would ask.
 9 DR. SEGAL: Good. Great.
 10 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: What we have is —
 11 Well, we call it — it's a policy on interpersonal
 12 relationships without the Coast Guard. I'll leave it for
 13 the record. But it addresses the types of conduct we
 14 expect between individuals in general at our units, and
 15 one of the things that is prohibited is sex on board —
 16 It's not just ships. It's also any spaces, government-
 17 controlled spaces on our shore facilities as well.
 18 But I'd be glad to leave that for you.
 19 MS. POPE: Does it address —
 20 DR. SEGAL: So that —
 21 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: It addresses the
 22 relationships between individuals we expect. So we, for
 23 example — It's the fraternization piece you would go to

1 there. We would prohibit that —
 2 MS. POPE: Actually, fraternization is a
 3 piece of it. But consensual relationships, not on duty
 4 but —
 5 DR. MOSKOS: Among the same peers.
 6 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Among the same
 7 peers we would not prohibit.
 8 MS. POPE: Among peers. Okay.
 9 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: We would not
 10 prohibit.
 11 MS. POPE: Right.
 12 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Where it becomes a
 13 prohibition is when it becomes a fraternization issue —
 14 MS. POPE: Right.
 15 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: — when they're of
 16 a different grade and —
 17 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: But if I
 18 heard you right, what it speaks to hard is the expected
 19 conduct of professional people in the organization.
 20 MS. POPE: Right. Right.
 21 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Yes, sir. We try
 22 to make it simple. It's not as simple as we would like.
 23 But if you look, we characterize our relationships as

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1 personal, romantic, or married or family relationship,
 2 and then we laid out what we expected and what we'd
 3 accept at different types of units.
 4 As you might expect, we have some
 5 different problems than the other services because many
 6 of our units are so small. And so a relationship that
 7 might be acceptable at some other places or either in
 8 some other services, because of the size of the unit, we,
 9 in fact, tend to be more rigorous in prohibiting.
 10 At a small boat station, for example, if
 11 there are only twenty or thirty people there, although
 12 someone might not be in a direct supervisory relationship
 13 with a junior, because of the size of the unit, it can
 14 cause a problem. So we're a bit more restrictive in that
 15 respect than the other services.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: So the fraternization rule is
 17 no officer-enlisted —
 18 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: That's correct.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: — dating; is that right?
 20 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: That's right. We
 21 also restrict our senior petty officers from
 22 relationships with —
 23 DR. MOSKOS: Junior.

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1 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: — junior enlisted,
 2 again, because of the same type of fear of overreaching
 3 that you have.
 4 DR. SEGAL: What about senior petty
 5 officers with petty officers who are not senior? Or do
 6 you just have a break at —
 7 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: We actually
 8 prohibit that. The break —
 9 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: It depends upon
 10 what the working relationship is.
 11 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Working
 12 relationship between them is. But, generally, chief
 13 petty officers and junior enlisted, E-4 and below, would
 14 be restricted. That's where we drew the line.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Across the board?
 16 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Yes, sir.
 17 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: And, actually, to
 18 get to your original question, it prohibits sexually
 19 intimate behavior aboard any Coast Guard vessel or in any
 20 Coast Guard-controlled workplace.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: I don't want to get too
 22 technical, but the sexual — What was the word again?
 23 Sexually what? Intimate?

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1 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Intimate.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: I don't know. We had another
 3 incident case here as to how that's defined, but let's
 4 leave that.
 5 MS. POPE: But that one is actually pretty
 6 clear. But this — But sexually intimate is —
 7 DR. SEGAL: This doesn't say sexual
 8 intercourse. It says sexually intimate behavior.
 9 MS. POPE: Sexually intimate. That's
 10 pretty broad.
 11 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: One of the reasons
 12 we wrote this and one of the problems we were having goes
 13 to gender-integration from the other direction. We also
 14 had situations where relatively innocuous conduct between
 15 men and women in the service was getting hauled up and
 16 people were getting criticized and in some cases
 17 inappropriately disciplined for behavior that was, on its
 18 face, neutral.
 19 A junior officer woman jogging with
 20 another officer at lunchtime. Pretty neutral conduct,
 21 but people would start rumors and start — So what we're
 22 also trying to do here is not only indicate what's
 23 prohibited, but also make it clear that the types of

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1 relationships which have always been a strength of our
 2 service between members are acceptable, whether the
 3 individual is a man or a woman and whether the
 4 relationship is cross-gender or not.
 5 That cohesiveness and team-building does
 6 actually — We want to make sure people are not isolated
 7 in our wardrooms, isolated on our units, simply because
 8 of their gender. So we came from both directions at that
 9 —
 10 MS. POPE: I'm sorry —
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: How old is
 12 this policy?
 13 Excuse me.
 14 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: It's about three or
 15 four years old now, sir.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 17 MS. POPE: I'm sorry, I missed the
 18 example. I couldn't — I missed whether it was
 19 encouraged or discouraged. Two Coast Guard — Two
 20 officers — Similar rank, officer or enlisted, running
 21 together. That was discouraged or encouraged?
 22 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Encouraged.
 23 MS. POPE: Oh, okay. I thought you had

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1 said discouraged.
 2 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: I'll give you the
 3 word that — Fundamental principle that interpersonal
 4 activities which are appropriate among men or among women
 5 are appropriate among men and women.
 6 MS. POPE: Okay. Okay.
 7 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Positive social
 8 interaction among men has proved beneficial to the
 9 organization in the past. Women should be afforded equal
 10 opportunity to participate in these activities and not be
 11 insulated or isolated from proper professional and social
 12 activity.
 13 MS. POPE: Okay. Yeah, I'm glad I asked
 14 because I thought I heard you say that it was
 15 discouraged.
 16 DR. SEGAL: Well, some —
 17 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: No.
 18 DR. SEGAL: What he was saying is that, in
 19 practice —
 20 MS. POPE: Right.
 21 DR. SEGAL: — it was being discouraged
 22 when it ought not be.
 23 MS. POPE: Okay. Okay.

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1 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Exactly.
 2 MS. POPE: Okay. Thank you. Thank you.
 3 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: And so we're —
 4 MS. POPE: That's the part I missed.
 5 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: — trying to bridge
 6 that.
 7 DR. MOSKOS: Barbara, it's up to you.
 8 MS. POPE: I have a question. You may not
 9 be the right people to ask it of, so I'm going to ask it
 10 for the record.
 11 Pregnancy policy and medical — men and
 12 women on medical leave. Is pregnancy and maternity leave
 13 combined? I mean, is it a six-months definition? And is
 14 there data kept for — I mean, that's the first part of
 15 the question. Are the pregnancy and maternity leave
 16 combined as medical leave, or are they two different
 17 categories of absences? And is there data that separates
 18 out the time away from the job, men and women, and a
 19 breakdown along the kinds of medical absences or is
 20 maternity separate?
 21 And then my next question is backfill.
 22 What are the policies for backfill? And are they — it's
 23 a shore duty versus a deployment status? And if

1 pregnancy and maternity leave are not captured together,
 2 what happens in the backfill? Because we're hearing some
 3 differences among services on what their policies are.
 4 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: I have a copy of
 5 our — I have to admit I have to look up to try and look
 6 up to answer your question.
 7 In general, we treat pregnancy as a health
 8 condition only. Okay? And so our pregnancy policies are
 9 directed primarily at health care for the individual
 10 service member, and that includes making sure that their
 11 duties don't expose them to hazardous — And it's not
 12 simply a ship or to shore. We have people in our marine
 13 inspection field that are frequently exposed to hazardous
 14 chemicals, so we have that concern.
 15 But it's managed as a health issue and it
 16 would be treated the same as any other health issue on a
 17 unit. Typically, if the member can continue to do their
 18 job, they would be able to do so. If a member —
 19 Pregnancy leave, I believe, is right around —
 20 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Four weeks.
 21 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Four weeks? Four
 22 weeks.
 23 MS. POPE: But does it come under leave or

1 does —
 2 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Maternity.
 3 MS. POPE: — come under medical?
 4 And then what would be the backfill
 5 policy? I mean, one of the issues we're hearing is
 6 billets are gapped like any other medical absence.
 7 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: If you took
 8 the scenario that you described of someone that worked
 9 around hazardous materials —
 10 MS. POPE: Right. Right.
 11 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: — my
 12 assumption would be that she would then be taken out of
 13 that job —
 14 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: That's correct.
 15 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: —
 16 immediately until term and maternity leave. So do you
 17 lose that body forever and ever, or does the Coast Guard
 18 backfill so the unit doesn't suffer with shortage?
 19 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: The Coast Guard
 20 normally would not transfer the member. What they would
 21 look at the unit to do is internally reassign or
 22 reapportion tasks so that the member would not be out in
 23 the field doing the inspecting but probably is back at a

1 desk, relieving somebody else to go out in the field and
 2 do the inspecting.
 3 MS. POPE: But what if it was on a vessel?
 4 And I don't know, second trimester is when you're no
 5 longer deployable.
 6 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: I would need some
 7 help in —
 8 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Twenty weeks.
 9 MS. POPE: Okay.
 10 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: We normally would
 11 — A woman who is — We would normally rotate an
 12 individual off a vessel at the twenty-week point.
 13 MS. POPE: And would you backfill?
 14 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: And we would not
 15 deploy someone who we expected to pass that point on that
 16 particular deployment.
 17 MS. POPE: Right. Right.
 18 But if someone deploys and isn't
 19 conscious, you know, that they're pregnant or whatever —
 20 I mean, I'm sure it happens. But my question is, is it
 21 backfilled? Is it based on the criticality of that
 22 billet?
 23 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: It would be an

1 individual case-by-case, unit-by-unit determination.
 2 MS. POPE: Okay.
 3 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: There is no overall
 4 policy that says we will or will not backfill. We treat
 5 it as any other health issue. If the unit can accept the
 6 gap, they accept the gap. If they cannot accept the gap,
 7 the personnel command would work with them to backfill.
 8 MS. POPE: And would the individual go —
 9 This is — As a matter of fact, I'm getting ready to give
 10 you a Data Call because I think it's getting kind of
 11 lost, at least for the other services — is you go —
 12 you're pregnant; you're captured in the data under
 13 "medical." Okay? But are you captured for maternity
 14 leave? And do you then go into a leave status versus a
 15 medical status, and is that captured anywhere?
 16 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: I don't know.
 17 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: I don't know. I
 18 have never —
 19 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: We don't think
 20 about it like that.
 21 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: It hasn't come up
 22 as an issue like that. You know, we have a couple of
 23 policies that are different than the other services.

1 MS. POPE: Right.
 2 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: For example —
 3 MS. POPE: Well, that's what I'm trying to
 4 understand, how — what you're doing and how you satisfy
 5 the readiness —
 6 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: We also have a
 7 leave of absence policy for both men and women.
 8 MS. POPE: Right.
 9 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: So sometimes women
 10 who — a woman who would go to term with a pregnancy
 11 might decide to apply for a leave of absence and can
 12 actually get up to two years off duty —
 13 MS. POPE: Right.
 14 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: — to deal with
 15 that situation and then come back in without a loss of
 16 grade or rating.
 17 DR. SEGAL: And how has that worked?
 18 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: It works well. We
 19 actually have fewer takers than we thought we would with
 20 it. But we have a number. We can get you stats on that.
 21 But it seems to be important to some people. For the
 22 most part, I'd say our numbers are relatively small.
 23 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: I think one reason

1 the numbers are small is that when you take that
 2 sabbatical, it only guarantees you'll have a job when you
 3 return. There are no benefits that accrue during that
 4 time —
 5 MS. POPE: Right.
 6 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: — and a lot of our
 7 more junior people need the benefits.
 8 MS. POPE: Can't afford to...
 9 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: But we can try and
 10 respond. But as Sally says, we don't approach it that
 11 way. It does tend to be treated as a health issue and
 12 managed like anybody else who has a health condition that
 13 warrants special attention or management.
 14 MS. POPE: Yeah, the issue has come up as
 15 far as operational and readiness, and that's — my
 16 question is, do you move from medical status, you know,
 17 into a leave status and you're kind of lost in the larger
 18 numbers? And the billets gap for some commanders that
 19 we've talked with, that's their only issue or major
 20 issue.
 21 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: I don't know how
 22 the other services approach it, but, you know, the Coast
 23 Guard's operating philosophy, if you look at how we

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1 manage our personnel gaps in general, we tend to keep our
 2 operating units as full as possible and we absorb the
 3 gaps more at the shore commands.
 4 MS. POPE: Sure.
 5 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: So if you — A not
 6 unusual scenario would be if a cutter had to leave
 7 someone on the beach because of pregnancy, they would
 8 tend to place that person at the shore unit to do work
 9 there and the shore command would turn someone back over
 10 to the ship to run the deployment.
 11 MS. POPE: Okay.
 12 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: But we're so small,
 13 it's maybe a little easier to manage.
 14 DR. SEGAL: It sounded as if — if I could
 15 just follow-up, it sounded as if backfill issues are
 16 determined by this particular unit as to whether the unit
 17 commander feels —
 18 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: That's right.
 19 DR. SEGAL: — that they can absorb that
 20 absence of a servicemember or whether they need to
 21 replace that person.
 22 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: That's correct.
 23 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: And the nice thing

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1 period of probably up to about eighteen months.
 2 You then will be given an opportunity —
 3 And people compete for advanced training opportunities in
 4 all of our ratings, so you would apply to be a bosun or
 5 an engineer or electronics or telecommunications or a
 6 machinist's mate, or you name it, and at some point
 7 during that tour, when the school slot opens, we'll
 8 ship you off for what we call "A" school and we'll
 9 provide you that initial advanced training.
 10 At the "A" school also we would provide —
 11 we're now providing — when I talked about the continuum
 12 — like, for example, a two-day module on leadership-type
 13 issues where we didn't used to do that, and that would be
 14 linked to what we had done at Cape May.
 15 But you get the basic tactical training;
 16 go back out to a unit as a rated petty officer, and then
 17 advance via service-wide exams, off-duty education, and
 18 what we call Class "C" or advanced training, depending on
 19 your rating. Electricians or what have you.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What will I
 21 do between that time that I've finished my recruit
 22 training and I'm selected for — in that eighteen-month
 23 basic period and I'm selected for an advanced school?

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1 about a pregnancy is that you do have some time to make
 2 plans and we rely very heavily on our reserve component.
 3 And one solution might be to work out how you would bring
 4 a reservist on board to help you bridge the gap where
 5 that person will not be at the unit.
 6 It's much easier to do it when you're
 7 dealing with a shore unit. When you have a cutter, it's
 8 a little bit of a different situation. And the admiral
 9 mentioned that you might swap out somebody from ashore.
 10 Quite honestly, we don't have enough seagoing billets.
 11 They are highly sought and it would not be difficult to
 12 find a volunteer to fill in for somebody. And perhaps it
 13 becomes — eventually it becomes a permanent tool for the
 14 new person and the woman ends up staying ashore. That
 15 would not be at all unusual.
 16 But we have the ability to be very
 17 flexible because we are fairly small.
 18 MS. POPE: Thank you.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Let me just
 20 follow-up. And if you would, you aptly alluded to the
 21 continuum of training that starts with accession and goes
 22 on through to the chief petty officer training. We've
 23 talked about your eight weeks. But the implication I got

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1 What can I expect?
 2 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: You would serve as
 3 a seaman or a fireman on one of our units. They have
 4 billets that require nonskilled — basically non-skill.
 5 Basic seamanship skills is what we're talking about, or
 6 basic engineering skills for firemen. And the units, you
 7 would go to a unit that has a requirement for those jobs.
 8 We still are — As much as we're moving
 9 toward a more technologically-based society, running
 10 ships still requires a lot of manual, physical work to do
 11 it effectively. Same way on the shore stations where we
 12 run the boats. So you'd work as a non-rate for a period
 13 of time.
 14 Sally, have you got any...
 15 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: The only other
 16 alternative the wasn't mentioned is that there is the
 17 ability to strike for a rating.
 18 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Sure.
 19 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: For some of the
 20 less-technical ratings, you can learn it on-the-job and
 21 then compete in the service-wide exam to be advanced in
 22 that specialty.
 23 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Bosun mate would be

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1 was that at the conclusion of that eight weeks, that that
 2 young man or woman is either going to go to their cutter
 3 or go to a particular shore station or whatever.
 4 Could you further carry that continuum of
 5 training for me as to if I'm a young Coast Guardsman,
 6 I've finished my eight weeks, now what would I do next,
 7 what I can expect; what kind of continued training, if
 8 anything, I can expect?
 9 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Typically — And,
 10 again, it's not all a hundred percent. We would send
 11 some people directly on to advanced schools if we had,
 12 for example, guaranteed them a school as an enlistment
 13 incentive. But typically you —
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Those type
 15 of schools would be...
 16 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Electronics,
 17 engineering. Some of our higher-tech schools do attract
 18 those people. We would guarantee them a slot in school
 19 almost immediately.
 20 But typically, if you graduate from boot
 21 camp, we would assign you to a unit. It's likely going
 22 to be an operating unit, either a cutter or a shore
 23 station, where you're going to be assigned there for a

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1 a good example of that. Our basic deck skills, deck
 2 seamanship skills, would be typically done on-the-job,
 3 not at a formal school.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 5 DR. SEGAL: What is the gender-integration
 6 like aboard ships? I know you have very — all different
 7 size ships. Boats, actually. Cutters and the different
 8 classes would have different numbers of people. Could
 9 you give us a sense of what are the common classes of
 10 seagoing vessels that you have and what the sizes would
 11 be, how many people would be on board and what you do
 12 about berthing of men and women?
 13 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Sure. It varies
 14 with the class of cutter and the age of the cutters.
 15 Newer cutters are more flexible and are larger ones. And
 16 on our older, smaller cutters, it's more difficult. And
 17 we will not have women on all the ships. We have women
 18 on every class of ships, but not all the ships have
 19 berthing.
 20 Our largest cutter is a 378-foot high-
 21 endurance cutter. It has a crew of about 170 people.
 22 Other than icebreakers, which are a little bit bigger and
 23 a little — a very specialized class, but that crew would

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1 probably have up to sixteen women, officers and enlisted.
 2 And as you move down from that class of cutter, we have
 3 270-foot cutters, 210-foot, and the crew sizes would
 4 ratchet down. Our most common patrol boat is 110-foot,
 5 which would typically run a crew of about a dozen.
 6 And again, the berthing arrangements on
 7 the ships were not designed for gender-integrated crews.
 8 So on a 378, for example, you might take a — what was
 9 originally designed as a six-man berthing compartment and
 10 assign six women to it, and that's the number of folks
 11 they could take in that compartment on that ship. Or a
 12 twelve-person berthing compartment, with the senior petty
 13 officers — Chiefs, for example, they would have two-
 14 person staterooms.
 15 DR. SEGAL: Do you — Are you constrained
 16 in your assignments that if you have a six-person space,
 17 that you would make sure you have six women? What do you
 18 do if you only have four? Do you not send women at all?
 19 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: It tends to run the
 20 other way. If we had four or five, we'd probably still
 21 use that compartment. The problem becomes if you have
 22 eight or you'd want to put eight on board. You've got a
 23 six-person berthing. The next berthing size up is

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1 twelve. Well, you're going to have to move on six or run
 2 four people short. So that becomes a problem.
 3 And the ability of women — Not all the
 4 ships have women assigned to them. In other words, we
 5 would tend to concentrate the women where we can manage
 6 the berthing in great numbers.
 7 There's another factor aside from the
 8 berthing, too — is the commanding officers generally
 9 prefer not to have women isolated.
 10 And, Sally, maybe you can comment on it.
 11 They do not like having one or two women
 12 assigned to a ship. They like to have a cadre of
 13 enlisted women and some senior enlisted women for
 14 leadership. They like to not have a junior officer.
 15 They like to have several. Provides for better teamwork
 16 and support and integration.
 17 So we try to balance those factors.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Would you
 19 just describe "run ashore"? You said "run ashore," and I
 20 think what you mean is if I had — as an example, if I
 21 had more women than I had compartments for a ship, some
 22 would be billeted ashore. Is that what you meant by
 23 that?

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1 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: No, sir. No, they
 2 would not be billeted on the ship. We would — We tend
 3 to concentrate them on particular cutters, so we would
 4 look to put them on a —
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 6 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: We would look to
 7 get enough to run six more on another ship.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Got it.
 9 Okay.
 10 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: But no, we don't
 11 berth ashore and send them out.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 13 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: Well, I think that
 14 it's very important that we not isolate women in groups
 15 of one's and two's because there's no one for them to
 16 turn to. It's best when you can have some vertical
 17 integration so that you have more senior women as role
 18 models; senior women who have been through it, who can
 19 help coach and mentor the junior women that are coming
 20 along, and help men make the interface between the sexes
 21 so that relationships are professional and appropriate as
 22 we want them to be.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: Following up on Mady's point,

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1 I'll tell you an incident that I observed in Haiti on the
 2 Army boats in the harbor, on the small boats where there
 3 were two-person rooms. And they used to have — The
 4 situation occurred where you would have an NCO and a low-
 5 ranking enlisted man sleeping two, and there'd be one
 6 woman, she'd be sleeping by herself. Then the sergeant
 7 said, "No, we don't like that anymore." So then the
 8 sergeant took the single room and they put the single
 9 woman — the enlisted woman and the enlisted man together
 10 in the same room.
 11 Does the Navy — I mean Coast Guard —
 12 What if you have a chief? Does he or she have to sleep
 13 with the other enlisted people?
 14 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: No. We try and
 15 avoid that kind of situation.
 16 So you end up with a result that Dr. Segal
 17 was alluding to. We say that we are gender-integrated.
 18 There are no restrictions on assignments. That does not
 19 mean that we have women on every ship. In other words,
 20 we would look to put the chief petty officer and two
 21 women that could fill up the berth on that particular
 22 ship even if another cutter might have all men or
 23 conceivably almost all women.

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1 DR. SEGAL: Would you put one woman in a
 2 berthing space that was intended for two people?
 3 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: We have done that
 4 with both men and women from time to time. It depends on
 5 the cutter requirements and the number of people on
 6 board.
 7 DR. SEGAL: Do you find you get this
 8 feeling of relative deprivation? How come we have to
 9 share a space? There's two or three of us, whereas, that
 10 person has a place to herself or himself?
 11 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: I don't think —
 12 Generally we try to avoid that. But I haven't picked
 13 that — It's not that unusual, again, to — You know, on
 14 a 378, it's not unusual to have an officer or a chief
 15 petty officer be in a single if the crew is short. So
 16 what happens, the way they play that is, you know, you
 17 bring the other rules into play. The senior person
 18 usually gets their own room and —
 19 DR. SEGAL: So it's not something that's
 20 seen as a gender issue. I mean, in some of the
 21 situations it's been — there's been a sense of — it's
 22 always the men are crowded in and the women are in larger
 23 spaces.

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1 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: We try and avoid
 2 that, to the point of not putting single women, you know,
 3 in that situation if we can avoid it. I can't think of
 4 where we'd have the scenario you describe.
 5 It's an issue. I mean, we're about 10
 6 percent women. So as you distribute them throughout the
 7 organization, that's not a lot, and there is a desire to
 8 keep them — Particularly senior leadership. If you talk
 9 to the CO's, what they want most when they have women on
 10 the ship is senior enlisted presence. They want the
 11 senior — They want some senior enlisted women to be able
 12 to be role models and mentors and guides for the enlisted
 13 women in the crew.
 14 DR. SEGAL: Are you short senior enlisted
 15 women in the Coast Guard?
 16 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Absolutely.
 17 Absolutely. We have — The 10-percent figure runs —
 18 We're probably about 13 or 14 percent at the lower end.
 19 When you get up to the E-8/E-9 level, we're at the two or
 20 three percent level. And that is a problem for us.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: That's interesting, since
 22 you've been the most gender-integrated service, that
 23 you'd have such a paucity of senior enlisted women.

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1 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: We've been
2 gradually getting better, but we also have — you know,
3 the character of our service is —
4 DR. MOSKOS: From the character of the
5 service, yeah.
6 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: — is a lot of
7 seagoing. We have a lot of ratings — damage control
8 men, machinist's mate, bosun mate — that typically will
9 not attract a lot of women and I don't think — You're
10 just not going to attract a lot of them to choose that as
11 a career. We do have some that are just superb, but I
12 just don't think you get them in large numbers.
13 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: I think another
14 problem — And this — I'm sorry, I don't have any
15 statistics to back it up, but a lot of Coast Guard people
16 are married to other Coast Guard men or women. And what
17 I've found through my career is that when it comes down
18 to who's going to stay at home with the children, it's
19 generally the woman who ends up leaving, and I think
20 that's why we have a fair amount of attrition at the more
21 senior levels.
22 It's when they start wrestling with how do
23 you manage two people standing duty or extended

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1 deployments with raising a child, with holding down
2 things at home, and it's often the woman who leaves. And
3 we were hoping that our care-for-newborn-child sabbatical
4 opportunities would be an inducement for those women to
5 return and it has not produced the results that we had
6 hoped.
7 Some have taken advantage and used it to
8 return to the service, but certainly not everyone.
9 DR. SEGAL: And what has the careers —
10 the subsequent careers been like of those women or men
11 who have taken the newborn — the sabbatical for a child
12 and then come back? Are they being as successful and
13 their peers who haven't taken that?
14 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: I believe that they
15 are, but I don't know the statistics. I don't think we
16 have enough real data at this time to be able to evaluate
17 completely. I know a few women officers who have
18 returned, who were able to step right back in and are
19 doing well.
20 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: We haven't heard
21 any anecdotes on the negative side, but we — like Sally
22 said, we had very few takers. Surprisingly so.
23 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I have no

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1 more questions.
2 DR. SEGAL: We go around the table until
3 there are no questions.
4 DR. MOSKOS: I guess that's it.
5 Madam Chair?
6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, we do have a couple
7 of Commissioners who were not able to be here with us
8 today, and we've been asking our guests if they wouldn't
9 mind — just in case somebody's who's absent or
10 somebody's who's here thinks of a question later, if we
11 might send it to you later on.
12 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Sure. We'd be
13 delighted to answer or provide any data that we didn't
14 have here today. If someone wants to send us the
15 questions, we'd be glad to respond.
16 We take a lot of pride in what we're doing
17 on gender-integration in the Coast Guard. We think it's
18 essential to the success of the organization in the
19 future. It is — Like every service, it's not without
20 its issues and its bumps, but I think we're making
21 reasonable progress.
22 I was going to comment that collocation
23 issues Sally raised, that's one of the issues we hear the

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1 most about today from men and women. I think we're over
2 a lot of the other problems, and the fact that we're
3 working into that as the type of issue we have up on the
4 board I think is a positive sign. It's an issue we have
5 to work with.
6 But that's actually one of the larger
7 issues we get up on the gender scope these days, is
8 collocation.
9 DR. SEGAL: So that's higher on your radar
10 screen than sexual harassment?
11 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Absolutely.
12 Absolutely.
13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And that
14 collocation, it's coming from within? Or is it coming
15 from the spousal side?
16 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: It comes from both.
17 It's just the ability to manage two careers in the same
18 geographic area with, again, because of the rules,
19 different commands. In other words, we can't have one
20 working for the other or supervising the other; so we
21 tend to try and get people on different commands in the
22 same area. Depending on their individual skills or
23 ratings, that can become difficult to manage.

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Have you
2 had some difficulties or any difficulties with — as you
3 integrated the ships or you integrated the cutters and so
4 forth, with the families of those who were not, you know,
5 two Coast Guard spouses but wife or —
6 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Sure. I think
7 we've had what I would call isolated problems over time.
8 It generally comes down to a command leadership issue in
9 terms of making sure that both the — that the
10 environment is professional and that that professional
11 environment is reflected back to the community. We have
12 had problems like that and it usually boils down to CO/XO
13 leadership and making sure that the command climate is an
14 appropriate one.
15 DR. SEGAL: What proportion — I think the
16 Commissioners would be interested — the proportion of
17 Coast Guard Academy cadets who are women?
18 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: This year, it's
19 over 30 percent. 30 percent.
20 DR. MOSKOS: Is that right?
21 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Yes, sir.
22 DR. SEGAL: And that's an increase from
23 the previous one?

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1 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: It's been — I was
2 just trying to see. Officer —
3 DR. SEGAL: Actually, last year you had an
4 increase, too. Last year it was over 30 percent also —
5 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: It's been steadily
6 going up.
7 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Steadily going up.
8 DR. SEGAL: — for the incoming classes.
9 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: But that's very
10 much a target of our academy recruiting efforts as well.
11 Diversity generally.
12 DR. MOSKOS: Is that — the graduation
13 rate around that level, too?
14 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: No, sir, it's not.
15 I was just looking at the stats. Our officer corps at
16 the O-1/O-2 level, which would reflect recent graduates
17 from the Academy and/or OCS, looks like it's about 20
18 percent women. 19 percent at O-1, 22 percent at O-2. So
19 there's some attrition there, obviously.
20 DR. SEGAL: Well, actually it's also that
21 — And the Academy produces almost all of your officers
22 nowadays; is that right?
23 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: The larger

1 percentage.
 2 DR. SEGAL: Right.
 3 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Over half.
 4 DR. SEGAL: And the increase to the —
 5 it's only in the last couple of years that they've had so
 6 many incoming cadets who are women. So you may well see
 7 the O-1 and O-2 rising.
 8 Do you think that would have an impact on
 9 your recruiting of enlisted women? Visibility of...
 10 DR. MOSKOS: Or enlisted men. Look at
 11 both sides, at what impact that could have.
 12 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Sally, do you
 13 want...
 14 CAPTAIN BRICE-O'HARA: I'm not sure that
 15 that is something that young people think about when they
 16 decide to enlist. I don't think that's a concern to
 17 them.
 18 DR. SEGAL: I'm out.
 19 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Okay.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: This time we really mean
 21 it. Thank you very much for coming to see us.
 22 REAR ADMIRAL BARRETT: Thanks for having
 23 us. I do appreciate it.

1 (A brief recess was taken.)
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We are very happy this
 3 afternoon to have Major General Richard Siegfried, who
 4 was the Chairman of the Sexual Harassment Senior Review
 5 Panel, and we thank you very much for coming here today,
 6 welcome you. And as I mentioned, if you'd like to make a
 7 statement, we'd love to hear it, and then we will go
 8 ahead with questions.
 9 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Ma'am, I think
 10 perhaps it would be useful if I did make a statement,
 11 even though I don't have anything written, and talk to
 12 the folks about what happened to Steve Siegfried. I am
 13 the guy that asked the United States Army to gender-
 14 integrate basic combat training, so perhaps I ought to
 15 explain to you how all of that happened.
 16 It would help me, anyway, if I can refer
 17 to just a simple little diagram that I use to talk about
 18 initial entry training and it's helped me an awful lot in
 19 trying to explain to folks what happened.
 20 We've had — for some time in the Army,
 21 had two ways to go through initial entry training. When
 22 I took command of Fort Jackson, South Carolina, in
 23 December of 1991, you either went through One Station

1 Unit Training, which is where all of our combat arms
 2 folks — the infantry and armor, and field artillery,
 3 combat engineers, but also the military police corps and
 4 the chemical corps — been doing that for some years —
 5 where they were gender-integrated from day one, right
 6 down to squad level, and had been doing that for more
 7 than two decades.
 8 I took command of Fort Jackson where we
 9 did BCT and AIT. AIT, for more than two and a half
 10 decades, has been gender-integrated, you know, right down
 11 to squad level, from day one of AIT. So our initial
 12 entry training has been gender-integrated, you know, for
 13 more than — for decades. So it's not a new thing and
 14 it's not a social experiment. It is something that we
 15 had been doing for some time.
 16 In early January of 1992, I had just taken
 17 command of Fort Jackson. I got a call from the then-
 18 TRADOC commander, General Freddie Franks. And General
 19 Franks said, "Steve, I have been asked a question that
 20 I'm not sure I really know the answer to. And the
 21 question is, why don't we gender-integrate basic?" And I
 22 told him what I really and truthfully believed.
 23 I said, "Boss, it's simple to my

1 viewpoint. First of all, these youngsters that we're
 2 privileged to lead are coming out of an environment that
 3 leaves them undisciplined and they're horribly out-of-
 4 shape physically. So what we do is we try to build into
 5 them some self-worth and some pride and some discipline
 6 and those sorts of things before we get them together and
 7 start handling this man-woman thing. So, you know, I
 8 think it is probably good for both of the sexes because
 9 we do that."
 10 And he said, "Okay. Write that out for
 11 me." And I wrote it out for him and sent him a message
 12 in a heck of a lot more detail than I just gave you. I
 13 sent it off to the boss and everything was fine.
 14 And I went home and I told my wife. I
 15 said, "You know, I've been a trainer all of my life and I
 16 think I've just told my boss something wrong. I think I
 17 just told him you build a gender-integrated soldier first
 18 — "a soldier first and then a gender-integrated soldier,
 19 and the trainer in me says I may not be telling the
 20 truth."
 21 You know, I commanded the Infantry
 22 Training Center for thirty months and I had seen the OSUT
 23 process work in training all of America's skill level one

1 infantrymen and it's a thrilling process to watch and
 2 it's just tremendous training. I'm very, very proud of
 3 that. As a part of that, I had gone to Fort McClelland
 4 and I had seen the military police corps and the chemical
 5 corps work, and I also knew that that process was
 6 marvelous, too.
 7 And I told my wife — I said, "I just —
 8 you know, "I've got to call the boss back and tell him I
 9 may have answered him too quickly; I don't really know if
 10 what I told him was the truth or not," and I had to do
 11 that. You know, hard for a soldier to do, but I called
 12 my boss and said, "Boss, I gave you an answer that I
 13 believed to be true. I may have answered too quickly.
 14 "The trainer in me says if you're going to
 15 build a tank, start building a tank. If you're going to
 16 build an infantryman, build an infantryman. If you're
 17 going to, you know, build an adjutant general corps
 18 soldier, then you ought to — you know, "you ought to
 19 start building an adjutant general corps soldier from day
 20 one."
 21 It's sort of, you know — So what I asked
 22 for was permission to look into it more fully so I could
 23 give him a more complete answer. And General Franks

1 said, "Okay, Steve, go do that."
 2 Now, I messed around with it for about a
 3 year and, quite frankly, I didn't do a very good job of
 4 it. I just didn't do it right. And I called the boss
 5 back and I said, "Boss, I can't do this without some help
 6 and what I need are some social scientists, and I need
 7 some people like the Army Research Institute to help me
 8 so that I understand exactly what I'm measuring and, at
 9 the end of it, ask the right questions and I got the
 10 right algorithms to determine what all the data means."
 11 But after that year, I told him — I said,
 12 "I've got to tell you one thing that I think people
 13 misunderstand. First of all, no combat arms officer or
 14 soldier goes to basic combat training. They all go to
 15 OSUT. The next thing is that every male soldier who
 16 comes to basic combat training is in a gender-integrated
 17 MOS and will be expected to go to war side-by-side with a
 18 teammate who may or may not be a woman.
 19 "I also know that most of your resource in
 20 terms of adult supervision" — you know, I'm talking
 21 about noncommissioned officers and officers — "in
 22 initial entry training are in basic combat training.
 23 They're not in AIT."

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1 I've got to tell you, folks, as a matter
2 of fact, the AIT companies in our world have less adult
3 supervision than any company, battery, troop, detachment
4 level in the Army. I mean, when you start talking about
5 drill sergeants who have — They're supposed to have one-
6 to-fifty. It's more like one-to-250 in some places —
7 for example, at Fort Gordon — who are doing training
8 around-the-clock.

9 I mean, you know — And I myself am doing
10 advanced individual training and I see them show up on
11 day one, standing side-by-side in formation at attention,
12 saying, "My goodness, that's a woman. What do I do now?"

13 "So we're waiting to handle this man-woman
14 thing until, I think, too late in the process, but I need
15 some help to determine whether or not what I am telling
16 you is the truth."

17 The boss agreed to that. Even in times of
18 short money he gave me the budget and a wonderful team of
19 Army Research Institute social scientists. And folks
20 came down and we sat down and very seriously took care of
21 some of the problems that Steve had had, designed the
22 algorithms and did the study.

23 The results of that study were very

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1 much. That's actually very enlightening for us —

2 MR. PANG: Yes, it is.

3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — because we have been
4 — a specific part of our statute is to assess the
5 rationales that were in place when certain changes were
6 made.

7 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, ma'am.

8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And it has been difficult
9 for us to get any written record of the rationales,
10 apparently because typically an order comes down and it
11 doesn't explain itself. It's just an order.

12 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yeah. But I
13 spared myself —

14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: So it's nice to have a
15 human being who can explain himself.

16 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes. I should
17 have been more forthcoming in some of the mistakes that I
18 made, but I spared myself that humiliation. I just
19 didn't put it together right.

20 But I think the best — I really didn't.

21 I asked them training side-by-side, a gender-integrated
22 company here and an all-male company here and, you know,
23 an all-female company there, and they — I mean, it was

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1 positive towards integrating BCT rather than AIT. I have
2 told folks over and over again: all I did was move the
3 start date, didn't create anything new. It wasn't a
4 social experiment.

5 And if you're going to get at a man-woman
6 problem, if you want to find out about it and whether or
7 not this soldier has the ability to work in a gender-
8 integrated environment, then you'd better start figuring
9 out whether that's going to happen on day one rather than
10 waiting until further down the line.

11 I'm sure that you've had a chance to see a
12 copy of the study that ARI did for me. The results of
13 that were very, very positive for the female soldiers and
14 somewhat positive for the males.

15 I'll tell you what hasn't been analyzed to
16 my mind. I saw this happen at — You know, I looked at
17 this every day for over two years. I didn't do just a
18 little bit of study. And you're talking to an
19 infantryman who believes that the combat arms ought to be
20 all-male forever. You're not talking about somebody who
21 was sent someplace to do a mission because the DACOWITS
22 was angry or the National Organization for Women had a
23 program that they wanted.

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1 just not the right way to do business.

2 And it took somebody who was familiar
3 with, you know, the concepts that you use to measure
4 those kinds of things — and I'm talking about a social
5 scientist — to take the old infantryman and beat him in
6 the head and make him do that.

7 But I think, Madam Chairman, that the
8 report that ARI did — Dr. Jackie Modern, who is just a
9 brilliant social scientist and a dear friend, and she
10 worked with me on the Senior Review Panel for Sexual
11 Harassment, which is where — I met her in doing this
12 sort of thing, and it opened my eyes to a lot of things,
13 an old infantryman.

14 First time I ever saw any real gender-
15 integrated training was as a brigadier general, as an
16 assistant division commander of a combat division, and I
17 saw some great soldiers and said, "Okay, the training's
18 going just great." Then I went to command an ROTC region
19 and I got a chance to see men and women training together
20 on a day-to-day basis, who were going to be officers. I
21 got the chance to see them in the field — you know,
22 sharing duties in the field — and saw how magnificent
23 that was.

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1 And I had answered my boss' question and
2 it was over with — until I go home and talked to my
3 Maggie and I say, "I think I told my boss something that
4 may be wrong," and went after — The first briefing was
5 given to the Chief of Staff in April of '94, then Gordon
6 Sullivan, and when he looked at the report — I had
7 already gone to be the Deputy IG, but the study was
8 finished before I left command of Fort Jackson.

9 I'm telling you, in looking at this
10 process from soldiers in the field being dirty, hungry,
11 tired, hot, bloody, together, convinced me that if you
12 are going to have an adjutants general corps as strong as
13 it needs to be, then you need to start them out together
14 from day one. The study told us that.

15 But what was foremost in my mind was, hey,
16 you're talking about soldiers who have elected to go into
17 an MOS where they're going to be working together with
18 other soldiers and you'd better make sure, starting from
19 day one, whether or not they can do what they have said
20 they want to do.

21 With that, I'll be glad to answer any
22 questions that you may have.

23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Great. Thank you very

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1 But, still, when I got to Jackson, I had
2 no earthly idea that I was going to be the infantryman
3 that would recommend to the United States Army that they
4 gender-integrate basic combat training. I had no earthly
5 idea. But I'm the guy that's guilty of doing that. And
6 I'm very proud of it, by the way.

7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. I will start off
8 the questioning with just another factual question which
9 I hope you can help me with. Can you describe for me
10 what the standards of training were like for the males
11 and the females before gender-integration?

12 I know that in the past few years there
13 have been a lot of efforts to move the physical standards
14 closer together and I have had a hard time trying to
15 picture in my mind what it looked like before, when you
16 did have all-women training units and all-male training
17 units. Were they doing the same things in fact or were
18 they in fact doing different things in BCT?

19 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Ma'am, the short
20 answer is that they were doing exactly the same thing.

21 We didn't change the program of instruction when we
22 gender-integrated basic. The basic was exactly the same.

23 The emphasis for adding some rigor and

1 adding some standards and some values training and all of
 2 that, I think a lot of that came out of our report when
 3 the Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment found out
 4 that when you get into basic and AIT, the rigor wasn't
 5 there and it needed to be there.

6 That was because — And I'm sure that
 7 you've had a chance to see our report. We were very
 8 dissatisfied, not with the concept — the concept's fine,
 9 but very, very sloppy execution, and not throwing
 10 resource at it.

11 When it comes to the physical standards,
 12 those standards haven't changed. Gender-integrated
 13 training is not what caused the United States Army to
 14 say, "Hey, are women doing enough pull-ups or sit-ups?"
 15 The answer to that is no, women could do more than men.
 16 That kind of — That hurts me, you know, and I can do a
 17 lot of sit-ups.

18 So it was a different set of stigma that
 19 got the United States Army to examining its standards.
 20 There was a cry that said you ought to treat everybody
 21 the same. Well, the standard in the Army has always been
 22 an equal amount of effort, you know, and I think that
 23 that's where we're moving.

1 Now, I would tell you that the extra week
 2 in basic combat training is to add values training and to
 3 get more — to get tougher, to add more time in the field
 4 and those kinds of things. But that didn't come —
 5 that's not a gender issue. That is a training issue, not
 6 a gender issue.

7 I hope that I have responded to your
 8 question, ma'am.

9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yes. Thank you.

10 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, ma'am.

11 MR. PANG: You know, I'd just like to
 12 follow-up. Ms. Blair asked, you know, with regard to the
 13 — and you alluded to it — the Senior Review Panel. It
 14 might be helpful, you know, to the Commissioners if you
 15 can kind of just give us a thumbnail and summary of the
 16 thing. I know that we have a copy of the report, but if
 17 you could just do for us kind of the —

18 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Mr. Pang, have
 19 you got about an hour-and-a-half?

20 MS. POPE: I know. I know. But, you
 21 know, just kind of, you know, what drove the panel and
 22 kind of what the basic results were.

23 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Well, let me

1 tell you how I focused. I focused the panel in this way.
 2 And it was difficult. That's the hardest job I have ever
 3 had in my life. And I hope I don't ever have one that is
 4 that tough again, by the way.

5 I said, "This is not a gender issue. If
 6 all the men went away tomorrow, would sexual harassment
 7 go away?" Well, that's stupid. I don't have any strong
 8 feelings, you know, but that's silly. And if some of the
 9 beady-eyed killers — and I'm one of those, you know, I
 10 can tell you. You get rid of all the women, there
 11 wouldn't be no problem. Well, how absurd. That's
 12 absolutely absurd. We have men being sexually harassed
 13 by men — okay? — and women being sexually harassed by
 14 women. So we didn't go there. And I said, "We're not
 15 going to be used for that agenda."

16 It is not a women-in-combat-arms issue.
 17 If you open up all of the combat arms tomorrow to women,
 18 would sexual harassment go away? That's absurd. I mean,
 19 it's absolutely absurd. Okay? So I said, "We're not
 20 going to go there. That's not going to be one of our
 21 issues."

22 As a matter of fact, it's more than a
 23 sexual harassment issue. As far as we were concerned on

1 the panel, it is an indication of a bigger problem. And
 2 the way we coined it was it is a matter of the way we
 3 treat each other as human beings. If we treat each other
 4 with respect and dignity, then you'd take care of lots of
 5 problems, not just sexual harassment.

6 And I will tell you that the Secretary of
 7 the Army or the Chief of Staff of the Army said, "Thank
 8 goodness that's where you're going." And the Chief of
 9 Staff of the Army at that time, General Reimer, said,
 10 "Okay. We're going to go with chain teaching, but it's
 11 going to be called respect and dignity." That's where he
 12 got the title from.

13 So we focused ourselves on how we treat
 14 each other as human beings and that's where we were had
 15 from day one, Mr. Pang. Okay? That's an
 16 oversimplification but that's the way we focused
 17 everybody on the panel. I said, "There's going to be no
 18 agenda."

19 We found some sexual harassment everywhere
 20 we went. More than that, we found sexual discrimination.
 21 The sexual harassment, it would have been very easy for
 22 the United States Army to say that this is a victory;
 23 sexual harassment has decreased over the last five years

1 by some odd percent — and I think it was around seven
 2 percent, and Dr. Segal can help me with this — but it
 3 was still over 20 percent. So you're talking one in —
 4 you know, 20 percent, that's tough.

5 Most of the harassment we found was — I'm
 6 not going to say less egregious, but it was towards
 7 language and stories and putting people down because of
 8 their sex rather than soldiers walking around being
 9 afraid of being raped. Okay?

10 Our data was not much different than
 11 Defense Manpower Data Center's data and some studies that
 12 had been done before by ARI when it comes to the criminal
 13 aspects of sexual harassment. We found an equal
 14 opportunity system that was broken, broken in lots of
 15 ways.

16 First of all, it stigmatizes those that
 17 use the system. You know, think about your standing as a
 18 team member if you go forward and complain. You can ask
 19 some of our African American soldiers that have been
 20 around for a while. Exactly the same thing happens to
 21 them if they scream. Okay? We found it was horribly
 22 undermanned and understaffed.

23 We took a look at the leadership aspect of

1 what was going on in the Army and couldn't find somebody
 2 who's principally responsible for that. And we found in
 3 an initial entry training organization that was woefully,
 4 woefully under-resourced and it was just an accident
 5 waiting to happen.

6 We also found that we were not preparing
 7 drill sergeants as good as we should be preparing them
 8 for that business. Very, very good at teaching them — I
 9 mean, those drill sergeants can teach you how to stand at
 10 attention, and they can do that in thirty minutes and
 11 you'll have no idea — there'll be no question in your
 12 mind about what you're doing. And they can go through
 13 the rote procedures, but when it came to the human
 14 dimension of being an example-setter and of being
 15 someone, we weren't doing enough.

16 Our noncommissioned officer corps — And I
 17 am a former noncommissioned officer, and my father was
 18 and my grandfathers were. I absolutely love the
 19 noncommissioned officer corps. And if you prepare that
 20 corps well, they will do anything that you ask them to
 21 do. They always have, they always will. We weren't
 22 preparing them very well.

23 And I'm talking about 500 pages of report,

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1 Mr. Pang, but that's fundamentally where we were at. I
2 probably told you just enough to confuse you, but that's
3 probably —

4 MR. PANG: No, no. You know, that was
5 very helpful because, you know, I think we need to kind
6 of know what the — You know, when you read the report, I
7 mean, it's pretty hard — okay? — to get that kind of
8 summary —

9 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir.

10 MR. PANG: — you know, that you just
11 delivered and I think that was helpful, you know, with
12 regard to that. I mean, are you — And I know that
13 you've left, I mean, you know. Are you pretty satisfied
14 with what the Army's doing with regard to the action it's
15 taking on that report?

16 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Sir, I will tell
17 you that I had a chance — After I was released from the
18 Army, I did some work for DoD and got a chance to go look
19 at some of the other services. I would tell you that I
20 think the impact of the study has reached not only the
21 Army, but the other services.

22 I will tell you that you can't walk down
23 the street at Fort Jackson — And in preparation to come

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1 here, I went back out to Fort Jackson last week. I went
2 to a graduation. I asked General Vennelstein if I could
3 go out and take a look at some of the things that had
4 been happening and it brought tears to my eyes.

5 You can't walk down the street, into a
6 barracks, into a squad room, without seeing values
7 everywhere. When you see soldiers now that willingly
8 talk about the values of an Army and know what they are
9 and can sing the Army songs — General Christmas is going
10 to smile at me.

11 We started doing some things we should
12 have been doing a long time ago. I'm immensely proud. I
13 think in the end analysis, with the help of some very
14 talented people, we'll have a socially significant
15 document. I hope that I'm not fooling myself.

16 I am pleased at some of the stuff that I
17 have seen in the field. I saw the Air Force do some of
18 the same stuff and some of their folks said, "Hey, thanks
19 a lot, appreciate it — what you guys did." Saw the same
20 thing in the Navy.

21 So I think that there is change and it's
22 good change, and it doesn't have anything to do with
23 gender-integrated training.

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1 MR. PANG: I think I've gotten my two
2 questions in. Okay.

3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: No.

4 DR. SEGAL: When you first were doing some
5 research to see — before you actually implemented
6 gender-integrated training and ARI came in and helped you
7 with doing a study, did you set it up so that your
8 different companies had different proportions of men and
9 women in them?

10 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Dr. Segal, when
11 ARI got there and got me under control — okay? — if
12 memory serves me, and I think it does, we tried 50-50 and
13 we tried 25-75.

14 Now, you've got to think about what we're
15 doing. We're talking —

16 DR. SEGAL: And a hundred-zero and zero-a
17 hundred?

18 DR. SEGAL: Right. We've got four
19 platoons, so we said, "Okay, let's try this." And the
20 best ratio that we found based on the data that we got
21 was the 25 percent, and that fit with what we were — It
22 also helped with some of the training management
23 problems. I call them training management problems. A

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1 lot of folks call it conceptual problems. I think
2 there's a great deal of difference.

3 DR. SEGAL: When General Sullivan was
4 here, he said something about that there was a finding —
5 and I think he was talking about this study — that the
6 50-50 didn't work. And I don't know whether his
7 assessment of the difference in magnitude between the 75-
8 25 and the 50-50 — how that related in terms of — Do
9 you recall?

10 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: No, I don't. I
11 know that the statistics and the way the soldiers felt
12 about themselves, their training, and they felt about
13 each other, were better in the 75-25 than they were in
14 the 100 percent and in the 50-50.

15 So I don't know where that — Cause-and-
16 effect escapes me here, but I know for a fact that the
17 data were better. I can't give you empirical —

18 DR. SEGAL: Okay.

19 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: — examples of
20 that, Dr. Segal, but they were better. And I, for the
21 life of me, don't know why.

22 DR. SEGAL: Okay. We'll have to go back
23 and check that because I know that was something that

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1 General Sullivan mentioned and I —

2 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: It is — As a
3 matter of fact, it is addressed in the report that Dr.
4 Modern did for us.

5 DR. MOSKOS: His exact words, "men become
6 weird."

7 DR. SEGAL: When there's 50-50.

8 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I'm sorry, sir,
9 I didn't hear you.

10 DR. MOSKOS: That General Sullivan said
11 something when the ratio gets too equal, the men become
12 "weird." Something weird happens, I think he says.

13 DR. SEGAL: Something weird happens.

14 And I took another look at the study, and
15 I didn't have a chance to read through all of the
16 results, but I did find that there was a comparison and
17 that — between the all-male — in each battalion. There
18 was one all-male, one all-female, one 75-25 and one 50-
19 50, in each of the two or three —

20 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: The first time
21 we tried that, Dr. Segal, it didn't work either because
22 they're eating in the same mess hall, they're taking PT
23 on the same PT field. So we finally went to a battalion

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1 and said, "This entire battalion is going to be gender-
2 integrated." And it's got its own building; they all
3 live in the same place; they've got the same — you know,
4 their PT ground is away from the other battalions'.

5 They'll be on a range all by themselves.
6 Once we got it set up that way and ran a
7 couple iterations through one battalion, we got much
8 better results, as far as I'm concerned, because we
9 didn't have any —

10 DR. SEGAL: What sorts of lessons learned
11 were there from that initial experience with the
12 integration in terms of — Other than the actual
13 percentage mix, what other things did you learn about how
14 to do it best?

15 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I would say —
16 You know, one of the striking things — And I've had to
17 do this, Dr. Segal, several different times. And I've
18 travelled with another commission who will remain
19 nameless.

20 The drill sergeants are amazing. God, I
21 love them. And when I grow up, I want to be just like my
22 drill sergeant. I'm still trying to be like him. And I
23 mean that sincerely. I'm not being flippant at all. A

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1 drill sergeant who is a magnificent airborne ranger is
 2 somebody who — you know, if I had a daughter, I'd love
 3 for her to bring him home. Just a marvelous poster child
 4 of a fighting machine. Just a wonderful guy.
 5 He says, "This is horrible. These
 6 soldiers are sent here to train, and in my opinion, women
 7 are holding the men back." And the commission member
 8 wrote this down and said, "Oh, boy." And I said, "Go
 9 on." He said, "Well, you know, they can't march as fast
 10 and they can't — "they're not as strong," and such-and-
 11 such, and had finished with that.
 12 And I said, "Hang on just a second,
 13 please." And I said, "Drill Sergeant, I love you. You
 14 know, I really do. Do you take PT in ability groups?"
 15 He said, "Yes, General, we do." I said, "Okay. Have you
 16 got any women in the fast group?" He says, "Yes, we've
 17 got a couple of those." "Okay. Do you have any men in
 18 the slow group?" "Yes." "Okay. Are the women in the
 19 fast group holding down the men in the slow group?" And
 20 he didn't have an answer.
 21 And I said, "Drill Sergeant, I'm not
 22 trying to embarrass you here. I really am not. But tell
 23 me how the women are preventing you from doing your job.

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1 Do you ever have a 120-pound male who is holding you
 2 back? And what do you do with that male? Do you have
 3 some women in here who can do more push-ups than that
 4 120-pound male," and the answer is yes.
 5 But here I'm talking to a fellow who
 6 absolutely, honestly, totally believed this because I
 7 hadn't trained him well enough. It wasn't me.
 8 So the lesson learned for me was if you
 9 ask the drill sergeant, the drill sergeant is going to
 10 tell you "I want all-male." Male and female drill
 11 sergeants will tell you "I want all-male." It's easier.
 12 If you get into their psyche and say, "Okay. If these
 13 folks are to go to war together, what's the best way to
 14 train them," it'll end up, "Okay. If they're going to be
 15 mates in the same branch, then you ought to train them
 16 together."
 17 But if you ask them how you think you
 18 ought to do it, it's easier — I've got to tell you, it
 19 absurdly simple, you know, to train combat arms guys.
 20 You can tell them, "Take a five-minute break and
 21 everybody use the porcelain facility," and they disappear
 22 and five minutes later they're back. When you've got
 23 women, you've got to get into a porta-potty and you've

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1 got to take off a lot of stuff and then you've got to put
 2 on a lot of stuff and it's hard.
 3 And I'll tell you something else: you've
 4 got to explain things to a female soldier a little
 5 differently than you do to a male. I mean, it's tougher.
 6 It is absolutely tougher. It is also more effective, in
 7 my opinion.
 8 So the biggest revelation to me was that
 9 you had to train the noncommissioned officers and the
 10 officers about what it was you're about.
 11 And soldiers are fine. You know, the
 12 soldiers in basic, their morale is always high, because
 13 if your morale isn't good, you're doing push-ups. The
 14 concept's been around forever. You know, they're always
 15 yelling and I think it's marvelous. The soldiers don't
 16 have a problem with it.
 17 But I knew that we were getting there, Dr.
 18 Segal, when, after about a year-and-a-half of this, just
 19 sitting out on the range, on a log with some drill
 20 sergeants and, you know, just saying, "Hey, guys, you
 21 know what we're doing here? You know what we're trying
 22 to do? Is it getting through to you here?" and I had a
 23 young infantry soldier tell me, "Well, sir, I've been

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1 here three cycles and they've all been gender-integrated.
 2 It's just the way we do business."
 3 And so my biggest revelation is soldiers
 4 are fine. They just need to be trained a little better,
 5 and you need to train the trainers a little better. We
 6 haven't done a very good job of that.
 7 DR. SEGAL: So what was it — Just one
 8 last question and I'll pass it around. What was it that
 9 turned you around as you — You were an infantryman and
 10 you felt — you still feel that women shouldn't be in the
 11 combat arms. What was it that convinced you that gender-
 12 integrated training was the way to go? Was it DACOWITS?
 13 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Dr. Segal — No.
 14 I'll ignore that. Please. No, ma'am. I am —
 15 DR. SEGAL: I want it on the record.
 16 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I am a soldier.
 17 I wouldn't ever do anything to a soldier because somebody
 18 told me that that's the right thing to do. I was after
 19 trying to be the best trainer I could be.
 20 And there's a direct answer to your
 21 question. When I started seeing soldiers come out of a
 22 gas chamber, finish a confidence course, at a graduation
 23 hug — If you ever see a football game, and afterwards,

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1 two big pro-football players — after it's over, one from
 2 one team, they sort of half-hug and they do that.
 3 When you start seeing soldiers do that at
 4 their graduation or they come out of that gas chamber and
 5 they have done something together and accomplished
 6 something together, then I've got to tell you, the first
 7 couple of times I saw that, that brought tears to my
 8 eyes.
 9 I said, "We're doing something good here.
 10 We are building a team of soldiers who have confidence in
 11 each other, that they can go off and perform their combat
 12 support and combat service support roles more
 13 efficiently. And we are also doing our job as trainers
 14 by addressing this problem before they get to the field."
 15 You see, when you really get into it and
 16 the guy gives you the mission, you say, "Okay. Do we
 17 have to train them together?" Sure, we do. You know, if
 18 they're going to be in an Army — And I think they always
 19 are. I hope they are. They're very good soldiers. You
 20 know, I hope that they're never in the combat arms
 21 because I don't think that they ought to be there. All
 22 right? I really don't. But they're good soldiers.
 23 So we're going to have to train them

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1 together. So the only question is, where do you start
 2 that?
 3 I think the MP's and the chemical corps
 4 got it right, you know, a lot quicker than the Army did.
 5 They did it over two decades ago and they've been doing
 6 it — As a matter of fact, I asked one of my dear friends
 7 who was on another commission. I said, "Hey, you guys
 8 said this ain't good. Did you go to McClelland? Did you
 9 go look at the MP corps?" He said, "Yeah, we did."
 10 I said, "What did you find?" He said, "It
 11 was marvelous." I said, "Well, you didn't say that." He
 12 said, "Well, Steve, that's because they got buy-in." I
 13 said, "Why is that?" He said, "Well, all the drill
 14 sergeants are MP's and they're training military
 15 policemen, so they know that these soldiers are going to
 16 be in their unit when they get there so they got buy-in."
 17 I said, "Well, why didn't you say that?" You know, I've
 18 got to tell you, it just escapes me why they didn't do
 19 that.
 20 But I will tell you — And I did that
 21 again. I did it on Thursday morning — I'm sorry,
 22 Wednesday morning. I went and I watched two graduations
 23 of gender-integrated companies at Fort Jackson, South

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1 Carolina, and I got a chance to talk to a bunch of
2 soldiers, and as far as I'm concerned, it's working very
3 well.

4 By the way, you get a different answer
5 when you go out to a range or to a field location and sit
6 on a log than you do if you call somebody into a room and
7 say, "Fill out this form." There's a different answer.

8 I probably went way beyond what you asked
9 me.

10 DR. SEGAL: No, that's fine. Thank you.

11 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Sir, I
12 watched some of your testimony. C-SPAN's a wonderful
13 thing.

14 And one part of the testimony that I
15 thought was really instructive — and I'd ask that you
16 share it with us, and it has to do with — I think the
17 questioning was along the lines of perception of the
18 system and how the system handles allegations and that.
19 And you talked about the consequences of choice, if you
20 recall.

21 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I do, Sergeant
22 Major. Boy, oh boy. I think probably what I need to do
23 is, if I can — bore you to tears — It doesn't have

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1 wouldn't mind having my pass in my pocket."

2 So, you know, you can use — Others have
3 seen it done before. What I didn't find anywhere,
4 Sergeant Major, is anybody spending one ounce of
5 intellectual energy trying to add positive consequences
6 for soldiers doing what you ask them to do: just merely
7 following your orders. And by the way, nobody's been to
8 any — they say, "Look, I want something bad to happen."

9 Now, there's something down here already
10 called self-worth. I mean, if somebody's doing something
11 wrong to you and you know it, how do you feel about
12 yourself when you look in the mirror and shave or put on
13 your lipstick? I mean, you're not as brave and as
14 courageous as you want to be, but that's not as powerful
15 as what's over here (Indicating).

16 Now, I don't think that these are mirror
17 images of each other. I think there's a little bit of
18 similarities. I think there's a different intellectual
19 exercise you go through. And I sat down, Sergeant Major,
20 and I spent weeks working my felt through this so I could
21 better advise the Army about what I think it needed to do
22 to make the consequences of choice more balanced. I
23 don't know whether we are or not, Sergeant Major. I hope

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1 anything to do with gender-integrated training, but the
2 consequences of choice had to do with using the system
3 that we had designed for folks to report sexual
4 harassment. Okay? And I said, what's happening is that
5 we're asking soldiers to tell — And I'll just do that.
6 I'll use "tell," okay? And when it happens, they want
7 you to confront it and then they want you to come tell
8 us. What's happening is they're not.

9 Now, before we go off and flog the
10 soldiers for not doing what we have asked them to do, I
11 believe that it is the responsibility of a leader to run
12 himself through an intellectual exercise that I call the
13 "consequences of choice." Okay?

14 You've got to ask yourself a question:
15 what positive consequences accrue to a soldier who does
16 what you've asked him to do? And, oh, by the way, what
17 have you done to your soldier? Is there anything
18 negative happened? Is there a negative consequence for
19 the soldier following my orders, for something that I've
20 asked the soldier to do? If it is, then it's my fault,
21 because the environment that a soldier lives in is
22 created by me. I am a leader. And the environment that
23 soldiers live in comes from the bottom up, doesn't come

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1 that we are.

2 And I spent a lot of time working with
3 units, just sitting down and saying, "Okay, let's talk,"
4 because I happen to believe that's a different exercise
5 if you're at site 212 in Bahrain or in Kuwait or Fort
6 Jackson or, you know, on the DMZ in Korea. Different
7 exercise. There's going to be some similarities, of
8 course, but, you know, the surrounds are going to be
9 different.

10 So I don't know if I've answered your
11 question.

12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: No, you
13 have. You have. Thank you.

14 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: That was just
15 something that I saw that we weren't doing, examining the
16 consequences of soldiers doing what you asked them to do.
17 And it's not just with sexual harassment
18 systems. I've been using it most of my adult life for
19 whatever. When you find soldiers that are not doing what
20 you asked them to do, something's wrong someplace,
21 because soldiers want to follow orders. That's the way
22 we're trained.

23 But what you don't have is folks sitting

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1 from the top down.

2 And, oh, by the way, is there a positive
3 consequence that accrues for not doing what I've asked
4 him to do? Must be, because that's what they're doing.

5 And by the way, I've got every right,
6 because I run this outfit, to establish the consequences
7 here, and I've got to tell you something: if you don't
8 follow my order, I want something bad to happen to you.
9 Has something bad happened?

10 And what I found is that you can fill up
11 this block (Indicating) all day long — okay? What
12 happens to you? Well, if you happen to be a woman,
13 you're branded as a lesbian. She must be. I mean, after
14 all, all I was trying to do was to get a date with her.
15 I mean, you know, all this kind of stuff. Not a team
16 player. Why didn't she handle it herself? Why did he
17 have to go to — I mean, you can fill this up all day
18 long with what we've got.

19 By the way, you can fill this one up
20 (Indicating), too. You know, the status quo sort of
21 stays the same as an element of power in here. You say,
22 "Okay, Dare, I've got you. All right? One more time,
23 partner, I'm going to take you down. By the way, I

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1 down enough and saying, "Wait a minute, I've got to
2 examine the entire environment that I've created here
3 because I did that. Before I go out and start flogging
4 people here, I need to find out what's going wrong with
5 the consequences of choice."

6 Okay? And I found that to be horribly out
7 of balance. And in fully half of what the
8 recommendations we made, Sergeant Major, we tried to
9 bring that back into balance.

10 Does that make — Have I answered your
11 question?

12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Yes, indeed.
13 Thank you.

14 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, Sergeant
15 Major.

16 DR. MOSKOS: For following-up on the
17 sergeant major's remarks, not ever mentioned in the
18 sexual harassment report is the issue of false
19 accusations. You talk about the damage — the negatives
20 for, you know, reporting something, but there's also the
21 other side of the coin, which is somebody's career can be
22 severely damaged with false accusations.

23 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yeah.

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1 DR. MOSKOS: The NAACP had — at their
2 national convention in the summer of 1997, actually had a
3 major session on this issue of false accusations because
4 the vast bulk of the Aberdeen sergeants were black and
5 the vast majority of the accusers were white women. So
6 at least the NAACP thought it was an issue that should be
7 aired.

8 I have a few more questions but, you know,
9 General, what's your reaction? Why has the false-
10 accusation issue not surfaced as an Army concern,
11 particularly in your —

12 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: You know, my
13 personal opinion — And it is not something that I
14 haven't thought about.

15 DR. MOSKOS: It's not in the report at
16 all. Yeah.

17 And we had the — you know, the hotline,
18 if I may just interject, you know, and so many things
19 came in, they finally decided to close it down again
20 because so many of the reports apparently were false.

21 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir.

22 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.

23 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I was in the

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1 Army in the early sixties when we decided to get real
2 serious about race. And I will tell you that there were
3 a bunch of white men like me who said at that time, "Boy,
4 if a black man looks at you and says 'race', you're out
5 of here. Your career is ruined. This is horrible.
6 We've created something we didn't want to create." It
7 was never ever true. It's not true now.

8 Are there instances? There are going to
9 be. Okay? I can't name you one. But I don't believe
10 that it is true. Is it a concern? You bet. And we've
11 had —

12 DR. MOSKOS: The false accusations aren't
13 true?

14 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I'm sorry?

15 DR. MOSKOS: There are no false — I
16 didn't get the first part of the statement. What's not
17 true?

18 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: The rumor that
19 ran around in the early sixties, Dr. Moskos, is that if a
20 black man looked at a white man and said, "You're a
21 racist," you were out of here.

22 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.

23 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: That was always

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1 a lie. It was not true. Did it happen?

2 DR. MOSKOS: Occasionally. Right.

3 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: A couple of
4 times it did.

5 DR. MOSKOS: Right. Okay. So that's an
6 analogous thing today?

7 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Absolutely.
8 Absolutely analogous.

9 DR. MOSKOS: So you think that true,
10 genuine harassment is more of an issue than false
11 accusations by far?

12 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I do, sir. I
13 do, sir. And I've talked to over eight percent of the
14 entire United States Army.

15 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Because we're looking
16 into that question, some data, so I'm interested.

17 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: But I say I did.
18 Not me personally. The panel did.

19 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.

20 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Not Steve.
21 That's too many.

22 DR. MOSKOS: Another question is — We
23 were supposed to have General Meyer testify to us today

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1 but he was unable to make it. But he was talking about
2 the decision in the early eighties to re-separate the
3 genders in basic training, and I wondered just what your
4 views were because you did the opposite during your
5 stint.

6 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Dr. Moskos, the
7 first thing I did when the boss said "go do this" is I
8 went back and tried to determine and see what the heck
9 happened here. I couldn't find out. The only answer I
10 got was from a fellow who knows. He said, "Well, the
11 chief made up his mind and, with a stroke of the pen,
12 stopped it." I didn't find any empirical data or any
13 institutional memory about what had gone on and why it
14 had gone on.

15 DR. MOSKOS: The reports here are that
16 General Ulmer made a report to Shy Meyer that indicated
17 standards had been lowered at the training centers, et
18 cetera, et cetera. So that was — I have no idea what
19 the background was because we didn't hear what — all we
20 have is an abbreviated statement here.

21 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes. I have
22 heard that all of my adult life. I talked to the folks
23 who just love to talk to you about the good ol' days

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1 that, in my mind, never were. You know, "When I went
2 through, it was tough. By golly, you know, we really had
3 it rough." And I'm the president of the Retired Officers
4 Association in Columbia, South Carolina, and I love this.
5 The guys from World War II just beat me all the time. I
6 love them. I love to —

7 DR. MOSKOS: Were you U.S. or R.A.?

8 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I'm sorry?

9 DR. MOSKOS: When you entered the service?

10 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I enlisted, sir.

11 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.

12 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I was blind
13 drunk and had a draft notice in my pocket, but I was a
14 regular army soldier.

15 That's a fact, as a matter of fact.

16 But I've got to tell you, I think the
17 training is much more difficult today, and it is much
18 more purposeful and much more meaningful. Even the
19 battalion training that we do in the United States Army
20 is so much better than when I had a battalion. These
21 guys that tell you the good ol' days I think are probably
22 wrong.

23 I mean, I wish —

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1 DR. SEGAL: Can I just follow-up on —
2 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I wish that I
3 had been as good as some of these kids we've got today.

4 DR. SEGAL: I want to follow-up on that
5 question. And just for clarification, it wasn't Walter
6 Ulmer's report who indicated that the standards had been
7 lowered. That was General Ace Collins, I think.

8 DR. MOSKOS: Oh, General Ace Collins.

9 DR. SEGAL: General Ulmer reported that
10 there was a poor quality of male soldiers arriving in the
11 division.

12 This was in —

13 DR. MOSKOS: You're right.

14 DR. SEGAL: — June of 1979. Do you
15 recall June of 1979? That period in Army experience?

16 Could you talk a little bit — I know this isn't fair
17 since this is General Meyer's and not yours, but since
18 Charlie brought it up, do you remember what was going on
19 in the Army during that period —

20 DR. MOSKOS: Early seventies?

21 DR. SEGAL: — in terms of the quality of
22 personnel? And in 1978, '79, and '80?

23 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Dr. Segal, I

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1 believe that the quality of soldier that we're getting in
2 the United States Army today is far superior to what we
3 were getting back — And I enlisted with a bunch of
4 hoodlums.
5 DR. SEGAL: When did you enlist?
6 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I enlisted in
7 1961. Okay?
8 DR. SEGAL: '61.
9 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I mean, I'm
10 telling you the serious — I'm not trying to be funny
11 here. I mean, I mean guys that judges sent and daddies
12 said, "Okay, you're going into the Army or I'm going to
13 —"
14 DR. SEGAL: "I give up. The Army will
15 take you."
16 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: You ask some of
17 the recruiters. Some of them may tell you. They said —
18 Some of the recruiters would tell you that, you know, on
19 Thursday afternoon, they'd go to the courthouse and guys
20 would — And, you know, I had some pretty tough guys that
21 enlisted when I did. Me and my guitar player enlisted
22 because we had a draft notice, okay?
23 But I think the all-volunteer force has

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1 proven itself over and over again to be a much better
2 force. I think the caliber of soldier and the caliber of
3 training that we've got right now in all of the services
4 is much, much better than it was in 1979.
5 I can recall an Army in the seventies and
6 perhaps we had started to get better by late '79, but we
7 weren't there yet. It was the early eighties when we
8 started to get better. Where an officer had to wear a
9 sidearm to go into his barracks in Germany, where
10 noncommissioned officers —
11 DR. SEGAL: This is in the combat arms
12 units.
13 In combat arms units?
14 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Lots of units.
15 It wasn't a combat arms problem. It was an Army problem.
16 DR. SEGAL: Okay. But it included the
17 combat arms that trained all-male.
18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: It was in all
19 services.
20 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: It was all
21 services.
22 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I think so.
23 So I think that the caliber of young men

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1 and women that we're getting in our services now is much
2 better than it was.
3 DR. SEGAL: Well, my point is, of course,
4 that there was a lot responsibility for the poor quality
5 of male soldiers arriving in the divisions. You had low
6 unemployment. You had recruiting difficulties. There
7 was a lowering of standards for men and women in
8 enlistment. There was the mis-norming of the aspect from
9 1976 to 1990 and all the commanders in the field —
10 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: You bet.
11 DR. SEGAL: — were saying there's
12 something wrong with the people arriving.
13 And so just to put it in perspective in
14 terms of the times. But I'll let you...
15 DR. MOSKOS: Another question on the ARI
16 data. There are different interpretations — And you
17 alluded to it yourself. They were comparing questions
18 like soldiers work hard to get things done, soldiers
19 encourage each other, those kinds of issues.
20 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Right.
21 DR. MOSKOS: Generally speaking, the women
22 in gender-integrated units for training were much more
23 positive than had women asked similar questions in

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1 gender-separated —
2 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir.
3 DR. MOSKOS: — training. Much more
4 positive.
5 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir.
6 DR. MOSKOS: But for the males, it was
7 sort of the other way around. Not quite to the degree,
8 though, as the women. There was a sort of trend. But
9 the men in the gender-separate units had higher, you
10 know, positives on these kinds of questions —
11 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir.
12 DR. MOSKOS: — than those men in the
13 gender-integrated ones. Something like that. While for
14 the women —
15 DR. SEGAL: It wasn't significant for the
16 men, was it?
17 DR. MOSKOS: Well, you know, it was 90 to
18 68 percent or 61 to 41.
19 MS. POPE: What year was this?
20 DR. MOSKOS: 1993.
21 MS. POPE: This was just after?
22 DR. MOSKOS: No. There were still some
23 segregated — gender-segregated units as well as gender-

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1 integrated. So you can make four comparisons: women in
2 integrated or separate, and men in integrated or
3 separate.
4 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir.
5 DR. MOSKOS: And, you know, the women are
6 generally much more positive and the men are somewhat
7 more negative in the integrated status. So, I mean, it
8 isn't like an all-win situation, at least on the issues
9 of some of these.
10 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: If you pick out
11 one or two questions out of the myriad of questions that
12 we asked, you can make a point. I think it is an
13 incorrect one. I think you have to look at the entire
14 report and I think you have to go a little bit further
15 than that.
16 I think you have to understand that we —
17 we still didn't have it right. You know, we still — it
18 still hadn't come the way that we were doing business at
19 BCT. If you ask the same questions of somebody who's
20 been doing it for a couple of decades in the military
21 police corps or the chemical corps, you will get
22 drastically different answers.
23 DR. MOSKOS: Which is right. Yeah, and

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1 that's what —
2 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Okay. I think
3 if you go out there now, Dr. Moskos, and ask the
4 questions, you will get better answers than you got on
5 that one.
6 DR. MOSKOS: We can't do it anymore,
7 though. You don't have the comparisons anymore.
8 MS. POPE: Sure you do. You have —
9 DR. MOSKOS: Well —
10 DR. SEGAL: There's no all-female.
11 DR. MOSKOS: Right. You don't have the
12 comparison.
13 Another item, too —
14 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir.
15 DR. MOSKOS: And it's — You said that
16 equal effort is ultimately what we're asking for in
17 physical training.
18 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Just for the PT
19 test.
20 DR. MOSKOS: For the PT test. Okay.
21 That's better. Yeah.
22 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Okay.
23 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.

1 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: If every soldier
 2 who's going to be a wheeled-vehicle mechanic —
 3 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 4 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: — has got to
 5 pass an end-of-cycle exam that requires that soldier to
 6 pick up a tire and put it on —
 7 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 8 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Okay? And to
 9 pick up a wrench and to take an engine apart and put it
 10 back together again, the standards are exactly the same.
 11 Physical standards.
 12 DR. MOSKOS: Sure.
 13 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: To do a job in
 14 the Army, the physical standards are exactly the same for
 15 male and female.
 16 And I've got to tell you, I don't think it
 17 would do any harm if we told everybody, "Okay,
 18 everybody's got to do the same amount of push-ups." I
 19 buy the fact that there's some physiological differences.
 20 Okay? Somebody else has got to figure that out. I don't
 21 know how to do that.
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 23 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Okay? I don't

1 I think we would do anybody any harm if we said everybody's
 2 got to do push-ups, the same amount. And by the way,
 3 some folks who know more about that have told me that I'm
 4 wrong.
 5 Okay. As long as we've got the same
 6 standards for a job — If you're going to be a signaller,
 7 you've got to put up an antenna. A male has got to put
 8 it up, a female's got to put it up, and everybody passes
 9 the same end-of-course exam. Same physical standards.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. That clarifies that.
 11 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir.
 12 DR. MOSKOS: My last — I won't. I'll
 13 pass.
 14 Go ahead.
 15 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: It's too
 16 contentious?
 17 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah, I'll ask it because
 18 it's sort of an issue for the Commission as a whole.
 19 We are constrained by the language of the
 20 law that set up this Commission which uses the term
 21 "gender-integrated training." That's the —
 22 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: — conventional use here.

1 And I was — What's your reaction to —
 2 See, to me, "integration" means that people live in close
 3 quarters together. When we racially integrated, we have
 4 people living in close quarters.
 5 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Yet, in the so-called gender-
 7 integrated training, which we are bound by, it isn't
 8 truly integrated because we have separate male and
 9 separate female living facilities.
 10 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: So is "integrated" the way to
 12 call this? Or do we need — There might not be a proper
 13 word for this kind of condition but it isn't integrated
 14 in the conventional sense of the word "integration,"
 15 which means people live side-by-side, cheek-by-jowl.
 16 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yeah.
 17 DR. MOSKOS: I don't know.
 18 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Well, I think
 19 that I live in an integrated neighborhood — okay? — but
 20 me and my wife are the only two folks that live in my
 21 house. So I don't understand where you're trying to take
 22 me.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: An integrated neighborhood,

1 but not an integrated house, though.
 2 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: When you start
 3 talking about a certain amount of civility, then — And
 4 by the way, you don't do any bonding when you sleep. You
 5 know, so —
 6 MS. POPE: Hopefully.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: It's been a
 8 long day for this Commission.
 9 DR. SEGAL: We're digressing a little bit.
 10 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I'm serious. I
 11 looked at this long and hard every day. I really did.
 12 You know, I spent two years of my life looking at this.
 13 An old infantryman had to change his mind about some
 14 things. I didn't like that. And I had to go attack some
 15 of my own beliefs and my own principles, okay? And I
 16 think that I'm the guy that did this to the Army. I
 17 think we did something good.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Thank you.
 19 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: And I'm basing
 20 that on data that is good, hard, strong, and data that I
 21 have seen with my own infantry eyes. It's a good thing.
 22 DR. MOSKOS: I appreciate that very much.
 23 Thank you.

1 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir.
 2 Ma'am?
 3 MS. POPE: I have a couple of questions.
 4 I think most of — But mine has to do with OSUT training.
 5 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, ma'am.
 6 MS. POPE: And I was one of those who did
 7 go to McClellan and see MP's and chemical.
 8 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, ma'am.
 9 MS. POPE: And I've been impressed with
 10 the end product. I mean, the soldierization. And they
 11 corrected us. I mean, they just said, "We're not men and
 12 women. We're green."
 13 And I guess my question has to do with
 14 between OSUT and BMT, where we are at basic training,
 15 OSUT training in an ideal world is expensive.
 16 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Oh, yes, ma'am.
 17 MS. POPE: And —
 18 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: But, you see,
 19 only in terms of drill sergeants.
 20 MS. POPE: Okay.
 21 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: That's what —
 22 Because my first thought was, "Hey, look, I want to live
 23 in an OSUT world. I've seen it and I want that. I want

1 all 75's" — Let me talk Army talk here. The 75 series
 2 has got 75 Bravos who are clerks —
 3 MS. POPE: Right.
 4 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: — and 75 Deltas
 5 who are legal clerks, and then they've got Charlies who
 6 are some other kind of clerk. And then they got payroll
 7 clerks, but they're 75's — or whatever they are.
 8 DR. SEGAL: Actually, they're 71's.
 9 But...
 10 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: But I trained
 11 all the infantry guys. And we'd wake up in the morning
 12 and the mortar guys would go off that way and the Bradley
 13 guys would go off that way and the ground guys would go
 14 that-a-way.
 15 MS. POPE: Right.
 16 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: But they came
 17 back at night and had the same bunk and the same rifle
 18 and the same drill sergeant. Okay? And there were some
 19 other mortar guys — drill sergeants in there. And they
 20 said, "Okay, let's get all 75 sergeants, drill sergeants,
 21 and we'll put them together." There's no cost in the
 22 amount of billets. I think you save money.
 23 What I did at Fort Jackson is I graduated

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1 somebody on Thursday morning. I spent four days getting
 2 them to turn in rifles, turn in bunks, turn in canteen
 3 cups and canteen covers, and turn in sheets, and then I'd
 4 graduate them on Thursday morning, march them off to the
 5 other side of the class, issued them a new bunk and a new
 6 canteen cover, a new drill sergeant, new company, and it
 7 took me a week to get them used to this. I said, "Stop
 8 that."
 9 They said, "Well, all this stuff belongs
 10 to the battalion." I said, "No, it doesn't. It belongs
 11 to me. I gave it to them. It's mine. Let them keep
 12 it." You know, clear across the other side of the post.
 13 Stop it. Couldn't do it.
 14 And I think we built a very good case for
 15 having every MOS in the United States Army be OSUT. You
 16 know, that OSUT diagram that I drew, when you look at
 17 that thing, OSUT and then BCT, AIT, in my mind a light
 18 comes in someplace out here (Indicating). Okay? And you
 19 can tell the difference in an OSUT soldier in the first
 20 three sentences when you're talking to him. I'm telling
 21 you, it is a remarkably efficient training process.
 22 So I tried to convince the Army to do
 23 that. The problem is that you need four drill sergeants

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1 for — or twelve drill sergeants per company and that's
 2 the bill that the United States Army said they can't pay.
 3 So when you start talking about expensive,
 4 that's the only expense.
 5 MS. POPE: So that's the only —
 6 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: The rest of it's
 7 cheaper. If you start thinking about it, you don't have
 8 to, you know — If I could get the signal guys to do
 9 signal OSUT —
 10 MS. POPE: Right.
 11 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: — at Gordon,
 12 they wouldn't have to go to Jackson —
 13 MS. POPE: Right.
 14 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: — or Leonard
 15 Wood. Okay? Or to, you know, one of the other posts
 16 that do basic. They'd just go right there. They'd stay
 17 there. Same bunk, same canteen cover, same whole deal.
 18 But the drill sergeant bill is what you
 19 can't pay. So when some people tell you that's too
 20 expensive, that's what they're talking about.
 21 MS. POPE: It's really the drill sergeant.
 22 Because the other issue — and it's across the services
 23 — is the time constraints, men and women, when they come

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1 into basic training, and then the huge jump into advanced
 2 training, "A" schools, whatever the — and so little time
 3 to mature into that process, where OSUT, you own that
 4 person for the entire process.
 5 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Right. Yeah.
 6 MS. POPE: And you've got that commitment
 7 to the drill instructor. You've got the drill sergeant.
 8 And so they own that soldier and the soldier has this
 9 commitment to — and the role model.
 10 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes.
 11 MS. POPE: And you've got the community.
 12 I mean, it's a small community, so you're producing
 13 people, but you don't want your fellow soldiers coming
 14 back and saying —
 15 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Now, there are
 16 some MOS's in the Army that wouldn't work for. Some of
 17 the language MOS's where you've got to send them off; it
 18 takes a year.
 19 MS. POPE: Sure.
 20 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: But I still
 21 think that there is —
 22 MS. POPE: But you could do more.
 23 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: — that there

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1 are some common subjects, especially ones — And by the
 2 way, I think it would probably be healthier — The
 3 trainer in me says if you've got somebody who goes to AIT
 4 for a year, you've got something wrong. Okay? You know,
 5 that's wrong.
 6 You can't be a trainee for a whole year.
 7 You've got — Sooner or later you've got to grow up. I
 8 mean, somebody's got to say, "You're a soldier now.
 9 You're just doing something different." You know. I
 10 mean, let me graduate from something here, is what I
 11 mean.
 12 I still think that there's some sort of
 13 system you can put together that covers all of the basics
 14 —
 15 MS. POPE: Right.
 16 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: — that all
 17 soldiers need, then the basics of being in a technical
 18 field. And perhaps you could compare them together, you
 19 know, that sort of stuff. And then you graduate and you
 20 say, "Okay, you're now a soldier. You're no longer a
 21 trainee, and you're going to go to college or something
 22 rather than AIT. You know, go learn a language."
 23 DR. SEGAL: General Siegfried, do you

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1 think you would lose anything if you took everybody and
 2 divided them up by their MOS's so that they're not
 3 getting an appreciation for what the people in the other
 4 MOS's get at all? If you had all of the training done in
 5 OSUT by MOS?
 6 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: No. I don't
 7 think that that's the job of the initial entry training,
 8 Dr. Segal. That is something that happens — You know,
 9 you learn to love all the branches when you get out in
 10 the field and see an Army work. I don't think we harm
 11 the infantry by sending them to Fort Benning and then
 12 saying, "You've now graduated," and then we send them to
 13 Fort Pope, Louisiana, and they start training with all of
 14 the other branches and start — As a matter of fact, when
 15 you get into the professional development systems for
 16 officers and NCO's — I call it leader development
 17 programs. Rather than NCOPD's and OPD's, I just call it
 18 leaders.
 19 When they get together, a large part of
 20 that is to familiarize you with what some of the other
 21 folks are doing. I don't think that — I don't know what
 22 we'd do about it anyway. You know, I think that that's
 23 something that's fixed when you get out into the field in

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1 the Army.
 2 Yes, ma'am.
 3 MS. POPE: Thank you.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Now that
 5 you've become Mr. Sexual Harassment —
 6 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Oh, Lord. I'd
 7 never answer to that, sir.
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: General Sexual
 9 Harassment.
 10 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Oh, Lord.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Let me ask
 12 this question. There are some services that profess that
 13 the answer to sexual harassment is zero tolerance.
 14 Taking zero tolerance and going back to your consequence
 15 of choices —
 16 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — how does
 18 that really play with the do's and the don'ts? If I'm
 19 backed into a zero — Here's where I'm going to.
 20 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: If I'm
 22 backed into a zero tolerance, am I less likely to
 23 indicate that harassment has occurred because I really am

1 not going to get — I'm going to see this individual who
 2 has harassed me. Yet, I may like them as a fellow
 3 soldier.
 4 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Right.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I'm going
 6 to pick on soldiers, but —
 7 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Right.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — we don't
 9 have that.
 10 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I've got you.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: You know,
 12 in fact, that individual is going to be thrown out of
 13 that service. Have I put myself with zero tolerance,
 14 based on your consequence of choice, into that kind of
 15 role?
 16 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: General
 17 Christmas, I don't think so, sir. I've got to tell you
 18 why. Okay? I think if this Commission said, "Okay,
 19 we're going to have a policy here about behavior." Okay?
 20 And that's what you're talking about. And you can
 21 mandate behavior as a condition of employment.
 22 Let me give you an example. Okay? I grew
 23 up in an Army where if you didn't go to Happy Hour on

1 There were two African Americans, one male and one
 2 female. The second-in-command was an E-5 who was a
 3 Caucasian — Caucasian guy, okay? It was obvious that
 4 I'm looking at a good group. I mean, this group had good
 5 feelings towards each other and you could tell it. I
 6 mean, you could see a unit like that.
 7 And I asked. I said, "What happened?
 8 What do you guys do?" And the story's a long one and
 9 I'll make it short. They had gone to the chain teaching,
 10 and they said — and I had them locked in a room so they
 11 — you know, I told them — I said, "Look, it stays in
 12 the room. Let's talk now."
 13 And the staff sergeant said, "Our
 14 battalion commander's a pretty nice guy but he puts you
 15 to sleep giving you money." You know, the guy's not the
 16 most dynamic guy ever walked down the block. I mean,
 17 this guy — "But he told us you go back and 'you work on
 18 how are we going to handle this don't-tolerate system
 19 here, how we're going to make sure our behavior is
 20 correct'."
 21 So the men said, "Let's make a list.
 22 Okay, Sarge, tell me what you don't want me to do." She
 23 said, "I tried. I said, 'Okay, there ain't no 'B' word

1 Friday night and get drunk with the guys, you weren't
 2 part of a team. Okay? And I did that. And some of
 3 those Friday nights I drove home drunk. I'm ashamed of
 4 that. I'm not proud of that but I did that. And I
 5 thought that that's what infantrymen did. I mean, we
 6 arm-wrestled and did parachute-landing falls off the bar
 7 and we bonded.
 8 The United States Army said, "We're going
 9 to do away with Happy Hour." I was mad. I thought
 10 they'd truly gone insane. I said, "The fools in the
 11 Pentagon who all go to church this Sunday. How are we
 12 going to bond? This is wrong." But I understood one
 13 thing: if I got a DUI coming out of that club going home,
 14 I'm out of here.
 15 Now, sir, I still went to Happy Hour, but
 16 I had one drink.
 17 Now, they mandated my behavior as a
 18 condition of employment and my attitude changed over
 19 time. Pretty soon I found out, hey, wait a minute, my
 20 Friday nights are much more productive. I moved my tee
 21 time on Saturday from 11:30 to 7:30 in the morning.
 22 Okay? You know, we've done it with lots of things. We
 23 mandate behavior as a condition of employment.

1 around here. Okay? And there ain't no 'girls' unless
 2 you want to be 'boys'." And so they made this list.
 3 And the guys said, "All right. Don't be
 4 hollering sexual harassment unless you get up in my face
 5 first and tell me what it is. Maybe I did something I
 6 didn't want to or I didn't mean it or there's been —
 7 "you know, let's talk this over before somebody screams
 8 sexual harassment." So they made the list.
 9 Two days later, the E-5 comes in and says,
 10 "Hey, Sarge, this ain't on the list." They say, "Okay,
 11 we can't do a list. What are we going to do?" That
 12 little group said, "Okay, here's the way we're going to
 13 make sure that zero tolerance is a way of life. We'll
 14 help each other. And what we're going to do is use this
 15 term: 'don't go there'." How topical.
 16 And then she looked me in the eye and she
 17 smiled, and so I knew something else was coming. And she
 18 said, "We didn't like that." I said, "Wait a minute,
 19 that's brilliant. That's teamwork to say, 'Don't go
 20 there'." She said, "No, it's accusatory, and we changed
 21 that." I said, "How did you change it?" She said, "We
 22 say, 'Let's don't go there'."
 23 General Christmas, to those six young

1 We've done it with safety. We don't
 2 follow every soldier around with an aid man, so we
 3 mandated — Every PFC knows they can stop an assembly
 4 line if something's unsafe. Okay? We've done it with
 5 seat belts. Do you wear a seat belt? Sure you do. I
 6 do, too. I didn't used to, but all of a sudden I got —
 7 you know, now I can't start the car. It's just an
 8 automatic reaction. They mandated my behavior. You
 9 know, I had to. The MP's would stop me. Over time, my
 10 attitude changed. Now I wear my seat belt.
 11 We've done it with maintenance, okay? You
 12 know, we don't let it happen. We don't tolerate safety
 13 things and we don't tolerate drunken — the abuse of
 14 alcohol. We don't tolerate drugs. And by the way, we
 15 don't tolerate aberrant behavior.
 16 Now, I don't think — Let me tell you one
 17 of the most magnificent things that I've seen. I asked
 18 folks how do you do this, and I'll never forget this. I
 19 was in Dahran and I went into a small personnel shop run
 20 by a female African American, staff sergeant. I give you
 21 the sexes and the races just — only so you'll understand
 22 the diverse group.
 23 There was an American Indian female.

1 soldiers, that was a huge difference because it's
 2 inclusive. And I'll tell you, you saw the results.
 3 "Let's don't go there." That says working together and
 4 helping each other.
 5 And I'm telling you — I said, "Okay.
 6 What happens when you walk outside the personnel shop
 7 here? I mean, you go over to unload your *. You know
 8 how they are." "She said, "No, no, no." That same
 9 battalion commander came back. He was doing something
 10 about the environment that he had created, and he came
 11 back and he said — and she said, "You know, when we
 12 explained it to him, he almost cried. And he said, 'You
 13 guys are wonderful'.
 14 And he said, "The whole battalion" — And
 15 they were talking about an air defense artillery
 16 battalion, a Patriot outfit, that's sitting in a horrible
 17 place, you know, so they had every reason in the world
 18 not to have a good environment. I mean, they had things
 19 tugging at them called weather and sand and away from
 20 home, all the — every reason not to be as high as they
 21 were. But that little system stood them apart.
 22 Zero tolerance doesn't mean you shoot
 23 somebody. It means that you don't want it to happen and

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1 you'll do whatever you need to do not to let it happen.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And let me
 3 follow-up that because of —
 4 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: If I have
 6 such a policy —
 7 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — can I
 9 rehabilitate the individual who, through time and
 10 circumstance and upbringing, may be a sexual harasser?
 11 Should that individual who in fact has been accused of
 12 sexual harassment — should they receive the same type of
 13 approach that we do to a drug abuser or to an alcohol
 14 abuser or the like, where we equally have zero-tolerance
 15 policies?
 16 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Sir, I believe
 17 so. I know you have and I have worked with ex-drug
 18 addicts that have benefited from the United States Army's
 19 program.
 20 Now, if you talk about criminal activity
 21 — if you're talking about somebody who rapes somebody,
 22 okay? — you know, that is something that is different
 23 and I think that we've got ample mechanisms to take care

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1 of that.
 2 But if you're talking about an improper
 3 use of language, insulting somebody in a less egregious
 4 way — you know, I hate those words, okay? I think so.
 5 I don't think that that has to be terminal, shouldn't be.
 6 I think that each one of those cases is an individual
 7 case the way you and I have had to look at individual
 8 cases.
 9 Did I kick everybody out that got a DUI?
 10 No, sir, I didn't. If it was an officer, I was tougher.
 11 You know, if it was a young E-4, no, sir, I didn't do
 12 that. But there was zero tolerance, and I believed that
 13 and so did my soldiers.
 14 So I think yes, I don't think that it has
 15 to be terminal. If you're talking about sexual
 16 harassment, that can be fixed.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 18 Final question has to deal with fraternization. And I
 19 know you've moved on like I, you know, through
 20 retirement, but you know the Department of Defense has
 21 just established a new fraternization policy and it
 22 impacts the Army more than it does the other services.
 23 You may or may not know.

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1 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I don't know
 2 what that is, so...
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay. I'm
 4 not going to ask you the question, then, because I was
 5 going to ask you an opinion question as to your
 6 experience.
 7 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I thought we had
 8 a pretty good system when I left, but —
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Well, it's
 10 been changed. So we'll leave it at that.
 11 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: It's probably
 12 better now. Everything I see is better than what I left,
 13 so...
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: We'll leave
 15 it at that. Thank you.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. General, the old
 17 line of battle that Napoleon and Duke of Wellington faced
 18 each other across seems to be gone, and we also send our
 19 armed services out to do lots of different things.
 20 Police actions —
 21 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, ma'am.
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — humanitarian actions
 23 and so forth. It seems more likely today that the folks

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1 we think of as combat support and combat service support
 2 are increasingly at a greater risk than we may have
 3 thought in times past.
 4 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, ma'am.
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I would like to know
 6 whether you're satisfied that the training given to non-
 7 combat arms personnel, other than chemical and MP, which
 8 I'll put in a separate category, is adequate for them to
 9 be able to take care of themselves and take care of one
 10 another if they should find themselves at that kind of
 11 risk.
 12 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Ma'am, I do.
 13 You know, it's an evil place —
 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And I ask because I've
 15 observed the training at Fort Jackson and the training at
 16 Fort Benning and I will represent that it's very
 17 different, although — even though we may expect that
 18 some of those folks at least may be encountering some of
 19 the same kinds of conditions.
 20 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Ma'am, the
 21 dangers that you face on today's battlefield are more
 22 lethal than the ones that I fought on. I understand that
 23 because of the range of weapons and those kinds of

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1 things.
 2 I don't think that there is any increased
 3 threat of hand-to-hand combat in rear areas. I really
 4 don't. You know, there is a threat from SCUD missiles
 5 and those kinds of things, and I think every soldier is
 6 trained to the point where if something catastrophic
 7 happens in the rear or in their area, they can fight.
 8 In addition to that, they are also trained
 9 on how to defend their own position. You don't have any
 10 soldier in any branch that isn't capable of manning a
 11 crew-served weapon like a machine gun, from a machine gun
 12 bunker, to protect their own rear area installation,
 13 regardless of where that rear area may be.
 14 But I don't think that there is a risk of
 15 hand-to-hand combat that you have to train infantry
 16 soldiers in.
 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Well, previously
 18 you talked about the ability groups for physical
 19 training.
 20 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, ma'am.
 21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I should think that there
 22 are women who are physically capable of doing all the
 23 things that a combat soldier does —

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1 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, ma'am.
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — in his training and in
 3 carrying out his career. What in your — I just want to
 4 find out what is your own personal opinion of why it
 5 should be different for the combat arms as opposed to the
 6 other arms in terms of simply looking at individuals in
 7 terms of their abilities?
 8 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, ma'am. I
 9 have lived on an infantry battlefield. I don't think
 10 that that is a place where you can mix the genders
 11 civilly even though we are mixing genders in basic. And
 12 I believe that it is absolutely the right thing to do and
 13 I have been a champion of women's rights, I should like
 14 to think, for lots of issues.
 15 Fundamentally, I would tell you that I
 16 don't believe that that battlefield can be made to work.
 17 It is an ugly, despicable, obscene, horrendous place that
 18 I don't think any woman should be made to go into,
 19 regardless of how strong she is or how mentally adept she
 20 is. And that's ingrained in me through lots and lots of
 21 years. Whether or not I am correct, I do not know. I
 22 feel that way very strongly.
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.

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1 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, ma'am.
 2 MR. PANG: Thank you very much. And I
 3 don't have any further questions. You've been very, very
 4 helpful. Very, very helpful.
 5 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Thank you.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: No. Thank you.
 7 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I would tell you
 8 —
 9 DR. SEGAL: Can you think of anything else
 10 that you think we should hear or that you want us to tell
 11 Congress? And recall that we have a mission not only —
 12 our task is not only to look at the gender-integration
 13 issue, but to evaluate basic training in all of the
 14 services more generally. Do you have a sense of the
 15 things we should recommend to Congress in that regard?
 16 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: At the risk of
 17 being presumptuous — First of all, I'm glad you're here.
 18 God Almighty, I'm glad we've got Americans like you who
 19 would come and do something like this. I know that
 20 you're not — none of you are going to get rich doing
 21 this.
 22 I firmly believe that sometime, in some
 23 place, somebody is going to have to stand up and say,

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1 "Services, we trust you." God bless the Congress. You
 2 know, in its wisdom, it has always said that the Title X
 3 authority to raise and train a force belongs to the
 4 services. And I think it is presumptuous of anybody in
 5 the Congress to stand up and tell a Marine how to train
 6 another Marine. That to me is ludicrous. I think our
 7 services can be trusted to do what is best for them.
 8 Now, if the execution is sloppy and you
 9 see that, you ought to flog them. We deserve to be
 10 flogged when we're not executing things the way we ought
 11 to be doing.
 12 But I've got to tell you — I've got to
 13 tell you this. I was talking to a female drill sergeant
 14 at Fort Jackson on Thursday and she had just seen in the
 15 law where they were going to say, "You've got to be of
 16 the same gender to go into a barrack." And she says,
 17 "The Congress" — you know, I was just asking her. She
 18 said, "The Congress doesn't trust me. I'm a
 19 noncommissioned officer and I can be trusted."
 20 So, you know, that — I mean, that's
 21 ludicrous. We've been doing that for so long — you
 22 know, you can trust a noncommissioned officer who is
 23 properly trained and properly motivated to do anything.

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1 To give their life to do something.
 2 And so I think we ought to be very, very
 3 careful to start saying that the Congress probably has a
 4 better idea of how to train a sailor than a sailor does.
 5 That to me is — would just be a horrible thing to have
 6 happen.
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Any other questions?
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Let me ask. General, would
 9 you feel the same if that came from the executive branch?
 10 The same kind of edicts? You said Congress shouldn't do
 11 that. Obviously constitutionally Congress has the right,
 12 you know, to make rules and regulations.
 13 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, sir, I
 14 would.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Would you be also upset with
 16 similar edicts coming from the executive branch, or just
 17 Congress? Or the judicial branch, for that matter.
 18 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: The Congress
 19 gave us Title X, and the Title X responsibility to raise
 20 and train the force belongs to the service secretaries.
 21 I happen to believe that is true, and I don't think
 22 anybody from anywhere should be presumptuous enough to
 23 tell a Marine how to train a Marine.

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1 DR. MOSKOS: Including the courts?
 2 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes.
 3 DR. MOSKOS: Or including the executive
 4 branch?
 5 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: I see. Okay. Thanks.
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I think I mentioned
 8 earlier, General, that we're missing a couple of people
 9 and —
 10 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Yes, ma'am.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — we reserve, if you
 12 won't mind, the right to send along some additional
 13 questions.
 14 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: I'll come back.
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We would be delighted to
 16 see you then.
 17 DR. MOSKOS: Drafted again.
 18 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: You betcha. I'd
 19 be delighted to come back.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much.
 21 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Thank you, Madam
 22 Chairman.
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: This has been extremely

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1 helpful.
 2 MAJOR GENERAL SIEGFRIED: Thanks
 3 everybody.
 4 (A brief recess was taken.)
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We will resume and go
 6 back on the record.
 7 Our final panel this afternoon is
 8 Brigadier General Myrna Williamson and Colonel Karen
 9 Frey. And we do have biographical materials in our
 10 books, so we will go straight to your comments. And
 11 then, as I mentioned, after that we will take questions
 12 from the Commissioners, simply going around the table.
 13 And I'd like to also start by thanking you
 14 both for coming here. We appreciate it very much. It
 15 has been difficult for us to come up with written history
 16 on a lot of these things that we're required to
 17 investigate, and so we are happy and honored to have
 18 people who can give us first-hand oral history.
 19 So General Williamson, why don't you
 20 start.
 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Thank you,
 22 Madam President and members of the Commission.
 23 I grew up on a dairy farm in South Dakota,

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1 and when people asked me during my career why I joined
 2 the Army, I said, "Because I grew up on a dairy farm in
 3 South Dakota." And being very precocious, I decided
 4 early on that there was a better life, and so I started
 5 writing my themes when I was in grade school that I was
 6 going to join the military when I grew up and I did.
 7 Fortunately, I had very good teachers when
 8 I was in grade school, high school, college, and in the
 9 Women's Army Corps Basic Course after I joined the Army
 10 and took my first airplane ride to join the service. And
 11 thus it was in the Army, besides the fact that I had
 12 majored in education in college, that I was always
 13 volunteering to be a teacher because I thought that was
 14 just so very, very important.
 15 And I really came close. I was scheduled
 16 to be an instructor at the Women's Army Corps Basic
 17 Course and I came within two weeks of that, until they
 18 asked me to take over the Enlisted Education Department,
 19 which was in charge of all the training at Fort
 20 McClellan, Alabama. I said, "May I think it over
 21 tonight?", and went back the next morning and gave one of
 22 the best answers of my career, which was "I would be very
 23 honored to do that," and did for the next three years.

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1 I also volunteered to stay and teach at
2 the Command and General Staff College, and was scheduled
3 to do that and came very close, until the battalion
4 command list came out and I went back to Fort McClellan,
5 Alabama.

6 Well, why am I telling you this? Because
7 as it turned out for me, instead of being in a classroom
8 with four walls, I would never have imagined that my
9 classroom in the military would be without walls and
10 would cover thousands and thousands of young men and
11 women. And it was very, very fortunate for me.

12 Most of my time in the military was spent
13 in the Training and Doctrine Command, in the educational
14 and training environment. And also in my career, it
15 seems that I have been through the entire personnel
16 cycle. I have been through recruiting, reception,
17 training, the promotion, field command, and then finally
18 ending up in military personnel management, where we
19 handled all the military personnel policies for the Army
20 and began the draw-down.

21 Let me illustrate. I had five-and-a-half
22 years in recruiting in South Dakota and the eight western
23 united states, plus Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam, recruiting

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1 Then I had thirty-nine months as
2 Commanding General of the 3rd ROTC Region at Fort Riley,
3 with 104 colleges and universities and 154 high schools,
4 with Junior ROTC in eight states. Both men and women, of
5 course. And then ran the eight-week summer camp training
6 program for 2,500 cadets.

7 So my total experience in this area was
8 seven years of command, one quarter of my career, plus
9 one year as battalion XO, plus three years as chief of
10 the basic training committee group. And then I had an
11 intimate association with six military schools and with
12 the school house.

13 I was three years with the Field Artillery
14 School, as chief of the administration, four months as
15 the XO at the MP school, and in addition to working, of
16 course, at the WAC Center and School, the MP school, the
17 AG, finance and neutral schools.

18 I also, during my career, served four
19 years as the Committee — the delegate to the Committee
20 on Women in the NATO Forces and served the last two years
21 as chairman of that committee, so was exchanging
22 information with them on what was going on in other
23 services around the world.

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1 women. I had fourteen months at the U.S. Army Reception
2 Station at Fort Lewis, Washington. These were all male
3 recruits. I had thirteen months as company commander in
4 Headquarters, United States Army Europe, a female
5 company.

6 I had thirty-two months as head of the
7 Enlisted Education Department, better known in many
8 places as the Committee Group at Fort McClellan, Alabama.
9 And here we did a reverse integration and I brought on
10 the first male members of the cadre who would join the
11 female members who had been training them, and so there
12 was a lot of looking out for those people as they brought
13 those talents from the infantry side over to the
14 training.

15 We introduced weapons training to women
16 there, offensive and defensive techniques, and integrated
17 the first male cadre members to come over and join the
18 female cadre members in the training battalions. And at
19 the time, these were all female trainees that we were
20 training.

21 I had a year as a basic training battalion
22 executive officer at Fort McClellan as we closed down the
23 3rd Training Battalion for the CAS program — the

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1 So I worked and trained in all-male
2 environments, all-female environments, and gender-
3 integrated environments. I wanted you to know this from
4 me because I think that where you come from and where you
5 have walked in my shoes makes what I say from the heart.
6 And I have done this during the military career. If
7 someone asked me a question, I would give them the answer
8 to the best of my ability. I shall do that with you
9 today.

10 When it came to basic training
11 integration, I don't have a lot to say. Problems that
12 others anticipated just, to me, did not develop. I know
13 you're going to hear from Brigadier General Pat Foote
14 tomorrow. She and I had the two battalions at Fort
15 McClellan which integrated the men and women at the same
16 time when it was switched over from the WAC school to the
17 MP school.

18 In my experience, the men and women traded
19 strengths. The men, of course, without a doubt, are
20 stronger in the physical aspects; the women excelled
21 better in the classroom and in repetitive kinds of
22 things. But they helped each other and they traded off.
23 And underneath each, in my opinion, there was always that

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1 Civilian Acquired Skills program — for those who came in
2 with an advanced rank.

3 Eighteen months as basic training
4 battalion commander at Fort McClellan, Alabama, beginning
5 as — under the Women's Army Corps School, moving to the
6 MP school, as you know, when they came there, beginning
7 under all females, and then in late '78, I believe it
8 was, integrating the men and women into the basic
9 training cycle.

10 We also brought the male drill sergeants
11 over during that period of time at Fort McClellan to the
12 all-female companies. And I believe it was at that time
13 that men and women's physical training also became very
14 much the same and we got rid of the little ol' sissy
15 things that the women used to do like the shuttle run and
16 things of that nature.

17 I had fourteen months as brigade commander
18 at Fort Benjamin Harrison, where I had an AIT brigade. I
19 also had all the permanent party at Fort McClellan and
20 dealt with three schools because I had students in the
21 finance school, the AG school, and the DINFOS, Department
22 of Defense Information School. These were men and women
23 both, and, of course, DINFOS was all services also.

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1 feeling of "I'm not going to let that man get ahead of
2 me," and then from the men, "I'm not going to let that
3 women get ahead of me." And so everyone just did better.

4 It was at the same time, of course, when
5 One Station Unit Training — OSUT — was going on over
6 across the post because of the MP's being there and since
7 women had integrated into the MP's earlier, then that
8 made it more difficult, of course, to cut off basic
9 training and move into the OSUT atmosphere. So that was
10 happening across-post at the same time.

11 So I left in '79 and went on to other
12 assignments, ended up in the Pentagon in 1982. To me,
13 gender-integration was a success. No major problems of
14 any kind. They did very well together. And it was
15 during this period that someone pointed out to me in the
16 Pentagon they were stopping gender-integration training
17 and I said, "What?"

18 And the notice that I saw was all of this
19 big (Indicating). It was this size of a paragraph
20 (Indicating) that was in some newspaper. I can't tell
21 you where it was. Somebody read it.

22 I couldn't believe it and I went stomping
23 down the hall to what was at that point one of the all-

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1 too-frequent studies of Women in the Military to try to
 2 get an answer. And I said, "Can you tell me who did
 3 this? Why and who? Why is it stopping?"
 4 I never did get an answer, except for one
 5 that was a stretch, I do believe. They said, "Well,
 6 statistics have proven at Fort Jackson that gender-
 7 integrated companies have lower PT scores than all-male
 8 companies." And I said, "It would not have taken a
 9 rocket scientist to have predicted this. I could have
 10 told you that before you did it." It's the closest I
 11 ever came to an answer and I was extremely disappointed.
 12 I thought it was a step backwards, I truly did.
 13 So to me, that's what I know about the end
 14 of gender-integrated training, of which I was a part, and
 15 have watched the study of it succeed or dissipate since
 16 then.
 17 I'll be happy to answer your questions
 18 regarding that or any other issues that you may have
 19 after Colonel Frey.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much.
 21 COLONEL FREY: Thank you. If you would
 22 bear with me, I do have a prepared script here just so I
 23 try and get my main points across. So I hope I'm not too

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1 moving in the direction of further integration. For
 2 example, while Army policy prohibited mandatory weapons
 3 training of women, we instituted a voluntary basic rifle
 4 marksmanship program for women, beginning in that very
 5 first training cycle.
 6 A year later, as a staff officer at the
 7 Directorate of Plans and Training, I was tasked to work
 8 on the development of a male-female basic training POI,
 9 which included a sixty-hour gender-neutral BRM program.
 10 My aggregate Fort McClellan-Fort Jackson
 11 experience caused me to see the stark contrast between
 12 training women in the all-female environment of Fort
 13 McClellan and the male training environment of Fort
 14 Jackson. In relative terms, the training at McClellan
 15 was done in isolation and clearly inferior in terms of
 16 preparing female recruits to do their part to achieve
 17 mission accomplishment in operational units.
 18 Now I will address my experience as an
 19 OSUT MP battalion commander from 1987 to 1989. I
 20 commanded four gender-integrated companies in a starship
 21 configuration. The women soldiers were billeted in their
 22 own bay within each company area. The cadre was
 23 comprised of both men and women and all soldiers, male

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1 painful a reader for you.
 2 My purpose in appearing before the
 3 Commissioner today is to provide historical information
 4 about initial entry training in the Army, stemming from
 5 my personal experience as a basic training company
 6 commander at Fort McClellan, 1973, Fort Jackson, 1974, as
 7 a staff officer in the Directorate of Plans and Training
 8 at Fort Jackson, 1975, and as a battalion commander of
 9 Military Police One Station Unit Training at Fort
 10 McClellan, Alabama, in 1987 to 1989.
 11 First I will address my company command
 12 experience at Fort McClellan and Fort Jackson. By way of
 13 background, prior to assuming company command at Fort
 14 McClellan, I was assigned to recruiting duty. I served
 15 on recruiting during the transition from the draft Army
 16 to the all-volunteer Army. For military women, this was
 17 a very significant period of new jobs and challenges.
 18 For me personally, it meant a new role as
 19 an Army officer. My basic branch changed from that of
 20 the Women's Army Corps, where the basis of my commission
 21 rested on my gender, to that of Military Police Corps,
 22 where the rest of my military career would be
 23 characterized not on the basis of gender but rather on my

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1 and female, trained together under the same POI. We also
 2 had two female-only basic training battalions at the
 3 Military Police School in the 1987-89 time frame.
 4 Because we battalion commanders all
 5 attended one another's post training cycle review and
 6 analysis, I am aware that the all-female units
 7 consistently achieved lower rates of training success.
 8 The main measures of success were the Army physical
 9 fitness test, basic rifle marksmanship, and the end-of-
 10 cycle testing scores.
 11 In terms of discipline, I had no
 12 remarkable problems associated with gender-integrated
 13 training. My attrition was approximately 3.2 percent.
 14 My in-discipline rates were low, about one or two Article
 15 15's per cycle, and my trainee performance rates were
 16 high. The high water mark was in the 1988 time frame
 17 when all four companies achieved what the Military Police
 18 School called the "Triple Crown" awards, which was 90
 19 percent first time go rates on the APFT and in BRM, and
 20 80 percent first time go rates on the end-of-cycle
 21 testing.
 22 In preparation for this testimony, I read
 23 several studies on gender-integrated training. My

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1 professional skill and qualification.
 2 I became company commander at Fort
 3 McClellan just as the expansion of women in the Army was
 4 impacting the training base. At Fort McClellan,
 5 increased female enlistments necessitated an increase in
 6 training capacity. My company — D Company, 2d Basic
 7 Training Battalion, WAC Training Center — was a part of
 8 the training expansion. Most significantly, in my
 9 memory, it marked the beginning of integrated, male-
 10 female cadre of female recruits.
 11 Then a year later, the Army announced the
 12 intention to further expand and introduce basic training
 13 at Fort Jackson. I volunteered and was accepted to go to
 14 Fort Jackson to take part in this new expansion phase.
 15 At Fort Jackson, we began training on
 16 January 8, 1974, in my company — A Company, 17th Basic
 17 Training Battalion, 2d Basic Combat Training Brigade. At
 18 that time, we had gender-mixed cadre but still had a
 19 distinct program of instruction. I later refer to that
 20 as POI for the women training.
 21 However, it was clear that the Fort
 22 Jackson commander was impressed with the training
 23 performance female recruits and the emphasis was on

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1 experience as an OSUT MP battalion commander is
 2 consistent with the empirical findings of the Defense
 3 Equal Opportunity Management Institute evaluation of
 4 recruit training at the Naval Training Center in 1992.
 5 And in that regard, I am speaking of specifically their
 6 findings that cohesion and teamwork were enhanced by
 7 gender-integrated training.
 8 In 1993, the U.S. Army Training and
 9 Doctrine Command had a prototype report of gender-
 10 integrated IET, and again the performance rates for
 11 soldiers in mixed units was higher than that in
 12 segregated units in terms again of these success
 13 measures: Army physical fitness, basic rifle
 14 marksmanship, and end-of-cycle testing.
 15 And finally, the Army Research Institute
 16 assessment of 1995, again reinforcing that women tend to
 17 perform better and men about the same in integrated or
 18 segregated units. In sum, it was my experience that the
 19 gender-integrated training works and it works well.
 20 Finally, I would like to address the issue
 21 of readiness, for I believe the case for gender-
 22 integrated training rests on readiness imperatives. In
 23 my view, women are integral to the fighting capability of

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1 the Army. It may have been true once, but it's no longer
2 true: military women are not adjunct support. The
3 reality is that the Army is an integrated gender-mixed
4 force.

5 My experience tells me that segregated
6 training produces less trained soldiers, especially women
7 soldiers. With women now representing about 15 percent
8 of the Army, I do not believe readiness is advanced by
9 having 15 percent of the force less well trained than the
10 other 85 percent. Readiness requires that all soldiers
11 be equally well trained.

12 And I will say that I speak specifically
13 as an MP commander, with units deployed all over the
14 world, since about the 1989 time frame, really beginning
15 prior to Grenada, and I can say that I don't think any MP
16 commander can afford to have 15 percent of its units less
17 well trained than the other 85 percent.

18 This concludes my prepared remarks. I
19 thank you very much for the privilege to testify today.
20 And subject to your questions, that's the end of my
21 statement.

22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much.
23 And I thank you again for coming here. As

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1 I mentioned earlier, our practice is just to go around
2 the table until we run out of questions, and I will
3 start. I have been very interested to learn, if you can
4 tell us, at what point the POI for male training and
5 female training came together.

6 COLONEL FREY: I think it was probably
7 about the 1976 time frame. When I left Fort Jackson, we
8 had already integrated basic rifle marksmanship into the
9 sixty-hour program and it was somewhat — sometime
10 thereafter, which was '76, that they actually went to one
11 POI.

12 And at this time, Jackson was really one
13 of the leaders in developing training programs. It
14 wasn't until much later that Fort Benning became the
15 proponent for the basic combat training POI.

16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. You mentioned that
17 at a certain point weapons training for women was —
18 could not be mandatory and so forth.

19 COLONEL FREY: That's correct.

20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Was that before this
21 period?

22 COLONEL FREY: Yes. When we started
23 training women at Fort Jackson in 1974, after three weeks

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1 into the training cycle — and I remember it very well —
2 we went into a voluntary basic rifle marksmanship
3 program, which was over the weekend because we had to
4 compress it into the schedule. Twenty-five hours, with
5 qualification still being the outcome.

6 And the results were really very
7 gratifying. The soldiers generally participated at about
8 90 percent of the unit and they generally qualified at
9 about 99.9 percent.

10 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: If I might,
11 when I was at Fort McClellan, which I didn't mention, and
12 took over the Committee Group, weapons training was
13 voluntary and you did not have to do it in order to pass
14 and go on into the rest of the Army.

15 General Kingston arrived at Fort McClellan
16 and wanted to make it part of the POI and move it very
17 much forward for women at Fort McClellan. But we were
18 instructed to keep it very quiet because we did not know
19 "how the American public will accept weapons training for
20 its women," so we moved from familiarization to firing
21 for qualification very quietly and very carefully. And
22 that was '74 to '76, when that was done. Along that
23 area.

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1 And then I do remember when the men
2 integrated also in like '78, I guess, when we integrated
3 together at Fort McClellan. I believe it was then when
4 we had a similar POI, because it seems to me that we
5 added a lot more in the physical area because I remember
6 seven, ten and twelve-mile road marches every week. I
7 mean, these feet got really tired.

8 DR. SEGAL: What year was that?

9 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: I believe
10 it was late '78 when we integrated the men and women in
11 the basic training because I gave over the battalion in
12 early '79. So it was the end of '78. And we had not
13 done anything along the line of that much road marching
14 and stuff before. Bivouacking.

15 And also, when I was Chief of the
16 Committee Group at Fort McClellan, we had introduced very
17 much expanded defensive and offensive techniques. So
18 women understood how to do the foxholes and do all that
19 kind of thing.

20 So that's — What I was personally
21 involved in was that expansion of that POI for the women.
22 And when that male cadre person came over, who was an
23 infantry person that we could do that, that brought a lot

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1 of expertise to the Women's Army Corps Center, who did
2 the best that they could with the knowledge that they
3 have; but when you just didn't know how to do that, it
4 was something that was a great attribute when we got some
5 outside male experience.

6 COLONEL FREY: During that time frame
7 where I was still at Fort Jackson, there was a lot of
8 collaboration between McClellan and Fort Jackson on the
9 POI.

10 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Right.

11 COLONEL FREY: I made several trips down
12 in helping Fort McClellan prepare their POI as they — in
13 that time frame.

14 The other point I would make on the OSUT
15 training at Fort McClellan, the school moved from Fort
16 Gordon to Fort McClellan and I believe it was in 1977
17 when they stood up the battalions and started training.
18 My battalion, which was the 40th, started with integrated
19 training and has, until it was inactivated in the draw-
20 down in the nineteen-nineties, had continuous integrated
21 training from '77 on.

22 The McClellan OSUT units never
23 desegregated as the rest of TRADOC did in that 1982 time

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1 frame. Was it '82? '86.

2 MS. POPE: I'm sorry, but do you know why?

3 COLONEL FREY: It's pure conjecture and
4 speculation.

5 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: What?

6 MS. POPE: Why it didn't — McClellan and
7 the OSUT training didn't —

8 COLONEL FREY: Oh.

9 MS. POPE: Oh, I'm sorry.

10 COLONEL FREY: I think they viewed
11 themselves as not basic training but OSUT, and gave
12 themselves latitude to continue.

13 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: And, of
14 course, the reason for OSUT was to not have that
15 delineation between basic and now —

16 MS. POPE: Right. Right.

17 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: — you move
18 on to AIT. So by making it One Station Unit Training,
19 and bringing half the people in in the middle, you were
20 totally denigrating the idea of One Station Unit Training
21 —

22 MS. POPE: Right. Of OSUT.

23 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: — for the

1 cohesion and team-building and all of that kind of thing.
 2 MS. POPE: Who was the commanding general
 3 at McClellan at the time?
 4 COLONEL FREY: In 1973, when I was first
 5 there, it was General Cole.
 6 MS. POPE: No, ma'am — Okay.
 7 COLONEL FREY: Then Kingston was there '74
 8 —
 9 MS. POPE: But I meant when the rest of
 10 the Army went back to segregated.
 11 DR. SEGAL: '81-82.
 12 MS. POPE: Yeah. In the early eighties,
 13 when the Army made the decision to go back to segregated
 14 basic training.
 15 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: I left in
 16 '79. I can't recall who was there then. It would have
 17 been an MP, and I —
 18 COLONEL FREY: Yes.
 19 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: I don't
 20 know who it was. I'm sorry.
 21 DR. SEGAL: An MP commander at McClellan?
 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Yeah, it
 23 would've been an MP.

1 MS. POPE: It was just curious that as the
 2 Army decided to go back — I'd be curious as to the
 3 rationale on why OSUT — I mean, it's probably pretty
 4 obvious, but...
 5 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: I can't
 6 remember when General Clark was there. I'm sorry.
 7 MS. POPE: Okay.
 8 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: General
 9 Clark was there and I don't remember the date that she
 10 was there.
 11 MS. POPE: Okay.
 12 DR. SEGAL: It may have during that period
 13 —
 14 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: She was
 15 there in '78, I think, when I had my battalion.
 16 Now, whether she was there during the
 17 period of time you're questioning, I'm sorry, I don't
 18 know.
 19 MS. POPE: No, that's — I was just
 20 curious.
 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Because
 22 then she came up here to DA and I'm —
 23 MS. POPE: Thanks.

1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.
 2 Fred.
 3 MR. PANG: Just to follow-up a little, you
 4 know, on the — You know, I think it's fair to say that
 5 since 1973, there has been a tremendous evolution in the
 6 way basic training is being conducted in the Army. And
 7 when I think about this, it's probably fair to say that
 8 there were more differences at the early — between the
 9 training — the training between men and women, there
 10 were more differences in terms of standard and the like
 11 than there is today.
 12 So today, when we look at basic training,
 13 the only difference seems to be, you know, in terms of
 14 measurable standards and the like, is physical fitness
 15 training because of the different physical attributes of
 16 men and women, and, you know, the obstacle course, which
 17 is really not a measure but, you know — So there are
 18 these differences.
 19 And I'm just wondering in your experience
 20 how divisive was that, you know, in your view, with
 21 regard to the men and women who were engaged in that
 22 training, and was it really a big deal or not really a
 23 big deal?

1 COLONEL FREY: Again, my view is there's
 2 no substitute for good leadership, and units did not have
 3 divisive problems if they had strong leadership.
 4 In terms of the progressive — or the
 5 physical conditioning, again, starting in the '76 time
 6 frame, we went into an evolution on progressive
 7 conditioning.
 8 And as a battalion commander, the issue of
 9 physical fitness was one where we challenged everybody
 10 because we did it in ability groups, and there was really
 11 no rivalry within the ability group other than within the
 12 ability group. So as I say, if you had the fast-
 13 trackers, they could still be fast-trackers without
 14 causing any problems for the other soldiers that were
 15 less physically up-to-snuff.
 16 And I'll also make a comment again in
 17 terms of outcomes. At the end of eight weeks in an OSUT
 18 program, which there was really very little difference
 19 between the eight weeks for basic combat training and
 20 OSUT training, men generally performed at a higher level
 21 of physical fitness. But by the end of the eighteen
 22 weeks, the women's level of physical performance was
 23 better.

1 And I believe that again had to do with
 2 the fact that women, for whatever reasons, tend to take
 3 longer to come up to a high level of physical fitness.
 4 But did they meet it? Yes, particularly if you have
 5 sustained emphasis on it.
 6 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: I'd like to
 7 say something to that, too. I think so very often that
 8 people put far too much emphasis on physical fitness
 9 scores because the standard is here (Indicating), and the
 10 question is, did you meet and exceed the standard. And
 11 if you did, then you've X'd that thing.
 12 And perhaps because it is so easily
 13 measurable, that in my opinion a lot of times people who
 14 drive for this-whole-company-has-to, you know, max-the-
 15 300 kind of thing, really can be more divisive than
 16 letting people do the ability grouping and do the best of
 17 what they can with their physical fitness abilities
 18 because they're not always going to be heros.
 19 MR. PANG: And the reason I raised the
 20 question was, you know, in our trips — and we've been to
 21 all of the basic training units or organizations — okay?
 22 — of the services — and in some of our operational, you
 23 know, visits, when we talked to men and women, you know,

1 the issue arises, you know, gee whiz, women have to, you
 2 know, perform at a — have to have a different level of
 3 fitness that they have to achieve than men do.
 4 And when they say that, they mean test
 5 scores. I mean, you know, running the two miles or
 6 whatever it is. You know, how many push-ups and sit-ups
 7 you have to do and the like.
 8 And I agree with you. I mean, you know,
 9 the basic training is not all physical fitness. There's
 10 physical conditioning. I mean, there's a lot more —
 11 okay? — to basic training than just that.
 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Oh, yeah.
 13 And I wasn't speaking to just basic training.
 14 MR. PANG: But because there is a
 15 difference — okay? — for some — not all, but for some
 16 people, I mean, you know — and it's bothersome and I
 17 think we need to address that because it's covered in our
 18 statute. I mean, you know, there's this perception and I
 19 don't know how you overcome that.
 20 I mean, you were leaders. How did you
 21 overcome that? Because it must have arisen, I mean, in
 22 your units as you were commanding, I mean, because it
 23 exists today.

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1 COLONEL FREY: Again, I think it's a
2 question of what the commander emphasizes, and the
3 emphasis in the units that I commanded was that every
4 soldier be the best he or she can be. And second of all,
5 that they meet the standard.
6 And, unfortunately, I think there has over
7 time been some erosion of the standards for women just
8 because they've been dismissed as something less worthy
9 of training in some units, particularly — It's a start-
10 up problem. I won't tell you that when we started
11 training women at Fort Jackson there weren't problems.
12 But as the male cadre and the male commanders learned
13 what women were capable of, things got better and better.
14 MR. PANG: So in your view, it really
15 wasn't a huge problem for you then.
16 COLONEL FREY: No.
17 MR. PANG: You know, this perception
18 problem. Is that correct?
19 COLONEL FREY: And the other thing is,
20 really what you're talking about is running and how fast
21 women can run in comparison to men, even more than the
22 upper body strength, because I've seen some women do
23 fairly well on the push-up event.

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1 But if the measure is running — okay? —
2 then — and you make women feel like they're less
3 successful because they can't run as fast, then I say
4 shame on the leadership. Because by the same token, we
5 used to do road marches and I know some women who could
6 dog out the men every time.
7 So it's the well-rounded soldier that
8 you're looking for and something for every soldier to
9 feel good about.
10 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: It might be
11 helpful for the committee in total to know that there was
12 another dynamic at work in the Army between '75 and '80,
13 and that was an analysis of every career field in an
14 attempt to document for the first time task conditions
15 and standards for those tasks specific to those jobs.
16 And it was an educational process for
17 anybody involved in it, but what it did I think in the
18 end — and you may or may not agree, but what it did is
19 it put an end to that concept of he or she, or even in
20 some cases that unit, "did not get assessed the same way
21 we did."
22 The Army had a set of criteria now that
23 said if you're going to be a military policeman, here are

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1 the individual tasks that you must be able to execute,
2 both physical and mental, in order to measure up to be a
3 military policeman. And it grew, but it started in '75.
4 So at the same time that we did this with
5 gender-integration, we were changing the dynamics of
6 training at the same time.
7 MR. PANG: Yeah.
8 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: That's
9 true. That's true.
10 DR. SEGAL: What other changes —
11 Following on that, what other changes were taking place
12 in a program of instruction during this period? We heard
13 earlier today, for example, that it wasn't until about
14 '75 or '76 that basic training actually became more
15 hands-on. That earlier it had been, for both men and
16 women, primarily classroom education.
17 Could you talk about the changes that you
18 saw in that? Not just as a result of gender-integration,
19 but also that was taking place in the POI for men and the
20 POI for women.
21 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: More field
22 training. More living in the field. Essentially field
23 duty. Like I said, the road marches which were added on,

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1 which used to be very minimal.
2 DR. SEGAL: And that wasn't — that was a
3 change for men as well as for women?
4 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: It was a
5 change in the female battalion that I had to add those on
6 and make them more difficult.
7 Now, how long the men might have been
8 doing that, I suspect it was quite a while.
9 COLONEL FREY: That was one of the major
10 issues for me when I moved from McClellan to Jackson as a
11 company commander. At McClellan — And the POI was so
12 different, because one of those areas that comes to mind
13 as different was there was a large block of instruction
14 on appearance in terms of wearing makeup, manners, and
15 care and wear of your uniform, which was introduced at
16 Fort Jackson; but as we went further and further towards
17 integration, there was less wear of a — what we call the
18 Class B uniform, which would be a skirt, and more into
19 fatigues at that time or BDU's, as we know them today.
20 The other thing that was clear at Jackson
21 is the ranges were well developed; been operational for a
22 very long period of time. And so when you went out to
23 the ranges with your women trainees, they were getting a

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1 different exposure to the combat soldier skills than they
2 would have at Fort McClellan and did at that point in
3 time.
4 And all of the ranges were operated by
5 committees of combat arms NCO's and officers that were
6 fully skilled, which was not true — First of all,
7 McClellan didn't even have a lot of active ranges at that
8 point in time.
9 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: And we used
10 to just envy them when we'd go to visit Jackson because
11 all the ranges were right out there on that white sand.
12 And when those targets would pop up, man, they could all
13 shoot at those targets. Back there in McClellan, this
14 little target would pop up in all that deep, dark green
15 woods and you were lucky to even see it, let alone shoot
16 it.
17 So we always knew why the Jackson people
18 got higher scores than the McClellan people. They had
19 great ranges. As she said, they had great facilities and
20 they've been doing it for a long time and had really
21 super — you know, super training facilities.
22 COLONEL FREY: It was also that same time
23 that the task condition and standard way of training in

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1 the Army was coming about, too. So you were — That's
2 the hands-on at that point in time. And we were defining
3 that not only for basic training in the initial training
4 environment, but also in unit training as well.
5 DR. SEGAL: What level of soldier were you
6 getting, both male and female, during that period when
7 you were there? We talked a little bit about the
8 standards of selection. And also, I believe — since you
9 were in the training establishment when it was primarily
10 classroom instruction, I believe the issue of the grade
11 level of the reading materials was something that was
12 prevalent at the time.
13 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Well, the
14 women, first of all, were always high school graduates as
15 a minimum and many of them had some college — a year or
16 two, perhaps even more, college graduates — and you
17 didn't find that as much with the men at all. So that
18 made it easier for them to pick up a lot of things and
19 just, you know, very quick-studies in many ways.
20 And another thing — it may not be
21 directly related, but something that the cadre really
22 liked about training the women, particularly out on the
23 weapons ranges and things like that, was the woman was

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1 never afraid to say "I'm afraid of the weapon" or "I've
 2 never done this before. I don't know how to do it," and
 3 the man would want to be so macho, he would never admit,
 4 even if he had never seen a gun in his life, that he
 5 didn't know all about it.
 6 And so this level perhaps of maturity —
 7 this level of maturity also made them not afraid to say
 8 that; it made the training safer. Because with them not
 9 saying it — They would listen better, both sexes would
 10 listen better to the instruction, and the cadre really
 11 did like that; felt that was a great plus.
 12 DR. SEGAL: What sort of cadre transition
 13 adjustments did you find, especially since you've been —
 14 you went through a period where first you were training
 15 — women training women, then you brought in men to train
 16 the increase in women who were being recruited, and then
 17 you started training gender-integrated.
 18 What sort of issues did you have? I
 19 presume that most of your cadre — male cadre coming in
 20 were combat arms and they were training the women or — I
 21 don't know. Talk a little bit about the cadre and how
 22 they adjusted to this.
 23 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Well, in my

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1 experience, I believe that most of them were MP's in mine
 2 because they came over from across the post. Cole came
 3 with the MP school. And they were the spearhead. They
 4 were the ones who were going to go over and get into this
 5 new thing and they came being very weary — very weary of
 6 what they were going to get into.
 7 DR. SEGAL: Had they volunteered for this?
 8 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: I truly
 9 don't remember at the beginning if they were volunteers
 10 or selected. I just really don't remember.
 11 DR. SEGAL: I presume they —
 12 COLONEL FREY: I would doubt seriously. I
 13 mean, there was great trepidation.
 14 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Yes.
 15 COLONEL FREY: I mean, this was ground-
 16 breaking at the time.
 17 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: But once
 18 they got over there and were there for just a little
 19 while and saw how eager the women were to work, how —
 20 Like I said, they'd say they were afraid of something and
 21 so on and so forth, and —
 22 DR. SEGAL: What were the fears of the
 23 cadre when you started the —

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1 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: The
 2 unknown; as anything is, the unknown. "Gee, how do we
 3 talk about female issues," that kind of thing. And they
 4 got so they could talk about women's periods and things
 5 of that nature without smirking and being embarrassed
 6 about it and things of that — These are facts. These
 7 are things that leaders do.
 8 And once you've been through a cycle, a
 9 training cycle, you've kind of been around the Horn once
 10 and next time it's old hat. And then you initiate the
 11 new ones and — And so after the first ones went around,
 12 it became a whole lot easier.
 13 DR. SEGAL: And I know we didn't have the
 14 term "sexual harassment" back then, but did you have
 15 charges of inappropriate behavior?
 16 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Minor.
 17 Very minor. I just — It doesn't even stick out in my
 18 mind. Again, as Karen has said and I just always
 19 emphasize, it's really a leadership issue and the
 20 presence of leadership after hours, in the clubs, in the
 21 church, here and there, and they know that someone is
 22 there caring. And it was truly minimum that I recall.
 23 COLONEL FREY: I think you will always

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1 find there was an occasional incident of what I would
 2 call in the larger context training abuse.
 3 MS. POPE: What was that? I'm sorry.
 4 COLONEL FREY: Training abuse. Excuse me.
 5 MS. POPE: Training abuse.
 6 COLONEL FREY: Because what you're really
 7 talking about is, is a subordinate taking advantage of
 8 the situation.
 9 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Subordinate
 10 or superior?
 11 DR. SEGAL: Subordinate or superior?
 12 COLONEL FREY: I'm sorry. Superior.
 13 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Superior.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: Or both.
 15 COLONEL FREY: It could be, although —
 16 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: That's
 17 true. That's true. That's true, Charlie.
 18 COLONEL FREY: And there was that. But
 19 for the most part, when there were incidents, it was with
 20 a drill sergeant who lost control, and in most cases it
 21 was when they were late on what they called in the Army
 22 "on the trail."
 23 The drill sergeant tour was eighteen

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1 months to twenty-four. And after that, then if they
 2 stayed a third year, they usually went into the reception
 3 battalion, and there is where you had most of your
 4 problems. It was almost as if they knew they had made it
 5 and they relaxed. And it was very tempting, obviously,
 6 because as you know — I'm sure you've heard lots of
 7 testimony — drill sergeants are gods. They are the
 8 outside world to the soldier, be it male or female.
 9 And that's why I call it an abuse of
 10 power, because what you're really talking about is
 11 someone who is there, entrusted with the responsibility
 12 to take care of young people who don't know any better,
 13 to lead them in the right way. And when they fail to do
 14 that, they are really doing more than a sexual problem.
 15 This is really —
 16 DR. SEGAL: But this was a rare event?
 17 COLONEL FREY: For the most part, yes.
 18 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: You know,
 19 Karen brought up a good point. That once they get to a
 20 certain point and they've really been around the Horn and
 21 they feel really good about themselves, and they love
 22 what they're doing — They love what they're doing
 23 because it's really fun and it's great stuff to do.

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1 And I think it was like at thirteen months
 2 or thereabouts where they had to put in for their
 3 extension for the third year. I believe that in all the
 4 time I was there, I only approved two extensions of all
 5 the ones that I got. Because when you're high and you
 6 want to extend and you want to do it for a third year —
 7 Because I truly knew in my heart of hearts that at the
 8 end of twenty-four months they would be worn out.
 9 And I ran into one of them later in Korea.
 10 Interesting. And she came up to me and said, "Ma'am, I
 11 want to thank you." She said, "I came up and saw you and
 12 begged for you to give me a third year on drill sergeant
 13 status and you turned me down." And she said, "It was
 14 absolutely the right thing to do. I could never have
 15 made it."
 16 And I felt really good about that, and
 17 felt good, furthermore, that she validated that. But
 18 there is a point where burn-out happens for everybody.
 19 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I'll defer
 20 to Charlie while I think.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah, while you think.
 22 First of all, thank God that they have
 23 that dairy there. Otherwise, we wouldn't have had you in

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1 the — I'm not sure if the dairy has a similar — I don't
 2 know — situation or not.
 3 I wanted to just ask a couple general
 4 questions, and I think you have been very, very
 5 informative to us. To what degree are modesty concerns
 6 — especially in women, but to some degree men as well —
 7 an issue in basic training or OSUT training or any other
 8 kind of training setting? Should these be at the
 9 forefront of our concerns, middle level, ignore it, or
 10 what?
 11 As opposed to — Everybody always talks
 12 about the physical stuff all the time, which is
 13 important, but what about — Are there modesty issues
 14 which people don't tend to shy away from discussing? Are
 15 these questions that we should look at or not?
 16 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: I just —
 17 People find there are accommodations. They really do.
 18 You know, turn your back; close your eyes; hang up the
 19 sheet; you go to that room, I go to this room. Latrine:
 20 "closed" sign, "open" sign. You know, whatever it is,
 21 that kind of thing.
 22 COLONEL FREY: I guess I would say that —
 23 as a commander, I would say that every soldier, male or

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1 female, has a right to a certain amount of privacy. And
 2 that's within the context of being in a barracks and
 3 sleeping in open bays, what I would consider the optimum
 4 training environment, because you're learning to work
 5 together as a team.
 6 But still, there is — And it probably
 7 boils down to respect more than anything else. Respect
 8 to women. But having said that, I think if you asked any
 9 soldier trained, they would say that they probably
 10 practice a lot of field expedient. That they apply a
 11 much more common sense standard to what is modesty and
 12 what isn't than what a commander would like to hope for,
 13 particularly in latrine facilities and any time you're in
 14 the field.
 15 And that's true not only of the training
 16 environment, but also the operational units.
 17 MR. PANG: Very true.
 18 COLONEL FREY: And I think everybody just
 19 says, "Hey, I'm in the Army. I chose to be here and this
 20 is the way it is."
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Well, what about the issue —
 22 This is not directly — You can probably pass this off as
 23 the same question. Should women be allowed into the

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1 combat arms? The ground combat arms? What are your
 2 personal views on that question?
 3 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: My personal
 4 view is "no."
 5 DR. MOSKOS: No.
 6 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: It is. And
 7 many do not understand the difference between being in
 8 the combat arms and being in a combat zone, and I find
 9 this particularly — Like when Desert Storm and so on has
 10 heated up and you're doing a lot of radio shows and
 11 interviews and those kinds of things. People say, "Well,
 12 they're over there doing that with their — "they've got
 13 their weapons." And I said, "Of course."
 14 I mean, I'm not telling you anything new.
 15 The rifle is our basic weapon and everybody does that,
 16 and you do what you have to do and you're ready to, you
 17 know, protect yourself.
 18 But to me, the issue is how we win the
 19 first battle of the next war. And if the issue of women
 20 in combat is going to be so divisive that it divides the
 21 Army and takes the focus off of us doing that, and it's
 22 not necessary at this time, then to me, personally, the
 23 answer is "no."

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1 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you.
 2 COLONEL FREY: My view would be that this
 3 whole issue of women in the military is evolutionary and
 4 that the issue of whether women serve in the combat arms
 5 is really one of necessity and skill and qualification.
 6 And that as the threat changes and as we become more and
 7 more technological, that my view would be that we want
 8 the best qualified person to do the job, whatever branch
 9 it might be.
 10 But it is certainly nothing that I see as
 11 we ought to mandate right today that everything's open.
 12 It will come if it's going to as a basis of military need
 13 and readiness.
 14 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Readiness.
 15 Based on readiness.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Thanks.
 17 MS. POPE: I don't have any questions
 18 right now. I may.
 19 But thank you. Thanks for coming.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My question
 21 deals with barracks and the security of barracks. Both
 22 of you have commanded and both of you have had mixed-
 23 gender barracks and the like.

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1 Recently, the armed forces, through dictum
 2 of the Department of Defense and studies such as
 3 Kassebaum, have taken some pretty stringent, in my
 4 judgment, efforts, such as TV cameras and monitors and
 5 permanent strong partitions, et cetera, et cetera.
 6 You obviously integrated in a barracks
 7 with men and women a couple decades ago. I'd just like
 8 your personal opinion on security in the barracks with
 9 the mixed-gender organization.
 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Security —
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Especially
 12 in recruit training. Basic —
 13 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Security of
 14 person or security of property?
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Security of
 16 persons I guess is the real issue, apparently. Property
 17 has always been one of — Well, comment on both if you
 18 will.
 19 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Well, the
 20 men had these wings and went there, and the women had
 21 these wings and went there. And again, I truly just — I
 22 cannot remember an issue of that really being a concern.
 23 Now, in a training environment, you

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1 normally have someone who's pretty much around the
 2 barracks. I mean, a cadre member or a trainee holdover
 3 or somebody who is there kind of keeping an eye on
 4 things, too, which may be different than a permanent
 5 party barracks.
 6 But when I read the recommendation that,
 7 if you will, women be taken over and put into the
 8 separate barracks again, my thought was something like
 9 this: "Gosh, the update of the nineteen-forties when we
 10 put them with the barbed wire around the barracks is now
 11 that we'll just use lasers and keep out whoever it's
 12 supposed to keep out."
 13 I don't like to see that. It's not
 14 happened to their sisters and brothers who were in the
 15 college campuses or on the apartments out here. These
 16 are men and women who are all over eighteen, and if you
 17 think you're going to prevent everybody from getting
 18 together, you're not. And I think it will spend more
 19 time, money and energy trying to do that than it's worth.
 20 I just don't see it as being that much of
 21 an issue.
 22 COLONEL FREY: We've always had duty NCO's
 23 and CQ's in units, in charge of quarters, and I am sure,

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1 as it was in my day, there is a policy that they make
 2 checks throughout the night to check on soldiers. More
 3 for safety reasons than anything else. But if there are
 4 transgressions or violations, that again is really a
 5 failure of the chain of command and the system to enforce
 6 standards.
 7 The notion that we need to segregate or
 8 separate in my mind is a problem in terms of command
 9 control and in the long run may cause more problems. Not
 10 only does it stretch your cadre to check more areas, but
 11 as I say, it also separates out part of your unit.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Well, I can
 13 follow this up because obviously it's an issue I just —
 14 You're in your barracks. I'm going to take you back now
 15 in time and you're both commanders, battalion and a
 16 company, and it's been legislated that because we're
 17 concerned about security, you're going to have TV cameras
 18 in all the ladder wells, and at your duty desk you're
 19 going to maintain monitors so that you in fact can watch
 20 what's going on.
 21 I assume I'm going to get the same answer
 22 I've already gotten, but is that a worthwhile expense?
 23 COLONEL FREY: No.

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1 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: No, not at
 2 all. On a military post? Military place? I don't think
 3 so.
 4 COLONEL FREY: I can speak as a military
 5 police, and a security person, too, and I would tell you
 6 that whenever you have TV monitors, they are only as good
 7 as the person watching them. And, I mean, there's a
 8 whole industry of people making a living off of security
 9 and security intrusion detection devices, but it's that
 10 guard, whoever he might be, that's watching the machine
 11 that really makes it work or fail to work.
 12 So I would be less than candid if I didn't
 13 say that it's probably a fairly big waste of money. The
 14 real issue with the training is that we're trying to
 15 instill discipline and standards in soldiers and I don't
 16 think you do it with crutches like intrusion detective
 17 devices.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I
 19 appreciate that. I just wanted to get that on the
 20 record.
 21 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: General
 22 Christmas had to have someone else say that on the record
 23 besides us.

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Because,
 2 quite frankly, the Army and the Air Force are spending a
 3 great deal of money right now based on —
 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: The Army,
 5 too?
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Oh, yes.
 7 MS. POPE: Yeah.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: At Fort
 9 Jackson. And that's — One wonders that a lot of that
 10 money couldn't be spent for other training that is
 11 required.
 12 COLONEL FREY: And you can't imagine how
 13 many times those TV monitors break down, too, for one
 14 reason or another.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 16 MS. POPE: I thought I had reserved my
 17 question. I guess both of you have been in a variety of
 18 command positions. Were there any tools you wish you had
 19 had for — as far as leadership, discipline, when the
 20 soldiers — when something was out of whack, that you
 21 didn't have as Commanding Officer?
 22 COLONEL FREY: I guess I would react, time
 23 and drill sergeants. If there's one stress in the

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1 training environment, it's probably on the cadre more
 2 than it is on the soldiers.
 3 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Oh, that's
 4 true.
 5 COLONEL FREY: And if there was a way to
 6 create less stress on drill sergeants, you would probably
 7 have less problems in the training environment.
 8 MS. POPE: Interesting. That answer
 9 hasn't changed much in —
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: It hasn't
 11 changed much.
 12 MS. POPE: Thank you.
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: One of the recurring
 14 issues that we hear about as we talk with people in the
 15 field is pregnancy. And when we talk about gender
 16 issues, we talk about pregnancy. And realizing that
 17 people are deployable for lots of — non-deployable for
 18 lots of different kinds of reasons, nonetheless, this
 19 issue seems to be something that people connect with the
 20 presence of women.
 21 And I just wonder if you could give me a
 22 little historical perspective about attitudes towards
 23 pregnancy, you know, from your time, and your personal

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1 opinion about that as a special kind of readiness issue
 2 or whether it's just another aspect of, you know, people
 3 showing up or not showing up to be deployed.
 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Well, back
 5 when I was first in training and even when Karen and I
 6 were in recruiting duty, it wasn't an issue because you
 7 couldn't stay in. You couldn't have children. And then
 8 when it changed — and I don't remember when that was —
 9 DR. SEGAL: It was in the middle — It was
 10 during the seventies. And it's very hard to pin down
 11 because the services were different and there was a
 12 period where it went from women had to get out to they
 13 could possibly stay in if they requested a waiver, and
 14 then it switched to they could only get out if they
 15 requested a waiver.
 16 So it happened gradually. By 1978, all of
 17 the services — '78-79, all of the services were allowing
 18 women to stay in if pregnant.
 19 COLONEL FREY: There was also a
 20 prohibition against a woman enlisting in the military if
 21 she already had dependent children and I'm not sure
 22 whether that policy is still in force or not. I don't
 23 know.

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1 But having said all that —
 2 DR. SEGAL: I think single parents can —
 3 Well, that may have just recently changed. But up until
 4 very recently, single parents of either sex could not —
 5 COLONEL FREY: Well, I will tell you it
 6 was —
 7 MS. POPE: Well, you could be a parent but
 8 you have to have a legal guardianship.
 9 COLONEL FREY: And it was easily
 10 circumvented —
 11 MS. POPE: Right.
 12 COLONEL FREY: — because you give legal
 13 guardianship to your parents while you're in basic
 14 training. Then when you get to your first station, you
 15 get the kids back.
 16 MS. POPE: That hasn't changed.
 17 COLONEL FREY: Yeah.
 18 But having said that, the whole issue of
 19 pregnancy is a very significant one and I don't believe
 20 that the services have really come to grips with it. I
 21 don't think the services can separate truth from fiction.
 22 Again, it becomes a stereotype of women and their ability
 23 to deploy, but the reality may or may not be substantive.

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1 There are some statistics that I am aware
2 of that say that the pregnancies of women in the military
3 is really less than the average for certain ages. So I
4 just think there needs to be a lot deeper look into the
5 entire issue.

6 The other thing is, I have also heard that
7 in deployed areas you have women who get pregnant at a
8 higher rate.

9 Okay. If that's true, I would like to
10 know why. Is it because they want to get out of the
11 deployment, or is there something else about the
12 environment that causes pregnancies? You know, if
13 nothing else, the absence of birth control?

14 You know, there are a whole lot of issues
15 that perhaps we don't talk to men and women about and one
16 of them may be intercourse and the potential for
17 pregnancy and other sexually transmitted diseases. We
18 probably don't do enough candid talk about all that.

19 So I would say that's an open issue and
20 it's one that we need to deal with.

21 DR. MOSKOS: What would be your — Colonel
22 Frey, if you could make a pregnancy policy just
23 unilaterally, what would you like to see happening?

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1 COLONEL FREY: That's a good question.

2 DR. SEGAL: That men would have to get
3 pregnant, too.

4 COLONEL FREY: That's right. The men
5 would have to get out if the women got pregnant.

6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We know your policy.

7 DR. MOSKOS: Geez, that's easy for the
8 men, then. If they impregnate a woman, they should get
9 out of the Army.

10 COLONEL FREY: Right.

11 DR. MOSKOS: Gotcha.

12 COLONEL FREY: We'll keep the kids.

13 No. Seriously, I really — I think that
14 there is a — A woman has a right to serve and a duty to
15 serve if she so feels that way. And having said that, if
16 having a family seems to come to the point where it's
17 incompatible with military service, she also probably
18 ought to choose to leave.

19 But there are a lot of women who are
20 unfairly judged by virtue of being pregnant because I
21 know a lot of military women who continued to serve up
22 until very late in their pregnancy and do their duties.
23 So, you know, it's not one-size-fits-all, by any stretch.

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1 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: I certainly
2 think, in my opinion, you know, there's a vast difference
3 between having one or two children and having four or
4 five or six, too. Because if you've had four children,
5 you've probably been out of the loop for a long period of
6 time, and then because it's prevented you from doing what
7 your peers are doing, you can't come along and holler
8 discrimination because you didn't have the chance to do
9 what they were doing — i.e., maybe commanding in a very
10 rough environment or something at the time when all their
11 peers were doing it.

12 And as I've often pointed out to people,
13 the military service isn't like when you say, "Well, I'll
14 skip this now and go back and do it later," like when
15 you're in college: "Well, I won't take this freshman
16 course now. I'll take it, you know, in a couple-three
17 years." Which you can do some of those kinds of things,
18 but you don't say, "I'll go back and be a company
19 commander later," or a platoon leader or what have you.

20 And so people make some choices. But I
21 just think that there's — in many cases, there's a
22 fulcrum point where family responsibilities probably are
23 much heavier than dedication to being on-call to deploy

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1 in twenty-four hours and leave four children behind or
2 something.

3 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: You know,
4 it's interesting how things change. I saw a change in
5 the Army from the time when a female was pregnant, she's
6 out, period, no and's — even if she begged to stay,
7 she's out — to put them in civilian clothes so that they
8 were a mark, easily marked — from day one, they went
9 into civilian clothes — to the Army maternity uniform
10 that was — It was a signal from a mile away, and as a
11 consequence, they were treated as pariah — to today.
12 And I think the difference today is "we were one deep in
13 that job and I don't have her now to do that job because
14 she is pregnant."

15 I've seen this whole thing switch to "we
16 rely on that individual to do the job," and I think that
17 is the crux of the issue today, more than the negatives
18 towards women being pregnant.

19 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Well said.
20 Well stated. Thank you. Well stated.

21 DR. SEGAL: So basically you're saying
22 that the issue of pregnancy is like other issues of
23 people's non-availability to serve for whatever reason.

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1 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Readiness.

2 DR. SEGAL: And there are multiple ones
3 that impact on readiness.

4 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Absolutely.

5 DR. SEGAL: And those are the issues we
6 have to deal with, is the one deep or the fact that other
7 people have to pick up the slack.

8 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Right.

9 DR. SEGAL: And that those issues are
10 issues that are not peculiar to pregnancy. In fact,
11 pregnancy, it's easier to predict the length of time when
12 the person's not going to be available. Although you
13 can't predict exactly, it's easier to predict then when
14 somebody breaks a leg because of a sports accident or all
15 the other injuries or abuses drugs or has a family
16 problem of some other sort or has an in-discipline
17 problem.

18 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, I
19 mean, I wouldn't put it — If I have a female fuel
20 handler and she comes and tells me she's pregnant, she
21 just found out she's pregnant and she's in her first or
22 second month, in my mind, I have now lost her. At a
23 minimum, I have lost her for twelve months.

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1 She is non-deployable and not available to
2 me. And the Army is not going to replace her. She is
3 going to be on my books. She's going to be one of my
4 soldiers. I don't say this to be negative but to be
5 realistic.

6 That's a little — I think that's looked
7 at a little bit different than if I walk in to you with a
8 cast on my foot and you say, "How long is that going to
9 be on," and I say four weeks, six weeks, whatever the
10 case may be.

11 It's just perceived to be different. It's
12 a long period of time of which you're charged with the
13 responsibility of this individual and she works for you
14 but you're not going to have her available to do her job.

15 DR. SEGAL: Maybe that says something
16 about policy changes that should be made in terms of when
17 you are just one deep in a job, taking the person out of
18 the TO.

19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But you're
20 exacerbated by the size of the armed forces today.

21 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Exactly.

22 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Exactly.

23 DR. SEGAL: Yes.

1 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: It's the
2 downsizing, I think.

3 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Exactly.

4 COLONEL FREY: The services have a lot of
5 personnel issues associated with deployments and
6 rotations and maintaining vacancies in units that go
7 beyond the issue of pregnancy, but clearly there's great
8 turbulence in the military right now and I don't think
9 that, again, we have got all the right answers yet of how
10 to solve that.

11 A point in case: I think probably part of
12 the problem of people not reenlisting in the services
13 today has an awful lot to do with what I'll term quality
14 of life. And in the military of the future, this issue
15 of quality of life is going to have to be something that
16 attends to some of these needs and still maintains a
17 ready force.

18 And as I say, I don't know all the answers
19 but I know it ought to be number one on the personnel
20 plate.

21 MR. PANG: And, you know, I think with
22 regard to quality of life, you know, oftentimes people,
23 you know, equate quality of life very narrowly — to pay

1 your kids, and some people never do.

2 DR. SEGAL: If I could ask another
3 question about training. We have multiple taskings from
4 Congress. One is the gender-integration in basic
5 training issue. Second is — and maybe we should get to
6 that, too — some of the cross-sex regulations with
7 regard to both fraternization and adultery.

8 But the third — and that's the one I want
9 to talk about — is we're supposed to evaluate basic
10 training in all of the services in general, regardless of
11 the gender-integration issue.

12 And I know that you haven't been out there
13 in training recently, but do you have any thoughts about
14 ways to improve basic training in the services,
15 especially in the Army today, or do you feel like you
16 don't want to comment on that?

17 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Well, I
18 think anything that they can do before they get there to
19 get a jump on physical fitness is a definite plus.

20 Now, that pre-dates what you're saying a
21 little bit but with this sedentary group of youngsters
22 that we're dealing with who don't participate in PT
23 anymore, I think they'll come in with a greater deal of

1 housing, child care and the like. That's important.
2 But, you know, a large aspect of quality of life has to
3 do with, you know, the conditions under which you work.

4 I mean, if you're demanded to put in
5 twelve-hour days and those twelve hours can then stretch
6 into sixteen hours because you don't have adequate parts,
7 you have to cannibalize, you have people off to do, you
8 know, other duty, ancillary duty, and this is a drain to
9 support that, then, you know, your quality of life — I
10 don't care how much child care you give a person or how
11 much pay you give that person, it's poor. And,
12 therefore, that person is going to say, "This is not for
13 me. I can do better," and they'll leave.

14 I mean, you know, I think, you know,
15 that's another aspect. I know that's not a function of
16 this particular Commission, but, you know, I think when
17 you talk quality of life, you need to take that into
18 account because it weighs heavily.

19 I mean, the people that, you know, are
20 leaving now — pilots and some of the people in the
21 critical skills who can be hired on the outside — you
22 know, very marketable skills — are asking themselves,
23 "Why am I doing this?"

1 self-confidence and do a greater — you know, do much
2 better if they come physically prepared.

3 And to me, that backs it up to the
4 recruiters and the delayed entry program people to really
5 emphasize that. And some of them do it and they do it
6 well. They do.

7 COLONEL FREY: The services are moving in
8 directions to already improve training, so a lot of what
9 I might say are probably things that they're already
10 dealing with to some extent.

11 And you're always looking for the ideal,
12 but I guess I would say that my view of basic training is
13 one that provides for a soldier discipline, teamwork,
14 soldierization, which includes in my mind something very
15 core, which is — in terms of the Army, the Army ethic,
16 or the core values of the other services, and then the
17 basic soldier skills. So that those issues are the
18 outcomes and we need to attack and make sure that we have
19 those built into the program means to achieve those
20 goals.

21 Having said that, I think there is a
22 tendency from time to time to overload the training POI
23 with a lot of extra stuff that is really not relevant to

1 I mean, you know, "I'm not really doing my
2 job as well as I can do it. And it's not because I don't
3 want to do it well, it's because the system is not
4 providing me with people I need, the parts I need and the
5 money I need to, you know, operate a train."

6 MS. POPE: And add on that career
7 potential.

8 MR. PANG: Yeah.

9 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Well, may I
10 tell you that I was thinking quality of life this last
11 week when the missiles started falling on Iraq. And I
12 said, "Here we go. Once again, right before Christmas.
13 And think of all the troops who almost got to stay home
14 for Christmas and how —"

15 DR. SEGAL: As well as the ones —

16 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: "— how
17 many more is this in a row that they're not going to be
18 here for Christmas. And how many are going to walk at
19 the end of this enlistment because the spouse is going to
20 say, "That's enough'?"

21 And this was very much in my mind this
22 last week, which is what you were addressing. Quality of
23 life is being home for Christmas once in a while with

1 training soldiers to be — training individuals to be
2 soldiers, or as I say in the other services, operational.

3 So I would say, if anything, we ought to
4 get back to the basics. And one of the most important
5 basics, which was devoid certainly during the Army's
6 problems with the sexual harassment in the training base,
7 is sort of a lapse in dedication and commitment to core
8 values and I really think it's very important that we get
9 back to that.

10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I have one
11 more, if I may. It's the kind of a question we've asked
12 everybody along the line here and it's an opinion
13 question. But basically it's — we have got a free rein
14 as we try to address these three issues and we get to
15 tell the Congress something. So if you were us, what
16 would you tell the Congress about these issues we have to
17 look at?

18 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Well, when
19 you're saying "these issues," what are you saying besides
20 gender-integrated training?

21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Well, the
22 three things that we've been required to look at is the
23 current or new fraternization and adultery policy, the

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1 gender-integrated basic training, and then basic training
 2 as a whole: Are we providing the soldiers, sailors,
 3 airmen and Marines of the operating forces and the
 4 operating commanders the means to do the job that the
 5 armed forces has been called upon today?
 6 So if you could tell Congress based on
 7 your experience, what would you say?
 8 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Well, I'd
 9 say gender-integrated training — basic training — is
 10 the way to go. Train the way you fight. Train the way
 11 you live. That's what I would say.
 12 And having sat through a session of
 13 Congress, oh, a year, year-and-a-half ago — I don't
 14 know.
 15 Karen, were you at that one where Joe
 16 Reimer and some other people were over before the
 17 congressional committee and they were talking about basic
 18 training and one of the senators railed on and on about
 19 "the raging hormones in the barracks" repeatedly?
 20 Well, I have not seen "the raging hormones
 21 in the barracks" and I would tell them that's not where
 22 the problem is. If they perceive it to be as simple as
 23 changing basic training to gender-segregated training, to

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1 me, that's not it.
 2 And the word that we've used here today,
 3 "leadership," is the key. And it's a simple thing: the
 4 superior is always in charge; the superior is always
 5 responsible. And those are very few words and it's very
 6 simple to remember.
 7 And to me, you can move that into the
 8 fraternization policy and the whole thing: the superior
 9 is always in charge. You know, I used to tell people, "I
 10 don't care if somebody comes in and lays down naked in
 11 front of your desk, you're in charge and you" — That's
 12 it. "You're in charge. I don't want any excuses of
 13 anything else as we talk about those kinds of things."
 14 Basic training as a whole. To hear all
 15 the commanders and the people out there say these are the
 16 best soldiers that we've ever had and to hear that
 17 repeated in some of the other services, I say we must be
 18 doing something right, and to start tinkering with it
 19 when it ain't broke concerns me.
 20 And I guess it would particularly concern
 21 me with a group of people who less and less have members
 22 of their body who have served and who have not walked a
 23 mile in my shoes.

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1 So I think we aren't doing too bad. Thank
 2 you very much.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you
 4 very much.
 5 Colonel.
 6 COLONEL FREY: Sir, sort of following on
 7 that, one of the first things that always comes to mind
 8 when we start this debate is the fact that it should have
 9 reached the level it has when, in my total military
 10 experience, training was always the commander's
 11 responsibility. And if the commanders have failed in
 12 their responsibility, get new commanders.
 13 But this whole process is excruciatingly
 14 painful, and when the bottom line is drawn, it's still
 15 going to be up to commanders to make it work.
 16 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: I think the
 17 Army's new policy — Isn't it right, Karen? — now, that
 18 you can choose the command path also versus the policy
 19 path —
 20 COLONEL FREY: Yes.
 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: — if you
 22 will, which didn't used to be the case. So you might get
 23 selected for command whether you wanted it and were

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1 really good at it or not.
 2 So I think — if I may just insert that to
 3 what she's saying right now — that to have people who
 4 really want to be commanders is a big step and it's okay
 5 that it doesn't take anything away from them to say, "I'd
 6 rather not go that career path. I'd rather stick with
 7 the paperwork," or whatever it is.
 8 COLONEL FREY: The issue of gender-
 9 integrated training itself, because I believe very
 10 strongly that the success of military units rests on
 11 teamwork and cohesion and the only way I know to achieve
 12 that is to have common experience and shared values and
 13 trust, then I would argue that you don't get there from
 14 here unless you have gender-integration in those units
 15 that are going to operationally be gender-integrated.
 16 And even carrying it one step further,
 17 there has got to be an appreciation by the gender-
 18 segregated organizations — such as, in the Army, your
 19 combat units — of their teammates that are in the combat
 20 support and the combat service support.
 21 DR. SEGAL: How do you do that?
 22 COLONEL FREY: I think you could open up
 23 drill sergeant duty to — A drill sergeant's a drill

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1 sergeant's a drill sergeant, and that means that you
 2 could have a mix of drill sergeants at all training
 3 bases.
 4 DR. SEGAL: So have combat support MOS
 5 folks training —
 6 COLONEL FREY: Correct.
 7 DR. SEGAL: — in OSUT?
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Or even Benning.
 9 COLONEL FREY: That's right.
 10 DR. SEGAL: And maybe OSUT in Benning.
 11 COLONEL FREY: And male and female. As
 12 you go around in your travels and look at your female
 13 drill sergeants, I don't think you will find them any
 14 less qualified than their male contemporaries. And it
 15 would go a long way for young male recruits and male
 16 drill sergeants to see how well women can perform in that
 17 capacity.
 18 The drill sergeant schools are another
 19 place where you could have a much greater mixed cadre to
 20 include combat command sergeant major commandants that
 21 might be female in some cases.
 22 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: They're
 23 trying. Benning may even have some female drill

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1 instructors there.
 2 COLONEL FREY: Carrying it a step further,
 3 obviously you could open it up to the officer levels as
 4 well. But, you know, as far as I'm concerned, drill
 5 sergeants are the ones who are the link for the soldier
 6 into the greater military.
 7 The other issue you raised was on
 8 fraternization and adultery. Adultery is something that
 9 speaks to values and I think it is probably something
 10 that ought to be dealt with as a violation of commitment
 11 on the part of a noncommissioned officer or officer who
 12 does not meet the ethic.
 13 The fraternization policy. I was very
 14 comfortable with the Army's fraternization policy. I
 15 understood very well undue command influence or
 16 preferential treatment. I am not very comfortable in a
 17 military organization such as the Army, which is a ground
 18 force, where officers and enlisted have to work together
 19 and have to respect one another, and having what I would
 20 consider an artificial barrier to unit cohesion.
 21 The other thing that bothers me very much
 22 about this policy as it currently stands is we have to
 23 grandfather a significant portion of the force that

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1 already has a relationship with somebody else and I don't
2 know how you explain that to soldiers. That it's okay
3 for those that are a little bit older but it's not okay
4 for you.
5 DR. MOSKOS: For you. Right.
6 COLONEL FREY: So in that regard, I think
7 this policy is dead on arrival. At least maybe not on
8 the books, but certainly in reality and practice.
9 MS. POPE: Practice.
10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
11 Thank you.
12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Any other questions?
13 Great.
14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: We did it
15 well.
16 MR. PANG: Yeah.
17 DR. SEGAL: I think we're all petering
18 out.
19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yes. Well —
20 DR. SEGAL: We've been here since a
21 quarter of 8:00, so —
22 MR. PANG: But this was very helpful.
23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Believe it or not, this

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1 is the shortest day of the year.
2 DR. SEGAL: That's right.
3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can't you
4 tell?
5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Can't you tell?
6 We truly appreciate your coming to talk
7 with us and it's been extremely helpful.
8 BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON: Thank you
9 very much.
10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.
11 (Whereupon, at 5:38 p.m., the hearing in
12 the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at
13 9:00 a.m., the following day.)
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CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES

Tuesday; December 22, 1998

1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 940

Arlington, Virginia

DEC. 22, 1998

1 Those present:
 2 Anita K. Blair, Esquire - Chairman
 3 The Honorable Frederick F.Y. Pang - Vice Chairman
 4 LtGen George R. Christmas, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner
 5 CSM Robert A. Dare, Jr., USA(Ret) - Commissioner
 6 LtGen William M. Keys, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner
 7 Thomas Moore - Commissioner
 8 Charles Moskos, Ph.D. - Commissioner
 9 The Honorable Barbara Spyridon Pope - Commissioner
 10 Mady Wechsler Segal, Ph.D. - Commissioner
 11 - - -
 12 Stephen C. Fogleman, Esquire - Executive Director
 13 Susan L. Fry - Executive Assistant
 14 Hank Hodge - Staff Liaison
 15 James Renne, Esquire - Staff Counsel and Secretary
 16 Carolyn F. Duke - Staff, Budget
 17 Kathleen M. Wright, Ph.D. - Research Director
 18 Janice Laurence, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 19 Charles Johnson, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 20 Capt J.S. Snyder, USN - Service Representative
 21 LtCol Brenda L. Harris, USA - Service Representative
 22 LtCol Mary Street, USAF - Service Representative
 23 Maj R. Scott LaShier, USMC - Service Representative

1 Those present:
 2 Leadership and War-Fighting Issues
 3 Professor Charles G. Percy, Professor of Strategy,
 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort McNair
 4 Mackubin T. Owens, Ph.D., Professor of Strategy and
 5 Planning, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI
 6 - - -
 7 Gender-Integration of Other Nations' Military
 8 Mrs. Shoshana Bryen, Director of Special Projects, Jewish
 Institute for National Security Affairs
 9
 10 Capt Vivian van de Perre, (Ret), Former Chief, Office of
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 12 History of Gender-Integrated Training
 13 BG Evelyn P. Foote, USA (Ret), Vice Chairman, Sexual
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1 PROCEEDINGS (9:00 a.m.)
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: This is the Congressional
 3 Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related
 4 Issues. It is Tuesday, December 22nd. And our first
 5 panel this morning is on war-fighting and strategy, and
 6 our first witness is Dr. Mack Owens.
 7 And we have biographies in our materials,
 8 so we'll just go ahead and start. And then after you
 9 make a statement, we'll continue with Dr. Charles Percy,
 10 and then open it up to questions. And our practice has
 11 been for the Commissioners to just go around the table
 12 with questions until we're finished or time runs out.
 13 And we thank you both very much for coming this morning.
 14 So please begin, Dr. Owens.
 15 DR. OWENS: Thank you very much. It's an
 16 honor and a privilege to have the opportunity to talk to
 17 you all.
 18 I did have a long statement which, of
 19 course, I will not read, but I think you've all had a
 20 chance to look at it. I think it might be, however,
 21 useful to summarize it a little bit because the seminal
 22 part of it is concerned with what I believe to be the
 23 timeless nature of war and to try to infer certain things

1 from that nature of war concerning the future of U.S.
 2 military.
 3 I quote Thomas Ricks in his book, Making
 4 the Corps, where he observed that the United States
 5 military today "is extremely good." Indeed, "arguably
 6 the best it has ever been and probably for the first time
 7 in history the best in the world."
 8 There do, however, seem to be a couple of
 9 things that threaten this continued quality and one of
 10 them has to do with perceptions. The first perception is
 11 that large-scale war is a thing of the past. We don't
 12 have to worry about it so much in the future. May be
 13 constabulary-type operations, but large-scale war has
 14 seen its day.
 15 The other is the idea that arises from
 16 what I would call technophiles. Evidence of the RMA, not
 17 as a process but as an outcome, that argue that
 18 technology has solved so many of our problems that the
 19 very nature of war has been changed.
 20 The first I always like to point out —
 21 and I have a quote here from Winston Churchill's
 22 description of the Agadir crisis in 1911 where he
 23 describes the optimism that prevailed leading up to World

1 War I, where it was impossible that a civilized world
 2 could possibly consider anything like war.
 3 And it is always useful to point out that
 4 the only time the world was more interdependent than it
 5 is — or as interdependent as it is today was on the eve
 6 of World War I. So sometimes it's useful to think that
 7 rather than being in an era of post-war thinking, we're
 8 in an interwar period.
 9 As to the other issue of whether
 10 technology can solve all our problems in the future, I
 11 think that there are some timeless factors, and I base
 12 this on a paper that I did — an article I did for
 13 Strategic Review on technology, the RMA, and the future
 14 of warfare. And these are ideas that one gets by reading
 15 Clausewitz, who is probably one of the folks that gave us
 16 a comprehensive theory of war.
 17 And these timeless factors are the
 18 persistence of friction, which I'll talk about in a few
 19 minutes, the impossibility of eliminating uncertainty
 20 from war, and what we now call sort of the nonlinear
 21 nature of war. These are things that lead us to look at
 22 war as a complex phenomenon, not something that is
 23 simple, that can be solved by technology.

1 One of the most, I think, important of
 2 these concepts is friction. If you'll bear with me, I'll
 3 take a couple minutes to read this passage from "On War."
 4 And Clausewitz says that this is "the only concept" —
 5 that is, friction is "the only concept that more or less
 6 corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from
 7 war on paper."
 8 "[E]verything in war is simple, but the
 9 simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate
 10 and end by producing a kind of friction that is
 11 inconceivable unless one has experienced war. Countless
 12 minor incidents — the kind you can never really foresee
 13 — combine to lower the general level of performance, so
 14 that one always falls short of the intended goal . . .
 15 The military machine — the army and everything related
 16 to it — is basically very simple and therefore seems
 17 easy to manage. But we should keep in mind that none of
 18 its components is of one piece: each part is composed of
 19 individuals, . . . the least important of whom may chance
 20 to delay things or somehow make them go wrong . . . This
 21 tremendous friction, which cannot, as in mechanics, be
 22 reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with
 23 chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured,

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1 just because they are largely due to chance.”
 2 Now, Clausewitz wrote in the eighteen-
 3 thirties — he was describing Napoleonic war, and so some
 4 people say, “Well, what do we have to learn from him?”
 5 Barry Watts, over at NDU, has a very wonderful little
 6 monograph called “Clausewitzian Friction and the Future
 7 of War,” and I commend it to you because what he seems to
 8 indicate is that friction seems to be tied up with human
 9 nature and conflict.

10 These are things that complicate war and
 11 make war — the outcome of war uncertain. And so the
 12 question is, what has the military traditionally done to
 13 try to reduce these factors or deal with these factors;
 14 and I believe they are the search of things that are
 15 traditionally associated with the traditional military
 16 ethos. Such things as training, discipline, cohesion,
 17 regulations, orders, and what Clausewitz calls “the iron
 18 will of the commander.”

19 Now, I believe anything that undermines
 20 these components — generally it’s friction, and I think
 21 that’s one of the issues that we’re here to talk about
 22 today. Those who insist that members of both sexes
 23 should be trained together or who would expand further

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1 the role of women in the military must confront the
 2 possibility that such steps will have precisely this
 3 effect, to the detriment of combat effectiveness.
 4 I talk a little bit about cohesion and the
 5 whole idea of training. And my argument that — with
 6 cohesion is that while some have denied its importance —
 7 I know there’s a piece in the current International
 8 Security by Elizabeth Kier that calls the concept of
 9 cohesion into question — it’s one of those things that
 10 it’s hard to describe to somebody who hasn’t actually
 11 been through it.

12 And, you know, I hate to do that, but I
 13 think there’s something there. That if you’ve been in a
 14 combat situation and you can describe this sort of thing,
 15 it’s very difficult to quantify but I think it’s — you
 16 know, people who have been in combat have described it.
 17 I think you see the description of that with Stephen
 18 Ambrose’s book “Citizen Soldiers.”

19 There’s a new book, the name of which I
 20 can’t think of, that just came out from Presidio Press on
 21 the whole issue of cohesion — Glen Gray, “The Warriors”
 22 — talking about fighting men in World War II. And, of
 23 course, you know, cohesion can be defined down to where

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1 it’s just like, well, it’s teamwork in a place of
 2 business.
 3 But in my statement, I used the sort of
 4 description of unit cohesion that came out of the 1992
 5 report of the Presidential Commission on the Assignment
 6 of Women in the Armed Forces and I argue that basically
 7 there are three ways in which sort of the thoughtless
 8 integration of women into certain areas can have some
 9 impact on cohesion.
 10 The first are costly problems from the
 11 physical differences between men and women; the second is
 12 the emergence of double standards that result from these
 13 physical differences — undermining fairness and trust —
 14 and third, the replacement of what I call — the Greeks
 15 call “philia,” which is comradeship, brotherly love, by
 16 “eros,” which is a — The Greeks had several words for
 17 “love.” We only have one. But “eros” is much more
 18 individual focused and is completely at odds with the
 19 concept of “philia.” And, of course, I’ll be perfectly
 20 glad to try to answer any of the questions that you might
 21 have on this.

22 The other issue that I talk about is the
 23 training, the training standards. I go back to the fact

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1 that some people have argued that technology solves all
 2 of our problems. And in the fall 1996 issue of
 3 International Security, an analyst named Stephen Biddle
 4 did a very nice job of showing that probably the most
 5 important factor in war is not the technology, per se —
 6 it certainly wasn’t the case in the Gulf War — but the
 7 training and the performance of the units.

8 And he basically argued that what really
 9 made a difference in the Gulf War was the skill
 10 differential between the allied forces and the Iraqi
 11 forces. That what — though what technology did was to
 12 magnify that difference. An implication is that if you
 13 have two forces that are, you know, closer in terms of
 14 skill and training, then technology is going to have less
 15 an impact.

16 And that happened to be my experience in
 17 Vietnam. You’re talking about, you know, technology was
 18 far less important in Vietnam and certainly didn’t affect
 19 the outcome because of the very high quality of our
 20 opponent. You know, the skill differential was not there
 21 to exploit with the technology.

22 One of my concerns and I know the concern
 23 of some people is the fact that training standards,

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1 especially at the individual level, in many cases have
 2 been lowered. And some people suggest that one of the
 3 reasons for this is that the insistence on integrated
 4 training and the physical standards in order to ensure
 5 that everybody can meet the standards, the standards are
 6 in fact reduced. And I for one believe that’s a problem.

7 And I’m — if I go to my last Page here, I
 8 know that the term that is used often to justify this
 9 sort of thing is the idea that, well, we have to train
 10 men and women together because we must train as we’re
 11 going to fight. But, of course, in the old days, this
 12 used to be — that term used to be used to justify the
 13 hardest, most demanding, and realistic training possible.
 14 And the argument was that only by means of such training
 15 could the rigors and demands of combat be approximated in
 16 the least.

17 Countless soldiers, sailors, airmen and
 18 Marines were told that by sweating more on the training
 19 field, they were likely to bleed less on the battlefield.
 20 You get something like this: “The training is hard,
 21 Private, because war is hard. If you can’t make it in
 22 training, you can’t make it in war. You will die, and
 23 those who depend on you will die. We must train as we

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1 will fight.”
 2 Now the phrase is employed to justify
 3 reduced training standards — almost reverse of the
 4 original intention. It goes something like this:
 5 “Because women will be in operational units, Private, men
 6 must learn how to work with them. We can’t enforce the
 7 old standard, because not enough women can meet them.
 8 But, we must train as we will fight.”

9 And I think that in times of peace that’s
 10 okay, but I think that, you know, if the test comes —
 11 and I’m one of those who thinks that it will — then
 12 perhaps we will set ourselves up for a problem.

13 Thank you very much.

14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.

15 Dr. Percy.

16 PROFESSOR PEARCY: Well, first of all, I’m
 17 quite flattered with your — How are you doing, Fred? —
 18 with the title, but I’m not — I do not have a Ph.D.,
 19 so...

20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Oh. Sorry.

21 PROFESSOR PEARCY: But that’s all right.

22 Most of them do over where I work.

23 First, I’m presently a federal employee at

1 the faculty of the Industrial College of the Armed
 2 Forces, the National Defense University. I teach
 3 military strategy and war-fighting to Army, Navy, Marine
 4 Corps, Coast Guard, and Air Force officers, as well as
 5 senior civilians, employees of federal departments and
 6 agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and
 7 State Department. The views I express are my own and
 8 should not be taken as official positions of the
 9 Industrial College or the National Defense University or
 10 the Department of Defense.

11 In my more than twenty-nine years in the
 12 Army, I served two combat tours, and my first was a year-
 13 long in 1962-63 as a lieutenant, advising Vietnamese
 14 infantry and artillery units. My second was as a captain
 15 in command of an artillery battery and later as a major
 16 on division staff for a period short of a year, from '67
 17 to '68. The unit that I commanded, I trained from
 18 scratch in Hawaii over a five-month period prior to
 19 introduction to combat.

20 I commanded a battalion in the 101st
 21 Airborne Division from 1976 to 1978, which I trained from
 22 scratch, all the way up to combat-ready status under
 23 peacetime conditions. My last operational command was

1 Joint Task Force Bravo in Honduras, 1984 to '85, under
 2 the combatant command of General Paul Gorman and later
 3 General Jack Galvin.

4 I'm going to direct my comments toward
 5 ground combat, on which I spent the majority of my
 6 training in the Army. And I think it would be useful to
 7 do a little bit of contemporary history tour of the
 8 battlefields of the past, reaching back to World War II.

9 I generally agree with most of Dr. Owens'
 10 views, although I am not sure in my own mind that a
 11 future large ground war could not take place. There are
 12 candidates — possible candidates for it. Among others,
 13 the Republic of China. I could foresee a situation
 14 developing out of the possible use of weapons of mass
 15 destruction — anthrax or something like that — under
 16 state-sponsored terrorism, wherein it would require —
 17 the American people would require a crusade that would
 18 require the taking down and occupation of a country,
 19 which would require more than what we've been used to for
 20 the last thirty or forty years.

21 Ground combat can vary in intensity and
 22 duration from the high end, as seen most recently in the
 23 realistic opening scenes of Spielberg's "Saving Private

1 Ryan," to the lower end, as experienced in Operation Just
 2 Cause in Panama. The accepted training philosophy is to
 3 prepare soldiers to face the most demanding high end
 4 since that will be the most difficult environment in
 5 which to accomplish the mission, and having prepared for
 6 the worst, anything less demanding will be all the
 7 easier.

8 The Army's National Training Center at
 9 Fort Irwin in California comes closest to creating a true
 10 combat environment for a battalion level unit training.
 11 And I would agree with Dr. Owens that probably the Army
 12 and Marine Corps of the Gulf War is probably the most
 13 effective combat-effective ground force in the history of
 14 modern warfare and most of it due to the training of
 15 those units of those services.

16 In the final analysis, ground combat at
 17 the point of the spear is best described as a "death
 18 grapple," where the purpose is to destroy the enemy or be
 19 destroyed. Over 90 percent of military casualties are
 20 suffered on the ground in the combat arms — mostly in
 21 the infantry, armor, and artillery units.

22 In World War II, the 29th Infantry
 23 Division suffered 20,111 battle casualties and 8,665 non-

1 battle casualties in eight months of sustained combat,
 2 for a turnover rate of 204 percent.

3 The U.S. divisions that entered combat in
 4 France between 6 June and 15 August, 1944 experienced an
 5 average turnover rate of approximately 200 percent over
 6 an eleven-month period. In the battle of the Hurtgen
 7 Forrest, the 28th Infantry Division lost all of its rifle
 8 company officers over a three-week period.

9 U.S. Army and Marine Corps divisions in
 10 the Korean War suffered similar casualty rates as those
 11 of World War II. The poorly trained and poorly equipped
 12 battalion Task Force Smith, committed to battle first,
 13 was destroyed in a matter of days.

14 Although combat in Vietnam was not as
 15 continuous as World War II and Korea, it still reached
 16 equal intensity on occasion. The first engagement
 17 between U.S. and North Vietnamese Army units came in
 18 November of 1965, in the Ia Drang Valley, when two
 19 battalions of the First Cavalry Division fought for a
 20 total of seventy-two hours against several regiments of
 21 North Vietnamese infantry. These U.S. units suffered
 22 nearly 50 percent battle casualties in that engagement.
 23 Army and Marine units fought many engagements like Hue

1 City and Hamburger Hill that were equal in intensity over
 2 the next five years.

3 The Gulf War is our most recent experience
 4 and was remarkable for its swift conclusion and low
 5 battle casualty rate. There were many reasons, too
 6 numerous to go into in detail, but I will give the most
 7 salient.

8 First is air superiority in a desert
 9 environment, which bestows enormous freedom of action on
 10 the side who has it — and we did — and in addition,
 11 placed immense stress on Iraqi logistic capabilities and
 12 lines of communication. Another is the quality of the
 13 U.S. Army and Marine Corps tactical combat units who were
 14 the best trained and equipped forces to fight a war of
 15 maneuver in the history of warfare. Finally, U.S. units
 16 faced a comparatively poorly trained and led Iraqi force
 17 whose trench warfare experience fighting Iran for eight
 18 years did not prepare them to fight a fast-paced war of
 19 maneuver in the desert.

20 This combination of factors is not likely
 21 to be seen again in the future. Combat support and
 22 combat service support personnel in rear areas are
 23 subject to direct combat in self-defense and may be used

1 as infantry reserve in emergency situations. Modern
 2 artillery weapons are capable of reaching significantly
 3 behind the line of contact. Unconventional or guerrilla
 4 warfare situations increase the probability of direct
 5 ground combat for support troops.

6 The soldier faces major physiological and
 7 psychological challenges in ground combat. The keys to
 8 success on the battlefield lie in training and leadership
 9 mainly at the squad, platoon, and company level.
 10 Soldiers who are not physically fit will not withstand
 11 the extreme rigors of combat well. Hardened soldiers, on
 12 the other hand, can persevere under harsh conditions.
 13 Commanders can ensure their soldiers' fitness, enhance
 14 their self-confidence, and increase their chance of
 15 survival through tough, realistic training and proper
 16 equipping.

17 Army Field Manual 100-5 best describes the
 18 psychological aspect: "The harsh environment of combat
 19 is likely to have a greater effect on the soldier's mind
 20 than his body. Since the mind directly affects the
 21 soldier's will to win, it must be prepared to accept the
 22 stress of combat. Loneliness and fear on the battlefield
 23 increase the fog of war," referred to by Dr. Owens.

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1 "They can be overcome by effective training, unit
2 cohesion, and leadership."
3 Important parts of basic training are the
4 introduction of continuous physical and psychological
5 stress to the trainee in order to force adjustment to
6 these challenges and thus increase self-confidence to
7 withstand the physical and psychological rigors of the
8 battlefield. My experience has been that the individual
9 soldier can take a hundred percent more mental and
10 physical hardship than imagined before tough training and
11 testing of the limits.
12 In summary, tough, demanding individual
13 and unit training are essential to combat effectiveness
14 and survival on the battlefield. Anything less does not
15 meet the test of leadership and responsibility to
16 accomplish the mission in battle at least cost in
17 casualties.
18 I'm prepared to take your questions.
19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Thank you very
20 much.
21 As I mentioned, we habitually just go
22 around the table. And because the phone is sitting next
23 to me, I'll go to Barbara after my opening question.

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1 So, Barbara, you can be thinking about
2 yours.
3 Both of you focused on ground combat and I
4 wonder if you can comment on the differences, if any, in
5 training for war conducted from the air or the sea in
6 terms of the result and the necessary factors that you
7 need to be successful.
8 DR. OWENS: Well, I'm not an aviator but
9 I'll give it a shot. I mean, aviators are some of my
10 best friends. Flying an airplane under — especially jet
11 aircraft — is extremely stressful. It requires quick
12 reactions. It requires physical strength. It requires
13 tremendous, I think, physical capabilities, mental
14 capabilities. You have to be able to react extremely
15 quickly. It also requires a certain amount of trust
16 because, of course, of the way U.S. pilots fly in teams
17 with wings and so forth.
18 Whether cohesion is an important — I
19 mean, clearly training is, and there can be no doubt
20 standards in training for — training to fly an airplane.
21 Otherwise, you're going to get people killed. But the
22 issue of cohesion is one that comes up because people
23 say, well, it's not an important in aviation units as it

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1 is with ground units. And again, I don't have the
2 personal experience but I do know people who would argue
3 that it is.
4 You have to have a certain amount of
5 trust; you have to — you certainly have to trust your
6 ground crew; you have to trust your wing man. And all of
7 these things are present; if not to the degree that you
8 see it in the case of ground combat, it's still there
9 when you're talking about either flying an airplane or
10 working in close quarters in a ship.
11 Especially a ship that's actually engaged.
12 We know that ships — you know, sometimes they actually
13 catch fire in peacetime. The U.S. Navy has been fairly
14 fortunate over a very long period of time that they
15 haven't had combat at sea. That's not to say that they
16 won't. And we have had, of course, you know, several
17 incidents during the run up to the Gulf War where ships
18 were badly damaged by mines and air attack.
19 And so this sort of knowing exactly what
20 to do, trust, cohesion, it would seem to me, has to be
21 present when you're operating in the close confines of
22 the ship as well as when you're working in ground combat.
23 So I would say that while I can't speak

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1 from personal experience, the people that I know who have
2 served in these sorts of things would argue that training
3 — high quality training, physical capabilities, and
4 cohesion, are as important in those circumstances as they
5 are in ground combat.
6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Thank you.
7 (Discussion off the record.)
8 MR. PANG: You know, there's just two
9 subject areas I'd like to explore on the basis of, you
10 know, your writings and in your comments this morning.
11 And one has to do with the issue of cohesion, and I'll
12 save that for the second part. The first part has to do
13 with, you know, ground combat in relationship to the
14 other services.
15 What we've heard in our deliberations here
16 is that, you know, the way the services conduct training
17 is very dependent upon their missions, and we've been
18 told time and time again that the missions are different,
19 you know. And when you look at the ground combat
20 services — the Army and the Marine Corps — you know, I
21 think it's fair to say that with regard to both of those
22 services, I mean, it was made clear to us that the combat
23 arms are entirely male and they're closed to women.

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1 My personal feeling is that that's the
2 right thing. I mean, you know, that you have the combat
3 arms — the infantry, the artillery, and the other
4 branches that are combat arms — fully male. So in basic
5 training, they train separate from women. And when they
6 finish their basic training, they go on to combat
7 training, infantry training, and follow this training
8 continuum.
9 So what I see is males — okay? — in
10 these two services being trained separate from women and
11 to standards that, you know, we've been told — okay? —
12 that are established by the hierarchy to produce people
13 who are going to be able to succeed in those fields. And
14 so my question, I guess, has to do with, you know, if
15 that's the case, if there's weakness, then it must be
16 weakness in the way we train males, you know, separate
17 from females.
18 How does that relate, you know — I mean,
19 do you see any weakness? Because then the other side of
20 it, in the combat support and combat service support
21 elements — okay? — there is, you know, integrated
22 training and they occur at different points. In the case
23 of the Marine Corps, it's after basic training —

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1 basically at the tail-end of it — and for the Army, it's
2 at the beginning.
3 And the rationale for that is that people
4 in these — you know, in the combat support and combat
5 service support, because there's a mixture of men and
6 women, need really to learn to work together as a team to
7 maintain the kind of cohesion that, you know, you've
8 talked about.
9 So I'm just wondering how you would
10 comment with regard to that.
11 DR. OWENS: I think when you're talking
12 about specialty training, that's absolutely true. But I
13 personally believe, though, that when you are talking
14 about the transition from civilian to the military, that
15 it's very important that this be in fact a transformation
16 process.
17 Whether you're talking about just basic
18 training — and I differentiate that from basic infantry
19 training, which we all agree is what it is — but I think
20 that — I mean, again, take what the Marine Corps does.
21 The Marine Corps separates men and women in their basic
22 training, and then when they go to their specialty
23 training, it's frequently with members of the other

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1 services that they are in fact integrated.
 2 You've established a base, it seems to me,
 3 in terms of expectations and so forth in your basic
 4 training, and you basically can adjust your standards to
 5 ensure that they're as high as they possibly can be for
 6 the individuals in the different groups. And then once
 7 that base is established, then, you know, integrated
 8 training for a specialty MOS of some sort, it seems to
 9 me, is fine.

10 I have a problem with the idea even in
 11 basic training that is not infantry-oriented, of the
 12 integration simply because I think that it tends to —
 13 insofar as military life is physical — and I think that
 14 even in the most technological of the services you have
 15 to have some physical standards — there's a tendency to
 16 draw those down, and I think that's to the detriment of
 17 the military overall.

18 PROFESSOR PEARCY: I would generally agree
 19 with that. Of course, combat service support and the
 20 other branches are — it's not unlikely that some or a
 21 large portion of them, depending on the kind of war you
 22 get involved in, could be involved directly in ground
 23 combat.

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1 And so certainly having the men and women
 2 separated in basic training puts them through a standard
 3 that you can stretch a little bit higher. I mean, it's
 4 just a matter of fact that when it comes to strength and
 5 endurance, on average, men will exceed women. There will
 6 always be an exception.

7 But in rear areas, depending on the kind
 8 of war, it may even be that the combat service support
 9 and combat support units will see an equal amount of
 10 combat.

11 MR. PANG: You know, with regard to the
 12 rigor — and that's one of the things that, you know, we
 13 are charged with — of basic training, and beyond that —
 14 I mean, you know, the readiness of training to prepare
 15 individuals in the combat arms, which, by definition for
 16 the Army and for the Marine Corps, are all-male — you
 17 know, what's your sense of it, you know, at this point in
 18 time?

19 I mean, do you think that the training is
 20 rigorous enough and does prepare these people who are, as
 21 you point out, at the tip of the spear, to engage the
 22 enemy in a ground war?

23 DR. OWENS: I can speak mostly from the

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1 standpoint of the Marine Corps. I think the answer is
 2 yes. I think that certainly General Krulak has gone out
 3 of his way to even add to the intensity with the Crucible
 4 and things like that, designed specifically to confront
 5 young people with the sort of rigors that they might face
 6 in unexpected situations.

7 So yes.

8 MR. PANG: How about the Army? I mean, do
 9 you have any feel for that?

10 DR. OWENS: I think that, again, the Army,
 11 for its infantry training, sends its folks to a separate
 12 school. And while, of course, being a good Marine, I
 13 don't think it's as rigorous as Marine training, you
 14 know, it's pretty darn good. But that's, of course, at
 15 the individual level.

16 Listen, after I came back from Vietnam, I
 17 was sent to become an artilleryman and I spent a great
 18 deal of my time with the Army, teaching field artillery
 19 at Fort Sill. And the Army is absolutely the best at
 20 these sorts of things and Marines, to this day, are
 21 trained in Army schools — at Fort Sill for armor, and
 22 other sorts of capabilities as well.

23 But, I mean, infantry training has to be

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1 as rigorous as possible for the reasons that I think both
 2 of us have addressed.

3 MR. PANG: Yeah. I don't disagree.

4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can I
 5 follow-on? I'm having a little problem, and the problem
 6 I'm having is by inference. I'm hearing that standards
 7 have been reduced and that units are not being trained —
 8 or are being trained less rigorously across the spectrum
 9 of all the armed forces. Is that the correct inference
 10 that I should draw?

11 DR. OWENS: No, I don't think so.

12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.

13 DR. OWENS: I'm suggesting that they have
 14 to be trained as rigorously as possible. The cohesion
 15 has to be —

16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay. But
 17 you're not saying —

18 DR. OWENS: No.

19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — that
 20 they are currently not —

21 DR. OWENS: No.

22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — across
 23 the armed forces. Thank you.

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1 DR. OWENS: No.

2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.

3 MR. PANG: You know, the second part of my
 4 question, so that we can move on, you know, has to do
 5 with the issue of cohesion. You know, we have a study
 6 that we're conducting now — our researchers are — and,
 7 you know, I don't profess to be an expert in this area
 8 but, you know, in my experience in serving in the
 9 military and having observed the combat arms on the
 10 ground, even though I was in the Air Force, you know, it
 11 seems to me that all the people I've talked to basically
 12 talk — you know, when they talk about cohesion, there's
 13 a range of cohesion.

14 I mean, you know, in my view, there is
 15 peacetime cohesion and there's wartime cohesion. Because
 16 in war, you know, when the battle is intense and it's
 17 chaotic, you know, all of a sudden survival becomes the
 18 key, and all of a sudden you become very cohesive, and
 19 that cohesion can degrade afterwards. I mean, you know,
 20 after the battle, you know.

21 And I cite the fact that, you know, in
 22 battle, for example, blacks and whites don't see each
 23 other as black and white, I mean, because you can die if

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1 the other person fails you; yet, after the battle and
 2 when people return to a peacetime mode, you have
 3 division.

4 I mean, you now have people who now then
 5 separate back out and you have problems, I mean, you
 6 know. And you say, gee whiz, I mean, you know, we were
 7 cohesive as a unit here, you know, in Vietnam; now this
 8 unit's back, you know, in the States someplace and it's
 9 not as cohesive.

10 And so I don't think you can say that, you
 11 know, there's — I'm not saying that you're saying, but I
 12 don't think there is, you know, just one degree of
 13 cohesion that you're going to sustain throughout. You
 14 know, I think maybe we had problems even in wartime when
 15 the mission was not well understood, when the leadership
 16 was — couldn't explain — okay? — to the people that
 17 they were leading why it was what they were doing was
 18 important. For example, we had these base frags. I
 19 mean, when did they occur? You know, and the fragging
 20 incidents, things like that, even in a wartime situation.

21 DR. OWENS: Combat area.

22 MR. PANG: So this is a very, very
 23 difficult area, you know, that — and I don't know how

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1 the introduction of women — okay? — more women into
2 combat support and combat service support affect that
3 cohesion. I think not a lot in the war zone, I mean, and
4 I saw that.

5 I mean, you know, I think it's when you
6 come home to a peacetime situation where all of a sudden
7 the military is in the training mode and can go home.
8 You know, they're in the garrison but they go home at
9 night, and really then you start losing it and it becomes
10 much more of a challenge, I think, you know, to a
11 commander than it does in a wartime situation.

12 PROFESSOR PEARCY: Well, I would agree
13 with you, Fred. You know, it goes back to that speech
14 from Henry the Fifth: "yes, we few, we happy few, we band
15 of brothers, where he who sheds his blood with me shall
16 be my brother." And, of course, when you're in combat,
17 you are a twenty-four-hour-a-day family. You don't go
18 home to quarters. You don't go back to your wife and
19 children. It's a twenty-four-hour-a-day operation.

20 In fact, I would — last night, just by
21 chance, I tuned in and saw the film "Hamburger Hill." I
22 don't know how many of you have seen that before. I
23 would say that it ranks right up with Spielberg's

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1 high levels and high tempo levels of stress, prepared
2 those units very well to perform at the very outset of
3 ground combat.

4 So, actually, ground combat really, for
5 all practical purposes, only lasted for about four days
6 in the Gulf War, but they were well prepared for it. And
7 that unit cohesion that you talk about in these kinds of
8 training environments can prepare you for the reality of
9 the battlefield.

10 And perhaps most important, the most
11 dangerous time is the first exposure to ground combat.
12 And if you can get through that without suffering too
13 many casualties, then probably your effectiveness will go
14 up.

15 MR. PANG: Thank you very much for your
16 comments. They're very helpful.

17 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Could I
18 follow-on to Fred's question very quickly?

19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. Let me just —
20 Barbara, how are you doing? Do you want to hang on?

21 MS. POPE: I can hear parts of it. I can
22 hear enough to make it worth hanging on.

23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Okay, thanks.

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1 "Private Ryan" in describing not only the intensity of
2 combat but the relationships between individual soldiers
3 — officers, enlisted men.

4 And that can give you a taste of the
5 situation and the kinds of little frictions that come up
6 because of the situation you're in where you're all
7 equally threatened with losing your life. Your
8 differences, although you may have some differences, you
9 put them down because you are essentially so dependent on
10 each other.

11 DR. OWENS: But on the other hand —
12 while I agree with what you have just said, on the other
13 hand, it's better to have the basis for cohesion in
14 peacetime. It's better to do those things as much as you
15 possibly can in peacetime so that you minimize the
16 problems in war.

17 I mean, the fact is that — Again, I'll go
18 back to what the Marine Corps is trying to do now — is
19 something very similar to what the Germans did in World
20 War II, which was in fact to enhance cohesion as much as
21 possible. The cohesion develops out of fear in many
22 cases, but how much better is it if in fact you have
23 provided the groundwork during peacetime?

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1 MS. POPE: Yeah. Thank you.

2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right.

3 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Since this
4 has to do with training, am I incorrect, Dr. Owens, in
5 thinking, then, that you disagree with the approach at
6 the service academies, ROTC and OCS as well, with the
7 training of the officer corps?

8 DR. OWENS: Well, I think that's a done
9 deal. If you had asked me when we first did it, I would
10 have preferred to keep them the ways they were. But I
11 think that there are clearly some — some problems have
12 arisen that have to do with, again, double standards when
13 it comes to physical requirements and so forth, but I
14 think there has been an adaptation that's occurred over
15 time.

16 But on the other hand, you know, with the
17 sorts of frictions that arise as a result of personal
18 attractions and so forth, those are going to occur. And
19 I think we've adapted with our service academies, but I'm
20 not sure that you can take that further and put it into
21 training when you're actually talking about putting
22 people into — We might actually have to fight a war and
23 fight a war by units.

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1 And if cohesion — And again, I mean,
2 cohesion is one of these things that it's hard to
3 measure. You know, political scientists have tried it,
4 sociologists have tried it, and I suppose we're trying it
5 again. And, you know, I can only, you know, talk about
6 personal experience when I'm talking about it, but it's
7 interesting that when I talk to other people who have
8 similar experiences, they say, "yeah, I know what that
9 is."

10 So I infer that it's important, and those
11 things that we can do in peacetime to make it more likely
12 that we'll have a high degree of cohesion in war is — we
13 ought to be doing.

14 MR. PANG: I agree with that.

15 PROFESSOR PEARCY: And training exercises
16 like going out to the National Training Center, for
17 instance, that approximates — with the exception of real
18 bullets and stuff like that, approximates the kind of
19 environment that you describe.

20 And I would say that the training that
21 took place at the National Training Center in the
22 nineteen-eighties as well as the training the Marines had
23 at Twenty-Nine Palms for extended periods of time under

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well, I would
2 like to commend you on your analysis of combat. I think
3 it's good. And I think you're right-on about the force-
4 on-force at the National Training Center exercises
5 because I really do think that's what made the difference
6 over there.

7 From a personal standpoint, I don't think
8 our training is rigorous enough at boot camp or the
9 follow-on training for the combat arms. I would like to
10 see it longer —

11 PROFESSOR PEARCY: Are you talking about
12 the Army or the Army and the Marine Corps?

13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well, everybody.
14 I just think it would be better.

15 Now, I think they probably can't afford it
16 because of Optempo and because of many other factors, but
17 I think you'd have a better soldier or Marine all around,
18 again from a personal standpoint.

19 But from the integration viewpoint, I
20 think it'll work, but I don't think it will ever really
21 be tested in those places we put females until you go
22 into an extended combat situation — long-term — and
23 that would be the only time you could really test this;

1 and until you do, I think it's going to be a question in
 2 everybody's mind.
 3 DR. OWENS: Clausewitz talks about war as
 4 being — that in war, you have to pay attention to the
 5 moral factors. And by that, he means the human factors:
 6 the ways that human beings actually behave, the way they
 7 respond to real things like fatigue, like fear, and these
 8 sorts of things.
 9 Douglas Southall Freeman, when he wrote
 10 about Lee and Confederate generals, had an interesting
 11 comment. He said, "Beware of the fifth day." And the
 12 interesting issue is that human beings can operate for a
 13 long time on little sleep in a high-stress environment,
 14 but on the fifth day you break down. I mean, a perfect
 15 example that comes out of the Civil War is Stonewall
 16 Jackson's behavior at the beginning of the battle of the
 17 Seven Days. He had been literally in the saddle for
 18 ninety-six hours and he just broke down. He wasn't
 19 himself.
 20 Now, what this basically means is that —
 21 to get back to your point, I think, which is that the
 22 things we do in training ought to recognize this and
 23 ought to, you know, stress individuals as much as

1 possible to approximate that. You're never going to
 2 match it. You're never going to match the rigors and
 3 terrors and so forth of real war in training, but you
 4 need to get as close as you can. And one of the ways to
 5 do it is really to stress the physical endurance of
 6 individuals, it seems to me.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: But on the
 8 service academies — I don't know if it's the same
 9 question that Bob had, but I personally think they've
 10 changed so much from what they were originally set up to
 11 do that they probably hurt themselves. I mean, I think
 12 you ought to go to those academies and they ought to
 13 produce line officers only. Now you can become a doctor,
 14 an oceanographer — I mean, a million other things. I
 15 don't know what else.
 16 PROFESSOR PEARCY: I couldn't agree with
 17 you more.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I mean, I think
 19 if we got back to what they were supposed to be — had a
 20 good rigorous program — male or female, I don't care —
 21 but that's what they ought to be used for.
 22 PROFESSOR PEARCY: Well, originally that's
 23 what they were designed for — to turn out essentially

1 warriors.
 2 DR. SEGAL: Engineers. Engineers was what
 3 they were originally designed to turn out.
 4 PROFESSOR PEARCY: Well, in modern times,
 5 everybody had to go in the combat arms to begin with and
 6 you had to stay in the combat arms for at least three
 7 years. At least the Army got on the slippery slope when
 8 they changed in the nineteen-seventies from requiring
 9 graduates to be commissioned into the combat arms and
 10 then they became something else.
 11 So today you have — In fact, for many at
 12 West Point, they look to going into the quartermaster
 13 corps or the transportation corps to prepare them for
 14 future civilian professions. At \$300,000 a pop, that's
 15 —
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: There are plenty
 17 of occupational fields in all services for the women to
 18 go into that would, you know, satisfy the Army
 19 requirements.
 20 MR. MOORE: Could I have a follow-on to
 21 that since we're on that topic?
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Yeah.
 23 MR. MOORE: Would that suggest to you,

1 then, perhaps — especially given the inordinate expense
 2 to train people in the academies who don't necessarily
 3 make it a career or even reach flag rank any faster than
 4 ROTC or OCS graduates, would that suggest maybe that we
 5 do away with the academies altogether and go to maybe a
 6 one-year post-graduate commissioning process like
 7 Sanherst or Sansier or something like that?
 8 Would that work in the American force or
 9 is it —
 10 PROFESSOR PEARCY: Well, I think that's
 11 pretty theoretical, you know. I mean, it's interesting.
 12 I think it would be an interesting trial but I am not
 13 sure it's a realistic type of — I mean, they're so —
 14 service academies are so institutionally ingrained —
 15 MR. MOORE: That's really my question.
 16 PROFESSOR PEARCY: — that we wouldn't —
 17 that I don't think you could make those kinds of changes.
 18 This was hearsay, but one of the things
 19 that occurred at the Military Academy was — and again,
 20 this is something I heard, so I can't — I don't have any
 21 fact to back it up. But one of the things that went out
 22 when women were integrated into the Corps of Cadets in
 23 the nineteen-seventies — one of things that they did

1 away with was recondo training at the Military Academy —
 2 recondo training is kind of like Ranger-type training —
 3 simply because female cadets — it was not accessible for
 4 female cadets and, therefore, put them in a different
 5 category. But I question whether or not that kind of
 6 change was helpful to the long term.
 7 Again, originally the mission of the
 8 academy was to produce warriors. Now, they did not all
 9 become warriors. In fact, many of them went into the
 10 railroad business in the eighteen-forties and fifties and
 11 then came back in or became salesman like Grant and
 12 railroad presidents like McClellan. But, nevertheless,
 13 they returned to serve as warriors and warrior leaders of
 14 the Union army. And in Confederate as well, with
 15 Jackson, of course, at VMI.
 16 But, you know, to spend a lot of time
 17 discussing it and theorizing about how you're going to
 18 change that is probably, you know — I mean, it's maybe a
 19 waste of time.
 20 MR. MOORE: I withdraw the question.
 21 Strike it from the record.
 22 DR. SEGAL: I would pursue this but it's
 23 not related to our charge to Congress, so I'm not going

1 to ask because there's a lot that we could discuss about
 2 the academies. I happen to be on the Board of Visitors
 3 at West Point, so I'm there very frequently and I'm very
 4 familiar with the changes that have taken place.
 5 But it's not related to the charge that we
 6 have from Congress, and what I'm trying to do is to — I
 7 appreciate your coming here and talking with us and I
 8 want to pick your brains about the ways in which I think
 9 that you can be most useful to us.
 10 We have two tasks from Congress that your
 11 knowledge can be helpful for us. One is the issue of
 12 gender-integration which we've been talking about, and I
 13 want to pursue that a little more and then move on to the
 14 other, which is the larger issue that we have of
 15 evaluating basic training more generally and I think
 16 that's where you can be most useful to us.
 17 But first there are a couple of things
 18 that I need to ask you about and talk about with regard
 19 to gender-integration issues. We are not being asked by
 20 Congress to indicate what jobs we think women should be
 21 in in the military. We are only asked to evaluate
 22 whether basic training is most effective if it is gender-
 23 integrated or gender-segregated.

1 And I actually find contradiction in your
 2 arguments about that because, for example, Dr. Owens, you
 3 have unit cohesion — this is a quote from your testimony
 4 — unit cohesion “is far more than teamwork. Cohesion
 5 arises from the bond among disparate individuals who have
 6 nothing in common but facing death and misery together.
 7 This bond is akin to what the Greeks called ‘philia’ —
 8 friendship, comradeship, or brotherly love.”

9 Now, I don’t think we’re going to have
 10 trainees facing death in basic training but I think they
 11 certainly do face hardships. Misery? I think they face
 12 some misery at times. And they certainly develop some
 13 feelings for the others in their group because they’re
 14 going through this together. Indeed, I think that’s
 15 something that we have all seen on our visits. We have
 16 visited basic training in all of the services.

17 Would it surprise you to hear that in the
 18 gender-integrated units we’ve talked to, that that is
 19 exactly what we were seeing among the men and women?
 20 That they referred to each other as shipmates? That they
 21 were in fact developing a brother-and-sister relationship
 22 with strong bonds of friendship that were not pair
 23 friendships but a sense of devotion to the group? And

1 that through those shared experiences and seeing what the
 2 others were doing, that’s where they were developing that
 3 trust?

4 And so my contradiction that I hear is you
 5 say that in war, the friction is countered by training,
 6 discipline, cohesion, regulations, orders, and “the iron
 7 will of the commander.” And we can talk about all those
 8 others, but certainly in terms of cohesion and the sense
 9 of trust that one’s fellow servicemember has been well
 10 trained and can do his or her job and can help to protect
 11 you in a combat situation, that that is precisely why it
 12 is so important in that transition from civilian to
 13 training as you fight, to learning what it’s like to be
 14 in the kind of position you’ll be in in the military,
 15 which is precisely why in the combat support and combat
 16 service support MOS’s we have to train them gender-
 17 integrated. What would you say about that?

18 DR. OWENS: I suppose that if we can be
 19 assured that this is going to be the situation, that’s
 20 fine. But maybe I’m a dinosaur in all of this but I —

21 DR. SEGAL: That’s not a question, is it?

22 DR. OWENS: No. Just a possibility.

23 But, you know, my observations — my own

1 observations and operating with — you know, talking over
 2 the last twelve years, teaching the Naval War College,
 3 talking to people of all services who have dealt with
 4 these sorts of issues, talk about problems that arise, no
 5 matter what appears to be the case on the surface,
 6 because no matter what may be the situation or appear to
 7 be the situation, men treat men differently than they
 8 treat women.

9 And once again, over a sustained period of
 10 time under stress and so forth, the question is will
 11 those sorts of manifestations of cohesion be maintained
 12 or will the sort of pairings you’re talking about, the
 13 possibility that men, for whatever reason, whether it’s
 14 social or maybe have something to do with nature, too —
 15 protectiveness — will lead to problems that will
 16 undermine the effectiveness of the unit.

17 I mean, I understand exactly what you’re
 18 saying and I understand the argument. I’m just not sure
 19 — I’m not convinced by the argument, I suppose.

20 DR. SEGAL: Are you saying, then, that
 21 women shouldn’t be in the combat support and combat
 22 service support specialties because they would undermine
 23 cohesion?

1 DR. OWENS: I think that it’s probably
 2 less important there than it is in combat. But I still
 3 think — I would still argue that there would be
 4 manifestations of these same sorts of problems under
 5 periods of prolonged stress.

6 DR. SEGAL: Well, which problems?

7 DR. OWENS: Well, sexual pairings,
 8 jealousy, favoritism, sorts of things that undermine
 9 morale, which, you know, I would argue that in combat
 10 service support types of environments are still going to
 11 degrade your effectiveness, although they’re not going to
 12 be nearly as important as it would be if it was in a
 13 combat unit.

14 DR. SEGAL: Isn’t this the kind of
 15 friction that also needs to be countered by training,
 16 discipline, regulations, and “the iron will of the
 17 commander”?

18 DR. OWENS: Absolutely, insofar as you can
 19 in fact do that. But you know as well as I do — I mean,
 20 I cite in the piece — you know, very interesting piece.
 21 I thought it was very ironic. I just sat down and U.S.
 22 World & News Report has this — the 14th of December, has
 23 this piece on office romances. And you’re not talking

1 about units that are noted for their cohesion. You’re
 2 talking about, you know, places where teamwork is fairly
 3 important.

4 And what I got out of this article was
 5 that, geez, there are problems there, too, that have to
 6 do with the sort of ambiguities that have been
 7 superimposed on the sort of natural relationships that
 8 have to do with sexual harassment, these sorts of things,
 9 which, you know, create their own set of problems.

10 Now, if what you say is true, then we need
 11 to rationalize some of these other things and we need to
 12 come to grips with the additional friction that is
 13 created by sort of the legal situation that makes these
 14 problems more difficult. If you can do it —

15 DR. SEGAL: You say in your piece that you
 16 see that there’s a — You cite Charlie Moskos, actually,
 17 to talk about that there’s a big difference between
 18 gender-integration and racial-integration, but these very
 19 same arguments were used to exclude black men from combat
 20 units on the grounds that they would interfere with
 21 cohesion; that there would be jealousy; that there would
 22 be — that they would be in their own camps; that they
 23 wouldn’t be able to bond; that the white men wouldn’t

1 bond with the black men. They also raise all sorts of
 2 privacy issues in terms that they didn’t want to eat with
 3 — the white men didn’t want to eat with the black men,
 4 they didn’t want to shower with them and such.

5 So there is a similarity in terms of the
 6 degree to which those groups were accepted in the
 7 military at the different periods of time. I’m not
 8 saying we’re at the same place now with regard to racial-
 9 integration that we are with regard to gender-
 10 integration, but there is a similarity in the process.

11 DR. OWENS: I would — you know, I
 12 stipulate that some of these issues, on the surface seem
 13 similar, but I would go on to say that the physiological
 14 and psychological differences between white and black
 15 males is minute compared to the differences between males
 16 and females in the same area.

17 DR. SEGAL: The perception at the time, by
 18 the way, is that —

19 DR. OWENS: Well, yeah, but I also — but
 20 I also say something that I said one place before: that I
 21 know the difference between segregating restrooms on the
 22 basis of sex and why that is more important and, you
 23 know, makes sense, where segregating restrooms on the

1 basis of race doesn't. And, you know, I think reasonable
2 people can understand why the one makes sense or the
3 other one doesn't make sense.

4 And I think it confuses the fact to use
5 the racial — the problems with racial-integration
6 because I think they're different than the ones of — One
7 is based in nature; the other is based in — if you ask
8 me, based in mere prejudice.

9 DR. SEGAL: Well, the perception was — in
10 the early period of time, that the racial differences
11 were based in nature and should lead to different
12 behaviors. But I don't want to — we don't have to
13 pursue that.

14 I actually want to raise another issue
15 with regard to the physical issue because that's the
16 other one that you have raised, and the perception of a
17 double standard, which, in fact, is a problem in terms of
18 that perception.

19 DR. OWENS: Sure.

20 DR. SEGAL: And you cited specifically
21 with regard to the training of fighter pilots and that
22 possibly some women have been pushed through training
23 when they didn't meet the same standard. And I

1 the fact of the matter is, if you have different physical
2 fitness standards, that it's not just a matter of health
3 but a matter of being able to do a number of things.

4 And in combat, you do a lot of things, not
5 just your MOS skills. You will have to break track,
6 change track, do a number of things that may not be in
7 your MOS. And if you — in a combat situation, whoever
8 can do it is what you're looking for.

9 And upper body strength is a major part of
10 it. Being able to do pull-ups. There are women who can
11 do as many pull-ups as probably practically any man,
12 certainly some of these gymnasts. But by and large, when
13 you start making pull-ups a requirement — ten or twelve
14 pull-ups a requirement — if you made that for women,
15 then you're going to have a hard time. It's not that
16 they cannot be built up to it probably, but women can do
17 it over time.

18 Another thing is stress. And this is
19 anecdotal, not a deep and long study. But about four
20 years ago — four or five years ago, I was working-out at
21 the Naval Training Center at Orlando and I got into a
22 conversation with a petty officer who was on the cadre,
23 training cadre.

1 completely agree with you that when it comes to actual
2 performances, that individuals should be judged as
3 individuals and they should have to meet the standards.

4 Now, when it comes to the physical fitness
5 test, this is something I want to talk with you about
6 because we've learned a lot about physical fitness
7 requirements here on the Commission because it's
8 something we've been looking into. What do you see as
9 the purpose of the physical fitness measure?

10 And to be fair, I should — I mean, I
11 should tell you we have heard from the experts who say
12 that the physical fitness test is to measure health and
13 well-being and how high a level of fitness the individual
14 has, and they make a sharp distinction, both within the
15 military and outside the military, between the physical
16 fitness tests and job performance measures. So your
17 concern about lowering standards seems to have the
18 assumption that the physical fitness test is measuring
19 job-specific performance requirements.

20 So I wanted to be fair. This is the way
21 we have been approaching this. So in light of that, what
22 do you think — Do you think that the perception of
23 double standards is because of the physical fitness test

1 And I asked him about training women and
2 he said, "Well," he says, "you know, it's different," he
3 says, "but — "they can do the job and everything, but
4 you cannot treat" — I'm quoting him. He says, "You
5 cannot treat women in the same way you treat men." And
6 he said, "They just react differently and you have to
7 adjust."

8 Now, you can argue about whether or not
9 that's a big problem. For that matter, you can argue, I
10 guess, for leaders that you don't treat everybody the
11 same anyway. You know, some people — In fact, I've
12 heard a friend of mine describe the great coaches —
13 basketball coaches — are not the ones who, you know,
14 know so much about the game; it's how they treat their
15 players. Some players require something other than —
16 But if there's a distinct difference gender-wise in the
17 way you treat folks and whether or not you yell at a man
18 and don't yell at a woman, then you're going to run into
19 some problems there.

20 DR. SEGAL: We've been talking a lot to
21 the trainers in all of the services. We have met
22 systematically with groups of trainers to talk about
23 their perceptions and the differences of training men and

1 gender-norming?

2 DR. OWENS: That's one of the things. But
3 I also think that there — If I'm not mistaken, the Army
4 stopped trying to do tests on — strength tests on women
5 in the seventies. They stopped, for whatever reason. Is
6 that not true?

7 PROFESSOR PEARCY: It was an item, as I
8 recall —

9 DR. OWENS: Early eighties? Late
10 seventies?

11 PROFESSOR PEARCY: It was in the eighties.
12 Somebody came up with the idea that — And it was kind of
13 a trial that didn't last very long, where they decided
14 they were going to have the same standards for men and
15 women for physical fitness strength. And when they
16 started trying it out — I just remember seeing them down
17 in the athletic center at the Pentagon. They were
18 bringing down various women, NCO's and officers, and
19 giving them tests. And to adopt a single standard would
20 have eliminated something like 70 percent of the jobs —
21 of the MOS's in the Army.

22 Now, again, that's what I heard. I never
23 saw anything published on it. But clearly I think that

1 women and such. And I don't — I mean, we've been out
2 there talking with them, so we have a sense of what their
3 perspectives are.

4 Do I hear you both saying that basically
5 there should be more testing of what is really required
6 in terms of physical performances?

7 DR. OWENS: It would seem to me that — I
8 mean, the question of basic training about physical
9 standards, I think to a certain extent you're right,
10 although, again, I think basic training does something
11 other than just, you know — Well, one of the — Well,
12 let me change it.

13 The most important thing that basic
14 training does is to effect a transformation; to make
15 people see that being in the military is not just another
16 job. There's its own set of requirements and so forth.
17 So the idea of physical standards and that would seem to
18 be fairly important.

19 But beyond that, I think it's extremely
20 important that, you know, you have MOS tests that in fact
21 look at what you really need to do in this job and then
22 make sure that the standards are met.

23 DR. SEGAL: The services have told us that

1 to do this —
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Mady?
 3 DR. SEGAL: I'm sorry?
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We're getting short on
 5 time. I think you're on about your fifth question. So,
 6 you know, maybe we can come back.
 7 DR. SEGAL: Okay.
 8 MR. MOORE: Thank you both for coming.
 9 You know, you both have commanded troops in combat and
 10 you've thought deeply about the nature of warfare and I
 11 think some of your insights are very valuable to us,
 12 particularly the idea that we perhaps have not seen the
 13 last of general war, we may encounter another protracted
 14 ground war, and that the nature of modern warfare, no
 15 longer being linear, may actually involve rear area
 16 support troops in an intense combat situation as much as
 17 "front line" infantry. So I thank you for those
 18 insights.
 19 I'm concerned about this whole issue of
 20 the rigor of training. And we've touched on it a bit.
 21 I'm not sure whether I agree or disagree with General
 22 Keys as to whether the rigor of it has sort of been
 23 drained out. I'm still open-minded on that. There seems

1 to be an implication, though, that if indeed that has
 2 happened, one reason it has happened is because of
 3 gender-integration and the necessity to lessen the rigor
 4 in order to avoid eliminating large numbers of women, and
 5 I think the jury is still out on that.
 6 But I wanted to ask you specifically about
 7 the mental or psychological stresses that used to be
 8 associated with basic training and which seem to have
 9 been eliminated.
 10 We've been focusing primarily on the
 11 physical demands. In the meetings that Mady has cited
 12 that we have had systematically with trainers and
 13 trainees, we very often hear on the part of the drill
 14 sergeants and drill instructors, "Well, it's gotten soft.
 15 You know, I can't yell at them. I can't get in their
 16 face."
 17 And even from trainees. Very often when
 18 we talk to them we encounter almost a sense of
 19 disappointment: "Well, it's not as tough as I thought it
 20 was." And when you press them on that, that tends to be
 21 what they cite more than the physical — the elimination
 22 of certain physical demands, is the adversarial nature of
 23 the training. It's more mentoring and coaching as

1 opposed to confrontational. There's no profanity — or
 2 at least a lot less.
 3 I'd like your views on whether you think,
 4 in the first place, it's even necessary to have a
 5 rigorous training, whether that sort of mental stress
 6 does or does not approximate the stresses of combat, and
 7 whether we're losing something or maybe gaining something
 8 by eliminating some of this abuse and personal
 9 confrontation in the training regime.
 10 PROFESSOR PEARCY: Well, my view is that
 11 — as my statement indicates, that psychological stress
 12 is important in basic training. And to the extent that
 13 you can use those tools, those time — tried-and-true
 14 experiences of the past, to put stress — I'm talking
 15 about mental stress — on the trainee, it builds their
 16 self-confidence in order to stand up to it. I think that
 17 it is a confidence-builder.
 18 In addition, that psychological stress, I
 19 believe, is another rite of — going through it and
 20 standing up to it is a rite of passage that prepares one
 21 mentally to face great and difficult hardship.
 22 In my statement, I stated that
 23 psychological stress in combat in many ways is much

1 greater than physical stress. Having said that, good
 2 physical conditioning — my experience over a lifetime,
 3 good physical conditioning can help you also stand up
 4 under psychological stress better.
 5 I mean, perhaps my best experience was not
 6 so much in combat as it was working in the Pentagon,
 7 where I would find myself running around the hallways,
 8 you know, sometimes with my hair on fire, and all of a
 9 sudden stopping to say, "Hey, wait a minute, nobody's
 10 shooting at you." But, nevertheless, I was probably at
 11 some of my best physical conditioning while at the
 12 Pentagon because I had to escape for a couple of hours
 13 every day to work-out.
 14 MR. MOORE: One more and then I'm through
 15 then. One thing I have noticed — it's a subtle thing
 16 and it's hard to articulate, but I have definitely
 17 noticed this phenomenon as we have toured the training
 18 bases and talked to trainers and trainees at all levels.
 19 Clearly the services are doing the best
 20 they can in trying to make gender-integration work in
 21 basic training and it seems largely to be working. But
 22 one thing I have noticed in this sort of post-modernist
 23 philosophical environment that we're in is that there is

1 an attitude that the differences between men and women
 2 are — they do not exist in any objective or absolute
 3 realm; that they are all factors of conditioning,
 4 societal attitudes, and that we can use — we, the
 5 forces, can use basic training to essentially eliminate
 6 those retrograde attitudes. Men and women then will
 7 essentially be interchangeable, with the possible
 8 exception of the physical strength dimension.
 9 And so what I see happening is that the
 10 forces really are trying to effect as part of that
 11 transformation that you cite a sort of psychosocial,
 12 cultural transformation in eliminating the psychosexual
 13 differences. And one of the byproducts of that seems to
 14 be eliminating some of the natural male attributes that
 15 you would want to preserve in the military — just
 16 aggression; you know, a certain stubbornness and
 17 tractability — the things that males seem to be hard-
 18 wired to have by evolutionary biology which can't be
 19 dismissed as just a, you know, societal phenomenon. And
 20 I worry about that. I'd like your comments on that.
 21 Is there a way that we can make gender-
 22 integration work without eliminating aggression and some
 23 of the male attributes that you would want to preserve in

1 the armed forces?
 2 DR. OWENS: Well, first of all, I try
 3 whenever possible to avoid using the word "gender," and I
 4 think for the very reasons you've talked about. I mean,
 5 I — I don't know. I mean, I — sexual differences —
 6 when I talk about sexual differences, they seem to be
 7 rooted in nature. Gender seems to be socially
 8 constructed sorts of things, and I think that's the
 9 reason we've moved from one to the other.
 10 In the article I sent to the — I had
 11 published in the proceedings, that's not my title. I
 12 would never use "gender." I used it my title here, but
 13 just because it's what you guys are doing. But my
 14 original title was "The Military Ethos, Friction, and
 15 Women in Combat," and they changed it to "gender."
 16 I think a lot of the disagreements — and
 17 we're going to find this out one day, I guess — is
 18 whether in fact these sorts of things we're talking about
 19 are socially constructed or whether or not they are
 20 rooted in nature. And I guess I would just hate to find
 21 them out under stress in war, so we ought to find them in
 22 — we ought to find out about them in training. That's
 23 why I think training needs to be as rigorous as possible.

1 And I happen to like those sorts of traits you talk
 2 about.
 3 Now, it leads to all sorts of problems. I
 4 think any of us who have been in the military have run
 5 into the problem where you have a guy that's just
 6 absolutely fabulous in combat, but you never want to get
 7 him into the rear areas because he's — you know, he's
 8 destructive. I remember that I had a, when I was in
 9 Vietnam and reported to my platoon, a private who had
 10 been in the Marine Corps for four years.
 11 Well, that just doesn't happen, you know,
 12 even at that time. Well, the problem was he had been all
 13 the way up to sergeant and back twice. He was a fabulous
 14 combat Marine. He was absolutely fabulous. He was
 15 aggressive. He was knowledgeable. He made a difference.
 16 But, geez, you get him in the rear area, he was a liberty
 17 risk, to put it mildly.
 18 And I think that you don't want to dull
 19 those sorts of things, but I think that that is probably
 20 one of the maybe unintended consequences of integrating
 21 the sexes in training that we have to pay attention to,
 22 whether or not we — We just have to test it. We have to
 23 decide what's important; what's more important and what's

1 less important.
 2 But that's what I'd say about all these
 3 sorts of things. We have a number of things that are of
 4 value to us in this discussion. The question is which is
 5 the most important. And, you know, if we find that some
 6 of these things are adversely affecting combat efficiency
 7 and combat effectiveness, then I'd say we need to perhaps
 8 revisit them.
 9 MR. MOORE: Thank you.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you. I think what
 11 General Keys said, though, until we have an extended
 12 conflict, we're not going to know the answer.
 13 Just a couple of empirical questions
 14 first.
 15 By the way, Mack, I think you're saying
 16 Jomini is winning over Clausewitz now. I think —
 17 DR. OWENS: They actually said a lot of
 18 the same things.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: — the scientific,
 20 quantitative, technological, mathematical or — And by
 21 the way, the last bombing gave more, you know, credit to
 22 the anti-Clausewitzians.
 23 In your piece — Well, I'd like to state

1 for the record that Mack mentioned this piece in the
 2 current International Security article questioning
 3 cohesion. I think it would be useful, you know, to get
 4 that article.
 5 What was the name?
 6 DR. OWENS: Elizabeth Kier. It deals
 7 especially with homosexuality and its effect on cohesion,
 8 but it's —
 9 DR. MOSKOS: Homosexuality.
 10 DR. OWENS: Yeah.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Not gender so much.
 12 DR. OWENS: Not so much gender. But it —
 13 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. That's all right, too.
 14 DR. SEGAL: She does literature —
 15 Actually, I haven't seen that particular piece but she
 16 has a chapter coming out —
 17 DR. MOSKOS: I'd like to see that. Yeah.
 18 DR. SEGAL: — in a book called "Zero
 19 Tolerance," that — where she reviews the literature on
 20 cohesion.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. That would be useful,
 22 I think, for our purposes.
 23 You mentioned in your paper, Mack, 24,000

1 pregnant women in the military, which is on a basis of —
 2 my calculation is about 11 percent of all women at one
 3 moment in time are pregnant. Is that accurate?
 4 DR. OWENS: That was accurate once. I'm
 5 not sure — It was about a year-and-a-half ago. I'm not
 6 sure —
 7 DR. MOSKOS: Well, I mean, that recently?
 8 I mean, that's a huge number — 11 percent of all women
 9 at one time.
 10 PROFESSOR PEARCY: One of the problems —
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. I can't — It seems
 12 too high.
 13 PROFESSOR PEARCY: — with that is that a
 14 lot of women migrate into units like medical units. For
 15 instance, back in 1980, when they had the Army commanders
 16 conference, I was part of the staff to set that up.
 17 General Krozen, who was the commander in Europe, came and
 18 he made a presentation on the effect of women on the Army
 19 in Europe and he gave out a figure that on any day in
 20 Europe, 10 percent of the women are pregnant.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. That corresponds to —
 22 PROFESSOR PEARCY: 10 percent. And he
 23 said that was — That's a quote from General Krozen. And

1 he said in spite of thoughts to the contrary, we have to
 2 make the assumption that at the highest level of alert,
 3 that we will evacuate all of those women and that we're
 4 not going to have — knowingly have pregnant women in
 5 combat.
 6 And he said it had a profound effect in
 7 that so many of them are in the medical units. So you
 8 have this high concentration in — higher concentration
 9 in some units than others, with the obvious implications
 10 for dealing with high level —
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Charles, there's another
 12 question. In your presentation, you mentioned when you
 13 were training this unit up from scratch in Hawaii, they
 14 were in Vietnam five months afterwards.
 15 PROFESSOR PEARCY: Yes.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Correct me — and, Tom, you
 17 may know the history best of all — I thought in World
 18 War II there was a regulation or a law or something like
 19 that —
 20 PROFESSOR PEARCY: There is one today.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: — that you could not go
 22 overseas before six months of training.
 23 PROFESSOR PEARCY: Well, this is not —

1 DR. MOSKOS: What's the law say today on
 2 this training before you can go to a combat area? I
 3 don't know.
 4 MR. MOORE: But they had already gone
 5 through basic.
 6 PROFESSOR PEARCY: They had already gone
 7 through basic.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Oh, it wasn't from scratch
 9 scratch.
 10 PROFESSOR PEARCY: They had gone through
 11 basic —
 12 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 13 PROFESSOR PEARCY: — and they had not —
 14 although we —
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. I misunderstood.
 16 PROFESSOR PEARCY: — can train them at
 17 AIT within the unit —
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. All right.
 19 MR. MOORE: You were training them as a
 20 unit.
 21 PROFESSOR PEARCY: I was training them —
 22 It was unit training.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: I see. I thought it was from

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1 day zero.
 2 PROFESSOR PEARCY: When I say "scratch,"
 3 not —
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 5 PROFESSOR PEARCY: — not just coming
 6 through the door.
 7 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 8 PROFESSOR PEARCY: They had come out of
 9 the training base and —
 10 DR. MOSKOS: What is the rule today? Is
 11 there a law on how much training is required before a
 12 person can be deployed?
 13 PROFESSOR PEARCY: I think it's somewhere
 14 around sixteen weeks or something like that. It's
 15 normally weeks of training and I can't say for certain,
 16 but I seem to recall — and that's probably about right
 17 because you've got to go through advanced individual
 18 training now before you go into combat.
 19 And, of course, in World War — in the
 20 Korean War, after the Korean War, they took a lot of
 21 Military Academy graduates and just sent them in as
 22 platoon leaders without even sending them through the
 23 basic course at Benning and the Class of 1950 was —

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1 suffered enormous, enormous casualties.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: My other question — I know
 3 we're talking about combat, but there are other missions
 4 in the military today, other — operations other than war
 5 — whatever, peacekeeping — which the research that
 6 Laura Miller has done, and myself, argues that women in
 7 those roles — and you can say, "Well, this is not
 8 combat," which, though, in Somalia, you know, it's close
 9 to it — actually add to effectiveness in terms of
 10 bringing another dimension of — you know, by not
 11 treating locals badly, not committing atrocities as often
 12 as all-male units are more likely to do.
 13 That's one of our propositions — that
 14 actually having women as a force in Bosnia —
 15 PROFESSOR PEARCY: Well, I didn't find
 16 that when I commanded JTF Bravo where I had women — a
 17 substantial number of women there.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Where was that?
 19 PROFESSOR PEARCY: This was in Honduras.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: In Honduras. In '84, you
 21 said.
 22 PROFESSOR PEARCY: '84-85, when I was
 23 running intelligence operations in —

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1 DR. MOSKOS: In Pammarolin.
 2 PROFESSOR PEARCY: In Pammarolin.
 3 DR. MOSKOS: I was there. Yeah.
 4 PROFESSOR PEARCY: And I didn't find that
 5 they contributed any more than anyone else in that
 6 regard. Of course, we weren't — I know we couldn't — I
 7 had no — fortunately had no atrocities, and didn't have
 8 "Sixty Minutes" either, which was my major accomplishment
 9 as the COMJTFBRAVO.
 10 But I saw no difference. They performed
 11 their jobs well. It was not a combat situation, although
 12 it was kind of on the edge.
 13 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 14 PROFESSOR PEARCY: So —
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Well, let me defer — Oh,
 16 Mack wanted to respond.
 17 DR. OWENS: And even if that's true, I
 18 mean — and it may very well be true — the problem is —
 19 and we can expect in the future to have more
 20 constabulary-type operations, but we can't afford to have
 21 two militaries. We can't have one ready, you know,
 22 basically that hones its skills towards war-fighting and
 23 another that is constabulary-type operations. The same

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1 military has to do both.
 2 And the question is, where do you assume
 3 the greatest risk, I guess, and —
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Or what degree of trade-offs
 5 do you want.
 6 DR. OWENS: Yeah, trade-offs. All those
 7 sorts of things.
 8 PROFESSOR PEARCY: And we always — The
 9 accepted philosophy is that we train for the hard stuff.
 10 And we'll do the lesser stuff, but the hard stuff is
 11 where you're going to get most people killed and badly
 12 injured.
 13 And, of course, that's another one of the
 14 problems that is cited with the present Opstempo —
 15 Bosnia, Serbia, and doing operations short of war or
 16 other than war — is that, what effect does it have on
 17 the combat effectiveness of these units, which could
 18 easily — easily — be shifted out and sent to Korea in
 19 an emergency that could develop virtually overnight.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Thank you.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Well, I see
 22 that we've run out of time, so I'm not going to quote any
 23 dead Germans. All I'm going to do is, I think — just

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1 very quickly, I think, summarize what I've heard. And I
 2 think what you gentlemen are asking us to do is that, as
 3 we look at basic training of the force — and when I talk
 4 about "the force," I'm talking about the force as a whole
 5 — that you've clearly identified the importance that
 6 friction is real in both peace and war — that's a very
 7 real statement and I hopefully understood — that
 8 realistic training is required and that cohesion should
 9 be strived for, and that transformation is the most
 10 important element of basic training. I think that's what
 11 I've heard you say.
 12 I think that — And I'll leave this at
 13 this. I think our visits will allow us to do this, and I
 14 thank you for citing those important elements.
 15 PROFESSOR PEARCY: I'd like to add one
 16 other thing about — I'm a soldier, twenty-nine years in
 17 the Army, but — and I've often heard some of my fellow
 18 soldiers criticize the Marine Corps. And I always have
 19 — my observation — And I had probably more joint
 20 training than most general officers, in fact, and
 21 exposure to the other services. I had a Marine company
 22 in my command in JTF Bravo under my operational control.
 23 But I go back to a time in the nineteen-

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1 seventies when we were switching to an all-volunteer
 2 force and the Army came out with a recruiting pitch that
 3 said, "The Army wants to join you," simultaneously when
 4 the Marine Corps came out with "I didn't promise you a
 5 rose garden."
 6 And since that time, I have always made
 7 the argument that if the Army didn't have the Marine
 8 Corps, we'd have to invent them, because it reminds us
 9 about what we're about in being warriors.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: That's a good point.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Barbara?
 12 MS. POPE: I'm here.
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Anything to add?
 14 MS. POPE: No. I may have some, though,
 15 for the record.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.
 17 MS. POPE: I need to be able to hear
 18 everything in context, though.
 19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Great.
 20 MS. POPE: Thank you.
 21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Thanks.
 22 Barbara, we'll close with you for now and
 23 then pick you up on the next round.

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 74</p> <p>1 MS. POPE: Okay. Ask Hank to call me. 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Hank's here. 3 MS. POPE: Okay. 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Thanks. 5 As Barbara mentioned, we may have some — 6 we have some additional people besides Barbara who may 7 view the tape and have some questions. And, likewise, 8 unfortunately we didn't get around for a second round, 9 but there may very well be questions. So if you would be 10 amenable to receiving written questions, we would 11 appreciate your time to spend some more with us. 12 And I'm sorry that we've run out of time. 13 Thank you very much for coming. This has been most 14 helpful. 15 DR. OWENS: Thank you. 16 PROFESSOR PEARCY: Thank you very much. 17 (A brief recess was taken.) 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Our next panel is a 19 comparative look at two other countries' experiences, and 20 we have Vivian van de Perre to speak concerning the 21 Netherlands. And we do have a biography, so I'll just 22 proceed with that. And as I mentioned, we'll start with 23 statements and then go with questions from commissioners</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 77</p> <p>1 were only about twenty women at this certain point in 2 time. All cadets lived on base continuously and they 3 completed a fully integrated program, including such 4 training as a two-week combat survival course with the 5 Commando Troops. That's the Green Berets in the 6 Netherlands. 7 My other perspective to this issue comes 8 from having served as the Chief of the Female Military 9 Personnel Office for two years, where I was able to 10 observe gender-integration from a broader perspective 11 than only in the narrow world of highly motivated cadets. 12 And I was also able to work with other countries on these 13 issues. 14 And after my introduction, I hope you will 15 feel free to ask me all the questions you want and I 16 would like to answer them as frankly as I can, but I want 17 to first give you my general opinion on this subject so 18 you know what you can expect from me. 19 I think that if one is going to have 20 integrated units, then the training should be integrated 21 as well, starting with basic training. This is the only 22 way to effectively train a unit and to bring out the 23 message to the members of the unit that gender-</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 75</p> <p>1 as much as time permits. 2 But we thank you very much for coming and 3 welcome you, and please proceed with your statement. 4 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Good morning, Madam 5 Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, members of the 6 Commission. 7 Thank you for the opportunity to share my 8 personal experience and opinion with this Commission. It 9 is a great honor for me to be here. It is also an 10 opportunity that I have been looking forward to for many 11 years — to be able to elaborate on the Dutch experience 12 of gender-integration in the military to other interested 13 countries. 14 Through working with the NATO Committee on 15 Women in the Armed Forces and with the U.S. Defense 16 Advisory Committee On Women In the Armed Forces — 17 DACOWITS — I have become aware of the different approach 18 to gender-integration in the military by our two 19 countries. 20 My country, the Netherlands, does not have 21 your quantities of military women. Our current 22 percentage is only about 6 percent, but gender- 23 integration is, in my opinion, carried further than in</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 78</p> <p>1 integration is possible and desirable and should not be 2 looked upon as something special. 3 After all, to take in new recruits from 4 their fully integrated civilian schools, then to separate 5 them by gender, only to afterwards try to teach them to 6 integrate again, makes no sense to me. From the start, 7 it should be clear to everybody that men and women can 8 and should work together and live together without it 9 necessarily having to lead to problems. 10 There's a few more comments I'd like to 11 make, in no particular order. First I'd like to note 12 that from having worked with large numbers of draftees 13 myself, which were, by the way, all men — and the draft 14 was abolished in the Netherlands two years ago — it 15 demonstrated to me that the newest recruits are most open 16 to gender-integration and have the least problems with 17 it. The longer they are in the military, the more they 18 become affected by the military culture, which seems to 19 regard cross-gender relations as something out of the 20 ordinary. 21 Secondly, I believe that education level 22 influences the extent to which men and women will 23 integrate smoothly. The lower the education, the more</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 76</p> <p>1 the USA. And maybe it is even so that the high level of 2 integration causes the low numbers of females, but we can 3 talk more about that later should you be interested. 4 Since 1978, almost all functions in the 5 Dutch Armed Forces, with the exception of Submarine Units 6 and the Marine Corps, have been open to women and 7 training has been fully integrated. I am sure you are 8 all aware that there are not inconsiderable cultural 9 differences between the USA and the Netherlands in 10 general, and maybe even more so between our armed forces, 11 but, nevertheless, I think we can both learn from each 12 other's experiences. 13 I trust you have had a chance to review my 14 bio sheet and noticed that I can approach the subject 15 from two sides: my personal experience as a cadet in the 16 Royal Dutch Military Academy, where I received infantry 17 training for three years — And the standard procedure at 18 that time used to be that all cadets, regardless of their 19 final destination — which was for me finance and 20 logistics — received infantry training and only in the 21 last year the training was diversified according to the 22 branch you will be going to. 23 Out of an average of 500 cadets, there</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 79</p> <p>1 problems are generally likely to emerge. This implies 2 that a different approach may be required, for example, 3 for pilots than for infantry flemen. 4 My third point is a controversial one, I'm 5 sure, but I think it's relevant and true: where men and 6 women work together, you can never completely avoid 7 personal and/or sexual relationships. The question is if 8 it is even desirable to try to fully avoid this. 9 I noted that the Commission, in its 10 initial findings of the interim report of 15 October of 11 this year, has expressed concern about resources not 12 being utilized optimally, such as security cameras and 13 television monitors, and the detrimental effect of these 14 measures on the training environment. Maybe a more 15 realistic goal could be to try to avoid only certain 16 types of undesirable relationships, such as those which 17 would be considered undesirable in the civilian society 18 as well, instead of all relationships. 19 I believe that attempts to fully avoid 20 personal relationships or sexual relationships between 21 men and women by imposing very strict rules and 22 monitoring them is not conducive to harmonious 23 relationships and mutual respect in the unit.</p>

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1 Lastly, I would like to address briefly
2 the complicated issue of physical requirements. When I
3 was a cadet, all physical requirements were exactly the
4 same for men and women in 1985. This is one of the
5 reasons why there were so few women in the academy. I
6 can assure you it was very hard for women. However, by
7 being subjected to the same standards, we undoubtedly
8 gained the respect of many male cadets.

9 The situation has changed in the meantime
10 and there is now some limited diversification in the
11 physical requirements for men and women nowadays. My
12 point is, however, that there will always be a choice
13 that has to be made between quantity and quality — and
14 I'm talking about physical quality only in this respect
15 — since women will generally be physically weaker than
16 men.

17 More important, I think, is the question
18 whether it is fair to exclude those women that are
19 capable of physical achievements equal to those of men,
20 to deny them career opportunities just because the
21 average of the group they are part of is lower. And my
22 question is then, does the slogan "Be all you can be?"
23 apply to women as well?

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1 In sharing these considerations with you,
2 I am happy to answer any questions you might have about
3 my personal experience with gender-integrated military
4 training in the Dutch Armed Forces.

5 Thank you.

6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much.

7 We next have Shoshana Bryen, who is going
8 to talk to us about the Defense in Israel.

9 MS. BRYEN: Thank you for the invitation
10 to be here today. I am not an Israeli and I have not
11 served in the military. However, I have been with JINSA
12 — the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs —
13 for more than eighteen years. And during this time, I
14 have had the privilege of escorting more than 200
15 American flag and general officers to Israel to meet with
16 members of the Israel Defense Forces, and I think some of
17 my experiences and what I have learned especially from my
18 American guests may be relevant.

19 Comparing the American and Israel military
20 structures has sort of surface appeal. You have two
21 modern democratic high-tech countries with educated
22 populations, including educated women. But even though
23 my visits to Israel were designed specifically to find

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1 areas of commonality and enhance those areas of
2 commonality, I think there are more differences than
3 common points, and that's what I'd hope the Commission
4 would focus on in looking at Israel and the United
5 States.

6 As an example, during my travels, the
7 American officers invariably suggest that the IDF would
8 be well-served by having a professional NCO corps and the
9 Israelis invariably throw up their hands and say, "We
10 can't have that." Ultimately what we discover is that no
11 Israeli can imagine spending his career in the military
12 and ending up as a sergeant, and they don't understand
13 the respect that's given to senior NCO's in the United
14 States. They don't understand the important position
15 that they serve here. They hear the word "sergeant," and
16 to them, it's not what they want to be.

17 During the 1991 Los Angeles riots, I was
18 in Israel with a group of American officers and we
19 visited a training school for what they call "marginal
20 youth." They are school dropouts, petty criminals; young
21 men who, if left unattended, will not be productive
22 members of society. And they take them to this school
23 and they give them a course to make them military-

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1 eligible.

2 So we, of course, asked the question, what
3 happens if they fail the course, and we were told, "Well,
4 they take it again." And we asked what happens if they
5 fail it again, and the answer was "They don't." And we
6 said, "Well, of course they do. What happens if they
7 fail it again?", and the answer was "They don't."

8 Of course they do. There are people who
9 do. But what they're teaching them in this school and
10 what was important to them was they're really teaching
11 them the importance of service. They are teaching them
12 this is their last best opportunity to get into Israeli
13 mainstream society, and so basically they don't let them
14 fail.

15 My officer said, "This is great. Let's
16 take this home to South Central Los Angeles and let's do
17 this in the United States," as if they could. Of course
18 they couldn't because the imperatives are different.
19 There is an imperative in Israel to enter service at
20 eighteen, do your service, and stay with the reserve
21 system. There is no imperative in the United States.

22 American men and women join the military
23 to defend the United States. They join to acquire

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1 discipline and skills. They join to have adventures.
2 They join for educational reasons. I have a daughter
3 who's in the Army Reserves, who joined because she wanted
4 the adventure and she thinks Bosnia is a great thing. I
5 have a son-in-law who's a major, who joined for combat
6 reasons and he finds Bosnia to be a real drag. So there
7 are different ways of doing it.

8 But in Israel, the reason to join the
9 military is to defend the State, and secondarily to help
10 build a cohesive society between immigrants and native-
11 born Israelis. And so compulsory service creates a whole
12 different paradigm for them. You can choose among elite
13 combat units, combat units and other units, and women do
14 not have the option for the first two.

15 So even when you start out, women are not
16 on a par with men. Women, in fact, are something of an
17 afterthought in the IDF, which is kind of funny because
18 we tend to think of them as — because they're drafted,
19 they are important, but they are drafted and they are
20 essentially not terribly important. Mainly because, I
21 think, the differences between compulsory service and
22 volunteer service lead to different reasons for going in,
23 but also you have different social tectonic plates.

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1 Different things rub up against each other
2 in Israeli society and American society. We tend to look
3 in the military at male-female relations and gay/straight
4 relations, and that's what we're doing here, is looking
5 at male-female relations in the military. The Israelis
6 tend to look at people who serve versus people who don't
7 serve. Men and women who serve are here (Indicating),
8 men and women who don't serve are over there
9 (Indicating).

10 This is beginning to change. There are
11 now too many people in Israel of the draft age to
12 actually fit in the Israeli services, and so there is
13 some discussion about how to deal with compulsory service
14 for everybody and that has created enormous upheavals in
15 society: what would happen if we don't draft everybody?

16 The two groups of people in Israel who
17 don't serve are Arab Israelis, who comprise about 18
18 percent of the Israeli citizen population. This is not
19 Palestinian. It's not people over the Green Line. But
20 18 percent of the Israeli citizen population is either
21 Christian Arab or Moslem Arab and they don't serve. This
22 creates enormous tension because they then don't get the
23 benefits — the societal benefits — of having served.

1 And then the other group of people who
 2 don't serve are ultra-orthodox, not to be confused with
 3 what are called "modem orthodox." Those are people who
 4 are the same as secular Israelis except for their level
 5 of Jewish observance. They are drafted. They do serve.
 6 But the people with the black hats and the long earlocks
 7 and coats are not drafted. They have a blanket draft
 8 exemption, which has suddenly been declared illegal in
 9 Israel.

10 The Israeli Supreme Court said — yes, the
 11 Israeli Supreme Court said last month that the blanket
 12 exemption on yeshiva students is illegal. They have
 13 charged the Parliament with finding a legislative
 14 solution to this problem within one year, and they have
 15 decided the solution has to be legislative. It can't
 16 come from the Prime Minister. It can't come from the
 17 Defense Ministry. The Parliament can draft them, the
 18 Parliament can exempt them, but the Parliament has to do
 19 it.

20 The reason for that is to force Israeli
 21 society to deal with one of these tectonic plates, to
 22 deal with who serves and who doesn't, and they want the
 23 broadest kind of discussion they can have. It was the

1 equivalent of throwing an atomic bomb in Tel Aviv.

2 The uproar that this caused was far and
 3 away by orders of magnitude greater than the decision not
 4 too long ago of the Israeli Supreme Court to train women
 5 as fighter pilots. The women's issue didn't count. The
 6 who-serves-and-who-doesn't-serve issue was just — you
 7 know, there it was.

8 Women also, with very, very little comment
 9 in Israeli society, have taken over the role of combat
 10 arms trainers. All of the trainers in Israeli armed
 11 forces now are people who do not serve in combat, which I
 12 think in the United States would be a big problem. In
 13 Israel, it just went like this (Indicating). It just —
 14 It happened. It was a way of using female personnel and
 15 it just — and it happened.

16 The people who seem to have commented on
 17 that most strenuously was a group of cadets that I sent
 18 to Israel last summer, and they went to the training
 19 bases and they discovered women teaching men artillery
 20 and women teaching men to drive tanks and they weren't
 21 sure how that was going to work. The men commented on
 22 it, by the way. The male cadets commented on it. The
 23 female cadets had nothing to say about it.

1 So it happens, I think, in Israel because
 2 most of the attention is paid to the draft units, the
 3 reserve units and the elite combat units, and only in the
 4 draft units do you find any appreciable number of women
 5 anyway.

6 Women do have to serve, but if they're
 7 married or they have religious convictions that prevent
 8 them from serving closely with men, they're exempted.
 9 They look at their time spent in the Israeli service as
 10 useful and important to the State, but it's a duty to be
 11 accomplished and hopefully forgotten about fairly
 12 quickly.

13 Men, on the other hand, since they face
 14 reserve duty until the age of forty-five, have incentive
 15 to get into elite combat units because they're going to
 16 spend a long time there. And so men have different kinds
 17 of incentives as they move through the system.

18 So there are individual women who
 19 challenge the Israeli system. They are now Israeli
 20 pilots. And the Israeli head of the women's corps, who I
 21 had hoped to bring to you this morning — except the
 22 bombs were falling last week so they wouldn't let her out
 23 of the country — is an officer that I think you would

1 find comparable to any female officer — any male
 2 officer, for that matter — in any country. She's an
 3 outstanding military officer. But they are the
 4 exceptions in the Israeli system. They are not the rule.

5 So what I would caution — and I can
 6 answer specific questions, but what I would caution is
 7 against looking at Israeli society, although its surface
 8 resembles ours, and thinking that there's a lot of
 9 translate-ability between their experience and our
 10 experience.

11 Thank you.

12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Thank you very
 13 much.

14 Just to make sure that we get a couple
 15 people's questions in, Bob, I know you're leaving early.
 16 Do you want to start now or —

17 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Sure.

18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Thank you.

19 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Mine would
 20 be for Captain van de Perre. Two very quick ones, and
 21 one is just a point of clarification because I think I
 22 know what you meant.

23 You made a statement about it didn't

1 appear that the younger people coming into your Army had
 2 a problem with the gender-integration, and then I thought
 3 you said the longer one stays in the Army, the more of a
 4 problem they had with it. Did you mean the more senior
 5 people are in your Army today, they are the ones that are
 6 having a problem with the gender-integration?

7 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: No, I wouldn't
 8 translate it to rank. I would translate it in how long
 9 one actually serves in the Army in any rank. And I would
 10 actually say that the senior management is completely
 11 different. They usually are very much aware of the whole
 12 issue of gender-integration. And I would say the senior
 13 management never, in my opinion, or hardly ever has a
 14 problem with pushing for gender-integration.

15 It's more like how long one is in the
 16 military. For example, new recruits — the first half
 17 year — are used to working with women, being instructed
 18 by women, don't even question it. But when you then send
 19 them to a base in Germany where they sit together for
 20 four years and they hardly ever see a woman, then they
 21 get used to the idea that this may be exceptional to see
 22 women in the — So that's what I meant. I didn't mean to
 23 relate it to rank but the time one serves.

1 And that goes very quickly. I'm not
 2 talking about twenty years from the time you joined you
 3 are more negative about gender-integration than after
 4 five years. I'm talking about basically the first year.
 5 That's what I meant.

6 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. And
 7 the other question I would have is on leadership training
 8 that accommodates this environment. Do you have a
 9 structured, formal leadership training that trains your
 10 noncommissioned officers and officers to deal with this
 11 environment?

12 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: We have a formal
 13 structure in place, yes. In all the career training, the
 14 women's issue always comes up and there's always talk
 15 about integration of women, but it is, in my opinion,
 16 very focused on the technical points, like what kind of
 17 rights do women have when they become pregnant.

18 It's very much focused on how do you deal
 19 with each other's barracks; like what are the rules, and
 20 much less about what's really underneath; like why is it
 21 so important that women integrate in the armed forces,
 22 maybe how people interact, how that may change over time.
 23 All these things that I think are more important than

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1 what kind of rules that we have made for our day-to-day
2 work together.

3 So, yes, there is a lot of attention to
4 it. It's, oh, a lot. It's usually somebody goes for
5 career training, for example, for four weeks, and there
6 will be one day dedicated to, you know, women in the
7 forces. It's very much formal — the formal aspects of
8 it.

9 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
10 (Discussion off the record.)

11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Charlie.

12 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you both for very
13 enlightening presentations. I have a set of different
14 questions. I'll start with the Netherlands and then go
15 to Israel, and some of these are relatively short.

16 In the basic training area for the
17 enlisted folks, what are the barracks like in terms of
18 sexual separation?

19 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Women have separate
20 rooms but not in separate buildings. So there might be a
21 building — And it's changing. During the draft, we had
22 big rooms, where twelve men would sleep together in bunk
23 beds or twelve women, if we had that many, which were

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1 then not — you know, there were no draft women, but they
2 had a different kind of a short contract, a two-year
3 contract.

4 Now that's changing, now that we're moving
5 to a professional Army. It's two persons per room, with
6 one bath for that one room; so it's becoming a lot
7 easier.

8 But at the time when I served in the
9 military academy, you could have a room with six women,
10 next to a room with six men, and then the showers would
11 also be women or men's showers. And that's all there
12 was. That's all the rules that were in place. You had
13 to sleep separately and shower separately, and that was
14 it. And it was only in the barracks. At the moment you
15 went into the field for an exercise, that was it. You
16 could share a pup tent, a man and a woman.

17 The training that I mentioned with the
18 Green Berets, you had to share a sleeping bag with two
19 people. They tried to put two women in the group
20 together so they could share a sleeping bag, and then one
21 would get an injury or something, drop out. So I slept
22 basically with another man for two weeks in the same
23 sleeping bag.

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1 DR. MOSKOS: I never heard of two-person
2 sleeping bags.

3 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: No?

4 DR. MOSKOS: No.

5 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: It's because of all
6 the mines you carry and, you know, it's a little too
7 heavy.

8 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. That's very
9 interesting.

10 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yeah.

11 DR. MOSKOS: Another question. I don't
12 want to talk — But these are probably more — are
13 generally interesting to people.

14 The question about — The enlisted woman
15 in the infantry, when I went to the Netherlands and I
16 wanted to see, you know, a woman carrying a pack, and as
17 it finally turned out — well, this was during the later
18 — the draft was ending and we didn't draft women
19 obviously to put them in the infantry.

20 Today, is there an enlisted woman like a
21 private or a corporal in the infantry? Female?

22 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: I am not sure, but
23 I —

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1 DR. MOSKOS: This is like the Loch Ness
2 monster. I mean, I had always heard about it but I could
3 never actually see one.

4 Now, officers, yes.

5 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Officers, yes. I
6 know of some.

7 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. But I never —

8 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: But enlisted, I'm
9 actually not —

10 DR. MOSKOS: You're not sure.

11 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: — sure. But I am
12 —

13 DR. MOSKOS: Because they make a big story
14 about this.

15 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yeah.

16 DR. MOSKOS: You know, that everything's
17 open.

18 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: I would think so
19 because there's always — of all the women that want to
20 join, there's always — Very few of them — Most of them
21 absolutely don't want to have anything to do with the
22 infantry. There's always a few that do want to go to the
23 infantry.

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1 But, still, we made some rules that if you
2 want to join a combat unit, you have to meet exactly the
3 same physical standards as the men.

4 DR. MOSKOS: The other question: are there
5 rules — I think you were very candid, too, about there
6 would always be sexual, you know, issues going on when
7 you have men and women together. Are there rules about
8 fraternization between officers and enlisted or people
9 within the same chain of command dating each other?

10 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: You cannot date
11 people in the same chain of command. That doesn't mean
12 that, for example, a colonel couldn't date a private if
13 they were in totally different units.

14 DR. MOSKOS: I see. Okay. Are there many
15 marriages that way?

16 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes, there are
17 marriages that I know of, you know, from completely
18 different ranks. Sergeants with some lieutenant
19 colonels.

20 DR. MOSKOS: If somebody feels sexually
21 harassed — a woman — what does she — what are her
22 recourses in the Dutch Army?

23 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Oh, she has many

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1 recourses. First of all, the most obvious: you can go to
2 your colleagues or to your chief. But what if it is your
3 chief?

4 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.

5 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: You can — There's
6 a line — a direct line that anybody can call directly.
7 It's to a female lieutenant colonel in The Hague; that
8 everybody knows this colonel travels a lot and goes —
9 visits the barracks, and so everybody really knows this
10 person. I used to work with her. And, also, when women
11 join the Army, she goes and she talks to them and makes
12 sure that everybody has the number and it works pretty
13 well.

14 So first of all, they can just call —
15 It's for informal advice. It's not immediately to charge
16 somebody because —

17 DR. MOSKOS: That's interesting.

18 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: — you could always
19 go to the military police, but I'm talking about what
20 other things you can do.

21 So you can call directly to this female

22 colonel —

23 DR. MOSKOS: Does she get much business or

1 not?
 2 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: She does get a lot
 3 of business. And a lot of times it's not immediately
 4 sexual harassment. It is a question, like "this happened
 5 to me and I wasn't too happy with it, what should I do
 6 about it?" A lot of times people don't want to go to the
 7 military police and make it a big formal issue.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 9 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: They can also go to
 10 their — like to the — How do you call it?
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Chaplain?
 12 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Chaplain.
 13 DR. MOSKOS: Right.
 14 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: There's also one
 15 person per base that's an ombudsperson for all kinds of
 16 things, and usually they try to make one female and one
 17 male ombudsperson.
 18 There's so many different possibilities.
 19 And we make sure that when women join, that there's
 20 always somebody that goes there on the first day and
 21 gives them the information package and lines out what the
 22 possibilities are if they ever have a problem.
 23 And it doesn't even have to come to a

1 problem. It's even if they have a question, like "is
 2 this normal" or "should I feel this way," and they just
 3 want to talk about — Because a lot of times you're
 4 dealing with eighteen-year-olds, kids really.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Well, thanks so much,
 6 Vivian.
 7 Shoshana, my question will be sort of a
 8 spinoff of that. I understand — excuse my pronunciation
 9 — CHEN, the female auxiliary corps —
 10 MS. BRYEN: Right.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: — which means — It's an
 12 acronym in Hebrew and it also means "charm," which is an
 13 interesting juxtaposition.
 14 Does the CHEN still have — because we
 15 have these sort of two modern western democratic
 16 countries with sort of almost the extreme poles, you
 17 might say, on gender training. I understand — and tell
 18 me if this is still the case — that if a female has a
 19 sexual harassment or related — or any feminine issue
 20 ranging from hygiene to, you know, a serious harassment
 21 case, that she will report that within the CHEN chain of
 22 complaint —
 23 MS. BRYEN: Yes.

1 DR. MOSKOS: — which is sort of like an
 2 inspector general to the side of the chain of command and
 3 it's all-female.
 4 MS. BRYEN: Yes.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: Is that — That's still the
 6 —
 7 MS. BRYEN: That's still the case.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: That's still the case.
 9 MS. BRYEN: That is still the case.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: Is it still the case that
 11 women who misbehave are tried by all-female court-
 12 martials?
 13 MS. BRYEN: I believe that's still also
 14 the case.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Because this is very
 16 interesting — in Israel, that only women judge women.
 17 MS. BRYEN: Yeah.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: And the Israeli argument — I
 19 think is interesting for the record — is this does two
 20 things. One is it encourages reporting of harassment.
 21 And, B, it also discourages false accusations because
 22 women tend to be tougher on women than men will be.
 23 MS. BRYEN: I don't know if the second is

1 true, but the first is true. It was designed to give
 2 them an avenue that they would be more willing to use
 3 than if they had to report to men instead of females.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: And it was surprising to me
 5 to learn a few minutes ago that the Netherlands has a
 6 female sort of inspector general for female issues,
 7 you're saying. I didn't even realize that.
 8 America will never do that because we're
 9 too hung up on other issues, but those are interesting
 10 points.
 11 The other thing — my last point.
 12 Shoshana, I understood that in conscription, however,
 13 it's much easier that where virtually every able-bodied
 14 male is conscripted, for women, it's almost a voluntary
 15 draft.
 16 MS. BRYEN: Yeah.
 17 DR. MOSKOS: And only about half or 60
 18 percent of the women really go in.
 19 MS. BRYEN: About 60. A little more than
 20 60 percent actually go in.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 22 MS. BRYEN: You can be exempted. A woman
 23 can be exempted for two reasons.

1 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 2 MS. BRYEN: One is if she marries. And in
 3 Israel, there's a lot of relatively young marrieds.
 4 Seventeen, eighteen, they get married. And the other is
 5 religious conviction. But that is where — Now, a lot of
 6 women opt out because you used to have to be certified by
 7 a rabbi and then someone had to say that they knew you
 8 and they knew you came from a religious family, and they
 9 knew that it would be a religious hardship for you as a
 10 woman to work in the military. That's no longer the
 11 case. You simply have to certify yourself before the
 12 draft board that you would find it uncomfortable for
 13 religious reasons. So it's become an avenue.
 14 And, frankly, they're looking for people
 15 to opt out — not just women — at the moment. I know
 16 you work with Stewart Cohen. Stewart Cohen was almost —
 17 People throw stones at him for suggesting that there
 18 might be a more effective way to use Israeli personnel
 19 than in the draft and reserve system. And when he
 20 started that, he was almost burned to the stake as a
 21 heretic.
 22 But it's now become clear that there are
 23 simply too many eighteen-year-olds, male and female, so

1 the first thing they did was allow women to opt
 2 themselves out. The second thing they do is let men opt
 3 themselves out for a variety of reasons.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Oh. I can ask you to —
 5 Excuse me. What are the fraternization rules in the —
 6 MS. BRYEN: Much more liberal than
 7 anywhere else. They encourage fraternization in some
 8 ways because, well —
 9 DR. MOSKOS: You can change —
 10 MS. BRYEN: Because men are in the service
 11 at some time or another until they're forty-five. I
 12 mean, you do your month or you do your six weeks or
 13 sometimes longer, depending on the situation, and there
 14 is fraternization within the ranks. Male-to-male as
 15 well. I mean, it's not unusual to find conscripts and
 16 officers having a drink together. There is a lot of
 17 informality that exists in the Israeli system as opposed
 18 to our system.
 19 Male and female, it's the same way. Many
 20 women enter the military with the assumption that they
 21 will find a husband and, in fact, many women do. And
 22 when they get married, they're out.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: Can you date a chain-of-

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1 command person?
 2 MS. BRYEN: You can't date your own
 3 officers but you can date up and down the ranks. There's
 4 no rule about a sergeant dating a colonel, but you would
 5 not date —
 6 DR. MOSKOS: As is true in Netherlands.
 7 MS. BRYEN: It's — Really it's about the
 8 same thing.
 9 DR. MOSKOS: Sort of like —
 10 MS. BRYEN: If you go this way
 11 (Indicating).
 12 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah, I know. We think of it
 13 as this way (Indicating), but there are some points where
 14 it comes together.
 15 MS. BRYEN: Yeah.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Thank you very much.
 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I hope you don't mind,
 18 but Charlie makes a good interlocutor for all of us.
 19 Mady.
 20 DR. SEGAL: Thank you very much for coming
 21 and sharing your experiences and ideas with us.
 22 I'm sort of wondering: are things going
 23 reverse ways than — well, both — It sounds to me like

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1 both countries — You've done away with conscription, and
 2 I've heard talk that there's actually talk in Israel
 3 about abolishing conscription.
 4 MS. BRYEN: They still whisper, but yes.
 5 DR. SEGAL: In the Dutch military, you're
 6 only six percent women right now. But given that you've
 7 just done away with conscription, is it likely that the
 8 numbers of women are going to increase?
 9 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: There's two forces
 10 at work here, in my opinion. The first is that since
 11 we've done away with conscription and we need to have
 12 more volunteers, we have to rely more on women because we
 13 have difficulties filling the posts right now and we go
 14 out to the market and advertise the Army. We never used
 15 to do that. We didn't have to. So first of all, we have
 16 to rely more on women; so that would say that probably
 17 the numbers are going to increase.
 18 Now, the second part is my subjective
 19 opinion. I think the atmosphere is changing for women
 20 because the level of education is going down by getting
 21 rid of conscription. Before, we could just pick and
 22 choose people. We took people that were in college, with
 23 university education, and we would put them in the

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1 infantry and we had smart infantry soldiers. Now we have
 2 to rely on people that need the Army for one reason or
 3 another, and usually it's not because they just finished
 4 college.
 5 So the level of education has gone down.
 6 The whole atmosphere is changing. Instead of having
 7 people that are highly educated and not very motivated to
 8 serve and that you have to motivate with intelligent
 9 arguments to do their job, now you have highly motivated
 10 people with low education.
 11 So the whole atmosphere is completely
 12 different and I think it's getting worse for women to
 13 serve.
 14 DR. SEGAL: Because as you said, the lower
 15 educated are less accepting —
 16 DR. MOSKOS: That's interesting.
 17 DR. SEGAL: — of women, and so — Now, I
 18 imagine that college incentives probably wouldn't work as
 19 much in the Netherlands as they do here because —
 20 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Not at all, because
 21 —
 22 DR. MOSKOS: It's free.
 23 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: — it's free.

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1 DR. SEGAL: — it's free.
 2 Right. Okay.
 3 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes.
 4 DR. SEGAL: And here, that's a major way
 5 that we get college-bound people.
 6 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yeah.
 7 DR. SEGAL: We get at some of the smarter
 8 — They may not have had the education and such.
 9 DR. MOSKOS: Which the Department of
 10 Defense opposed. But, anyway...
 11 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: We have to go with
 12 smaller incentives, like, you know, driver's license,
 13 which is very expensive to get in the Netherlands. For
 14 example, we can get a lot of drivers because of that in
 15 the Army because they get their free driver's license.
 16 DR. SEGAL: That's a different incentive.
 17 That's all I have for now.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Just to clarify.
 19 Now, you've done away with conscription of
 20 both men and women?
 21 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: We didn't have
 22 conscription for women.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Oh, you did not.

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1 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: We have a different
 2 system for women where they could sign up voluntarily for
 3 two years and serve in the same kind of functions that
 4 the conscripted men did, but with better pay; because the
 5 conscription pay was really very low, so that didn't sit
 6 very well with a lot of people.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: How big is the
 8 Dutch Army?
 9 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: We halved it
 10 basically after the end of the Cold War. It used to be
 11 about a hundred-thousand, including all three services
 12 and civilians, and now it's about 50,000.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Do they deploy?
 14 And where do they deploy and how long?
 15 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: They go mainly on
 16 peacekeeping operations if they go outside of the
 17 Netherlands. And we also have lots of bases still in,
 18 you know, surrounding countries like Germany. We have a
 19 joint corps with the Germans. We have cooperation with
 20 the French, with the Belgians. Our Marines also are
 21 places in the world like the Caribbean where we have
 22 several islands.
 23 But mainly if we deploy somewhere, it's

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1 like peacekeeping operations or in Bosnia.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: And these are
 3 integrated units? Both?
 4 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Now, you said —
 6 I know the Marines don't. Who else does not have women?
 7 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: The Submarines and
 8 the Marine Corps.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Submarines and
 10 Marines.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Those Special Forces people
 12 who went in during the Mollican thing eight or nine years
 13 ago, does that unit have women in it?
 14 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: They could have,
 15 theoretically.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Theoretically.
 17 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 19 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: The Submarines and
 20 the Marine Corps, there's a law that —
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 22 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: — there cannot be
 23 any women.

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: How big is your
 2 Marine Corps?
 3 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Theoretically,
 4 Green Berets can be women. But they can't meet physical
 5 standards, so they're not in.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: I see.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: How big is your
 8 Marine Corps? Do you know?
 9 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: It's four
 10 battalions.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I think an
 12 interesting point that was raised here — and I would
 13 follow through on it a little bit more, it seemed to be
 14 that from both countries the importance of demographics
 15 or the changes in demographics have had a great deal of
 16 impact on the role that women will play within the armed
 17 forces and I wonder if you'd comment on that.
 18 First from the Netherlands, as you go to
 19 kind of an all-volunteer force, what that impact of men
 20 and women in the demographics — numbers of men and women
 21 and the age groups — and then the same from the Israeli
 22 perspective.
 23 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Shall I start?

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1 When we had the draft, we had the same
 2 problem as in Israel: there were too many people of the
 3 right age group that we could choose from. And then
 4 after we had screened out medically unfit people and
 5 everything, we still had about three times as many than
 6 were needed.
 7 So there was a lottery system and then two
 8 didn't have to go and one had to go — of the men, and
 9 the women didn't have the draft at all. So that was very
 10 unfair, so this is one of the reasons why we got rid of
 11 it.
 12 Right now, we have the opposite. We can't
 13 get enough people, so we really have to actively try to
 14 come up with things to lure people in, like a free
 15 driver's license and stuff like that. But it's not as
 16 easy as here because of the fact that college education
 17 is free. But the better the economy is, the more
 18 difficult it is to get people to join the armed forces.
 19 So right now, it's really very difficult
 20 because the economy has been booming for the last ten
 21 years or so, so we're really waiting for a recession now.
 22 And because college education is free, a lot of people
 23 study.

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1 Now, after you've gone to university,
 2 nobody will join the armed forces anymore. That's a
 3 reality they have to live with. So it's really difficult
 4 to find enough men and women.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 6 MS. BRYEN: In Israel, actually, there was
 7 a slightly different situation. The myth of the Israeli
 8 female combat soldier was born in the War of
 9 Independence, which was now fifty years ago, and they
 10 simply didn't have enough people in the country to man
 11 the armed forces, so they used women. But it was their
 12 only experience with women in combat.
 13 It was a very unsuccessful experience.
 14 There were women who were taken prisoner by Syrians and
 15 Iraqis and that was basically the end of women in combat
 16 for the Israeli armed forces.
 17 DR. SEGAL: Just because culturally —
 18 MS. BRYEN: Because culturally it was
 19 unacceptable to have female prisoners in Arab male hands.
 20 And what happened to those women probably should not have
 21 happened to anyone in —
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Were they assaulted?
 23 MS. BRYEN: Yes.

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1 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 2 MS. BRYEN: They were returned in not —
 3 Well, never mind how they were returned. It was the only
 4 experience they had with women in combat.
 5 Now they have more people than they need.
 6 Now the question — And the Israeli armed forces, too, go
 7 in two different directions. One is the actual Army, and
 8 the other is the educational corps, which provides other
 9 outlets for people who would like to serve the State but
 10 who do not wish to be soldiers.
 11 You do find some of the black hats, the
 12 ultra-orthodox who serve in this corps because it allows
 13 them to serve the State without any fear of combat or
 14 arms, which is — you know, they won't do. In fact, the
 15 people who have the single worst job in all of Israel are
 16 those people. They are the people who clean up after the
 17 bombings and ensure that —
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 19 MS. BRYEN: By Jewish law, all body parts
 20 of deceased people have to be buried. And so someone has
 21 to go around after bombings and do the actual clean-up,
 22 and that is done by — you see it on television — the
 23 guys with the black hats and the long earlocks. That is

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1 their service to the State, and that's a highly respected
 2 spot that they take because nobody else would really want
 3 that spot.
 4 So you have an avenue for people who do
 5 not go into combat arms and don't serve in the actual
 6 armed forces, and that's in the educational force.
 7 All of the trainers in the school that we
 8 went to for delinquent youth were women. So you had the
 9 functional equivalent of ghetto kids from Brooklyn being
 10 trained by, you know, very nice young ladies from
 11 someplace else, and their role, however, was elevated and
 12 respected, and they received enormous respect in the
 13 classroom.
 14 But even after you separate them, even
 15 after you put some in combat and you put some in
 16 education and you account for all, there's still too many
 17 people.
 18 DR. SEGAL: Can I just follow-up on
 19 something?
 20 The women also train — You mentioned it
 21 earlier. What sorts of combat skills do the women train
 22 men in?
 23 MS. BRYEN: All combat skills. Tanks,

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1 airplanes, artillery. I don't think they do Submarines.
 2 The Israeli Navy is a separate service and I don't think
 3 they do that. But there is some female — there are
 4 female trainers in the Israeli Navy, on surface ships. I
 5 just don't think they do Submarines.
 6 DR. SEGAL: Do they get respect even
 7 though they can't —
 8 MS. BRYEN: Yes.
 9 DR. SEGAL: How does that happen?
 10 MS. BRYEN: I don't know how it happens.
 11 But I will say — I should have brought you some of the
 12 papers that the American military cadets wrote after they
 13 had been on these training bases and watched the women
 14 trainers, and they were shocked.
 15 DR. SEGAL: Could you send them to us?
 16 MS. BRYEN: Absolutely.
 17 DR. MOSKOS: Shoshana, somebody said to me
 18 in Israel one reason they get respect is it's a female
 19 role to be a teacher and that you get that. How do you
 20 react to that argument?
 21 MS. BRYEN: There is — Yes, I think there
 22 is some of that.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.

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1 MS. BRYEN: One of my cadets suggested —
 2 And I think he may be right. One of our cadets suggested
 3 that men don't want to fail in front of women. And so if
 4 a woman can drive a tank, you'd better be able to drive
 5 it better. Israel is a very macho society and there's a
 6 level at which, you know, they still operate that way.
 7 And you don't want to fail in front of women, and so the
 8 women are trainers and the men feel that they have to do
 9 at least as well.

10 DR. MOSKOS: On that same point, if I may
 11 just interject, in the basic training of the women
 12 soldiers on the different bases, what is the male
 13 presence on those bases?

14 MS. BRYEN: There is —

15 DR. MOSKOS: Are there men who do
 16 something?

17 MS. BRYEN: There is —

18 DR. MOSKOS: It's not all — you know, not
 19 a hundred-percent female base.

20 MS. BRYEN: Well, there is actually a
 21 female training base and that's what it's for. It's for
 22 the training of women.

23 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.

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1 MS. BRYEN: I mean, it's run by a woman
 2 colonel —

3 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.

4 MS. BRYEN: — one of the people that I
 5 had hoped to bring you today but didn't do.

6 So actually there are female training
 7 bases where they train by themselves.

8 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.

9 MS. BRYEN: But then there are skills that
 10 women need to learn in places where the men teach them
 11 the skills in order that they can teach the next
 12 generations, and so they then go to —

13 DR. MOSKOS: An advanced kind of course.

14 MS. BRYEN: Advanced courses are taught by
 15 —

16 DR. MOSKOS: But the basic is all-female?

17 MS. BRYEN: Is all-female.

18 It doesn't last very long, and then they
 19 go off and they —

20 DR. MOSKOS: How long does it last?

21 MS. BRYEN: I think it's three months that
 22 they —

23 DR. MOSKOS: Three months.

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1 MS. BRYEN: — spend on that base. And
 2 then you go off to places —

3 DR. MOSKOS: That's comparable.

4 MS. BRYEN: — like the Golan Heights,
 5 where you find men and women in the same small bases up
 6 there in the Golan Heights, in simply separate quarters,
 7 separate little buildings.

8 DR. SEGAL: How long is basic training for
 9 the men?

10 MS. BRYEN: I think it's twice as long. I
 11 think theirs is six months.

12 DR. SEGAL: What about in Netherlands?

13 How long is basic training?

14 MS. BRYEN: But then they go on to more
 15 training.

16 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: About six months
 17 and nine months, depending on —

18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Perhaps for
 19 both the Israeli forces and for the Dutch forces, one of
 20 the things that we've been looking at is the continuum of
 21 training that each one of our respective armed forces go
 22 through from accession, you know, to that point when they
 23 go to their first operational unit. I wondered if —

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1 from both countries — you could just — if you all map
 2 out that continuum of training. If you know it.

3 MS. BRYEN: I know it. All the women
 4 start in the women's training base, but they then move on
 5 depending on what they're doing. If the women move on to
 6 educational functions, they essentially stay with women
 7 all the way through. They don't ever really need to go
 8 to places where men are.

9 Then there are other women who — This is
 10 the part that they don't like to talk about: there are
 11 the Israeli women soldiers who file papers and serve
 12 coffee. After their basic training, they are sent to
 13 offices and they file paper and they serve coffee, and
 14 essentially they're just waiting to get out.

15 They are the basic conscripts. They do
 16 not wish to remain in the military. They look at it as a
 17 holding pattern; maybe they'll find a husband, maybe they
 18 won't. And that's probably about 30 percent of the
 19 women. They do their basic training and they go to
 20 offices.

21 And then there are those women who teach
 22 skills.

23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: How big is the

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1 Israeli Army?

2 MS. BRYEN: Don't know. It's gotten
 3 smaller recently. I think when they are fully mobilized,
 4 there are about 550,000. But that's full mobilization.

5 MR. MOORE: That's a large reserve
 6 contingency.

7 MS. BRYEN: That is a very large reserve
 8 contingent.

9 That's it. That's fully mobilized. I

10 think they are about 170-something-thousand as —

11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Every day.

12 MS. BRYEN: Every day.

13 MR. MOORE: Because your — if I can
 14 interject, the Israeli defense strategy really depends
 15 far more on the reserves than any other western force I
 16 would say in the world.

17 DR. MOSKOS: Well, the Swiss, too.

18 MS. BRYEN: The Swiss do it —

19 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.

20 MR. MOORE: Well, yeah, okay. That's

21 right.

22 MS. BRYEN: Although the Swiss —

23 DR. MOSKOS: They don't fight wars.

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1 MS. BRYEN: The Swiss —

2 MR. MOORE: The don't fight —

3 MS. BRYEN: Yeah, the Swiss combat
 4 experience is a little different.

5 MR. MOORE: But your active — your
 6 standing force is basically designed to hold and give
 7 time for the reserves to mobilize and deploy.

8 MS. BRYEN: That's right. It's a 48-hour
 9 mobilization. So for the first forty-eight hours of a
 10 war, you would have your standing Army, which is
 11 comprised of conscripts and the professional services.

12 The Air Force is a professional service,
 13 with the exception of pilots. Some pilots are reserve
 14 contingents and they —

15 DR. MOSKOS: Oh. Shoshana, that brings up
 16 another question on the Air Force. I've been told, too,
 17 that on the fighter pilot side of it, the fixed-wing,
 18 that no Israeli woman has successfully completed that
 19 program. Is that true or false?

20 MS. BRYEN: That's true.

21 DR. MOSKOS: That is true.

22 MS. BRYEN: But there haven't been that
 23 many that have tried. It's only recently that the

1 Supreme Court has ordered the IDF to put women in those
 2 programs.
 3 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 4 MS. BRYEN: So the answer is no, there
 5 aren't any.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: How much
 8 training do the reserve forces get?
 9 MS. BRYEN: You're supposed to be one
 10 month a year in your reserve units. But then it depends
 11 on what kind of reserve duty you do. Those people that
 12 go to Lebanon, for example, can spend three months out of
 13 the year in their reserve units in Lebanon.
 14 Same is true — was true on the West Bank,
 15 before the Palestinians took control of the major cities.
 16 You could spend three months reserves doing the West Bank
 17 or the Gaza. But that's pretty much disappeared now.
 18 So you're expected to do one month a year
 19 in reserves.
 20 Pilots are expected to do more, by the
 21 way.
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Let's get back to —
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Could I

1 And then after a while, the attention goes away a little
 2 bit and they're more able to do what they want to do.
 3 Of course, you have better and worse
 4 women. And it is nice to be below average and still be
 5 able to — like the below-average man that makes the
 6 training, to still make it. And that's almost impossible
 7 if there are low numbers of women.
 8 DR. SEGAL: Now, the acceptance — if I
 9 could just follow-up on that, you talked about — in
 10 explaining why the acceptance becomes less over time, you
 11 talked about men who are in all-male units. What's the
 12 gender-integration and the acceptance like in those units
 13 that have women?
 14 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: It depends very
 15 much on the experience.
 16 Now, I can talk from my own experience in
 17 the military academy. I was — I started there in 1985
 18 and we started with twelve women that year. That was the
 19 first time there were that many women and eleven of us
 20 made it to the end. That was exceptional. And there
 21 were very many very strong women. I've seen women that
 22 pulled men up over obstacle courses because they didn't
 23 have the strength anymore. And so it was an exceptional

1 hear the Netherlands now?
 2 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes. First people
 3 go to basic infantry training and that's about — It has
 4 been varying a lot. When we had the conscription, it
 5 used to be first eight months, then it was cut down to
 6 six months; it was cut down to four months. Now that we
 7 have all volunteers, we have more time and it's been
 8 going up again. And I suspect it's somewhere around four
 9 to six months now. I'm not completely sure.
 10 After that, you get your training for
 11 whatever you're going to be. So it depends. If you're
 12 infantry, then you are basically almost finished. You
 13 get some extra skills. And if you're going to be a
 14 technician, then you're going to study for another full
 15 year, and you're also going to go to civilian
 16 institutions to do that.
 17 So it depends really on what you are going
 18 to be.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I see.
 20 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: But everybody
 21 starts off with the same basic infantry training.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Just a
 23 follow-on to that. Based on just the size of the force

1 group, I think, that I was part of and we had very good
 2 acceptance.
 3 However, the year before me, they started
 4 out with I think eight women and only one made it. And
 5 she made it because she was a very exceptional woman,
 6 very exceptionally strong and exceptionally able to take
 7 — yeah, to take this position of being very special.
 8 She was able to deal with that.
 9 All the other —
 10 DR. SEGAL: Well, I've heard some — I'm
 11 sorry.
 12 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yeah. Also, all
 13 the others dropped out. So in that year, men were very
 14 different towards their women. They said, "Well, women
 15 don't really function that well. This one does, but
 16 she's just" — yeah, an exception. In my year, it was
 17 completely different. Men were very positive in general
 18 towards women, although you always had the group that
 19 wasn't.
 20 DR. SEGAL: I understand that women are
 21 integrated on ships in the Navy.
 22 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes.
 23 DR. SEGAL: And that that has been more

1 and the percentage of women, you have made the comment
 2 that when the new recruit comes in, you know, there's not
 3 really a problem and the integration goes very well; but
 4 then when off to that assignment, over time that focus of
 5 yes, integration was fine, seems to leave.
 6 Is that just a matter of numbers, too?
 7 Demographics?
 8 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes, it is also a
 9 matter of numbers. A lot of women drop out during basic
 10 training because of — mostly because of physical
 11 problems, but also because of acceptance problems. And
 12 it is very hard if you are only five percent to maintain.
 13 And I suspect it's the same with the
 14 pilots that drop out. We have the same in the beginning.
 15 The fighter pilots, the first five to ten women over a
 16 series of years all dropped out because everybody's
 17 watching them. They're in the newspaper all the time:
 18 "How are our female fighter pilots doing?" There's such
 19 tremendous pressure, and mistake is — you know,
 20 everybody knows about it.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 22 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: It's an enormous
 23 amount of pressure. So the first ones will drop out.

1 successful than the Army — Is that correct? — in terms
 2 of integrating the Army?
 3 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: I can't tell if it
 4 has been more successful or not. The first ship that
 5 went out with a mixed crew was a big scandal because
 6 there were some relationships that evolved. And it
 7 wasn't really that much of a problem on the ship, but
 8 everybody else that stayed at home, the families, it
 9 became a big press scandal and it was a real big deal.
 10 And it was really a disaster. They
 11 decided to go ahead with it. After that, it smoothed
 12 out.
 13 DR. SEGAL: Was that the Zeidezee? Was
 14 that the name of it?
 15 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: The Zeidezee, yeah.
 16 You heard of it. So you can imagine.
 17 So after that, it smoothed out. And
 18 there's still relationships going on, but it's — You
 19 know, you have the same thing in civilian companies. And
 20 after a while, people just get used to it and they try to
 21 minimize it and things happen.
 22 So I think it's pretty successful. I
 23 don't know if it's more successful than in the Army. I

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1 really actually doubt it because the Navy culture is very
2 different.
3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What do you
4 —
5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Did you get an answer to
6 your...
7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Let me ask
8 a couple if I can. What — because it was brought up
9 here. What do you think about the fact that by Dutch
10 law, neither the Submarines nor the Marines — the Royal
11 Marines — can in fact have women in the service?
12 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: I think it makes no
13 sense to arrange that by law to exclude women. It makes
14 no sense. I think it's a better idea to deal with it as
15 with the Green Berets. You can join if you want, but
16 prove that you can do it. If that means that never any
17 woman can join, that's fine. That means that they can't
18 meet the requirements.
19 But if there is one somewhere that wants
20 to do it, that is willing to put up with all the nonsense
21 that she will have to put up with, that is physically
22 capable of doing it, why would she not be able to join?
23 That's something that I don't understand.

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1 DR. MOSKOS: "G.I. Jane."
2 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes.
3 So if there is one out there, why would
4 you not let her?
5 I remember one time a talk I had with the
6 Norwegians, who have women on submarines, and actually a
7 woman did very well and became a submarine commander.
8 And we asked them — This was in the NATO committee and
9 it was all wonderful. And then afterwards, we said —
10 when we were having a drink — "So now tell us what's
11 really going on." And they said, "Well, the woman is
12 basically a very particular person, like the men on
13 submarines. They're also very particular."
14 So they fit very well together. There's
15 less of a difference between that woman and those men
16 than between submarines in general and the rest of the
17 military.
18 So if this is the case, I think, should we
19 then make a law to exclude those women — that handful of
20 women that really would fit in? Would we have to exclude
21 them? It's my personal opinion, really.
22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Tom.
23 MR. MOORE: I think all my questions have

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1 been covered.
2 DR. MOSKOS: Can I ask one?
3 Vivian, I think it would be interesting
4 for the group to hear what you told me both at Cambridge
5 and later — earlier this morning. That when DACOWITS
6 was asking the Dutch military questions about women in
7 the military and —
8 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes.
9 DR. MOSKOS: I think the group would be
10 interested to hear it.
11 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: When I worked as
12 the Chief of the Female Military Personnel Office, a lot
13 of times we got questions — from the U.S. military
14 mainly, and sometimes from DACOWITS, sometimes through
15 other channels — questions about the integration of
16 women and our policy of having women in combat roles.
17 And we had to give politically-correct answers, so we
18 would throw some statistics at the question-asker and we
19 would say some politically vague and correct things and
20 that was it.
21 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you.
22 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: You're welcome.
23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I'd like to know what —

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1 Does either of your countries have a policy regarding
2 homosexuality in the military?
3 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: We have a policy.
4 MS. BRYEN: Yeah, we have a policy. Not
5 "we," they.
6 One of the groups of officers that I took
7 to Israel, it was exactly during that moment when the
8 President was announcing "Don't ask, don't tell," so we
9 went through Israel asking all over the place what the
10 Israeli policy was.
11 Because the military is the avenue to
12 other social benefits, anyone who can possibly serve does
13 serve, including gays, including people who have
14 handicaps that would disqualify them from service in the
15 United States. They're taken into the Israeli military.
16 The way they deal with them is never to
17 put them in a position where they will be camped out with
18 other soldiers. They don't send them to the Lebanon
19 border. They don't send them to the small posts on the
20 Golan Heights.
21 They have office jobs. They are in places
22 where — Because it's a small country, you can do it
23 where they can essentially go home at night or they can

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1 — They don't have to be in a compromising position. But
2 they are drafted like everybody else.
3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What kind
4 of acceptance — Did that question come up —
5 MS. BRYEN: Doesn't come up in Israel.
6 People serve. There are people who serve
7 with one eye or one leg. There are people who serve who
8 are homosexual. They would not serve in our country. I
9 mean, we wouldn't take people with one leg. In Israel,
10 they take them.
11 And that's the way it is. There's a
12 common understanding that you want as many people to have
13 the ability to serve, and this is why they have trouble
14 and they only whisper about getting rid of the draft.
15 The goal is to get as many people who can serve to pass
16 through the system and you close your eyes to a lot of
17 things that we in the United States would not close our
18 eyes to.
19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
20 MS. BRYEN: So it's acceptable.
21 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: We have a policy on
22 homosexuals, which is just treat them like anybody else.
23 So they can serve. And as far as acceptance is

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1 concerned, they had a very cruel experiment in my opinion
2 —
3 DR. MOSKOS: "Experience."
4 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Experiment. They
5 asked — They had some kind of written questionnaire to
6 people to rank whether you'd rather work with a woman
7 military colleague, a gay military colleague, or an
8 ethnic minority, which is, you know, people from Surinam,
9 Turkey —
10 DR. MOSKOS: Morocco.
11 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: — Indonesia,
12 Morocco, anywhere. And they ranked them as follows:
13 first an ethnic minority, then a homosexual, then a
14 woman.
15 DR. MOSKOS: I might add just for the
16 group's interest on this question that the Navy post-
17 graduate school asked a group of middle-level Navy
18 officers — They didn't use the "ethnic minority." But
19 they asked the question, "Would you prefer to serve with
20 a male homosexual or a woman," presumably straight, and
21 the response was they would prefer the homosexual.
22 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yeah.
23 DR. MOSKOS: So it was an interesting

1 parallel.
 2 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: That might also be
 3 cultural because my country looks a little bit different
 4 upon homosexuals than the USA.
 5 DR. SEGAL: Isn't it true that you have a
 6 union for the homosexual military personnel?
 7 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes. Yes.
 8 DR. SEGAL: Of course, the military people
 9 are unionized in the Netherlands. They have a union to
 10 represent the military people, right?
 11 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes. It was more
 12 of the time of the draft, and it's kind of —
 13 DR. MOSKOS: The draft.
 14 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: — dying a slow
 15 death.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Anybody else?
 17 DR. SEGAL: Yeah, I'd like to follow-up on
 18 something in response to Charlie's question about what
 19 happens when DACOWITS makes a request for information.
 20 You say you throw some statistics at them.
 21 Do you give them incorrect statistics?
 22 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: No.
 23 DR. SEGAL: Oh, okay.

1 rules. Then somebody decided that he was going to make
 2 this all work a little bit smoother, and then came all
 3 these rules like men couldn't visit women after ten
 4 o'clock anymore; women have to be in a separate tent in
 5 the field; they have to have separate latrines.
 6 We found out that the more rules that were
 7 made to make things smoother, the worse it went. Maybe
 8 technically it went okay, but the acceptance became a lot
 9 less because the men said, "Why do we have to set up a
 10 separate latrine for the women? It's extra work." "Why
 11 do we have to have the women in a tent somewhere else?"
 12 Because we can't communicate. We want them in our tent."
 13 So we experimented lots. We started out
 14 with almost no rules, then we got a lot of rules, and
 15 then we got rid of those rules again in the four years.
 16 This is one thing I didn't want to keep
 17 from you.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: That's great.
 19 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, that
 20 begs one question, then. Is the culture there — when
 21 you started out with no rules, do the men — are they
 22 considerate of a woman's privacy and considerate of her
 23 space, if you will?

1 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: No.
 2 DR. SEGAL: But are you selective in the
 3 statistics? Is that what happened? You're required to
 4 give —
 5 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes, you can make
 6 statistics look any way you want to. But the point is
 7 that you would never say officially that something
 8 doesn't work easily or it has to be really bad; but in
 9 general, everything works okay.
 10 DR. SEGAL: In the Committee on women in
 11 the NATO forces, do you share the information about the
 12 difficulties?
 13 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes. Well, no,
 14 that's also a statistics committee. And then afterwards,
 15 in the bar, then we share some, but that will never make
 16 its way into the report.
 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: More questions?
 18 DR. MOSKOS: The training, may I ask, on
 19 Sebernica, Vivian —
 20 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: After the Sebernica incident,
 22 which you told me it was an infantry all-male unit —
 23 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes.

1 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Very, very
 2 considerate. And if you try to regulate that, they feel
 3 offended, and they take it out on the women, not on the
 4 people that make the rules.
 5 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Right.
 6 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: I must, however,
 7 add that I'm talking about the military academy and
 8 people with, you know, a certain level of education. And
 9 so it's not that easy if you go to a rifleman unit. The
 10 higher the education, the more that comes into play, in
 11 my opinion.
 12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Sure.
 13 DR. SEGAL: Now, you talked about sharing
 14 a sleeping bag with a male peer. Was that in the academy
 15 or out in the unit?
 16 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: No, that was in the
 17 academy.
 18 DR. SEGAL: That was in the academy.
 19 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes.
 20 DR. SEGAL: Was there any problem with
 21 that?
 22 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Not at all, because
 23 this is the combat survival course and you do this for

1 DR. MOSKOS: — that was involved in that
 2 episode —
 3 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: — was there any talk there
 5 about why not have women in those kind of units?
 6 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: They can be there,
 7 but they were the Red Berets. And rigorous physical
 8 training, and there were some women that tried and didn't
 9 make it. But they had female drivers, female nurses.
 10 There were females there, but not as infantrymen.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you very much.
 12 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: I would like to —
 13 DR. MOSKOS: By the way, this has been so
 14 enlightening — Oh, go on.
 15 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: — add one thing —
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Sure.
 17 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: — that wasn't
 18 asked and that I hoped somebody would ask.
 19 For my experience in the military academy,
 20 as I said, we were the first large group of women that
 21 actually made it through the four years and we were used
 22 for a lot of experimenting with rules and regulations.
 23 In the beginning, there were almost no

1 two weeks; and in those two weeks, you might sleep for
 2 about fifteen hours at most.
 3 So first of all, you're never in that
 4 sleeping bag. Second of all, it is certainly the hardest
 5 thing I have ever done in my life, and the last thing you
 6 even notice about another person is whether he's male or
 7 female.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Shoshana, I wanted to ask.
 9 All these things are coming off. I'm so happy you're
 10 here. And they happen to be two of my favorite
 11 militaries, you know.
 12 The question about uniform: I have the
 13 observation — This is just a visual impression. In
 14 Israel, most of the women are wearing almost a different
 15 uniform than the men in the sense that they wear low
 16 quarters or sandals and the men are always in boots. Is
 17 this an accurate —
 18 MS. BRYEN: They are not always in boots.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Not always.
 20 MS. BRYEN: Men wear sneakers. Men wear
 21 lots of funny things on their feet. Men do —
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Right. Go ahead.
 23 MS. BRYEN: — almost invariably have to

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1 wear closed shoes, although I think there are exceptions
2 to that and I think there have been men in sandals.
3 Women do not. Women do wear sandals. But everybody
4 wears sneakers. Footgear is — I'm not sure why, but
5 footgear is operational.

6 DR. SEGAL: Say something about the
7 discipline in both militaries in terms of — I know — I
8 mean, I know some of this, but I think it would be
9 interesting. The Israeli military, they don't salute
10 each other. What about in the Dutch military? Is there
11 saluting?

12 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: No. Just the
13 academies. Not outside, no.

14 MS. BRYEN: Discipline — There's a lot of
15 what we would call discipline for the draftees. But
16 since the reserve units are where you spend most of your
17 military career, you may be serving under someone who is
18 actually your boss in civilian world or your friend from
19 down the street, there is very little formal discipline
20 at the higher levels. Beyond your basic training, when
21 you move into reserves, it's extremely informal.

22 DR. SEGAL: And it seems to me that units
23 are more consultatory of subordinates. That it isn't —

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1 they are not the same sort of trainers. I don't think —
2 I mean, I have not experienced but — I wasn't in the
3 Israeli Army. I have not experienced "Lou Gossett" in
4 the idea of sense. I think there's a different —
5 there's a difference in the way they train. The in-your-
6 face drill sergeant that we have in lore and in fact I
7 don't think exists there.

8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Is that also true in the
9 Netherlands?

10 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Which question?
11 The one of the culture? The discipline?

12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Of the stressful in-your-
13 face type of training.

14 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yeah. It depends
15 on what kind of unit you go to. It's very different for
16 technical specialists than for somebody who joins the Red
17 Berets. But —

18 DR. MOSKOS: No. I mean the basic — that
19 course that everybody takes.

20 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yes. But they
21 don't mix them together. They split them already for
22 from the start, what your destination is, more or less.
23 So you have a totally different atmosphere in the unit.

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1 There isn't the unquestioning of orders that we have.

2 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yeah. And I think
3 some of that comes from the way they choose their
4 officers. Everybody goes in at eighteen. Everybody's
5 drafted, everybody is an enlisted person first, and those
6 who rise to the top of the enlisted class are selected
7 for officer school. So there is no officer who hasn't
8 first been an enlisted person.

9 This again — I'll send you the cadet
10 papers — just absolutely floored the cadets because the
11 cadets — American cadets think this is how you make
12 officers. You send them to — They are either ROTC or
13 they came from academies, and so they are, by their
14 nature, separate from enlisted personnel. And the
15 Israelis say, "Well, how can you command somebody if
16 you've never been on the bottom?"

17 Because of that system, they do tend to
18 consult more.

19 DR. SEGAL: I spent a year as a visiting
20 professor at West Point. And after a little while, I
21 told my cadets that they should have to serve for two
22 years as enlisted personnel before —

23 DR. MOSKOS: Shoshana —

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1 DR. MOSKOS: Interesting.

2 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Yeah.

3 But to come back at the discipline
4 question for the Netherlands, it has changed a lot in our
5 Army lately because we went from the draft to an all-
6 volunteer armed forces. Before, I'm sure you have all
7 seen the pictures from the seventies when the unions
8 accomplished that you could wear long hair and earrings,
9 and that's all gone. It's not allowed anymore. It has
10 completely changed.

11 So I think still the discipline is much
12 less overt than here in the United States. It's not like
13 people have to salute. And the formal discipline seems a
14 lot lower, but I think it might not actually be a lot
15 lower because we try to make people think for themselves
16 and think with the commander and — you know, so that
17 everybody can be able — is able to take over when
18 something happens to the commander.

19 There's a big difference between the
20 United States forces and the Dutch forces.

21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, this has been a
22 wonderful hour and we thank you both very much for
23 coming.

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1 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: I think they would
2 almost agree with you. The cadets that we sent seemed to
3 think it was a good idea.

4 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. The Germans actually
5 have a system like that, too. All their officers serve
6 six months in the ranks before they are sent to the
7 university, the Bunderswehr School.

8 But, Shoshana, I want to — Do you have an
9 impression — maybe you're — Is the drill sergeant, in
10 the female or in the male side, in your face? I mean,
11 you know, this sort of "Lou Gossett" type role? I mean,
12 do you have any sense of that?

13 MS. BRYEN: Well, they don't have drill
14 sergeants. I mean, that's where our professional NCO
15 corps —

16 DR. MOSKOS: Well, whoever this second
17 tier enlisted person is who is doing it.

18 MS. BRYEN: No, they don't. They're
19 trained by trainers, but the trainers then become higher
20 and higher officers.

21 DR. MOSKOS: No. But are the trainers
22 shouting in your face?

23 MS. BRYEN: They are not the same — No,

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1 DR. MOSKOS: So great. Really.

2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We have been asking other
3 folks who have come to talk with us if they wouldn't mind
4 if we might submit some questions to you later on if
5 something comes up with the folks who are not able to be
6 with us or somebody else has another question. But this
7 has been one of the most enlightening and interesting
8 hours I have spent on this Commission and —

9 DR. MOSKOS: I think so.

10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — I'm sure everybody
11 joins me. Thank you very much.

12 MS. BRYEN: Thank you for having us.

13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And I think
14 you.

15 CAPTAIN van de PERRE: Thank you very much
16 for inviting us.

(Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing in
18 the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at
19 1:00 p.m., the same day.)

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<p style="text-align: center;">Page 146</p> <p>1 (AFTERNOON SESSION) 2 (1:00 p.m.) 3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We have here with us 4 General Mutter and General Foote, and we have their 5 biographies in our materials. I understand each of them 6 has a statement to make to start off, and then we will 7 follow our usual procedure of going around the table with 8 questions from Commissioners. 9 And we'd like to thank you both very much 10 for coming to visit us today and we're very much looking 11 forward to hearing from you. 12 So, General Mutter, why don't you start. 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: Thank you. 14 And thank you very much for the opportunity to be here 15 and to talk a little bit. 16 I would like to start by talking a little 17 bit about my background, my experience, and my current 18 status. I think it's important to clarify that last 19 point since I am not yet officially retired. My 20 retirement date is 1 January, but I've obviously given up 21 my position. And I am not here to speak on behalf of the 22 Marine Corps. I am here speaking for myself alone. 23 My experience relevant to your concerns,</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 149</p> <p>1 junior person. They are protection. Otherwise, the 2 junior individual can be coerced into going out and 3 playing golf for money, loaning people money, getting 4 involved in inappropriate relationships that can then 5 lead to all kinds of potential problems. 6 The rules, I think, for the Marine Corps, 7 are about right with regard to fraternization. When I 8 say "about right," the first question is, what would you 9 change? And I've thought about that and I don't think I 10 would change anything at this point. We are always 11 looking at the rules, trying to find better ways to 12 perhaps articulate what those rules are, but the basic 13 underlying principles underneath those rules, I think, 14 are long lasting and are right. 15 There is a recent Rand study of military 16 members that concludes that in units with good 17 leadership, the presence of women is not a negative 18 influence. It does not negatively impact on unit 19 cohesion. In units where the leadership is not so good, 20 then divisiveness becomes defined in many ways. 21 Sometimes along gender lines, sometimes racial, sometimes 22 age groups, ranks, whatever they can find to pick on, 23 depending on what the local issues are.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 147</p> <p>1 certainly my last job — about twenty-seven, twenty-eight 2 months as Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve 3 Affairs. I was responsible for the policies with regard 4 to the cross-gender relationships as well as many other 5 Manpower personnel policies, and I was also responsible 6 for the entire process from when we recruit, to when we 7 put Marines out into the field, and in fact, take care of 8 them once they get there. Even though recruiters didn't 9 work for me directly, I was responsible for that process. 10 My job, too, before that, was as a 11 commanding general of a major field command — 6,000 men 12 and women in the 3d Force Service Support Group, and 13 within the first two months of that command time, I was 14 required to hold the mandated two-day stand-down for 15 sexual harassment and so forth as a result of the 16 Tailhook investigations and process. 17 And I received approximately a thousand 18 new Marines from their initial entry training every year 19 into that command. That command was about eight percent 20 female, where our average across the Marine Corps is 21 between four and five percent. 22 In 1971 to '73, going back a much further 23 ways now — about twenty-five years — I was a platoon</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 150</p> <p>1 With regard to adultery, this is an ethics 2 issue for me. Military leaders have authority over our 3 America's sons and daughters to order them into very, 4 very dangerous situations and into harm's way. There is 5 a very special responsibility that goes with that. If a 6 person would lie, cheat and steal, which is what adultery 7 is, violating the most sacred lifelong contract they will 8 ever make, how can he or she be trusted to do the right 9 things for the right reasons, under the stresses of a 10 battlefield situation? 11 I do not agree with those who say we're 12 out of step with the American people on the issue of 13 adultery. The University of Chicago — Professor Edward 14 Laumann —has been studying American attitudes and sexual 15 behavior for many, many years — I think upwards of 16 thirty years — and frequently publishes the results of 17 his surveys. 18 And recently, the most recent information 19 revealed that Americans are certainly more open in their 20 views now than they were years ago with regard to 21 premarital sex and that type of a relationship, but a 22 higher percent now opposes adultery. Adultery is a 23 different issue and I don't think we're out of step with</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 148</p> <p>1 commander and instructor for women officer candidates and 2 lieutenants, and this was when we still had a Woman 3 Officer School, before we combined the officer training. 4 Over thirty-one years of active duty in 5 the Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps was only one 6 percent female when I first started out. I've worked in 7 various functional areas, including commission 8 management, financial management, command and control 9 systems, acquisition, logistics and quality of life. 10 I have just a few remarks to address in 11 the three areas and the three working groups that you're 12 working on. First is the requirements and restrictions 13 on cross-gender relationships and talking specifically 14 about adultery and fraternization rules. 15 Fraternization is not just a male-female 16 issue. It is with regard to good order and discipline 17 and mutual respect. Those are the important things. And 18 in fact, General John A. LeJeune, United States Marine 19 Corps, made a very significant statement on 20 fraternization and appropriate relationships twenty years 21 before women were in the Marine Corps. So this is 22 something that goes much deeper for us. 23 The rules are there really to protect the</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 151</p> <p>1 the American public on that. 2 Physical fitness standards is something 3 that's not mentioned in your interim report and is 4 something that I think we should talk about briefly 5 because it is much discussed and there are many who think 6 that rules have to be exactly the same in order to be 7 equal. If they had to be the same, then we would all 8 have very, very short haircuts, and I don't think every 9 rule has to be exactly the same in order to have 10 equality. 11 We have to have consistency and we 12 certainly need to have minimum standards for each of the 13 services. We have to have minimum standards for jobs. 14 If you're required to lift a 200-pound bomb above the 15 waist, then you have to be able to lift a 200-pound bomb 16 above the waist, male or female, in order to do that job. 17 There's no doubt in my mind that we could 18 devise a physical fitness test appropriate to the 19 military that women would have a much easier time passing 20 than men would, and I just think that they're different. 21 The physical — There have been many studies on the 22 differences in physical nature of men and women. And we 23 can all do the job. We may do it in a slightly different</p>

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1 way, but we can still get the job done. Cannot
2 compromise on those minimum essential standards, though.
3 With regard to the basic training
4 programs, as you know, the definition of "initial entry
5 training" differs significantly. And I know that you've
6 spent some time in trying to determine what reality is
7 and how it's really going out there. I'm not going to go
8 over that in any kind of detail at all.

9 I would just add that over the years we
10 have tried a lot of different ways of doing training,
11 both for officers and for enlisted, and especially among
12 officers, I think. We have experimented with it a great
13 deal between the men and the women and we've tried a
14 number of different ways. It's always helpful to review
15 the way we're doing the training, what the results are,
16 what we're accomplishing with the way we're doing the
17 training, and look at if maybe it's time to adjust, adapt
18 and change, and so that's always helpful. We can always
19 continue to improve.

20 I'd like to provide a quote from a book by
21 Kathleen Hall Jamieson, "Beyond the Double Bind: Women
22 and Leadership." She says that "Girls benefit from same-
23 sex education in part because in that environment their

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1 the-editor of a base paper from a female lance corporal
2 who said that if she had gone through basic training with
3 the men, integrated with the men, she thought there were
4 several problems that would have come up. That the male
5 classmates very likely would have intervened to help the
6 women instead of letting the women do for themselves.
7 That the men would be there, always trying to help them.
8 That the male drill instructors would be
9 more likely to accept excuses — that it was "that time
10 of the month" or whatever they came up with. They would
11 have had limited strong female role models. That was not
12 a problem when they had female training. And the limited
13 ability to compete from the beginning in training that is
14 so physical.

15 So this is what we're actually hearing
16 from the women as well. And you have been out there and
17 heard various things from the various folks you've talked
18 to. I'm not saying that the other services need to
19 change it. In fact, to go to training in general, I have
20 to say that one size does not fit all. TRADOC is not
21 trying to make Marines. They're trying to make soldiers.
22 They should not train like Marines train. The Marine
23 Corps needs to train Marines, TRADOC needs to train

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1 voice is the norm. The majority of women Novel
2 laureates, for example, were educated in all-women
3 schools."

4 There was a study published by NASSP
5 Bulletin about eighth-grade students who were separated
6 by gender for training and there are numerous studies out
7 there that give examples of why it can be beneficial —
8 that girls say they feel freer to speak out. Grade point
9 averages in this particular eighth-grade math and science
10 classes for both the boys and the girls were higher than
11 when compared to co-ed classes. There were obviously
12 fewer discipline problems.

13 The boys also seemed to enjoy not feeling
14 pressured to perform for the girls. Of course, we're
15 talking about eighth-graders here, but the gender bias, I
16 think, is real. Even teachers who know they're being
17 evaluated and being looked and watched for how they treat
18 the different genders in a classroom still treat the
19 genders differently. There are just some inherent innate
20 things that are unintentional that happen, and it's
21 unintended but it's very real.

22 So there's a lot of research out there, I
23 think, that says that there are occasions — there are

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1 soldiers, and so one size does not fit all.

2 The nature and the abilities of the
3 nation's youth changes over the years. For example, the
4 last couple of generations have grown up in tennis shoes,
5 running shoes. We have found that we can't put them into
6 military boots right away the way we used to all the
7 time. It used to be they wore different kinds of shoes
8 growing up. They don't do that anymore, and so we break
9 their feet right away if we don't acclimate them a little
10 bit differently than we used to in the past.

11 So as society changes, as things out there
12 change, we've always got to review and look at how we do
13 things. The Marine Corps did our last major review in
14 '95-96, as you know, and made significant changes to our
15 basic training. We need to make sure we are still
16 producing that same high-quality Marine output from
17 recruit training with the different raw material coming
18 in. We know we have different raw material. We can't
19 use the same process to get that same high-quality
20 output. We have to change to process and we've done
21 that.

22 My concerns about your recommendations
23 would be that we be careful about personnel policies with

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1 times when separating the genders for training is
2 worthwhile. And I think in the Marine Corps in
3 particular, where we are trying to train for a very, very
4 physical, macho, male-oriented type of duty, it is well
5 that we have some time to toughen-up, if you will, for
6 lack of a better term, the women, to give them an
7 opportunity to understand what type of environment
8 they're in, what the expectations are going to be
9 physically and otherwise — mentally — before we throw
10 them into the environment where they are training with
11 the men.

12 And as you know, in the Marine Corps we go
13 through a very significant socialization process before
14 we start training them in the military duties, and that's
15 — it's in that socialization process where they're kept
16 separate. And I think this is very good for the women's
17 self-esteem as well, because if they're thrown
18 immediately into the environment, competing with the men
19 in the socialization issues, they're not going to have as
20 much success initially and then their self-esteem is
21 going to suffer because of that, and their self-
22 confidence.

23 We have actually also seen a letter-to-

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1 sharp edges. Again, one size doesn't fit all. Sharp
2 edges are dangerous. For example, in fraternization, if
3 you say officers and enlisted can never date or be
4 married, then you create a situation where you have a
5 couple who are both sergeants, one of them applies for
6 the officer program. Extraordinarily well qualified,
7 should be an officer. What do you do? Require the other
8 one to get out or not select the individual to be an
9 officer who really should be an officer?

10 So I think we can accommodate those
11 exceptions. We have to be careful about policies with
12 sharp edges.

13 Secretary Cohen's guidance for safe and
14 secure barracks, I think, is a good example where that
15 fits a lot of situations and circumstances and then we
16 can leave it to the individual leaders to make the
17 appropriate decision to ensure that we have safe and
18 secure barracks. It does allow for interpretation and
19 different ways of implementation, but that's what we
20 train and pay our leaders for — is to make those types
21 of decisions and to do the right thing. After all, we
22 trust them in life-and-death situations. Why not in
23 daily living?

1 And in conclusion, as a woman who has
 2 spent over thirty years in the military, I have seen
 3 many, many changes over the years and I know we will
 4 continue to evolve. I can tell you that our women want
 5 to be Marines and that many times all this outside help
 6 is not help at all but serves to magnify the differences,
 7 and sometimes even encourages special treatment, and that
 8 special treatment is resented by both the men and the
 9 women. There are several letters-to-the-editor I have
 10 seen written along those lines.

11 Many of us are tired of being experimented
 12 on, tired of all of the studies, commissions, focus and
 13 changes. But as I said before, we do need to review our
 14 policies and procedures routinely. Sometimes we need
 15 outside help to do that.

16 I was told in OCS that I would be living
 17 in a goldfish bowl. I have. Realistically, I know that
 18 women will continue to be a minority in the military, an
 19 inherently male organization. And so I thank you for the
 20 work you're doing to continue the process of evolutionary
 21 change that has been going on.

22 Thank you.

23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much.

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: And I
 2 apologize, I took too much time.

3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: General Foote.

4 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Madam Chairman
 5 and Commissioners, I, too, appreciate the opportunity to
 6 appear before the Commission and give my viewpoint based
 7 upon my experience; more specifically, about how we train
 8 men and women together, and peripherally, some of the
 9 issues that General Mutter discussed, such as the
 10 fraternization issue and the relationships with the
 11 genders. I haven't addressed them specifically but
 12 certainly would welcome any questions you may have on it.

13 I would say so far as fraternization, I
 14 think the Army faces a more serious problem since our
 15 policies have permitted officer-enlisted relationships
 16 when those individuals are not in the same chain of
 17 command. To go away from that now, after so many years
 18 of the other direction, will create a small problem.

19 My roots in the Army go back to 1960, when
 20 I came through basic training with the Women's Army Corps
 21 at Fort McClellan, Alabama, having all-female cadre, an
 22 all-female training environment, all-female instructors.
 23 Except the few from the chemical corps who instructed us

1 in the combat arms areas of instruction, it was an all-
 2 female world so far as my training was. That corps, the
 3 Women's Army Corps, remained my home corps until 1978,
 4 when, by Act of Congress, it was disestablished.

5 I have commanded gender-integrated and
 6 gender-segregated units, and I have led troops from
 7 platoon, company, battalion, brigade, to major
 8 installation.

9 During the two-year period of August '64
 10 to July of 1966, I commanded an all-female company at
 11 Fort Belvoir, Virginia, just about nine miles down the
 12 road. At the time I was there, it used to be the Center
 13 for Engineers, who now have moved out to Fort Leonard
 14 Wood. Twenty-two years later, I returned to Fort Belvoir
 15 as the commanding general of that post, something that
 16 would have been totally impossible until we began the
 17 process of expanding the career opportunities for women
 18 in the armed forces and when we began increasing —
 19 greatly increasing — the numbers of women within the
 20 inventory.

21 Like General Mutter, when I came into the
 22 Women's Army Corps, I think, women were two percent of
 23 the Army complement in the sixties and well into

1 seventies. The catalyst for the increased numbers of
 2 women in the greatly expanded career options was
 3 undoubtedly the end of the draft in 1973 and the advent
 4 of the all-volunteer Army or the all-volunteer force.

5 In this new, draft-free environment, it
 6 was readily apparent that the enlistment of highly
 7 qualified women would be essential to the Army's filling
 8 countless thousands of noncombatant MOS. That same
 9 dynamic was true, I believe, for most of the other
 10 services.

11 In November 1977, I took command of the 2d
 12 Basic Training Battalion of the U.S. Army Training
 13 Brigade at Fort McClellan, Alabama. When I assumed
 14 command, it was an all-female training battalion. But
 15 within six months, my sister battalion commander, who I
 16 understand was here yesterday, General Myrna Williamson
 17 — we were given the luxury of at least six months
 18 planning time to develop those plans and policies for
 19 bringing men into what had previously been an all-female
 20 training environment.

21 It was not an easy thing to do, but I
 22 found out very quickly that in doing such a conversion,
 23 my biggest problem was ensuring that we had secure

1 privacy for the men and the women in the barracks. And I
 2 know in the first company I integrated, I had one platoon
 3 of men and four platoons of women, which meant the men
 4 stayed on the first floor and the women were the second
 5 and third floors. But as the numbers of platoons
 6 increased, we were constantly changing this ratio.

7 And, yes, during the process we made a lot
 8 of mistakes. We learned the hard way. But we learned,
 9 and learned our lessons very well. I think I gave you
 10 more information concerning this aspect in the statement
 11 that I made before the National Security Committee back
 12 in the spring of this year.

13 One thing I did find out very quickly,
 14 though: gender-integrated basic training for the Army
 15 works. The absolutely essential ingredient is committed
 16 leadership at every level: squad, platoon, company and
 17 battalion, and in the military classrooms.

18 As the battalion commander, it was my
 19 responsibility to set the standards, to enforce the
 20 standards, to live those standards, and to insist that
 21 every member of my command do the same. While I could
 22 not change attitudes which might be negative to training
 23 men and women together, I could — and did — demand

1 positive behavior and positive leadership as conditions
 2 of employment. Those who could not meet these standards,
 3 when discovered, were removed as trainers.

4 Quite frankly, the decision by Department
 5 of Army to revert to gender-integrated — or gender-
 6 separated basic training in 1981 was personally shocking.
 7 There is no audit trail of empirical data to be found
 8 which supports that decision. There is apparently no
 9 "paper trail" which documents the thought process out of
 10 which such a decision grew, and any assertion that
 11 integrated training was a failed experiment reflects
 12 someone's personal bias and does reflect a rigorous,
 13 scientifically-based and rational assessment of the
 14 process.

15 As a senior woman officer who has lived
 16 through the whiplash years of the nineteen-eighties, when
 17 a change of political administration brought with it a
 18 series of actions to curb the recruitment of female
 19 soldiers and to constrain the utilization of such
 20 soldiers, I must candidly say that ending gender-
 21 integrated basic training was a giant step backwards.

22 Some gender-integrated training never
 23 ended, however. From the nineteen-seventies to today,

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1 the members of the Military Police Corps training at Fort
2 McClellan trained as men and women together from day one
3 through One Station Unit Training. These great soldiers,
4 in the thousands, have more than earned their spurs
5 serving together through the Cold War and in countless
6 places where the MP, humanitarian and peacekeeping
7 missions have placed them high on the list of soldiers
8 who are "first in, last out" of danger spots throughout
9 the world.

10 What I say now is certainly no reflection
11 on this Commission but reflects a personal view over the
12 years of my service of what we go through as women in the
13 military every day.

14 In my nearly forty years of affiliation
15 with the United States Army, women soldiers have been the
16 subject of an unending array of studies, tests, and more
17 recently, congressionally or presidentially-directed
18 commissions. The inference so often in these studies is
19 that, somehow, women negatively impact readiness. I know
20 of no study to date which supports such a contention.

21 A very serious consequence of this parade
22 of studies is that the flames of dissent and contention
23 between genders are never permitted to die down. The

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1 wind up in particular classifications.
2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: I think that
3 has a very strong appeal to it from a logical
4 perspective. When you start thinking about how you might
5 implement something along those lines, it begins to argue
6 for some concerns. Perhaps there are things that could
7 be overcome.

8 But I think if you take that approach,
9 what you're essentially saying is that men and women —
10 in this case, we are saying women — can serve in all
11 MOS's in all units, and so we would have to cross that —
12 make that decision first — to say that women can and
13 should serve in all MOS's — we call it in the Marine
14 Corps — in all fields, in all areas, and in all units.
15 If we believe that is the right thing to do, then
16 absolutely the approach to say it ought to be a
17 standards-based decision on who does what is the right
18 thing to do.

19 Do we want to get to the point where we
20 don't pay any attention at all to how many women go in
21 which units? Because the numbers — the percentage is so
22 small in the Marine Corps of women, we have already
23 situations where we have one woman lance corporal in a

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1 emphasis is forever focused on gender differences and not
2 on what is common to all soldiers, which is our shared
3 core values and our commitment to serve this nation in
4 war or in peace.

5 Some of us have — I guess rather
6 cynically — said from time to time when the Army was
7 proposing another study about who we were and what we did
8 and where we served, that studies too frequently become
9 agendas for institutional inertia: as long as you're
10 studying something, you don't have to do anything about
11 it. But I do find out in my travels throughout the Army
12 that the women themselves feel if we could ever have an
13 environment where they are not being looked at as
14 something atypical for the Army, things could get better
15 in a hurry.

16 Like the Service Chiefs of the Army, Navy
17 and the Air Force, I remain fully committed to the
18 gender-integrated basic combat training of military men
19 and women who fill combat support and combat service
20 support positions in their respective branches. I am not
21 talking about gender-separated combat training. That's
22 40 percent of the Army. But 60 percent of us fill the
23 same types of jobs and serve together throughout the

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1 company of 300 men. That happens on occasion and I think
2 that's not good — for very young people to be put in
3 that type of situation. I think that puts a lot of
4 pressure on individuals, both men and women, that is very
5 unfair to them and I think the American people expect
6 more from us than that.

7 So I think to the extent that we don't do
8 something wrong, which I think it would be wrong to put a
9 woman PFC or lance corporal in a unit of 300 men by
10 herself, I think we want to be very careful before we do
11 that and we do have to pay some attention to that. As
12 long as our numbers are so small percentage-wise, that
13 will happen. That's a natural outcome of what you
14 propose.

15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: General Foote.
16 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: I am a proponent
17 of standards-based selection criteria and I have long
18 taken that position. And this doesn't mean I'm trying to
19 rush women into the infantry, the armor or artillery.
20 But I think if in our military occupational specialties
21 we removed any reference to gender and insisted that any
22 man or woman who was applying for that particular duty
23 meet all criteria, physical and otherwise, then I think

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1 world. I think this as the approach for the Army is the
2 correct way and should be sustained.

3 Thank you, Madam Chairman.
4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much.
5 I introduce Tom Moore, who has joined us.

6 MR. MOORE: I apologize for coming in late
7 and I'm sorry I missed the first part of your statement.
8 I'll be happy to study it in detail when you...

9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. As I
10 mentioned, we've been following the practice of just
11 simply going around the table as long as we have
12 questions and time. And I will start by asking both of
13 you what you might think of a system in which there were
14 rigorous standards modeled after performance requirements
15 absolutely open to men or women who qualify and without
16 regard to how many individuals of either sex might
17 quality.

18 And I ask this because we, this morning,
19 earlier, had a briefing from folks who are familiar with
20 the armies in the Netherlands and in Israel and it was
21 interesting to hear the position that the Netherlands
22 takes, which is simply having objective standards, but
23 then not taking any notice of how many people of what sex

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1 we would have made a forward step.
2 As General Mutter has said, I do not
3 believe it is logical to take one woman or two women
4 even, and put such women in an infantry company because I
5 believe that if women are going into new fields, they
6 will never, never have a voice in that field unless the
7 numbers in which they are serving within that unit
8 represent something attune to a critical mass, whatever
9 that number may be.

10 But I think to put one or two or ten even,
11 in a company of 200 is sort of to set up a self-
12 fulfilling prophecy of failures for those women. I think
13 that would be somewhat overwhelming.

14 My whole Army career I have felt that if
15 we do not select from our young people those who are best
16 and brightest and most capable to fill any professional
17 specialty, then we're missing the boat. And I have
18 always felt that artificial constraints based on gender
19 and gender only, are eventually over time going to pass.

20 We see that today as more and more women
21 and men are serving together in combat support roles
22 which just bring them into harm's way as part of their
23 contract. But then I don't see women complaining that

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1 they shouldn't be out there doing their job. I find them
 2 complaining if there are artificial constraints to their
 3 doing their job.
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: I may have —
 6 DR. SEGAL: I've got two questions. One
 7 for each —
 8 DR. MOSKOS: I may have a time constraint.
 9 Can I interject myself? Because I've got to catch an
 10 airplane. Thank you.
 11 I just have a quick — Carol, we just got
 12 a statement here on other gender recruiting objectives by
 13 service and it says the Marines have a female enlistment
 14 goal of seven to eight percent. And the question was, if
 15 you had a hundred — if all the positions could be filled
 16 by qualified males, is that conceivable in the Marine
 17 Corps? Or is there really a goal — you know, quota —
 18 on having seven or eight percent female entrants?
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: I think that
 20 we would be putting our recruiters in an even more
 21 untenable position to try to go out and recruit from only
 22 male population and restricting them from not being able
 23 to recruit —

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1 DR. MOSKOS: But, hypothetically, could
 2 you have a hundred-percent male enlistment? Or would
 3 that violate some kind of a quota goal that's in the —
 4 either explicit or implicit — in the recruiting
 5 objectives?
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: Our recruiting
 7 objectives as they're stated are a floor. And in fact,
 8 they can recruit more women than we tell them to go out
 9 and recruit and frequently do recruit more women.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: They have a floor?
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: We have a
 12 floor.
 13 DR. MOSKOS: Like what would that be, for
 14 example?
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: The numbers
 16 you have there I believe are the floor.
 17 DR. MOSKOS: Well, I thought that — No, I
 18 thought that was the limit. I thought that was the
 19 ceiling.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: Well, I
 21 haven't seen your piece of paper. But as we —
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah, right.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: As we publish

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1 the recruiting goals each year at the beginning of the
 2 year, the numbers of women are generally considered to be
 3 a floor —
 4 DR. MOSKOS: A floor. Okay.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: — not a
 6 ceiling. Even though it's a goal —
 7 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: — it's a
 9 floor.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: That's misleading.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: And we do have
 12 to be careful about how much we go over that because of
 13 the capacity situation with the barracks.
 14 DR. SEGAL: With the training.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: On the
 16 training.
 17 DR. SEGAL: So that the limitations
 18 actually have to do with the fact that you have the
 19 segregated training, and so you have to have enough room
 20 for them in those women's units.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: Right.
 22 DR. MOSKOS: My other question, I would
 23 like — and maybe General Foote will respond. One of the

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1 terms that's used is "train as you fight," and obviously
 2 the Marines from basic boot camp don't follow that
 3 philosophy. I believe they train as you deploy, or
 4 whatever you want to call it. And I was wondering how
 5 you would — What's your reaction to that "train as you
 6 fight"?
 7 And maybe, Pat, you might respond to that
 8 as well.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: I think it's
 10 because our training is a continuum. We have a three-
 11 phase initial training before they get to the unit where
 12 they are going to potentially go fight and they do train
 13 as they will fight before they get to that unit. They
 14 just don't do it in that first phase, that very first
 15 phase.
 16 There is a phase that is a socialization
 17 process first, before we even begin to talk to them about
 18 combat training, and then there's individual skill
 19 training. Once they get to their combat training, the
 20 individual skill training, then they are more integrated
 21 and do train the way they fight.
 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: You know, when
 23 we go through our basic combat training for men and women

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1 — And I have watched the evolution of this over the past
 2 thirty years. It's been fascinating. I think the whole
 3 emphasis is on bringing the men and women together who
 4 will serve together and train them as they would operate
 5 together, to include in defending their unit, should the
 6 need arise, from the first day on in their training.
 7 We go on the premise that the men and
 8 women who come to us are coming to us after their high
 9 school years as young men and women who are certainly
 10 adult enough to participate in the defense of their
 11 nation. So our emphasis is more on the soldierization of
 12 these young individuals and the early exposure of men and
 13 women in training together to the fact they each bring
 14 something very positive to the table in what they offer
 15 in the way of service. We don't always do our tasks the
 16 same way, but we get them done and get them done
 17 appropriately.
 18 So I look at the combat support, combat
 19 service support training through basic combat training
 20 together as being the very best beginning for young men
 21 who are going to disperse throughout a very, very
 22 dispersed Army, to serve in their units together and,
 23 when called upon, to defending that unit.

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1 I have a real strong memory of my
 2 training. When we were not trained with weapons, we were
 3 familiarized with weapons. When we didn't go on bivouac,
 4 when I was not even issued organizational clothing, and
 5 when assigned to Vietnam in 1967, I went with no weapon,
 6 no load-bearing equipment, no helmet, no field equipment,
 7 in an area that was considered, in the city or in the
 8 jungles, 100 percent combat.
 9 And we don't send our soldiers out without
 10 that preparation of how to protect yourself and how to
 11 defend those with whom you serve.
 12 DR. MOSKOS: That's a little different,
 13 Pat, than gender-integrated or separate. I mean, you
 14 could do that —
 15 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Yeah.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: — in either mode.
 17 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Right.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: And I just wonder, how would
 19 you respond to Carol's argument that that initial period
 20 of the core first couple of weeks should be separated?
 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: I don't believe
 22 that. And I believe it based upon my experience and
 23 having gone through gender-separate training, and having

1 commanded a gender-separate group of women who on Fort
2 Belvoir were a small enclave who were looked at as an
3 oddity.

4 We were not part of the engineer center.
5 We were that group of women over there, all living
6 together. And I commanded a unit that actually had all
7 of the women assigned at Fort Belvoir in three major
8 commands, in forty-three MOS's, as students or permanent
9 party. They lived with me and I commanded them simply
10 because they were women. It had nothing to do with what
11 they were doing.

12 We built our unit cohesion through the
13 fact that we were very proud women soldiers and we were
14 going to be the best unit on the base. But we had no
15 doubt in our minds, by our isolation, that we were not
16 considered by the men really soldiers. In fact, the men
17 always called the women "WACS." We were not even
18 permitted, I believe, until the mid-seventies, to refer
19 to ourselves as soldiers. It took that long.

20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: We've always
21 been Marines. The "W" on "women" in front of "Marines"
22 has always been a little letter. The Marine Corps was
23 the last to accept women. And when the Commandant at

1 different ways. That was my point.

2 DR. SEGAL: Is this actual redesign going
3 on? I know that —

4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: Yes. We've
5 already —

6 DR. SEGAL: — women can certainly carry
7 more packs if they carried it on their hips.

8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: Yeah. The
9 Marine Corps has already bought a new pack that is lower
10 — rides lower down on the back.

11 DR. SEGAL: Is that for use by men and
12 women?

13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: It's the same,
14 yeah. Unisex backpacks. They always have them.

15 DR. SEGAL: What would you say to people
16 who say that the physical fitness test constitutes a
17 double standard in that women are allowed to pass when
18 they can't cut it?

19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: I think that's
20 an excuse people use when they don't — Again, we're
21 built differently and we are not going to be able to do
22 the same things at the same levels.

23 Now, our Marine Corps physical fitness

1 that time finally said, "We will have women," and was
2 asked "what will we call them," because there are WACS
3 and WAVES, he said, "They're Marines. We will call them
4 'Marines'."

5 So we've had that affirmation
6 institutionally from the very beginning.

7 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you. Those are
8 actually my questions.

9 DR. SEGAL: General Mutter, you earlier
10 said that — in talking about physical strength
11 requirements — And I think this is a really important
12 issue and we've been wrestling with the difference
13 between physical fitness tests which measure health and
14 what's required for the job.

15 And sometimes even the people who come
16 representing the physical fitness experts slop over into
17 — They know that the physical fitness test is a measure
18 of health, but then in justifying the particular tasks or
19 events that they have people do, they start referring to
20 what's required on the job.

21 And you made the statement that you could
22 devise a physical fitness test that men would have more
23 trouble passing than women, if I heard you correctly.

1 test, we finally did the right thing and made the women
2 run three miles the way the men have been running three
3 miles for many, many years. We should have done that a
4 long time ago, in my opinion. We've finally done that.
5 We require everybody to run three miles.

6 The minimum time allowed to run those
7 three miles is a little different for women than it is
8 for men because of different builds, different
9 capabilities, but that minimum should be defined based on
10 what's the minimum strength required for men and women in
11 the Marine Corps. What's the minimum endurance required.

12 Now, you talked a little bit about the
13 confusion of physical fitness versus standards for doing
14 the job. I believe — I don't know because I have not
15 been in this business over my career, but I believe we
16 have devised the physical fitness test as a suitable
17 substitute for what are the minimum standards everybody
18 has to meet in order to do any job in the military.
19 There are additional standards then for some jobs because
20 of the unique character of those jobs.

21 But this is a suitable substitute so that
22 you don't have to administer — because the job of
23 defining, describing, and administering and maintaining

1 Could you elaborate on that a little bit?

2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: You may recall
3 an old party game where you have people stand up close to
4 a wall, bend at the waist and put your head up against
5 the wall and try to pick up a chair. Well, a woman could
6 do that very easily. A man can hardly do it at all.

7 I have had women tell me, "If they gave me
8 a pack that rested on the front instead of up high on my
9 shoulders in the back, I could carry a lot more weight
10 than a man could carry because I'm built to carry weight
11 there where men have the shoulders built to carry high."

12 It's interesting to me that in the
13 backpacking circles now, the common wisdom is no longer
14 that you have your backpack sitting real high up on your
15 back. It's moving lower and lower down. Even with the
16 recreational backpackers. And our military equipment,
17 we're doing the same thing.

18 That is helpful to women because when you
19 spread that load and don't rely so much on that upper
20 body strength that isn't there for women the way it is
21 for men, then women will be much better able to carry
22 equivalent loads and be able to do what they need to do.

23 So, you know, we have strengths in

1 thousands of different standards for all these different
2 jobs is an extraordinary one. You buy yourself into a
3 tremendous overhead — for what benefit? What's the cost
4 of doing this versus the benefit that we will get from
5 it?

6 Again, I think it makes sense to have a
7 standards-based testing. But if most of the jobs can get
8 by with this basic physical fitness test that's a
9 suitable substitute, and we can limit it to just a few
10 jobs where we know there are additional physical
11 requirements, then we can do that.

12 But I would caution you there, too,
13 because do we want to say a radio repairman has to be
14 able to lift forty pounds from floor, up to the repair
15 table, because there's a forty-pound radio that they have
16 to lift from the floor, up to the repair table, to be
17 able to repair it? And so, therefore, that's a
18 prerequisite for a radio repairman?

19 Not necessarily. It seems to me that you
20 would preclude a lot of people who are very, very capable
21 radio repairmen who might feel very comfortable and want
22 to sit on the floor to repair that radio. When you're
23 out in the field, you don't have to lift it up to a

1 platform.
 2 So we have to be careful about how we
 3 define those standards. I think we can get ourselves in
 4 a box and define the standards in a way that are not
 5 going to necessarily lead to readiness and might unfairly
 6 preclude certain people from getting those jobs who would
 7 be very, very good in those jobs.
 8 DR. SEGAL: Thanks.
 9 General Foote, did you want to say
 10 anything about physical standards?
 11 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: This past year
 12 — Well, I should say December '96 and all of '97, when I
 13 was Vice Chair of the Secretary of the Army's Senior
 14 Review Panel on Sexual Harassment. We traveled
 15 throughout the Army to fifty-nine different installations
 16 and talked to about — or surveyed over 35,000 troops.
 17 There is no question in my mind that at least mentally,
 18 psychologically, the Army physical fitness test is one of
 19 the flash points — emotional flash points — of
 20 difference between men and women which must be resolved.
 21 We are trying very hard now to bring those
 22 standards closer and closer together while still
 23 recognizing that there are valid physiological

1 soldier who says, "No, women can't lift this, so we'll
 2 say that this is what we'll make the standard be."
 3 That happened repeatedly. It happened to
 4 women in the military police. We had a young E-4 who was
 5 marking documents, the manning documents of the Army as
 6 to whether men or women could serve. He had a particular
 7 bias against women serving in anything where he was, so
 8 those organizations were never changed to branch
 9 immaterial, only because he was marking this up and it
 10 went through the system for quite a while before it was
 11 scrubbed and before honesty and reality settled in and
 12 the right job was done.
 13 Again, we've got a lot of emotion involved
 14 when we are talking about changing in some respects the
 15 sociology or the culture of an organization that for
 16 centuries was male or at least officially was male.
 17 DR. SEGAL: I'll pass along to —
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: If I could
 19 make just a quick follow-up comment on that. I spent
 20 five years stationed in Okinawa, Japan. The Japanese
 21 people generally are smaller than Americans. When you
 22 watch them as my husband has done on numerous occasions
 23 in their construction work, and watch how they carry

1 differences and there are age differences that have to be
 2 factored in. I don't think we would — any man would
 3 expect a fifty-year-old general to run as fast as he does
 4 if he's eighteen years old. And there's no question
 5 about that. It simply is the male-female dichotomy that
 6 is the flash point.
 7 It is a standard of fitness to serve. But
 8 the standard of fitness to serve in a given military
 9 occupational specialty could be something entirely
 10 different. And where there are very heavy strength
 11 requirements, then that must be validly measured for any
 12 man or woman who proposes to do that work. And if either
 13 cannot do everything the job calls for, they shouldn't be
 14 serving in that duty.
 15 DR. SEGAL: We had some — Just a follow-
 16 up on that same question. We had some discussion earlier
 17 today about the attempt to measure the physical
 18 requirements of Army jobs back around 1980. I assume you
 19 —
 20 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Oh, the MEPS
 21 SCAT?
 22 DR. SEGAL: Yes. I assume you remember
 23 that.

1 heavy equipment, how they do heavy jobs, heavy lifting,
 2 jobs that require a lot of strength, they do it
 3 differently than American men would do in a similar
 4 construction job because their strengths are different.
 5 And all that means is they're different.
 6 It doesn't mean they can't do the job. And I think a
 7 similar analogy applies.
 8 DR. SEGAL: Women actually use more of
 9 their leg strength in lifting something rather than —
 10 They'll bend down and then use the leg strength to lift
 11 it up rather than trying to lift it with their arms.
 12 MR. MOORE: I'd like to come back to a
 13 question that Chairman Blair asked. I just didn't
 14 understand your logic on your response and I'd like to
 15 probe that a little more.
 16 She asked your views about establishing a
 17 sort of single standard for — and removing all, as you
 18 put it, artificial gender distinctions. And you've got a
 19 single physical standard, and anybody that can meet that,
 20 male or female, would be eligible to go into that
 21 specialty.
 22 And then you both observed that the
 23 consequence of that would be to have very few females in,

1 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Yes.
 2 DR. SEGAL: And I notice that you said
 3 "must validly measure what's required." Do you want to
 4 talk about the MEPS SCAT from your perspective?
 5 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: It never truly
 6 got off the ground, I don't think, because — unless I'm
 7 mistaken, and I think the Deputy Chief of Staff for
 8 Personnel or the Army Fitness Center folks at Fort
 9 Benning could give a better historical overview than I.
 10 But no one ever came up with what were the valid
 11 measurements.
 12 Now, I do know early in the game, in 1981,
 13 when we announced a list of over 700 pages of units that
 14 women could not be assigned to because of the physical
 15 requirements or proximity to combat, most of those who
 16 had put in what the physical requirements were, were men
 17 serving in those fields, who had no expertise to make
 18 such judgments.
 19 If we ever come up with such requirements
 20 or such measurements, I think it is absolutely essential
 21 that it be done by an organization that is recognized for
 22 its expertise and its capability of defining what the
 23 requirements should be. But it should not be another

1 say, the infantry or the combat arms, and that's where I
 2 began to lose your train of logic. I don't understand
 3 why that would be. Maybe it's self-evident and I just
 4 don't get it.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: Yeah. No, I
 6 didn't —
 7 MR. MOORE: But why would that be such a
 8 terrible thing?
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: Yeah. I
 10 didn't say that means we would have very few females in
 11 infantry or combat arms. What I said was if you're going
 12 to make it a physical standard that is gender-neutral,
 13 gender-blind —
 14 MR. MOORE: Right.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: — then you
 16 have to be willing to say that anyone, male or female,
 17 can do that job. And, therefore, a number — and maybe a
 18 very large number of women would end up in the infantry,
 19 and we have to be prepared for that consequence if that's
 20 what we're going to — if that's the road we're going to
 21 start down.
 22 MR. MOORE: Well, I mean, let's assume
 23 that we've decided to do that.

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: Now, unless
 2 you have someone defining the standards — as General
 3 Foote just said, who is trying to define the standards at
 4 such a level to ensure no woman will ever —
 5 MR. MOORE: Right.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: — be able to
 7 cross that hurdle — But is that really the — What
 8 really is the physical standard required for an
 9 infantryman?
 10 MR. MOORE: Well, let's assume that —
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: I don't know
 12 how we'd define that.
 13 MR. MOORE: Yeah. But let's assume that
 14 that is validly established by an impartial body and the
 15 presumptive standard would still be fairly high for a
 16 combat infantryman. I mean, one of the requirements
 17 might be to physically carry a wounded soldier off the
 18 battlefield. I don't know. I mean, you can conjecture
 19 about any number of things, but we presume that it would
 20 be a fairly high standard physically.
 21 And, therefore, because of the upper body
 22 strength differential, fewer women probably would meet
 23 it, and, therefore, fewer women would be in those

1 specialties. And you seem to think that that would be
 2 self-defeating or detrimental, and that's where I didn't
 3 follow your train of thought.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: If it's a
 5 very, very small number. If you have only two or three
 6 women in a 200-man unit, that is self-defeating.
 7 MR. MOORE: Why?
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: Because the
 9 women are under tremendous pressure. If they don't
 10 outperform the men, they're not as good as the men. You
 11 have to be better in order to be considered as good in a
 12 situation like that where you are very, very much in the
 13 minority.
 14 And it is difficult for women to speak
 15 out, to be aggressive, to take charge, to do the things
 16 that would need to be done in order to be considered good
 17 when they are in such a minority, and part of that is the
 18 socialization process that we've experienced the first
 19 eighteen years of our lives.
 20 MR. MOORE: All right. Let me take it a
 21 step further. Let's suppose, then, that concurrent with
 22 your shift to a gender-blind physical standard, you also
 23 embarked upon a much more concentrated effort than

1 presently exists, although certainly there's an effort
 2 today to change that sociology.
 3 I mean, General Foote, you correctly
 4 observed that, you know, we have a — there's a sort of
 5 military tradition that — I mean, I guess it goes back
 6 to recorded time when the profession of arms was
 7 exclusively male, and now in this country we've embarked
 8 upon a rather interesting revolution to change that.
 9 So clearly a re-socialization would have
 10 to accompany that parallel effort to eliminate the
 11 physical differential. And if you did that, then why
 12 couldn't you have large numbers of women serving in the
 13 infantry? Or even armor, which is probably a better
 14 example because there you at least get to ride around.
 15 You don't have to carry a lot of weight.
 16 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Or field
 17 artillery.
 18 I have driven the M-1 Abrams and I've
 19 fired the weapons system. Knocked an APC off a hill.
 20 But that's not the point, really. I think the point is,
 21 if you only have a few women in a unit that is a male
 22 fighting unit, the women will have no voice. They will
 23 be looked at as tokens only, who would not be taken

1 seriously. But if you had a company of women in a
 2 battalion of soldiers, they would — that would be a more
 3 vocal and that would be a more critical mass presence
 4 there.
 5 MR. MOORE: Would you have them separate
 6 or integrated into the full battalion?
 7 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: You know me. I
 8 would eventually say the best way is to integrate them
 9 throughout the battalion.
 10 But if I may digress for just a minute on
 11 this whole subject, I have said for years — and Dr.
 12 Segal knows it — that when we started out on this path
 13 of the volunteer force back in 1973, at which time I was
 14 the plans officer for the Director of the Women's Army
 15 Corps, there was so much haste to tear down the barriers,
 16 to reinvent where women could serve, to expand it so
 17 quickly that there was absolutely no time allotted within
 18 the armed forces to the units to prepare the environment
 19 for a level of change which, when you think about it, was
 20 monumental, and that was a big mistake.
 21 In the Director's office, we tried very,
 22 very hard to be the voice to say, "Don't rush what you're
 23 doing. Let's plan, let's educate, let's prepare the men

1 and women for changes that are coming," that are more
 2 than significant, they're radical, because women were
 3 going to go into divisional and support units, TO&E
 4 units, in the field, where they had never been. Well,
 5 maybe not since World War II. And with no preparation,
 6 they were arriving at commanders' doorsteps where there
 7 was no housing and there was no forewarning that they
 8 were coming.
 9 That is not the best way to bring change
 10 to the fore and to make it become an institutionalized
 11 process and we have bumped along since then.
 12 MR. MOORE: Well, I don't mean to
 13 attribute a false position to you, but what I seem to
 14 conclude from what you're both saying is that what we
 15 really need as part of our training base and as part of
 16 that transformational process that is supposed to occur
 17 in the training, is a sort of demasculinizing of the
 18 institution. Sort of psychocultural, psychosocial
 19 transformation as well that eliminates traditional male
 20 attitudes as part of the training so that a fully, truly
 21 gender-integrated force can ensue. Would that be a
 22 correct conclusion?
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: No, I don't

1 think so. We are always going to be men and women. We
 2 will never turn women into men in uniform. They just
 3 happen to be women, but they are like a man in uniform.
 4 They will never be men. And we don't want them to. We
 5 do not want to emasculate the military because that macho
 6 — for lack of a better term, the attitude — is what you
 7 need in combat. It's what you —
 8 MR. MOORE: Aggression —
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: The aggression
 10 and all of that, yes.
 11 MR. MOORE: Just plain meanness.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: And we cannot
 13 socialize out of men and women what's been socialized in
 14 for eighteen years and what will continue because they
 15 are still going to be men and women who are still going
 16 to be attracted to one another, who are going to interact
 17 with each other as men and women, as well as interacting
 18 with each other as professionals.
 19 And that's what is — I've found for a lot
 20 of young people it's hard for them to understand that
 21 they have to learn how they relate to each other as men
 22 and women and as professionals at the same time. And as
 23 they mature in the process, they grow into that. I think

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1 you see that happening on college campuses. You see that
 2 happening with a lot of young people in their first jobs.
 3 They mature into learning how to relate to each other.
 4 We will always have the difference. There is always
 5 going to be a social difference because there's a
 6 difference and we're not going to change that.
 7 Now, I do think that if you'd look at
 8 science fiction movies and you look at — into the future
 9 a hundred years, what is war going to be like a hundred
 10 years from now, if it's all lasers and it's very little
 11 — it's not on the battlefield the way we think of a
 12 battlefield today, and a lot of it's out in space and all
 13 of that kind of good stuff, you know, you don't need the
 14 same kind of fighting skills, upper body strength,
 15 carrying somebody off the battlefield.
 16 And who's going to measure the adrenalin
 17 that's pumping at the moment anyway that you can — You
 18 know, people can lift cars off of other people when the
 19 adrenalin of the moment is pumping. So it seems to me
 20 we're trying to push for something that's very
 21 unrealistic.
 22 DR. SEGAL: Could I follow-up on that
 23 question?

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1 MR. MOORE: Sure. I'm through in any
 2 case.
 3 DR. SEGAL: I heard a very interesting
 4 paper presented at a conference the week before last that
 5 studied recruits in Navy boot camp and found — using
 6 what's called the BEM sex role inventory, but basically
 7 there are some traits that the BEM scale labeled as
 8 masculine and they found that men and women came in — in
 9 terms of how they described themselves on these traits.
 10 And men and women recruits in boot camp
 11 were the same when they came in but that they both moved
 12 in the direction of describing themselves as — More of
 13 them described themselves as possessing these traits that
 14 were considered "masculine," but that the women changed
 15 more than the men.
 16 So that the women ended up describing
 17 themselves more on these traits — I hate to call them
 18 "masculine" but I think it's what you're talking about.
 19 It actually had aggressive, independent, forceful,
 20 leadership qualities, confident. Those were just some of
 21 the adjectives. They're self-description adjectives.
 22 So it seems like this doesn't surprise you
 23 and I gather that you would agree that these are traits

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1 that it makes sense to foster in new recruits.
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Right.
 3 DR. SEGAL: Is that right?
 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: But, you know,
 5 one of the things I will say and have always said about a
 6 woman in an atypical profession, she has got to be more
 7 of a woman than most women will ever be because she's
 8 going to tap down and develop dimensions of herself and
 9 her capabilities simply by the nature of the demands that
 10 the armed forces place upon those who select this as a
 11 profession, and she who might have been meek and mild may
 12 suddenly blossom into an exceedingly competent and
 13 confident young woman by simply having success through
 14 training or success through performance.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Following on Tom Moore's
 16 question, when you were co-chairing the sexual harassment
 17 panel —
 18 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Yes.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: — the Secretary of the Army
 20 independently hired another consultant, Madelyn Morris,
 21 whose position was to "demascualize" the Army.
 22 So, I mean, you did have that kind of
 23 activity going on.

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1 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Not really,
 2 Charlie, because Madelyn Morris was not a consultant to
 3 the panel. She was —
 4 DR. MOSKOS: To the Secretary of the Army.
 5 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: — a consultant
 6 to the Secretary.
 7 DR. MOSKOS: Which is even more important.
 8 Go ahead.
 9 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: And I think she
 10 was employed by him based upon an editorial or something
 11 that he had seen in the newspaper. I'm not that
 12 thoroughly familiar with all of her work.
 13 DR. MOSKOS: I mean, this is not so far
 14 out, what Tom is saying, though. You did have an
 15 official consultant.
 16 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: But I don't
 17 think — We're talking about demasculinizing. I think
 18 one of the things that is so difficult to get your handle
 19 on is the fact that we're in the process in all of the
 20 armed forces in redefining what constitutes the role of
 21 the soldier, and that's not demasculinizing it. It's
 22 expanding it to be more inclusive.
 23 And that we speak of the warrior ethic and

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1 that is wonderful. We need aggression, strength,
 2 training. But I consider myself a warrior, and if called
 3 upon to defend my unit or my position, I would fire every
 4 weapon in my — anywhere around me that I had the
 5 capacity to fire and participate in that defense.
 6 And when I think of the warrior ethic
 7 through history, it seems to me most of the major wars
 8 that we have ever been involved in have called countless
 9 thousands — even millions in World War II — of men and
 10 women from civilian life, their farms and their offices,
 11 to bear arms, go to war, stay the course, and then go
 12 home when the victory is there.
 13 That does not mean that the warrior ethic
 14 is not valid, but it is more than simply combat arms.
 15 The warrior ethic is the men and women willing to put
 16 their lives on the line in any capacity to participate in
 17 national defense.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: I agree with that. Yeah.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: I'd like to go
 20 back and make one point that came up through the
 21 conversation of "if we are going to try to integrate
 22 women into units that they're not in now, how do we do
 23 that?"

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1 I think you would like to talk to the
 2 Navy, if you haven't already, about how they have
 3 integrated women aboard ships. They learned some very
 4 good lessons and did it very, very well — integrating
 5 women aboard the noncombatant ships — so that when women
 6 then needed to go aboard combatant ships, they had a very
 7 good process to know, you know, what is that critical
 8 mass.
 9 It's not more than 50 percent, but there
 10 is a percentage there. You need to have leadership
 11 there. You don't want to have just all junior enlisted
 12 without any women NCO's and officers there. You don't
 13 have a separate chain of command but you still need to
 14 have a good mixture of women aboard.
 15 And because a ship is a very, very small
 16 community you can get your arms around, they have had a
 17 lot of good experience in that and I think have done a
 18 very good job.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My turn
 20 finally? I've got a series of questions and they deal
 21 basically with the issues we've been asked to address,
 22 and the first one deals with adultery.
 23 One of the things we've been asked to do

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1 is to comment on whether or not the current adultery
 2 policy in the form of guidelines to be added by Executive
 3 Order to the Manual for Courts-Martial and then, in turn,
 4 its guidance to the — within the UCMJ system as to
 5 whether or not that is required or not.
 6 I would ask your opinion on just that
 7 subject. Do we in fact need additional guidelines by an
 8 Executive Order on adultery and that issue?
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: I believe that
 10 the regulations that we have now are sound; that they
 11 have not always been implemented in the way that we would
 12 like to see and maybe perhaps not consistently, but I
 13 think we've largely overcome that problem, frankly.
 14 I think that some folks kind of went
 15 overboard, overreacted to a very — an issue that was
 16 very public and had a lot of publicity and there was a
 17 lot of overreaction to that. But those things happen.
 18 The pendulum always is swinging one way or another, but
 19 it always comes back.
 20 And I think that the basic rules,
 21 regulations that we have now are sound and that the
 22 pendulum is swinging back and that we are just fine the
 23 way we are now. But every once in a while something will

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1 to — I think we should do whatever is necessary to
 2 ensure "safe and secure." We should not go overboard and
 3 gold-plate it and buy a lot of bells and whistles that
 4 make it look safe and secure when in fact it isn't,
 5 because that can happen, too.
 6 What we've got to ask ourselves is, is it
 7 safe and secure, and are they doing what's necessary to
 8 be safe and secure?
 9 Is there somewhere extra money is being
 10 wasted in order to just look like we're safe and secure?
 11 There may be some of that going on. I don't know.
 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: That would be my
 13 concern, too, sir. I have always noted that in times
 14 when such cases as those at Aberdeen transpire and the
 15 barracks behavior of some of the noncommissioned officers
 16 and trainees is so suspect, that we tend to fly over and
 17 overreact to this problem and then generalize it to the
 18 service at large.
 19 I would come back to saying first and
 20 foremost, that the barracks life of the men and women
 21 must be absolutely secure for each of them. They must
 22 have privacy in their quarters, they must have latrine
 23 privacy, and they must have separation between

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1 happen to make that pendulum kind of swing out-of-kilter
 2 and we just have to bring it back into line where it's
 3 been in the past.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Pat?
 5 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: I think, as
 6 General Mutter does, that what is contained in the
 7 Uniform Code of Military Justice is sufficient. I think
 8 the difficulty is that the interpretation and the
 9 implementation of that policy or actions taken based upon
 10 cases of adultery is not consistent among the services.
 11 One service will throw the court-martial at an individual
 12 who is so charged, while in other services maybe it's a
 13 matter of a letter of reprimand or an Article 15.
 14 It's a commander's judgment as to the
 15 nature of punishment that should be accorded. I don't
 16 think we want to take away the commander's discretion to
 17 deal with those cases as they see fit, but I really don't
 18 think we need anything additional in the Manual on the
 19 subject.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Let me
 21 shift, then, to the next area, clearly one that we made a
 22 comment to in our interim report, and that deals with
 23 security and security in the barracks.

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1 themselves.
 2 But I'm old-fashioned. I want to come
 3 back to the leaders and fix the responsibility right on
 4 the leadership: "Now, you make it happen. And if you
 5 don't — "Through your duty NCO's, your CQ's, and any
 6 other means possible, but without bells and whistles, you
 7 go out there and make it happen, and you put the policies
 8 in effect that leave no doubt in anyone's mind about
 9 where you're coming from. And then when you have those
 10 who break those policies, then you take care of it and
 11 you deal very quickly with them."
 12 I think so much that has gone down wrong
 13 in any of the services in recent years is a matter of
 14 leadership failed, and we've got to get back to the
 15 basics and make leaders lead.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: And I think
 17 one of the problems is that men are concerned that when
 18 it comes to women, they will — that attention is on the
 19 issue. If there is something that happens in their unit,
 20 it's going to blow up, and they can't afford to have
 21 anything happen. And, therefore, we get to a zero
 22 defects environment, and there we get to the overreaction
 23 problem, which is unfortunately something that is

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1 Some services have taken the findings of
 2 the Kassebaum group and others to mean that what they
 3 have had to do is they need to put security cameras in
 4 all the ladder wells of the barracks have TV monitors and
 5 the like. What is your opinion of that? I'll tell you
 6 mine afterwards, but what is your opinion of that type of
 7 security in recruit training?
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: I think it
 9 depends on the situation. I've not seen what you've
 10 seen, so I can't comment on specifics. I think there are
 11 different ways of doing that.
 12 We have a culture in the Marine Corps
 13 where there is always a drill instructor on duty, and so
 14 there is somebody in charge on duty. Rather than having
 15 one of the recruits standing watch on a door, we've got
 16 someone in a position of authority standing and watching
 17 doors and not letting people through locked doors and
 18 that type of thing and so cameras aren't needed.
 19 In some situations maybe cameras are a
 20 good answer. I would hate to say no, don't ever put
 21 cameras on ladder wells, without knowing what the
 22 circumstance/situation is. It may not be possible for
 23 them to cover all ladders without having cameras in order

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1 counterproductive for everybody concerned.
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: I don't know if
 3 the Marine men and women have this situation, but the
 4 Army women — during the Women's Army Corps days when we
 5 had all-female barracks, we were frequently behind chain
 6 fence, with MP guards and postings "off limits to men."
 7 And this is almost that type of mentality coming back if
 8 we're talking about the cameras, the warning bells and
 9 buzzers between the barracks. I hope we don't get back
 10 to that.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: You know, I
 12 had a tour with the Air Force and one of the things that
 13 they do very, very well is they have checklists. And,
 14 now, I think it can be taken to an extreme so that
 15 everything is checklist-ized, but it may not be a bad
 16 idea when you say, "What do you mean by 'safe and
 17 secure'?" You're able to answer "yes" to the following
 18 twelve, fifteen, twenty questions. That gives a leader,
 19 a commander, a guide, at least, rather than just what's
 20 going to be the next guy's interpretation of "safe and
 21 secure."
 22 My next CO that comes in is going to look
 23 at this and worry about whether or not we're going to

1 I have something blow up on the front Page of The
 2 Washington Post. Is he going to look over my shoulder
 3 and give me a bad time because what I've interpreted as
 4 "safe and secure" is not what he's interpreted as "safe
 5 and secure"?)
 6 I don't think we'll ever get to — I don't
 7 want to get to a point where we dictate things. We need
 8 to have leaders who can lead, who can make decisions.
 9 That's what we pay them for. That's what I said in my
 10 statement.
 11 But having a little bit of a checklist —
 12 maybe twelve, twenty questions — that says, "You can
 13 answer 'yes' to all of these questions," would give them
 14 a comfort level that would say, "Okay, I've done the
 15 right — "reasonable thing. There's going to be an
 16 anomaly, something may happen, but I've at least done the
 17 reasonable thing and whatever happened could not have
 18 been prevented by reasonable action."
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I have two
 20 more, Madam Chair, if I may.
 21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: May we just ask Barbara
 22 if she's here?
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: Barbara, are

1 you still with us?
 2 MS. POPE: I am with us.
 3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Barbara, I heard
 4 "leadership" and I thought of you.
 5 MS. POPE: Well, you know that that's
 6 going to be my first question after —
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Do you want to let Ron
 8 ask — All right.
 9 MS. POPE: First I wanted to apologize for
 10 not being there, but thank you for indulging me in being
 11 able to listen in.
 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Okay. That's
 13 great, Barbara.
 14 MS. POPE: I have kind of a three-part —
 15 three questions. First is that what I think I heard both
 16 of you say — so please correct me — is that you support
 17 — I'm saying this currently, as the Marine Corps and as
 18 the Army do basic training, and under current definitions
 19 of combat and combat exclusion. So I'm not going there.
 20 But currently, as the Army and the Marine Corps train and
 21 operate — is that you both support gender-neutral
 22 standards?
 23 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: That's sort of

1 mixing apples and oranges. But I do — If I say I
 2 support gender-neutral standards and the inference is
 3 that would cover every MOS in the inventory —
 4 MS. POPE: But I'm stopping it at combat.
 5 I don't want to go there —
 6 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Okay. But —
 7 MS. POPE: — because that's not in our
 8 charter. But currently, as the Army is structured and
 9 operates.
 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Yes.
 11 MS. POPE: Okay.
 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Now, one caveat,
 13 Barbara, is —
 14 MS. POPE: Okay.
 15 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: — it would have
 16 to go back to the APFT. I think there are legitimate
 17 physiological differences and age differences that have
 18 to be factored into a test —
 19 MS. POPE: And I'm sorry, that's — I
 20 think we are now all under the assumption — at least on
 21 the Commission — that we agree.
 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Right.
 23 MS. POPE: And so thank you for correcting

1 that so the record is straight.
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: I don't want any
 3 differences in what we demand of a male soldier and a
 4 female soldier in training insofar as performance. I
 5 want it on the same level.
 6 MS. POPE: Okay. And, Carol?
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: I would agree
 8 with that. And I agree with the standards if we can
 9 implement it in a way that is reasonable. And I think I
 10 would have trouble if we said to all the services, "You
 11 have to come up with standards for every one of your
 12 MOS's."
 13 MS. POPE: And I totally agree. And I
 14 think where it's needed or necessitates — And I think,
 15 Pat, you used the words, you know, "valid measurement."
 16 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Right.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: Right.
 18 MS. POPE: So that's why I wanted both of
 19 you to respond in your own words, but that's exactly
 20 where I was going in trying to understand, because it's a
 21 price tag nobody could afford.
 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: That's true.
 23 MS. POPE: The next part of the statement/

1 question is critical mass. I think what I heard both of
 2 you say is that in any MOS rating, that there needs to be
 3 — And, Carol, you made the example of the one female in
 4 — And I forget where it was. One out of 300. That
 5 there really isn't — It happens on occasion, but that's
 6 not a goal. That experience has shown that critical mass
 7 is helpful for everybody, and what that number is varies
 8 from unit, service, but there is a critical mass.
 9 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Right.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: Right.
 11 MS. POPE: Okay. Okay. The next question
 12 or statement that I think I heard and I guess —
 13 Actually, this is my statement. I'd like your response
 14 — is that you both have distinguished careers. You both
 15 have firsthand experience leading men and women. And I
 16 guess my question — And it's to you personally. And I
 17 know, Carol, you can't quite separate yourself — but
 18 having women integrated is different.
 19 But my question to each of you, do you
 20 think from your experience — and this is, you know,
 21 Carol Mutter and Pat Foote's response — do you think
 22 your service is more effective in the long run?
 23 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: With the

1 integrated —
 2 MS. POPE: With the integrated.
 3 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Most assuredly.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: No doubt.
 5 MS. POPE: Okay.
 6 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: No doubt.
 7 MS. POPE: And then the fourth was the "L"
 8 word, which Anita was laughing at. And I think I heard
 9 both of you say in a variety of statements and so I want
 10 you to respond to that — is that how the Marine Corps
 11 conducts its business, how it trains, how it operates,
 12 how the Army trains and operates, that the single
 13 critical difference, element, predictor of success, is
 14 the leadership.
 15 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Absolutely.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: Absolutely.
 17 MS. POPE: Okay. I think that's — Anita,
 18 you knew I was going to say something on the leadership
 19 issue.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Actually, Barbara, the
 21 phone started hopping around on the table.
 22 MS. POPE: You know it was bouncing at
 23 this end.

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1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Thanks.
 2 Ron, you want to return...
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I have two
 4 questions that I wanted to ask. The first deals with
 5 physical fitness training, physical fitness. We've heard
 6 a great deal, even with all of these experts — I'm
 7 beginning to worry about experts because we've been
 8 dealing with them for thirty years and every few years
 9 they come up with a new way you're supposed to do
 10 something that you were doing before and all that sort of
 11 thing. And I guess we're getting better at it.
 12 But it seems to me that there are two
 13 types. Currently, our physical fitness test, whether it
 14 be in any one of the four services, is clearly a health-
 15 and-wellness test.
 16 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Yes.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: That's
 18 basically what it is. It's the ability to say yes, the
 19 individual soldier, sailor, airman and Marine, based on
 20 the respective service's physical fitness test, is
 21 maintaining certain health and wellness or a degree of
 22 health and wellness.
 23 Then the counter to that is, "Well, we

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1 the ability of that unit to work as a cohesive unit in
 2 performing its missions and to meet all the physical as
 3 well as all other requirements.
 4 So there are two requirements out there
 5 that have to be measured and leaders have to go measure
 6 them. You could have a world-class marathoner in your
 7 unit, but the unit as a whole in terms of endurance might
 8 not be able to do its job; could go on that ten-mile
 9 forced march, or twelve or twenty.
 10 And I think there's something about a
 11 forty-pound backpack on your back with full load-bearing
 12 equipment, a steel pot, and carrying a weapon, that can
 13 put a challenge into a 200-pound man and a 105-pound
 14 woman in the unit.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: Yeah, I really
 16 agree with that a hundred percent. I think the key in
 17 the unit conditioning is that it is geared toward what is
 18 required, it's mission essential if you're deployed; not
 19 in a normal day-to-day garrison-type of environment, but
 20 what is your true mission requirement. And that, yes,
 21 you need to be able to go out and demonstrate that — you
 22 need to practice it and then demonstrate that you can do
 23 it on occasion.

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1 have to have a performance physical fitness program of
 2 some type based on MOS." The key to what we hear,
 3 though, is that's probably not something that is either
 4 manageable or affordable.
 5 But there seems to be that there really is
 6 an alternative that perhaps the services haven't
 7 approached or have approached just kind of half-
 8 heartedly, and that's really unit physical conditioning.
 9 So that you literally have two things.
 10 You have a physical fitness test which is your health-
 11 and-wellness aspect, but you have a unit physical
 12 conditioning program that is crafted based on the type of
 13 organization unit that you are in.
 14 And I would ask your opinions on that,
 15 based on your experience and your years of service, and
 16 the gender aspect of that also.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: I wanted time
 18 to think. I wanted you to go ahead.
 19 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: All right, I
 20 will.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: That's an
 22 interesting question.
 23 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: One of the

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1 That that is very, very different from the
 2 MOS standard because you have people of lots of different
 3 MOS's in the same unit. You've got supply clerks and
 4 admin clerks and cooks and bakers and candlestick-makers
 5 in each engineer support company, engineer company — you
 6 know, combat engineer company or infantry or tank or
 7 artillery unit.
 8 You've still got all these different
 9 MOS's, but they have to work together as a unit. And
 10 that is much more important than having a common physical
 11 ability as an admin clerk or as a combat engineer person.
 12 It's much more important that the unit can function
 13 together as a unit and do what they need to do.
 14 Absolutely.
 15 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: They sure feel a
 16 lot better about themselves when they do.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: As well as the
 18 ancillary benefits of morale and unit cohesion.
 19 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Right.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: You know,
 21 that's just, again, good leadership.
 22 There's the "L" word again.
 23 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: I went out and

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1 programs that I put into effect with my headquarters
 2 company in Europe when I was commanding the 42nd MP's —
 3 Because we were not doing the Army training evaluation
 4 programs at that time. I had a wonderful MP brigade but
 5 it had an oddball job. It was the DoD military customs
 6 executive program, so we spent a lot of time not doing
 7 basic MP work but a lot of time doing the Army's customs
 8 program. Black market and what have you.
 9 But we had our regular calisthenics
 10 program, our PT program, three days a week, in the
 11 morning. But about once every two months, I'd fall out
 12 the entire company. We'd stand down and we'd go do five-
 13 mile marches, with forty-four pounds on our back. We'd
 14 do the whole thing — carrying the weapons — to see if
 15 this company as a unit is going to make it all the way or
 16 we're going to have people falling out along the way, but
 17 testing the ability of the company as a company to
 18 perform that mission together. We eventually got into
 19 the RTF's for all of the units and things got a lot
 20 better once we had the standards for the unit to be
 21 measured against.
 22 So I think you not only have to worry
 23 about the individual soldier, but you have to worry about

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1 begged, borrowed or stole every master physical fitness
 2 training position for school that I could get so that
 3 every company that I commanded had people who were
 4 qualified as Master Physical Fitness Specialists. Made a
 5 big difference in the quality of the PT program of the
 6 units.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I'm not
 8 sure if I can articulate this question I'm going to ask
 9 very well because it deals with kind of evolution. It
 10 deals probably a little bit with demasculinization — I
 11 hadn't heard that term until I got involved in this
 12 committee — and the like.
 13 Both of you, through your careers, have
 14 obviously gone through an evolution, just like our
 15 country has gone through an evolution of changes. Roles
 16 of women, roles of minorities, et cetera. Our country
 17 has evolved.
 18 It seems to me that where we have evolved
 19 best or how we have evolved smoothest, for lack of a
 20 better way of saying it, is when in fact the system has
 21 gradually built where you were going so that there could
 22 be acceptance by those who were being affected.
 23 And I guess my — and again, very poorly

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1 articulated, but my question is — Carol, you know — and
2 you and I have commanded the same unit, you know — in
3 that evolution of thirty years and that evolution of
4 forty years, you know, what is it that we as a committee
5 should understand about that evolution? What is it that
6 we should understand because we've got to deal with these
7 issues that the Congress has thrown at us?

8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: I agree with
9 what Evelyn said. I watched when women Marines were
10 first introduced into the Fleet Marine Force operational
11 units. Before that, we used to always be just at bases
12 and stations — when I first came in the Marine Corps.

13 When we were introduced into operational
14 units, from my perspective at that time of the bottom
15 looking up, it didn't appear to me that there was very
16 much preparation and that the women were yanked from
17 perfectly good jobs where they were and thrown into a
18 completely new and different environment without being
19 told what was going on, why, or what to expect. The men
20 weren't told what to expect either.

21 Different people — Different commanders
22 made different rules about whether or not they could even
23 deploy out into the back forty for an overnight field

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1 exercise, and it wasn't very well prepared, it seemed to
2 me. So I think preparation is important.

3 But I don't know that in every case we
4 should wait for acceptance. If we wait for acceptance,
5 it will never happen in some cases. And so in some cases
6 it has to be led from the top down, but properly
7 explained and articulated.

8 If you can articulate perhaps to the folks
9 who are supporting you as support personnel — to them,
10 and say, "This is what we think should happen and why,"
11 and "This is how it needs to be articulated," and they
12 don't come back to you and say, "That's the dumbest thing
13 I ever heard," then maybe you're okay.

14 So I think the articulation, the
15 explanation, the preparatory work in talking about what
16 we need to do and why, is important. But some things
17 won't be accepted and need to be done anyway, and we have
18 to be prepared to make those decisions.

19 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: I agree with her
20 100 percent, sir. And one of the things that we've said,
21 we know that we should have time to prepare an
22 environment for significant change. Sometimes you get
23 it, sometimes you don't.

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1 But one of the ways that we try to work
2 through this when reason fails, when education fails,
3 when leaders explaining to subordinates that change is
4 coming fails and there are still those who would resist
5 the change, is to make those individuals understand that,
6 "While I may not be able to change your attitude, I can
7 certainly control your behavior. And if your behavior is
8 not consistent with the policies of the Army and how we
9 will lead and how we will utilize men and women in the
10 future, then maybe you'd better go somewhere else."

11 If we control that type of behavior — And
12 we've done it so successfully in the past with curbing
13 drinking in the Army, cutting out "happy hours," drugs,
14 safety, all of the programs that were top-down-directed,
15 where the leaders gave great value to the implementation
16 of these programs, it worked, and it continues to work
17 today.

18 And working — putting working men and
19 women together in unfamiliar circumstances until they
20 become familiar with each other's capability again
21 becomes something that has to be top-down-commitment, but
22 behavioral expectations have to be laid out there. The
23 more time we have to prepare the environment, the better.

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1 I've often envied the Air Force. I've
2 heard it said that the Air Force builds a new base,
3 stocks the base, brings in all of its personnel, all of
4 its mechanics who know how to operate the planes, and
5 will never bring in the plane or put down the runway
6 until the whole operation is there to go, and I wish we
7 could all do it that way.

8 But in the Army, we've sort of grabbed the
9 tiger by the tail periodically over time, thrust open the
10 doors, and we either walk into a wall and have to bounce
11 off it and readjust or we correct our behaviors and we
12 correct our impressions of each other and begin to learn
13 that what's not important is gender. What is important
14 is readiness, what is important is the contribution each
15 brings to the table, and what is important is that you
16 have leaders out there that preach that gospel loud and
17 clear.

18 DR. SEGAL: I have one last question that
19 actually comes back to the leadership question. Both of
20 you have stressed how important leadership is for
21 accomplishing gender-integration, successful, effective
22 units, regardless of gender and in all sorts of ways.
23 But specifically with regard to gender-integration

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1 issues, are there specific characteristics or behaviors
2 of leaders that you see as critical to success that you
3 might want to articulate for us?

4 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Oh, absolutely.
5 First of all, they know their job 100 percent and they
6 expect the same level of competence and performance out
7 of every soldier and every noncommissioned officer and
8 every officer. And they expect not only that in the way
9 of performance, but in the way of personal conduct and
10 character and behavior. But if they expect that, they've
11 got to live it.

12 In our work with the Senior Review Panel
13 — and we have an enormous study of over 450 pages, with
14 all of the survey data — all of the data is there — we
15 found that units that were well-led had strong
16 leadership, had very low dysfunctional behavior levels.
17 Those that had self-serving commanders, who were a good,
18 big part of the problem, had high levels of sexual
19 harassment and dysfunctional behavior.

20 The leadership is the key.

21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: I think the
22 most important characteristic of a leader is someone who
23 really cares about the people he's leading.

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1 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Yes.

2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: And that's the
3 difference between the self-serving leader and the good
4 leader — someone who really cares about the people he's
5 leading.

6 And I think the term "love" is not too
7 strong a word. We've actually even seen it written in
8 military publications lately about — having to do with
9 leadership. You need to really love, care about your
10 people. When you care about them, you will take care of
11 them. You will ensure they're trained properly to do the
12 job they have to do, to fight and survive and win and
13 come home alive from the battlefield.

14 And you won't be self-serving. You won't
15 be seen as self-serving either. People can tell when you
16 care and they can tell when you're just pretending to
17 care, and you can't fake it.

18 That's the most important thing, I think,
19 and all the other things — setting the example and all
20 those things — follow.

21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I have one
22 final question. You know what our charter is. What
23 would you like us to tell the Congress?

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1 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: That the
2 services — each individual service knows best its
3 training requirements and the methods that are most
4 successful. And that given this, then the service
5 chiefs, with their vast experience, should be permitted
6 to direct the manner in which men and women of their
7 organization will be trained.

8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: I would second
9 that, for sure, and suggest that there be a moratorium of
10 at least two or three years before we have another study
11 of women that's congressionally-driven.

12 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: And I will
13 second that.

14 MR. MOORE: If we do our job well enough,
15 this will probably be the most thorough study of its type
16 and there won't be a need for another one for two years.

17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUTTER: Well, there's
18 always a new wrinkle. After Desert Storm, it was women
19 in combat and how do we change the rules and the policies
20 there. So there's always a new wrinkle that comes up and
21 a reason for a commission.

22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Barbara? A final
23 question?

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1 MS. POPE: No, I think my questions have
2 been answered. Thank you.

3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Great.

4 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Hope you feel
5 better.

6 MS. POPE: Pat and Carol, thank you both
7 for coming today. I appreciate it.

8 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: And I hope you
9 feel better.

10 MS. POPE: Well, I'm getting there.

11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right.

12 DR. SEGAL: We all hope you feel better,
13 Barbara.

14 MS. POPE: Thanks.

15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yes.

16 Well, thank you very much for coming.
17 This has been very enlightening and we appreciate your
18 help very much.

19 BRIGADIER GENERAL FOOTE: Thank you for
20 the opportunity.

21 (Whereupon, at 2:37 p.m., the hearing in
22 the above-entitled matter was concluded.)

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CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES

Monday; January 11, 1999

1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 940

Arlington, Virginia

JAN. 11, 1999

1 Those present:
 2 Anita K. Blair, Esquire - Chairman
 3 The Honorable Frederick F.Y. Pang - Vice Chairman
 4 LtGen George R. Christmas, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner
 5 CSM Robert A. Dare, Jr., USA(Ret) - Commissioner
 6 Thomas Moore - Commissioner
 7 The Honorable Barbara Spyridon Pope - Commissioner
 8 ---
 9 Stephen C. Fogleman, Esquire - Executive Director
 10 Susan L. Fry - Executive Assistant
 11 Hank Hodge - Staff Liaison
 12 James Renne, Esquire - Staff Counsel and Secretary
 13 Carolyn F. Duke - Staff, Budget
 14 Kathleen M. Wright, Ph.D. - Research Director
 15 Janice Laurence, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 16 Charles Johnson, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 17 Capt J.S. Snyder, USN - Service Representative
 18 LtCol Brenda L. Harris, USA - Service Representative
 19 Maj R. Scott LaShier, USMC - Service Representative
 20 ---
 21
 22
 23

1 Also present:
 2 Gen Charles C. Krulak, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps
 3 Maj Norman L. Cooling, USMC, Commandant Staff Group
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1 PROCEEDINGS (2:33 p.m.)
 2 GENERAL KRULAK: I thank you for, one, the
 3 invitation to all of the service chiefs to come here
 4 because I think it's important that you hear from the
 5 people who are working the issues on a day-to-day basis.
 6 I have, for your information, blocked my
 7 schedule. I have tanked everything for this afternoon,
 8 so I will stay here until the last question has been
 9 asked. If I don't have the answer, I promise you I'll
 10 get it back to you.
 11 One of the reasons why I've blocked the
 12 schedule is because — I know that you want to have a
 13 dialogue, but I think in order to really understand where
 14 one of your services is coming from in the entire issue
 15 of training, gender-integration, and the entire issue of
 16 discipline and good order, that you need to have a
 17 holistic view, and a holistic view doesn't come from just
 18 a very short presentation and a Q&A.
 19 Particularly for us, because as I'm sure
 20 Ron has told you and you have probably heard, we have
 21 made some major changes in the way we make Marines in the
 22 21st Century and unless you understand why those changes
 23 were made, what they are, how we see them progressing

1 into the 21st Century, I think we've missed something.
 2 I'm going to start with the last thing
 3 that any Marine sees upon going through the Crucible.
 4 You may have seen this. If you have, I apologize, but I
 5 would ask that you watch it again. The visuals are not
 6 as important as the words because it is the words that
 7 set the stage for what we call "Transformation," for what
 8 we in the Corps are trying to do.
 9 And to put it in a nutshell, what we're
 10 trying to do is to take men and women of character from
 11 the American population. And whether we keep them for
 12 four years or forty, that will prepare them so that when
 13 they go back, that American people can look us in the eye
 14 and say, "They are better for having been a United States
 15 Marine."
 16 We believe that. I mean, we believe that
 17 that is our mission right now. Make Marines, win
 18 battles, but the ultimate is to return to the American
 19 people somebody — their daughter, their son — that is
 20 better for having been a Marine.
 21 This film you're about ready to see is
 22 shown to them. They are exhausted. They've been through
 23 it all. They are starved. They are fed. They are given

1 several hours of sleep and then they are rousted back up,
 2 and they are brought into either a theater — or into a
 3 bunker in some cases — and they are shown this film.
 4 And so if we can go from there. I'll sit
 5 over here (Indicating).
 6 (Whereupon, the Commission viewed the
 7 video presentation entitled "The Moral Compass.")
 8 GENERAL KRULAK: Okay. You probably think
 9 that's dramatic. It isn't dramatic. I mean, at this
 10 point in their career, they are almost at the graduation
 11 mark and this is their Commandant. And it is different
 12 from any other service chief. Ms. Pope probably knows.
 13 The Commandant — when the Commandant stands up there and
 14 says, "You will not fail," that means something, and I'm
 15 telling them they are not going to fail.
 16 (General Krulak offered a slide
 17 presentation concurrent with the following discussion.)
 18 GENERAL KRULAK: Now, if you think that
 19 there isn't some little guy out there right now doing
 20 something I don't want him to do — I'm not naive, but
 21 the intent is that they will not fail. It's called
 22 "Transformation." It's called "Transformation." It is a
 23 massive undertaking, a massive undertaking.

1 It is built around the concept that the
 2 Marine Corps does two things that are unique for this
 3 nation: we make Marines; we win battles. We do not claim
 4 to win wars. The Army, Navy and Air Force are the
 5 chainmail fists of American diplomacy, not the Marine
 6 Corps. We win battles and we make Marines to do it.
 7 Let me tell you what I think the
 8 battlefield's going to look like so that you understand
 9 why we did this. This is the 21st Century strategic
 10 environment that we see. This is not Chuck Krulak's view
 11 of the world. This is what the Quadrennial Defense
 12 Review said, the National Defense Panel said, the Joint
 13 Strategy Review says, this is what every think tank in
 14 the country says that the 21st Century environment's
 15 going to be.
 16 It says that there's going to be a
 17 changing global center of our economic well-being. And
 18 do you know where it's going to be? It's going to be in
 19 Asia. And everybody looks at me and says, "You've got to
 20 be crazy. Are you not watching the stock market? Are
 21 you not understanding?"
 22 Well, let me tell you something. If you
 23 have an extra dollar, put it against the stock market in

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1 Asia. In one country alone, there are 1.2 billion
2 consumers. It is going to change the economic center of
3 gravity of the world.
4 If that's the case — And by the way, I
5 opened the New York Stock Exchange on November 11th and I
6 asked the very question. And I said, "Tell me what you
7 think is happening in Asia," and not one individual I
8 talked to did not think that within two years they will
9 have rebounded.
10 Resource shortages are going to be there
11 in the world. Right now, everybody looks at me and they
12 say, "You're crazy. The gas is cheaper than it's ever
13 been." Wait. Wait. With this changing (Indicating),
14 what's feeding the miracle? What's feeding the miracle
15 is oil. Where's the oil coming from? It's coming out of
16 the Persian Gulf, through the Indian Ocean, through the
17 Straits of Malacca, into Northeast and Southeast Asia.
18 If you do anything — anything — to upset that, you're
19 going to have conflict. Water and food — precious,
20 precious commodities — they're going to be scarce and
21 people will fight to get them.
22 Increasing cultural and religious strife.
23 I mean, we're just seeing the tip of the iceberg. The

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1 tip of the iceberg. Kosovo, Somalia — Mogadishu is a
2 great example — Bosnia.
3 Rapid change in weapons and information
4 technology. I'm not going to go into information
5 technology. I will just tell you right now that on the
6 drawing boards in multiple countries around the world
7 there's a weapons system that's about the size of my arm.
8 Maybe about as much around, too. And that weapon, if it
9 can sense you — whether it can sense you electronically,
10 heat — or if you're like me and you wear Old Spice — if
11 it can smell you, it will kill you. It will kill you.
12 If it senses you, it will kill you. It will take out a
13 tank. It will take out an airplane.
14 It will come in a little box. On top of
15 the box is going to be a chip. That chip is going to fit
16 in the port of your Casio watch. They're making the
17 watch right now. And in that watch, you will push a
18 button, and what will happen will be a video and it will
19 tell you how to put that weapon together. But more
20 importantly, it will tell you how to employ it. And it
21 will be in the language — Farsi, Chinese, you name it.
22 And it's being made right now and it will sell for about
23 sixty dollars. If you don't think that's going to change

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1 warfare and the way we look at warfare, you're sadly
2 mistaken.
3 Reduced access to land bases overseas. We
4 couldn't attack Iraq from Saudi and we're supposed to be
5 protecting them.
6 Sovereignty. Sovereign nations are going
7 to change the way we think about war-fighting. Seventy
8 percent of the world's population in the year 2010 will
9 live in urban areas, urban slums and cities, within 300
10 miles of the ocean. Seventy percent of the world's
11 population. And let me just tell you, none of those
12 cities — or very few of them — have the infrastructure
13 to absorb those people. Not the power grids, not the
14 food, not the toilets, you name it. And you add that to
15 this resource shortage and you have got real problems.
16 We're moving from crisis to chaos. Ron
17 Christmas and I will think back on these days and say
18 "the good ol' days."
19 Crisis. Crisis is when the President of
20 the United States can pick up the red phone or pick up
21 any phone and talk to a state actor. State actor versus
22 state actor. President Kennedy picking up the phone and
23 talking to Fidel Castro and saying, "You either move

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1 those missiles or we're going to take you out."
2 Today it's chaos. Non-state actor against
3 non-state actor. You pick up the phone and it's "Hello?
4 Hello?" There's nobody on the other end. There is no
5 way for the national command authority to deal with
6 another national command authority, and it is terrible
7 and going to cause us major problems and the services
8 need to be thinking about that.
9 This is the face of war in the 21st
10 Century (Indicating). This is the face of war in the
11 21st Century (Indicating). This — And I'm not saying
12 it's going to be actually these people. I'd love it to
13 be him (Indicating). I can whip him. Even at my height,
14 I can probably beat this guy. He looks like he's out of
15 shape.
16 This guy's pretty tough (Indicating).
17 He's a Chechnyan rebel. The Russians went into Graz with
18 what equates to a large Marine air-ground task force.
19 They had armor; they had air; they had great troops. The
20 troops that fought in Graz are the same troops that are
21 now with the United States Army in Bosnia. They're a
22 parachute brigade out of Saint Petersburg.
23 This guy (Indicating), with nothing but

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1 basic guerilla equipment, in a two-week period of time
2 destroyed eighty armored vehicles, shot down eleven
3 attack helicopters, and destroyed one fixed-wing jet. A
4 guerilla, a rebel.
5 To tell you what ethnic and cultural
6 warfare is all about, they hate each other (Indicating).
7 And so what they did with this guy (Indicating) is they
8 doused him with diesel fuel and lit him on fire. It is a
9 different type of enemy.
10 You know who this guy is (Indicating).
11 This is the saran gas man from Tokyo. All I'm saying
12 here is we'd better be prepared to deal in an environment
13 of weapons of mass destruction.
14 And up here (Indicating), you look at them
15 and you say, "What is the Commandant worried about?
16 These guys are a bunch of idiots. We're not — "You've
17 got to be kidding me. Skull in their hands?" Take a
18 look at what else is in their hands: state-of-the-art
19 weapons. In the back (Indicating), an armored vehicle.
20 And, oh, by the way, nobody's ever beaten these people.
21 Nobody. They're undefeated, and we're going to have to
22 fight them.
23 The battlefield is this (Indicating). If

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1 anybody that you talk to thinks that some Third World
2 strongman is going to come up and jerk Uncle Sam's beard
3 and invite us to a rematch of Desert Storm, they're
4 crazy. And you'd better not be training your soldiers,
5 sailors and airmen and Marines to fight the rematch of
6 Desert Storm because it's going to be the stepchild of
7 Chechnya and we'd better be ready for it.
8 It's going to look like this (Indicating).
9 It's going to look like this (Indicating). It's going to
10 be a young man or woman with a young child in their
11 hands, and they're going to wrap that child with
12 swaddling clothes and they're going to clean that child
13 and they're going to feed that child, and it's called
14 humanitarian assistance and we're doing it day in and day
15 out right now.
16 The next moment in time, that same
17 soldier, sailor, airman and Marine, is going to have
18 their hands apart. They're going to be keeping two
19 warring tribes apart. They're going to have weapons in
20 their arms. They're going to have air overhead, and it's
21 called peacekeeping. And guess what? We're doing it
22 right now. We're doing it right now.
23 And then the next moment in time, you are

1 going to be in some of the most highly lethal, mid-
 2 intensity conflict that you've ever seen. And if you
 3 question that, get the book "Black Hawk Down" and read
 4 about the Army in Mogadishu.

5 The difference between what we've
 6 experienced before and now is that this thing is going to
 7 happen within one twenty-four-hour period and three city
 8 blocks. One twenty-four-hour period, three city blocks,
 9 and this nation saw it first with the Army in "Black Hawk
 10 Down."

11 So the question that I and my fellow
 12 service chiefs face is how do you make a Marine to fight
 13 this fight (Indicating), to fight this fight
 14 (Indicating)? How do you do that when they come from
 15 this (Indicating)? And let me tell you, I policed these
 16 folks up. We cleaned them up. We cleaned them up.
 17 They're looking good there.

18 Because I don't care what you say or what
 19 anybody says, this is what we're dealing with
 20 (Indicating). And if we don't understand that and if we
 21 don't put your committee in the context of the fight and
 22 the people we're drawing — our resources — to do the
 23 fight with, then we're really going to miss something.

1 And so how do you train these (Indicating)? Do you train
 2 them the way we always trained them? Do you? Or do you
 3 have to make some adjustment?

4 Generation X. I became the Commandant on
 5 the 30th of June, 1995. 1 July was a Saturday. 2 July
 6 was a Sunday. 3 July was a Monday. I was pumped. I
 7 came into my office. Man, I'm the Commandant! I go in
 8 there. Guess what? Nobody's there. Why not? Because
 9 it's the 4th of July weekend. I mean, that's how dumb I
 10 am.

11 I'm sitting there all alone. I've got my
 12 driver, myself and a clerk, and I'm looking around.
 13 "Hello?" I'm the Commandant and I want to be adored by
 14 everybody, right? Three days into it. "Do something
 15 nice for me." Nobody's there.

16 But fortunately I had made an appointment,
 17 and the appointment was with three psychiatrists and
 18 three psychologists. And I had asked them to come in and
 19 tell me — because the Marine Corps general officers had
 20 met for about six months before to talk about the future,
 21 come in and tell me about these people. "Tell me about
 22 them." And so they gave me the description of Generation
 23 X, and it changed the way the Marine Corps went about

1 their business — at least some of it.

2 Here's what they said about Generation X.
 3 First, this generation is desperately looking for
 4 boundaries. They want to know what the playing field is.
 5 "Where's the fence around which to I will be held
 6 accountable?"

7 And the second point is, they will be held
 8 accountable. They have no problem being held accountable
 9 so long as they know where the fence line is. If the
 10 fence has a little break in it, those suckers will take
 11 you to the cleaners. They will pick your pocket in a
 12 heartbeat. In a heartbeat, they will go through that and
 13 rip you off. But as long as they've got a boundary,
 14 they're willing to be held accountable.

15 Three: they do not mind being followers.
 16 Understand that as they follow, they will look to the
 17 leader and will normally adopt the leader's direction.
 18 They're not sitting there questioning is this a good
 19 leader or a bad leader. That's a leader? That's how you
 20 act.

21 Four: they don't mind being a follower if
 22 — four — they can be a leader sometime.

23 Five: they want to be part of something

1 that is easily recognizable and at the same time
 2 challenging. Recognizable and challenging.
 3 And six: they believe in something
 4 overarching, a faith. They don't know it's faith — many
 5 of them don't — they just know that there's something
 6 out there that impacts on their life and they realize it.

7 Well, they told me this and I said
 8 "hurrah." I mean, this is motivating. This is great.
 9 We can deal with this. And their answer was, "This
 10 nation is kicking it into the grandstand because we're
 11 giving them none of this. And instead, since they aren't
 12 getting it from us, you know what they're doing?" I
 13 said, "What are they doing?" And they said, "They're
 14 joining gangs. They're the Bloods. They're the Crypts.
 15 They're the Skinheads. They're a fraternity, a sorority,
 16 a click. They're going to those to get what this nation
 17 isn't giving them."

18 And then I started to think: my God,
 19 they're right; they're right. Think about a gang. First
 20 off, the gang absolutely gives them the boundaries and
 21 the parameters on which they're going to operate.

22 Two, if they go outside of those
 23 parameters, you'd better believe the gang holds them

1 accountable. It's called "we're going to break your
 2 arm," "we'll break your leg," "we'll break your head."

3 Three: they don't mind being a follower.
 4 They will sell dime baggies of marihuana on the corner,
 5 they'll run numbers, just so long as — four — they've
 6 got a crack at the big stuff, the cocaine. They want to
 7 drive a Cadillac.

8 Five: if you don't think they wear a
 9 uniform, you're crazy. If you find somebody wearing Doc
 10 Marten boots, bluejeans, white T-shirt, red suspenders,
 11 and a close haircut, that's not just a good guy; you've
 12 got a gang member of the Skinheads. No question about
 13 it. If you get one of those in the Marine Corps, we
 14 throw him out. We don't care about their explanation.
 15 We immediately start figuring out how to process that guy
 16 out.

17 You've seen other uniforms. My son —
 18 I'll never forget him. He comes home. Ron knows him.
 19 He comes home. He's wearing Nike shoes that probably
 20 were two sizes too big. They're unlaced. He's got a
 21 pair of baggy trousers. He does not wear underwear.
 22 Why? So his crack will show halfway down. That's his —
 23 That's what he does. He wears a coat and some kind of —

1 normally it's a kerchief, either wrapped around his arm
 2 or wrapped around his leg. And guess what it is? It's
 3 his colors. It's his colors. He don't wear that anymore
 4 because we figured out what was going on. But the point
 5 is, you can see it around the nation right now.

6 And six: they do, in a gang, have an
 7 overarching umbrella. It's called "the turf." Your
 8 home, your turf. That's critical to them.

9 Anybody here ever see the movie, "The
 10 Warriors"? Has anybody ever seen the movie, "The
 11 Warriors"? Yeah. It's a great movie. It's now probably
 12 the most popular film with Generation X. They love this
 13 film, and the story is very simple.

14 The story is about a gang from Coney
 15 Island, that goes up to New York City where there's a big
 16 meeting of all of the gangs, and the person who's leading
 17 the gang is going to be the gang of all gangs and become
 18 a political entity. And sometime during his speech he
 19 gets shot. They blame the gang from Coney Island.
 20 They're called the "Warriors."

21 And the story then goes for how does this
 22 gang get back to Coney Island, and the way they do it is
 23 they have to fight their way through all these other

1 gangs. Halfway through, the gang head meets a woman, of
 2 course, and they come together and they go through this
 3 — The point is not the gang war and all of that. The
 4 point is — that I'm driving home, is that when they get
 5 off of the elevated subway at the stop for Coney Island
 6 — and they get off and in the background is the ferris
 7 wheel at Coney Island, the gang leader turns to the woman
 8 and says two words that I'm telling you the daggone
 9 Generation X just goes — "We're home." "We're home."
 10 Keep that in mind because you're going to see it again.
 11 "We're home."

12 Generation X. So we said, "If that's it,
 13 we've got a wonderful recruit training and a wonderful
 14 ethos that has served us for 223 years. Is there
 15 anything that we can do with the process to make a Marine
 16 for the 21st Century?" And the answer was "Yes. We're
 17 going to build them. We're going to do something that
 18 people will probably laugh at. We are going to transform
 19 them and the change will be forever."

20 And the transformation is made up of four
 21 points: recruiting, recruit training, cohesion and
 22 sustainment. Right in here (Indicating) is something
 23 called MCT — Marine Combat Training — slash SOI —

1 School of Infantry. This is the "Transformation."
 2 Okay. If that's — If we understand that
 3 they want a challenge, they want boundaries, et cetera,
 4 et cetera, then we've got to start where? You start in
 5 recruiting. There was a one-star general working for Ron
 6 Christmas. His name was Jack Klemp. He was the head of
 7 the Marine Corps Recruiting Command. He is now a three-
 8 star general. Hello? Hello? Why is he a three-star
 9 general? Because it's working, and we reward somebody
 10 who does it right. You're going to see that the way we
 11 build our drill instructors, male and female, you are
 12 special if you make this work.

13 I called in Jack Klemp and I say, "Okay.
 14 We've heard what they all have to say. We know about
 15 Generation X. So what we're going to do is we are going
 16 to take an about-face and just raise all the standards.
 17 The DoD standard for high school graduates is 90
 18 percent." Nine out of ten. I said, "I want 95 percent."
 19 "Middle group 123 Alpha, DoD standard is 60 percent." I
 20 said, "I want 63 percent."

21 Jack Klemp said, "You're crazy. You're
 22 going to kill us." I said, "You haven't even heard the
 23 beginning. We're going to extend the length of boot

1 camp. We're going to extend it by some people say seven
 2 and some people say ten days." He says, "You can't do
 3 that." And he was right, you can't. I can't extend it
 4 without going to the Congress of the United States.

5 And so we had a big breakfast and — Were
 6 you there, Ron? I don't know if you — We had a big
 7 breakfast in my dining room at my quarters and we brought
 8 over all the personnel people from both Senate Armed
 9 Services Committee and now the House Armed Services
 10 Committee, and said, "Here's what we want to do." Why?
 11 Because it was going to cost big-time in something called
 12 T2P2, the transient line in particular, and the training
 13 line, and they gave us authorization.

14 So we went and I said, "Jack, we are going
 15 to extend it and we're going to make it tougher." We
 16 then said we are taking off every bit of advertising off
 17 of our TV that says anything about "we're going to give
 18 you money for a college education." You will not see
 19 that on a Marine commercial. We are going to take
 20 anything off of that commercial that says "we're going to
 21 teach you a skill." We're going to put out a commercial
 22 and all it's going to say is, "If you want to be
 23 challenged physically, mentally and morally, join the

1 Marine Corps. You'll be transformed and the change will
 2 last forever."

3 So we didn't have a commercial that said
 4 that, so we called in our old friends from J. Walter
 5 Thompson. This twenty-six-year-old who had never shaved
 6 in his life shows up in my office and I said, "This is
 7 what I want." He says, "Thank you very much. It'll cost
 8 you a million dollars to make that commercial." "What?"
 9 "A million dollars, that's right." "Okay."

10 So several months later, in they come.
 11 I'll never forget it. They come in, takes a video
 12 machine, plugs that commercial in, and here's what I saw
 13 — I paid a million dollars for this and this is what I
 14 saw: a young male peek his head up over a mountaintop and
 15 look down, and there's a maze. A maze. And the next
 16 thing you know, you see this young lad running through
 17 the maze.

18 And he gets to a certain point and his
 19 feet look like he goes into quicksand, and he's sitting
 20 there, trying to get out. And he kind of — you can see
 21 almost in his mind: he thinks, "Ah, ha," and he takes his
 22 belt off and he loops the belt over top of an outcrop in
 23 the maze wall and pulls himself up, jumps over and

1 continues to run.
 2 Mind you, not a word has been said. All
 3 that's going on is this ba-boom, ba-boom, ba-boom — this
 4 music.

5 He gets down this path, and all of a
 6 sudden two gargoyles on a wall spit balls of fire at him.
 7 The guy stops. He's got this wall of fire. Once again
 8 thinks, takes his shirt off, jumps through the fire, into
 9 a big room. In the middle of the room is a big ball, a
 10 globe. Sticking out of the globe is "Excalibur."
 11 "Excalibur." He runs over, grabs the sword, pulls it
 12 out, and finally somebody says something.

13 In not these words, but in basically these
 14 words, the message is: "If you want to be challenged —
 15 physically, mentally, morally — join the Marine Corps.
 16 You'll be changed, and the change will be forever." And
 17 as those last words are saying, off of the bulkhead comes
 18 this big ol' monster, "Evil" — "Evil" — and he has a
 19 sword-fight, slashes through it, throws his sword up in
 20 the air.

21 Just when it says "and the change will be
 22 forever," "Faith" — the umbrella — reaches down in the
 23 form of light and a lightning bolt, hits that sword; the

1 sword turns into the Marine officer's sword with the
 2 Mameluke hilt, and boom, the kid turns into Dress Blues
 3 and that's the end of the commercial.

4 I look at this thing and I said, "What the
 5 hell was that? I mean, where are the tanks? Where's the
 6 planes? This is bad. I mean, there is no way I'd join
 7 the Marine Corps based on that garbage." And this
 8 twenty-six-year-old who had never shaved in his life
 9 looked at me and he said, "General Krulak, we're not
 10 trying to recruit you. We're not trying to recruit you."

11 Boy, was he ever right. Was he ever
 12 right. Forty-two months in a row. Forty-two months in a
 13 row. The only service to meet or exceed not only net new
 14 contracts, but shipping. DoD average, high school
 15 graduate, 90. Chuck Krulak asked for 95. We're
 16 averaging over forty-two straight months over 97 percent
 17 high school graduates. We have a DoD average of 60
 18 percent, 123 Alpha. Krulak said 63. We're up around 66
 19 percent. They will come. They will come if you meet
 20 what Generation X is asking for.

21 They come to recruit training. We kept
 22 our hand firmly planted on the ethos of our Corps, and
 23 that is recruit training. It is the soul of the Corps.

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1 But we believed in our hearts that to fight and win the
 2 three-block war, there had to be more time for what I
 3 call mentoring — the face-to-face dealing.
 4 And sometimes it can be nasty mentoring, I
 5 can tell you that. But at least the opportunity for that
 6 drill instructor to get in the face of that recruit that
 7 had been slowly but surely taken away from him, and at
 8 the same time, the drill instructor to get in the face of
 9 the recruit about values. Values. And so we extended
 10 the length of recruit training.
 11 And then what the psychiatrist said was
 12 “You need to understand that most of these young men and
 13 women have never had what you and I grew up with, which
 14 was called a ‘defining moment.’” Most of them grew up in
 15 an age where the defining moment had slowly but surely
 16 slipped out of their lexicon and certainly out of their
 17 realization in their lives, and so we had to, in order to
 18 push this issue of values, give them a “defining moment.”
 19 They will tell you — and you already know
 20 this — at eighteen years old, you are not going to
 21 change a man or a woman’s values. You will not change
 22 them. You can’t take an eighteen-year-old and say,
 23 “Okay, here’s your values. We’re going to change your

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1 values,” because it isn’t going to happen.
 2 What you can do, what they tell you
 3 absolutely you can do, is you can give them your values
 4 and hold them accountable. Give them your values and
 5 hold them accountable. And what you saw in that tape was
 6 me just banging home, banging home, banging home: “You
 7 are going to have these values. They’re honor, courage
 8 and commitment. You are going to treat each other with
 9 respect and dignity. You will succeed.” Not “You may
 10 succeed, possibly, hey.” “You will succeed.” “If you
 11 don’t,” the hidden and not-so-hidden message is, “You
 12 aren’t going to wear the eagle, globe and anchor of the
 13 Marine Corps.” Simple as that. You violate them, you’re
 14 out.
 15 You take a look at what’s happening today.
 16 The Marine Corps gets itself in the press all the time.
 17 Aviano, a rape or adultery or what have you. We don’t
 18 try to hide that. As a matter of fact, we invite people
 19 down to watch the Article 32. Why? It isn’t to send a
 20 signal to America. It’s to send a signal to the Marine
 21 Corps that, “Hey, you screw up, you violate, you’re going
 22 to be held accountable. Now, you may beat the rap, but
 23 at least everybody knows you are going to be held

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1 accountable.”
 2 The defining moment for us was the
 3 “Crucible.” The Crucible, the fifty-four — Well, you’ve
 4 seen it. Fifty-four straight hours. But that’s what the
 5 Crucible is. It’s got nothing to do with making recruit
 6 training tough. It’s all to do with driving home the
 7 values, to give them a “defining moment.”
 8 Fifty-four straight hours of food and
 9 sleep deprivation, twenty-nine separate challenges,
 10 humping with a thirty to thirty-five-pound pack on their
 11 back, forty to forty-five miles. It is the same for men
 12 as women. There is no difference. There is no slack
 13 given.
 14 We changed all of the physical fitness
 15 tests. We stopped having separate tests. “This is what
 16 you all are going to do.” And the result is a recruit
 17 training that’s tougher, not easier.
 18 This is the old POI (Indicating). This is
 19 the new one (Indicating). Those are facts. Those are
 20 facts. None of this counts (Indicating), the additional
 21 hundred hours that we gave back to the drill instructor.
 22 If you think for a moment that that drill instructor is
 23 using this (Indicating) for hug-a-Marine time and sit on

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1 the rack and talk about the good ol’ days, you’re crazy.
 2 They are running them, they’re marching them, they’re
 3 drilling them, and they’re doing PT.
 4 So these hours (Indicating) are just
 5 what’s in the program and instruction and have absolutely
 6 no contact with this (Indicating).
 7 The PFT, male and female: look what
 8 happened on both of them (Indicating). We took away —
 9 The males used to be able to kip. They used to — It’s
 10 kind of almost a gymnastic evolution. You can’t kip
 11 through a window in combat, in a built-up area. You have
 12 to pull yourself up. Well, we knocked it off. Look what
 13 happened to the males (Indicating).
 14 The females, we said, “You’re not going to
 15 run only 1.5 miles.” Well, why? Because it was a
 16 disgrace to them. And everybody said — You think that’s
 17 why I did it? In the back of my mind that was a reason.
 18 They’ve got to be able to fight.
 19 The three-block war, I said it starts with
 20 a woman with a child in her hands.
 21 Drill.
 22 You fail the Crucible, you don’t graduate.
 23 What’s failure? Well, I’ll tell you. If your team — If

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1 you break your leg on hour forty-eight and your team
 2 makes a stretcher, picks you up, carries your pack,
 3 carries your rifle, across the finish line in hour fifty-
 4 four, you graduate. Why is that? You’re trying to build
 5 a team. And you’ll see why, because that team is going
 6 to stay together for their entire enlistment.
 7 Tough. People who say recruit training
 8 has gotten easier ought to get their butts down to
 9 recruit training and try it on. Try the Crucible. We’ve
 10 got two — Let me just say, I’m going to show you two TV
 11 news stories on the Crucible. We didn’t invite anybody
 12 down. They came down because they heard about it.
 13 The words — Like in everything else in
 14 the media, the words of the newscaster are absolutely not
 15 important. What is important is the words of the
 16 Marines. You’re going to see two. One of them is the
 17 males going through the Crucible. One will be the
 18 females.
 19 The important part on the females — and
 20 the important part for both of them, in my opinion — is
 21 listen to a private by the name of Amelia Meador. She is
 22 asked a very simple question: “Do you think you’re going
 23 to make it?” And you’ve got to listen to Generation X

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1 and then put her response in the context of what we’re
 2 trying to achieve. And if you don’t get a little lump in
 3 your throat, you’re really missing it.
 4 (Whereupon, the Commission viewed the
 5 video presentation entitled “The Crucible, CBS and NBC.”)
 6 GENERAL KRULAK: Okay. We go from there
 7 into two things. One, the soul of what we’re trying to
 8 do comes under “cohesion,” and I’ll talk about that.
 9 They go from boot camp. If they’re going to be
 10 infanteers, they go to the School of Infantry. If
 11 they’re going to be any other MOS’s, they go into
 12 something called Marine Combat Training.
 13 Whatever they do, the soul is around the
 14 concept of cohesion because we have worked so hard
 15 getting these young men and women of character, getting
 16 them through boot camp, that if there is a way to take
 17 those who have experienced that same thing, even if it’s
 18 just two of them, and get them to school together, get
 19 them to their MOS-producing school together, and get them
 20 to the Fleet together and keep them together for their
 21 entire first enlistment, then we will be able to, almost
 22 like a virus, infect the Corps, and that’s what we’re
 23 doing.

1 Right now, as an example, over 50 percent
 2 of the Marine Corps is into cohesion. By 30 June, 1999
 3 — and I use that only because that's when I stop being
 4 the Commandant — over 80 percent of the Corps will be in
 5 cohesive units. What this means is women — Let's take
 6 the easiest one because Ron was involved in this and it
 7 was the first crack at unit cohesion and we took the
 8 biggest population, the infantry.

9 And that kid comes out of boot camp and
 10 he's got the set of orders. And the set of orders reads
 11 "Private Krulak," and underneath "Private Krulak" are ten
 12 or eleven other people: "You will proceed and report to
 13 School of Infantry, East Coast, for further transfer to
 14 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines." 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines,
 15 gets a set of those orders two months before those kids
 16 ever come. 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines, is located
 17 adjacent to School of Infantry, East Coast.

18 When those Marines get ready to come out
 19 the last week of the School of Infantry, the squad
 20 leaders, platoon commanders, the company commander, the
 21 battalion commander, the staff noncommissioned officers,
 22 the sergeant major, walk en masse to pick up their
 23 cohesion Marines. They do not pass "Go." They do not

1 collect \$200. They don't go to the division
 2 headquarters. They don't — They go directly to the
 3 battalion CP.

4 And they are given what? I'll tell you
 5 what they're given: they're given the fence by the
 6 commander and his sergeant major. "This is what you're
 7 going to be held accountable for. And if you aren't,
 8 you're in deep trouble."

9 You see the same thing with AV-8B engineer
 10 mechanics. A male and a female, they're going to MATSI
 11 to get instructed. They're identified because of their
 12 talent, their EL scores, right out of boot camp, and they
 13 are married together, and they say, "You're going
 14 together, gang." And guess what? They stay there for
 15 their entire first enlistment.

16 There is only one person — one person —
 17 who is allowed to break a cohesion unit and that's the
 18 Commandant of the Marine Corps. In order for a single
 19 individual — And if you think I'm kidding you, I can
 20 give you the name of Colonel Chuck Skipper, head of MMEA.
 21 I will not talk to him. You call him and you'll hear
 22 that once a week — we have taken one battalion, and I
 23 said, "Chuck, I want to know every week your cohesion

1 report on that battalion." And if it ever comes up that
 2 he has transferred somebody that the Commandant didn't
 3 authorize, somebody swings.

4 We cannot afford to put the effort, the
 5 time and the money, into cohesion to have some crazy
 6 person out there break it, thinking that they are — "Oh,
 7 my God, we're getting ready to move. We're getting ready
 8 to go afloat. I don't have all my people. So I'm going
 9 to go to the regimental commander and say I'm short a
 10 2521, and please" — and then they jerk down in this
 11 battalion and grab him.

12 Never again. Why? Because you break
 13 cohesion. And you break cohesion, you break MCT; you
 14 break School of Infantry; you break recruit training; you
 15 break Transformation. Is it easy? It's terribly
 16 difficult. It takes people with the eye on — as Martin
 17 Luther King said, "the eye on the prize." "The eye on
 18 the prize." You've got to believe it. Very hard, very
 19 hard.

20 Do you think that's hard? It's a piece of
 21 cake compared to this (Indicating), compared to
 22 sustaining the Transformation. Why is this hard? Why is
 23 this hard? Very simply, because these folks (Indicating)

1 didn't go through the Crucible; they didn't go through
 2 cohesion. They're just out there. And some of them are
 3 saying, "Hey, these guys aren't any good. They're not
 4 any better than I am."

5 Well, they aren't any better. Nobody ever
 6 said they were better. That's not the issue. The issue
 7 is we have changed something and you've got to get these
 8 people's head in the game. Plato talks about the
 9 "endurance of the soul." Their soul has got to get into
 10 the ballgame.

11 What have we done? For the last two years
 12 I have travelled — In three years, I have travelled over
 13 700,000 miles. Let me just put that in perspective. The
 14 last two commandants together in their eight years did
 15 not travel 500,000. We've travelled 700,000 miles.

16 Where do I go? Do you think I go to Paris
 17 and suck up? No. It's going from one unit to another,
 18 talking about Transformation; trying to get this guy
 19 (Indicating) to understand what we're doing in his Corps
 20 — because it is his Corps. It's not mine, it's his.

21 I go back to — Let me just flip back one
 22 second to Amelia Meador. What did she say at the very
 23 end? The ultimate — the ultimate — Generation X:

1 "Anything to get us home." This is home (Indicating).
 2 This is the extended family (Indicating). If we can't
 3 get that to work, it all is broken, and so you've got to
 4 get buy-in by your noncommissioned officers, your staff
 5 noncommissioned officers, your junior officers and your
 6 seniors.

7 That's why — That's why we have something
 8 called "Power Down." "Power Down," critical to this
 9 (Indicating). Because what we're telling the young NCO
 10 is, "You now become the change agent." No longer is it
 11 General Krulak and General Christmas and Sergeant Major
 12 "This." It is back down to the young NCO, the young
 13 lieutenant. "These are your children." And remember
 14 what John A. LeJeune said about the relationship between
 15 the officer and the enlisted? It will be like that of
 16 the teacher to a scholar, a parent to a child.

17 So that's what this is about (Indicating),
 18 and I'll let you all have that.

19 But, anyhow, it's key. This is all — A
 20 lot of rigor has gone into this. It isn't just a bunch
 21 of people pulling it out of their rear-ends. That's
 22 important.

23 The key to sustainment? Hello? Guess

1 what? It's leadership. Leadership. But what kind of
 2 leadership? This kind of leadership (Indicating):
 3 steward, teacher, mentor.

4 Steward. In other words, a steward of an
 5 institution, a precious institution that they feel
 6 responsible for. That if the institution goes down, then
 7 they've failed. And if you can get that leader to
 8 understand he is not that platoon commander of 1st
 9 Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, he is the steward.
 10 It has been entrusted to him. It's a precious trust.

11 He is a teacher. You cannot just mouth
 12 it. That is not the kind of teacher we're talking about.
 13 We're talking about the example of day-in and day-out,
 14 being a man or a woman of character.

15 And, finally, you are a mentor. A mentor
 16 does not mean picking your favorite child and making sure
 17 they get all the good deals. A mentor is a long-term,
 18 lifetime commitment to excellence. And it is not done in
 19 a major group. Each one of these staff NCO's, NCO's,
 20 gets their little group to mentor and they give them a
 21 great deal of attention.

22 Above all, leaders must be men and women
 23 of character. You cannot have a leader committing

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1 adultery. You cannot have them committing sexual
 2 harassment. You cannot have them lying, cheating and
 3 stealing. You break everything. And, therefore, if a
 4 leader does that, the leader must not remain in the
 5 Marine Corps. It is a non-negotiable. Non-negotiable.
 6 They do something, they are going to suffer.
 7 And is it embarrassing for the Marine
 8 Corps? You better believe it's embarrassing. And people
 9 say — My own officers say, "Why do you continue to
 10 publicize what the hell you're doing? Your problems?"
 11 It is not for you, it's for them (Indicating), so that
 12 they know that if you do this, you are in trouble. It's
 13 called accountability, truth. Truth.
 14 This is what we live by (Indicating).
 15 Every time I talk to a Marine, that goes up. Every time.
 16 Ron knows it. He's seen it a thousand times.
 17 "We exist today - we flourish today -
 18 not because of what we know we are, or what we
 19 know we can do but because of what the grass-
 20 roots of our country believes we are and
 21 believes we can do... The American people
 22 believe that Marines are downright good for the
 23 country; that the Marines are masters of a form

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1 of unfailling alchemy which converts unoriented
 2 youth into proud, self-reliant, stable citizens
 3 - citizens into whose hands the nation's
 4 affairs may safely be entrusted... And,
 5 likewise, should the people ever lose that
 6 conviction - as a result of our failure to meet
 7 their high - almost spiritual - standards, the
 8 Marine Corps will quickly disappear."
 9 "And, likewise, should the people ever
 10 lose that conviction - as a result of our failure to meet
 11 their high - almost spiritual - standards, the Marine
 12 Corps will quickly disappear."
 13 Written by Brigadier General Krulak,
 14 except it was my dad, almost fifty years ago. There's
 15 nothing new.
 16 If you do it all, if you pull it all off,
 17 that's what you get (Indicating). You get a wonderful
 18 fighting organization, men and women of character who
 19 love each other — And I don't mean "don't ask, don't
 20 tell" kind of love. I mean just love each other as young
 21 men and women can — who have respect for each other, who
 22 respect who they are, the dignity of the individual.
 23 And, oh, by the way, after they do all of

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1 these great things, like I said, they go back to American
 2 society better for having been a Marine, and that's
 3 important to us.
 4 What are we seeing? What are we seeing?
 5 Well, we're seeing sexual harassment rates going like
 6 this (Indicating) — going like this (Indicating).
 7 Reported incidence of sexual harassment going up.
 8 I told that to the Chair of the DACOWITS.
 9 I mean, she almost went ballistic. I said, "Wait a
 10 minute. Hello? This is good. Do you understand?
 11 You're developing a woman who's gone through the Crucible
 12 and says, 'I'm not going to put up with this crap. I
 13 don't have to put up with this,' and she goes and reports
 14 it. And what happens? We as a Corps say, 'You did this.
 15 We're taking action.'"
 16 And what we're about ready to see is this
 17 (Indicating), because the woman and the man know that
 18 sexual harassment or anything like that is intolerable,
 19 and two, that the command structure will do something
 20 about it.
 21 What are we seeing? We're seeing in the
 22 1st Marine Expeditionary Force a projection on the
 23 manpower scale that says — and we have manpower

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1 projections just like anybody else — that we're going to
 2 lose 800 people last year for non-AS attrition. In
 3 excess of 800. But we figured, okay, there's so many —
 4 Last year, in the cohesion battalions, the Marine Corps
 5 missed the projection by 820 people. 820 people we
 6 thought we were going to lose to non-AS attrition we
 7 didn't.
 8 That's powerful. That's powerful. I
 9 almost busted my manpower cap. I mean, I was really
 10 sweating it. You were there for when this thing first
 11 started happening and we — our manpower, we were saving
 12 too many.
 13 What does it look like on the officer?
 14 Let me tell you what happens to the officers. Those are
 15 officer cases opened by calendar year (Indicating). This
 16 is — And I'm not knocking anybody. I'm not knocking
 17 people before me. I'm just saying it went from 65 in
 18 '94, to — all of a sudden we said "it's intolerable." 43
 19 — boom, 159. My officers wring their hands and say,
 20 "What the hell's going on?" And I'm saying, "Hello?
 21 It's called accountability."
 22 And look what's happening (Indicating).
 23 Just like it's going to happen in everything else. You

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1 tell them — whether it's an officer or enlisted, you
 2 tell them what the boundaries are, what's acceptable, and
 3 you hold them accountable, and I am going to tell you it
 4 will come down.
 5 You want to solve the problems of sexual
 6 harassment, gender problems? Hold people accountable.
 7 Tell them what the daggone standards are and hold them
 8 accountable. It's simple as that. You start doing that,
 9 you will win, and that's what that shows (Indicating).
 10 Is it painful? Is it embarrassing? Yes.
 11 Do I like going up to the Secretary of Defense and
 12 showing my stats? Absolutely not. We look like a bunch
 13 of Nazis, for crying out loud. Will it be successful? I
 14 will bet anything on it.
 15 And it's nothing that we haven't learned
 16 when we were parents. You hold your children
 17 accountable, you give them a positive role model, and
 18 they will grow up to be men and women of character.
 19 I believe in my heart and soul that the
 20 mothers and fathers of America are not trying to produce
 21 junk, one; I believe in my heart and soul that the
 22 schools are not trying — There's no teacher out there
 23 that says, "Gee, I think I'll produce a dumb student."

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1 There's no church out there that isn't trying to develop
 2 men and women of character. What has happened — and
 3 there's no — You know, what's happened is they're being
 4 bombarded by junk — by junk.
 5 Our question to ourselves as the Corps was
 6 do we join the mothers and fathers, the schools, the
 7 churches, in a fight or not? We said we're going to join
 8 the damn fight. They, in return, have honored that
 9 commitment by helping us recruit.
 10 Example. We had a major. You all went
 11 down to Parris Island. One of our districts is right
 12 there. A major who had never been on recruiting duty was
 13 assigned as the Assistant OPSO of the district. He went
 14 out to learn a little bit, so we go through an RSS. He
 15 walks into the RSS. There's a family with their child
 16 and they're going through this interview, and finally the
 17 recruiter says, "Okay. You know, I've got enough from
 18 the family. Let me talk to your son for a moment."
 19 "Fine."
 20 The kid goes — The parents go out. The
 21 young major goes out with them and they start talking
 22 about this kid coming into the Marine Corps and it took
 23 about two nanoseconds for the major to realize these

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1 parents didn't want him to join the service. I mean, the
 2 parents said, "Hey, we didn't want him to go into the
 3 service. We wanted him to go to college. But — "But he
 4 wanted to join. And, therefore, we said, 'If you're
 5 going to join, you're going to join the Marine Corps.'"

6 The question then came out: "Well, why?"
 7 And he says, "Because you all at least take stands." He
 8 said, "What?" And they said, "Well, the Marine Corps has
 9 some standards and you all take stands." And then the
 10 dad — father turned to the major and said, "And by the
 11 way, we don't necessarily agree with all your stands, but
 12 at least you're taking them. And so if that's the case,
 13 we want you to take our son."

14 Now, that's one family reacting to
 15 Transformation. They don't know it. They're just
 16 reacting to it.

17 My own father, I talked to him last night.
 18 He's all upset. He's seen our latest commercial. If you
 19 thought the maze was crazy, wait til you see the latest:
 20 the guy jumping through the blades and crawling and —
 21 Have you seen that one? He dives through some — He
 22 thinks his way: "How do I get through these blades?"
 23 Gets through that, then climbs up this daggone mountain

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1 cherished Major LaShier here, who has been with us from
 2 the very beginning and has —
 3 GENERAL KRULAK: And you can see he wears
 4 the ribbon of a Marine recruiter. He's been there, done
 5 that, and got the T-shirt.

6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, he is certainly
 7 part of our family. And when he's here, we're home.
 8 GENERAL KRULAK: Well, thank you. Thank
 9 you.

10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And with that —
 11 GENERAL KRULAK: I really will answer any
 12 question. I have a lot of statistics. I have prepped
 13 and prepped, so somebody had better ask. And if I don't
 14 know, I'll get back to you.

15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And I usually toss a
 16 softball, but I think —
 17 GENERAL KRULAK: No need for that.
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — that would insult you.
 19 So I'll pass it on to my next Commissioner.
 20 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, I do
 21 have a question, General.
 22 GENERAL KRULAK: Sure.
 23 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And it's

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1 and then walks across a light beam with a sword and
 2 fights this fiery "Evil," and then ends up with the sword
 3 in the air. Same thing: "You want to be physically,
 4 mentally, morally challenged? Join the Marines." It
 5 says, "Join the Marines. You'll be changed, and the
 6 change is forever."

7 This time we added something because of
 8 what we've learned about the mothers and fathers. What
 9 did we add? Anybody? Anybody remember? That's right.
 10 As he raises his sword, all of the people in this arena
 11 that have been watching this stand and cheer.

12 It is the single most recognized
 13 commercial on TV today. It has only been on two months.
 14 For the age group that we're talking about, it is the
 15 single most recognized TV commercial on the tube. Only
 16 been on for two months. Exceeds Coca-Cola; you know,
 17 Chevy, you name it. This silly commercial that my father
 18 hates. When he said he hated it, I said, "Hurrah, we're
 19 there."

20 Okay. That's all explained in these two
 21 documents (Indicating). It's called "Making Marines,"
 22 and the issue is "Power Down." And you will see the
 23 Commandant of the Marine Corps talking to every one of my

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1 really — it's opinion more than probably what your data
 2 would call.

3 But you've made very, very clear your
 4 feelings about the Marines and I think what we've seen
 5 probably bears out what you said. But I was reading the
 6 testimony of last week. You and the chiefs were in front
 7 of the Senate Armed Services Committee and I just want to
 8 quote one thing. I think it was from Senator Levin who
 9 said, "And once again our men and women in uniform have
 10 demonstrated that they are by far the best trained, best
 11 equipped, best disciplined, most highly skilled and
 12 motivated military force in the world."

13 And I know that from your foxhole you have
 14 an opportunity to see all of the services, not just the
 15 Marines, and do you share that same opinion?
 16 GENERAL KRULAK: Could you read the quote
 17 again? Because I've got to pick out which ones I agree
 18 with and which ones I don't.

19 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: "Once again
 20 our men and women in uniform have demonstrated that they
 21 are by far the best trained, best equipped, best
 22 disciplined, most highly skilled and motivated military
 23 force in the world."

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1 officers — all generals, all commanding officers, all
 2 officers-in-charge. Handwritten note: "Your Corps needs
 3 your help. Take this letter for action," underlined
 4 twice, exclamation point. "CC, Krulak."

5 That's why we do what we do. It works for
 6 us. I think it works for the nation. And in the first
 7 battle of the next war, I think we're going to find out
 8 it's going to work for the individual on the ground.

9 And with that, I'll answer any questions
 10 you have.

11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Well, thank you
 12 very much, General. We appreciate your coming today.
 13 Would you like a glass of water or a seat?

14 GENERAL KRULAK: No, I'm fine. I'm fine.
 15 I'm fine.

16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Hurrah.
 17 That was a notably comprehensive
 18 presentation and it may be that there aren't questions at
 19 this point, but I do want to take an opportunity on the
 20 record to tell you what splendid cooperation and
 21 assistance we've had from Marines all over, wherever
 22 we've been.

23 And I want to say a word in favor of our

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1 GENERAL KRULAK: I would disagree with the
 2 "motivated." I would disagree — Well, of the world? I
 3 would have — There's a question on the "best equipped."
 4 "Motivated." I think that there's a lot
 5 of them — Marines, Army, Navy and Air Force — who are
 6 discouraged with their leadership, discouraged with the
 7 apparent turning-of-the-back of that leadership to what
 8 they think their needs are.

9 I can give you example after example,
 10 whether it's the kid that is down there trying to get a
 11 spare part out of the spare-parts bin and it's been —
 12 that spare part hasn't been there and it hasn't been
 13 there for three months and we have a piece of equipment
 14 deadlined, and some battalion commander is angry at him
 15 and he's angry at the system and the system isn't
 16 responding to him. And if you think that promotes
 17 motivation, you're wrong, and you and I know that.

18 The pilots. We can talk all we want about
 19 pilot bonuses, et cetera, et cetera. The main reason the
 20 pilots are getting — Well, there's multiple reasons why
 21 they're getting out. They're getting out because, again,
 22 they don't think they're being led right.

23 Two, they aren't getting the flying hours

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1 they want. And they say, "If you're going to hold me
2 accountable to go up against a MiG-29 and fight and win,
3 I need to feel confident of my system and I need to feel
4 confident in my own competence as a pilot, and if I'm
5 only getting sixteen hours a month in the cockpit, I
6 don't feel confident. And if you were a leader, you now
7 flew thirty hours when you were a daggone captain, now
8 you seem to think it's okay for me to fly sixteen and I
9 don't think that's acceptable and you're not looking
10 after me."

11 So I don't know the motivation of, say,
12 the British Marines other than you'll never hear them say
13 anything but they're highly motivated.

14 But the bottom line is, to make this flat-
15 out statement that we've got the most motivated force in
16 the world, I think that any service chief who would buy
17 onto that is really naive. And it is the service chief
18 — You can have all kinds of sergeants major and
19 lieutenants and majors and colonels in the line, but the
20 ultimate responsibility for the morale of the troops
21 rests squarely with the service chief.

22 And we have, in my opinion, earned some of
23 their disdain. We are trying to do something about it.

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1 A lot of it — You wish you could sit down with them and
2 say, "Well, let me just tell you the reality is, you
3 know, we're doing the best we can with the budget we were
4 given," da-dah, da-dah, da-dah, but all of that doesn't
5 — It's a nothing to them. It's a nothing to them.

6 They operate under an equation that reads
7 like this: "perception equals reality." You wish, you
8 hope, you pray, that they would have an equation that
9 says, "perception plus knowledge equals truth equals
10 reality," but you can't expect them to do that, certainly
11 not Captain Smith or Corporal Jones.

12 So I would say they are — you know, I
13 just don't know that I could sign onto the "most
14 motivated."

15 I think that the "best equipped" —
16 across-the-board, we're the best equipped. My pilots are
17 flying a CH-46 aircraft that I flew when I was a second
18 lieutenant in Vietnam. My C-130 pilots are flying a
19 plane that will be replaced, and when it's replaced, it
20 will be sixty-three years old. That is the same age
21 difference as if you took the Wright brothers — the
22 plane that the Wright brothers flew at Kitty Hawk and
23 flew that in aerial combat against and during the Vietnam

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1 — yeah, Vietnam War — Vietnam War.

2 So when you think that we're the best
3 equipped, you've got a — That's a stretch. That's a
4 stretch. I mean, the Russians — each country has within
5 its capabilities some very good equipment. And if you
6 talk about overall, we probably are.

7 The best trained? We will remain the best
8 trained so long as the Army gets the tank miles they
9 need, the Marine Corps gets spares, the Navy gets
10 steaming hours, et cetera, et cetera, and that's what
11 we're fighting for.

12 His overall comment is probably accurate,
13 but in there are some chinks that cause the frustration
14 within the force. If that — I mean, that's probably —

15 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: No, it
16 didn't. If I could follow-up with just one quick one. I
17 guess what I'm trying to come to grips with is why does
18 it appear — and you may not be able to answer this, but
19 there are a select few on the Hill who have a completely
20 opposing view: that the military has deteriorated; that
21 the rigor and the challenge to training has been replaced
22 by touchy-feely-happy-glad things that —

23 GENERAL KRULAK: Well, I think they feel

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1 that way because in reality, in some instances that's
2 what happened. I mean, we cannot deny that at one point
3 in time the Navy, in an experiment — and I'm not
4 knocking them — made a very dumb move.

5 They got a "stress card." It was a little
6 blue card, and if they showed that, they could go "time
7 out." They could go literally sit on their racks and
8 have a two-hour break. Dumb idea. They've been trying
9 to fight their way out of that forever.

10 Jay Johnson would like to choke the person
11 who — I mean, I can tell you the CNO didn't sit up there
12 and say, "Okay, I think I'm going to have 'stress
13 cards.'" Somebody did it, and now he's trying to get by
14 that as hard as he can.

15 Each service is putting in some kind of a
16 "Crucible," some kind of a "defining moment." They vary
17 in rigor, but they're realizing that you've got to have
18 that.

19 And so I think it's not unfair to Levin to
20 have him say it, and it's also not unfair to a guy like a
21 "Bob Smith" or a somebody like that who says, "Hey, you
22 all have gotten soft."

23 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. Thank

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1 you.

2 GENERAL KRULAK: Yes, ma'am.

3 MS. POPE: One of the things that has
4 concerned me — We've talked to commanders in the field
5 and I'm just curious about whether you share the opinion.
6 I haven't gone to the Marine Corps in the field but we're
7 doing that next month — I am.

8 When we ask the question about are you
9 prepared to deploy — you know, your men and women, are
10 they trained? Are you getting, you know, a soldier, a
11 Marine, sailor, airman, out of basic training, "A" school
12 — are you getting what you need? And the answer for the
13 most part has been "yes," but the caveat is
14 sustainability. They're real concerned about
15 sustainability.

16 GENERAL KRULAK: I think that what you're
17 — When you go to the Marine Corps, the first answer, of
18 course, is going to be "No, Jiminy Christmas." I mean,
19 really. They'll say, "It ain't like the Old Corps." You
20 just need to understand that Ron Christmas said that
21 about, you know, once he had a weekend. That's the
22 Marine Corps. It's never tough enough. If you're not
23 choking them, you know, what the heck.

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1 After you get by that initial and start
2 getting into them, you know, then they'll say, "Yes, the
3 training is coming along." They will say that those that
4 come out of the "A" schools, the actual hard-skill MOS's,
5 that they're probably having to do too much OJT at the
6 squadron, at the 2d FSSG, or wherever.

7 Again, you can throw all the statistics in
8 the world that would dispute that: the schools are
9 better, there's — What's happened is they're just
10 different. I mean, there's a lot of self-pace schooling;
11 there's a lot of video-teleconferencing and things like
12 that, that the average Marine, Old Corps — and I confess
13 to a Cro-Magnon type attitude in the Marine Corps — that
14 they'll say it can't possibly be as good.

15 It's like you and I used to talk about,
16 that in the dawn, trying to get people to understand that
17 simulation is good. There's some good things about
18 simulation. To a Marine, if it doesn't get you dirty, if
19 you don't smell of cordite, it can't be good.

20 Well, that's just our ethos. They are
21 beginning to understand. My gosh, if — And what brought
22 it to a head was the Reserve tank battalion that went to
23 Desert Storm and killed more tanks than any other Marine

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1 tank unit in the Corps. Why? Because they used
 2 simulation before they went out and fired their tables,
 3 and all of a sudden they got better and better. And so
 4 they get to Desert Storm and they were getting first-
 5 round hits like that (Indicating).
 6 And so I think that's kind of what you're
 7 going to get. You're going to get an initial "umh," and
 8 then as you kind of walk it through, you'll be able to
 9 understand.
 10 My own belief, I think that we're getting
 11 young men and women who are smarter from the standpoint
 12 of savvy about systems, and it's just because Generation
 13 X has been brought up operating in systems and process.
 14 It is very difficult — and that's where
 15 sustainment comes in — to get that to translate to a
 16 staff sergeant in the Army or the chief in the Navy.
 17 They just have trouble understanding that. And I think
 18 that when you talk to these — whether it's Army, Navy,
 19 Air Force, Marine Corps — that you need to put that and
 20 keep that — and I know you do — keep that in the back
 21 of your mind, because you're talking about generational
 22 differences.
 23 Most NCO's and above do not understand

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1 this generation and so they are continuing to try to mold
 2 them into what worked when they were, you know, eighteen,
 3 and they're now forty and it isn't going to work.
 4 MS. POPE: Thank you.
 5 MR. MOORE: Well, thank you very much for
 6 a superb briefing. And I'm glad you brought that initial
 7 address to recruits. That you didn't need to apologize
 8 for at all. That was really quite impressive. As I'm
 9 sure you know, being in a visible position, we live in
 10 such a highly-charged political culture that I have to
 11 make the sort of obligatory disclaimer before I ask you
 12 this question. Otherwise, I couldn't ask it.
 13 I'm going to ask you a question about some
 14 gender-related problems, and certainly that question
 15 doesn't flow from any lack of regard for our females in
 16 the military. You have to admire Marines and soldiers
 17 and sailors and airmen like Amelia Meador and I hope we
 18 get more of them. And I'm not suggesting that we roll
 19 back the clock.
 20 On the other hand, it has to be
 21 recognized, it seems to me, that the American forces have
 22 attempted a socio-military revolution that is
 23 unprecedented in all of recorded history. No other

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1 nation — No other nation's military forces have ever put
 2 females into the force to the extent that we have,
 3 including what I think really are combat positions even
 4 though there seems to be some distinction about where
 5 that combat exemption lies. And my question relates not
 6 so much to that, but to one of the perhaps unanticipated
 7 effects of it that I think in many respects is very
 8 harmful to the forces.
 9 We've been to every basic training base of
 10 all the services. We've been to some of the advanced
 11 training bases. We've been to some of the operational
 12 units' bases. We've talked to literally hundreds if not
 13 thousands of Marines, soldiers, sailors and airmen, and
 14 very often I hear this — sometimes even pulled aside and
 15 told for fear that someone might overhear — "Sir, we are
 16 concerned about this problem. No one is allowed to
 17 honestly address some of the problems that do ensue from
 18 feminizing the force and from the degree of integration
 19 upon which we've embarked."
 20 And I hear this very often and it concerns
 21 me, quite frankly, more than just the extent to which we
 22 have women in the force itself, and that is — and it
 23 gets to something you've already touched on — the extent

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1 to which this inability to tell the truth engenders a
 2 loss of confidence in the leadership. And so I'm putting
 3 the question to you because of all the chiefs, you have
 4 the greatest reputation for truth-telling and
 5 forthrightness.
 6 How do we — If we're going to, as a
 7 national policy choice, continue down this path, this
 8 socio-military revolution, how do we at least deal with
 9 the problem of honestly facing cases where it doesn't
 10 work, honestly facing cases where there is a softening of
 11 standards, so that we don't create a sort of
 12 institutional lie which is really draining a lot of the
 13 confidence in the senior leadership out of those NCO's
 14 and company-grade officers that have to bear the brunt of
 15 combat when it comes?
 16 GENERAL KRULAK: Well, let me first start
 17 off by saying that I think one of the key things that can
 18 happen from this Commission is to establish standards. I
 19 mean, if you see in your walk-around where we don't have
 20 reliable standards, then I think they need to be set.
 21 For my Marines, I think that you will
 22 find, I would hope, a little bit less of that kind of
 23 viewpoint regarding the women. For one thing, we are

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1 basically following what we think and what I think the
 2 American people believe, and that is, the American people
 3 believe that women can in fact be a combat multiplier but
 4 that their role should not be in the area of direct
 5 combat. And so we stress that, and those young ladies
 6 who come into the Marine Corps understand that.
 7 At the same time, I've got to caution you
 8 that the battlefield is going to be different. And if we
 9 don't establish the standards for the woman to be
 10 trained, equipped, and effective as the men, then you're
 11 going to lose women. I mean, they're not going to
 12 survive that kind of battlefield.
 13 And so I would urge you to — And that's
 14 part of why I wanted to get an opportunity to describe
 15 the battlefield of the 21st Century, because the idea of
 16 having a forward line of troops and, "Oh, my goodness,
 17 we're safe because we're behind the FLOT or the FIBUA,"
 18 is nonsense.
 19 And so what Angie Silene has said was, you
 20 know, they're not going to go into combat. Silene is a
 21 very, very smart woman. Everybody said, "Well, what the
 22 heck did she mean?" What she's saying is we've got to
 23 prepare them for what's coming. She was not just talking

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1 about preparing that somebody's going to, you know,
 2 possibly try to hit on them. What she's talking about is
 3 you've got to be prepared to fight. You've got to
 4 understand what it's like to crawl through the mud, to
 5 have a weapon in your hand, to go through barbed wire.
 6 We don't want you to do that. That is not
 7 the intent. The Marine Corps absolutely does not believe
 8 that they should be walking point. What we do say is we
 9 think this battlefield is going to be so chaotic and so
 10 lethal that if you do not give that young lady the same
 11 thing that you're giving that young man, you are doing
 12 her a grave disservice.
 13 Along that line, it puts a lot more
 14 pressure on her because she's no longer running a mile-
 15 and-a-half and she's no longer doing so-many sit-ups in
 16 so-many minutes. She's going to do what it takes to be a
 17 Marine. If she can't, she's not going to be a Marine.
 18 They know that when they come in. They're told that by
 19 their recruiters.
 20 Another thing, and to be very honest, our
 21 percentages, to be, you know — I mean, you all know our
 22 — our percentages are lower than the other services. I
 23 mean, we have, you know, about five or six percent

1 female. The Air Force is different. The Army's
 2 different. The Navy's different. And so it's probably
 3 easier for me to do it. To be honest, it's probably
 4 easier.
 5 And then the final thing is, we've tried
 6 to get at your concern by something that we incorporated
 7 that initially didn't get much — many "thumbs up" from
 8 the officer corps and the senior staff NCO's but now is a
 9 very valuable tool, and we put — it's called "Marine
 10 Mail." Poor old Ron had to answer mail. Marine Mail is
 11 a way that anybody can communicate with the Commandant of
 12 the Marine Corps. I mean, VFR-direct. You push that
 13 damn button, you get in to the Commandant.
 14 And they all get answered. And if you
 15 think that when they have that, they aren't willing to
 16 take you apart — We've got an issue going right now.
 17 Sergeant Major Lee — God bless him, love him — got in a
 18 little contest with a staff sergeant. Probably did
 19 something stupid.
 20 Well, I'm telling you it's the biggest
 21 thing. It's debated in Marine Mail. It's debated in the
 22 Marine Times. It's debated all over the place. There's
 23 nobody pulling any punches. Sometimes they're really

1 hard and they'll put "A concerned Marine." They won't
 2 even put their name down. "A concerned Marine."
 3 But it all gets in to the Commandant, and
 4 then, as Ron will tell you, it then gets funnelled to the
 5 various staff sections and they will answer. And not
 6 only do they answer, they go back and they ask one of
 7 three questions: "Is this — you know, "Did I give you an
 8 answer?" "Is this enough?" — da-dah, da-dah — "Here's
 9 another place to call."
 10 So we've tried to get at that by opening a
 11 chain — Now, the chain of command doesn't like that.
 12 You can imagine, being a former — They don't like that.
 13 They don't like it. And so what we've tried to do to
 14 solve that is we say, "Okay, here's the questions you may
 15 ask..." "You can ask the following three questions" or
 16 "you can comment on the following..." "What are we doing
 17 now that we shouldn't be doing at all", "What aren't we
 18 doing that we should be doing," and "What are we doing
 19 now that we could be doing better," and "here's how."
 20 Now, that sounds pretty specific. Let me
 21 tell you, they use that. They come rolling in. But, I
 22 mean, we — I mean, the issues of "female" are probably
 23 on my screen two or three times a day, and we go back and

1 we go back and we go back, and it's educating the Marine
 2 Corps. Not always successfully, but at least they know
 3 that they can contact their chain of command and get an
 4 answer, because they know they will get an answer.
 5 MR. MOORE: Thank you.
 6 GENERAL KRULAK: Ron?
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Just for
 8 the record, I think it would be good if you might go
 9 ahead and describe why the Marine Corps segregates that
 10 portion of basic training — i.e., boot camp — and then
 11 integrates male and females as we go to advanced infantry
 12 training and so forth.
 13 GENERAL KRULAK: I would hope that after,
 14 you know, you all saw what we're doing, that you
 15 understand the rigor behind the effort and what we're
 16 trying to do. And the bottom-line answer to that is we
 17 believe that to fight the three-block war, there has to
 18 be a point in time when that male or that female
 19 concentrates on learning to become the basic 21st Century
 20 Moral Warrior.
 21 That's what we call them: the Moral
 22 Warrior. We have two names for them: the Moral Warrior,
 23 the Strategic Corporal. They are the Strategic Corporal,

1 because in this day and age, the actions of that Moral
 2 Warrior, the Strategic Corporal, will be videoed by CNN,
 3 and if they are not operating in a moral fashion, they're
 4 going to bring discredit to our nation, which is at the
 5 strategic battle.
 6 We believe in our souls that it is
 7 critical to have an eleven to twelve-week period of time
 8 when, in fact, they concentrate on being the United
 9 States Marine. There's a lot of other, you know,
 10 rationale that goes with it as we go through that. We
 11 can talk all we want about role models and they want to
 12 be able to see somebody they can be like. The bottom
 13 line for your Commandant, the reason we're doing it and
 14 are not backing away, is we believe it's critical to
 15 learn how to be a Marine.
 16 Let me tell you, they already know how to
 17 be gender-integrated. I went to a wrestling match and
 18 watched the world's most studly 105-pounder whip up on a
 19 boy, and it was a girl. There are multiple states — I'm
 20 a wrestler. There are multiple states in this country
 21 today that have male-and-female wrestling. They play
 22 soccer. They play — You name it.
 23 This idea of somehow you have to go

1 through life male-and-female and that there's no way you
 2 can be a warrior or effective in the military without
 3 starting and ending together, in my opinion, does a
 4 disservice to our nation. That's not saying that it is
 5 bad; I'm just saying I think that that argument is
 6 specious because they've already — they know how to get
 7 along.
 8 What has happened — And I go back to the
 9 description of Generation X. What happens is if you do
 10 not put the parameter, if you do not show them the fence
 11 line, I don't care whether they went through gender-
 12 integrated or gender-segregated, that guy is going to put
 13 his hands in that girl's pants just as fast as he can.
 14 He does not respect her. And if you do not attack that,
 15 you're never going to win, and the only way I think —
 16 and I'm only responsible for the Marine Corps — the only
 17 way I can make it work for my Corps is to establish the
 18 values, give them to them, give them the "defining
 19 moment," and hold them accountable.
 20 And I think it's going to work. I'm
 21 seeing it working at the officer level. And I would
 22 expect it to come home to them a little earlier than at
 23 the enlisted level. I mean, they're smarter. They've

1 got more to risk. But it will work. And if we came back
 2 here three years from now and sat at this same table, I'd
 3 show you statistics that it's working. It is
 4 accountability. It's Generation X.
 5 And by the way, Generation Next has the
 6 identical, same characteristics as Generation X.
 7 Generation Next. So those of you who have young kids,
 8 there you are, gang. I just gave you a heck of a break.
 9 And they're not going to change.
 10 They had an article — They had an
 11 editorial in Sunday's Atlanta Constitutional or whatever
 12 that paper is — which, by the way, I thought the
 13 Washington Times was right-wing. If you have never read
 14 this thing, this is bad. I mean, it is not a good paper
 15 because it's just too skewed to the right.
 16 But this — they had an editorial on the
 17 young of today and they went down and they articulated
 18 all the bad things about them. One of them was "45
 19 percent of the youth of today believe that it is okay to
 20 lie, cheat and steal, to succeed." Okay. So I listen
 21 and I saw it. Then the final one was "97 percent of the
 22 young men and women of today believe that character
 23 counts."

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1 Now, why is the dichotomy? I'll tell you
 2 why. Who sets the definition of "success"? Generation X
 3 or us? We have, for them. We're killing them. We're
 4 polluting them. We say, "This is success." If that's
 5 success, 45 percent of them will lie, cheat and steal to
 6 meet it. Why? There's no fence line. "This is what the
 7 definition of 'success' is. I'm going to go through that
 8 gate and I'm going to get it." We're killing them
 9 because 97 percent of them say what counts is character,
 10 and, yet, we show them the example of 180-out.

11 Do you want to know why the troops are
 12 pissed at us? If they think you're lying, you're going
 13 against 97 percent of their value system. Why are they
 14 mad? I wonder...

15 Why do you stand up in front of the
 16 Congress of the United States and tell the truth? It's
 17 got nothing to do with the Marine Corps or Chuck Krulak
 18 or the Congress. If you remember what I said, I said,
 19 "You've got my Marines watching. All I've got is my
 20 integrity. Don't take that from me."

21 Had nothing to do with me. And I said
 22 that. I said, "This hasn't got to do with Chuck Krulak.
 23 My Marines are watching. You don't ever, ever want to

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1 reporter a break —
 2 GENERAL KRULAK: Okay.
 3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — even though you don't
 4 need one.

5 GENERAL KRULAK: I'm so cheap, I have to
 6 buy my own slides.

7 Well, thank you.

8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much.

9 GENERAL KRULAK: It's been an honor. I
 10 appreciate the chance to come by and tell you what is
 11 behind what we're doing.

12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Great. Thank you.

13 (Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing in
 14 the above-entitled matter was concluded.)

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1 show that Marine that you're not a man of honor, a woman
 2 of courage, a Marine Corps of commitment. You do that,
 3 you're finished."

4 And that's the problem, and that's what's
 5 happening. They get these unbelievably crossed signals.
 6 Ninety-seven percent of them will want to be people of
 7 character. But we're setting the standards — "this is
 8 success" — and we're killing them.

9 I feel like a daggone preacher but it's
 10 the truth. It's the truth. I am telling you, it is the
 11 truth. Truth is the hard currency of a free people.
 12 Think of that. Truth is the hard currency of a free
 13 people. That's what they want more than anything.
 14 You're not always going to give it, but I'm going to tell
 15 you, if you don't think that's on the mark, you really
 16 are missing it.

17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: General, as you see, we
 18 have a few people who could not be with us today. And we
 19 have requested of other folks who have come to see us if
 20 they wouldn't mind that, when our colleagues may view the
 21 video or read the transcript —

22 GENERAL KRULAK: Sure.

23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — if they have

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1 questions, that we may pass them on to you.

2 GENERAL KRULAK: Absolutely. I'll be more
 3 than willing. And if you have anything else — I only
 4 brought two of these (Indicating), but I think that, you
 5 know, there's a lot of question as to how we're going
 6 about doing that.

7 And the issue is "how to empower NCO's and
 8 junior officers." The challenge is you give the young
 9 NCO the job of responsibility and accountability, the
 10 mentoring by the staff NCO, the junior officer; stakes
 11 for future leaders.

12 Goes right to your question: "If they
 13 don't find the right kind of leadership, if they aren't
 14 continued to be challenged, if they aren't held
 15 accountable for their actions, if they aren't given the
 16 opportunity to grow" — to grow — "to lead and to become
 17 even more important to the Marine Corps and expand their
 18 own individual capabilities, then we lose. The rules are
 19 very simple. When you don't hold them accountable, they
 20 will skate. If you hold them accountable, they respond."

21 And that's it. We learned that when we were kids.

22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, once again we thank
 23 you very much for coming. I'm going to give the court

JAN. 11, 1999

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CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES

Thursday; January 28, 1999

1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 940

Arlington, Virginia

JAN. 28, 1999

1 Those present:
 2 Anita K. Blair, Esquire - Chairman
 3 The Honorable Frederick F.Y. Pang - Vice Chairman
 4 Nancy Cantor, Ph.D. - Commissioner
 5 LtGen George R. Christmas, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner
 6 CSM Robert A. Dare, Jr., USA(Ret) - Commissioner
 7 LtGen William M. Keys, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner
 8 Thomas Moore - Commissioner
 9 Charles Moskos, Ph.D. - Commissioner
 10 The Honorable Barbara Spyridon Pope - Commissioner
 11 Mady Wechsler Segal, Ph.D. - Commissioner
 12 ---
 13 Stephen C. Fogleman, Esquire - Executive Director
 14 Susan L. Fry - Executive Assistant
 15 James Renne, Esquire - Staff Counsel and Secretary
 16 Kathleen M. Wright, Ph.D. - Research Director
 17 Janice Laurence, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 18 Charles Johnson, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 19 Capt J.S. Snyder, USN - Service Representative
 20 LtCol Brenda L. Harris, USA - Service Representative
 21 LtCol Mary Street, USAF - Service Representative
 22 Maj R. Scott LaShier, USMC - Service Representative
 23 ---

1 Also present:
 2 Captain Kathleen M. Bruyere, USN(Ret), former Special
 Assistant for Women's Policy (1988-1991); Former
 3 Commanding Officer, Recruit Training Command, Orlando, FL
 4 ---
 5 GEN Dennis J. Reimer, USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
 6 LTC Bruce W. Batten, Program Division, Office of the
 Chief for Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of
 7 the Army
 8 LTC Pat McQuiston
 9 ---
 10 U.S. Army Panel
 11 LTG William J. Bolt, USA, TRADOC, Deputy Commanding
 General, Initial Entry Training
 12 LTG David H. Ohle, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for
 13 Personnel
 14 LTG Thomas N. Burnette, Jr., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Plans
 15 LTC Angela Manos, USA
 16 LTC Monica Gorzelnik, USA
 17
 18 LTC John Snyder, USA
 19
 20 LTC Bruce W. Batten, Program Division, Office of the
 Chief for Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of
 the Army
 21
 22 CPT Chris Hornbarger, USA
 23

1 Senior Enlisted Panel
 2 SMA Robert E. Hall, USA, 11th Sergeant Major of the Army
 3 SgtMaj Lewis G. Lee, USMC, 13th Sergeant Major of the
 Marine Corps
 4 MCPON James L. Herdt, USN, 9th Master Chief Petty Officer
 5 of the Navy
 6 CMSAF Eric W. Benken, USAF, 12th Chief Master Sergeant of
 the Air Force
 7 LtCol Sandy Rufkahr, AF/OPBET
 8
 9 Maj Michael F. Morris, SAF/LLP
 10
 11 MSgt John Harrison, USAF, Public Affairs Advisor to the
 CMSAF
 12 MSG Phillip Prater
 13 LTC Monica Gorzelnik, USA
 14 LTC Bruce W. Batten, Program Division, Office of the
 Chief for Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of
 the Army
 15 ---
 16 ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN(Ret), President, Admiral
 Zumwalt and Consultants, Inc., Former Chief of Naval
 17 Operations (1970 to 1974)
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1 PROCEEDINGS (7:30 a.m.)
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Today is Thursday,
 3 January 28th, and this is the Congressional Commission on
 4 Military Training and Gender-Related Issues. This
 5 morning we have Captain Kathleen M. Bruyere to come and
 6 speak with us. Her biography is in the materials, so I
 7 will dispense with an introduction and invite Captain
 8 Bruyere to talk with us.
 9 Thank you very much for coming.
 10 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Well, good morning. I'm
 11 delighted to be here. And I think that this is an
 12 exceptionally important task that you all have, and I say
 13 that because I know that it is, even though a labor of
 14 love to try to come to some grips with some very, very
 15 important issues.
 16 And I did not prepare any statement today.
 17 I thought I would just present myself and anything I can
 18 contribute, having participated during some very intense
 19 and — moments in the United States Navy and worked with
 20 many of the people who are — some of the people on the
 21 Commission, in various forms.
 22 Anything I can contribute, I'd be happy to
 23 do so.

1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Very good.
 2 Mr. Pang, would you like to start?
 3 MR. PANG: Kathy, you know, thank you for
 4 joining us. I appreciate it very much and, you know, on
 5 behalf of the Commission, I want to thank you for giving
 6 us your time.
 7 You're right. I mean, this is a very
 8 interesting Commission. I hope we produce the kind of
 9 work that the Congress expects.
 10 You know, I heard this morning from Bob
 11 that, you know, there is some discussion about the
 12 Commission testifying sometime in March. Is that
 13 correct?
 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: There has been
 15 discussion. I can confirm that.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: The word is
 17 out. The word is out.
 18 MR. PANG: The word is out. Has anything
 19 been firmed up yet, Madam Chair?
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: The last that we heard
 21 from the House staff was that they are penciling us in
 22 for March 17th to testify. And that's on the House side
 23 only. There's no word from the Senate.

1 MR. PANG: So that would be about the time
 2 we deliver the report, or just before?
 3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: The report is due March
 4 15th and we are aiming to meet that deadline.
 5 MR. PANG: Terrific. Terrific.
 6 You know, I just wanted to, you know, for
 7 the record, note that in reading Kathy's bio, there's
 8 something in here that, you know, I don't know if it's —
 9 Let's see, where is it. Hold on just a moment.
 10 You know, right in the first paragraph
 11 where in — there was a court action in 1978 that
 12 resulted in Title 10 being declared unconstitutional. Is
 13 that correct? I mean, you know, did the court really
 14 come up with a finding? Because I don't think that was
 15 the case.
 16 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: That's Owens v. Brown,
 17 and Judge John Sirica was — It was his court here in
 18 Washington. He declared that he felt that it was
 19 unconstitutional. But, of course, as you know, the judge
 20 can't repeal the law and, of course, it took another
 21 fifteen years until we saw the law repealed. I would
 22 commend that to you to take a look at. If you don't have
 23 that available, it's — the whole record is available.

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1 But, yeah, it essentially was, you know,
 2 based on gender and...
 3 MR. PANG: Because I think, you know, it
 4 is crucial that maybe we ask the legal consultants to
 5 look into that because I thought that courts always found
 6 that the military had the ability to discriminate,
 7 regardless of anything, I mean. And so I don't know if
 8 it was a Supreme Court ruling or it was just an opinion
 9 or what it was, because later on the law was repealed.
 10 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Yes.
 11 MR. PANG: And if something is declared —
 12 you know, a piece of law is declared unconstitutional, it
 13 has no standing, so you don't have to repeal it. So I
 14 think we need to get that on the record and make sure
 15 that that's — you know, whatever it is, the correct —
 16 the facts of the matter are correct.
 17 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Yes.
 18 MR. PANG: I pass for now.
 19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.
 20 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I guess my
 21 question may command a lengthy answer. I don't know.
 22 But because of your experience, you saw a lot of
 23 transition as it pertained to the integration of women in

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1 the force, and mine would speak specifically to gender-
 2 integrated training. And I guess what I would ask you is
 3 as you saw it progress, what mistakes do you think were
 4 made in the process and how do you assess the status of
 5 it today?
 6 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Okay. I can only speak
 7 to having been involved in the first pilot for the
 8 gender-integrated training in Orlando when I was the
 9 commanding officer of the Recruit Training Command, and
 10 it certainly has progressed a lot since then. I have not
 11 been to Great Lakes recently to see what's happening
 12 there, so I can't really speak with any clarity on that.
 13 But I will say that when the decision was
 14 made to bring the men and women closer together in basic
 15 training, it was done as a result of having studied the
 16 issue again, coming out of a study group in which I also
 17 participated, and it wasn't as a result of hiring some
 18 outside consultants to come in and take a look at what we
 19 were doing, et cetera.
 20 It really was listening to the people on
 21 active duty, listening to the people who were the leaders
 22 in the ships, at the shore stations, who were working
 23 with these young men and women who had come out of the

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1 gender-segregated boot camps.
 2 We had men and women at Orlando going
 3 through training — in quotes, if you will — "together."
 4 but they never really did anything "together." They were
 5 simply collocated.
 6 And I guess it was while we were looking
 7 at some issues on the study group that convened during
 8 that time — and we had now men and women working
 9 together on ships for a number of years and we had some
 10 data to study and some people to talk to — that it
 11 dawned on us that we needed to go back to the beginning.
 12 That it was so important in the beginning
 13 to instill that comradeship, that dependency on one
 14 another in a respectful way, realizing you are dealing
 15 with eighteen and nineteen-year-olds and that does have
 16 to be taken into account, but to teach them from the
 17 beginning what is the right thing to do.
 18 We essentially had men and women going
 19 through the boot camp in Orlando, which was the only one,
 20 as you know, that trained women at the time. And we
 21 would tell them all these things about what would happen
 22 when they would get to their ships and how they would all
 23 work together, but no one ever had the experience of even

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1 sitting together in a classroom, sharing problems,
 2 working together in firefighting exercises and all that
 3 sort of thing we did. And then we would say, "Okay."
 4 After nine weeks, "Now get out there and work together."
 5 Well, it's no wonder that it was
 6 dysfunctional. We never gave them the chance to go
 7 through it at the boot camp.
 8 So we decided we would take a look at how
 9 to do that. And there was nothing — We had no model to
 10 follow, really, and we decided we would put together a
 11 system to keep them working together, training together,
 12 going through physical activity together, that sort of
 13 thing, and try to instill in them the importance of
 14 depending on each other, which they may have to when they
 15 would get to their ships, for their lives.
 16 And that's how it all started. It wasn't
 17 a result of, as I say, some major study that went on for
 18 years and scientists came in and looked at it. It really
 19 was the leaders coming to that conclusion.
 20 And what we heard following it — You have
 21 to keep in mind, too, in all fairness, that these people
 22 were in the limelight. As Barbara remembers, it was
 23 major publicity.

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1 And at the time, as far as the Navy was
 2 concerned, it was — because Tailhook was still in the
 3 news, it was probably one of the few pockets of good news
 4 the Navy had. And so we tried to keep the young people,
 5 you know, out of the glare of the media as much as we
 6 could while we were going through the process.
 7 Now, as I understand it since that time —
 8 And keep in mind, this was many years ago. It was '93,
 9 that time frame. '92, '93. Once the boot camp closed at
 10 Orlando and things were shifted to Great Lakes, you have
 11 a little different scenario. You have a much larger
 12 place. You have one boot camp now and there had been
 13 some changes to the program.
 14 From what I have seen and read, it appears
 15 to me that the system is working very well, and the
 16 feedback that I get from young people going through the
 17 Navy now is it's a very positive experience. I think a
 18 lot of improvements have been made to the recruit
 19 training in general, which we wish we had had at the
 20 time, but with funding being what they were and the fact
 21 that you had three separate boot camps, you weren't able
 22 to do that.
 23 But I remember the young people when they

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1 were going through the pilot program and they would be
 2 interviewed by whomever, from whatever media, and they
 3 were very astounded that there was any attention being
 4 paid to what was happening at all.
 5 They said, "You know, we were surprised
 6 when we got here and saw that we weren't working
 7 together. What's the big deal?" That was exactly what
 8 they said. "We're used to being together in school" —
 9 unless they had come from a school which was, you know,
 10 gender-specific.
 11 "We're used to that. We know about that.
 12 We don't really see anything" — And they didn't know any
 13 better because they had never been through boot camp
 14 before. So what can I say?
 15 But that's really how it came about.
 16 There was a realization that — because of some problems
 17 the Navy had been having with — aboard ship, we realized
 18 that we hadn't been teaching them from the beginning what
 19 to expect or what was expected of them. So we did — it
 20 was the very, very beginning steps of trying to rectify
 21 some of that.
 22 It's come a long way since then. We
 23 didn't have the Standing Committee on Women and several

1 other things that came along that I know you all know
 2 about.
 3 But that was just the very beginning.
 4 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 5 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: It was a long answer,
 6 but...
 7 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: That's all
 8 right.
 9 MS. POPE: Kathy, again, thank you.
 10 Admiral Zumwalt is coming this afternoon to kind of talk
 11 about as the Navy looked at the all-volunteer force and
 12 changes in society and women looking to come into the
 13 Navy. I don't know what he's going to talk about except
 14 kind of what was precipitating it and the thinking.
 15 You were involved in a lot of stages along
 16 the way, up to the movement to fully integrate —
 17 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Right.
 18 MS. POPE: — men and women at Orlando.
 19 Do you know what you could add from your experience?
 20 And I know you worked — you know, you had
 21 the women's issues for Admiral Boorda for a number of
 22 years as the Navy was going through a lot of those
 23 transitions. But looking back to late seventies when the

1 Navy began to put women on support ships — I don't know
 2 that I could remember back that far, but from your own
 3 personal experience.
 4 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: There's so much that
 5 went on and — There really is. And, of course, Admiral
 6 Zumwalt, I would love to be here to listen to him.
 7 Of course, we know that that was the very
 8 beginning, too. When I came in in 1966, we were very
 9 restricted in what we could do. And, of course, no women
 10 on ships.
 11 And what precipitated my participating in
 12 that lawsuit that Fred mentioned was when I was told that
 13 I could not even command a shore station; because Navy
 14 regulations said that in order to be qualified for a
 15 command ashore, one had to be qualified for a command at
 16 sea — a little "Catch-22" — and, of course, I couldn't
 17 get there.
 18 And neither could my — the other folks
 19 that were named plaintiffs in that lawsuit who were
 20 interested in and were young enough still — and I had
 21 passed that stage — was young enough still to go into
 22 the more combat-oriented areas and it was a major
 23 frustration.

1 We surveyed every member of Congress to
 2 get his or her opinion on the issue. No one would step
 3 forward and volunteer to introduce legislation to repeal
 4 the laws; which we didn't expect they would, but we had
 5 to go through that wicket. And so we thought that the
 6 only thing open to us was to take it to court, which we
 7 did.
 8 I would say in answer to your question,
 9 Barbara, it really has been an evolutionary process and
 10 it has been as a result — looking back on it in the big
 11 picture, a result of many, many people who are truly
 12 concerned — as opposed to some people who have an
 13 agenda, many people who are truly concerned about good
 14 order and discipline, what's the right thing to do. And
 15 these are people who are both in the military and those
 16 outside the military.
 17 And I think it's important to get the
 18 inputs from everyone as to what they're thinking but to
 19 be very careful about people who may have a self-serving
 20 agenda. We ran into a lot of those folks along the way
 21 who had never been there and didn't care to listen to the
 22 people who had been there, if you will, and that's what
 23 gets frustrating, I think — is trying to separate, you

1 know, where people are really coming from.
 2 I think the one thing that I would add is
 3 that — and I know you have because I looked at your
 4 schedule and I know you've had an incredible travel
 5 schedule and been out talking to people — is to listen
 6 to the leaders, listen to the people who have been out
 7 there getting the job done, and not just concentrating on
 8 one or two incidents that come along that blow everything
 9 out of proportion.
 10 We had that at Orlando. It was not a
 11 happy day when I would have to take a company commander
 12 who had a very distinguished Navy career of many, many
 13 years, to captain's mast — or, worse, to court-martial
 14 — for an offense that he or she committed against a
 15 young person that had to do with emotions rather than
 16 what was the right thing to do.
 17 But these issues should not be blown out
 18 of proportion. They should be taken in context over the
 19 big picture — what's the right thing to do? If we're
 20 going to maintain an all-volunteer force, which I think
 21 most people would like to maintain, I think it's
 22 important that we listen to people; that we let the
 23 leaders, whom we have entrusted with the lives of these

1 young people, run their organizations the way they should
 2 be run, and not get caught up in one or two incidents and
 3 get it all blown out of proportion.
 4 That's the worst thing, I think. It just
 5 gets — Well, I think we've seen that. We see that a lot
 6 every day. So I think that's — keeping it in
 7 perspective is the important thing.
 8 You know, you get somebody like Admiral
 9 Zumwalt coming this afternoon, with his many, many years
 10 of being able to look back and see what has happened.
 11 And thanks to him and his forward thinking, we are where
 12 we are today on a lot of those issues with his Z-gram 116
 13 and all the issues that he brought forward for women. It
 14 wouldn't have happened — and at great personal risk,
 15 which we all take.
 16 MS. POPE: Thanks, Kathy.
 17 You know, Anita, for fear of the
 18 commissioners and the staff bombarding me, I would like
 19 — Not that we need any more paper, but one of the things
 20 that the committee hasn't seen was the Standing
 21 Committee's report that looked at Navy and Marine Corps.
 22 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: That's important, yeah.
 23 MS. POPE: And I think I have a copy, but

1 — I'll bring it in. At least the Executive Summary
 2 piece. Not that I want any more paper either, but I
 3 think for the record —
 4 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Sure.
 5 MS. POPE: — what the recommendations
 6 were and what were some of the changes —
 7 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Yes.
 8 MS. POPE: — and the history behind some
 9 of those changes.
 10 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: That would be important.
 11 MS. POPE: Yeah. Because the committee
 12 hasn't seen it, nor the Executive Summary.
 13 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Okay.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Barbara,
 15 are you trying to say you're going to have to build
 16 another room on your house because you have so much in
 17 the way of boxes?
 18 DR. CANTOR: We all have that information.
 19 MS. POPE: I also don't want to admit that
 20 I've only got six of the seven notebooks. I don't know
 21 which — I don't want another notebook.
 22 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I've got
 23 eight. I'll loan you one.

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1 MS. POPE: Oh, okay. Maybe that's what
2 happened.
3 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: It really is a fact that
4 many of us who worked on these issues over the years
5 would keep copies of things, of course; and frequently
6 when the next committee came around — next study group
7 — we were the only ones who had copies and you had to go
8 digging in your basement or your attic.
9 MS. POPE: That's where mine is.
10 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Yeah.
11 MS. POPE: But it's there.
12 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Dig it out and lend it
13 to someone, so...
14 MR. PANG: Well, I think the Standing
15 Committee's report is an active document, though. I
16 mean, you know, there was a whole series — okay? —
17 MS. POPE: Right.
18 MR. PANG: — of findings that occurred on
19 your watch. And then after you left, I came aboard.
20 MS. POPE: You had to implement.
21 MR. PANG: Yeah. And we were — And we
22 had meetings, you know, all along the way. So I think a
23 report on the current status of the — on each issue

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1 would be helpful.
2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I've got
3 two questions. I'll ask my one now — or do you want
4 them both?
5 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Sure.
6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: One of the
7 things that has occurred today, if you go to Great Lakes,
8 you see an expanded PT program — physical fitness
9 program. You see events such as Battle Stations now and
10 the like, and it appears that the rigor of recruit
11 training has in fact increased.
12 The question that I would ask is that,
13 based on your experience at Orlando in the first and the
14 like, first of all, is this increased rigor something you
15 support? And then, secondly, if it is, why do you
16 believe that it took this long to get to that increased
17 rigor?
18 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: First of all, I do
19 support it. I think that — I'm in the health care
20 business right now and I've always been a big believer in
21 improving the physical fitness of our young people, which
22 has been atrocious over the years — I think we will all
23 admit that — from our lifestyles.

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1 We always wished we had had more time at
2 Orlando — first of all, we had great weather all the
3 time, so you could be outside — to do more in that area.
4 And I was delighted to see the incremental increases over
5 the years in especially recruit training, and then the
6 emphasis on the active duty forces on keeping physically
7 fit, on sticking with a schedule, and helping people get
8 physically fit.
9 There's only so much you can do when you
10 are handed a young person who has already gone through
11 however many years it is — eighteen, nineteen years —
12 if he or she is not up to the standard.
13 Why has it taken so long? Probably
14 because it took so long for the active duty forces to
15 come to grips with what they wanted to do physical
16 fitness-wise.
17 We went through a lot of cycles. We went
18 through, "Gee, we really should be looking at getting
19 more physically fit. What should we do about it?" And
20 it was a learning experience and a lot of people had
21 many, many years of ingrained attitudes about being
22 physically fit.
23 You know, what does that mean? Some

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1 services could do it more easily than others because of
2 the nature of their work and what they do. But I think
3 it was just another issue that was on the plate. I don't
4 think there was any reason why we didn't do it.
5 We went through some years where we had a
6 heavy hand on the physical fitness side — you know, if
7 you weren't meeting the standards, you know, you had so
8 much time and something would happen to you — other
9 years where it wasn't as important.
10 And we always looked to the leaders again.
11 It was very hard to tell a young twenty-year-old that he
12 or she had to be physically fit when he would look around
13 and see a flag officer or a general officer who, I should
14 say, was not physically fit. I mean, let's face it, your
15 seniors were your examples.
16 And you weren't going to kid them; they
17 knew. They said, "Come on. You know, what do I have to
18 do to get away with as little as I have to? That's what
19 I'll do." But then you had as you went through the years
20 the physical fitness awareness in the whole country and
21 how important that is, and I think that that's important.
22 The other problem we had with Orlando was
23 the time, how much time you had for the training. It

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1 used to be twelve weeks. When I was there, it was nine
2 weeks — and tried to cram in all the things you had to
3 teach or you wanted to teach those young people in that
4 period of time and still get them out and work on
5 physical fitness or whatever else it was, was an
6 incredible dilemma. It still is, probably.
7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Could you
8 elaborate on that? From your experience, how long do you
9 think Navy basic training should be at Recruit Training?
10 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Oh, gosh.
11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I mean, you
12 just talked about nine to twelve weeks.
13 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Yeah. We didn't have
14 enough time in nine weeks back in '91 to '93. In fact,
15 I'm not even sure — What is it today, the exact...
16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: About nine weeks.
17 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Is it still nine?
18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: It's still
19 nine.
20 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: I don't think it has
21 increased. Yeah.
22 I really truly feel that there should be
23 more time added. If we didn't have enough time, you

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1 know, those years ago and you're still adding things to
2 the curriculum — Plus, now they're leading up to the
3 final test there at boot camp, which I think it's
4 fantastic that they've added that portion to it.
5 But there's so many things to cram in that
6 I think that if you take more time in the beginning, the
7 rewards in the end will be even better. I couldn't
8 really give you a time, General —
9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay. But
10 that —
11 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: — because I don't know
12 the exact curriculum or would have to take a look at it.
13 But we were pressed. We were stressed.
14 And if you got a change in the schedule — God forbid,
15 you know, something came along and you had to figure out
16 what to do.
17 And at any one time we had 7,000 young
18 people there, you know, each trying to — with their own
19 schedule, trying to get through, and sometimes it was a
20 logistics nightmare. And sometimes corners had to be cut
21 on a physical training day or you cut a class short or
22 something like that due to extraordinary circumstances.
23 But I still believe that the end product

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1 was fantastic — you know, what the staff was able to do
 2 in that short period of time — and I will go to my
 3 grave, you know, saluting them — and all the services.
 4 You know, how they get everybody through in such a short
 5 period of time is just incredible.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: That really
 7 leads to the second question — and it's back to you, I
 8 think, very nicely articulated that all of this has been
 9 an evolutionary process that has occurred. I guess you
 10 could say apparently it's worked, but is this the way we
 11 should continue?
 12 Because we're faced with those who say we
 13 should get back or those who say we should go all the way
 14 now. Is the evolutionary process the best way to
 15 approach this? Or what would you suggest as we fully
 16 integrate women into the armed forces?
 17 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Well, I always think
 18 sometimes it's good to get a healthy dose of
 19 revolutionary, too — and having been involved in a
 20 couple of those myself during my career.
 21 I think sometimes it does take — Well,
 22 let me say it this way. I think it is too bad that
 23 sometimes it takes an incident, if you will, to bring

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1 something to attention.
 2 I think that perhaps if we had a better
 3 system of — I don't want to use the word "inspecting" in
 4 the harsh sense of the word, but of keeping up with what
 5 is going on and listening to people — then perhaps some
 6 of these things wouldn't slip through the cracks. We
 7 would know what is going on.
 8 You know, people read the paper and they
 9 say, "How did this" — Not only how did it happen — you
 10 can see how it happened — but why didn't we know about
 11 it? And that's what we always said when incidents came
 12 up right under our noses.
 13 I am a firm believer in full integration.
 14 Always have been, always will be. I think that there is
 15 — and having been a victim myself of being told I
 16 couldn't do something simply because of my gender or what
 17 someone thought the culture would allow, which was
 18 offensive to me and made me mad as hell — to the point
 19 where I went outside the organization and took it through
 20 the courts — I think that there is no way that men and
 21 women can be full partners in doing what needs to be done
 22 in the military if you don't allow them to be full
 23 partners and work together.

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1 I think that if there is something missing
 2 — and this Commission will have a much better picture of
 3 it than any of us because you've been looking at it in
 4 the microcosm — if there's something missing in any of
 5 the services' training programs or — I know you're
 6 looking beyond that and exactly what's happening in the
 7 services — that will help contribute to preparing the
 8 young men and women to work together even though it may
 9 not happen today.
 10 I think part of our problem as we saw at
 11 training was that we opened up the ships in the late
 12 seventies to women but we still didn't do anything in the
 13 beginning to teach them in boot camp. We went for a
 14 number of years before the light dawned that, "Well, what
 15 do you mean they don't know how to work together?" Well,
 16 because we never taught them.
 17 And it wasn't anyone's fault. I don't
 18 know that anyone ever came up with that idea before. It
 19 just sort of "couldn't see the forest for the trees." I
 20 remember when the group from the — the study group at
 21 the time went down to Orlando, and they came back and
 22 they said, "You know, it was right in front of our faces."
 23 We have men and women who are collocated but we're not

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1 teaching them how to work together in the beginning."
 2 So you have to go back to the beginning,
 3 but then you need to monitor along the way. And I think
 4 a lot of our — I'll use that word "monitoring" instead
 5 of "inspecting." I think some of that sometimes falls by
 6 the wayside and needs to be watched a lot more carefully.
 7 Questions need to be asked.
 8 People need to be in place who are
 9 respected and for whom people would not feel afraid to go
 10 and talk to. We had many folks and we'd go out and talk
 11 to the women, going around the world. I did a lot of
 12 travelling when I was a Special Assistant for Women's
 13 Policy and we'd go in — And then I worked with DACOWITS
 14 for years and I would go on all their field trips for
 15 three years. And you'd stand in front of a group and
 16 you'd ask, "Well, if you know something had been going on
 17 for years, why didn't anyone say anything?" Well, of
 18 course, they were afraid to bring it up.
 19 So you need some kind of a safe mechanism
 20 for people to go to — similar to the Air Force, had a —
 21 I thought had a good system in their — for people to go
 22 to and they seemed to feel safer than they did in some of
 23 the — at least in the Navy. Maybe because it was

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1 bigger.
 2 I don't know, Fred, what the answer was.
 3 But I think one of the answers was you trained your
 4 folks. You took the time; you spent the money to train
 5 people for that sort of an activity and they were
 6 respected and they were trusted.
 7 We had many people who were able to trust
 8 people like chaplains, thank goodness, and went to
 9 chaplains and told them what the problems were. But we
 10 didn't have a real — we didn't really have a real system
 11 in place and you sort of found out about these things as
 12 — when they blew up in your face. And then you said,
 13 "Well, gee, how did that happen?"
 14 And I truly felt that one of the reasons
 15 some of the things happened was because we didn't teach
 16 people from the beginning what was right and what was
 17 wrong and what was expected of them, and then we didn't
 18 monitor it effectively enough along the way. We learned
 19 a lot of lessons, as it should be.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 21 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: But whether — how far
 22 it should go or how many more they can do, at least in
 23 the training side, I'm not sure. Again, it has a lot to

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1 do with the time and how much time do they have to do it.
 2 I'm sure you probably heard some of that from some of the
 3 folks there. Everybody always wants more time to do
 4 things. But it's asking an awful lot in just nine weeks.
 5 It really is.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Captain, one of the
 8 specific requirements in our statute is to ascertain the
 9 rationale for changes that were made from time to time in
 10 the method of basic training. And we have discovered
 11 that at least as far as the documentation from the
 12 services, there is a lack of a rationale. Orders would
 13 go out, but orders don't necessarily explain themselves.
 14 And our historical research has also been
 15 — kind of come up dry on some of these questions, so
 16 we're happy to have people who were there, who can
 17 perhaps illuminate the reasons for the changes a little
 18 better.
 19 I'm glad to know, however, that Barbara
 20 has all the answers in her attic.
 21 MS. POPE: Well, but a document that we
 22 ought to have, yeah.
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah.

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1 But you've referred a couple of times to
2 problems on the ships and so on and so forth, and for the
3 record, essentially, I wonder if you could specify the
4 nature of those problems.

5 I'm sitting here wondering — are we
6 talking about unwelcome sexual advances? Are we talking
7 about excessively welcomed sex? Are we talking about a
8 mere inability to do the same task together because
9 different people have different approaches to it?

10 Can you tell me more specifically what was
11 the nature of the problems that led people to conclude
12 that gender-integrated boot camp would solve those
13 problems?

14 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Well, as far as being
15 able to do the job, I don't remember any documentation
16 that showed that they weren't able to do the job. Even
17 if we hadn't trained them how to do it together, the
18 young people were always clever enough to come up with
19 solutions to work problems because they're smart, and
20 they are because we recruited smart young people.

21 The problems I was referring to were
22 getting along with each other. The unwelcome sexual
23 advances are in many cases just abhorrent behavior by

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1 Navy, still sitting there when the groups were dispersing
2 and this DACOWITS member suggested that I go and chat
3 with them. She said, "You know, they're from the USS
4 SAFEGUARD, where we were this morning, and there seems to
5 be some problems on the ship."

6 Well, I was surprised to hear that since
7 we thought everything was terrific on the SAFEGUARD, and
8 I said, "Fine, I'll be happy to do that." She said,
9 "We'd like to know by the end of the day what you find
10 out," and I said, "Fine."

11 So I went over and — My senior enlisted
12 advisor at the time was with me and she and I went over
13 and talked to the women. And there were some enlisted
14 women and the two officers from the ship, and they said,
15 "Things are not well on our ship. In fact, they're
16 pretty bad."

17 And so I let them talk for a few moments,
18 and from what they were telling me, things really were
19 pretty bad. There were some allegations of very, very
20 serious abuse — starting with the commanding officer,
21 the command master chief — against the women in the
22 command, which apparently, according to them, had been
23 going on for a couple of years.

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1 some people in senior positions, and I'll refer right
2 away to the USS SAFEGUARD incident while I was in Hawaii.

3 We only learned about the issues aboard
4 SAFEGUARD, which involved the commanding officer — Are
5 you all familiar with the case?

6 This is what precipitated one of the study
7 — All the study groups are always precipitated by some
8 incident, as it turns out. Nobody ever just said, "Let's
9 have a study group" — because it's the right thing to do
10 — "We haven't look at it in ten years," which probably
11 we should have in retrospect.

12 In 1987, as a result of a DACOWITS trip to
13 the Far East — I was stationed in Hawaii as Commanding
14 Officer of the Personal Support Activity and essentially
15 the senior line woman officer in the area — and DACOWITS
16 came through and wanted to show off, you know, all the
17 activities — the Navy and Marine Corps activities — and
18 Air Force and Army — all of us, in fact, were there —
19 and we were really the host. The Navy was the host, so I
20 was sort of in charge of what was going on.

21 We lined up a schedule of places we wanted
22 to take the DACOWITS to, and one of the ships, the new —
23 not "new" ship, but a ship that was gender-integrated —

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1 So, of course, I immediately —
2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Can I just break in?
3 What kind of abuse? What was the issue?

4 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: One of the issues was
5 that the commanding officer, in one incident when the
6 ship was deployed, was forcing some of his crew members
7 to go to some of the clubs in the Philippines and either
8 participate in or witness sexual acts that were occurring
9 there.

10 He offered to sell his — the female
11 members of his crew to a passing Korean ship.

12 Now, these things are all in the record.
13 The commanding officer was taken to nonjudicial
14 punishment.

15 Some of the women had been subjected to
16 sexual advances by senior members of the crew. They
17 claimed that they had been prohibited from — been given
18 low marks on evaluations because they were not putting
19 forth sexual favors for the crew members — and no one
20 had ever said anything about it. A couple of the women
21 were undergoing psychiatric evaluations because of this
22 treatment — et cetera, et cetera.

23 So the bottom line was, of course, we took

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1 was a diving-and-salvage ship, the USS SAFEGUARD, a small
2 ship.

3 And the SAFEGUARD had won every award
4 there was to win. To the outside world and to the
5 public, this was the world's greatest small ship, doing
6 its job. Everybody was happy. Great, we'll take them
7 aboard this ship and let them talk with the young men and
8 women — how they do their jobs, the diving and the
9 salvage — it was tough work — and see how that's going.

10 So that was arranged, and the men and
11 women on the committee went to the ship and spoke with
12 the young people with the leaders, et cetera, and
13 everything appeared to be great.

14 The same day, we had arranged, as is the
15 custom with DACOWITS, for them to meet with small groups
16 of women in a site that was — In this case, I believe it
17 was the officers' club in Pearl Harbor. And there were a
18 hundred or so women from various commands in small
19 groups. The DACOWITS members would go around and sit and
20 just chat with them for a while.

21 And at the conclusion of this session,
22 which lasted about an hour, one of the DACOWITS members
23 came up to me. And there was still a group of women, all

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1 the information to our seniors. We kept the DACOWITS
2 informed of what was happening, and, of course, we
3 discovered that this had been going on for a couple of
4 years. The commanding officer — who had come up through
5 the ranks, was former enlisted, had a sterling, sterling
6 record — it turns out, was condoning all of it; in fact,
7 participating in a lot of this behavior.

8 But the question was — how did it go that
9 long? And, of course, the answer was, the women were
10 afraid to tell anyone. Small ship. You know,
11 retribution, et cetera, et cetera. No one to go to —
12 they felt they could go to until this commission came
13 along and they figured, "Well, what the heck. You know,
14 we've taken all we're going to take and we're just going
15 to talk about it."

16 That incident was, of course, a major,
17 major embarrassment to the Navy and really was a shock
18 because people thought, "Well, here's a ship that has a
19 sterling record, they've done everything right, but
20 there's some things going on. I wonder how many others
21 there are out there and what else is happening."

22 And as I remember, that was the impetus
23 for some people to start asking questions and for some

1 answers to start coming in about, "Well, maybe there's
 2 some things going on in other places we need to look at."
 3 And to the Navy's credit, it was the
 4 impetus for calling together a study group to look at
 5 issues on women in the Navy, and I was sent back to
 6 Washington to participate in that study group. And as a
 7 result of it, one of the issues — We decided to look at
 8 everything, as much as we could, and go back to the
 9 beginning, and one of the beginnings was boot camp.
 10 And a group went down to Orlando, and
 11 that's where the lightning struck that maybe we need to
 12 really go back to the beginning and start instilling some
 13 of this — They're not going through training together.
 14 They're collocated but they're not going together.
 15 They're not able to work out problems together. They're
 16 not able to, you know, do activities together, that sort
 17 of thing.
 18 In fact, it was pretty strict. God forbid
 19 them if we found they were, you know, even talking to one
 20 another. They couldn't even talk to one another, which I
 21 thought was pretty absurd. That's just not the way to do
 22 it. And so that was the beginning of how that came
 23 about.

1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Fred?
 2 MR. PANG: You know, I think one of the
 3 foundations or the foundation for practically all
 4 decisions — and I hope that they are — all decisions
 5 with regard to the military, either done by the military
 6 leadership itself — made by the military leadership
 7 itself or the civilian leadership — the foundation for
 8 any of these decisions has to be, you know, improving the
 9 readiness of the forces, you know.
 10 So I trust that a lot of these changes
 11 that you've observed over time, you know, were, in your
 12 view, founded on this notion of improving readiness
 13 because I think that's what you're getting at.
 14 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Absolutely.
 15 MR. PANG: Having said that, I think, you
 16 know, the way the services go about improving the
 17 readiness of their forces really is based on how they
 18 operate, what their missions are.
 19 I think with regard to the Air Force and
 20 the Navy, you know, with the repeal of the "combat
 21 exclusion" laws and the integration of women as full
 22 partners really in those two services — because there
 23 are only a very few positions that are closed to women in

1 those two services — that they have a rationale, you
 2 know — a good rationale — for the way they go about
 3 conducting basic training.
 4 That's my view, you know, as a
 5 commissioner in the business that we've conducted thus
 6 far.
 7 On the other hand, you have the Army and
 8 the Marine Corps which have large elements of their
 9 forces that are closed to women.
 10 So, therefore, the Army's adopted the
 11 rationale in its basic training that it will have mixed
 12 — it will have gender-integrated training for the combat
 13 support and combat service support elements of their
 14 forces, and with regard to the positions that are closed
 15 to women, that they will conduct basic training
 16 separately, and then later on, you know, in follow-on
 17 types of training, integrate.
 18 And the Marine Corps has that philosophy
 19 where you have basic training separated, but then you
 20 come together, you know, at the end of basic training.
 21 What is your kind of view on that? I
 22 mean, you know, given the fact that, you know, these
 23 decisions that the services have made really are kind of,

1 I hope, founded — and I trust founded on improving the
 2 readiness of their forces?
 3 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: And that's where it
 4 should be, obviously. But keeping in mind that even in
 5 the —
 6 MR. PANG: You know, what I'm trying to
 7 get at, I guess, is, you know, I've come to the
 8 conclusion that there is no "one size fits all" — okay?
 9 — I mean, kind of, so that's kind of where I'm coming
 10 from.
 11 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Well, there may be not
 12 one size that fits all, Fred, but there's one size that
 13 fits all when it comes to contributing and being full-
 14 fledged citizens of this country. I do not support
 15 excluding someone on the basis of gender.
 16 MR. PANG: Even from the combat arms?
 17 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: No, sir. I never will.
 18 And another reason I say that on a
 19 practical note is — and maybe Bob can attest to this —
 20 their members of the Army or the Marine Corps, whatever
 21 service — and we went through that in the Navy and we
 22 still are in the submarine community — that they're
 23 never going to see women, that's not true.

1 They're not going to stay on that
 2 submarine their entire careers. They're going to come
 3 off those ships; they're going to work in offices;
 4 they're going to work in recruiting. And if they have
 5 never had the chance to work with women, to be told how
 6 to do it, they're going to be at a distinct disadvantage.
 7 And there are probably some MOS's still in
 8 the Army that are now — I have a stepson who is in
 9 artillery out at Fort Sill and there are still some areas
 10 that — I think that they're still — they aren't in.
 11 But they're not going to be staying in
 12 their little world their entire twenty years or, God
 13 forbid, thirty years, and never work with women. That's
 14 going to happen somewhere along the line.
 15 And if we don't take them through
 16 something at least in the beginning and a refresher as
 17 they go along, when they come ashore or come out of that
 18 area, they're going to be at a real disadvantage, and I
 19 feel sorry for them and it will be our fault for not
 20 teaching them.
 21 MR. PANG: So your —
 22 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: I've heard the same
 23 argument about the submariners. But I'll tell you, the

1 company commanders that I had at Orlando who came from
 2 the submarine community came up to me and thanked me for
 3 being there.
 4 They said, "You know, I have never worked
 5 with my peers who are women" — and now they are working
 6 with master chiefs and senior chiefs who are women, who
 7 are very, very sharp; they all have to be to be company
 8 commanders — and they said, "I never even hardly saw one
 9 and I am so much better for this experience. Even if the
 10 Navy never opens submarines and I never see one on my
 11 submarine, I have learned so much and I have missed so
 12 much."
 13 And I thought that was great — that they
 14 learned. These are senior people — E-9's and E-8's.
 15 MR. PANG: So your view is that basic
 16 training ought to be gender-integrated from day one —
 17 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Yes.
 18 MR. PANG: — regardless of the services,
 19 and —
 20 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: I think so.
 21 MR. PANG: — all services should be
 22 gender-integrated.
 23 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Or some way of doing it

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1 so that — I think that those people who don't get that
2 in the beginning, even though I know it's a small number,
3 are really at a disadvantage because they are going to be
4 working with the opposite sex at some time.

5 And what happens if we decide — if the
6 decision is made — of course, you always have a period
7 of time where something happens and you didn't prepare
8 someone for it because you didn't know it was going to
9 happen or you weren't expecting it — when the time comes
10 to open, if it does — if you decide, "Well" — the Army
11 decides, "Okay, let's open this MOS next year," or
12 whatever? You've got to put those people through some
13 kind of an assimilation situation.

14 We did that in the Navy when we opened the
15 ships. And we had some programs that we instituted —
16 and I think to the Navy's credit — not just for the
17 members of the ship's crew, but for the family members,
18 so they would know what was going to happen or what
19 wasn't going to happen and what the expectation was.

20 But I really have a concern because I
21 heard about it from people who had never been there,
22 having gone through the boot camp experience. The senior
23 leaders, they said, "You know, I'm at a real disadvantage

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1 Just from my own experience, knowing that
2 until recently going to a service academy as a young
3 officer, except — was generally not considered to be
4 career-enhancing. You were away from your warfare
5 specialty.

6 Now, the Army and the Air Force very
7 cleverly took care of this situation by making it career-
8 enhancing. Sending officers on to school, some for their
9 Ph.D.'s, which you would never see in the Navy, for the
10 warriors. I mean, they couldn't afford the time, for one
11 thing, but we didn't make the time. And I'm glad you
12 brought that up because that always was a pet peeve of
13 mine.

14 On the enlisted side, it was always the
15 cream-of-the-crop, and I can vouch for that. I don't
16 know what you saw at Great Lakes, but — and if it's
17 changed, I'm sorry to hear that. But there was no
18 question these folks were the best. No question
19 whatsoever.

20 And the officer side was not always the
21 case. You did not get the front-runners in general. It
22 usually was an aberration if someone was there. It might
23 have been for a family reason or something — because we

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1 here. I don't know how to act."

2 And these are thirty-year-old men. And
3 they were so grateful for that boot camp experience; not
4 just because they got to work with the young people,
5 which was fantastic and they loved, but because they got
6 to work with their peers — and not to mention having a
7 commanding officer who was a female. I mean, they had
8 never thought they would have that — but to work with
9 their peers who were E-8's and E-9's, and most of whom
10 had had sea duty also — not on the submarines,
11 obviously, but on other ships — were able to educate
12 them, and they said they learned more in that two-year
13 tour than, you know — So I thought that was kind of an
14 interesting take. I hadn't thought about that before, so
15 — But, yes, I do feel...

16 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: We're
17 running out of time here but I thought I'd ask quickly.
18 You commented more than a couple times on the leadership
19 role in this and I just wonder.

20 One of my observations — and to be
21 perfectly blunt, primarily with the Navy — is it does
22 not appear that the Navy, although they may be trying to
23 now — but it does not appear that the Navy has invested

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1 just didn't give it the credit — we didn't give it the
2 credit for promotions.

3 And having sat on some promotion boards
4 and listening to the feeling of my peers who were the
5 warriors, that was not regarded as highly as some other
6 tours ashore that they could have had. You know, the
7 question was — "Why is he" — it usually was a "he" —
8 you know, "Why is he teaching at Great Lakes?"

9 And it's too bad because many of these
10 people were wonderful teachers and instructors and they
11 loved doing that and they had so much to give, but then
12 if they weren't going to be rewarded for it, it makes it
13 tough.

14 So it's a self-fulfilling prophesy, and I
15 hope that's changed a little bit, but I don't know.

16 MS. POPE: I want to follow-on with that.
17 And I know we're getting in a time — We've got General
18 Reimer. But — And I need to know whether this is a fair
19 statement —

20 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Okay.

21 MS. POPE: — or whether it's my personal
22 statement. And that is, that — because Navy is so
23 technical, that personnel — manpower — putting

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1 their very best to the training centers. And maybe you
2 saw it different in Orlando. Maybe you felt you got the
3 absolute best to be the trainers in your command. I
4 don't know.

5 But it just didn't hit me at Great Lakes
6 that that was the case from talking to some of the
7 trainers and their expressing their attitudes, and it was
8 especially clear to me at the officer level. And I
9 wonder if you feel that perhaps you had it better back
10 then and maybe I just saw an anomaly or whether that is a
11 fair assessment.

12 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: I think we have — the
13 Navy has always — always — on the enlisted side, put
14 the very best — cream-of-the-crop — in the training
15 situation, whether it was in the schoolhouse instructing
16 or at the boot camps or advanced training, whatever it
17 was.

18 And I think the reason that you may have
19 seen or even the perception or the reality is that it was
20 not considered career-enhancing on the officer side.
21 People were not rewarded for it as compared to — I'll
22 just take the example — to throw this out — the service
23 academies.

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1 integrated, you know — the issue of integration aside,
2 but training all the way up the pipeline — that manpower
3 has not always been in the top, even — I would say even
4 top three issues.

5 Not only for pipeline and promotions, but
6 it's the — it was the exception, not the rule, that
7 manpower was, I would say, even in the top three of Navy
8 issues, which I think you were alluding to a little bit
9 on why you didn't hear about some of the issues.

10 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Yeah. I think that's
11 probably a fair perception. It wasn't anybody trying to
12 be, you know, nasty or mean, but — and you know that
13 from your position with the Secretariat. I mean, I think
14 it has a lot to do with the nature of what we do.

15 Just compare it with the Air Force. You
16 know, it's very — the Air Force doesn't deploy, and the
17 Air Force has a wonderful — I always thought had
18 incredible, incredible "people" programs — they always
19 did — and I just thought they were great.

20 And some great facilities, too, Fred,
21 but...

22 But the "people" programs, because they
23 invested the time. But again, they have to turn around

1 and say, "Hey. Well, they don't deploy." Well, sure
 2 they don't.
 3 MR. PANG: They do now.
 4 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Well, they do now, this
 5 is true.
 6 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: The times
 7 are a changin'.
 8 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: But they always did have
 9 great — You invested in the people.
 10 MS. POPE: Please get the head-nodding for
 11 the reporter.
 12 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: And I was always very
 13 envious, always checking out what the Air Force was
 14 doing, too, and saying, "Gee, I wish we could do that.
 15 Can't we do a little bit of that somehow?" And I always
 16 thought that was good. And I think they were really the
 17 leaders in those "people" programs when I look back on
 18 it.
 19 Now, the Marine Corps, of course, takes
 20 care of their people, there's no question. I have a
 21 brother-in-law who is a Marine Corps lieutenant colonel,
 22 but — and having grown up in the Army — I guess I have
 23 a representative from everyone — and I was an Army brat

1 — but, yeah, I think so, Barbara. I think that's a fair
 2 — without meaning it to be, you know nasty or the Navy
 3 didn't take care of its people, which certainly was not
 4 the case.
 5 We learned an awful lot along the years,
 6 along the way, and I think we learned that you have to
 7 make that investment in the people. And not just because
 8 it's an all-volunteer force, because there are other
 9 options for them. They don't have to stick around, and
 10 you want them to stay and do well. You also want them to
 11 work together in a cooperative effort, so — Tough
 12 issues.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I just want
 14 to clarify a response you made to Fred's questioning.
 15 And I understood the responses that you believe that
 16 basic training should be integrated, but do you believe
 17 — In response to his question, I thought you said you
 18 believe that women should also be in the combat arms, and
 19 I would just follow through. Does that mean infantry,
 20 armor, that type of thing?
 21 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Yes, sir.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Is that
 23 what you're saying?

1 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Absolutely.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Could you
 3 —
 4 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: I sure do.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Could you
 6 tell me why?
 7 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Because I don't feel —
 8 First of all, I think we need their talents; we need
 9 their smarts. We need people who are smart and know what
 10 they're doing and want to be there, regardless of whether
 11 they're men or women or we think it's the right thing to
 12 do or we're upset about women being blown up, taken
 13 prisoners of war, coming home in body bags. We've heard
 14 all that stuff. It's already happened, and it's sad that
 15 anyone has to go through that.
 16 It used to pain me — just pain me a great
 17 deal on my recruiting tours — to have to go out and
 18 explain to some very bright young woman — example, in
 19 the Navy — why she couldn't come in and be in the
 20 nuclear power program. I mean, how absurd is that?
 21 Number one in her class in high school, brilliant in math
 22 and science. "I'm sorry, you can't come into our program
 23 because of your genes." And I don't mean J-E-A-N-S's.

1 We are shooting ourselves in the foot by
 2 not taking advantage of people who are bright, who are
 3 smart, who want to do the job, because they happen to be
 4 a female — because she happens to be a female. And I
 5 can't — just thinking of so many people that we weren't
 6 able to bring in and train and work with and take
 7 advantage of how smart they are for — not just because I
 8 think it's great and women should do everything, but
 9 because of the mission.
 10 I really think that there is a — It's
 11 just not the right thing. I don't think we can afford
 12 that anymore, for one thing. I really don't. And I just
 13 think that just as there are some women who probably
 14 can't do some things, there are men who can't do some
 15 things. Does that mean we should exclude the women
 16 because we think they can't or we don't think it's the
 17 right thing to do or it goes against our personal
 18 beliefs, our religion, our culture, our whatever? I
 19 don't think so. I haven't found the argument yet that
 20 can convince me to that — that that should be how it is.
 21 So — And I think a lot of people look at
 22 some of the jobs that are done now, at the way they used
 23 to be done. So many things now are done — that used to

1 require, you know, some physical activity and they think,
 2 "Well, maybe women can't do that." My experience has
 3 always been they always figured out a way to do it
 4 together, with their male counterparts, which I thought
 5 was very, very clever.
 6 But just to exclude someone — I've been
 7 there. I've been excluded because I was a female. It
 8 had nothing to do with physical activity or getting shot
 9 at or killed, or it had to do with how smart I was and I
 10 knew I could do the job — and they said, "No, you can't
 11 do it because you're a female." That doesn't fly, just
 12 doesn't fly.
 13 So I think that if you're going to say
 14 that women cannot participate to the full measure, which
 15 includes giving their life for their country, then what's
 16 to say that they can't participate in some other activity
 17 in the country to be a good citizen? I think it comes
 18 down to that. I really do.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. We are right up on
 21 the hour and unfortunately you are followed by a Chief of
 22 Staff, so we have to be time-sensitive this morning.
 23 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: There you go.

1 Absolutely.
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: But we thank you very
 3 much for coming.
 4 CAPTAIN BRUYERE: Well, thank you all. I
 5 appreciate the opportunity.
 6 (A brief recess was taken.)
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: General Reimer, we thank
 8 you very much for coming to visit with the Congressional
 9 Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related
 10 Issues. As you see, we are both video-taping and doing a
 11 written transcript, and we —
 12 GENERAL REIMER: I will have no
 13 deniability, then.
 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And so our usual process
 15 is to hear, you know, initial thoughts from the witness,
 16 and then we simply go around the table until the
 17 commissioners' questions are exhausted. And we hope that
 18 there will be time enough this morning to exhaust
 19 ourselves with the United States Army.
 20 We have made a number of trips to Army
 21 facilities — I can say around the world because a couple
 22 of us have just returned from Tuzla — and I would like
 23 you to know that we have had exemplary cooperation from

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1 everybody. And speaking for myself, at least, and I'm
2 sure for the other commissioners, we've been tremendously
3 impressed with your Army.

4 So we are delighted to have you here today
5 and look forward to what you have to say.

6 GENERAL REIMER: Thank you, Madam Chairman
7 and members of the Commission. Let me just say first of
8 all, thank you. Thank you for what you're doing. This
9 is a very important issue and we appreciate you taking
10 your time and your efforts to really help us in this area
11 because I think it's absolutely critical.

12 And I look forward to the format as you've
13 outlined, Madam Chairman. I'll kind of talk a little
14 bit. I'll use, as Army people do, a number of slides to
15 kind of take you through that, but I will not take up the
16 entire time because I want to hear what is on your mind
17 and answer some of the questions that you may have.

18 I know you're going to spend the full day
19 with the Army. As I told somebody, when it's all over,
20 we're going to ask you to raise your right hand. We're
21 having a little trouble recruiting and this will improve
22 the quality a great deal if we can get all of you.

23 I thank you, though, for taking the time

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1 Georgia, during the Vietnam build-up. So I have some
2 appreciation for the training area that we're going to
3 talk a little bit about today. I've commanded units from
4 the company to the division level, and I've had other
5 staff jobs that have been very helpful to me in terms of
6 what I've done.

7 (General Reimer offered a slide
8 presentation, "The United States Army, Building Winning
9 Teams," concurrent with the following discussion.)

10 GENERAL REIMER: I would simply start out
11 by saying that this is a time of great change in the
12 United States Army and it's a time of change in our
13 world.

14 I was flying back from Minnesota one time
15 after being on leave and I read a booklet that the
16 airlines put out, and there was an article there by the
17 CEO in which the CEO was talking about change. And he
18 said, "The real challenge for leadership is managing
19 change. Managing the status quo is not much of a
20 challenge at all," and he's absolutely right. It's not
21 only a challenge, but it's a wonderful opportunity for
22 all of us.

23 And so what I would like to do in my short

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1 to go see our soldiers. I know you've been in places
2 like Fort Hood, Fort Jackson, and as you said, Bosnia. I
3 just was over in Bosnia for Christmas myself, and this
4 was my fourth visit over there in Bosnia and I was struck
5 by the improvements that I see across-the-board. Not
6 only in the quality of life for our soldiers, but also
7 what they are doing over there and the great progress
8 they're making.

9 It was best, I think, illustrated — to
10 me, anyway — by a female specialist who was serving over
11 there. And she had crossed the Sava River in December of
12 '95 and she was back now with the First CAV, and she
13 talked about the progress that she had seen during that
14 three-year period.

15 And she said, "You know, when we came over
16 here initially, you didn't see any children. And if you
17 saw children, they were very concerned. They were very
18 distrustful. They were very scared." And she said, "Now
19 we come back in December of '98. The children are in the
20 villages and the towns. They're playing in the fields
21 and the streets, and they come up to you and they say
22 'thank you.' And they've got a smile on their face and
23 things have turned completely around."

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1 remarks here is to take you through change from my
2 perspective and change in the United States Army because
3 I think it's very significant. Some of this will be "old
4 hat" to many of you because you've been associated with
5 the military for a long time and I understand that. But
6 I think it's important to see this in its totality so
7 that we can have a common baseline to start from in our
8 discussions and our dialogue about the United States
9 Army.

10 [Army Mission and Responsibilities]

11 Where I always start is at the very front,
12 and that is, the mission of the United States Army. And
13 I'm going to try to see if I can get this about right.

14 That mission is basically to help win the
15 nation's wars. That's what we're all about, and if you
16 don't accept that, then you probably don't need the
17 United States Army. I mean, we've done that for 224
18 years and hopefully we'll continue to do that as long as
19 this nation exists.

20 That was brought home to me, I guess, in
21 May of '62, when MacArthur spoke to our class at West
22 Point and he talked about the profession. He said,
23 "Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the

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1 And I thought, what a great way to measure
2 the contributions that our soldiers have made over there
3 in the three years of service and I think that really
4 illustrates what they're all about and the tremendous job
5 that they're doing over there.

6 I thought maybe it might be helpful to
7 tell you a little bit about myself, without going into a
8 bio; but I think you need to know my perspective and
9 where I come from, probably because of where I've been.

10 I'm probably like most people who joined
11 the Army in early nineteen-sixties. I come from a small
12 town in Oklahoma, had no military experience, had no idea
13 what this military life was all about. None of my
14 relatives had served in the military.

15 The Army educated me, trained me, gave me
16 wonderful opportunities, and certainly let me be all I
17 could be — some would argue, put me more than where I
18 should be — but at least it's been a great experience
19 and a great love affair that I've had with the Army for
20 almost thirty-seven years.

21 During that time, I've had the opportunity
22 to and the high honor to command soldiers at all levels,
23 and I commanded a basic training company at Fort Benning,

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1 sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for
2 victory, that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed."

3 That is a very powerful statement of our
4 profession and that's why our profession is so different,
5 and that's why our profession is built on teamwork and
6 being able to get the most out of each of the individual
7 soldiers.

8 We have to do that because we're a much
9 smaller Army. Some people say, "Well, you're the largest
10 Army in the world." Absolutely not. We're barely in the
11 top ten. And so we have to make sure we get the most out
12 of every soldier — active, guard and reserve, regardless
13 of race or gender.

14 [The Times—They are a Changin']

15 There's an awful lot going on and I think
16 it's best captured by Buffalo Springfield when they said,
17 "There's something happening here. What it is, we ain't
18 exactly clear..." — and I think that is very true.

19 There is something happening in the Army. There's
20 something happening in the world, and it's probably the
21 most fundamental change that we as a nation have
22 undergone since the end of the Cold War.

23 [Our Strategy Has Changed]

1 It starts with the strategy. The strategy
 2 has changed dramatically. When I joined the Army, the
 3 strategy was containment of the Soviet threat. We
 4 basically understood the threat very well. We were a
 5 threat-based force.
 6 Most of us, when we weren't in Vietnam,
 7 spent our time going back and forth to Germany and trying
 8 to figure out how we were going to fight the Soviet
 9 threat. We spent a lot of time walking the battlefields
 10 or the potential battlefields in Germany and we had
 11 fought those battles many times in our minds. We
 12 understood how we were going to do that.
 13 In a lot of ways, that was a very
 14 predictable world and it was a very dangerous world, but
 15 it was easy for us to design our training system. We
 16 knew what we had to train against. The threat was there,
 17 and so when you were in the Army, you trained against
 18 that Soviet threat.
 19 When you modernized and when you had to go
 20 to Congress and say, "We need a new tank because of the
 21 threat," it was very understandable. Everybody
 22 understood that. When we wrote our doctrine, we wrote
 23 our doctrine against the Soviet threat, and that was the

1 way we did things and we became very comfortable in doing
 2 that.
 3 And I spent from '62 to '89 — twenty-
 4 seven years — in that Army, and then all of a sudden the
 5 Wall came down and changed our world dramatically. We
 6 found instead of a strategy of containment, we have now a
 7 strategy of engagement and enlargement. And when you
 8 stopped to think about that, that's almost 180 degrees
 9 from the strategy that we had before 1989.
 10 And engagement-and-enlargement strategy
 11 required us to do a lot of things that we had never done
 12 before and we were thrown into what we called a "new
 13 world order," which was long on "new" and short on
 14 "order."
 15 It was hard for us to justify some of the
 16 things that we needed and we get a lot of people that
 17 say, "Well, why do you need to invest all of this in your
 18 trained-and-ready forces today? Why don't you just stop
 19 and get ready for the future, because that's where the
 20 real threat's going to be?"
 21 And so you're continually working your way
 22 through those issues at the same time that you're
 23 downsizing the Army, and I'm going to talk about that and

1 the impact on that in just a minute.
 2 [The National Military Strategy...]
 3 That national security strategy translated
 4 into a national military strategy, which I think is
 5 terribly important. It's not the old Cold War national
 6 military strategy. It isn't oriented on the Soviet
 7 threat. It's based upon three pillars, to be able to
 8 respond to crises wherever they occur. And basically
 9 we're talking about threats and crises like Korea or
 10 Southwest Asia, and we're doing a lot of that nowadays.
 11 We know how to respond. We know how to
 12 project power. It's about shaping the environment,
 13 making the world safer for our children and
 14 grandchildren. It's the things that you saw the people
 15 — our soldiers in Bosnia — doing. That's shaping the
 16 environment.
 17 It's shaping the environment to work with
 18 the new countries coming out of eastern and central
 19 Europe, to try and develop them into a more stable
 20 region, a more democratic society, so that hopefully we
 21 can push war off to the right.
 22 In my mind, it's a very valid mission;
 23 yet, it's not clearly understood. We have just spent —

1 the Joint Chiefs — eight hours, testifying in front of
 2 the Congress on readiness. Nobody has asked the
 3 fundamental question — readiness for what? There has
 4 been almost zero discussion about this national military
 5 strategy.
 6 That's what the Army is putting its
 7 efforts against — this national military strategy. We
 8 must be able to execute that national military strategy.
 9 When you went over to visit our soldiers in the First
 10 CAV, they were doing what they were asked to do over
 11 there in Bosnia. There's a very valid mission.
 12 But if you look at their readiness reports
 13 that they send in, they continue to go down in readiness
 14 because our reporting systems are of the Cold War
 15 reporting systems and do not necessarily reflect what
 16 we're doing today.
 17 Another important part of this strategy is
 18 to prepare for an uncertain future, to be able to change
 19 the Army in a fundamental way that is much different than
 20 what it has ever been — the most fundamental change
 21 since the end of World War II, I think — and that we're
 22 going to talk about a little bit because that's terribly
 23 important to the issue that you all are wrestling with in

1 terms of how we do that.
 2 So this is the strategy — the national
 3 military strategy that we have been spending a lot of
 4 time since 1989 executing and developing. And I don't
 5 want to tell you that I think we have it all correct, but
 6 I think we certainly understand it a lot more and we have
 7 a much better view of how we want to try to continue to
 8 do that.
 9 [Strategy to Army Reality...]
 10 What does that mean? Well, there are a
 11 couple of things. One is that we built the force that
 12 you see today and that's still out there in the field
 13 against a Cold War threat, against the Soviet threat, and
 14 it was basically built with divisions who were very good
 15 in terms of being able to take on the Soviet threat corps
 16 and units that go into those type of organizations.
 17 But what we found ourselves doing is
 18 executing what you see on the right, the bottom right
 19 side. Different type of environment. And as we talked
 20 about in the CINC's conference here the last couple of
 21 days, we have a force structure and a requirements
 22 mismatch.
 23 And so the units you saw in Bosnia,

1 although they come and they're made up of the bases from
 2 — that is from the First CAV, we have picked leaders
 3 from other units throughout the Army. And so when we
 4 talk about the PERSTEMPO issue here and the leader-
 5 intensive business that we're in, that's part of the
 6 reason.
 7 We don't have units that meet quite nicely
 8 the new threats that we face, and so we're having to do a
 9 lot of supplementing the units that we already have to
 10 meet this new threat that we show in the bottom part.
 11 The important thing here is to look at
 12 what we did between — In the forty years of the Cold
 13 War, we used the military about ten times. Now, in the
 14 last eight or nine years, we have used the military I
 15 think thirty-two times.
 16 So this is a much busier world we find
 17 ourselves in. And so we're not only smaller, we've not
 18 only changed the strategy, but we're also very busy, and
 19 that, I think, has impacted on the issues that we're
 20 going to talk about today.
 21 [We've Transformed]
 22 This is what the physical part of change
 23 has meant to us. If you look, you can see it's been a

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1 tremendous change. We have reduced the size of the Army
2 by over 600,000 people. That's active, guard and
3 reserve, and DA civilians. That's a lot of people to
4 take out of any organization.

5 We have closed over 700 bases worldwide.
6 And most of those have been over there in Europe and
7 there have been some here in the Continental United
8 States, but it's been a significant amount of change that
9 has occurred.

10 Our divisional units, which are really the
11 coin of the realm for the Army, have gone from eighteen
12 active component and ten reserve component divisions to
13 ten active component and eight National Guard divisions.
14 So it's been from twenty-eight to eighteen.

15 You can see how we've changed the
16 demographics of our force — or the stationing of our
17 force, I should say. Basically, we were a forward-
18 deployed force during the Cold War. Most of our troops
19 were over there in Europe, with 32 percent. In 1989, we
20 had 216,000 people over there — soldiers. Now we have a
21 little less than 65,000. Somewhere between 60- and
22 65,000. We have gone from a forward-deployed to power-
23 of-rejection force. And again, that's a tremendous

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1 amount of change that has occurred.

2 And so I'd just simply say that this is
3 the change that has taken place. I would argue that we
4 have done that change very well, but we have not done it
5 perfectly.

6 If you go back and look at previous times
7 where we've attempted to change the Army and you go back
8 after World War II, we took the force down from 12
9 million soldiers that served, to — five years later — a
10 force that we could not even put a trained-and-ready task
11 force in Korea, and we had Task Force Smith that went in
12 there.

13 The reason it was a task force was because
14 we took soldiers from other units and put them all
15 together. They were not trained-and-ready. They were
16 brave Americans, but the system had failed them. And I
17 think we've learned the lessons of Task Force Smith and
18 you don't see that happening today. There's not a "Task
19 Force Smith" on the horizon. We will never put soldiers
20 in harm's way without making sure they're properly
21 trained and ready to do the job.

22 The other one, the drawdown that I've been
23 involved in, was after the Vietnam War. We basically

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1 took the force down about the same amount as we took it
2 down now — from '75 to '79 — and basically what we had
3 at that point in time was a hollow Army.

4 A hollow Army was more than just a
5 shortage of people. It was hollow in a lot of other ways
6 and probably even more significant than just a shortage
7 of people. We had borrowed equipment from other
8 theaters. We hadn't replaced that. We had people
9 shortages that were there. We had quality indicators
10 that were not high. We had a lot of borrowed military
11 manpower doing other things and it was just not a good
12 time. But most importantly, we had lost our bearings.
13 Our morale compass had failed us and we had to get that
14 back after Vietnam.

15 And so I really argue that there are a lot
16 that goes into the revolution of military affairs, but
17 one of the most important things, I think, is the morale
18 revolution that took place after the Vietnam War.

19 Those of us who had been through that
20 said, "We don't want this again," and we have done
21 everything humanly possible to try to keep the Army —
22 and the other services I'm sure are the same way — on
23 the right track and keep our bearings straight.

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1 [Lessons from Aberdeen...]

2 But as I've said, we've done this drawdown
3 well but not perfectly. The most glaring example of
4 where we failed, I guess, is — or the most visible
5 example is probably Aberdeen. And I'd like to talk just
6 a little bit about Aberdeen because I was very much at
7 the center of that issue and it's very much at the heart
8 of what we're talking about here today.

9 The issue at Aberdeen was very complex, I
10 guess, in some ways, but, yet, it's very simple. It
11 simply boils down to — this was a leadership failure.
12 This was not about sexual misconduct and sexual
13 harassment. It was — Those were the symptoms, but that
14 was not the problem that I was trying to solve in my mind
15 and in my heart.

16 It was a problem that we had in that we
17 had leaders who had failed us, leaders who had broken the
18 special trust and confidence that the United States
19 places in them, the American people places in them — and
20 that is, to be able to take care of our sons and
21 daughters.

22 And what happened to us in Aberdeen was
23 that we had a whole chain of command, starting at the

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1 company commander level, go bad, and we were unable to
2 pick that up through our safety nets and exit interviews
3 and those type of things because it was self-contained.
4 And the other part was that we drove
5 TRADOC down too low. In our effort to keep as many
6 soldiers in the foxholes, to put them in the TOE units,
7 we had taken too much out of TRADOC and we had cut that
8 too deep.

9 We also found as we got into Aberdeen that
10 we had to go back and look at the values that people have
11 when they come into the service. We don't accept people
12 from America that come from a homogenous value base
13 anymore, and so we had to go back and take a look at that
14 effort.

15 And so there were a lot of things that
16 came out of Aberdeen that were all under the umbrella of
17 sexual harassment and sexual misconduct, probably, in a
18 lot of ways and got you into the gender-integrated
19 training, but it had more to do with leadership; it had
20 more to do with the values of our soldiers. And some of
21 the things that we did reflect, I think, our analysis of
22 what had gone wrong there.

23 That brings me, though, to the most

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1 difficult part of this change — is the human dimension
2 part of change. The physical part — taking the people
3 out, reducing the structure, the infrastructure, changing
4 your strategy and the way you operate — is relatively
5 simple compared to the human aspect of change. That is
6 much, much more difficult. It takes more time. It is
7 extremely leader-intensive, but that is what we are faced
8 with and that's what we've got to do.

9 [Readiness is the Key]

10 The key to all of what we're doing here in
11 terms of reshaping the force and moving in the future is
12 the readiness of the force. As I mentioned earlier, that
13 is what the Army exists to do — is to help win the
14 nation's wars and execute the national military strategy
15 — and so we've spent a lot of time on readiness.

16 This slide, I think as much as anything,
17 reflects the fact that we are a busier Army than we've
18 ever been. We've got 144,000 soldiers overseas at any
19 one time. About a hundred-thousand — or a little bit
20 more than that, I guess — 120- or 110,000 — are
21 stationed overseas in Europe and in the Pacific, and
22 another twenty-so-thousand are deployed from home station
23 over there at any one given time.

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1 That has been running as high as almost
2 40,000 on a daily basis, but it's starting to come down
3 to somewhere around 28- — 25-, 28,000 on a daily basis
4 deployed away from home station.

5 But it just illustrates how busy we truly
6 are in terms of what's going on.

7 We're doing this with a smaller Army. The
8 480,000 in-strength that we have, as I said, is one of
9 the lowest in-strengths that we've had since I've been in
10 the service.

11 [Quality Soldiers]

12 And so in this equation in terms of the
13 solution that — the soldiers that we have — And I just
14 want to show you a little bit about the demographics of
15 the soldiers. You'll see those peeled back for you in a
16 lot of different ways here today as we talk to you about
17 the Army issues, but I think you can tell here that
18 soldiers have changed.

19 We have about 67 percent — And I
20 apologize for some of this. I'll give you a copy of
21 these slides. But some of this you can't see.

22 67 percent of our Army is married today.
23 We enlist soldiers — or we recruit soldiers, we reenlist

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1 families. Families are a very important part of what
2 we're doing here and they tie directly into the gender-
3 integrated issue.

4 We've got a lot of dual military couples.
5 We've got single soldier parents.

6 We reflect the make-up of America to a
7 large extent. We're a little bit short in terms of
8 Hispanics and some of the other minorities, but I think
9 we really do reflect America. And my issue is the Army
10 really is America. In a lot of ways, it can be the best
11 part of America and I think is the best part of America.

12 But the point I try to make here is that
13 each and every one of those soldiers has a meaningful job
14 and we have got to make sure that we leverage their
15 tremendous capabilities.

16 [Gender-Integrated Training...]

17 This brings us to gender-integrated
18 training and why we believe that gender-integrated
19 training is the right way to go. We think it enhances
20 the readiness of the total force. It basically provides
21 the foundation for teamwork.

22 Teamwork is terribly important and you
23 have to start it early on. I have visited a number of

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1 basic training units and have always been impressed with
2 the teamwork that has come out of those experiences. And
3 I think back on my time as a basic training company
4 commander and it was teamwork that got us through.

5 I was a commander when McNamara pulled his
6 Project 100,000, and I'm sure that many of you remember
7 what was involved in the Project 100,000. It was a way
8 of getting the numbers up, but there was great concerns
9 maybe about the quality of those individuals.

10 I can tell you from my experience they
11 were wonderful, highly-motivated people who wanted to do
12 well, and if you could build that teamwork in there, you
13 could get something going.

14 But I remember we took the end-of-the-
15 cycle tests and there were four versions that you could
16 take. I knew good and well we could not handle four
17 different versions with this group. They were not
18 capable of handling that many different things at once.
19 And so what we did is we concentrated on one version, and
20 it was all or nothing. Luckily we hit that version.

21 They picked that version. That's the one our people went
22 through and they did very well.

23 But that was just an experiment at that

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1 particular point in time that I think we learned a lot
2 from. And what I'm saying, though, is the teamwork was
3 really important then; it's really important now.

4 The shared experiences. I think the
5 shared experiences, more than anything else, builds the
6 confidence that you have to have — the idea that you and
7 I have gone through the same training. And when we go to
8 our units, we don't look at each other and say, "Well,
9 you got over easy because you went to a different
10 training experience than I did."

11 I think that is terribly important. If
12 we're going to serve together in units, we need to have a
13 common, shared experience. One of the most important
14 things that I have ever done in my career is go to the
15 Ranger school. Not because I've ever served in a Ranger
16 unit, but because it taught me a lot about Denny Reimer
17 and it gave me the confidence that I could do things that
18 I didn't think I could do.

19 And that's what we've got to be able to do
20 — is to challenge each one of our soldiers to gain that
21 confidence and gain that trust in their fellow soldier,
22 the idea that we've gone through this together and that
23 we have bonded as a team member.

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1 It focuses on the strength of all members.
2 I was watching a unit at Fort Jackson go through and they
3 had this obstacle course where they go through in a team
4 of four, and I think there were two females and two
5 males.

6 And as I watched them go through there, my
7 reaction was — I could take four tackles for the Dallas
8 Cowboys or the Washington Redskins or whoever you want in
9 the NFL. They couldn't have handled that obstacle course
10 as well as that team, because what they got from that
11 teamwork and what they got from that mix was the strength
12 of each of those individuals. You needed somebody light
13 to get up there early and to get up there fast and get
14 the thing started.

15 And so you teach them to learn to work
16 together as a team from the very start. And I think that
17 the best place to do that, obviously, is start it
18 initially. You're going to have to bring this together.
19 When males and females serve together in units, you're
20 going to have to develop that cohesion somewhere.

21 In my mind, the best place to do it and
22 the best place to start is initial entry training. If
23 you wait and give it to the units, they have already got

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1 a platter-full. The 300 percent deployment increase that
2 we have, the fact that this is a leader-intensive
3 environment and many of the leaders in some of our units
4 are gone for 179 days, serving in Bosnia, makes that a
5 little bit too much to put on their plate.

6 And besides, you've got the best
7 supervision, the best ratio of supervisors to those being
8 supervised, at the Basic Combat Training.

9 And so I firmly believe that that's the
10 place for the Army to start this process and recognize
11 the fact that this is not the draft Army. Fifteen
12 percent of the force are females and we need to recognize
13 that and leverage the tremendous strengths that they
14 bring to our Army.

15 [The Army Vision]

16 Finally, let me just switch into the other
17 part of the change process and talk a little bit about
18 where we're going and, again, why I think this gender-
19 integrated training is very important.

20 This is simply a vision statement that
21 we've used for the last four years. This is where we're
22 trying to head. We are, I think, the world's best Army
23 today. We are a full-spectrum force. The Army, more

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1 than any other service, is the full-spectrum force of
 2 choice.
 3 Full spectrum runs from — all the way
 4 from winning the nation's wars to deterring wars, working
 5 with our allies and providing military support to
 6 civilian authorities. We bring a tremendous capability
 7 in all of those areas and are terribly important.
 8 Trained and ready for victory is the most
 9 important thing we do during peacetime. I tell all of
 10 our commanders to train against your most difficult
 11 mission — high-intensity combat. If you go someplace
 12 else, we will give you the time necessary to train for
 13 that particular mission.
 14 The total force — active, guard and
 15 reserve — 54 percent of the Army is in the reserve
 16 components today. This is more than 20 percent higher
 17 than any other service. It's the highest percentage of
 18 the force that we've had in the reserve component since
 19 the end of World War II.
 20 We're going to use our reserve components
 21 more. We've got to make sure that we do that and you
 22 have the same issue in terms of male-females. The Army
 23 guard is made up of 10 percent females. The United

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1 States Army Reserve is 24 percent females.
 2 Soldiers and civilians. We don't want to
 3 lose track of the tremendous contributions our civilians
 4 provide. We talk an awful lot about soldiers, but the
 5 civilians are equally important.
 6 Values-based organization. It was
 7 important for us to highlight this because of — This was
 8 before — We made this up before Aberdeen, but we were
 9 already concerned about the fact that values were
 10 changing in society and we had to make sure that they
 11 understood that these values are important.
 12 If you don't instill values in your
 13 soldiers, you don't get people like Sergeant Shugart and
 14 Gordon who would fast-roped to sudden death because there
 15 was a soldier down there that needed help. And it's that
 16 teamwork and it's that value, it's that selfless service
 17 that you instill in these people or in the soldiers that
 18 makes them different.
 19 Integral part of the joint team. I think
 20 it's terribly important to recognize that of all those
 21 operations that we have participated in, they've all been
 22 joint operations. Seldom do we go it alone. And so we
 23 are delighted that we have the world's best Air Force,

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1 Navy and Marine Corps. If it was anything different, I
 2 would be really worried. And so what we have to do is to
 3 break down the barriers that separate us and work
 4 together.
 5 The third bullet there is our biggest
 6 challenge today — is to make sure that the soldiers of
 7 the Twenty-First Century have the best equipment in the
 8 world. We have it today. Balancing that with limited
 9 resources is always difficult.
 10 Able to respond to our nation's needs. We
 11 had a big argument going on in the Army when we started
 12 in the early nineties about whether we just do the big
 13 ones, whether we're here for World War III or do we
 14 really have a role to play.
 15 The Army, for 224 years, has done what the
 16 nation has asked us to do. We helped settle the West.
 17 The Corps of Engineers developed the waterways, the
 18 lakes, the dams that we have. I think we have to do
 19 that, particularly with this national military strategy
 20 shaping. And again, it requires everybody to
 21 participate.
 22 And then the last one just simply says
 23 that change is part of our life and it's going to

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1 continue to be a part of our life for as long as I can
 2 see, and so we have to grow comfortable with change and
 3 our leaders have to grow comfortable with change.
 4 And so that's what that vision statement
 5 is all about.
 6 [We're Still Changing...]
 7 This is the process in which we're
 8 changing. It's a rather complex process and I don't mean
 9 to take you through it today, except to basically say we
 10 have a change process. What we have tried to do is to
 11 visualize the world as we see it in the 2020 time frame,
 12 and to try and put a mark on the wall as to what we want
 13 the Army to look like in 2020.
 14 We've tried to project ourselves out at
 15 2020 and then look back to 1998 and 1999 and connect the
 16 dots. We've looked at ourselves and said, "What are our
 17 core competencies? What are the things that make the
 18 Army what it is today?" And we've come up with six. We
 19 call them the six imperatives, and they're listed there
 20 on that slide.
 21 Basically, leader development — the Army
 22 will always be about leader development. You have to
 23 have it.

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1 The modern equipment — to make sure that
 2 the soldiers have equipment they need.
 3 The right force mix — the heavy, light,
 4 special operating forces to make sure that those forces
 5 exist.
 6 Quality people — the underpinning of that
 7 "quality people" is absolutely the underpinning of the
 8 force. And the quality, the contribution that females
 9 make in terms of quality indicators just cannot be
 10 overstated. They run about 13 percent higher in terms of
 11 grad alphas — in the recruiting language, means high
 12 school graduate, category I, II, III-A — than the males
 13 do. They run higher in high school diploma graduates.
 14 They bring a certain quality to the force, and so it's
 15 very important to leverage that tremendous strength.
 16 The tough, realistic training, and then,
 17 of course, the doctrine, which is our play book — how we
 18 do things.
 19 And the idea is to take those six
 20 imperatives and keep those synchronized over time, and
 21 we've done that through a process of change called Force
 22 21, with experimentations along the way to make sure we
 23 get it right.

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1 Experimentations are critical because when
 2 you start tinkering with something as important as the
 3 national defense, you need to get it right. The second
 4 thing is that this is a very conservative organization
 5 and you've got to convince the Army that this is the
 6 right way to go.
 7 So this is a change process that I think
 8 has been fairly well thought through and is serving us
 9 well and we will continue on that.
 10 [The United States Army-Constants]
 11 And I'd just close with this last chart
 12 that says there are a number of constants we don't ever
 13 want to change. One is the purpose of the Army, and it
 14 goes back to MacArthur's talk about this special
 15 profession that we all — those of us in the military are
 16 a part of.
 17 We don't want to change our values. Those
 18 have been constant for us throughout the history of our
 19 Army. And the fact that the Army must be a reflection of
 20 the people, and that's why having 54 percent and having
 21 an armory in every little village and city is terribly
 22 important, I think, to the nation.
 23 And so those are the constants that won't

1 change, and it's just as important to concentrate on
 2 those as it is to concentrate on what will change.
 3 Madam Chairman, that is my overview of the
 4 Army and where we are and where we're going, and now I
 5 look forward to talking about what you'd like to talk
 6 about.
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much.
 8 That was an extremely informative presentation and we are
 9 very grateful again for your time in coming here today.
 10 As I mentioned, we typically just go
 11 around the table until our questions are exhausted, and I
 12 usually lead off. And I found your talk very
 13 stimulating, so I hope my question is going to be
 14 coherent to you —
 15 GENERAL REIMER: It will be.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — because it is
 17 stimulated by what you've been saying.
 18 I am wondering where the design of basic
 19 training fits in terms of all of the intellectual ferment
 20 that is evidently going on in the Army.
 21 My question is, as you look at the
 22 missions that the Army is being called upon to carry out
 23 and as you look at all the other factors that determine

1 how the Army operates, what are the inputs into the
 2 design of basic training?
 3 Who's got a finger on the pulse of the
 4 product? Is there some formal way of measuring and
 5 evaluating those things in the Army?
 6 And I will tell you I've gotten kind of
 7 ambiguous responses to this type of question in the past,
 8 which is that, you know, "we like basic training," and
 9 "no, we're not particularly studying it," but, yet, it's
 10 evident that it's changing from time to time.
 11 And so my question is, does the Army have
 12 a formal process in place to evaluate and implement
 13 changes and then evaluate again?
 14 GENERAL REIMER: Very good question. And
 15 let me take a shot at it and then also ask you — maybe
 16 you'll want to talk with somebody following behind me in
 17 that area because I'm going to identify him as one of the
 18 key people.
 19 I would say that the question you ask is
 20 the foundation of our change process. It really is
 21 important as we try to build these teams, that we start
 22 it out properly and that we get the teamwork at basic
 23 training right.

1 I don't know whether any of you have ever
 2 attended a basic training graduation. Some of you
 3 probably have. What a wonderful, wonderful experience.
 4 And when I was doing it at that point in time, I was just
 5 — You look forward to graduation.
 6 Graduation occurred at — At that time, we
 7 were doing basic training eight weeks and every eight
 8 weeks you had a graduation ceremony. It made all the
 9 long hours worthwhile as parents came from — in my case,
 10 to Fort Benning, Georgia, all the way from California.
 11 And they'd come up to you with tears in their eyes and
 12 say, "I don't know what you've done, but you've changed
 13 our son in a very meaningful way and you've made him a
 14 part of a team."
 15 And so I think that the question that you
 16 ask about how is basic training structured and how do we
 17 incorporate changes as we go along is very fundamental to
 18 it.
 19 The purpose, in my mind, of basic training
 20 is to take civilians and make them into soldiers. And my
 21 admiration and respect for the drill sergeants that do
 22 that, that accomplish that minor miracle in a short
 23 period of time, is just absolutely as high as it could

1 possibly be.
 2 I have watched them and they do a
 3 wonderful job. I mean, they'll bring people in that
 4 can't tell their left foot from their right foot. One
 5 week later, they've got them marching in formation, and
 6 eight weeks later, they're looking like soldiers and
 7 standing tall and looking proud.
 8 And so it's the foundation of the Army;
 9 it's to build a team, give them the confidence that's
 10 necessary. How we adjust that over time is probably one
 11 of the lessons that came out of Aberdeen. As we looked
 12 at what happened to us in Aberdeen, we said, "Where were
 13 we on this? What happened?" And as I said, it was a
 14 leadership failure.
 15 My frame of reference was as a company
 16 commander. And I went back to my time as a company
 17 commander and I said, "How did this happen without the
 18 company commander and the first sergeant and the drill
 19 sergeants knowing?"
 20 Well, it happened because they were all in
 21 cahoots, and that's why. It was self-contained and we
 22 couldn't break through that thing. We should have.
 23 We've taken too many of the upper-level supervisors out.

1 And so we went back and said, "Let's get a
 2 more formal process," and we strengthened some of the
 3 organizational design to make sure that we were executing
 4 what we said we would execute.
 5 And then we created what I think was very
 6 important and maybe sometimes gets lost in the Aberdeen
 7 follow-on actions, but we had created a three-star —
 8 Lieutenant General Joe Bolt — who has the responsibility
 9 to tie all this together. And we said, "We want you to
 10 work a closer link here between Recruiting Command and
 11 Initial Entry Training and see if we can't figure out
 12 what has happened to us."
 13 What we found is — in the aftermath of
 14 Aberdeen, was somewhat predictable, and I spent a lot of
 15 time going around drill sergeants, trying to assure them
 16 that I understood that the vast majority of them — 99
 17 percent-plus — were still the same outstanding soldiers
 18 that I served with in the early or the mid — late
 19 sixties.
 20 But we found that there was an
 21 institutional reaction to that. And we fell back and we
 22 let some of the standards slip and we weren't as tough
 23 maybe on our soldiers, and so as we started to go back

1 there and do a formal evaluation of that process. We
 2 said, "Let's go back and get the standards back.
 3 Standards are terribly important."
 4 I charged the NCO corps, which is really
 5 the backbone of our Army and the thing that makes our
 6 Army different than any other Army in the world — I
 7 said, "You're the keeper of the standards. Those are the
 8 crown jewels. You can't let them slip."
 9 And so I think the formal process is the
 10 review that's done by TRADOC on a regular basis. We
 11 monitor attrition, we monitor how that's all working, but
 12 creating that lieutenant general's position up there
 13 gives us a more formal process. And his sole job is
 14 to evaluate what's going on in AIT; does it meet the
 15 needs of the people in the field.
 16 And, of course, you get the formal
 17 feedback or the informal feedback from the field. As I
 18 go around and talk to NCO's and officers in the field, I
 19 continually ask them, "What's the quality of the people
 20 coming out of the training base?" And you start to get
 21 some feel there.
 22 It's anecdotal evidence more than anything
 23 else, but that coupled with the formal process that we

1 have in TRADOC to evaluate that with the lieutenant
 2 general in charge and actually working for the four-star
 3 Training and Doctrine commander, John Abrams — I think
 4 that process is much more — is much stronger now than it
 5 was in the past.

6 But I think that your question gets to the
 7 heart of what we're trying to do: build these teams,
 8 start early, and make sure that the standards don't slip;
 9 that everybody feels good about what they've done. And
 10 if they meet those standards, then we pass them off the
 11 field as a trained and ready soldier.

12 Now, I don't know whether that completely
 13 answers your question or not, but I certainly think it's
 14 a fundamental question. If I didn't answer it, give me
 15 another shot.

16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, I'm very happy with
 17 your answer and I'll pass on. Thank you.

18 GENERAL REIMER: Okay.

19 MR. PANG: Chief, you know, it's good to
 20 see you again. You know, thank you for a very, very
 21 impressive presentation. And I just want to join the
 22 Chair in commending the Army for the outstanding support
 23 that, you know, the Commission has received from all of

1 anything broken in the Army policy because, as you said,
 2 it was based upon good order and discipline and it let
 3 commanders have a lot of flexibility in this particular
 4 area.

5 And I think if the Army — the Army's
 6 position was we don't need to change. But as you start
 7 to get into joint commands and joint organizations, what
 8 you find is you bring services with different policies —
 9 And I can't comment one way or the other on the goodness
 10 or the problems with those particular policies because it
 11 depends upon the service culture, but as you get into the
 12 joint arena, that's where the problem was surfacing.

13 Okay. The Army has this one policy, the
 14 Navy maybe has another one; the Air Force and the Marines
 15 may have slightly different. And so there was an attempt
 16 to try to bring a uniform approach to that and I think it
 17 was primarily to meet the needs of the joint commanders.
 18 That's where evidently the concern was surfaced.

19 My view is the same as yours: there wasn't
 20 anything wrong with the Army's; it wasn't broken. Why do
 21 we want to fix it? On the other hand, I understand the
 22 joint perspective.

23 What we have done and what the Secretary

1 your people.

2 And I just want to single out one
 3 individual, Lieutenant Colonel Brenda Harris. She's done
 4 a terrific job on our staff here, you know, supporting
 5 us.

6 You know, we were charged by Congress to
 7 look into three areas, and I think you've talked about
 8 two of them very, very well, with regard to basic
 9 training generally and preparing people to become
 10 soldiers and the way you've trained men and women. The
 11 third area that we were asked to look at had to do with
 12 good order and discipline.

13 GENERAL REIMER: Yeah.

14 MR. PANG: You know, it's something that,
 15 you know, I always felt was, you know, something that we
 16 always looked to the military to give you guidance on and
 17 to really be in charge of, because good order and
 18 discipline to me means, you know, the effect that has on
 19 unit cohesion, and by extension, readiness.

20 I know that DoD recently came out with a
 21 policy decision that has a significant effect on the
 22 Army, and I'll be frank with you, I was a bit concerned
 23 about it because the question I had to ask myself —

1 of Defense has done is given us all an opportunity to
 2 come back with the implementing instructions. We have
 3 again based our policy on good order and discipline.

4 There's been recent articles written on
 5 that, and quite frankly, I don't want to see the
 6 opportunity for a company commander and his first
 7 sergeant to have a beer together at night and to get to
 8 know each other a little bit better — I don't want to
 9 see that go off of the table and I don't think it will.

10 I think the way we've written our rules will be okay.
 11 On the other hand, there should not be a
 12 company commander who is dating somebody enlisted in the
 13 same chain of command. We did not think that was a major
 14 problem. You don't have colonels dating spec-4's, that
 15 type of thing. The age difference is a little bit too
 16 great.

17 Our intent here is to continue to focus on
 18 good order and discipline as the backbone of our policy.
 19 I don't want anybody to think that there's a cast society
 20 in the Army. I mean, our enlisted soldiers are just as
 21 good as the officers in every respect and I don't want
 22 them to get the label of second-class citizen. And quite
 23 frankly, that's a possibility that could happen unless we

1 okay? — as a commissioner, because we were asked to
 2 comment on this, is what was broken, you know, in the
 3 Army, that needed fixing?

4 And I couldn't quite get a good answer on
 5 it and I think this Commission needs to be able to answer
 6 that question somehow or another. You know, is it
 7 broken, requiring fixing, or was it pretty much okay and
 8 there's some other reason to effect change? And I was
 9 just wondering what your thoughts were with regard to
 10 that.

11 GENERAL REIMER: First of all, Fred, let
 12 me just say thanks for your nice comments about our
 13 people. And you see why I always say soldiers are our
 14 credentials. Every time we put our soldiers out in front
 15 to interface with your Commission, Congress or the media,
 16 they do a great job. I just wish I was half as good as
 17 most of those soldiers are in terms of explaining the
 18 Army's story. We'd have a lot better image, I'm sure.
 19 But they just do a wonderful job and I appreciate your
 20 complimenting them.

21 As far as the fraternization policy, my
 22 view on that was that from an Army perspective, the Army
 23 policy worked very well. I did not think that there was

1 do this right.

2 And so we're basing it on good order and
 3 discipline. The chain of command has to be solid. You
 4 can't have favoritism within the chain of command, and
 5 every time you do, you get into major problems.

6 So we're trying to walk the line to comply
 7 with what the Secretary of Defense has put out, and quite
 8 frankly, it's to get this joint perspective. There's a
 9 little bit of difference in all of our policies.

10 But ours will be based on good order and
 11 discipline and we think that's the only thing that makes
 12 sense to our people; because our officers and our NCO's
 13 stand side-by-side in those foxholes, and for us to send
 14 any signal that says that one life is more important than
 15 the other is absolutely the wrong thing for us to send
 16 and I don't want a fraternization policy that does that.

17 MR. PANG: Yeah. You know, Chief, I agree
 18 with you. You know, this question is not for you but I
 19 think this is a question we're then going to have to ask
 20 OSD and others, I mean, because the same — the question
 21 is, you know, do you really have major problems in the
 22 joint commands or not. I don't know.

23 I mean, you know, are there tens, hundreds

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1 or thousands of cases where you might have had a
 2 fraternization incident where you had an officer of one
 3 service, you know, engaged with an enlisted person of
 4 another, that was over-familiar? And if that was a
 5 problem, I mean, you know, how serious was it?
 6 Because my sense is — from your answer —
 7 that this would have — this policy change, if not
 8 implemented correctly, could have a very, very
 9 significant detrimental effect on the Army.
 10 GENERAL REIMER: I don't know. I think
 11 that's a very valid question and I don't know how much of
 12 a concern it was. There were a number of — a couple of
 13 highly visible cases that got, I think, maybe blown out
 14 of proportion a little bit there, but if you go back to
 15 — just down there where the rubber meets the road for
 16 us, in a tank, you have a four-soldier crew — four-man
 17 crew. You might have a lieutenant platoon leader and
 18 three enlisted personnel.
 19 Now, those people become very close. They
 20 have to. They live on the battlefield and they live and
 21 die based upon their belief in each other as a team. If
 22 we do anything to separate that — and it's certainly not
 23 our intent with this fraternization policy to do that —

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1 then we've done something wrong.
 2 We will continue to insist on good order
 3 and discipline and I think we can continue to build the
 4 cohesion that we have to but keep the emphasis on good
 5 order and discipline.
 6 MR. PANG: Thank you, sir.
 7 GENERAL REIMER: It's a very important
 8 point, though.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Good morning,
 10 sir.
 11 GENERAL REIMER: Good morning.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I just have one
 13 question. I assume that General Bolt's job is, in fact,
 14 not temporary. I mean, it will be an ongoing thing.
 15 GENERAL REIMER: No, we appointed him as a
 16 permanent three-star and my intent is to clearly keep
 17 that three-star together.
 18 The change that I'd like to see happen —
 19 and we didn't take it this far initially, but the change
 20 is to try to bring Recruiting Command totally underneath
 21 his command because I want to do the analysis as to the
 22 attrition in IET: what do we need to do differently in
 23 recruiting?

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1 Right now, most of our attrition is
 2 because of previous medical conditions and that type of
 3 thing. There needs to be a more — a closer link there
 4 and we need to bring Recruiting Command underneath that.
 5 What we have now established is a coordination line, not
 6 a command line, and we will eventually bring that under
 7 command line but I wanted to take it a step at a time.
 8 But my intent — and obviously somebody
 9 else may have different ideas and changes down the road,
 10 but my intent is to leave that very much a permanent
 11 part. We used to have it and I think it was something,
 12 again, as we were forced to address the issue of more
 13 requirements than we had general officers. We've cut
 14 that out under the title of efficiencies, but it was the
 15 wrong thing to do and Aberdeen said "let's bring it
 16 back."
 17 So I intend to make it permanent.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Thanks.
 19 I'd like to have a copy of your slides, if
 20 I could.
 21 GENERAL REIMER: Sure. Sure, we'd be glad
 22 to.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Charlie?

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1 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you, Bill.
 2 Again, General Reimer, it's really great
 3 to see you, and you know how much high regard we all have
 4 for our soldiers.
 5 I wanted to ask three different related
 6 questions, and some will follow-up on Fred Pang's because
 7 that's a part of our Commission, which is not as high-
 8 profile but we're supposed to report on.
 9 But on the question of sexual harassment
 10 and gender-integrated training, one issue that's appeared
 11 — and we don't have — we have some data coming in — is
 12 — which it seemed that the Secretary of the Army's panel
 13 did not really address, was the issue of false
 14 accusations. Many women are saying that that is as much
 15 of a problem as is genuine sexual harassment.
 16 And I'm wondering if you have — And there
 17 is a — you know, that once you're accused of this,
 18 guilty or — and especially — well, let's say if
 19 innocent, your career is stained.
 20 And another factor which is — we always
 21 tiptoe around is that much of the Aberdeen and other
 22 cases have had a racial aspect where the majority of the
 23 accused have been black NCO's and the majority of the

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1 accusers have been white women.
 2 I wonder what your reaction is — to those
 3 social kinds of questions are.
 4 GENERAL REIMER: They're both good
 5 questions, Charlie, and what I would say on the issue —
 6 DR. MOSKOS: We have an Annapolis case,
 7 too, now.
 8 GENERAL REIMER: What I would say on the
 9 issue of false accusations is what I've said from the
 10 very start. Where we find false accusations, we need to
 11 follow-up and take corrective action. Whether that is
 12 military judicial action — military justice action or
 13 whether it's counseling or whatever, I don't know.
 14 But this is a two-way street, and what we
 15 have tried to emphasize is that we need to treat all
 16 soldiers with dignity and respect, and false accusations
 17 are just as wrong as the accusations that are true
 18 against somebody else.
 19 We really have to instill this thing about
 20 treating everybody with dignity and respect, and that's
 21 basically what we have tried to instill in all our
 22 commanders. I have talked to every pre-command course
 23 since I've come in in June of '95 and I've given them

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1 three basic principles in terms of command philosophy.
 2 One is that we need to do what's right
 3 legally and morally every day, and it applies to them.
 4 And I also tell them that "you're getting high quality
 5 soldiers and most of them can handle that; if you
 6 basically explain to them what you want, they'll do the
 7 right thing." We don't have anybody that comes to work
 8 today and says, "I wonder how I can screw up the Army."
 9 They just don't do that. I mean, we're too busy and
 10 everybody depends upon everybody else — that there's a
 11 team out there.
 12 The second one is to be all you can be.
 13 We've had a fancy recruiting slogan now and there are
 14 expectations, and people join the Army because of this
 15 "be all you can be." Some of them want to be more in
 16 education, some of them want to be more in adventure,
 17 some of them want to just have the experience of the
 18 disciplined life that the military brings, and others
 19 just feel like it's their patriotic duty to join the
 20 Army. They join for different reasons, but there are
 21 expectations and we have to meet those expectations.
 22 The third one gets at your issue, and that
 23 is basically to treat others as you want them to treat

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1 you — just a restatement of the Golden Rule — and I
 2 think it's terribly important that we continue to focus
 3 on that. And where you find false accusations one way or
 4 the other, I think you have to deal with that.
 5 You're right in terms of the statistics,
 6 that there have been less people that have been dealt
 7 with on false accusations than there have been that have
 8 been accused of sexual harassment and sexual misconduct,
 9 particularly in a training base.
 10 That's not difficult for me to understand.
 11 There is no such thing as consensual sex between a
 12 trainee and a drill sergeant. The onus of proof — the
 13 burden of proof, the sole burden of proof — is on that
 14 drill sergeant. This is a god-like person over there in
 15 the training base and they have to be that way because
 16 they have eight weeks in which to turn these civilians
 17 into soldiers. And so you can't say this is consensual
 18 sex. That's on their back to not let that happen.
 19 And I'll tell you, some of the hardest
 20 ones that I've had on that are these females. Female
 21 drill sergeants will come down very hard on female
 22 trainees, and that's why you want to have female drill
 23 sergeants over there.

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1 I was talking to a group of drill
 2 sergeants one time and this female said, "Look, I'm
 3 important here because I can tell when that gal over
 4 there is looking at that drill sergeant and making eyes."
 5 And, you know, for most of us, that just — I would never
 6 recognize it. And she said, "I just go over there and
 7 get after her right away."
 8 So I really feel that in the training
 9 base, I wouldn't get overly concerned about the fact that
 10 there were less people accused of false accusations than
 11 there were people that were found guilty of sexual
 12 misconduct/sexual harassment. But I do think it's an
 13 issue that we have to deal with and I've charged all
 14 commanders to treat them fairly, and where you find that,
 15 we have to go after that, too.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: The second question is with
 17 Fred's remarks —
 18 GENERAL REIMER: Do you want —
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Oh, go ahead.
 20 GENERAL REIMER: On the race issue —
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Oh, on the race issue. Go
 22 ahead if you want to comment on that.
 23 GENERAL REIMER: Yeah. That was — The

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1 initial allegations as we got into this that there were
 2 far more blacks than whites that were singled out, I can
 3 simply tell you that race is not one of the
 4 considerations that we look at when right or wrong.
 5 There are far more black drill sergeants than there are
 6 white drill sergeants, also.
 7 But I really don't get into the race piece
 8 as an indicator because when it came up, we put the IG,
 9 Lieutenant General Larry Jordan, a minority officer, to
 10 investigate that issue. He could find no indication that
 11 there was a racial overtone to what was done here.
 12 I was so concerned about it initially when
 13 we started into this thing because we started to hear it
 14 from different organizations, that I called the former
 15 head of the DEOMI, Ron Joe, and I said, "Ron, would you
 16 go over there and talk to CID just to make sure that as
 17 we work this thing, we are sensitive to this issue from
 18 the very start?" He did. How much impact he had, I
 19 don't know. But I think there was a sensitivity in the
 20 Army to this particular issue because we did not want it
 21 to happen.
 22 At the same time — Well, as these things
 23 started to pick up, we were also dealing with the

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1 Sergeant Major McKinney issue, so this thing got a lot of
 2 attention.
 3 But I am convinced based upon what we've
 4 done that there was not a racial prejudice action on the
 5 part of this issue.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: The other will be short
 7 because I know that your time is running out. On the
 8 fraternization, if — And, for example, we came out with
 9 a recommendation that the status quo should be
 10 reintroduced on the Army's case. You know, the question
 11 of uniformity doesn't seem that persuasive. You could
 12 become uniform by everybody following the Army's policy,
 13 and it was the Army one that had to change.
 14 GENERAL REIMER: That was our argument
 15 initially.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Right. But would that — is
 17 the horse already out of the barn on that thing if the
 18 Commission said, you know, maybe the services could do it
 19 differently or maybe the Army policy should be the
 20 uniform policy or that you can date cross-rank but not
 21 within the chain of command? Or is that issue just —
 22 GENERAL REIMER: I don't know. My
 23 personal feel is that maybe they're looking for something

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1 like that, and that's why we've gone back in with trying
 2 to say we're going to continue to base it on good order
 3 and discipline and talking about some glaring examples
 4 that would not be okay underneath the Army policy.
 5 But as you know, I mean, for thirty-seven
 6 years I've been taught that you give your best advice
 7 before a decision. Once the decision is made, you salute
 8 and say, "We'll execute." And if you can't do that, you
 9 should be out of the Army. This is not one I want to
 10 fall on my sword on yet.
 11 MR. PANG: Could I follow-up on that?
 12 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. Go ahead, Fred.
 13 MR. PANG: I'll be frank with you, you
 14 know, what was troubling to me — and I'm not afraid to
 15 go on record on this one here, I mean, quite frankly — I
 16 mean, is that, you know, historically — traditionally,
 17 we've always, I mean, you know, — First let me step
 18 back.
 19 You know, I believe in civilian oversight
 20 in the military. You know, I really do. I mean, the
 21 Constitution provides for that. But there are certain
 22 areas, you know, that really are kind of uniquely left,
 23 you know, to military leadership and I have great faith

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1 and confidence in our military leaders.
 2 And the question I have in my mind is why
 3 would you want to intrude in an area that really was
 4 fundamentally — okay? — always has been, you know —
 5 something that you relied on, on military leadership to
 6 come up with policies that were good to their particular
 7 service. I mean, when you talk about good order and
 8 discipline and, by extension, unit cohesion and, by
 9 extension, readiness, I mean, who would know better than
 10 the people that wear the uniform is my question. Okay?
 11 You know, I mean, if I was given the
 12 choice of having to follow — you know, put in uniform
 13 and had to follow a civilian dictum on it or a military
 14 dictum on it, I'd follow the military dictum because
 15 that's who's going to look out for me. I mean, that's
 16 how I would kind of look at it.
 17 So that's how come I was a bit troubled,
 18 you know, by it and how we would as a Commission respond
 19 to it, Charlie.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: And we have to think about
 21 this very much.
 22 MR. PANG: Yeah.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: The other question — Oh, go

1 ahead, General Reimer.
 2 GENERAL REIMER: I'll just wade in here
 3 with my own personal view on this thing. And I think,
 4 first of all, I agree with you that there's a lot of
 5 experience there that needs to be listened to.
 6 And I don't have a problem from the
 7 standpoint of getting our day in court. I think we made
 8 our arguments. The people that developed this policy
 9 were very fair in listening to us. We just, at the end
 10 of the day, were not as persuasive as we probably should
 11 have been. I think this thing was blown out of
 12 proportion a little bit with the Kelly Flinn case and a
 13 few other things like that that were highly visible.
 14 And again, like so many of the other
 15 things that come up in this city and in the media, the
 16 Kelly Flinn case really wasn't necessarily about
 17 fraternization; it was about trust and confidence and
 18 lying and those types of things. And I think we fixed
 19 the wrong problem there; we needed to fix the integrity
 20 issue and the profession of leadership, I guess.
 21 So, you know, I totally agree with you. I
 22 just don't know the answer to whether the horse is out of
 23 the barn or not. I know — You might want to ask my

1 battle buddy when he comes up here, Sergeant Major Hall.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 3 GENERAL REIMER: He has very good views on
 4 this and very strong views, and I certainly am totally in
 5 sync with him. And what we're trying to do is to work
 6 our way through something that says that we don't have
 7 second-class citizens in the Army.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: My other question, General
 9 Reimer, is also sort of a horse-and-the-barn question.
 10 This deals — We have to also think of — One of our
 11 charges is to look at the adultery statutes.
 12 We were told by senior OSD officials that
 13 the original idea of re-configuring the adultery rules to
 14 make them more uniform and clearer to understand was
 15 initiated by the uniform services, which some of us took
 16 with a little skepticism.
 17 Do you want to comment on that — on all
 18 this discussion about changing the adultery regulations
 19 up there? What was the impetus for that?
 20 GENERAL REIMER: Well, I think — I can
 21 only comment from my standpoint. I just thought the
 22 adultery issues got way blown out of proportion,
 23 appearing in the press, and they should not be a part of

1 the open media writings and that type of thing.
 2 I do not think we should change the rules
 3 on adultery. I think that's a pledge that is made and I
 4 think we hold ourselves to those type of standards and I
 5 think that's something we ought to not fall off on. But
 6 I don't think we should necessarily be as — it should
 7 not be the headlines in the papers.
 8 And all of my looking at these cases —
 9 And the Army's come under some fair amount of criticism
 10 for the way we've handled it and the way that — double
 11 standards. And I've been right at the focal point and
 12 the center of gravity of most of that criticism, so this
 13 is kind of near and dear to my heart.
 14 I would only say to you that each of those
 15 cases, regardless of what you read about in the media,
 16 has to be judged on its own merits. Once the two most
 17 visible cases reach the same level of, oh, completion —
 18 In the case of Sergeant Major McKinney and Major General
 19 Hale, I will lay those side by side with anybody and talk
 20 about double standards because I know there are no double
 21 standards in those cases.
 22 I was the decision-maker in both of those,
 23 rightly or wrongly, and I can tell you that I made the

1 best decision based on the facts. I don't think that
 2 some allegation from an anonymous source about supposed
 3 infidelity should appear in the Washington Times, and
 4 that's what we found ourselves in.
 5 So yes, there was a movement for the — at
 6 least from my standpoint, to try to de-emphasize this,
 7 but I don't think that we should ever treat lightly the
 8 violation of a wedding vow and we ought not to fall off
 9 of that standard.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you very much, General.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can I
 12 follow-on? Because the real answer or the real question
 13 we have to answer is are the proposed adultery guidelines
 14 designed to go in the Manual for Courts-Martial by
 15 Executive Order necessary.
 16 GENERAL REIMER: I'm not sure, and I need
 17 to get you back a better answer. I need to review where
 18 we are on that because I thought there was an attempt to
 19 change that a little bit and then there was a fall back
 20 from that. So I don't know exactly where we are right
 21 now.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: We'd like
 23 to know that, too.

1 GENERAL REIMER: Well, you're obviously
 2 catching me on one that I don't know the details on,
 3 because I know there was somewhat of a lot of flurry over
 4 the fact we were going to change that and then there was
 5 immediate reaction from some that this was not the right
 6 thing to do, and so it kind of just disappeared.
 7 I do not know where we are on those
 8 changes now and I'll go back and figure out where we are
 9 and I'll get back with you.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: We'd
 11 appreciate that. Thank you.
 12 GENERAL REIMER: Okay.
 13 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you.
 14 DR. CANTOR: I join my colleagues in
 15 thanking you for this presentation. Let me — I'll try
 16 to be brief, and I think what I really wanted — You've
 17 put a lot of emphasis on the operational busyness, and
 18 what that brings with it — the correlative of that is
 19 clearly a lot of pressure now on basic entry training.
 20 I mean, any ideas about expanding that
 21 basic training? Like the time, the support put in?
 22 You've got a whole new national strategy. You've got
 23 gender integration in there. You, I think, argue

1 compellingly for it being there, but that's a lot of
 2 pressure on a system.
 3 GENERAL REIMER: It is a lot of pressure
 4 for a system. And first of all, one of the things that
 5 came out of our evaluation of Aberdeen was to expand
 6 basic training by one week.
 7 DR. CANTOR: Right.
 8 GENERAL REIMER: Some people represented
 9 it as a "values" week, but that was not the issue. It
 10 was to expand by one week and integrate values throughout
 11 the nine weeks. That was a step in the right direction.
 12 You have to be very careful in terms of
 13 expanding — how much you expand basic training. I mean,
 14 when you go twelve weeks. And we have over time, through
 15 our evaluation process, reduced it to what I think is
 16 about the irreducible minimum at this point in time.
 17 DR. CANTOR: The nine is the...
 18 GENERAL REIMER: The eight weeks was the
 19 irreducible minimum. We added one more.
 20 DR. CANTOR: Right.
 21 GENERAL REIMER: I would not want to see
 22 it go any lower because we are not training — as you go
 23 through basic training and then the advanced individual

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1 training, which is to give the soldiers the individual
2 skills that he or she needs, we are not training them in
3 all of the different skills that they'll have to use out
4 in the field.

5 A lot of it involves — we have different
6 types of equipment, and so you could keep them there
7 probably for three or four months and not be able to do
8 it.

9 What you have to do is to bring them up to
10 a certain level, then hand them off to the field, because
11 we are capped at a certain in-strength that we try to
12 recruit to; and if we keep them longer in the training
13 base then necessary, then the field does not have them in
14 the units and we're short there in the units.

15 So I think right now the nine-week course
16 that we're on represented our best shot at the knee of
17 the curve. In other words, trying to be able to give
18 them as much as we possibly could in terms of teamwork,
19 values, and individual training, and then the AIT portion
20 of that, and then get them out to the field as a trained
21 and ready soldier, recognizing that the field is going to
22 have some initial training responsibility.

23 So I don't think we can go back in terms

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1 and our TOE organizations and it's hard to try and
2 compare them, but they're both equally important.
3 And they always throw out to me: yeah, but
4 the TOE people do better in the general officers and all
5 of that. I'm in a position — maybe somewhat unique —
6 to say, "Look, I understand that, but my only company
7 command was a basic training company." I never commanded
8 a TOE organization.

9 And when I got orders to go to Fort
10 Benning to command something, the only preference sheet I
11 ever sent in to Branch — And I sent it in and said I
12 want a command somewhere, coming out of Advanced Course
13 and just out of Vietnam, and they sent me to Fort
14 Benning. I said, "I'm going to that artillery battalion
15 over there because I'm an artilleryman."

16 I reported in at Fort Benning. They said,
17 "You're going to Basic Training." I said, "What?" And
18 my reaction was the same as many of the others; but when
19 I got over there, I learned that was a wonderful
20 assignment.

21 In fact, I was recently asked at the
22 Brigadier General Orientation Course that we run for a
23 week what was the assignment that prepared me best for

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1 of reducing it, and I think it would be very difficult,
2 unless we increase the number of people we have in the
3 Army, to increase it much more.

4 DR. CANTOR: Okay. Thank you.

5 GENERAL REIMER: But I would also say in
6 answer to the chairperson's question, if our evaluation
7 proves otherwise, then we will adjust. But right now, I
8 think we're about where we can be.

9 DR. CANTOR: Okay. Thank you.

10 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Sir, it is
11 good to see you.

12 GENERAL REIMER: Nice to see you.

13 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And before I
14 ask you my question, I want to pay a compliment to a
15 group of folks that I think are erroneously maligned —
16 and I believed in uniform strongly that they were
17 erroneously maligned and my time on this panel has
18 confirmed it to me — and that's the young men and women
19 coming in, unfortunately labeled "Generation X." If you
20 put up a list of things, they're supposed to have no
21 direction — you know, you've heard it all.

22 But I would tell you that what I have seen
23 and heard is pretty refreshing because they appear to be

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1 the job that I'm currently in, and I said, "Well, that's
2 a tough one, and all of them contributed to that. But
3 you asked the single one and I'd go back to that basic
4 training company because that taught me about soldiers
5 and it taught me that whatever we do and however high we
6 go, that if we keep in mind our decision and the impact
7 it has on the soldiers, then we're going to be all right.
8 Chances are, we're going to make the right decision."

9 And so I think that in some way I can
10 serve as an example to say that, yeah, I understand that
11 reaction because I had the same reaction, but I'm just a
12 firm believer that you do what the Army asks you to do
13 and you do it well.

14 On the NCO piece of it, I think that
15 perception probably was existing there a little bit and
16 particularly as we went through Aberdeen. But I think as
17 we're starting to look at our selection rates, they're
18 equal to or better than the Army average.

19 And I just am really impressed with the
20 first sergeants we have down there. And as you know very
21 well, Sergeant Major, for most people in the Army, the
22 critical person of whether it's a good experience or not
23 is the first sergeant. I mean, they may know who I am,

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1 focused and respectful. They've got some high goals and
2 high expectations. And if anything that I have found
3 through this, unfortunately, as they progress through
4 their tenure — short tenure in the Army — their
5 expectations have been let down by the leadership, not by
6 their conduct.

7 So I pass that on to you. I think they're
8 great men and women that are serving you today.

9 My question is one about the leadership
10 issue in the training base. And I recall being a MACOM
11 sergeant major, and a lieutenant colonel came in my
12 office and shut the door and broke down literally with
13 tears because he had been selected for command in the
14 training arena and not FORSCOM.

15 And I wonder if you believe strongly if
16 the stigma has been removed — especially in the officer
17 assignment base, but also in the NCO's — about being
18 assigned in the TRADOC community vice the FORSCOM
19 community.

20 GENERAL REIMER: That's a very good
21 question and it's a fundamental question that we face all
22 the time. I try to address that this way. There is a
23 difference between what we do in our TDA organizations

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1 but I'll guarantee you they and their family know who
2 that first sergeant is. And all of us that are wearing
3 officer rank have always got to keep that in mind.

4 And that gets it back at some of the
5 issues that we've been talking about in terms of
6 fraternization — that this is maybe a little bit
7 different organization from that respect.

8 So I don't think it is a detriment, and I
9 really believe that you just do the best you can with
10 whatever they ask you to do and it'll all work out. I
11 think sometimes we worry too much about our own careers
12 and not enough about what we're supposed to do at that
13 particular point in time.

14 Your issue on Generation X is really
15 interesting. We've looked at Generation X and I totally
16 agree with you. These young lieutenants that are coming
17 in today — and I think it's the same thing with all the
18 soldiers — they're much smarter; they're much more
19 sophisticated than I was when I came in. I am just
20 tremendously impressed with this generation.

21 But you have to understand this is a
22 different generation than when I grew up. I mean, to
23 them, they grew up in a different world and so some of

1 this value training that we're doing is terribly
 2 important.
 3 And by the way, they want that. I was
 4 concerned — and we borrowed it from the Marines, that
 5 little card — but the "value" card has worked out very
 6 well for us and it's — I said, "Maybe they'll see it as
 7 a gimmick." But the initial feedback I get is not that
 8 at all. It's very helpful to them, and we're using that
 9 now to counsel people when people have a problem. We
 10 say, "Okay. You broke down here on loyalty and that's
 11 very important. That's one of our cardinal values.
 12 And so I think if we can take it that way
 13 and institutionalize it that way, I think it's going to
 14 be fine. A great generation.
 15 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 16 MS. POPE: General, my thanks for giving
 17 up your time and being here today. And I have a lot of
 18 questions which we'll probably substitute — I mean,
 19 submit for the record, but I have one and it's a follow-
 20 on on that first lieutenant impact.
 21 And a couple of us had the opportunity to
 22 go to OSUT and all the things that I thought positive
 23 about OSUT, the two things that were probably the most

1 good about themselves and they know they've improved
 2 themselves and they're a better person.
 3 Where we start to drop off is when we send
 4 them to the units and their time is not as well
 5 scheduled. You can't do that because of a lot of other
 6 considerations, but it just illustrates the tremendous
 7 cohesion we develop.
 8 I would answer your question in saying
 9 that we would like to do OSUT wherever we possibly can.
 10 Some MOS's probably do not allow themselves because of
 11 the density and then we have to move them into AIT, but
 12 then you start grouping them together.
 13 Your point on supervision is absolutely
 14 correct, and one of the issues I always make about
 15 Aberdeen is that I'm not sure why people would take
 16 Aberdeen and say, "We need to separate people at BCT."
 17 Aberdeen was AIT and our drill sergeant — or supervisor
 18 to — leader-to-led ratio there was fifty to one as
 19 opposed to twenty to one.
 20 So I'm not sure why you would separate
 21 them when you have the most supervision, and then throw
 22 them together where you have the least supervision. I
 23 think you're asking for a real problem in that particular

1 positive was the number of people that said they were
 2 switching from guard and reserve to regular Army.
 3 Because I think from our first briefing —
 4 And I don't have my notes, but I think the number was
 5 like Army recruits, something like 75 percent from people
 6 who say they'll never join the Army. And that number may
 7 be off, but it was a significant number. But I was
 8 impressed by how many people.
 9 And it addressed the issue that — And
 10 probably the only major issue I heard in AIT was the lack
 11 of discipline control when you go from basic to advanced
 12 training and it wasn't there in OSUT. I'm not even sure
 13 whether OSUT is or — I'm sure it's not practical for all
 14 of the Army, but at TRADOC, anywhere — Is the Army
 15 looking at more of OSUT?
 16 I mean, combine the two — The thing that
 17 impressed me was that commitment to that first sergeant.
 18 You wanted — Early on, you didn't want to fail because
 19 you didn't want to, you know, disappoint that individual.
 20 By the end of it, it was for yourself.
 21 And the other thing is, I mean, the
 22 consensus we got out of there is that they weren't men
 23 and women; they were green. And it wasn't a word coming

1 area.
 2 So that was another consideration, but
 3 your basic point is absolutely right. Where you can do
 4 OSUT, you ought to do OSUT, for all the reasons you just
 5 mentioned.
 6 MS. POPE: Thanks.
 7 DR. MOSKOS: Good recommendation, Barbara.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: General,
 9 we've run out of time and your time. And I know how busy
 10 it is, but my question is a very quick one. And I, too,
 11 join everyone in thanking you for a great presentation
 12 and coming.
 13 In our interim report, one of the things
 14 that was of concern to us was what we thought we saw as
 15 an over-reaction to the security required within the
 16 basic training barracks and so forth. And if we're
 17 really — if our values are really trust and we're really
 18 looking at dignity and we're really building a team, it
 19 just seems that having a television camera in every
 20 passageway and every stairwell, with a monitor, just was
 21 totally contrary to what our ethic is, and I wondered if
 22 you would comment on that.
 23 GENERAL REIMER: I think that's a fair

1 out of their mouths. It was very impressive — as were
 2 all the recruits, but it was different at OSUT. And I
 3 don't know how practical that is or whether the Army's
 4 even looking at it.
 5 GENERAL REIMER: The OSUT is practical for
 6 some MOS's, the large MOS's, where you can fill your
 7 basic training at 240 and really continue them through —
 8 all the way through AIT. Where you have a mixture of a
 9 large number of combat service support, you probably
 10 couldn't fill, for example, enough people in an adjutant
 11 general company to make it worthwhile.
 12 The OSUT, as you say, is very, very good
 13 for those MOS's that allow it and certainly we try to
 14 move to that as much as we possibly can because, as you
 15 say, it fosters the teamwork. You just develop more and
 16 you don't — When you start out with this group, you can
 17 see the attitude of the people change over time as they
 18 develop and they really become very confident.
 19 My guess is that if you interviewed most
 20 people after they've completed IET, we would have a high
 21 percentage that say, "I really love this Army," because
 22 they had — particularly after they graduate, because
 23 they have completed something tough and they feel very

1 criticism and we'll have to get back into that a little
 2 bit more. I think, on the other hand, there will be a
 3 requirement for some type of surveillance cameras,
 4 particularly in areas that we cannot see very well. And
 5 if we needed to police that, we would require additional
 6 people to come in there and do it on a 24-hour-a-day
 7 basis.
 8 I think this issue is that you can't
 9 really accept the fact that just because we bring them in
 10 and we talk to them in the initial orientation about how
 11 important values are, that you're going to get that right
 12 away. You've got to make sure you discipline the system,
 13 and so I want to keep the control throughout basic
 14 training.
 15 But to the extent that we're over-using
 16 cameras, we'll re-look that. I'm not aware that we're
 17 doing it, but you may have picked up some places that we
 18 are probably going a little bit too far.
 19 The barracks that I visited at Fort
 20 Leonard Wood about two weeks ago, we've got the alarms on
 21 them, but there are no cameras there because we didn't
 22 need them. I mean, we've got a CQ.
 23 One of the complaints was that when we

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1 have to do the checks to see if people are in their rooms
 2 and in their beds, if it's a male, you have to bring in a
 3 female to go around also, and there's some concerns about
 4 — with the drill sergeants, that we're being a little
 5 bit restrictive in that area and we'll have to review
 6 that.
 7 And that's one of the things that I'll ask
 8 General Bolt to do — is take a good hard look at that to
 9 make sure we don't go too far. But I don't want to lose
 10 control of it either. I don't want to — We may be
 11 overcompensating. We'll have to let the pendulum swing
 12 back a little bit, but we'll get it right.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 14 GENERAL REIMER: But you've raised a valid
 15 concern.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. General, we're up
 17 against the clock, but I cannot let you go without
 18 conveying the entire Commission's praise for our service
 19 representative, Lieutenant Colonel Brenda Harris. She
 20 is, I'm sure, eager to get back to being an artilleryman.
 21 But every one of the very demanding burdens that this
 22 Commission has placed on her, she has carried out with
 23 elan and perfect competence and professionalism.

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1 And I'd also like to recognize Lieutenant
 2 Colonel Bruce Batten, who has helped us along the way in
 3 many important ways.
 4 And so we also thank you for your time
 5 today. I won't prolong this, but we are very grateful
 6 for your time and this has been an extremely helpful hour
 7 with you.
 8 GENERAL REIMER: Well, thank you very
 9 much. And it's been delightful to be able to talk to you
 10 and I appreciate the questions. They were all very good.
 11 And I hope that as you spend the rest of the day with the
 12 rest of the Army, you'll get a chance to go in a little
 13 bit more depth in some of these areas that we've talked
 14 about.
 15 But again, I can't leave without thanking
 16 you enough for what you're doing. I think this is a
 17 terribly important Commission and we look forward to your
 18 report and the wisdom that you will provide us. I thank
 19 you.
 20 And thanks for mentioning two of our
 21 credentials, too. They're just great soldiers and we
 22 appreciate that.
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.

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1 (A brief recess was taken.)
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: This is our panel of
 3 representatives from the United States Army to come and
 4 tie up some loose ends today, give us some briefs that
 5 we've requested, including an update on basic training.
 6 Some of you we have met before and others
 7 are new to us today. We do have your biographies, so I
 8 will skip that part and ask you to launch right into your
 9 presentation. And as usual, we will follow with
 10 questions posed by the commissioners in turn until we run
 11 out of questions or time.
 12 And thank you again for coming.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL OHLE: Thank you,
 14 ma'am.
 15 (Lieutenant General Ohle offered a slide
 16 presentation, "Quality Soldiers: The Essence of America's
 17 Army," concurrent with the following discussion.)
 18 [America's Army]
 19 Put up the first slide.
 20 [Hearing Agenda]
 21 I am Dave Ohle, the DCSPER of the Army.
 22 I've been in the job four months. I had the great
 23 opportunity to work on a few of the studies for the Chief

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1 of Staff. I redesigned the Office of Personal Management
 2 system; then he said, "Okay. Since you've done that, you
 3 will become the DCSPER and implement it." So I've had
 4 that opportunity now to try to implement this in four
 5 months.
 6 As you can see here, General Reimer came
 7 in and his theme was change and how the Army has changed
 8 and developed over the years. The three speakers that
 9 you will have today — I'll talk about people, General
 10 Burnette will talk about the readiness, and Joe Bolt will
 11 finish with the training summary of how we've changed in
 12 our training centers.
 13 Next slide.
 14 [America's Army Lessons Learned]
 15 I've put this together because I think to
 16 follow-on with what General Reimer said, I think change
 17 is the theme. After Vietnam, I sat down in graduate
 18 school and studied what we had done right and what we had
 19 done wrong and put this together, and this has sort of
 20 been my theme throughout my career. And I think what has
 21 made the Army good is our ability to do three things, and
 22 they're listed right here.
 23 Number one is to embrace the change

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1 process; two, develop systems, and three, continually
 2 self-assess ourselves. And I think if you look at how we
 3 have developed in all our systems throughout the Army, I
 4 think you'll see a progression through this change
 5 process using this paradigm.
 6 Next slide.
 7 [Six Army Imperatives]
 8 In the Army, we use the six imperatives.
 9 I know General Reimer has talked about it. General
 10 Burnette will talk about it as he talks about readiness.
 11 But it really is the cornerstone. General Vono developed
 12 these, but they have been with us for a long time. He
 13 developed them in the late eighties.
 14 The top three on that chart — the quality
 15 people, the leadership development, and the training —
 16 we think of as the human aspects to Army business. The
 17 bottom three — the doctrine, the modernization, the
 18 organization and the force mix — have been what the Army
 19 has been about since 1991, since the drawdown, moving
 20 forward to Force 21, Division 21, "Army After Next," all
 21 those that General Reimer talked about. Today I want to
 22 talk briefly about the top three.
 23 In the seventies and eighties, we truly

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1 had a training revolution over here with the training.
 2 And the way we fixed the Army when we came out of that is
 3 we sat down and we did the assessment and we developed
 4 systems and programs to train, training to standard, and
 5 then we instituted an after-action review, a self-
 6 assessment at every level: tactical levels, down with the
 7 soldiers, intermediate level, operational level with the
 8 division commanders and PUTB's, and then the senior level
 9 with the Chief of Staff of the Army. We do it
 10 religiously.
 11 In the eighties, we had a revolution in
 12 leader development — General Sullivan was a brigadier;
 13 General Pea was a brigadier — and put together our
 14 leader development system for the Army. It was based on
 15 education — officer education, noncommissioned officer
 16 education system — and it was a total system. I'll talk
 17 about it a little later, but it was truly a revolution in
 18 leader development.
 19 And how did we do it? We did it the same
 20 way with training. We learned the lessons of the past.
 21 We instituted after-action reviews and put together the
 22 system, and we really did leader development very well.
 23 Now I think where we're at — and we're

1 talking about quality people here, that "people" part of
 2 the Army — and I believe that Aberdeen was truly a
 3 stimulus. If you go back even further to the Tailhook
 4 times in the early nineties — But the Army has been
 5 moving to institute a character development system that
 6 parallels our training development and our leader
 7 development.

8 And what we're all about in talking about
 9 gender integration, good order and discipline,
 10 fraternization, is about the character of the United
 11 States Army. And what lessons learned we have are that
 12 we're going to do it the same way that we did with
 13 training, the same way we did it with leader development
 14 — we're developing these systems, but more importantly,
 15 we're doing after-action reviews where we assess what's
 16 going right and wrong.

17 We've institutionalized these changes and
 18 will continue to tweak it and adapt it so that it's
 19 better next year and the year after and the year after
 20 that. And I think General Bolt — when he talks, you'll
 21 see exactly how we've improved this training system,
 22 which is all part of the character development, this
 23 values base of the Army.

1 So I just wanted to tell you how I see
 2 what we're all about today, fitting in with the overall
 3 concept of the Army and why I think what we're doing is
 4 not just flash-in-the-pan but it will be with us for a
 5 long time.

6 Next slide.

7 [America's Army: Today and into the Future
 8 - Demographics]

9 A few demographics of the Army. When we
 10 look at the Army — and General Reimer had a couple of
 11 slides of this — we truly are more educated and I think
 12 that's absolutely the key. High school diploma grads: 95
 13 percent of our force now has high school diploma grads.
 14 When you look back at 1987, only 88 percent. That's the
 15 force that fought in DESERT STORM. Only 88 percent of
 16 the force had high school diplomas. And when you look
 17 back to '73, when we started this training revolution,
 18 only 58 percent of the force had high school diplomas.

19 So we have moved towards a more educated
 20 force, we're a more diversified force, and we are an
 21 older force. When you look at the average age of the
 22 soldier in 1973, the average age was twenty-two years.
 23 In 1987 — I'm using the same years of comparison — it

1 was twenty-four years, and today it's twenty-six years.
 2 So you can see the average age of the United States Army
 3 has truly gone up.

4 Now, how do those demographics fit into
 5 the structure of the Army today?

6 Next slide.

7 [America's Army: Today and into the Future
 8 - Structure]

9 We've got to look across the whole Army.
 10 And as you know very well, we have the warfighting units
 11 we call the TOE Army; we have the TDA, the institutional
 12 Army, and we have the training account, the school
 13 account — we call it TTHS — and I've given you the
 14 total figures. These slides are available.

15 But what I want to highlight is number one
 16 in the warfighting Army. We have women doing jobs across
 17 the Army in those MOS's that are open. Thirteen-point-
 18 five percent of the TOE force are females. That's good.
 19 When you look at the TDA Army, 20.3 percent are females.

20 Now, I believe — and we can look at the
 21 statistics — that if — you know, we don't believe
 22 combat arms would — if you factor combat arms off, the
 23 percentage of women in the TOE would equal the percentage

1 of women in the institutional Army, and that's right
 2 because women serve across-the-force in all aspects.
 3 When you look at the school account, they're right there
 4 — 17.6. And overall, women, as you know, are about 14.9
 5 — about 15 percent of the Army.

6 So I think you can see that from the
 7 training environment, all the way through the units that
 8 deploy, women are across our Army.

9 Next slide.

10 [FY98 Recruiting Results]

11 Now, how do we get this force — this
 12 diversified force in-trained and ready to fight? We do
 13 it through our — first step is the recruiting. And as
 14 you all know, the recruiting problems of today is
 15 probably our greatest challenge.

16 The propensity to serve is down. We
 17 project we'll be somewhere — in the Army — about 6,000
 18 short of our recruiting goal for this year. We are
 19 looking at everything that we can to turn that up, but
 20 what the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of
 21 the Army say is we will not sacrifice quality for
 22 numbers. What we've got to do is maintain this
 23 (Indicating).

1 Look, high school diplomas, across-the-
 2 force, active, guard and reserve. The guard numbers are
 3 down a little bit in quality but they make the numbers.
 4 The reserves are right at the same quality marks as the
 5 active force: I through IIIA. High. We're higher than
 6 the Department of Defense standard. We say 67 percent
 7 have to be I through IIIA. Department of Defense says
 8 that number can be 60 percent. So we have raised that —
 9 raised the bar. We need this quality force to be able to
 10 do the missions.

11 So recruiting is a key. It's our biggest
 12 challenge today. What does that recruit look like?

13 Next chart.

14 [Today's Recruit]

15 As we look at the recruit today, we're
 16 recruiting about 18.9 percent females across the active.
 17 You can see the percentage here (Indicating). The reason
 18 that the USAR — the reserves — are higher, it's
 19 predominantly a combat service support organization, so
 20 percentages are balanced across the force. Again, right
 21 now we're bringing in 90 percent high school graduates.

22 Next slide, please.

23 [Leader Development Model]

1 Now, I mentioned earlier when I showed our
 2 imperatives about the leader development program. This
 3 is key because when you look at the Army — and you've
 4 gone to both the institutional, the training centers, and
 5 you've gone out to the operational forces, and the key to
 6 leader development is that we have a balanced program
 7 between each of these pillars.

8 And what we tend to focus on in a
 9 Commission like this is to look only at the
 10 institutional, the training center, but what we have to
 11 do is we have to realize that here we set the conditions
 12 for success for the women for their whole career. And to
 13 set those conditions properly, you have to integrate them
 14 right from the very beginning. If you delay that, then
 15 you delay this condition-setting for the women in the
 16 United States Army and put it off to another commander at
 17 another time.

18 So leader development for the Army starts
 19 in the base — And this was what General Sullivan and
 20 General Pea developed in 1987. It's based on the values
 21 set that we have. We've done a lot of work. We're
 22 revising those values, but we're truly a values-based
 23 organization.

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1 Next slide.
 2 [Leadership Development Program]
 3 Now, what is a leader development program?
 4 I mean, any one of the pillars? They're really about
 5 three phases that you have to go through to have a
 6 successful program.
 7 Number one: you have to have a program
 8 that teaches, instructs, counsels, guides, leads —
 9 whoever it is you're trying to train in the basic
 10 knowledge, skills and attributes, and we do that in basic
 11 training. You have seen that first-hand when you visited
 12 our training bases. You have seen it when you go out to
 13 look at the operational forces. We do that ongoing every
 14 day.
 15 But the two other components are the
 16 hardest to do. Provide this opportunity to practice.
 17 What we don't want to say is "Here is the mission, this
 18 is what we want you to do, and you've got to get it right
 19 the first time," and that's why it takes repetition and
 20 that's why it takes feedback and repetition and
 21 rehabilitation. We are never exactly right the first
 22 time. In our training doctrine, we always — most
 23 everybody says, "We need improvements." A "P," not "T,"

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1 "train," but "needs improvement." And that's the way we
 2 have to look at this leader development.
 3 And then finally the third component.
 4 That component of giving feedback to the individual and
 5 feedback to the organization on how you're doing in these
 6 programs is absolutely essential. Too often when you
 7 look at a program you only look at phase I. You don't
 8 look at how many repetitions and how often you provide
 9 this opportunity to practice, and you don't look at the
 10 feedback mechanisms. Those are the two critical parts, I
 11 think, in this whole leader development program that we
 12 have.
 13 Next slide.
 14 [Army Human Relations Program, Keys to
 15 Success]
 16 As we've looked at the basic training and
 17 we've looked at this character development, we truly have
 18 a human relations program. It really focuses right here
 19 on the human relations action plan that we put together
 20 as a result of the commissions that went out, the study
 21 groups that went out and took a look at what was right
 22 and what was wrong in the Army.
 23 We've implemented those. We have review

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1 processes on those recommendations. And I think any of
 2 these — and we can talk about this in the question-and-
 3 answer period — any of these initiatives in the human
 4 relations area, we are working very hard and have
 5 programs in the United States Army.
 6 My last slide, please.
 7 [Soldiers Are Our Credentials]
 8 You know, General Reimer says the soldiers
 9 are our credentials, the heart and soul of the Army is
 10 people, and I really believe that.
 11 There's a famous quote that was given to
 12 us by Ms. Hasselbaum, who used to be the Director of the
 13 Girl Scouts and is now in the Drucker Foundation, and she
 14 said, "When you look at the Army, you should be able to
 15 see yourself."
 16 And so no matter who you are — male,
 17 female, black, white, Hispanic — when you look at the
 18 Army, you should be able to see yourself represented in
 19 the force, and I think that's the bottom line. We are a
 20 diverse, well-trained, ready unit.
 21 And what I would like to do now is turn it
 22 over to the DCSOPS of the Army, Tom Burnette, and let him
 23 talk about readiness.

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1 I thank you, ma'am.
 2 (Lieutenant General Burnette offered a
 3 slide presentation, "What the Army Means by 'Readiness,'"
 4 concurrent with the following discussion.)
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURNETTE: You asked me
 6 to address a question. That question is, how does the
 7 Army measure readiness? What does the Army mean when
 8 they talk about readiness? And I'd like to do that for
 9 you today.
 10 By way of background, I enlisted in the
 11 Army in 1962 as an infantry soldier, started my
 12 assignments as a rifleman in the 82nd Airborne Division,
 13 and I've had a full career through the Army through the
 14 entire system. My most recent assignment was as a
 15 division commander at Fort Drum, New York, before coming
 16 here.
 17 So I've seen the Army kind of from the
 18 bottom to the top, all the way from 1962 forward. So
 19 later, as we talk about some of these things, I'd be
 20 happy to give you some perspectives on it, but first I'd
 21 really like to talk about this subject.
 22 Next chart.
 23 [Readiness Defined]

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1 "Readiness defined" is really simple for
 2 us. Military readiness is just a measure of the
 3 capability that you have against the requirement that you
 4 have. It's a very simple concept and it gets to the
 5 point of what does the strategy require of the Army. And
 6 you're pretty familiar with that right now. The strategy
 7 requires us to be able to go and fight two major theater
 8 wars, to do the major regional contingencies like Bosnia
 9 — hopefully not Kosovo — and the other operations that
 10 we have around the world.
 11 Next chart, please.
 12 [Readiness for What?]
 13 You ask yourself the question: the Army
 14 has to be ready to do what? And it has several different
 15 parts to it. It has current readiness — how ready are
 16 you today? But I think the Chief mentioned earlier: how
 17 ready are you in the future to do what you have to do?
 18 So there are two pieces to readiness as we
 19 look at it from the Headquarters, Department of the Army:
 20 what can we do today, and then, how do we prepare that
 21 force to be ready to do what they have to do in the
 22 future?
 23 Next chart, please.

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1 [Essential Components of Future Readiness]
 2 When we look at the components of future
 3 readiness, we look really at the things that Dave Ohle
 4 talked about. We have to make sure that we keep these
 5 things in balance. The problem that you run into
 6 sometimes is you will get out ahead of yourselves on your
 7 doctrine. You will have a doctrine that's out ahead of
 8 your equipment, or you'll have a situation where you have
 9 modern equipment that's outside the capability that you
 10 have to train properly on it for one reason or another.
 11 So as we work with this every day at every
 12 legislative session, we try to make sure as we go through
 13 these things in the future we get them in the right
 14 balance.
 15 The Army today is busy. We've talked to
 16 you about OPTEMPO. Soldiers are deployed all over the
 17 world. We just very recently deployed some more Patriot
 18 units into Turkey. We're deploying today some more
 19 Patriot units into Kuwait. A lot of operations are going
 20 on out there everyday. We're as busy as we ever have
 21 been in our history and, at the same time, have to be
 22 able to do our mission if we are called upon to fight in
 23 Korea or Southwest Asia.

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 146</p> <p>1 Next chart, please. 2 [Essential Components of Current 3 Readiness] 4 As we look at readiness, there's three 5 pieces to it and I'm going to focus in on one of these in 6 a minute. First, all the way on the right, our 7 installations — where our soldiers live and where we 8 train and where we deploy — how ready are they? And we 9 have a measure of that. I'm not going to talk much about 10 that today. 11 The second component of current readiness 12 is the training base that — General Bolt is our key 13 discussion leader today on that. And that's the ability 14 of that training base to provide skilled soldiers, with 15 the right values to go forth into the service, and we 16 have a way of measuring that. 17 And then finally, in our units, it's the 18 ability of that unit to go do its wartime job, and we 19 measure this every month for every active unit. 20 Next chart. 21 [Current Readiness - The 'Tip of the 22 Spear'] 23 And here is what we measure. First,</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 149</p> <p>1 there's broad requirements out there. 2 Second point: we've got to make sure we're 3 ready today and we're ready in the future. 4 Third point: the mission that we have out 5 there demands teamwork and cohesion at the lowest levels. 6 It doesn't matter how brilliant a division commander you 7 are, if you cannot — when you deliver those squads at 8 the point of the spear, if those squads aren't cohesive, 9 if they're not a team, if they don't know what they're 10 doing, they can't get the job done. So cohesion and 11 teamwork is important to us. 12 That teamwork requires a foundation of 13 values, something that we're working very hard on in our 14 training base today. 15 And then, finally, the training strategy 16 as we look at what we are doing out there — and I think 17 our training strategy is sound — is to make sure that 18 those units are trained and ready to do their mission, 19 which we work hard on; that we continue to build 20 effective teams, that we work hard on; and finally, that 21 we work hard to uphold those values in those 22 organizations. 23 Chart off.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 147</p> <p>1 personnel: Does the unit have enough of the right people? 2 And I'll tell you right now — and our testimony this 3 year is the same as last year before Congress — is the 4 number one readiness issue for the Army is people. 5 We are short noncommissioned officers and 6 we have a number of units — up to nearly 30 percent of 7 them — that do not have the required level of fill, 8 battalion level, in the active component. And anything 9 we do to affect this personnel system and the bringing in 10 of young men and women into the Army to fill those 11 positions — anything that's deleterious to that is 12 something we do not want to do. Recruiting is hard 13 enough without adding to that burden. 14 Second, training. As we look at an Army 15 unit, whether it's a battalion or whether it's a company 16 or whether it's a division, you ask yourself the 17 question: How many days of training do you need before 18 you can do your full wartime mission? 19 Third: equipment on hand: Does the unit 20 have the right kind of equipment that's called for in its 21 organization? And then, finally, does that equipment 22 work? 23 In the training area, we're doing pretty</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 150</p> <p>1 Readiness, then, very simply — the way 2 units define it in the field, the way a company commander 3 defines it — is really based on those four things I've 4 talked about — is do you have the right kinds of people, 5 both soldiers and senior grade, like sergeants and 6 officers; second, is it training to the level that it 7 needs to be training at; third, does he have the right 8 kind of equipment on hand; and fourth, does that 9 equipment work? 10 It's a very simple way of measuring 11 readiness. Most all the services do it the same way. 12 And I hope that answered the question which you wanted 13 answered. Thank you. 14 (Lieutenant General Bolt offered a slide 15 presentation, "U.S. Army, Initial Entry Training Update," 16 concurrent with the following discussion.) 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Well, it's good 18 to be back one more time. May it please be my last. 19 But what they've asked me to do and I 20 think what you really wanted to get was sort of an update 21 on what have been the changes to the IET process over the 22 period of time that, first of all, the Commission has 23 been seated, and what we've been doing over the period of</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 148</p> <p>1 well. We have had some issues over the last year, but 2 not this year, of resourcing of training at unit level 3 because we had been under-resourced for installations and 4 the repairs of the installations. Unit commanders had to 5 spend their training money oftentimes to run those bases. 6 Starting with the supplemental this year — yet this 7 year, that's getting turned around and going in the right 8 direction. 9 Equipment on hand is a good-news story for 10 the Army. Our units basically have the kind of equipment 11 that they need to do the job, as do they have it 12 serviceable. The number one issue for the Army is 13 personnel. 14 Next chart, please. 15 [Closing Thoughts] 16 I would just say in closing here — I 17 didn't want to take a long time talking about this today 18 — the Army's mission today is a broad mission. It 19 requires us to do things all the way from going down to 20 Central America and doing disaster-recovery, to doing the 21 operations in Bosnia and doing the operations in 22 Southwest Asia, and having to have the capability to 23 fight in Korea or Southwest Asia when called upon. So</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 151</p> <p>1 time since the previous commission reports and those 2 kinds of things. 3 So I'll try to do that for you, and I'll 4 try to highlight for you the changes as opposed to taking 5 you down the entire laundry list of all the programs as 6 we've gone. 7 Next slide, please. 8 [Background, slide 2] 9 Just for a slight review, here are what 10 really have been the catalysts of change for TRADOC and 11 for the U.S. Army in addressing the issues of initial 12 entry training over the last two-and-a-half years. 13 The DAIG report really focused on a 14 comprehensive look at the training base itself; the 15 Senior Review Panel — and the outcome of that was the 16 Army human relations action plan that was put together — 17 Kassebaum Baker report, and then subsequent SECDEF 18 guidance on separate and secure barracks and billeting 19 arrangements, all were drivers of change in policy inside 20 of the Army. 21 Next slide, please. 22 [Areas of Change, slide 3] 23 This sort of highlights the four major</p>

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1 areas of change and the ones that will form the framework
2 as I'll work on down.

3 First of all, lots of policy change, how
4 we have selected and assigned personnel, a whole host of
5 training improvements, and trainer improvements also in
6 terms of our drill sergeants.

7 Next slide.

8 [Revision of IET Policy and
9 Administration, slide 4]

10 Policy first. TRADOC Regulation 350-6
11 doesn't mean an awful lot to you but it really is the
12 basis for the policy statement of the performance of
13 initial entry training inside of the training units.

14 When I was here last, I told you we had a
15 new one on the street. It was on the street last April.
16 March-April, I believe. We have revised it based on
17 November because we had subsequent changes in separate-
18 and-secure guidance from SECDEF, so it has been revised
19 since that time. The latest edition is 30 November.

20 Really focused on rigor and
21 standardization of training.

22 As I told you before, we had a wide range
23 of AIT options, different ways soldiers were dealt with

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1 sleeping areas — In a couple of the places where we have
2 not been able to meet that, we have in fact gone to
3 separate barracks. Fort Rucker, they have a female
4 barracks in the same area just because of the very unique
5 construction of barracks down there to meet that
6 requirement.

7 So we have met the SECDEF's requirements.

8 Next slide, please.

9 [Separate and Secure Gender Living Areas
10 (Leadership Control), slide 6]

11 All of the supervisory controls are all in
12 350-6. I won't go through those. But in fact, we have
13 supervision in the living areas with drill sergeants or
14 other cadre twenty-four-hours-a-day, with the appropriate
15 leadership checks.

16 Next slide, please.

17 [Changes to BCT/OSUT, slide 7]

18 Major change here. I've talked to you
19 about this one before. That is, the extension — one-
20 week extension in Basic and One Station Unit Training.
21 That is in place as effective 1 October, so in December
22 we graduated our first basic training classes with this.
23 Added fifty-four hours, really focused in

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1 inside of AIT's. We have cleaned that up and
2 standardized that.

3 Worked with PT failures, how we dealt with
4 them inside of the training base; incorporated sensing
5 sessions; put all of the separate-and-secure and CQ and
6 supervisory policies required by SECDEF and done that;
7 and established the non-waiverable graduation
8 requirements that really was at the core of the rigor of
9 basic training.

10 So that regulation is out; it's in place.

11 The latest look that we've done — as a fact, as of
12 yesterday — would indicate that it's well-received;
13 soldiers understand it. It's one thing to have it on the
14 street; the second thing is to have everybody know what
15 it's about, and so it has been inculcated into the
16 training centers.

17 The other major policy and administrative
18 change has been the inclusion of Recruiting Command
19 inside of Training and Doctrine Command now. I told you
20 that was going to happen. 1 October, it did. We are
21 hard at work at making the recruiting through training as
22 seamless as possible, emphasizing the same standards,
23 same conditions, working through the issues of physical

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1 human relations, core values, Army traditions, and about
2 half of that time ended up being more trainer-to-trainee
3 contact time. Gave an awful lot of time back to the
4 drill sergeant.

5 Did some physical and mental rigor. That
6 had to do with non-waiverable requirements, rites-of-
7 passage, much more aggressive FTX and those kinds of
8 things. The Warrior FTX is in place. Rites-of-passage
9 ceremony — I think some of you saw one of those down at
10 Fort Jackson when you were down there.

11 All that has been done. All the training
12 support packages, all of the videos, all of the support
13 materials, lesson plans, were all developed for that and
14 are in place. We will go back in March with another
15 evaluation of the effectiveness of that to ensure that
16 we've got the right materials and we're doing the right
17 stuff.

18 Next slide, please.

19 [BCT Graduation Requirements, slide 8]

20 I just put this up. Those graduation
21 requirements are in place. The snapshot I give you on
22 graduation requirements is that they're very well
23 accepted. They have made remedial training a major,

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1 standards, readiness standards, and a baseline of values
2 through that entire process. That has been working very
3 well, frankly.

4 Next slide, please.

5 [Implementation of Separate and Secure
6 Gender Living Areas, slide 5]

7 Implementation of separate-and-secure. We
8 have completed that except for some of the higher-tech
9 ends of that process. We are still putting some
10 automated alarms and some of those kinds of things in at
11 the AIT. Basic training is all done. We finally got the
12 last of the money and we're making some decisions on — I
13 know cameras have been an issue. The Chief, as of
14 yesterday, asked us to review that one — or Monday —
15 asked us to review that one more time.

16 He does not want cameras into any place
17 where there are other alternatives. Places are under CQ
18 observation. They can be inspected. He doesn't want to
19 use them. He wants them to be exclusively used in those
20 places there there is absolutely no other alternative to
21 ensure that a safe environment exists.

22 But the rest of the things that we talked
23 about — separate entrances, separate latrines, locked

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1 major issue in every training center and they're doing
2 very well at it.

3 I would also tell you, very candidly, it
4 popped just about three percent attrition inside of basic
5 training inside of — well, last year, as we phased these
6 — over actually a half-a-year as we phased these in. I
7 personally think — and we are working at ways — and
8 I'll show you a slide later — that we can drive that
9 attrition down by doing some more things.

10 We went to more new-start programs,
11 recycled soldiers more frequently, and basically what we
12 did is took them out of an environment where they felt
13 very comfortable, to one that they did not feel very
14 comfortable in. We're doing things a little bit
15 differently, and that is, taking them a little bit
16 further in until they buy-in a little bit more and we've
17 had a little more time with them, and then recycling them
18 to meet the deficiencies.

19 And we saved about — over the last two
20 months, we've saved about one percent of that attrition
21 back down without affecting the standards or the
22 graduation requirements at all. So I think that's
23 probably a spike while we learned some lessons.

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 158</p> <p>1 Next slide, please. 2 [AIT Update, slide 9] 3 AIT update. I told you last time we were 4 going to do the same kind of reinforcement training 5 inside of advanced individual training. Those training 6 support packages are all in place. We have certified all 7 the drill sergeants that are out there to be able to 8 train that. 9 We have sixteen hours included. You can 10 see the subjects. Some of it is reinforcement training 11 of stuff, equal opportunity, will serve as a member of a 12 team, rape prevention — some of the stuff that was 13 inside of basic training. Others now start focusing on 14 the role of that soldier in his or her branch, and that 15 provides the tradition and honor, lineage, serving as a 16 quartermaster soldier or a military intelligence 17 soldier. 18 And that's now included inside of AIT, and 19 that started on 1 January. In place. 20 Next slide, please. 21 [Personnel Selection/Assignment, slide 10] 22 Personnel selection and assignments. I 23 think the last time I talked to you, I talked about</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 161</p> <p>1 yesterday, ran PT, and found two sergeants that had just 2 come out of drill sergeant school that were given PT. 3 Master fitness trainers. Felt very, very good about the 4 training they had received. So I think we've got a solid 5 program at this point in time. 6 Thirty-nine hours of human relations 7 training were added. That probably qualifies them at the 8 level of about an equal opportunity representative with 9 those kind of skills. 10 We've trained the leaders on master 11 fitness training and we've completed the first full 12 course with master fitness training embedded into it. 13 Next slide, please. 14 [Changes to DS Selection Requirements, 15 slide 12] 16 Changes, drill sergeant selection 17 requirements. I think the last time I was in here, I 18 told you that we were in fact changing the selection 19 requirements, the screening requirements. The only thing 20 that we had not completed at the last time was the 21 special files: inspector general, security files and 22 Central Registry, which was the Family Advocacy Files. 23 Those files are now being screened for potential drill</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 159</p> <p>1 company executive officers, unit ministry teams. The 2 initial reaction was to put those back into the units. I 3 bring that back to you today because since that time — 4 it's been about two years ago — we have gone through 5 cycles. General Ohle has been good enough to continue 6 the support of that program. Those people are out there. 7 The initial ones have PCS'd, the next crew is in; we've 8 been trained up. And so that's an ongoing program. 9 The accusation — The third bullet there. 10 The accusation was made — and you probably heard it — 11 as to the quality of especially officers serving inside 12 the training base. Personnel Command now does a quality 13 review of potential commanders upon assignment to ensure 14 that the training base is getting an equal cut of the 15 quality overall going into the training base. 16 The initial look at that is that that's 17 pretty good. Selection rates off the last board of 18 soldiers that have served in the training base as opposed 19 to those that have served in the TO&E Army, to major, 20 selection rate was almost identical. 21 So we've still got some work to do in the 22 combat arms here to try to get them back and certified 23 inside their branch, but this is a good-news story and</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 162</p> <p>1 sergeants, and so this program is all in place. 2 The one place that it is not in place that 3 Kassebaum Baker recommended we look at is psychological 4 testing for drill sergeants. We did four classes with a 5 three-instrument survey, and then had civilian health 6 professionals and Army Research Institute look at our 7 program, and what they came back to us and told us was 8 that the instruments aren't good enough. 9 And so the Army medical department now is 10 looking and trying to develop other instruments. Once 11 they come in and say we've got an instrument that's 12 useful, we will then go back and do some more 13 psychological testing. We have suspended that at this 14 point in time. 15 Next slide, please. 16 [Structure and Future Requirements, slide 17 13] 18 Some future requirements. I think I told 19 you before we capped the structure. One of our problems 20 was that we had some places where we were over-filling 21 basic training and OSUT. We've capped at 240. This 22 whole year, the max has been about 220. In the summer 23 surge, we'll go up to about 240. That keeps us within</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 160</p> <p>1 one that the entire Army personnel community is working 2 very hard at. 3 And all of the sexual harassment and EO 4 stuff that we inserted into the program at that time now 5 has been institutionalized in the routine training 6 programs, the pre-command course that every battalion 7 commander, brigade commander and their sergeant majors go 8 to — cadre training courses — and we've added 9 orientation courses and mini-CC cadre training courses 10 for all those civilian and other personnel that come in 11 contact with soldiers on the training bases. 12 Next slide, please. 13 [Changes at DS Schools, slide 11] 14 Changes in drill sergeant school. This is 15 a done deal. It was effective 1 October. We've 16 graduated our first classes with a full up-change in the 17 program of instruction at drill sergeant schools. 18 The last time I talked to you, we were 19 phasing in human relations training inside of the 20 schools. That has all been done. We graduated our first 21 class with an embedded master fitness training program 22 inside there now. 23 And so, in fact, I was at Fort Sill</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 163</p> <p>1 the drill sergeant ratios in Basic and OSUT. 2 This year, we'll get about 400 more 3 spaces, and next year, about 600 spaces of training 4 developers, training support personnel, to return to the 5 training base from the department. Part of that is 6 starting to come — about 400 is starting to come into 7 the training base right now. 8 We are expanding our training base for 9 several reasons. BRAC is closing Leonard Wood, so their 10 load is going up — McClellan — so their load is going 11 up to Leonard Wood. We're going to open up Fort Benning 12 with three battalions of basic training there. We're 13 training one battalion of it right now and the other two 14 are staged in over the spring. The money is out there. 15 The barracks are being in-fix. So that's on track. 16 We've done a lot of work in future 17 barracks design, brought a team together and said, "We've 18 got a lot of requirements out there now — force 19 protection, separate-and-secure — what's that mean in 20 terms of design?" 21 So we have remodified and redesigned the 22 starship and have a standard design for that, and we've 23 laid down the future billeting program and requirements</p>

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1 for future construction. We have not done basic training
 2 or OSUT construction in a long time. The 2001 program
 3 will have at least two starships in it.
 4 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: General
 5 Bolt, let me interrupt very quickly. The Benning BCT,
 6 will that be gender-integrated or segregated?
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: No, it will be
 8 gender-pure right now.
 9 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Our problem in
 11 putting gender-integrated in there is I couldn't get the
 12 right mix of drill sergeants in there in the amount of
 13 time to cause that to happen. And so standing up a new
 14 training center and trying to gender-integrate it was a
 15 risk that I did not want to accept at that point in time,
 16 and so we'll take it in gender-pure.
 17 Two years down the road, when I get the
 18 right mix of drill sergeants in there and the right
 19 military occupational specialties, that may be looked at
 20 again.
 21 Next slide, please.
 22 The reason we went in there is it had the
 23 only available starships left.

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1 and then you do peer counseling, peer training, to raise
 2 everybody's level of expertise in this business.
 3 We have done a visit to McClelland,
 4 Jackson, Leonard Wood — and Jackson. We reported that
 5 back out to all the commandants yesterday at Fort Sill.
 6 It's a dynamite program and I think it'll go a lot of
 7 ways to building teamwork inside of IET, sharing good
 8 ideas, and working at standardization inside the program.
 9 We will continue that program probably, and the next
 10 generation will be March-April.
 11 We're doing a manpower review of drill
 12 sergeant ratios. That ought to be out in about — Well,
 13 it's done. It's being staffed and the recommendation is
 14 being worked right now. I would hope to get that by
 15 February.
 16 As you've gone out, I'm sure you've been
 17 told there's not enough drill sergeants out there, and
 18 that is particularly true in a lot of AIT locations where
 19 the ratio already is one-to-fifty. But we're doing shift
 20 work and there's unique requirements out there — there's
 21 no hospital on the installation and some of those kind of
 22 issues.
 23 We're looking at using different models to

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1 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Right.
 2 [Changes in IET Resourcing Over the Past
 3 Two Years, slide 14]
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Other resourcing
 5 changes. I talked to company executive officers,
 6 chaplains, and the training positions. We've put about
 7 \$16 million over two years into separate-and-secure. Not
 8 all of that was directly separate-and-secure. Some of
 9 that was modesty and privacy enhancement — changing
 10 rooms in some of the barracks and those kind of things.
 11 But that money is out and being used, almost all executed
 12 at this time.
 13 Last year-end, we put \$28 million in just
 14 barracks maintenance. We've made a major commitment to
 15 that and I believe we'll be able to continue that out of
 16 TRADOC with the department's help. You've been out
 17 there. There's some money to be spent in barracks
 18 renovations and maintenance.
 19 Done some work with learning resource
 20 centers in some places. Fort Sam Houston. We've been
 21 able to enhance training with some automation, and it
 22 looks very, very good right now and we've put the money
 23 in there.

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1 staff drill sergeants. I have not provided my good
 2 friend, the DCSPER, the bill yet, but I would think that
 3 we are going to see, at least in AIT, a one-to-thirty-
 4 five kind of ratio on average to meet the requirements
 5 out there and we'll put that bill onto the department's
 6 plate.
 7 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And General
 8 Ohle will be glad to pay it.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL OHLE: We've got a lot
 10 of extra NCO's.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Yeah.
 12 Focus review on attrition. I've told you
 13 we've got some attrition. We've got the whole —
 14 everybody in the attrition business now working.
 15 Traditionally, we've lost about 15 percent inside initial
 16 entry training. That's between Basic and AIT. We were
 17 almost up to 19 at one point in time this summer. I
 18 think we can probably maintain close to historic levels,
 19 given the quality of soldier we're still bringing in.
 20 Now, if you change the quality cuts, if
 21 you bring more GED's or you change some parameters, you
 22 know, there's no guarantee. But I think we can still
 23 meet the same graduation standards and keep our attrition

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1 We've put the money for the training base
 2 expansion and also organizational clothing and equipment
 3 into Fort Benning and at Fort Leonard Wood to meet our
 4 requirements there. And as part of the sixteen-hours
 5 enhancement, we've put some computers and some CD-ROM,
 6 situational training exercises in to assist in teaching
 7 some of the enhancements in AIT.
 8 Resourcing has been — that's a better
 9 picture than what I could have talked to you a year ago.
 10 Next slide, please.
 11 [Summary, slide 15]
 12 So in summary, revised policy, separate-
 13 and-secure, POI's, AIT training, drill sergeant training
 14 and selection.
 15 Next slide, please.
 16 [On-Going Actions, slide 1]
 17 A couple ongoing actions that I probably
 18 need to talk to you about. We have just completed our
 19 fourth iteration of something we're calling an IET
 20 assistance program. What it is, is that we have gotten a
 21 lot of outside help; but this is an inside trainer-on-
 22 trainer kind of model really focused around the combat
 23 training center model. And that's you go in, you assess,

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1 at a manageable level. We're working at ways of doing
 2 that right now.
 3 We're doing a lot of fitness studies.
 4 Remember we talked fitness extensively. It has been
 5 twelve years ago since we're really looked at what is the
 6 right standard for a soldier to go into basic training,
 7 how long should they be in a fitness training unit, what
 8 are the indicators of success in terms of what exercises
 9 you can perform to be successful in basic training while
 10 driving down injuries.
 11 What we found in a couple of the places
 12 where we were putting more people into fitness, our
 13 injury rates were going down, but our attrition rates
 14 were going up because three more weeks of basic training
 15 — is what people perceived it as. So we've just got to
 16 find the right balance.
 17 And I need to standardize what we're doing
 18 with injury rehabilitation. In two places I have rehab
 19 platoons inside the fitness training units and other
 20 places I don't have that, and so we are looking at that
 21 whole thing. And again, about February we ought to have
 22 some fairly clear answers on which direction and how we
 23 want to staff that and what policies we want to adjudge

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 170</p> <p>1 that. 2 Next slide, please. 3 [Assessment to Date, slide 2] 4 This is a personal assessment. I'm not 5 sure that — Well, I think it's a TRADOC assessment. 6 Drill sergeants selection and training has improved 7 drastically over the period of time. The feedback I get 8 from the field and what I see personally is that drill 9 sergeants over the last six months have been 10 significantly improved, and the enhancement we've just 11 made with master fitness, we'll even do better. 12 We've included and have re-emphasized 13 support cadre training. I looked at some statistics 14 yesterday. If you're talking about misconduct — abuse 15 misconduct inside the training base, 55 percent is done 16 by drill sergeants; 45 percent is done by somebody else. 17 That's where we have to put some emphasis, and that's 18 where we've placed some emphasis, also. 19 We've improved the quality, the quantity 20 of manpower, and funding. All have improved over the 21 last eighteen months in the training base. I'm not sure 22 General Reimer told you, but his view was, as we drew 23 down the Army, we cut the training base too much, and</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 173</p> <p>1 can question how hard they're working and the dedication 2 they're putting into it. 3 And I think the second thing that I hope 4 you had walked away with is that we've just got a great 5 committed force out there that's doing the job for our 6 nation every single day. I think the last bullet here 7 probably says it: we have Army soldiers doing the job 8 today, trained out of the training base, that are 9 defending their nation, representing us in Bosnia, Korea, 10 doing the job every single day, and so their results is 11 the training base. 12 Again, thank you very much, and I guess 13 we're ready for questions if you have any. 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Great. Thank you all 15 very much. That was a very inclusive brief and I will 16 just state for the record that I know everybody would 17 like to have copies of your slides. 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I think we — 19 LIEUTENANT COLONEL GORZELNIK: They are 20 available. 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Yeah, we've 22 already — I came prepared this time. 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I noticed that the</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 171</p> <p>1 that's the payback. That's what you're seeing right 2 there (Indicating). 3 Values training makes a difference. It 4 really does. And in terms of the commitment of soldiers, 5 in terms of their conduct, in terms of all the indicators 6 that I can find, values training has really made a 7 difference inside the thing. And, plus, it's made a 8 difference for drill sergeants. 9 Of everything that we have done, I think 10 that has been the greatest impact to the Army, who, as we 11 claim we're a values-based organization, we are now 12 making soldiers measure up to the values of the 13 organization and be a part of that. 14 Soldiers feel challenged, and the initial 15 work DAIG is doing and some of the work that I get 16 anecdotally and the feedback that the schoolhouses are 17 getting from the graduates going out is that the field is 18 gaining a greater degree of confidence and satisfaction 19 in the soldiers that we're sending them out there. 20 I guess that pretty well wraps up my run- 21 down. Personally, I would thank you for the opportunity 22 to come in and give this wrap-up. 23 I did this as part of another presentation</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 174</p> <p>1 commissioners were scribbling away very fast and 2 ultimately gave up. 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: No, we — I've 4 got the whole thing prepared for you. 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you again. And I 6 will start with what I hope is a pretty easy question, 7 which is that, taking you back to the mandatory 8 graduation requirements, I got a little lost in the 9 negatives concerning your description of the effect on 10 new starts and recycles and the policy in terms of 11 remedial training. 12 I wasn't sure whether you were saying that 13 the policy now is to keep them in the regular training a 14 little longer before they get recycled or to identify and 15 recycle people earlier. I just got mixed up. 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Let me take you 17 through it. Early on, I have been a very, very strong 18 proponent of "new start." I mean, my direction to 19 everybody was we're not quitting on any soldier until 20 that soldier absolutely convinces us that he needs to 21 quit or for some other reason — mentally, morally, 22 physically — not capable of being a soldier. 23 And so what we — In the first cuts of</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 172</p> <p>1 one time and clearly there's been just a tremendous 2 amount of change over the last eighteen months, a 3 tremendous amount of energy, and it's not until you put a 4 set of slides together like this that you realize what 5 the impact has been. 6 I guess I would also say from the training 7 base perspective, thanks for your hard work. Nobody 8 likes to be inspected — me particularly — but I would 9 just tell you that I don't think anybody's going to be 10 able to say that you didn't come, you didn't see 11 training, that you didn't take a hard look and assessment 12 at it. And so just from the training base, I'd just 13 thank you for all your hard work and the time that you've 14 taken to come out and look at it. 15 I would hope that you saw two things while 16 you were out there if nothing else. I would hope that 17 you saw the dedication of leaders and trainers to train 18 American soldiers to do their job. I mean, our drill 19 sergeants and company commanders and battalion 20 commanders, brigade commanders, that are running these 21 outfits out there I think are highly dedicated. And you 22 might question how they're training, where they're 23 training, those kinds of issues, but I don't think you</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 175</p> <p>1 350-6, we encouraged a very strong new-start program, and 2 that says, "If you don't make it by this cycle or if 3 you're not making satisfactory progress, you need to go 4 back a couple weeks." 5 What we found as a result of that was — 6 especially in about the first four weeks, maybe through 7 the first two cycles — first five weeks, first two 8 cycles — is that, first of all, the soldier thinks — 9 First of all, has buddies; came in together. The platoon 10 really is the basis for the training. That's where the 11 cohesion is — knows he has the best drill sergeant in 12 the world: "Every other drill sergeant may be a slug, but 13 I've got the very best drill sergeant out there." 14 And so as soon as you say "new start" to a 15 soldier at the second week, even though they've enlisted 16 for three or four years, two more weeks of basic training 17 — "I know the drill sergeant in the new place isn't 18 going to like me. I've got to leave my buddies. I ain't 19 going to train anymore." And so our attrition — our 20 motivation attrition, lack of motivation chapters, were 21 the ones that were starting to kill us. 22 So we went back and reviewed that in a 23 couple of our training bases and we said, "Okay. Let's</p>

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1 emphasize remedial training. Let's go another step and
2 try to get that soldier inside his current chain of
3 command to meet the standard, and wherever possible,
4 let's move that soldier along. And then if we have to
5 remediate, remediate a little bit later, or at the end,
6 send him on back."

7 I mean, if you get a soldier through nine
8 weeks of basic training and say, "You haven't met the PT
9 standard, you've got to go back two weeks," that soldier
10 will do that because they know that they're very, very
11 close and their buddies are leaving anyway.

12 Those are the kinds of things that I'm
13 talking about. These are all techniques, has nothing to
14 do with the graduation requirements themselves. It's a
15 recognition, I think, and something that we are really
16 pushing very hard on right now, that the platoon forms
17 the basis for the cohesive satisfaction of the
18 requirements to get through basic training. And that
19 says it's as much of a team operation to help your buddy
20 get through, help your outfit to get through, as it is to
21 get an individual to measure up.

22 And so what we're really trying to do is
23 focus on drill sergeant responsibility for his platoon,

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1 something again — I mean, that's about the time we
2 change equipment and people — and so the video that I've
3 got showing commitment today is going to be out-of-date.

4 So that's one aspect. So I think there
5 are — But I think the POI's, some of those kinds of
6 things probably will have a longer time.

7 The aspect of values, I think, will
8 continue to live in our Army. I think we've learned a
9 tremendous, tremendous level. Not that we ever stopped
10 believing in values, but if you believe this Army of ours
11 is a culmination of competency and values — All of a
12 sudden we started talking about where we've been rather
13 than who we were and we swung the pendulum to competency.
14 I think the lesson out there today is values make a
15 difference. Soldiers want to have something to believe
16 in and it gives us a foundation for our Army. I think
17 that will stay in the Army for a long, long time.

18 I guess that's what I would tell you. I
19 don't think you can guarantee anything. I mean, if the
20 Army tomorrow took a 20 percent reduction in fiscal
21 resources, with no degradation in the type of missions
22 that we're receiving, I would suspect that you would see
23 shavings off of this program and other critical programs

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1 soldier cohesion, and trying to keep that soldier inside
2 that same outfit as long as we can to meet those
3 graduation requirements.

4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Great. Well, I'm glad I
5 asked. Thank you.

6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: In those cases,
7 it has proved to be very, very useful.

8 Every place I go, I apologize for not
9 being smart enough to understand that earlier, but that
10 was sort of the outcome of this increased graduation
11 requirements and non-waiver policy.

12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Good. Thank you
13 very much.

14 I will go this way (Indicating).

15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I've got
16 several questions. I'll only ask one so we can get
17 around by the bewitching hour.

18 When I was a lad back in Pennsylvania,
19 there was a big graveyard in my little borough and there
20 used to be these little signs on the graves, "in
21 perpetuity," and of course, that meant that that grave
22 was always going to be kept up.

23 How — And I ask you for our benefit. How

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1 just like any other times, but I think there's a
2 recognition — better recognition today among the
3 leadership of what the impact of that is in the training
4 base. As you can see, we're paying stuff back.

5 It's fragile. The training base is a
6 very, very fragile place. It is leadership-driven. It's
7 not driven by an awful lot of resources. It is
8 commitment and leadership-driven, and so you can move
9 away from it very quickly if you don't — I think one of
10 the things, too, that will keep this, is I think — I
11 think I was hired as sort of the two-year commitment to
12 basic training and OSUT and IET.

13 I think there's now a recognition that
14 when Bolt gets too old and we get tired of him, we're
15 going to need Son-of-Bolt to come. That there needs to
16 be a senior look and review of IET by somebody that's got
17 access to the department staff, to the Chief and to the
18 TRADOC commander, that can say when things are going
19 right or going wrong.

20 The commandants do have that kind of
21 access, for the most part, at the two-star level, the
22 people that are executing this thing. And so I think
23 there's been a recognition that maybe in some small way

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1 are you going to keep these improvements in perpetuity
2 based on a track record just in —

3 DR. MOSKOS: At least for the next ten
4 years.

5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — just in
6 my career, based on a track record whereby we've reduced
7 the length of recruit training because the GAO said the
8 P2T2 line was just too long or we reduced standards
9 because we thought that was what we should do, those
10 kinds of things, or, quite frankly, we made changes just
11 on the whim of whoever was sitting, you know, in the high
12 office? How do we keep these improvements in perpetuity?

13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Boy, that's a
14 hard question.

15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Well, I did
16 it to you on purpose.

17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I know you did.
18 I know you did.

19 First of all — and I'm not sure how long
20 of a time frame we're talking about — I would tell you
21 that there are things that have occurred — programs of
22 instructions, training support materials — that probably
23 have about a five-year life span before we have to do

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1 I've been useful to this process.

2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
3 Thank you.

4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL OHLE: Sir, if I could
5 add-on, from the personnel perspective, I think what I
6 said about the self-assessment is absolutely key. We got
7 away from it in the training base. We did it very well
8 in our tactical units, and I think now what General Bolt
9 has talked about is ingrained. It's a system in the
10 Army.

11 Just one example in the personnel. We're
12 looking at the reasons that soldiers are leaving basic
13 training, so I've got ARI doing exit surveys now to see
14 why every soldier is leaving. We give them the
15 questionnaire when he comes in — he or she comes in —
16 and then when they leave for any reason, we do an exit
17 survey; so we're able to analyze now what these soldiers
18 are quitting for or why they're leaving.

19 So I think as you do this self-assessment,
20 I think you're going to end up with a better product like
21 Joe's talking about.

22 MS. POPE: I, too, have lots of questions.
23 I'll ask one. The choice is kind of hard.

1 One of the things that we've heard across
 2 the services when we asked are you ready, you know, in
 3 the operational side, you know, to deploy — men, women,
 4 training, what's the product — for the majority, the
 5 answer has been "yes" with a caveat, and that is
 6 sustainability.

7 And the Chief alluded to it this morning a
 8 little bit and it's a couple-fold. Part of it is the
 9 E-5/E-7 void that's there and what's being done to that,
 10 and the other is, I guess, change and expectations of
 11 what the Army's going to be called on next.

12 I mean, there's a real concern — again,
 13 not just the Army, but across the services — about how
 14 long can we sustain this? Yes, we can deploy. How long
 15 do you keep me out there?

16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURNETTE: I'll take
 17 that one.

18 MS. POPE: It covers all three areas.

19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURNETTE: I think the
 20 first thing I'd say is, like any good team, we don't get
 21 to pick our schedule. I mean, you're in the Army, the
 22 Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, to serve the nation. The
 23 President, the national command authorities, the Congress

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I've got two
 2 wars down there, so — But, no...

3 Going to DESERT STORM, walking around the
 4 101st — I was the chief at the time — and you say, "Are
 5 you ready to go?" "Sir, you know, I'm not sure." "Boy,
 6 if we can have just two more live fires," and, "boy, I'm
 7 short two guys." "We'll get you two guys." "Well, I
 8 won't know them."

9 I mean, you fret over readiness. We all
 10 fret over readiness. We'd always like to have one more
 11 practice before the game. We'd all like to have — I sat
 12 in Panama and I said, "Boy, if I could just have these"
 13 — At that time, it was a PAQ-4. It was one of these
 14 things that you hit on the side of a rifle and it
 15 illuminates the target. If I could just have seven more
 16 of those, I could do anything anybody ever wanted me to
 17 do. You fret over that kind of stuff. I think that's
 18 sort of endemic to the answers that you get to those
 19 kinds of questions.

20 The fact is, is that this is a — you
 21 know, I have a very high degree of confidence in the
 22 training level, in the ability of the soldiers that we
 23 have out there. I mean, if you look at the track record,

1 — they pretty well decide what you're going to do. I
 2 mean, most services don't go around inventing missions.

3 So the first thing I'd say is that we have
 4 to have an expectation that we're going to serve the
 5 nation — and whether it's in Bosnia or Korea or
 6 Southwest Asia or whatever. That's the first point.

7 The second point is that we, as senior
 8 leaders, have the responsibility to report out to the
 9 President and to the Congress when conditions are such
 10 that we're having a hard time to get the job done.

11 So finally what I would say to you is
 12 this: that I believe that it's sustainable as long as we
 13 know what we're getting into and that the Congress, in
 14 the end, provides us the resources to do the job.

15 And, frankly, this last year was a good-
 16 news year. For instance, when the Army goes into Bosnia
 17 — for several years, one of the problems up-front was
 18 that there weren't really resources. That — you were
 19 eating your readiness accounts all through the year and
 20 get reimbursed at the end of the year. Starting this
 21 year, we actually got that money up-front.

22 So I think that the armed forces are ready
 23 to do the nation's bidding. On the other side of that,

1 we haven't failed our nation in a long, long time. I
 2 mean, we're doing a great job in Bosnia. Soldiers are
 3 out there doing what we're asking for.

4 I was in Panama. I saw the same thing.

5 I guess you had the outfit that went into
 6 Haiti.

7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURNETTE: I think the
 8 fact of the matter is that the systems that we have in
 9 place and the systems that we have improved in our
 10 training base is right for the Army.

11 And the point I would make, although
 12 nobody really asked me about it, is that as we look at
 13 this, as we're training our forces, each service is a
 14 little bit different. I mean, we are all different and
 15 we've got systems that work because our organizations are
 16 different; our missions are different; our tempos are
 17 different.

18 So I would say we have each — in
 19 particular, the Army over the last couple years — have
 20 gotten our training base about right. Would you want to
 21 put a little more money into it? A few more people into
 22 it? I sure would love to do that. Unfortunately, we
 23 can't really do that.

1 it's the responsibility of the Congress and the people to
 2 make sure you have the resources to do what you have to
 3 do.

4 And, yes, OPTEMPO is high. It is very
 5 high for all the services right now. But the fact of the
 6 matter is, when we joined up, we joined up for that, and
 7 you shouldn't — you really shouldn't be whining about
 8 that kind of business. I mean, you came in to be a
 9 soldier and you came in to do the nation's bidding. And
 10 if you don't like that kind of job, I mean, there's not
 11 much you can do about it.

12 But I would say that I think we're all
 13 doing better in two respects: Congress is supporting us
 14 on it and we're getting better predictability so we can
 15 tell the troops — airmen, Marines, sailors — when
 16 they're going to do what they have to do.

17 That's the way I'd answer you.

18 MS. POPE: Okay. Thank you.

19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Let me just add
 20 one more thing to that. Deployment to Southwest Asia —
 21 Southeast Asia — Southwest Asia? Southwest Asia.

22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURNETTE: Pick the one
 23 you like.

1 MS. POPE: I guess the follow-on to that
 2 is — and I think I'm hearing you but I want to ask you
 3 directly — is that the systems that are in place — the
 4 three of you are confident that if there was a
 5 sustainability issue, that somewhere in the systems that
 6 are now in place you would know. There would be feedback
 7 to you so that it —

8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL OHLE: Oh, yeah.
 9 Absolutely.

10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURNETTE: I agree with
 11 that.

12 MS. POPE: Thank you.

13 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, I want
 14 to thank all of you for being here because I know that
 15 you probably didn't have anything else to do today.

16 My question has to do really, I think —
 17 speaks to leader training. And I remember the old
 18 leadership manual, having a chapter in there about
 19 acceptance and integration of new people. In the
 20 training I'm talking about, is there any plan to
 21 institute formally some type of training that speaks to
 22 leader expectation?

23 And the reason I ask the question — and

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1 you can probably guess — is that in our travels — in
 2 all the services, but very clearly in the Army — there
 3 seems to be an incredible out-of-proportion perception of
 4 the leader out here of what he or she should be getting
 5 from the training base and the reality of what the
 6 training base can actually produce for them. And it
 7 seems to me it's a training issue.
 8 I put up with this when I was a division
 9 sergeant major in the 25th, sir. We walked the same —
 10 And, you know, the young captain wants that kid to arrive
 11 on the first day, put 125 pounds on his back, run him —
 12 walk him for twenty-five miles and then go into a live-
 13 fire, and never hear a whimper, and if it doesn't occur
 14 that way, then obviously Fort Benning failed him.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Yeah.
 16 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: So that's
 17 the question I ask, because it appears to be alive and
 18 well out there.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: It's interesting
 20 you say that. We worked that issue yesterday at Fort
 21 Sill. I mean, it is clearly — clearly — the most
 22 divisive issue that is out there between TRADOC or the
 23 training base and the field today.

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1 And that is, where do we draw the line
 2 between the institutional responsibilities for individual
 3 skills up to about a buddy-team level and where do the
 4 collective skills and the collective training and the
 5 mission-focus training take over? Intuitively, we all
 6 know where that line is but nobody can quite agree to it.
 7 And so we were looking at ways at trying
 8 to address those issues and we asked all the commandants
 9 to start addressing those issues inside the leader
 10 training at IOBC and at the service schools, NCO
 11 academies and BNOC/ANOC that they have available.
 12 And more importantly, they do a — We have
 13 now started doing some — almost all — every year or
 14 every two years the service schools bring back in the
 15 senior leaders of their branch for updates on their
 16 branch. Engineers do it down at Leonard Wood.
 17 And so last year, based on the Leonard
 18 Wood model, they went in and they brought — and they
 19 spent about a half-a-day doing nothing but IET issues.
 20 They took those people: "Here's a task we're training.
 21 What tasks do we need to change? Are you satisfied with
 22 the product? Here's what we're training."
 23 And so with a great exchange of ideas —

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1 and it really provided a baseline of "Here's what you're
 2 getting. Here's what you're going to have to do with
 3 that force. What's your suggestions on what you want to
 4 change, given the constraints of time and effort?" We've
 5 asked all the commandants to start doing that, including
 6 that in their branch leadership conferences.
 7 So I think a culmination of service
 8 schools and the dialogue between the branch school and
 9 the units for which they have a training responsibility
 10 will start addressing this issue in some way.
 11 But you're right. You're clearly on —
 12 You know, it used to be that we had — when I was a
 13 battalion commander in the early eighties, you ended up
 14 getting a little pamphlet from the school that says,
 15 "Here are the tasks they were trained in and here's the
 16 ones we didn't do." At least you knew where you were.
 17 And then we chopped training developers out of the system
 18 and we stopped producing those.
 19 So that dialogue has started back up again
 20 and we're trying to start closing those kinds of things.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURNETTE: I'd say that
 22 — That's right, Joe. But the other thing I would say is
 23 that most field commanders, at least the senior ones,

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1 have come to the expectation that the training base —
 2 the initial entry training — is turning out an
 3 apprentice soldier, and that that apprentice soldier is
 4 coming to the unit and then has to have subsequent
 5 training in soldierization in the unit.
 6 I think most people who think about it
 7 understand that. But I think we still don't have a good
 8 enough communication, particularly with our captains and
 9 our majors, to explain that to them. Battalion
 10 commanders get it because when they go back for their
 11 pre-command training at their branch, they go into the
 12 IET units and they see all that.
 13 But before that, we really don't get that
 14 point across. I agree with Bob.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: The DAIG will
 16 tell you that major and above understand that process,
 17 like the soldiers, high satisfaction right now. Captain,
 18 first sergeant, it wavers, and squad leaders and platoon
 19 sergeants think we turn out lousy soldiers.
 20 That's sort of — And it's for exactly the
 21 reasons that you said. They didn't come with the mission
 22 focus of the organization, trained to that level.
 23 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.

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1 DR. CANTOR: You mentioned in passing the
 2 tighter coordination between recruiting and training.
 3 You mentioned physical training issues in recruits. Can
 4 you give a little more detail on what is happening?
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Well, there's
 6 lots of things that are starting to occur. There's a
 7 commitment package that they start working right —
 8 Recruiting Command and us have the same — and the
 9 training base have the same problem. That's called
 10 attrition.
 11 It's called DEP loss in the recruiting
 12 business, and it's called basic training or IET attrition
 13 inside of my business. But the fact is, it remains the
 14 same. It's buyer's remorse. It's a change in the level
 15 of commitment of the signee.
 16 So what we're starting to do with videos,
 17 packages home, DEP training, is trying to reinforce
 18 commitment of soldiers from the first days that they
 19 start now enlisting as opposed to the first day they show
 20 up at the training base.
 21 So a lot of this values stuff now that
 22 we've laid out and a lot of the focus on character of
 23 soldier is now being pushed into the Recruiting Command.

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1 That's one thing.
 2 Secondly, there is — we are taking the
 3 same values package we're doing with drill sergeants now
 4 and we're working that into the Recruiting Command. So
 5 that, in fact, we have a seamless commitment or role
 6 model from recruiter to drill sergeant to — It's a very,
 7 very interesting phenomenon. Every recruit thinks their
 8 recruiter's the greatest person in the world, and —
 9 MS. POPE: Or the worst.
 10 DR. CANTOR: Or the worst.
 11 MS. POPE: Or the worst.
 12 DR. CANTOR: We heard more often the
 13 opposite.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: It's worse after
 15 they get their orders.
 16 DR. CANTOR: I think we heard more
 17 negative than positive.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: No, no. It's —
 19 Surprisingly, recruiters get "Dear John" letters. They
 20 get a letter that says, "I'm in basic training and I have
 21 the best drill sergeant ever," and then the
 22 correspondence ends. It's a "Dear John" letter to his
 23 recruiter. Now he's got a drill sergeant.

1 So that's the other thing that's
 2 happening.
 3 The third thing that's happened now is
 4 that we have formed the cabal of Recruiting Command MEPS
 5 and IET to start working all of the medical, EPTS.
 6 Yesterday we started working all of the issues of
 7 security clearances, ETNACS, that hold people — If
 8 Recruiting Command misplaces one number in a security
 9 application, I've got a kid that spends 180 days after
 10 they're trained inside the training base if they need a
 11 security clearance to go to their job.
 12 You think we're not dependent on one
 13 another? Those are really big issues. I've got 1,300
 14 soldiers today probably sitting, waiting to do something,
 15 that we probably could have handled by some type of
 16 further association.
 17 So that's the kind of interaction that's
 18 happening today. I think it is tremendously useful.
 19 The other thing that happens is — is that
 20 — I'm sure you've been talked to about summer surge and
 21 how it flows into. We now have a forum with myself, the
 22 DCSPER — the DCSOPS has got a rep in there; the force
 23 structure guy, Recruiting Command, MEPS — that try to

1 work at ways of flattening that, to get to decisions on
 2 changes and requirements for MOS level of detail inside
 3 the Army so that we can start getting this thing flat so
 4 that we do not have a plan out there that operates at 110
 5 percent efficiency or capacity in the summertime and 40
 6 percent capacity the rest of the time.
 7 Those are the kind of —
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Level load
 9 is a real problem, Joe.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I understand.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And there
 12 is a real thing called FMAM — February, March, April and
 13 May.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Yeah. Right.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And it's
 16 when you — these recruiters have their greatest
 17 difficulty. And if you're going to keep that quality,
 18 you know, boy, you have to address that.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Yeah. Well,
 20 we're doing a little work right now with some bonuses to
 21 see if we can move a little bit of that around. There's
 22 probably some other markets out there. There's probably
 23 the first-semester college market. I saw some statistics

1 yesterday that say about —
 2 DR. CANTOR: Leave those alone, please.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: No, no. About
 4 65 percent of all high school kids go to college, and 15
 5 or 20 percent of those drop out after their freshman
 6 year. I mean, there's a big market.
 7 DR. MOSKOS: That's right.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: So no, we do not
 9 recruit on campuses.
 10 DR. CANTOR: I'm joking.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Yet.
 12 DR. CANTOR: Right.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL OHLE: But the DCSPER
 14 does.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I did not —
 16 Just to sort of wrap that answer up, I did not think that
 17 it was — personally, that that was going to make a
 18 tremendous difference by putting Recruiting Command and
 19 TRADOC together or put the Recruiting Command subordinate
 20 to TRADOC. There are tremendous payoffs associated with
 21 that. Tremendous payoffs. The model the Marines have
 22 used for years I think is very, very useful to our
 23 situation right now.

1 DR. CANTOR: Thank you.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: I'm going to ask a question
 3 for General Keys first. And I think you've sort of
 4 alluded to this already, but — This is for General Bolt.
 5 For the record, does Lieutenant General Bolt see his new
 6 assignment as his primary duty in his present assignment
 7 as Deputy Commander of TRADOC?
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: It's my only
 9 duty.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Thank you.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: It is my only
 12 duty. I have not been on board. I have not — I get
 13 involved in recruiting only because of the interface, the
 14 interrelated actions. I spend at least three days a week
 15 at some training base in the United States Army.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Related to
 18 that is will there be a Son-of-Bolt?
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I think there
 20 will be. I mean, you're going to have to ask General
 21 Ohle and his chief, but —
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURNETTE: I'll bet the
 23 Chief answered that this morning.

1 DR. CANTOR: He did. We're just trying to
 2 seek consistency.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: He hasn't told
 4 me yet.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: That's right. You don't know
 6 yet yourself.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURNETTE: You're not
 8 being fired or anything, Joe.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: No, I hope not.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL OHLE: Or me, Joe.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: No, I think
 12 there will be. I think what has really happened is that
 13 the impact of the trainer from at least TRADOC
 14 perspective, maybe even more important than the impact of
 15 a three-star in the combat — So, you know, I don't know
 16 how that would ever go if another three-star was needed,
 17 but I think they're very comfortable with — or very sure
 18 that the impact of something that watches training on a
 19 daily basis inside of TRADOC is important to them.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: I'll turn to my — and if
 21 time permits once we go around, I have a second question.
 22 But my — First I want to just commend you for this
 23 business about reducing attrition. There's always such a

1 problem, and to the degree you can resist that pressure
 2 — because it looks nice to have lower attrition, but at
 3 the same time, you're making down-the-road, you know,
 4 negative payoffs on it, and I hope you will continue to
 5 keep, you know, standards up.
 6 My question was — I'm thinking a little
 7 bit outside of the box on the drill sergeant pressures.
 8 The Israeli Army has a system of sort of like middle-
 9 level enlisted people — E-4 types — who are sort of
 10 like assistant drill sergeants, and they take pressure
 11 off — By the way, in academia we have teaching
 12 assistants and research assistants who, by the way, make
 13 life for professors a lot more bearable.
 14 I was wondering if anybody's ever thought
 15 of using an E-4 as kind of an assistant drill sergeant.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: We use them in
 17 the training base and —
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: — we retained
 20 them inside our reserve component drill sergeant program.
 21 Drill corporals is what they were called.
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Drill corporals. Okay.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Drill corporals.

1 DR. MOSKOS: Good.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: And they proved
 3 to be unsatisfactory. The maturity level of those were
 4 not sufficiently high enough. They were involved in
 5 abuse. They were involved in low-level scams of money
 6 and things like that. They were somebody else a drill
 7 sergeant ended up having to watch, and we wanted —
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Rather than relieving work.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Yeah. And so we
 10 walked away from it.
 11 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And you even
 12 started to restrict, for the most part, sergeants from
 13 serving as drill sergeants.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: We do not use
 15 any sergeant who has not been through BNOC or they're on
 16 a promotion list.
 17 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: That's
 18 correct.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Well, I'm just wondering, you
 20 know, Bill, if there was some kind of special screening
 21 device for the drill corporal-type thing where you might
 22 get higher quality drill corporals to help these drill
 23 sergeants out.

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: In fact, I
 2 looked at —
 3 DR. MOSKOS: I don't know.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Because of the
 5 issue with women drill sergeants and some shortages
 6 there, I looked at E-5 non-BNOC graduates of women and
 7 decided to walk away from that — again, because of a
 8 schooling, maturity issue associated.
 9 Now, we have some MOS's in which you'll
 10 see sergeant/E-5's as drill sergeants, but that's because
 11 of time to get promoted after BNOC. They're all
 12 promotable. And so, you know, at least — That's a
 13 quality cut that says at least you have institutionally
 14 the most mature population that you can get.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL OHLE: We are going to
 17 take a look in the recruiting business to have recruiting
 18 corporals. We think it's very important to get somebody
 19 out that can relate to those young individuals, and that
 20 will help the drill sergeants. And so we're going to
 21 infuse the Recruiting Command with spec 4's, corporals.
 22 And not keep them out there for a full thirty-six months,
 23 but just eighteen months.

1 DR. MOSKOS: Sure.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL OHLE: After they get
 3 trained, eighteen months, and then we'll put them right
 4 back into troop. But the Navy — We gave that suggestion
 5 to the Navy. The Navy's trying it and their right rate
 6 per corporal is three times what a normal sergeant's
 7 right rate is.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Yes.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL OHLE: So I think it's
 10 all-important, this — and that's why it's good that
 11 TRADOC and USARC are merged.
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I have what I hope is a
 13 quick question for General Burnette concerning readiness.
 14 General Reimer this morning alluded to the problems of
 15 the Cold War reporting system for readiness; that it was
 16 not really appropriate for today's strategies and
 17 requirements.
 18 And I just wonder if you could tell us to
 19 what extent the very excellent brief you gave us reflects
 20 more of the Cold War approach or the more modern
 21 approach. You know, where is it along the evolution?
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURNETTE: The issue is
 23 a real simple issue. If you have a unit like the 1st

1 Cavalry Division that right now has part of its forces in
 2 Bosnia and part of its forces in Fort Hood, how do you
 3 report their readiness? Their readiness for doing their
 4 mission in Bosnia is obviously very good because that's
 5 where they are. Their readiness for flowing to Korea to
 6 fight the next major theater war is not so good.
 7 Our current system requires us to report
 8 against the major theater war, so we are exploring a way
 9 to report both. And as the Department of Defense goes
 10 through the update of how they're going to report
 11 readiness during this next year based on congressional
 12 requirements, then we're going to look at a way to do
 13 that.
 14 So the way we do it now is we report it
 15 against the major war, and then, oh, by the way, against
 16 the contingency that you're on. So you get a little bit
 17 confused sometimes, depending on which way you look at
 18 it. So we're taking a fresh look at that. That's how we
 19 do it.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My question
 22 deals with IET standardization. Obviously that's a
 23 difficult task when you look at the number of specialties

1 and the number of training bases that you have to look
 2 at. And some of the feedback we get as you talk in an
 3 operational unit of the cross-sector is the defining
 4 moment or PT or — with one group or one series of
 5 training bases seems to be very up, whereas, maybe a
 6 couple other training bases seems to be, well, you know,
 7 we're not receiving the same kind of product or that kind
 8 of thing based on PT or values training or whatever.
 9 What are you doing to try to ensure as an
 10 example that the defining moment in each one of those
 11 training bases — you know, that last great effort — or
 12 that PT is in fact truly standardized and the product is
 13 basically the same coming out?
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: I think we're
 15 doing that in basic training and in OSUT pretty well
 16 right now. We've gone to the POI's; we've standardized
 17 the graduation requirements. I track PT scores by
 18 installation, by kind of unit, just to get a feel that
 19 we're sort of in the ballpark.
 20 I think we have returned to a standard POI
 21 inside of the five places we do basic training very, very
 22 well right now.
 23 OSUT — The first — We have realigned the

1 BT requirements against the OSUT requirements with
 2 graduation requirements, standard requirements, the same
 3 way. I think we have done that very, very well. But
 4 there is no standardization between armor OSUT and
 5 infantry OSUT after the ninth week because of the MOS
 6 tracks that they have.
 7 Where the field has their complaint and
 8 what drives that is not the BT standards or the OSUT
 9 standards. It's the length of the AIT courses that feed
 10 those soldiers into them. If you are a 71-Lima clerk
 11 typist/personnel specialist coming out of Fort Jackson,
 12 South Carolina, your AIT is about four-and-a-half weeks,
 13 but if you are a 75-Zulu, which is a personnel specialist
 14 of another ilk, you're in there nine weeks.
 15 So I would suspect that the person getting
 16 71-Lima says, "That soldier's PT scores aren't as high as
 17 everybody else's," only because we've had him in there
 18 five less weeks.
 19 If you are a unit supply specialist,
 20 you're in there for fourteen weeks. If you are a chip
 21 repairer or electronics repairer, you're in there for
 22 twenty-seven weeks.
 23 So what comes out is not so much a

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1 function of the location when we're talking about
 2 physical stuff; it's a function of how long you have been
 3 in the AIT process. And that I don't think we will ever
 4 be able to standardize because what we have done in terms
 5 of efficiency, we have crunched them down as much as we
 6 can based on the critical task required for — and the
 7 complexity of the task associated with that military
 8 occupational specialty.

9 But in terms of standardization of BT, the
 10 BT experience, I think I can probably guarantee you right
 11 now that there's probably not more than five PT points
 12 difference in any one of them and there's probably not
 13 more than one major event difference in any single one of
 14 them.

15 We still have a couple differences in some
 16 of the confidence courses, teamwork courses, because we
 17 just have not been able to build the courses to standard
 18 the same places — every place. Within a little while,
 19 we'll have that down, too. We're working through that
 20 right now.

21 But I think there's a common BT experience
 22 out there. There is not a common AIT experience. But in
 23 terms of soldierization, there is a common soldierization

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: If you look at
 2 propensity-to-serve diagrams — you may have seen some of
 3 them — you go to 1992, and it starts going down like
 4 this (Indicating) and the propensity is now about 18
 5 percent, something like that. And that is twenty years
 6 after the end of the draft and the reduction of the size
 7 of the Army after Vietnam, and so what that says is that
 8 "Uncle/Dad did not go, and I have nobody that knows what
 9 that's all about."

10 It was very interesting yesterday in a
 11 conference that I was in, it was all about IET. We had
 12 sergeant majors and the senior leaders of all — every
 13 AIT and OSUT and BT organization in the Army there. And
 14 so one sergeant major said, "Well, when my daughter
 15 graduated from here, this is what she said," and all of a
 16 sudden there were about eight other people that popped
 17 up: "Well, this is what my son said."

18 I mean, that room was proliferating United
 19 States Army — which this goes to reinforce that sons and
 20 daughters of military people, even though they have not
 21 even retired but they had that experience, have a higher
 22 propensity to serve.

23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL OHLE: There's two

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1 experience that is now occurring because of our policies
 2 on phase 4 controls and phase 5 controls.

3 MS. POPE: My question is actually to
 4 General Ohle, and I want to make sure what I heard is
 5 what you meant. And it had to do with you — And I
 6 forget what it was about, but you were talking about it
 7 being best for women. And so I want to — And I wish I
 8 could remember what the specific was.

9 But I guess I'm asking the question — is
 10 there anything the Army is doing that is best for the
 11 women, that's not also best for the men or best for the
 12 overall Army.

13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL OHLE: I think it's all
 14 best for the overall Army. I believe what I was talking
 15 about was the integration right from the very beginning.

16 MS. POPE: That's what it was. Thank you.

17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL OHLE: And the
 18 integration is so important. It's the team-building.
 19 It's the preparation that we need. If we delay and put
 20 it down the road on the unit commander, then I think it
 21 becomes a bigger factor — a readiness issue — because
 22 you will have other training and other integration
 23 problems that you will have already have solved once you

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1 concepts we're working. General Foley, the commander of
 2 5th Army down in San Antonio, is going to do the
 3 experiment and I talked to him yesterday. The two
 4 concepts are partnering and teaming.

5 Teaming, meaning AC/RC — active, guard
 6 and reserve. We've got great soldiers out in the
 7 community today that can talk to other recruits who can
 8 help us come in. So that's the teaming aspect.

9 Last week, we had the guard and reserve
 10 down in Little Rock and the Chief of Staff of the Army
 11 talked to them about that concept. Not specifically as
 12 it applied to recruiting, but we translate what teaming's
 13 about for the Army into the recruiting community and I
 14 think we've got a winner.

15 The second part is partnering —
 16 partnership — and that is, Army and partners out in the
 17 community. The mayor of San Antonio is going to
 18 participate. All the service organizations — the
 19 American Legion, the Disabled Vets — all those that are
 20 out there are going to come together in this meeting to
 21 help recruit soldiers for the Army.

22 I think both of those concepts would be
 23 terrific and we're going to expand it through USARC,

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1 put them into the basic and do it as gender-integrated
 2 there.

3 So that's what I meant in terms of —

4 MS. POPE: Okay. That is exactly what you
 5 were talking about.

6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL OHLE: Yes, ma'am.

7 MS. POPE: Okay. Thank you.

8 I want to make one comment, and this is a
 9 personal observation on recruiting and it was just the
 10 feedback from recruits. And that is, I was pleasantly
 11 surprised on the number of exposure to military members.
 12 I mean, not all of it has been Army. But that influenced
 13 the decisions to join.

14 I mean, it concerns me because of the
 15 number of people, but I wish there was a way that
 16 recruiters could, you know, elicit/solicit retired, ex-
 17 members, because that impact was significant. You know,
 18 when we asked the questions about —

19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: Well, the
 20 highest propensity to serve is based on personal
 21 experience of people that have been members of the
 22 service.

23 MS. POPE: Right.

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1 through the whole country, and we've got to work through
 2 the grassroots —

3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: You know, it's
 4 interesting. That's why Junior ROTC is such a big thing.
 5 I mean, we don't recruit Junior ROTC. We're prohibited
 6 from it. But statistically, about — I think it's 70
 7 percent, 75 percent, of all Junior ROTC kids either have
 8 some association with the military — either through a
 9 military academy, through ROTC, through enlistment,
 10 National Guard, reserve — have some type of association.

11 And the only thing I can say is that
 12 there's somebody with a green suit who deals with them,
 13 that they become comfortable with, starts allaying the
 14 fears and myths and those kinds of things.

15 Recruiting Command will tell you that
 16 there are two common themes out there. Number one, the
 17 normal recruit's greatest amount of information about all
 18 the services comes from cinema. "Full Metal Jacket" is
 19 the view of the United States Army, I think. And they
 20 also think the Army is three years of basic training.

21 So, I mean, that's sort of what they have
 22 to deal with; so we have to show a little...

23 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: You know,

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1 one of the contentious issues here was this gender-
2 integrated training, and our charter said to look at the
3 historical perspective of why — if a service does it,
4 why did they do it; what caused them to change.
5 And you and I were talking about this
6 earlier, General Burnette. It doesn't appear the record-
7 keeping was really good back then because we've got a lot
8 of opinions.

9 In fact, we had testimony from one
10 individual who stated that he knew of a test — a
11 physical test — that was conducted years back that the
12 Army — his words — deep-sixed because it proved that
13 females could not do many of the jobs that the Army was
14 opening to them.

15 I certainly never heard of that test, and
16 I was just wondering if you had ever heard of a test that
17 the Army conducted that basically disproved, if you will,
18 the ability —

19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: No, I do not —

20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURNETTE: I've heard
21 — As I was getting ready to come visit with you all
22 today, I heard rumors of such a thing, but I — in our
23 training files and TR or any of the other places, we

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(AFTERNOON SESSION)
1 (1:07 p.m.)
2
3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Well, we are
4 continuing our hearings on Thursday, January 28th, 1999,
5 with a long-awaited panel of the chief enlisted persons
6 of each of the services.

7 And we already have your biography, so for
8 the sake of time, I will dispense with that and let you
9 proceed with your introductory remarks in any order you
10 folks can work out.

11 SMA HALL: If it's okay, Madam Chairman,
12 I'll go first.

13 Madam Chairman, members of the Commission,
14 good afternoon. I've submitted a written statement for
15 the record. What I'd like to do is, if I may, just take
16 a few minutes to make a personal statement.

17 First of all, I think I'd like to reassure
18 you that we in the Army willingly subordinate ourselves
19 to civilian control, and that part of my idea of
20 integrity is to discern what's right from what's wrong
21 and then act on what I believe is right.

22 And I'll tell you that I believe that the
23 way the Army chooses to train its recruits is a decision

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1 don't have anything like that.
2 But again, in looking through this over
3 history, it looks like there's not a whole lot of records
4 on it anyway. And that's not unique to this area, by the
5 way.

6 And just, oh, by the way, as we go into
7 the electronic age where everybody's deleting their E-
8 mail files every day, in the future there will be no
9 records of decisions that were made.

10 DR. MOSKOS: I do remember a study,
11 though, in the late seventies or early eighties — you
12 know, I can't remember the name of it — that said what
13 this physical expert — physical training person reported
14 —

15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOLT: The only study
16 that I know of was what was commonly referred to in our
17 Army as MAXWACS, and that was REFORGER '93 — or '73-74,
18 I think, in which they had organized units that had both
19 males and females in it and played them in Reforger and
20 evaluated their performance. And it was the precursor to
21 the end of the WAC Corps. It was to open more MOS's to
22 women during that period of time.

23 And I have never seen a study associated

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1 that should best be left to the Army and to each
2 individual service. It should not be a political
3 decision. It's all about soldiering and training and
4 shouldn't be part of a larger discussion.

5 I admit that we've had problems at
6 Aberdeen Proving Grounds, but those were leadership
7 problems and those were problems that caused us to take a
8 critical look at ourselves just as others were looking at
9 us. The IG, the Senior Review Panel, various human
10 relations panels, Kassebaum Baker, to name only a few.

11 As we went through that process, we
12 identified problems and we took corrective actions. The
13 new TRADOC regulation 350-6 increases the physical and
14 mental rigor of Basic Combat Training. It leads to mid
15 and end-of-course reviews. It causes us to comply with
16 the standards of separate and secure housing.

17 We've also increased Basic Combat Training
18 from eight to nine weeks, added fifty-four hours of
19 instruction in human relations, in core values and Army
20 traditions, which wasn't always there, and added
21 additional time for what I call drill sergeant face-to-
22 face time.

23 We've toughened graduation standards. We

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1 with it, but that was a field training exercise in Europe
2 in which there were — it formed the basis for testing
3 units that had both males and females in it that was
4 different than the old WAC Corps. I think it was
5 probably '74.

6 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
7 Thanks.

8 DR. MOSKOS: I think the time has expired.
9 There's something that I can talk to General Burnette
10 individually on about readiness. I pass.

11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, we thank you very
12 much. This has been a most informative session for us.
13 And we do have a couple of absent members and I think
14 there may be some pending questions; so if you won't
15 mind, we may submit some additional questions for the
16 record.

17 Thank you again for coming.

18 (Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the hearing in
19 the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at
20 1:00 p.m., the same day.)

21 - - -

22
23

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1 added a seventy-two-hour warrior field training exercise.
2 We added a rite-of-passage ceremony because I think it's
3 an important step when you make that transition from
4 trainee to soldier. We filled executive officer billets,
5 unit ministry teams, improved drill sergeant selection
6 and training, and much more, and you have all that.
7 And, also, I'll tell you that we have not
8 stopped. It's not time and we don't intend to rest on
9 our laurels. We're constantly reviewing our internal
10 command management review processes, our drill sergeant
11 ratios. We're focusing on attrition and just training to
12 standard.

13 If we haven't got this right — and we may
14 have missed something — I'd ask you to use your
15 oversight and supervisory and leadership responsibilities
16 to point them out and demand fixes.

17 See, I do care because this is my Army.
18 Minus a month or so, I've spent thirty-one years leading
19 and training soldiers. Today, those soldiers are
20 stationed around the world. 147,000 soldiers in sixty-
21 nine countries today. Some of those are FORGE station.

22 But we have about 28,000 deployed on
23 operational missions — 271 operational missions — in

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1 sixty-four countries today and they're doing everything
 2 that our Army and our nation demands that they do.
 3 They're doing so much and they ask for so little in
 4 return — decent pay and housing and medical care, and
 5 retirement benefits for the day that they do have to hang
 6 up their uniform for the last time.

7 But you've seen them, too, and we're all
 8 very proud of those soldiers — men and women who are
 9 willing to serve something larger than themselves.

10 I keep a set of sheets that I call "Heroes
 11 of the Battle," and those are soldiers, men and women,
 12 trained in gender-integrated/gender-segregated units who
 13 have excelled on a task, on a performance at one of our
 14 combat training centers.

15 It's amazing to see some of those and see
 16 the initiative that these young soldiers demonstrate
 17 today because they're willing to go the extra mile,
 18 because inside each one of them there's a fierce desire
 19 just to do what's right.

20 We just had that in Bosnia with a private
 21 first class. When we arrested the corps commander over
 22 there, the Serbs surrounded the vehicle. He was a PFC, a
 23 driver, twenty-one years old. The Serbs issued weapons

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1 issues that your Commission is exploring.
 2 I'd like to make a statement specifically
 3 addressing the issue of gender-integrated training
 4 because, as you probably know, I feel very strongly about
 5 this subject.

6 For more than twenty-one years, the United
 7 States Air Force has successfully integrated training at
 8 Lackland Air Force Base. Men and women train just as
 9 they serve in the mainstream Air Force — and that is,
 10 together — because roughly one-quarter of our recruits
 11 are female and they serve in more than 99 percent of our
 12 career fields.

13 We feel it is essential that they receive
 14 the same training as their male counterparts. It is
 15 further essential that they learn to serve together in
 16 Basic Military Training so the burden of that instruction
 17 does not fall upon the wing commander.

18 The Aberdeen incident was a result of
 19 breakdown in leadership and was a criminal act of a few.
 20 It should not serve as an indictment on the basic
 21 military training of other services, nor mar the
 22 unblemished records of hundreds of proud men and women
 23 who serve as military training instructors in our armed

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1 and ammunition, surrounded the vehicle that this private
 2 first class was in, demanded that he turn over his weapon
 3 and ammunition and he refused.

4 And when they asked him later why he
 5 refused, he said, "I knew I was a member of the greatest
 6 Army in the world, that I was trained what to do. I'm
 7 going to do it right, and if I get in trouble, my buddies
 8 will be here to come help me." He didn't give it up.
 9 They let him go.

10 Now, contrast that with the Israeli
 11 soldier that almost the same thing happened. He turned
 12 over his weapon and ammunition. The mob then beat him
 13 near senseless and his countrymen declared him a coward.

14 That's the soldiers that we have out
 15 there. And they do draw that strength from their own and
 16 from the unit's discipline, and they know that other
 17 members of the team are depending on them.

18 Now, the discipline that allows PFC King
 19 to do what he did in Bosnia must be built and nurtured
 20 during peacetime training. It didn't appear for the
 21 first time in Bosnia. And I think this concern for their
 22 fellow soldier comes from good leadership, from shared
 23 hardship, and from mutual respect.

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1 forces. The vast, vast majority of these men and women
 2 do the right thing every day in extremely tough
 3 circumstances.

4 My service counterparts and I represent
 5 nearly 120 years of experience. Each of us has strongly
 6 voiced our opinion on this matter. I would only hope
 7 that the Commission would hear our testimony and give it
 8 serious consideration. This issue is not about political
 9 correctness. It is about the right way to train our
 10 people. I firmly believe that segregated training would
 11 have a dramatic negative impact on our ability to recruit
 12 new basic trainees and to recruit female training
 13 instructors. We have an outstanding training system in
 14 place at Lackland. Anyone who observes a graduation
 15 ceremony on Friday can easily see the pride and
 16 enthusiasm exhibited by our troops. They are willing and
 17 able to serve their nation and are products of successful
 18 gender-integrated training.

19 And with that, I'd say thank you very much
 20 and I look forward to any questions that you may have.

21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, thank you.

22 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: Madam Chairman, I
 23 don't have much of an opening statement because I know

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1 Now, I know the Chief of Staff of the
 2 Army, my boss and my battle buddy, talked to you earlier
 3 about the Army, about changes that we're going through
 4 and what we've done since the end of the Cold War, to
 5 include national military strategy, and he did it better
 6 than I ever could and I certainly don't want to belabor
 7 any of those points again.

8 But what I would do, though, is to ask
 9 each of you — don't turn a decision on how to train
 10 soldiers into a political football. We believe we made
 11 the necessary corrections, and I think it's time for us
 12 to move on now to continue training the young men and
 13 women who come in the Army to serve their nation. I
 14 think it's time that we spent our time, effort and energy
 15 on turning them into soldiers very much.

16 And with that, Madam Chairman and members
 17 of the Commission, thank you very much. And when it
 18 comes my time, I look forward to your questions.

19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.

20 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: Well, good

21 afternoon, Madam Chair and members of the Commission.

22 I'm also very happy to be here and I thank you for asking
 23 me to appear before you today to talk with you about the

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1 the Commandant spoke to you all at length about
 2 transformation, so I would just kind of regurgitate what
 3 he said if I made a long statement.

4 Let me say this. We fully believe that we
 5 transform Marines by, first of all, concentrating on
 6 making a basic Marine. And we do that, as you know, in a
 7 segregated environment and we intend to continue to do it
 8 that way.

9 From that environment, we take our men and
 10 women and take them to Camp LeJeune and/or Camp
 11 Pendleton, California, and there we build what we call a
 12 basic warrior. After we've made a basic Marine, we build
 13 a basic warrior.

14 The non-infantry Marines are integrated at
 15 that time in Marine Combat Training, where they will
 16 learn what it's like to be an infantryman. And, of
 17 course, those who are going to be infantrymen will gain
 18 their occupational specialty at the School of Infantry.

19 After the non-infantry Marines have
 20 learned what it's like to be an infantry person, they
 21 will then move to their formal schools, as you already
 22 know, where they will be skilled warriors.

23 From that point in time, they will leave

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1 their schools, with all the skills that they've brought
2 with them, and they will be integrated into what we call
3 our Marine Air/Ground Task Force, shaped and sized for
4 whatever the mission might be, and in all honesty, that
5 is when we train up to fight. That's when we train the
6 way we fight.

7 So having said that, the Marine Corps has
8 absolutely no dog in the fight as far as how the other
9 services make soldiers, airmen and sailors. We support
10 whatever it is they do that works for them. We feel like
11 what we do works for us and it should continue that way
12 in the Marine Corps.

13 Thank you, ma'am.

14 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: Madam Chairman, first
15 of all, my apologies for being late. I had driver
16 problems — location problems — but I made it and I'm
17 glad to have had the opportunity to be here to be with
18 you today, late as it is.

19 I don't have a prepared statement as such,
20 but I would tell you by way of opening statement that we
21 feel like we've got it right. We feel that the way that
22 we currently train at our Recruit Training Command and
23 throughout the initial skills training phase is the type

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1 I'll tell you, ma'am, I have a hard time
2 with the term "fraternization." Sometimes I just don't
3 understand what fraternization means. I absolutely
4 understand what's appropriate behavior and inappropriate
5 behavior.

6 We each had a chance. We had a policy in
7 the Army, and the Army is different from the other three
8 services and I guess that's why I go first with regard to
9 what our views on fraternization are.

10 I thought our policy was working. We
11 hadn't had a problem in the twenty years that I know of.
12 I understand we're working in a joint world today. We
13 had a chance to make our views known to DoD and I guess
14 — Somebody asked me the other day — a reporter asked me
15 what happened. I guess our views just didn't carry the
16 day, so the proposal sort of went against us on that.

17 Now we'll go through the training once —
18 if that's signed, and once that's signed, we'll go
19 through re-training so that we can make sure that we
20 comply with that. But we did make our views known on
21 that one.

22 It's almost like the — that the Army's
23 definition for fraternization was — although we were

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1 of training that suits us best. It prepares us in a way
2 that — and for the environment that our sailors will
3 eventually live in.

4 There is unanimous consent from commanding
5 officers and the senior enlisted leadership that putting
6 the integration of men and women off to times other than
7 boot camp or times other than from day one will simply
8 push that task down to them and it's a task that they're
9 not prepared for. When our folks set foot aboard ship,
10 that is the time that they should be ready to fight. And
11 quite frankly, they can find themselves in that situation
12 at any given time.

13 So we, in summary, really do feel like we
14 have it right. We have been able to answer the bell any
15 time the bell has been rung. We do it quite
16 convincingly. It seems to work for us. It supports our
17 mission. And we feel very strongly that integrating men
18 and women from day one at Recruit Training Command, in
19 the very careful way that we do, meets the mission that
20 we have to accomplish.

21 Thank you.

22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.

23 As I mentioned earlier, our practice is to

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1 told to change the way fraternization policy affects us,
2 but it was almost our definition of fraternization that
3 is now the definition for adultery, and I just — I guess
4 from a personal standpoint, I just don't understand.

5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Maybe I could help by
6 amending my question a little bit to avoid the issue of
7 kind of following orders, which would be to ask if it is
8 perceived — if these things are perceived as problems,
9 are they things that take up people's time — questions
10 of adultery and fraternization?

11 And, you know, will the proposed changes
12 make a difference in how people spend their time as far
13 as enforcement of discipline or, you know, might there be
14 other issues that gain more attention?

15 SMA HALL: Well, certainly adultery and
16 fraternization will take up people's time, leaders' time.
17 It always has, it always will. You know, a very, very
18 small percentage will make a conscious decision to break
19 the rules, regulations, traditions of a service, and the
20 laws of the United States of America.

21 But there's always one that will do it, so
22 certainly it always has taken time, and I don't see the
23 amount of time that leaders spend on those issues

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1 simply go around the table with each commissioner's
2 questions until we run out of either questions or time.
3 And so far today, we have certainly run out of time
4 before we ran out of questions.

5 Each of you has addressed two of the
6 concerns of this Commission — namely, gender integration
7 and basic training generally — and we do have a third
8 item within our mandate, which is cross-gender
9 relationships.

10 We've been asked to look at proposals to
11 add some definition to the charges of adultery through
12 the Manual for Courts-Martial, and also to review
13 proposals concerning conforming each service's
14 fraternization rules, one to another, and I wonder if
15 each of you could perhaps take a moment and give us a
16 reaction about those parts of our mandate.

17 Would your service like to see additional
18 guidance on adultery, and how does your service feel
19 about the proposal to conform the fraternization rules?
20 And you can reply in any order.

21 SMA HALL: I think we have to be careful.

22 We're all great soldiers here, and once policy is
23 established, you know, we implement that policy.

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1 changing at all.

2 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: Ma'am, we're
3 comfortable with the fraternization rules that we
4 currently have. They seem to serve us very well. And
5 since fraternization really is an issue with regard to
6 good order and discipline, the proximity in which we as
7 sailors live day in and day out, I think, is the one that
8 may be the most limiting among all of us. I might be
9 presumptuous in saying that but I certainly feel that
10 way.

11 I would tell you that we're comfortable
12 with where we are. It works for us, and we have as a
13 goal zero violations of that fraternization policy. It
14 is a noble goal.

15 I do get the feeling that there are those
16 around us that think that we will at some point reach
17 zero and it will always be thus. I think that at least
18 in some of the circles that I taught that's the case.
19 They're always surprised when there is a violation or a
20 case that comes to attention. The human condition being
21 what it is, I think most of us understand that that will
22 never be possible and these garner a lot more attention
23 than probably they deserve.

1 I'm also struck by the fact that there are
 2 folks that think that this integration business doesn't
 3 cost us energy. It will always cost us energy, but it's
 4 the right energy to expend because it happens to be the
 5 right thing to do. And as long as we have the proper
 6 guidelines, which we feel we do with our fraternization
 7 policy as it stands, we work within those and we process
 8 them on a case by case basis.
 9 And as I said before, we're comfortable
 10 with where we are.
 11 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: We start
 12 off with our troops at Basic Military Training, you know,
 13 teaching them high standards, fundamental disciplines and
 14 things like that.
 15 One of the things that I tell the troops
 16 — "If you want to be successful in the military, all you
 17 have to do is remember everything that you learned in
 18 Basic Military Training. We taught you how to work as a
 19 team. We taught you dignity and respect for each other.
 20 We taught you the rules and regulations of the armed
 21 forces" — and one of those rules has to do with the
 22 professional relationships between officers, NCO's and
 23 airmen.

1 And I think it's very, very important that
 2 we retain those high standards because the military
 3 cannot function without the appropriate discipline and
 4 professional relationships between the ranks. That's why
 5 we have various levels of stripes and various level ranks
 6 for officers. So I think it's very, very important that
 7 we keep that.
 8 The rules on adultery, you know, were, I
 9 think, unclear. I think the levels of punishment — you
 10 can certainly look at and see, you know, if this conduct
 11 happens, what is the impact on the force? What is the
 12 impact, you know, in regard to what this person did to
 13 the United States Air Force? And I think that, you know,
 14 in that regard, there's some room for improvement.
 15 You know, I would agree with that. The
 16 fraternization rules among all the services were very
 17 confusing. We had some conversations with some high-
 18 level DoD officials and they said they couldn't
 19 understand them, and how could you expect an eighteen-
 20 year-old airman to understand them if that's the case?
 21 So I think that we owed that a rewrite,
 22 some redefinition and some clarity, and I think the
 23 proposal that I saw that the Air Force had where it gave

1 some specific examples and things like that, I believe,
 2 would clear that up.
 3 But when it comes to the relationships
 4 between officers and NCO's, I think we have to definitely
 5 retain the high standards associated with that.
 6 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: I think I understand
 7 your question, ma'am. On the fraternization issue within
 8 the Marine Corps, we're satisfied with the policy as it
 9 is or as has been proposed. We're on board with it.
 10 Does it need anything from this panel? Personally, I
 11 don't believe so. There are gray areas in it, but,
 12 frankly, Marines know to stay out of gray areas.
 13 Now, they may pretend they don't, they may
 14 argue they don't, but they do.
 15 So we're satisfied with that policy as
 16 it's written.
 17 On the issue of adultery, about the only
 18 thing I can add that hasn't already been said is it
 19 remains a violation; it should remain a serious violation
 20 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Any alteration
 21 of it to make it something less than what it absolutely
 22 is will be looked upon by the Marine Corps as a lowering
 23 of a professional standard.

1 So we would be against anything that would
 2 lower or mitigate what adultery actually is.
 3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I don't have any
 5 questions. Thanks for coming, you guys.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you again.
 7 Sergeant Major, it's good to see you again
 8 after our trip to Bosnia.
 9 I want to ask the master chief. In the
 10 Navy recruit training, approximately half of the
 11 divisions are all-male because of the numbers and
 12 approximately half, you know, are 20 or 30-percent
 13 female.
 14 On the assumption that training together
 15 makes you work together — you know, improves working
 16 relations later on, do you think there's a difference
 17 between those sailors who are trained in the all-male
 18 divisions and those sailors who are trained in the
 19 gender-integrated divisions?
 20 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: In answering that
 21 question, sir, I would tell you, if I had my choice, I
 22 would like all of them to have the experience of being in
 23 an integrated division. And as you know, the way we

1 integrate there is we have full divisions. We didn't
 2 find — the numbers do not support just divvying up a
 3 number of women among the male divisions.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Right.
 5 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: So you have to have a
 6 full division and that limits us.
 7 So could we do better if we had equal
 8 numbers so everyone could experience that? I think the
 9 answer is yes. I guess the real question — and I think
 10 this is, as I read your question, what you're asking me
 11 — is what we do about those sailors that don't —
 12 DR. MOSKOS: Tell me, do you presume those
 13 in the all-male divisions are not as comfortable or —
 14 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: No.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: — as agreeable working with
 16 women than those in the integrated divisions?
 17 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: No, I don't. And
 18 I'll tell you why. I would like to have had them have
 19 more exposure, but I don't think they're disadvantaged in
 20 that they see the integrated training going on. They
 21 understand that women are doing the same jobs and all of
 22 that.
 23 I came into a gender-segregated Navy and I

1 will tell you that the women just — when we trained them
 2 separately, we housed them separately, they never
 3 interacted, they became a separate entity.
 4 At Recruit Training Command Great Lakes,
 5 any given day, at any time, whether it's the chow hall,
 6 in training evolutions, whatever, it's very — the fact
 7 that we are gender-integrated to the extent that we can
 8 be is visible to all and they understand. And it's very
 9 important that they see women and men interacting, doing
 10 the same job, training the same way, being held to the
 11 same standards.
 12 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Thank you.
 13 DR. CANTOR: I have a follow-on to that
 14 and then another brief question. The follow-on is you're
 15 sort of implying that the key thing about gender
 16 integration is to break down the perception of not
 17 training to standard or — But we've also been told many
 18 times that it has to do with actual inculcation of a
 19 sense of cohesion and teamwork and unit togetherness;
 20 that it isn't simply — and I don't mean as a small
 21 thing, but simply about perception.
 22 So in answer to my colleague's question, I
 23 mean, do you — what about that second aspect of — in

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1 your all-male units...

2 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: I understand. As I

3 said, if I had my druthers, they'd all get that

4 experience.

5 DR. CANTOR: Right.

6 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: It is important. One

7 of the things that is key to us teaching at Recruit

8 Training Command is this unit cohesion, the teamwork and

9 the interaction that we depend upon aboard ship to get

10 the jobs done.

11 Given that we can't get that with

12 everybody, certainly the perception is huge. I think it

13 is a huge issue for males to understand and see that

14 women are doing those jobs.

15 Whether you build the teamwork male-female

16 or male-male, or even female-female, I think is a

17 separate issue of seeing other people teaming and doing

18 those things and knowing that it's possible to achieve

19 that kind of teamwork.

20 DR. CANTOR: Okay. Thank you.

21 I have — Should I wait until we go around

22 again —

23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Go ahead.

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1 DR. CANTOR: — or just a quick follow-on

2 which is actually related.

3 We've heard several times this morning

4 and, in fact, each of the three of you sort of alluded to

5 a "burden of gender integration" that you wouldn't want

6 to put on the operational forces or on units even in

7 advanced training; that you think you need to start from

8 day one.

9 And I think you've spoken very

10 compellingly, as have others, about it. I guess it would

11 be helpful for me to really understand a bit of your

12 sense of what this burden is of gender integration. You

13 know, it's related, I think, to what we just discussed.

14 I mean, what is it that would be harder to

15 achieve later on or that would be a "burden"?

16 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: Well, you

17 know, I think that if you look at what happens in the

18 process, you know, we take an eighteen-year-old who sits

19 on the other side of the recruiting table and, you know,

20 they've had no work skill, they've had no — they have no

21 resume, and we don't ask them for anything. You know, we

22 just ask them, "Do you want to serve your country?" And

23 we don't ask them, you know, male, female, ethnic

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1 persuasion or whatever. It makes no difference.

2 So when they come to us, they come from

3 all walks of life, and we take them to Basic Military

4 Training and we reduce everyone to the lowest common

5 denominator. It doesn't matter whether you're rich,

6 you're poor, you're black, you're white, you're male,

7 you're female, or whatever — you're reduced to the

8 lowest common denominator, and from that very basic first

9 day you begin to work as a team. You begin to come

10 together as a team, male and female.

11 And I think that it's very, very important

12 that you do that because if you don't, there are some

13 people who come from some backgrounds who — you know,

14 male-dominated families, female-dominated families or

15 whatever — they need to learn that socialization process

16 right there. That males and females serve in 99 percent

17 of our career fields; they're going to be doing the same

18 jobs; they're going to be working side-by-side.

19 And if you don't do the process there and

20 they go to their first duty assignment and they haven't

21 learned that, now the wing commander is going to have to

22 somehow figure out how to teach that. And that is not

23 the place to do it because they're too busy doing combat-

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1 related things, and that's the issue.

2 DR. CANTOR: So by that point, they're not

3 reduced to — they're not as open to influence,

4 presumably, as...

5 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: Right. I

6 mean, think about what happens here. You have an all-

7 female flight. You have an all-male. They never see

8 each other at basic training. They go through different,

9 separated — There's an obvious human reaction to that:

10 "My training is different. What are the guys doing?"

11 And I go back to when the males used to go

12 to the rifle range and the females went to the make-up

13 class. That's exactly what we did, and that's absurd.

14 So we don't want to put any socialization

15 burdens on the wing commander. We don't want to do that.

16 DR. CANTOR: Thank you.

17 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: It's a good

18 thing they got that part right and you weren't in the

19 make-up class.

20 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: I'm not

21 telling you which one I went to.

22 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: I'm going to jump on

23 that one, okay?

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1 Ma'am, if I had an all-male Marine Corps

2 and all of a sudden I brought 10,000 women into the

3 Marine Corps and threw them all on the operational

4 commanders, then there would be a burden. That isn't the

5 way we've been doing things for a long, long time.

6 So I take just the opposite tack. There

7 is absolutely no burden on our operational forces when

8 they receive their Marines. It don't matter whether

9 they're male or female. Okay?

10 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: I would tell you that

11 from the Navy perspective, the burden that we're talking

12 about is very similar to what the chief is saying in that

13 when you take a look at where the predominant number of

14 our young sailors come from, they come out of high

15 school, and they interact with each other on a day-to-day

16 basis in a much different way than what we want them to

17 have to react or interact within a professional setting.

18 And our job is to build those

19 interpersonal skills that de-focus the sexual side of

20 that interaction — which I don't think we can deny is

21 huge in high school — but build into it the idea that —

22 the need and the skills that they need to be able to

23 interact on a day-to-day basis in doing the professional

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1 job that we need them to do.

2 And by pushing that downstream, a couple

3 of things happen. We throw them into an environment that

4 is less supervised and one that doesn't have the

5 safeguards that we have built-in at Recruit Training

6 Command and continue to improve upon. But what we also

7 do is we throw them out there without the skills and we

8 put them into an environment where we can't do this in a

9 standardized way.

10 It's going to change. It's going to be

11 different from unit to unit. And the more that we can do

12 in a standardized way with regard to this to get them off

13 to a good start, such that when they fit into the unit,

14 that whatever variances there are in the unit, it's easy

15 for them to assimilate.

16 And that's the burden that I talk about.

17 There's no doubt that you have to build the skills some

18 way.

19 DR. CANTOR: Thank you.

20 SMA HALL: I'm not sure that "burden" is

21 the right term, but there are some challenges when you

22 mix males and females together for the first time and we

23 just believe that this soldierization process starts the

1 first day you put on a uniform. If you're in a military
 2 occupational skill, if you're in an MOS that's open to
 3 females, you mix right there where you've got the proper
 4 amount of leader-to-led ratio.
 5 It's better in basic training than it is
 6 any place else. You don't have the other operational
 7 tempo and personnel tempo issues to deal with. You can
 8 just put them together and start the team-building, the
 9 discipline, the training to standards, all right there in
 10 basic training. And if we do it right, I just think
 11 that's the right way to do it.
 12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, thanks
 13 for being with us again. And I guess my question is
 14 going to be similar to a question I asked the last group,
 15 and that was, one thing that I kind of found as a common
 16 thread as we went around — travelled around — was this
 17 issue of leader expectation.
 18 And the question I asked the Army DCSPER
 19 and the training guy in the last session was — is there
 20 a move to put in the formal training base the instruction
 21 to a noncommissioned officer, the professional
 22 development — and officers, as it may be — something
 23 that speaks to this leadership expectation?

1 Because to be perfectly honest, at
 2 company-grade level — and I'm sure you guys know it —
 3 they've got this expectation of what this person should
 4 be able to do when they arrive from the training base,
 5 and to be perfectly honest, it's out-of-kilter with
 6 reality.
 7 There's only so much you're going to do in
 8 the training base and then you're going to give it to
 9 them. And as a result, you hear a lot of negative
 10 comments from company-level leadership that says they're
 11 doing a terrible job because he can't do A, B, C, D and
 12 E.
 13 And I just wonder if you've been involved
 14 with that. Is there any discussion to inculcate that in
 15 the development of your leaders?
 16 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: We do a
 17 survey of the troops when they come to the first duty
 18 assignment. We do a survey of the supervisors. They get
 19 those troops. And we get a 95-percent satisfaction rate
 20 with what they've been taught in Basic Military Training
 21 and through the tech school.
 22 Now, there's some — depending on the tech
 23 school, depending on the training and depending on the

1 individual, you know, sometimes there's going to be, you
 2 know, this person, and then it becomes an indictment on
 3 the whole process.
 4 Because if this person is the only person
 5 you get and they happen to be somebody who's not meeting
 6 the standards, then you have a tendency to say, "Well,
 7 gee whiz, what are they teaching them down there in BMT,"
 8 or "what are they teaching" — But we have about a 95-
 9 percent satisfaction rate with the process.
 10 So I think the leaders — you know, the
 11 expectation is there and I think it's being met.
 12 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: I would like to tell
 13 you we had a 95-percent match. That's not true, and I've
 14 spent years trying to figure this out. Prior to coming
 15 to this job, I was the Command Master Chief of Naval
 16 Training Center Great Lakes, and then I became the Force
 17 Master Chief and Chief of Naval Education and Training
 18 that owns Great Lakes prior to coming here, and so I've
 19 been working on this very issue for a long time, trying
 20 to figure out just what it is.
 21 It is, I think, part of our make-up as
 22 humans to think that what we experienced in our past and
 23 what used to be was somehow more rigorous, more rigid,

1 more better than what we do today. And the fact that
 2 when I came in the Navy in '67, there were master chiefs
 3 wondering what in the world was going to happen to the
 4 Navy with this new group of sailors, has always sort of
 5 perplexed me because, you know, we've done okay.
 6 We have embarked in the Navy on a plan to
 7 do just that — to try to add the reality of what recruit
 8 training really is; how much more rigorous it is than
 9 when I went through in 1967. I'm not sure the standards
 10 were there in '67. Much more definable standards that
 11 we're meeting day in and day out at Recruit Training
 12 Command now.
 13 But how do you get away from that
 14 romanticized idea of what it used to be? We've hit upon
 15 an idea that has worked well for us and we're into the
 16 turn. We're not around the corner yet. We take Back —
 17 We stage what we call Back-to-Boot-Camp trips. We load
 18 up a C-9 with command master chiefs from east and west
 19 coasts and we take them to boot camp for two or three
 20 days and they live as a recruit does. They interact with
 21 the recruits for two or three days.
 22 It's amazing to watch them when they step
 23 off the plane. They have their arms folded across their

1 chests, ready to find the problems, and two days later
 2 they've got their arm around your shoulder: "Please take
 3 a picture of me." "Hey, you guys are doing okay. I'm
 4 going back to my command." "I'm not hitting the mark."
 5 We also take every class of our Senior
 6 Enlisted Academy — that's five classes a year — back to
 7 boot camp for two or three days, and with just that in
 8 mind — that every command master chief that goes through
 9 the Senior Enlisted Academy — and they all do, all the
 10 new ones do — they will then go to their first command
 11 as a command master chief with an updated view of what
 12 Recruit Training Command is.
 13 And it's working. It's not something that
 14 we can do overnight, though.
 15 SMA HALL: Historically, we have not done
 16 a good job doing that. Company leadership receives these
 17 soldiers right out of basic training and AIT and they
 18 think they ought to make 250 on a PT test and they ought
 19 to have mastered a hundred percent of the skills. So
 20 we've not done a good job of identifying what's a
 21 reasonable expectation of this young man or this young
 22 woman who has now been in for about four months.
 23 We spent some time talking about that at

1 the senior leader training conference last week and I
 2 suppose the DCSPER talked a little bit about that. We
 3 had the leadership from the active guard and reserve,
 4 commissioned and noncommissioned together, and we talked
 5 about just those issues.
 6 And we're — we haven't gotten there yet,
 7 but we're well on the road toward institutionalizing just
 8 what you talk about.
 9 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: Bob, leader
 10 expectations of the brand new Marine that they receive,
 11 General Krulak talked to you at length about the four
 12 phases of sustainment, which — or transformation, which
 13 is sustainment. That's what we've done. But then again,
 14 that ain't nothing new. That's what we've always done.
 15 And sadly — sadly — a cadre of our leadership, a corps
 16 of our core leadership — enlisted and officer, too — is
 17 never going to be pleased with what they receive.
 18 Now, how do you change that expectation?
 19 You do what we do now — you constantly remind them of
 20 their responsibilities to accept this basically-trained,
 21 basically-skilled, brand new Marine and get out of them
 22 what has been put into them so far.
 23 Some will fail. Some will fail. That's

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1 okay. That's the price of doing business. But that's
2 about all you can do.
3 And in all honesty, my tolerance level is
4 very, very low with those I rely upon to sustain that
5 transformation, who, frankly, don't take no interest in
6 doing that. They only want "give me more, give me more,
7 give me more."
8 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thanks.
9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Bob, I will refer you to
10 recent news reports that verify his low tolerance level.
11 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I'm aware of
12 that recent news release.
13 MS. POPE: My question is a little along
14 the same lines and it had to do with — We've heard from
15 operational commanders that they weren't coming out —
16 "they" — the men and women weren't coming out trained
17 and, you know, the balance of what are your expectations
18 — But one of the issues that we heard or some of us
19 heard was the question of the E-5, E-6, E-7, that used to
20 be the mid-level manager. That as people talked about
21 it, they said that's not there.
22 So they are actually doing more hands-on,
23 because my understanding of the continuum of training —

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1 which we try to refer to it to keep from comparing the
2 four services — is that basic is just that. I think you
3 all have just been saying that it is basic; it's the
4 first step.
5 But the OJT that used to go on happened
6 through the mid-level management of that E-5, E-6, E-7 —
7 that isn't there or at least not there in the numbers it
8 used to be. And so some of the frustration comes out
9 from you're still having to do the paperwork, you're
10 still having to do the big leadership issues, and you're
11 now also doing the OJT piece of that.
12 For each of you, is that being addressed
13 in the manpower planning and the time to get to a fix for
14 that?
15 SMA HALL: Let me talk to the Army's
16 perspective. Let me tell you when this started
17 happening. It started happening about 1989, when we
18 started the drawdown — and you started with the 775,000-
19 person Army — until you got 480,000 soldiers today.
20 That's where it started.
21 Today, we don't have the NCO's. With
22 480,000 men, you've got to have the right person, the
23 right place, at the right time, and we don't have it.

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1 What we've found — I guess we stole the Navy term — is
2 you "fleet up" a lot, and you end up — an E-5 ends up as
3 a squad leader.
4 Well, he does okay on field skills. Where
5 he does less well is on the garrison leadership
6 responsibilities. He just doesn't have the experience to
7 do that.
8 Now, the Army exacerbated that problem a
9 little bit in 1996. We came out with this program called
10 Change in NCO Structure. And we thought if we took the
11 content of the Army with regard to what the NCO content
12 of the Army is back to 1989 levels — and in 1989, about
13 46 percent of the Army was noncommissioned officers —
14 now we wake up in 1996 and it's 48-something percent.
15 If you take it back to that level, it's
16 about 4,600 noncommissioned officers. But, oh, by the
17 way, if you get it back — if you take those 4,600, you
18 save \$600 million. So it was a dollar-driven thing.
19 Our people went away in '96. The dollars
20 to promote them went away in '96. In '98, we get the
21 "execute" order. Everything else had already gone. And
22 now you get a hue and cry from the field: "We don't have
23 the people we need."

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1 Well, he hasn't been there for two years.
2 You know? How do you put the genie back in the bottle
3 now?
4 And we just went through a drill. To keep
5 from going into a lot more detail — and I'll be glad to
6 go into as much as you want — we're going to buy back
7 all those positions, and that's happening right now. If
8 I could just —
9 MS. POPE: All of the positions? I'm
10 sorry.
11 SMA HALL: Yes, ma'am.
12 If I could ask you to write down two
13 numbers. I'd ask you to write 3,700 and 6,500. 3,700
14 are the number of noncommissioned officer promotions we
15 had in the month of January. 6,500 — and it's actually
16 6,560. 6,500 are the number of noncommissioned officers
17 you're going to see in the month of February in the Army.
18 And I tell battalion commanders that
19 because I have an opportunity to go talk at every pre-
20 command course, and I tell battalion and brigade
21 commanders I grew up in an Army — Bob — we grew up in
22 an Army that platoon sergeants trained platoon leaders.
23 I tell them, you know, you can make that

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1 statement if you want to, but I'm going to tell you when
2 you go out there and you see what you've got, you don't
3 have that crusty old E-7 that's now had three or four
4 platoon leaders and can help train a platoon leader.
5 You've got a young staff sergeant. He's got a sparkle in
6 an eye and fire in his belly and he's going to do fine,
7 but not today, so you tell them how to get around that.
8 And, really, you have to get first
9 sergeants involved in training platoon sergeants. And to
10 give you a clear example of that — I had said that a
11 couple times and I thought that was truth and we had
12 talked through it.
13 I was in an airport in Dallas one time —
14 I was going out to El Paso — and there was a lieutenant
15 in the airport. I knew he was a lieutenant because he
16 had his Stetson on.
17 So we got on the airplane, going from
18 Dallas to El Paso, and we're — he's in the aisle seat,
19 I'm in the — I'm in the aisle seat, he's in the window
20 seat. It doesn't matter. His Stetson's under there, so
21 I knew who he was.
22 I said, "Lieutenant, where are you going?"
23 He said, "I'm going on leave." I said, "Well, where are

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1 you at?" "I'm at Fort" — I'm not going to tell you.
2 He's at Fort Polk. I said, "Tell me" — I mean, he's an
3 anti-tank platoon leader. He's been a platoon leader for
4 thirteen months. You want somebody that tells you the
5 Army ain't all broke, you go talk to this guy. I felt
6 good talking to this platoon leader.
7 And I said, "Who's your platoon sergeant?"
8 And he said, "Staff Sergeant" — and he called his name.
9 I don't remember. I said, "Well, tell me about him." He
10 said, "An awesome noncommissioned officer. He's a great
11 platoon sergeant, great." And I said, "How long has he
12 been a platoon sergeant?" "About six months." Who's
13 training who? I knew who was training who.
14 We had a great talk. About thirty minutes
15 later, he figured out who I was and he wouldn't talk to
16 me anymore.
17 But we are addressing those issues and
18 we're going to get to promotions. Those February
19 promotions, significant increases in staff sergeant — in
20 E-6/E-7 promotion, the maximum allowed by law to E-8 and
21 E-9. And that's — the law says 3.5 percent of the force
22 can be in the top two senior grades. That is absolutely
23 an issue and we are well on the way to fixing that.

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1 MS. POPE: Any concern that you're moving
 2 too fast?
 3 SMA HALL: No, ma'am.
 4 MS. POPE: You're looking at those
 5 numbers.
 6 SMA HALL: No, ma'am. They don't —
 7 MS. POPE: Okay.
 8 SMA HALL: They don't recommend them until
 9 they're ready for it. And then we have a philosophy and
 10 a policy of selecting them for promotion, then you train
 11 them, then you promote them and let them serve. And as
 12 long as we don't violate that, we're pretty comfortable
 13 that we're not selecting too fast.
 14 In fact — I don't know if General Ohle
 15 would have told you today — PERSCOM would like to see us
 16 recommend them earlier for promotion to sergeant. And at
 17 the senior leader training conference last week, General
 18 Reimer was kind enough to let me say in the forum that we
 19 are not going to recommend them before it's time.
 20 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: Madam, if I
 21 understand your question right, your question was that —
 22 or your comment was that the 5, the 6, the 7 — that that
 23 leadership level was more burdened or whatever. They

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1 — as the chief was just saying, in the second-term
 2 retention in those very highly-skilled NEC's and ratings
 3 where we're training them so well that they're so
 4 valuable to folks on the outside, and the fact that we're
 5 not promoting them at a fast enough rate that they lose
 6 faith with us.
 7 I have not seen that. I have not heard
 8 about it. I don't doubt that someone told you about it.
 9 But it doesn't seem to gel with the way we downsized the
 10 Navy because we really have excess E-5, 6's and 7's right
 11 now that we're trying to work our way through. We chose
 12 to downsize on either end of the force and not in the
 13 middle.
 14 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: The Air
 15 Force may have some of the larger impact of this. You
 16 know, we had a large force in the eighties and we didn't
 17 deploy a lot, et cetera. Nineties, we did the drawdown;
 18 we carved out the middle of the force. That's where you
 19 go after if you're going to do a large drawdown; you kind
 20 of go after that population, so we did that.
 21 And then, of course, we had the Gulf War,
 22 and then, ever since that, you know, we've come across an
 23 overheating economy and many other things.

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1 were having to do too much —
 2 MS. POPE: There's not enough.
 3 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Shortages.
 4 Shortages.
 5 MS. POPE: Shortages, yeah.
 6 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: Shortages.
 7 MS. POPE: Yeah. Not enough to go around
 8 for what — The leadership role that those individuals
 9 used to fill, some more senior people are doing that —
 10 that training, that are doing — I thought the Commandant
 11 said "yes" on that. Maybe he didn't.
 12 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: I'm having trouble
 13 understanding your comment.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: That we
 15 seem to have — That we are getting feedback from the
 16 operating forces that we seem to have this gap in the NCO
 17 leadership provided at the E-5, E-6, sometimes E-7 level.
 18 That there seems to be, either through attrition —
 19 meaning those getting out or the like — that there's
 20 this gap, and that was across — the comment came across
 21 the services.
 22 And that, therefore, what was occurring
 23 was that the senior NCO leadership was having to move

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1 But the drawdown, we drew back a lot of
 2 the infrastructure and things that we had in the overseas
 3 area. At the same time, because Saddam didn't go away,
 4 we had built up a lot of bare-base operations, so you
 5 have to support that.
 6 So you still have the Cold War manpower
 7 standard, the reduced force, and now you're covering not
 8 only the home fires, but now you have to cover Bosnia and
 9 the desert and everything else with the people that you
 10 have. In order to go to the desert and do some of the
 11 missions over there, you rely upon your more skilled
 12 people.
 13 So these are the folks that you would
 14 normally have on the flight line, doing the training for
 15 your "3" levels, as we call them — the young airmen —
 16 are now being tasked to go to the overseas deployed
 17 areas, so that leaves a void back at the home station,
 18 and that is very much the case.
 19 And that's why we're very, very concerned
 20 about second-term retention. In '92, we had a high of
 21 about 82 percent. We try to keep 75. We had a high of
 22 82 percent. In 1999, we are already down to 68 percent.
 23 So that slide has been like this (Indicating) in the

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1 down and do those things, you know, that the NCO's were
 2 doing and — you know, the trickle effect.
 3 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: And the Commandant's
 4 answer to that was yes, we have recognized that, and that
 5 goes back to sustainment, power down, good order and
 6 discipline rates more highly than quality-of-life
 7 concerns, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Those are all
 8 the things that we've been trying to do for the past
 9 four-and-a-half years — for the past four years.
 10 Yes, ma'am, we are addressing it and that
 11 is an issue.
 12 MS. POPE: Okay. Navy and Air Force?
 13 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: Ma'am, I have to
 14 admit to you that I have not heard that complaint one
 15 time.
 16 Now, I've only been doing this job ten
 17 months, but it's not occurred. It's not even come on my
 18 scope, and it concerns me that you've heard it, that I
 19 have not heard that. In fact, it's a little hard to
 20 understand in a Navy where promotions have been slow,
 21 where they've had more time to spend in those pay grades.
 22 The only place that I could see and that I
 23 know that we have lost some of that leadership are those

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1 second-term area.
 2 That is your eight-year, ten-year person;
 3 your staff sergeant, E-5, E-6. That is your core
 4 training capability, your front-line supervisors, and
 5 those are the ones that are attriting out of the service.
 6 And there are a lot of causes of that.
 7 You know, the high OPTEMPO that we have — they get tired
 8 of the twelve-hour shifts; they get tired of going to the
 9 desert over and over again. They look at their peers who
 10 get a 50-percent retirement; they get the 40 percent.
 11 They're very highly-skilled technicians in
 12 a lot of cases. The private sector is trying to draw
 13 them into their work force, so we constantly fight this
 14 battle to try to keep them.
 15 But that is very much a concern for us —
 16 is that mid-level E-5, E-6 area. You bet.
 17 And the people that have to take up for
 18 that are going to have to be your E-7's, which are going
 19 to have to drop down a little bit in status and
 20 everything else in what they do and they're going to have
 21 to do some of that front-line work that they had not done
 22 before.
 23 MS. POPE: Thanks.

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1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My
2 question's going to be to each one of you to address, and
3 it's really — it's a combination of opinion and how you
4 see it as the senior enlisted leader of your respective
5 service. We've got three charters here, as you know, and
6 none of them are easy.

7 Now, one, we've got to comment on whether
8 or not this change to the fraternization policy is really
9 necessary. Number two is part of that same one —
10 whether or not we do need adultery guidelines to go in
11 the Manual for Courts-Martial.

12 The second big issue is we've got to say,
13 is gender-integrated training working or should we go
14 back to what it once was? Or should everybody do it the
15 same? That's the second part.

16 And the third part is, are our basic
17 training institutions — each of the services —
18 providing the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines that
19 the nation needs to do all the things that the nation now
20 is requiring our armed forces to do?

21 So I'd like — just on those three areas,
22 I'd like your opinion, your shot — your shot. The
23 sergeant major knows I cut to the bottom line, okay?

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1 SMA HALL: Adultery. Adultery is a
2 criminal act, cannot be tolerated. What needs to go in
3 the Manual for Courts-Martial? Perhaps some words to
4 ensure that commanders have a range of options to take
5 based on circumstances. But other than that, nothing
6 else, because you don't immediately — All cases, you may
7 not go directly to a general court-martial. There's a
8 range of things that should happen. And commanders just
9 know that everything is case by case, as it is on the
10 other offenses in the UCMJ.

11 Fraternization. The only thing I'd tell
12 you, sir, is that I would share with you perhaps what
13 I've told DoD, and that's we thought the Army policy
14 worked. It worked for twenty years and we didn't have a
15 problem with it.

16 They wanted to change it because of
17 jointness, and I understand that, having come from a
18 joint command at CINCOM. But while they took on
19 fraternization because of jointness, they didn't decide
20 to do some of our compensation packages or our awards or
21 our physical training programs or our evaluation programs
22 or our — They picked and chose what they wanted to take
23 on in the area of jointness. It's only Bob Hall's

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1 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: I'll go first.
2 On the fraternization, the policy that I
3 have read simply reinforces our already existing policy.
4 So to that I say yes, the changes they made are good
5 changes because we agree to them.

6 On adultery, again, I don't believe the
7 basic tenets that are currently listed for adultery need
8 to be messed with — unless you want to make them
9 tougher. Okay?

10 Again, the gender-integrated training —
11 or the gender-segregated training we believe is crucial
12 for the Marine Corps, sir. Again, you concentrate on
13 making a basic Marine, you do that in an equal, but
14 separate environment, and then you move on from there.

15 I do believe — I firmly believe that if I
16 have to integrate 2,000 women a year into 20,000 male
17 recruit platoons, I'm going to have to lower the male
18 standards. I'm going to have to.

19 I already have anywhere from 20 to 26
20 percent attrition among the women doing men things,
21 segregated among themselves.

22 Now, if I put them in male platoons, that
23 attrition is going to go even higher because they are

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1 opinion.
2 I think gender-integrated training for the
3 Army — I agree with Sergeant Major Lee in respect I
4 don't want you to tell us how to train because I don't
5 want you to say gender-integrated across-the-board. I
6 want to train my combat arms soldiers, infantry, armor,
7 cannon, artillery, gender-segregated training. That's
8 the life they lead, they live, so I need to train them
9 gender-segregated. The other part of the Army, the other
10 60 percent of the Army, I think we need to keep gender-
11 integrated training.

12 So it's not one size fits all; it can't
13 be, because they train completely gender-integrated,
14 completely gender-segregated, and I have a 60/40 split.
15 If I'm to continue to provide the soldiers that the
16 country demands, I think we have to keep the training the
17 way it is now.

18 And I think the last part of it, are we
19 providing those operational commanders — sir, you've
20 seen them around the world, just like all of us have.
21 They're doing great things around the world. Operational
22 tempo is up 300 percent since '89, but those commanders
23 have the soldiers with the skills they need to accomplish

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1 going to be challenged against the males to do what the
2 males do with the males.

3 There's a difference in doing what the
4 males do separately, because they do do what the males do
5 separately and they meet success at it. But even that —
6 meeting the male standards for requirements to become a
7 Marine — they have twice the attrition rate. Why?
8 Because they break. They hurt themselves or mentally
9 they can't deal with it.

10 Now — So enough on — That's it for me.
11 We need to keep doing what we're doing.

12 Sir, I did not understand the last part —

13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: The third
14 one is, are we, from your experience, looking at the
15 continuum of training — in this case, the Marine Corps
16 — from accession, to delivery to the operational unit —
17 are you giving the operational commanders and their
18 senior NCO's the basically trained Marine they need to do
19 what the nation has asked them to do?

20 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: Sir, I believe we
21 are. Can we do it better? Of course. We can always do
22 it better, but I believe we are meeting the requirements.
23 Yes, sir.

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1 the missions that they have to accomplish.
2 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: I've already spoken
3 to the fraternization and our need for the one that we
4 have. It works for us. We're happy with that.

5 On the adultery side, I didn't address
6 that in that first question. We're equally happy with
7 the adultery rules that are on the books. We understand
8 them.

9 I will tell you in my years in the Navy I
10 have never seen someone taken to captain's mast on
11 adultery alone. We handle adultery in the way that we
12 handle most issues of discipline, and that is, we start
13 out by counseling and getting it squared away, give the
14 person the chance to get the situation in hand.

15 And that works about 99.9 percent of the
16 time and it doesn't go any further than that. Typically
17 when you see adultery charged in the Navy, it's typically
18 in addition to a charge — normally disobeying a direct
19 order, the counseling.

20 So I don't know that we need any change to
21 what we already have. Certainly we don't need anything
22 that broadens it and makes it somehow less.

23 The gender-integrated training, should it

1 be the same? I've already, again, talked to the fact
 2 that our mission and our environment that we live in day
 3 in and day out, I think, makes the case that it's the
 4 right thing to do. We think we're doing it right.
 5 Quite frankly, there isn't anybody in the
 6 fleet that I'm aware of, that I talk to — and we talk
 7 about things like this — that this is even on their
 8 scope. This is an issue that's of more interest in
 9 Washington than it is in the fleet.
 10 There are other issues out there, but
 11 training — how we train gender-integrated — is not of
 12 great concern to anyone, other than if we should stop
 13 doing it. That somehow — again, the burden — whatever
 14 word we want to use for that — and I agree with the
 15 sergeant major in thinking, I'm not sure that "burden" is
 16 the right word, but the task of doing that gets handed
 17 off.
 18 Are we training to our need? And I think
 19 that's really what the whole thing is all about. The
 20 issue is our missions and our environments that we work
 21 in, and the work that we do is so different that it
 22 really dictates on the best way for each of us to do
 23 this.

1 It is my opinion that we deliver better
 2 sailors than we have ever delivered to the fleet.
 3 They're ready. They come to us with a higher standard,
 4 trained to a higher standard. The fleet doesn't always
 5 understand the sustainment, as the Marines put it. I
 6 call it the reinforcement function that they share.
 7 But certainly we're putting the right
 8 people out there with the right training to assimilate
 9 whatever other jobs we're going to ask them to do in the
 10 fleet.
 11 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: Sir, when
 12 it comes to fraternization, I think that the Air Force
 13 also had it basically right. I think that the rules
 14 probably need some clarification so that everybody
 15 understands what the rules are and so it's easily
 16 understood.
 17 When it comes to adultery, I believe that
 18 — I've always felt that commanders should have
 19 flexibility when it comes to how they treat cases, and
 20 there should be some range there because I don't think
 21 that one case, you know, necessarily is like another.
 22 But it is a crime. I think it should
 23 remain that, I think, because it goes completely against

1 our core values. You know, it goes against integrity,
 2 honesty, trust, all those kinds of things.
 3 So I think that it has to remain a very
 4 serious charge. At the same time, I think that
 5 flexibility for any commander is the key when it comes to
 6 punishments and things like that.
 7 When you talk about our force, I will tell
 8 you today that I believe that, you know, we have the best
 9 trained men and women that we've ever had. I look at the
 10 missions that they do. I look at DESERT FOX, which we
 11 did. There was about eight percent of the Air Force
 12 involved there, I believe — or maybe it was across the
 13 services — but eight percent of those participants were
 14 female. We had a B-52 female pilot that was involved in
 15 that combat operation.
 16 So they're there. They're doing. They're
 17 on the fringes, if not directly involved in the combat.
 18 They're right there doing it.
 19 But I keep asking the question — and I've
 20 asked the question of a lot of folks — what is it that
 21 we're not doing? What is it that America has asked us to
 22 do that we're not getting done? We have done every
 23 single mission that has been asked of us by our country

1 and it's been done by men and women serving together.
 2 And to me, this is a non-issue and always has been, but,
 3 for whatever reason, it got blown out of proportion.
 4 There's one other issue that — you know,
 5 the housing issue. We did not discuss that, but there
 6 was the issue of the housing and I know that there is —
 7 will probably be a reappearance of a proposal to
 8 segregate in the housing down at BMT.
 9 Some of you went to Lackland, I presume.
 10 You saw how our RH&T is, the housing. I would tell you
 11 that if you look at that, I think you'd have to agree
 12 that we're there. We have segregated men and women.
 13 There is no reason to spend millions of dollars to build
 14 another building to put women in it.
 15 And I would just ask your support on that
 16 when that goes through the Senate again — to the Senate
 17 floor, like it did the last time — that you help us
 18 defeat that, because I can certainly take those millions
 19 of dollars and put them to better use.
 20 And that is a political issue. That is
 21 not a gender-integrated training or housing issue, by the
 22 way. In my mind, that is purely politics. And we
 23 offered the proponent of that the opportunity to go to

1 Lackland — the staffers or the particular senator to go
 2 to Lackland to see it and they would not go. And I
 3 think, you know, we should at least get a fair hearing on
 4 that by anybody who's going to propose things like that.
 5 So...
 6 DR. MOSKOS: I wonder if I could ask
 7 Sergeant Major Lee to comment on that, because the
 8 Marines have strongly argued there are a lot of benefits
 9 to having an absolutely separate building.
 10 Would you comment on what the Air Force
 11 just said?
 12 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: Dr. Moskoss, just
 13 that, again, we segregate, so our segregation is
 14 completely segregated. Completely segregated.
 15 We just — Again, that's just the way we
 16 have done it —
 17 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: Have you
 18 seen the —
 19 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: — and we believe
 20 we're doing it right.
 21 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: I'm sorry.
 22 Did you go to Lackland?
 23 DR. MOSKOS: No, but I heard the stories.

1 I wanted to — Maybe General Christmas wanted to comment
 2 about the lock-down aspects.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Well, I
 4 would just ask — I will follow-on.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: You brought
 7 up, you know, the barracks and the like. One of the
 8 things that bothered the committee who visited was
 9 because of the previous commission and other things, it
 10 appeared that a great deal of resources were being
 11 expended on security measures that literally created a —
 12 my words now — a lock-up mentality — i.e., that is, you
 13 know, cameras — cameras in the passageways, with three
 14 monitors to watch everybody going.
 15 And I — quite frankly, I was —
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Enemy of the State.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — I was
 18 reminded of a county prison, you know, and that bothered
 19 me from — just from our core values standpoint of trust,
 20 of honor, of those kinds of things that we — And I would
 21 care to have you, you know, comment on that.
 22 Obviously the services — other than the
 23 Marine Corps, because they just happen to be in separate

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1 barracks, you know, at Parris Island — are responding to
2 that and are putting such security measures in. Is this
3 something we should be doing?

4 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: Well, it's
5 — as you say, it was a reaction to, you know, the
6 previous commission on security and — I don't know. As
7 time goes by, there may be a side benefit to that. We
8 may be able to take a person off of Charge of Quarters
9 and reduce that from two to one or something, you know,
10 because of the cameras.

11 So there may actually be a benefit of
12 that. It's only in the common areas of — you know,
13 hallways and things like that. It's not a privacy issue,
14 for sure.

15 But my point really is — is that, within
16 that building structure, as you saw, we have segregated
17 men and women. There is — You know, the two shall not
18 mix, you know, and there is absolutely no reason —
19 Anybody who sees that would — I think would have to
20 agree that, you know, we have already accomplished what
21 the proposal was trying to achieve.

22 And I just — as good stewards of taxpayer
23 dollars, I don't want to see millions of dollars spent to

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1 about the efficacy of our current basic training programs
2 with reference to the present, and I'd like to draw you
3 into the future.

4 We had General Reimer this morning talk
5 about the end of the Cold War and the Army's engagement
6 strategy — preventing conflict, managing crisis. A
7 couple weeks ago we had the Commandant talk to us about
8 the expeditionary force as it looks on the verge of the
9 Twenty-First Century. A few weeks before that, we had
10 General Ryan talking to us about the Air Force's
11 organization into an expeditionary force, and I feel sure
12 that —

13 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: And you all will have
14 Admiral Johnson in the morning.

15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Admiral Johnson will give
16 us something tomorrow.

17 So with reference to those visions of the
18 future, the kind of things that we think we can foresee
19 right now that will be demands on our service persons of
20 the future, how can we position basic training so that
21 the young folks trained today and tomorrow will have the
22 basis that they need to face those challenges that we
23 think they will probably have to face?

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1 build another structure to achieve the very thing that
2 we've already done. And so when this comes around again,
3 I would just like to —

4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What about
5 the hundreds of thousands of dollars spent on television
6 cameras and monitors?

7 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: It was
8 about \$250,000 —

9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: From your
10 professional opinion, is that something required?

11 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: Well, sir
12 —

13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Or wouldn't
14 it be great to go out to those sergeants who put together
15 the field training exercise?

16 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: I could
17 have found better ways to spend the money. It was —
18 Again, it's — you know, we're — it's the pressure put
19 on us to respond to those things.

20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I put you
21 on the spot and I don't mean to.

22 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: If I might, though,
23 you know, that's a small investment compared to what it

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1 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: Let me take that one.
2 Let me just —

3 SMA HALL: You can have it all.

4 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: Let me just go real
5 quick. And I do understand. I don't want this to sound
6 like a macho answer, but I guess that's what it's going
7 to come across as.

8 The United States Marine Corps, first of
9 all, is a young, expeditionary-oriented, warfighting
10 organization. If you look at our structure, you will see
11 that 110,000 of my Marines serve with less than four
12 years of service. Been that way for a long time. So a
13 very young force.

14 Expeditionary warfare or to be on the
15 laterals where the problems are, calls for a very
16 energetic, strong, strong-willed, disciplined, well-led,
17 well-provided for, force. That's what we're trying to
18 do. That's why we bring in 40,000 a year and release
19 almost 40,000 a year from our service.

20 We know what warfare is at the most basic
21 level and all Marines have to understand warfare at the
22 most basic level. That's why we do our recruit training
23 the way we do it. We try to inculcate them with the

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1 would take to provide the separate quarters, quite
2 frankly. And we sort of get put in the spot of damned-
3 if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't. And make no doubt about
4 it — even if you build the separate quarters, you still
5 have to have the security measures in effect to prevent
6 what we're all talking about here.

7 The other thing that I would offer up as a
8 real issue with providing separate buildings is you build
9 in — going back to that expectation that I talked about
10 — and perception — that there's something wrong here;
11 that there's something different; that it's not quite the
12 same.

13 Again, I grew up in the situation where
14 the training was segregated. And not just the training,
15 but virtually all the housing was segregated. Single
16 housing was to the extent where there was the famous term
17 that the Navy has for it — the WAVE cage. And if that
18 wasn't deprecating enough, I don't know what is. It just
19 builds in something that "we can't trust you," "it isn't
20 right," "we know you're going to screw up," et cetera.

21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I'd like to follow-on
22 with sort of part 3-B of General Christmas' question,
23 which is — I think each of you answered the third part

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1 belief — with the belief that they can fight up close,
2 personal, in the worst places in the world — i.e.,
3 Sierra Leone, Monrovia, Liberia — those kinds of places
4 where we've got Marines in right now or near right now —
5 make them understand what it is to be a very basic
6 warrior and that warfare is ugly; it is dirty; it is
7 very, very difficult and demanding. Technology enhances
8 our Marines. That technology is not the cure-all.

9 Your Marine Corps leadership, I believe —
10 at least this part of your Marine Corps leadership,
11 really does not believe that the wars we fight five years
12 from now, ten years from now — at least Marines who come
13 in from the sea, into those areas that we will be going
14 into — will be a whole hell of a lot different than what
15 General Christmas did in Hue City as a second lieutenant
16 or what General Keys did in Vietnam or what I did as a
17 PFC or a lance corporal thirty years ago. That's what we
18 do. That's what we bring to the government.

19 That's why we're so insistent on building
20 Marines the way we build them and making every Marine a
21 basic infantryman before they become anything else.

22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.

23 SMA HALL: We're working Force 21. We're

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 278</p> <p>1 working digitalization. We're working Army After Next. 2 We're going out to 2020 to look at what the country looks 3 like, what the missions look like, demographics, 4 urbanization — you name it, but that crystal ball gets 5 awful fuzzy. 6 As we work Strike Force — and I was at 7 Fort Polk, Louisiana, a couple weeks ago, I guess — last 8 week maybe — talked to them about Strike Force, and 9 talked to them at Fort Leavenworth last week about 10 something called TLS — training, leader development and 11 soldier support — that support strike force in the Army 12 After Next. 13 But I had to remind them that everything 14 we're doing in that area are add-ons to basic skills. 15 There's time to do that, and you do that in the unit. 16 Basic training in the Army, in nine weeks, to turn out a 17 soldier skilled in the basic skills, is where I think we 18 need to stay. I think that's what we need to do. And if 19 you provide the force a basic soldier, with basic skills, 20 who's trainable, disciplined and motivated, you can add 21 all the rest of it on. If you don't have that, you don't 22 have a base to build anything on. 23 But I think basic training — I agree with</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 281</p> <p>1 simulated Prince Sultan Air Base or some kind of a 2 cantonment site where it will be a tent city, if you 3 will. It will hold a thousand people. 4 In the fifth week of training, the troops 5 will go out there and they'll wear a flak jacket and a 6 helmet. They'll carry an inert rifle so they don't shoot 7 each other. They'll eat MRE's, sleep on a cot, in a 8 sleeping bag. They'll learn force protection. They'll 9 learn gas mask training, chemical warfare — all of those 10 things that go with being a deploying airman, because 11 during the eighties we didn't deploy very much. We only 12 had about 3,000 people deployed at any one time and those 13 were people that understood how to deploy. 14 So it's kind of like the socialization 15 process that we talk about where we don't want wing 16 commanders to have to be concerned about somebody's 17 ability to deploy. 18 We also want that wing commander to have 19 confidence that when that airman comes to them, they have 20 the mindset that, "Hey, I may be going TDY. And, oh, by 21 the way, I know how to pack up my rucksack and I know how 22 to eat MRE's and I know how to provide augmentation for 23 force protection and all of that, and you don't have to</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 279</p> <p>1 Sergeant Major Lee in that I don't think the basic level 2 of training should change as we prepare for the future. 3 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: I find myself 4 agreeing with both of them to a "T" in that basic 5 training delivers those basic things that we need in the 6 Navy to go on and assimilate those skills and the 7 training that technology will require of us in the 8 future. 9 But the basics don't change. The core 10 values, the ability to team, to work as a team, to 11 understand discipline and self-discipline — those are 12 the things that we've been building in boot camp for all 13 these years and which we continue to build. 14 Now, what does change in boot camp, I 15 think, is the leadership method that you use to get there 16 — to get some of those skills. That's what we have 17 really gone through at Great Lakes, in the transformation 18 up there over the last five years or so, in that you 19 can't continue to beat the peg through the round hole if 20 the peg changes shape. 21 You still have to get it through the round 22 hole, but you have to figure a better way to do it, and 23 that's what needs to change. But those are on the margin</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 282</p> <p>1 train me to do that," so that we will have a complete Air 2 Force of people that are in that mindset and in that 3 culture of understanding that they may have to go sleep 4 underneath the wing of an airplane until the support 5 package shows up. 6 So very much a change in how we do 7 business from the year 2000 and beyond as we go to the 8 expeditionary Air Force and we're gearing up to do that. 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you. 10 DR. MOSKOS: I'm going to ask kind of a 11 delicate question here. If you had an all-male military 12 of the same quality that we presently have, from a senior 13 NCO's position, would the job of leadership — the task 14 of leadership be easier, the same, or harder than it is 15 with the mixed-gender military? 16 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: Can I take that, sir? 17 DR. MOSKOS: Sure. 18 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: Because I answer this 19 straight from the shoulder, and it occurred to me that 20 you're asking a delicate question of four guys that 21 probably aren't all that delicate. 22 I answer that question — I've been asked 23 that question before and I answer it straightforward.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 280</p> <p>1 and that doesn't really change what you're training to. 2 And so we have not put the money in at 3 Great Lakes that we should have over the years. We have 4 a plan to do that, to upgrade. We would like it to be 5 better. We consolidated from three to one Recruit 6 Training Command, and we know we're behind the power 7 curve in the money — in putting the money where it needs 8 to be. 9 But we're in the catch-up mode. We have 10 plans to do that, and I'm confident that it will happen 11 and it will happen in the best way possible to sustain 12 what we've been doing for a long time. 13 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: We have to 14 build the expeditionary force that General Ryan was 15 talking about and we have to build the culture of that 16 force. So at Basic Military Training, we're beginning to 17 do that. 18 In the fifth week of training in the 19 future, once we have it built — We already do the FTX 20 exercise — I'm sure you're familiar with that — which 21 is a two-day, flak jacket, helmet-kind of thing. We're 22 going to expand that to a week long. 23 The fifth week of training will be at a</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 283</p> <p>1 And that is, the answer is yes, it would be tremendously 2 easier. In fact, life was easier when our ships were 3 all-male. To say anything less than that would be 4 disingenuous. And I would tell you, by it being easier, 5 it allowed us to get lazy, too. 6 The fact that we do have this to deal with 7 and to work with has put us on our toes. And I don't 8 know that it hasn't made us even better than what we 9 were, because we think about things more frequently; we 10 understand — we think a lot more about interpersonal 11 relations. 12 And it does take energy out of the system. 13 It doesn't come free. But when you look what it does and 14 the country that we represent, the country we defend, is 15 it the right thing to do — my answer is yes, I think 16 it's the right thing to do — to offer people the 17 opportunity to be what they can be in our country and in 18 our military, with as few restrictions as we can. And I 19 understand the restrictions we have and I support those. 20 But where we have drawn the line and where 21 we have said that it shouldn't make a difference what 22 gender you are, I think it's absolutely the right thing 23 to do. And I speak for the enlisted leadership of the</p>

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1 Navy in that. They would all tell you that it's harder.
 2 But I also am very confident that they would also tell
 3 you that it's the right thing to do and that it's worth
 4 it.
 5 SMA HALL: It would be a lot simpler. I
 6 mean, there's no use — You can't hide that fact. But
 7 you live in a country where things like race and gender
 8 and creed and color and religion — that doesn't make a
 9 difference.
 10 You know, that's part of the bigger
 11 question that I say — don't get gender-integrated
 12 training mixed up with the bigger question. It's way
 13 above my pay grade if the country is willing to do that
 14 and re-institute the draft.
 15 You know, there's some readiness
 16 implications. Not just in what you asked, Dr. Moskos,
 17 but just in gender-integrated training. I mean, the four
 18 of us have worked very, very hard in front of Congress to
 19 get where it looks like we're going to get something in
 20 the area of compensation and retirement. It looks like
 21 we're going to get that.
 22 But that's not just quality of life for
 23 soldiers, because if we give them a pay raise and we tell

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1 you're saying.
 2 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: No. And I will say
 3 one more thing here. The first woman Marine — I hate to
 4 use that term — that I ever really got to know, I
 5 married.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Good for her.
 7 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: And she was a hell of
 8 an influence on me and obviously she helped me get to
 9 where I am.
 10 So I'm going to take a different tack on
 11 that. No, I don't think so. I don't think so.
 12 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you very much.
 13 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I guess I'd
 14 just ask you this. I think you made your stance very
 15 clear on the gender-integrated training issue. You've
 16 made your stance very clear on basic training and the
 17 status of it today and the way you move it, and I think
 18 you've been very clear on the other part of our thing.
 19 What is it, in that — considering our
 20 charter, if you could tell us something that we could
 21 help you in that area, what would you tell us? And you
 22 don't have to repeat what you've already told us because
 23 I got that message loud and clear. But how can we help

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1 them that REDUX is fixed and we tell them, "Okay. Now go
 2 back and live in your barracks, and when it rains, water
 3 is going to drip on your head and all," there's some
 4 readiness implications with quality of life that goes
 5 with that.
 6 It costs us \$271 million to build the
 7 barracks, but if we go back to your scenario, maybe we
 8 could just all live in tents and we wouldn't need that
 9 much money.
 10 It's just one that I don't think I can
 11 take on, sir.
 12 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: Well, I
 13 think obviously if you have one gender, regardless of
 14 what the gender is, you know, facilities are less of a
 15 problem and all the other things that go with it.
 16 But, you know, the Air Force is — we're
 17 just — you know, a quarter of our recruits are female.
 18 I mean, they serve in 99 percent of the career fields.
 19 You know, we're just — to me, we're gender-blind. We
 20 don't — We just don't see it.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Well, you're not gender-blind
 22 because you do have separate facilities, as you said. So
 23 that's not a fair, I think, characterization.

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1 you?
 2 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: I think I can answer
 3 it, at least from my perspective here. You could help us
 4 by getting the focus off of it. We are tired — And when
 5 I say "we," we the Navy, all of us — are tired of
 6 surveys; we're tired of the visits; we're tired of all
 7 the attention that this continues to bring and it
 8 continues to keep us from getting along where we need to
 9 be.
 10 We need to grow more senior enlisted
 11 female leaders, as well as officers. It takes time. As
 12 I said, we will never be at a zero incident rate. That's
 13 just my opinion. I think, again, the goal should be
 14 zero, but I understand human nature.
 15 But the issue is, if we could just get on
 16 with business and concentrate on our missions and quit
 17 getting jerked back to this issue all the time — I'll
 18 tell you, I just think that the entire personnel of the
 19 United States Navy would ask you, please do that for us.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: We don't want to go back to
 21 gays again.
 22 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: Let's not go there
 23 either, please.

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1 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: No, I'm
 2 talking about as far as a person filling a job or a
 3 position.
 4 DR. CANTOR: Yeah.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: Right. Yeah.
 6 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: You know,
 7 being a commander or being a first sergeant or whatever,
 8 I mean, it's just — you know, we don't take it into
 9 consideration anymore.
 10 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: Dr. Moskos, I'm going
 11 to — I'm probably going to surprise you. I really don't
 12 know — Well, let me caveat that by saying I served in
 13 totally segregated units for eighteen years and I've been
 14 a leader almost as long as I've been in the Marine Corps,
 15 but I had tremendous leadership problems in all those
 16 units that I served in.
 17 When I became a sergeant major, I had —
 18 well, before that, but I had eighteen years of service —
 19 I served in my first integrated unit. In all honesty, in
 20 all fairness, it has been no more challenging leadership-
 21 wise than the ones I served in previously.
 22 So my gut answer is no, I don't think so.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: It makes no difference,

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1 SMA HALL: I think this Commission has
 2 done well from an Army perspective. I mean, forget the
 3 fact that all the Army leadership has been over here all
 4 day today and we're not doing anything else. But you
 5 haven't been a training distractor in the units, and I've
 6 got to tell you that. That's not always the case, as Jim
 7 said, on some of them.
 8 But you haven't — But you could help us.
 9 We're spending a lot of time trying to do what's right,
 10 just what's right. And we've made an emotional plea for
 11 gender-integrated training, but let me tell you that
 12 there's readiness implications here. It's not just
 13 emotion. It's emotional for us. It's emotional for me
 14 because I care, and I think we've got it right and I'm
 15 just trying to convince you of that. But that's okay,
 16 you saw what you saw.
 17 Where you can help us more than any place
 18 else — if we miss something, let us know. We want to
 19 fix it. We really do. So if there's something that we
 20 missed — You can help us because we don't do enough of
 21 sharing of ideas in what you've seen. You've seen the
 22 whole training base. I see the Army. Jim sees the Navy.
 23 Eric sees the Air Force. Gary sees the Marine Corps.

1 When there's some ideas and some good
 2 things that you can cross-level — it's almost like basic
 3 load — just help us cross-level those things. And, you
 4 know, we do that. There's no new idea in the world. The
 5 Warrior FTX is Version 2 of the Crucible. We know that,
 6 and I shamelessly stole that. We don't —
 7 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: As did we.
 8 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: As did we.
 9 SMA HALL: You know, that's where it's at.
 10 So those things that we need to do, just
 11 let us know.
 12 And keep in the back of your mind that
 13 your whole work started because of Aberdeen Proving
 14 Grounds. Aberdeen Proving Grounds is AIT. It ain't
 15 basic training to start with, so I'm not sure how the
 16 leap was made that when we had the leadership problems in
 17 AIT, that basic training was broke.
 18 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: We'd just
 19 ask, you know, for your support, particularly in the
 20 gender-integrated training side, and that we put that to
 21 rest once and for all and that the services are allowed
 22 to do the training that we've been doing to the best of
 23 our ability, and we'd just ask your support in that.

1 I believe that this became a political
 2 thing and a political agenda. I don't think there's any
 3 doubt about that. No doubt in my mind. But I would just
 4 ask your help in putting that part to rest.
 5 I would say that there are some good
 6 things that came out of this — out of the Commission —
 7 in that there were some periphery things that we
 8 certainly could have done better. I don't think there
 9 was anything that was, you know, certainly hard broke,
 10 and not very many things broken at all, but I think out
 11 of all this, I think there were some things that we could
 12 focus on, we could do a little bit better, but I wish we
 13 could have done that under different circumstances.
 14 You know, maybe just have a little
 15 oversight commission to kind of review it and look at it
 16 and make some recommendations rather than focusing on
 17 gender-integrated training because that has not been
 18 wrong. That's been right for us for twenty-one years and
 19 to go back is such a giant step backwards. I mean,
 20 really a giant step backwards.
 21 And the ramifications of that are — who
 22 knows? I don't know what it's going to do. I'm having
 23 tremendous problems with retention now. We're having

1 problems with recruitment. And if we add one more thing
 2 to that that adds more problems for us, that is something
 3 we certainly don't need.
 4 So I would just ask that you help us put
 5 this thing to rest. And I certainly thank you for all
 6 your support, and the way that you've treated us has been
 7 tremendous and I certainly appreciate that.
 8 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: That was a good
 9 question. I'm going to go out on a limb here. If you
 10 can, comment that the service chiefs need to be
 11 reinforced in their ability to carry out their Title 10
 12 responsibilities.
 13 I'd say get rid of focus groups, get rid
 14 of surveys, get rid of fact-finding groups, get rid of
 15 hotlines, reinforce the belief that commanders will
 16 execute their responsibilities if they're given the
 17 opportunity, and that the use of the chain of command
 18 will solve 99.9 percent of all problems within an
 19 organization.
 20 And if you want a paper on that, I'll be
 21 glad to give it to you.
 22 SMA HALL: And when you do that, when you
 23 do all the things Gary just asked you, can we get \$5-

1 billion for the Army?
 2 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: Is this
 3 where we come to ask for money? I missed that.
 4 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: I didn't bring the
 5 figure.
 6 MS. POPE: I just want to say for the
 7 record that I don't think any of us expect zero incident
 8 rates. I mean, you're dealing with people. And I think
 9 if any of the services ever got to that point, that would
 10 be suspect.
 11 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: Good point.
 12 MS. POPE: You know, I think that part of
 13 the "people" business all of you are in — and I also
 14 think that over at least my experience with the
 15 Department, I have seen a lot of concentration and focus
 16 in particular on basic training. And the only thing I
 17 would say to continue to watch — I mean, I think you've
 18 had over-emphasis on basic — is advanced training. You
 19 know?
 20 And part of it has to do with manpower,
 21 and I think each of you are addressing it independently.
 22 The issues are back to the leadership institutions for
 23 those drill sergeants, instructors, and a lot of it, from

1 what I've heard, was manpower issues. And unfortunately,
 2 all of you know that that's what gets, you know, raped
 3 first — those manpower counts — and where you least can
 4 afford it.
 5 So as a word of caution, you know, in
 6 looking to the future, as Ms. Blair was saying, is
 7 looking to those advanced training institutions, which is
 8 your second piece of that leadership.
 9 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: May I respond to —
 10 MS. POPE: Not that there's problems with
 11 it.
 12 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: May I respond to
 13 that, ma'am?
 14 MS. POPE: Yes.
 15 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: You know, that is so
 16 important because we in the Navy, I think, fell into that
 17 trap over a period of time in a fashion that was slow
 18 enough that we didn't understand what was happening. We
 19 ended up taking the leadership — the military leadership
 20 out of our initial skills training and we've been
 21 struggling to get that back. It's taken some time.
 22 We're on the path, I think, to do it. We know that
 23 that's where our biggest problem lies.

1 But I also know that even if I get
 2 everything perfect in boot camp and I get everything
 3 perfect in the "A" schools, I will still fail if I don't
 4 continue and get the fleet on board with becoming part of
 5 this growing and this building-a-sailor process.
 6 But the fact that you've brought that up,
 7 I just felt it necessary to tell you that we did that by
 8 accident. We fell into that and didn't even realize we
 9 were falling, from my perspective. It happened over —
 10 We just kept raking the manpower out of it and bringing
 11 civilians in, and before we knew it, we had a problem.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I guess my
 13 final question would be one for the record, and it's the
 14 same question we asked platoon sergeants and leading
 15 petty officers and department heads and company
 16 commanders and the like.
 17 Are each of your respective services
 18 ready? If we had to go to the desert tomorrow or to the
 19 peninsula of Korea, are we ready to do that?
 20 SMA HALL: We're probably more ready than
 21 the American people. I got asked that question last week
 22 from a young commander. He said, "Is the Army ready for
 23 sustained combat and lots of casualties?" We are. We

1 can take care of Saddam Hussein and we can take care of
 2 North Korea, but there's some risk involved and there's
 3 some casualties involved in that.
 4 We're not going to have — As Sergeant
 5 Major Lee said, we're not going to have — Wars in the
 6 future will still not be as high-tech as you'd like to
 7 have. You're still going to have soldiers on the ground,
 8 fighting and dying as you do that, but I think that the
 9 product in the Army today is — yes, sir, they're ready
 10 to accomplish any mission that the nation assigns them.
 11 MASTER CHIEF HERDT: Sir, if I might,
 12 first of all — I'd say that that was a great answer,
 13 Bob.
 14 I don't think the American public is
 15 ready. I mean, we've been clean in this business for so
 16 long with regard to casualties that you'd have to
 17 question how ready we are. We've almost built the
 18 expectation that we will never give up the casualties.
 19 But I would tell you from the Navy
 20 perspective we are doing it today. We have done it —
 21 When I grade 1998, I put an "A" next to "mission
 22 accomplishment." Every time someone rang the bell, we
 23 were not only ready but we were on station.

1 And I thought that we demonstrated in a
 2 pretty convincing way that any time you needed us,
 3 whenever they asked for us to respond, we were there and
 4 we responded pretty convincingly.
 5 As the CNO says, it's the non-deployed
 6 side of our lives that causes us the greatest concern.
 7 And if we can get that fixed in '99, when I grade '99, I
 8 hope there's going to be a lot of "A's," because I think
 9 we have a great opportunity to fix that non-deployed side
 10 of our lives and stay ready in a way that has sort of
 11 fallen off in the last few years.
 12 But the question today, if the bell rang,
 13 could we go answer it, the answer is absolutely yes.
 14 CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT BENKEN: We have a
 15 lot of very, very serious challenges. If you ask me if
 16 we're capable of doing the mission, I will tell you that,
 17 yes, we are. We have, you know, the people that can do
 18 it and we have the weapons that can do it.
 19 But as the Joint Chiefs testified, when it
 20 comes to the budget and things like that, we have
 21 stagnated for so long that we have a lot of fraying
 22 around the edges. We have a lot of missing engines out
 23 of airplanes. We have a lot of parts problems that we've

1 got to resolve. We've got, you know, retention issues in
 2 the second term. Even in the third — the career side is
 3 slipping on us as well.
 4 So if we don't turn some of that around,
 5 if we don't get the right kind of budget for the Air
 6 Force, then I think in the next couple of years,
 7 certainly, if you asked me that question, you might get a
 8 little bit different answer.
 9 We've got a very serious situation in
 10 defense right now that has to be addressed and the Joint
 11 Chiefs and the SECDEF are trying to do that, and I just
 12 hope the American people will listen.
 13 You know, there's a tendency every time
 14 you come out of a war, whether it's a shooting war or the
 15 Cold War, to go complacent. The typical American doesn't
 16 know that we have 24,000 people serving in the desert at
 17 any given day. They don't know the number of people that
 18 are serving around the world and what the tensions are
 19 and things like that.
 20 So I think that the public becomes
 21 complacent. We tend to focus on domestic issues and we
 22 let defense slide. And there's just something about
 23 this. You know, we seem to have to get hard broke before

1 we start getting attention paid to it.
 2 We can't do it like anybody else would
 3 where you make some small adjustments, you know. We have
 4 to get hard broke before we get attention paid to it, and
 5 we're in the hard broke status in some areas.
 6 And so we're fraying around the edges.
 7 Readiness has definitely slipped. Can we do the job?
 8 Yes. Do we need some attention? Yes.
 9 SERGEANT MAJOR LEE: Sir, we're meeting
 10 our requirements and we are ready. But a real fight
 11 against a determined foe would require an immediate and
 12 tremendous investment in both people and money from our
 13 government, our leadership.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. We seem to be on
 16 time. We thank you very much for coming today. This is
 17 a session that we've all looked forward to for a long
 18 time and it has exceeded even our hopes and expectations,
 19 and we thank you very much.
 20 (A brief recess was taken.)
 21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We're very pleased this
 22 afternoon to have Admiral Elmo Zumwalt as our witness.
 23 And, Admiral, we have followed the

1 practice of hearing a few words from our guest first and
 2 then just going around the table with questions and
 3 discussion among the commissioners until we run out of
 4 time.
 5 And we do thank you for coming a little
 6 bit early this afternoon, but we may very well use up the
 7 extra time because I know you have a wealth of knowledge
 8 to impart to us. So thank you very much for coming.
 9 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: Well, it's a pleasure to
 10 be here. I felt honored that you would want to hear from
 11 me. I was, I guess, the person who sought to break down
 12 both the race barrier and the gender barrier during my
 13 watch, 1970 to '74.
 14 We began the experiment to prove to our
 15 males that females could do everything that they could do
 16 on sea duty by assigning them to the one ship which it
 17 was then legal to assign women, the Hospital Ship
 18 SANCTUARY, where they served with great credit in the
 19 traditional male ratings for the three years of life left
 20 for the hospital ship.
 21 And we also began the then-very
 22 controversial program of training women to be pilots.
 23 Male aviators at the time were convinced that it wouldn't

1 work, and within a year or two women were flying
 2 hurricane aircraft into the eyes of a hurricane and doing
 3 every bit as well as their male counterparts.
 4 There were two reasons why I thought it
 5 was just desperately important that we get those two
 6 major changes made, both in race and in gender. The
 7 first was that it was time for us to obey the Executive
 8 Order that had been issued two decades earlier by
 9 President Truman with regard to race, the Navy having
 10 practiced tokenism while the other services integrated,
 11 and the second major reason was the equity.
 12 But I also had my eye very much on the
 13 fact that we knew that we were being told that we were
 14 inevitably going to have an all-volunteer force and Mel
 15 Laird, the Secretary of Defense, was predicting we'd have
 16 it by 1973. There would no longer be draft pressure and,
 17 in my view, it was clearly beneficial to be able to bring
 18 in men of group one and two, women, instead of the group
 19 three and four males that we would have had to bring in
 20 without draft pressure as we knew from previous
 21 experience.
 22 So as a result, we began this process.
 23 It's been rather exciting to see the changes. In the

1 middle of my four-year term, there were only a percent-
 2 and-a-half of the total force that were women. That's up
 3 now to about 13 percent. There were only four percent of
 4 all officers who were women. That's now up to a
 5 significant percentage. I think it's about 15 to 18. We
 6 had women in only twenty-four of the seventy ratings —
 7 the shore ratings — and they're now in ninety-one of the
 8 ninety-four ratings.
 9 So we've made good progress. And women
 10 are serving alongside men in all warfare areas except the
 11 special warfare area where Congress has not yet admitted
 12 them — in submarines, minesweepers and coastal patrol
 13 boats — where, for policy reasons, the Navy still does
 14 not, and in my view, in time that will come.
 15 I think that the record is very good with
 16 regard to the women in their service. I think that, by
 17 and large, we maintain professional relationships in
 18 close quarters about as well as they can be done. I
 19 think that the advent of gender-integrated training was a
 20 natural and appropriate progression of events, given the
 21 proximity in which Navy men and women now live and serve.
 22 I think it's important for them to start
 23 right off at the beginning, finding out the way in which

1 they have to live together and be together. I'm
 2 convinced, therefore, that gender-integrated training is
 3 the best way to prepare them.
 4 I think it is important for Navy
 5 leadership to be provided with sufficient flexibility to
 6 work around those areas where there are special problems,
 7 and there's no doubt in my mind that the time to
 8 introduce the gender-based integrated training is right
 9 after they've gotten into the Navy.
 10 The problems of having to live closely
 11 together are problems that we certainly know how to solve
 12 — much more easily, as a matter of fact, than the
 13 problems of how we deal with homosexuals.
 14 I guess based on my visits to ships, my
 15 discussions with a wide spectrum of Navy personnel — I
 16 still get lots of visits from Navy men and women in the
 17 middle grades and junior grades. And the attitude that I
 18 hear expressed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the
 19 Chief of Naval Personnel and the Chief of Naval
 20 Recruiting leave me very confident that the Navy is
 21 sincerely dedicated to making this integration of men and
 22 women work, recognizes that it's important in equity and
 23 mandatory in terms of requirements.

1 I'll be interested in taking your
 2 questions.
 3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much,
 4 Admiral. I'll give you a moment to wet your whistle.
 5 I think that the package that you probably
 6 received included a copy of our statute and —
 7 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: Yes.
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — one of the areas that
 9 has become almost unpredictably of interest for us is the
 10 first part of our statute which directs us to look at the
 11 adultery and fraternization regulations. And I assume
 12 you're probably following the course of some of those
 13 stories in the news —
 14 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: Yes.
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — and I just wonder if
 16 you have any comment for us on whether you believe that
 17 the rules governing fraternization should be changed or
 18 whether the more traditional rules should be kept on.
 19 And then with regard to adultery, there is
 20 a proposal to add some additional definition to the
 21 charge of adultery through the Manual for Courts-Martial
 22 in order to provide guidance for commanders in the field.
 23 And I wonder if you would comment as to whether you

1 believe that additional guidance would be necessary or
 2 helpful to commanders as they evaluate some of these
 3 male-female type of issues.
 4 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: My own view is that the
 5 thought of policy or regulation changes with regard to
 6 adultery is one that ought to be put in the cooler for a
 7 while, given the special circumstances in our national
 8 life at the present time, where you need time to get
 9 beyond the national crisis lest one be accused of making
 10 changes for that reason or in spite of that reason.
 11 So I would defer any changes for a year.
 12 I don't consider myself any expert with regard to the
 13 nuances of whether they're working well or not at the
 14 present time.
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And concerning
 16 fraternization, there has been a proposal to make the
 17 services more uniform as far as their specific rules
 18 concerning fraternization. It has the most impact, I
 19 guess, on the Army, but some impact also on the other
 20 services.
 21 And I wonder if you have a point of view
 22 about whether there is a need for a uniform joint
 23 fraternization rule or whether each service should retain

1 its own individual approach to the questions of
 2 fraternization.
 3 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: I think we have to count
 4 on our chief executive officers, the service secretaries
 5 and chiefs of staff, to be the ones that make the changes
 6 within their own services. I fear the day for a number
 7 of reasons that we become totally homogenized in the
 8 services.
 9 And we put very good men in charge of
 10 running our services and ought to have confidence in
 11 them, not only to have the discussions among themselves
 12 that will lead to the elimination of unnecessary
 13 differences, and, yet, count on them to have the good
 14 judgment to preserve the differences that seem to work
 15 for their service.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much.
 17 MR. PANG: Admiral, thank you so much for
 18 joining us. You know, I must say that when you were the
 19 CNO, I was wearing a different color uniform and it was
 20 blue. I was in the Pentagon, and we used to just be
 21 amazed at how well you led the Navy through a very
 22 significant period of change.
 23 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: But I'd like to say that

1 I, as a result, have a wonderful list of friends and a
 2 wonderful list of enemies and I'm very proud of both
 3 lists.
 4 MR. PANG: Sir, we admired your courage
 5 and leadership because I know that a lot of arrows came
 6 your way. So we thank you very much for sharing your
 7 thoughts with us today.
 8 I want to just follow-up on the Chair's
 9 question. One of the constants in the military has
 10 always been the notion of good order and discipline and,
 11 by extension, unit cohesion and, by extension, readiness.
 12 So I was a little bit concerned about the recent policy
 13 that the Defense Department came up with that essentially
 14 mandated one policy for all the services.
 15 So I share your view, you know, that we
 16 ought to leave that in the domain of the military
 17 leadership — the senior military leadership — because
 18 that's what we pay them for — you know, good order and
 19 discipline, unit cohesion, and by extension, the
 20 readiness of our forces.
 21 But, you know, some people have argued —
 22 and I think we need to explore this somewhat — that our
 23 society now has changed significantly and that these

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1 rules really ought to be revisited, and some have even
2 suggested that, you know, they can be, you know, changed
3 to conform more with the mores of society — you know,
4 whatever that means — and I was wondering if you would
5 comment on that.

6 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: I think that the
7 military service does always need to be distinctly higher
8 in its standards across-the-board than civilian
9 individuals. I think it's intimately related to good
10 order and discipline that one sets high moral standards,
11 and it does not worry me that we see evidence every day
12 of less than those standards in other walks of life.

13 But I think that there's a certain amount
14 of pride generated as a member of the service to know
15 that you're held to a higher standard, and I don't think
16 that morale suffers when an individual, whether he be an
17 admiral or a seaman, is being court-martialed for moral
18 turpitude — for him to look beyond the military and see
19 people that are not so treated.

20 I think that for the overwhelming majority
21 it contributes to esprit to have those higher standards.

22 MR. PANG: Thank you, sir.

23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Admiral, thank

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1 DR. MOSKOS: Amen is what I have to say on
2 that.

3 Admiral Zumwalt, being one of those
4 Princetonian draftees of an earlier era, let me ask you
5 an iconoclastic question —

6 DR. CANTOR: Oh, God, I'm going to move to
7 the other side if we go up this...

8 DR. MOSKOS: All right. Sit over there,
9 Nancy.

10 Some informal focus groups were taking the
11 Navy post-graduate college last — or '97, I guess —
12 1997 — or middle-level Navy officers — O-4's, O-5's —
13 and they were asked a question: "Would you prefer to have
14 a gay aboard your ship or a woman?" — and the answers
15 were much more toward having a homosexual aboard rather
16 than a female.

17 And a probing of the researchers — Mark
18 Idelberg and others — was that they said, well, we've
19 always had homosexuals or gays, you know, on ships, and
20 it's marginalized. We kind of know how to handle that.
21 But women aboard ships are much more of a loose cannon
22 and you don't know what was going to happen.

23 Now, I don't know how much you can

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1 you for coming.

2 I don't have a specific question relative
3 to our charter but I would like to ask you again — You
4 mentioned the all-volunteer force and you were part of it
5 when it came in. Do you still feel as strongly about
6 that? And do you in fact — How do you feel about going
7 back to the draft today and what it would do for the
8 country?

9 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: First, on a
10 philosophical basis, let me say that I had reservations
11 about the all-volunteer force. It's worked better than I
12 thought it would and we have, until very recently, been
13 able to get the quality we have needed as a result of
14 opening it up, both ethically and gender-wise.

15 But what I have discovered is that we pay
16 a price. When I was commanding officer of a destroyer,
17 it was good for me to have a Yalee or a Harvard or a
18 Princeton in the wardroom asking agnostic questions about
19 my decisions and it was good for him to have three or
20 four years of naval service before he went off to join
21 his father's brokerage business and become a future
22 Secretary of the Navy or Secretary of the Air Force.
23 We're no longer getting those kinds of

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1 generalize from that, but what's your reaction to that
2 kind of a finding?

3 I've tested it on others, too, and they
4 sort of say, yeah — you know, there's something to that,
5 they say. But I — Go ahead.

6 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: My own view is the
7 reverse. I think it's more difficult to live with
8 homosexuals than it is with the other sex. At least in
9 the case of the other sex you know who they are. You
10 know where they are. In the case of homosexuals, they're
11 not separated, and, therefore, sexual activity is easier
12 to get undertaken.

13 So although I think that the present
14 system is working fairly well, I think that senior people
15 are having more trouble with the homosexual side of it
16 than they are with the heterosexual side of it.

17 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Well, I'll just follow
18 that quickly. Some of us were surprised to find out that
19 the Navy has no ban across-the-service on consensual sex
20 aboard ship.

21 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: I'm surprised to hear
22 that.

23 DR. MOSKOS: We were, too.

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1 citizens that have a good military base. It's getting
2 harder and harder to find them in Congress and in the
3 military — civilian sector, and that's the price that we
4 pay.

5 You know, the very finest Secretaries of
6 Defense we've had have been veterans, in my judgment.
7 Secretary Gates, Secretary Laird — that kind of person.
8 In another few years, it will be difficult to find one
9 just because the people that have come from an elite
10 background or have advantages and tend to forge to the
11 top — and some of us who didn't have those backgrounds
12 — are no longer going to have had the military
13 experience.

14 Right now, with full employment, as you're
15 well aware, we're not now getting the full quality that
16 we were getting and it would be very helpful right now to
17 have the draft. I would personally prefer — and I know
18 there's no immediate prospect of that happening, but if
19 anything is going to be done, I'd prefer to see it be a
20 universal military service or a universal service program
21 that requires people to serve somewhere in the
22 government.

23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Thank you, sir.

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1 MS. POPE: But the fleets do. We did push
2 that. The fleets have policies. There's not a
3 Department of Navy policy, but each — the fleets have
4 it.

5 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: And it's banned?

6 MS. POPE: And it's banned. I mean, it's
7 a non-issue.

8 But what happens on liberty isn't
9 addressed.

10 DR. MOSKOS: Is a different story.

11 MS. POPE: But there is a clear
12 prohibition.

13 DR. MOSKOS: We should see a fleet one. I
14 had the — I got that from one of our Data Calls here.

15 MS. POPE: Right. Right.

16 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: What's happened on
17 liberty hasn't changed in a hundred years.

18 MS. POPE: Right. Exactly. Right.

19 DR. MOSKOS: No, it's changed. Now there
20 are sailors with sailors doing it on liberty. That's
21 different than a hundred years ago.

22 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: You're right. Yes.

23 DR. MOSKOS: Right.

1 Okay. Thank you very much.
 2 DR. CANTOR: You mentioned earlier that
 3 you thought gender integration was working very well,
 4 perhaps even better than you had expected at the time,
 5 but that it was going to be important to have some
 6 flexibility in working around areas where there might be
 7 particular issues.
 8 I guess I wondered if you could expand a
 9 little on both the flexibility and the areas where —
 10 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: Yeah. I was thinking
 11 with regard to flexibility that I would not — if I were
 12 Secretary of Defense today, I would not seek to interfere
 13 with the Navy's policy of not assigning women to
 14 submarines or to patrol craft.
 15 DR. CANTOR: I see.
 16 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: I'm sure they have good
 17 reasons for feeling that those should be exceptions, and
 18 there are all kinds of opportunities without opening
 19 those up.
 20 DR. CANTOR: Okay. Thanks.
 21 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Admiral,
 22 thank you very much for being here, and thank you for
 23 your service to the country.

1 DR. CANTOR: Right.
 2 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: Thank you.
 3 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: In my view,
 4 you're kind of a legend. And I would expound on what Mr.
 5 Pang said — and that is, at a time when a lot of people
 6 threw their arms in the air and said, "That's it, the
 7 military has gone to hell," you stuck it out and tried to
 8 make it better, and we thank you for that.
 9 My question —
 10 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: Well, I'll have to go
 11 home and tell my children that you're making me a legend
 12 in my own time.
 13 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: That's okay.
 14 You're probably a legend to them.
 15 My question is if you would expound — I
 16 gathered from your opening statement that you do think
 17 it's important to have an integrated force. And can you
 18 expound on that? I mean, why do you believe it's the
 19 right thing and it's good for America?
 20 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: Yeah. First, because of
 21 the fact that without a draft — and particularly in
 22 times as good as this — you simply cannot fill your
 23 rolls with top quality males; you need to double the

1 person power pool available to you and women do that for
 2 us.
 3 Second, I strongly support the idea that
 4 there should be standards for admission to the various
 5 arms. If you need to be able to carry 200 pounds to be
 6 an infantry person, some women can pass that test — a
 7 lot of them can't, but there's some men that can't either
 8 — and so there ought to be the same standards applied to
 9 both and devil take the hindmost.
 10 With regard to most of the military
 11 positions in the Navy and the Air Force, small is
 12 beautiful. In the cockpit, what you want is a brain, not
 13 brawn — and, you know, in a combat information center
 14 the same thing is true — so that it seems to me just
 15 most unwise not to tap the very best brainpower that you
 16 have by doubling the availability.
 17 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 18 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: I think that, you know,
 19 so much of what the services do also is to contribute to
 20 our technical pool on the outside — not only pilots and
 21 commercial aviation, but electronics technicians and so
 22 forth — and the women deserve in this day and age the
 23 right to have the benefit of that military training

1 before they go into civilian life that males would get
 2 without women being taken in.
 3 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 4 MS. POPE: Well, Admiral Zumwalt, I want
 5 to say thank you, too, and echo Bob and Fred's comments.
 6 As a Navy brat and then someone who had an opportunity to
 7 serve the Department, I want to thank you for your
 8 leadership. I think the Navy still benefits from it.
 9 When you looked at expanding the
 10 opportunities for minorities — for African American and
 11 women — did you have a concern about readiness? That
 12 you would degrade readiness in any way?
 13 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: I knew that there was
 14 going to be some drop in readiness in the sense that the
 15 morale of some of our senior males was hurt and there was
 16 a tendency on the part of some of them to say, "Well, you
 17 know, the CNO has made his bed, now let him lie in it,"
 18 rather than get in and make it work.
 19 The polls that we took anonymously six
 20 months after these changes were initiated showed that the
 21 senior petty officers and senior officers — captains and
 22 admirals — the level of about 15 percent were in strong
 23 opposition to the changes, and then the further — the

1 lower down you went in both the officer and enlisted
 2 categories, the stronger the support was for the changes.
 3 And I believe that after a temporary drop
 4 in readiness because of that morale drop or which — what
 5 I would call a failure on the part of people to get with
 6 the program — that we, within a very short time, were
 7 better off because we were getting, on average, higher
 8 quality people.
 9 MS. POPE: A follow-on to that is what was
 10 your thinking and that of your advisers around you after
 11 the hospital ship was working? What were you looking at
 12 to go next?
 13 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: I wanted to have proven
 14 that women could do the male ratings at sea so that that
 15 would provide leverage for the change in the statute,
 16 which I felt was inevitable.
 17 I might also say that in my last month of
 18 office, the Congress — and this wasn't — decided to
 19 initiate the hearings as to whether or not to admit women
 20 to the service academies, and President Nixon, knowing
 21 where I stood, instructed that the other chiefs could go
 22 testify and that I was to send the most senior person who
 23 disagreed with me.

1 MS. POPE: Really?
 2 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: Yeah. It turned out to
 3 be very simple. My very loyal number two, Admiral Wirth
 4 Bagley, who would never have spoken up without
 5 instructions to do so, I told him to go over and give his
 6 honest view. He did. But the Congress, in its wisdom,
 7 admitted women anyway.
 8 MS. POPE: It's amazing, the history that
 9 you don't know about.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: Is that in On Watch? That
 11 story? I don't think so.
 12 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: I'm not sure it is. But
 13 Wirth Bagley could confirm it for you.
 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Admiral, among our recent
 15 visits, I had a chance to talk with a chief petty officer
 16 who was very enthusiastic about the presence of women on
 17 ships and he kind of blithely said, "I wish I had all
 18 women." And I said to him, "Oh, you can't be serious. I
 19 mean, 50 percent? A hundred percent? Are you talking at
 20 that level?" And he said, "Absolutely, yes."
 21 And my question to you is — did you, at
 22 the time you began this move or since then then, form an
 23 opinion about whether there is a level of participation

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1 by females on ships that is the best level or more
 2 appropriate or that is going to be a natural level where
 3 things will just even out? Do you have any sense of
 4 whether we might ever have a hundred percent on ships
 5 or...
 6 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: First let me say that
 7 when the announcement came out that we were going to send
 8 women to sea in the SANCTUARY, it was carried
 9 periodically all day on the radio and TV. When I came
 10 home, I said to my beloved wife Mouza, "Have you heard
 11 the announcement?" and she said, "Yes." And I said,
 12 "What do you think of it?" She said, "Well, I understand
 13 it in principle, but I'm certainly glad it didn't happen
 14 while you were going to sea."
 15 And that is a point that should be
 16 mentioned. I think morale on the part of wives did
 17 suffer initially, until they realized over time that
 18 their husbands are exposed to that kind of opportunity in
 19 the Pentagon and on all shore duty and that this is just
 20 a different manifestation of it.
 21 But with regard to your question,
 22 statistically you'll get better quality every time you
 23 take a woman in place of a man until you get to 50

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1 DESERT STORM and people were no more distressed about the
 2 women dead and captured than they were the male dead and
 3 captured, and I think that shows the essential common
 4 sense of the country.
 5 We'll get beyond the newsworthy phase.
 6 We'll get beyond problems like the problem that the Navy
 7 had when Admiral Arthur had to make a decision to
 8 disqualify a female aviator because she was not qualified
 9 and the female members of Congress made such an issue out
 10 of it that Admiral Arthur did not get his well-deserved
 11 opportunity to be CINCPAC.
 12 But that's the kind of individual tragedy
 13 that is lost in the noise of the overall picture of
 14 what's getting done.
 15 MR. PANG: Yeah. I think, you know, with
 16 regard to your comment with regard to Admiral Arthur, I
 17 was there at the time in the Department of the Navy when
 18 that occurred and, quite frankly, you know, he was blamed
 19 for it but it really wasn't his decision. It was the
 20 decision of the secretary and somehow it transferred down
 21 to him because he was the senior aviator.
 22 And that was very, very distressful
 23 because I think we lost a really fine man who would have

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1 percent, because you're getting — certainly at the low
 2 percentages that we now have in the service, you're
 3 getting much higher quality woman on average than you are
 4 a man. We have to get down to the edge in the case of
 5 males and we don't yet with regard to females.
 6 So I would say that the chief is right
 7 until you get up closer to that 50-percent range.
 8 The Coast Guard has already had some all-
 9 female ships, I understand. That ought to be checked,
 10 but that's what I've been told. And I don't think that
 11 we'll see that in the Navy, but I think that we will see
 12 women commanding officers; we'll see women chiefs of
 13 service; we'll see a woman chairman of the Joint Chiefs
 14 in time.
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Thank you.
 16 MR. PANG: Admiral, one of the things that
 17 I noticed — and I think other commissioners as well —
 18 on our operational visits and our visits to the training
 19 commands of all of the services is that when you ask
 20 leadership, you know, how high on the radar screen are
 21 the issues that we are charged to look into, you know,
 22 with regard to the effectiveness of basic training, how
 23 we train men and women at basic training, and with regard

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1 gone out and done a superb job, I'm sure, out there in
 2 CINCPAC.
 3 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: Hopefully the situation
 4 has improved with the departure of Pat Schroeder from
 5 Congress.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I don't have
 7 anything else. Thank you.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Nothing here either.
 9 MS. POPE: No questions.
 10 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I don't have
 11 any other questions, sir. Thanks.
 12 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: Well, you were very
 13 kind.
 14 MS. POPE: Thank you for giving us your
 15 time.
 16 DR. CANTOR: Yes. Thank you.
 17 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: I think you're involved
 18 in an important assignment. I'll be interested in
 19 reading your final report.
 20 MR. PANG: Well, this is —
 21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We will, too.
 22 Thank you very much.
 23 (Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the hearing in


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1 to good order and discipline rules that govern
 2 fraternization and adultery, the answer is quite
 3 interesting in that they say, "Not high on our radar
 4 screen from the standpoint of concerns within our
 5 command, but high with regard to any incident because
 6 that's sure to grip, you know, the media, and the next
 7 thing you know we look like, you know Peyton Place or
 8 something like that."
 9 I was just wondering, you know, because
 10 you have rich experience in this area, I mean, how you
 11 kind of view that.
 12 ADMIRAL ZUMWALT: Well, I think women are
 13 still newsworthy. Women in the service are still
 14 newsworthy and will be for some time until the numbers
 15 get closer to the number of males.
 16 But there's an awful lot of shibboleths in
 17 this business. You know, when we first began the
 18 practice of sending women into combat roles, the
 19 conventional wisdom was that the American public would
 20 never stand still for body bags coming back with women in
 21 them, nor would they ever stand still for the women being
 22 tortured if they were captured as prisoners.
 23 But we've now passed both those tests in

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1 the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at
 2 7:30 a.m., the following day.)
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JAN. 28, 1999



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CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES

Friday, January 29, 1999

1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 940

Arlington, Virginia

JAN. 29, 1999

1 Those present:
 2 Anita K. Blair, Esquire - Chairman
 3 The Honorable Frederick F.Y. Pang - Vice Chairman
 4 Nancy Cantor, Ph.D. - Commissioner
 5 LtGen George R. Christmas, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner
 6 CSM Robert A. Dare, Jr., USA(Ret) - Commissioner
 7 LtGen William M. Keys, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner
 8 Thomas Moore - Commissioner
 9 Charles Moskos, Ph.D. - Commissioner
 10 The Honorable Barbara Spyridon Pope - Commissioner
 11 ---
 12 Stephen C. Fogleman, Esquire - Executive Director
 13 Susan L. Fry - Executive Assistant
 14 James Renne, Esquire - Staff Counsel and Secretary
 15 Kathleen M. Wright, Ph.D. - Research Director
 16 Janice Laurence, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 17 Charles Johnson, Ph.D. - Research Consultant
 18 Capt J.S. Snyder, USN - Service Representative
 19 LtCol Brenda L. Harris, USA - Service Representative
 20 LtCol Mary Street, USAF - Service Representative
 21 Maj R. Scott LaShier, USMC - Service Representative
 22 ---
 23

1 Also present:
 2 CAPT H. Denby Starling, II, USN, Commanding Officer, USS
 EISENHOWER
 3 CDR David Morriss, Legislative Affairs Action Officer,
 4 Navy Office of Legislative Affairs
 5 ---
 6 ADM Jay L. Johnson, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy
 7
 8 RADM Norbert R. Ryan, Jr., USN, Director, Navy Office of
 9 Legislative Affairs
 10 CAPT James M. Kudla, Public Affairs Officer, Office of
 the Chief of Naval Operations
 11 CDR David Morriss, Legislative Affairs Action Officer,
 12 Navy Office of Legislative Affairs
 13 CDR Ronald B. Moranville, Aide to the Chief of Naval
 14 Operations
 15 ---
 16 U.S. Navy Panel
 17 VADM Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr., USN, Deputy Chief of
 18 Naval Operations, Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments
 19
 20 RADM Edward Hunter, USN, Commander, Great Lakes Training
 21 Center
 22 CAPT John J. Morrow, USN
 23 CAPT Craig L. Hanson, USN, Commanding Officer, Recruit
 Training Command, Great Lakes
 24 CAPT Randal O. Abshier, USN, Chief of Naval Education and
 25 Training
 26

1 OSCM (SW) Richard J. Sheridan, USN, Recruit Training
 2 Command, Great Lakes
 3
 4 CDR David Morriss, Legislative Affairs Action Officer,
 5 Navy Office of Legislative Affairs
 6 ---
 7 U.S. Air Force Panel
 8 Lt Gen Marvin R. Esmond, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for
 9 Air and Space Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
 10 Maj Gen Andrew J. Pelak, Jr., USAF, Commander, 2nd Air
 11 Force, Keesler Air Force Base
 12 Brig Gen Barry W. Barksdale, USAF, Commander, 37th Wing,
 13 Lackland Air Force Base
 14 COL Keye Sabol, AF/XOOA
 15 COL Stefan Eisen, 737 TRG/CC
 16 LtCol Sandy Rufkaur, AF/OPBET
 17 MAJ Carol Pugh, AF/XORP
 18 MAJ Steve Poerschmann, AF/XOOA
 19 MAJ Michael Morris, SAF/LLP
 20 ---
 21 CMSgt William A. Milligan, USAF, Command Chief Master
 22 Sergeant, 2nd Air Force, Keesler AFB
 23 ---
 24 U.S. Marine Corps Panel
 25 BGen Jan C. Huly, USMC, Director, Operations Division,
 Plans, Policies and Operations (PP&O), HQMC
 26 BGen T.S. Jones, USMC, Director, Training and Education
 27 Division, HQMC
 28

1 LtCol Leon Pappa, USMC, Deputy Head, Training Programs
 2 Branch, T & E, HQMC
 3 LtCol P.J. Greene, USMC, Operations Division, PP&O, HQMC
 4
 5 Maj S. Kelley, USMC, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, HQMC
 6 ---
 7
 8 Brenda L. Bryant, Director, Virginia Women's Institute
 9 for Leadership, (VWIL), Mary Baldwin College, Staunton,
 10 VA
 11
 12 Cadet Trimble L. Bailey
 13 Cadet Sherri L. Sharpe
 14 Elaine Donnelly, President, Center for Military Readiness
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 17 Elaine Donnelly, President, Center for Military Readiness
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1 PROCEEDINGS (7:37 a.m.)
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Good morning. This is
 3 Friday, January 29th, 1999, and the Congressional
 4 Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues
 5 is beginning another day of hearings. Our guest this
 6 morning is Captain Denby Starling, II, from the USS
 7 EISENHOWER. I believe we all have his bio in our
 8 materials.
 9 And so, without further adieu, I will
 10 thank Captain Starling for coming to visit us this
 11 morning and invite you to tell us what you know.
 12 CAPTAIN STARLING: Thank you, ma'am.
 13 Madam Chairman and members of the
 14 Commission, I thank you for the opportunity to speak to
 15 you here this morning. I have to say that this is the
 16 first time I've ever had the opportunity to appear before
 17 a group like this, so I ask that you be patient with me
 18 if I seem just a bit nervous or if I take a couple of
 19 extra seconds to make sure that I've got my brain in gear
 20 before I answer your questions.
 21 And, Ms. Blair, I'd like to add that it's
 22 always a pleasure to meet a fellow UVA grad.
 23 I know my bio has been forwarded to all of

1 you but it may be beneficial for me to take just a few
 2 seconds to expand on some of the information that's in
 3 it.
 4 Prior to assuming command of DWIGHT D.
 5 EISENHOWER, I commanded an aircraft squadron and an
 6 amphibious ship. Neither of these were mixed gender. I
 7 also served as Executive Officer of the aircraft carrier
 8 JOHN C. STENNIS, which in 1994 was one of the first
 9 aircraft carriers that had a gender-integrated crew.
 10 None of the commands I served in prior to JOHN C. STENNIS
 11 were gender-integrated.
 12 And like most Navy career officers, I have
 13 opinions on just about anything that you probably want to
 14 ask me about, but before I answer your questions, I think
 15 it's worth noting that some of my opinions regarding
 16 professional interaction of men and women were formed
 17 based on my observations in the workplace and my twenty-
 18 four years of Navy operational experience. These
 19 opinions may be of some use to you.
 20 Some of my opinions are a lot more heavily
 21 influenced by my nineteen years as a father. I have a
 22 son and two daughters, and they should probably carry
 23 considerably less weight with you. In any case, I'll

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1 answer your questions as best I can and I'll try to make
 2 sure that you know into which category my answer falls
 3 when I answer you.
 4 I assumed command of DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
 5 on deployment in the Adriatic Sea in August of 1998. IKE
 6 has a crew of about 2,700, and about 345 of those are
 7 women. While the ship is deployed with a staff and an
 8 air wing embarked, the ship's company approaches 5,000
 9 people. Women serve in almost every capacity on board
 10 IKE, from deck seaman to department head. During our
 11 last deployment, Carrier Air Wing 17 had three women
 12 pilots but was not a fully gender-integrated air wing.
 13 They had no women enlisted personnel in any significant
 14 numbers.
 15 There has been a lot of discussion
 16 regarding the impact of pregnancy in readiness. During
 17 IKE's last deployment, which ended on December 10th of
 18 last year, personnel shortages were our number one
 19 readiness degrader while we were on deployment. While we
 20 were deployed, IKE averaged between four and five hundred
 21 personnel less than our manning document said we should
 22 have.
 23 Some of this shortage was due to well-

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1 documented fleet-wide manning deficiencies, while some
 2 portion of it was caused by unplanned personnel losses
 3 where a crewman is forced to leave the ship prior to
 4 their normal rotation date. In these cases, there is no
 5 preplanned relief and the manpower system may not be able
 6 to react fast enough to provide a timely replacement and
 7 the billet goes empty.
 8 During 1998, which included the majority
 9 of IKE's heavy workup period and all of her deployment,
 10 we had 299 unplanned personnel losses. Of this total,
 11 pregnancy was the third-largest contributor at forty,
 12 13.4 percent of unplanned losses.
 13 But to try to put this number in a little
 14 bit better perspective, the number one and number two
 15 reasons were transfer to medical limited duty — we had
 16 108 personnel or 36.5 percent of unplanned losses — and
 17 misconduct discharges, ninety-eight people or 32.8
 18 percent of unplanned losses. In the five months since I
 19 have assumed command of IKE, there have been eleven
 20 pregnancies, the majority of them occurring to junior,
 21 single sailors.
 22 These numbers can be interpreted in a
 23 number of ways. Based on my experience as IKE's

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1 commanding officer, pregnancy losses, while certainly not
 2 desirable, do not outweigh the truly outstanding
 3 contributions made by the majority of our female sailors.
 4 I see no significant impact on operational readiness
 5 arising from having a mixed-gender crew that outweighs
 6 the advantages of having twice the sample pool of
 7 American youth from which to recruit.
 8 While we may lose a number of women for
 9 reasons that are unique to their gender, it is my
 10 personal observation over several tours that women impose
 11 significantly less discipline burden on the command and,
 12 exclusive of pregnancy, are discharged early in smaller
 13 numbers than their male counterparts. The numbers on IKE
 14 back this up.
 15 Women are about 13 percent of IKE's crew,
 16 which I think right now is about where they are Navy-
 17 wide. In 1998, women accounted for 21 percent of IKE's
 18 unplanned losses. When pregnancy is eliminated as a
 19 factor in unplanned losses, this number drops to 9.2
 20 percent. Women were 5.1 percent of our misconduct
 21 discharges. Women were 13 percent of losses to medical
 22 limited duty, which is exactly in their proportion to the
 23 rest of the crew, which I think is what you would expect.

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1 For all other losses combined — that is,
 2 if we exclude limited duty, exclude misconduct and
 3 exclude pregnancy — women accounted for 9.6 percent of
 4 the total of our unplanned losses. And I've got those
 5 numbers broken down by every reason if you are
 6 interested.
 7 Does having a mixed-gender crew present
 8 unique challenges to leadership that maybe we haven't had
 9 to deal with before? It absolutely does. There's no
 10 question about that. Will we ever be able to completely
 11 eliminate sexual harassment, fraternization, shipboard
 12 sexual activity and undesired pregnancy? I don't think
 13 so. But that, in and of itself, is not reason enough not
 14 to do this. There will be problems.
 15 But I would like to emphasize that, based
 16 on my experience, these are not "women's problems." We
 17 tend to call them women's problems because women come
 18 aboard the ship. They are "men and women's problems."
 19 They are the problems that arise from men and women being
 20 together in the workplace in the Navy just as in society,
 21 and I think they are problems that can be kept to a
 22 minimum by aggressive training, by strict enforcement of
 23 standards, and by proactive leadership.

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1 I understand that "if" mixed-gender
 2 training should take place in initial entry training is a
 3 significant question with which the Commission is
 4 grappling. I think it's important for the Commission to
 5 note here that I never went to initial entry training,
 6 never went to boot camp, never had that experience. So
 7 to try to prepare for some of the questions you might ask
 8 me, last week I got together all my leading and senior
 9 chief petty officers in my command to talk to them.
 10 The majority, but not all of them, felt
 11 that gender-integrated training should start on day one.
 12 A minority felt that a period of gender-separate training
 13 was warranted to ensure that recruits were fully
 14 indoctrinated in Navy policy regarding appropriate gender
 15 interactions before we mixed them in training. There
 16 were male and female chiefs on both sides of this issue.
 17 However, on the bigger issue they were
 18 unanimous — and I'd like to stress this, they were
 19 unanimous — gender-integrated training in boot camp is
 20 absolutely necessary. They were unanimous in their
 21 feeling also — surprising, a little bit, to me — that
 22 the level of training that was given to them in boot camp
 23 or the sailors that report to our ship from boot camp

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1 regarding gender-related issues is about right.
 2 It's essential for me as a commanding
 3 officer that newly-reporting sailors, both male and
 4 female, arrive on IKE with a clear understanding of the
 5 behavioral basics that the Navy demands of them. We will
 6 supplement their training with shipboard indoctrination,
 7 including some very specific instruction regarding the
 8 standards of behavior that we expect on IKE, but
 9 operational commands should not be placed in the position
 10 of being the first place where men and women closely
 11 interact in the work environment. This has got to happen
 12 someplace before they come to my ship.
 13 With that, I thank you and I'm ready to
 14 answer your questions.
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much,
 16 Captain.
 17 Captain, one of the comments that you made
 18 was that a fair number of the pregnancies that occurred
 19 on the EISENHOWER were among junior single sailors.
 20 CAPTAIN STARLING: Yes, ma'am.
 21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I wonder if you know what
 22 kinds of programs exist, whether in boot camp or, indeed,
 23 out in the operational fleet, to counsel young sailors to

1 take better care of themselves.
 2 CAPTAIN STARLING: I'm not an expert on
 3 what goes on in boot camp and I'm not sure about the
 4 level of training that goes on in boot camp. We try to
 5 talk to our sailors rather frankly about it when they
 6 report aboard — as best you can without appearing like
 7 you're talking down to them, I guess would be the best
 8 way to put it.
 9 I think the problems that we see in the
 10 Navy regarding that — And again, my observations here
 11 are — I don't have numbers to put behind those. Those
 12 are just what I see. I get a report on every sailor that
 13 we wind up — not a long one, a short note — on every
 14 sailor that we have that leaves the ship. And my
 15 observation, as I mentioned to you, is that most of them
 16 are young, a lot of them are single, and I think that's
 17 probably representative of what we see outside in society
 18 as a whole today. It's a problem that everybody is
 19 grappling with.
 20 So other than being up-front and talking
 21 with them, I'm not sure exactly what programs the Navy
 22 has for them before they get there. No, ma'am.
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.

1 MR. PANG: Good morning, and thank you so
 2 much for joining us. We appreciate it very much. And,
 3 you know, I think your comments are going to be very
 4 relevant to what we're about.
 5 I have two questions. I first has to do
 6 — One of the charges that we have as a Commission is to
 7 assess basic training generally. And the question is,
 8 you know, is the program — the Navy's basic training
 9 program and its follow-on training rigorous enough and
 10 sufficient enough to produce a sailor on the first term,
 11 going through their first assignment, fully capable of
 12 doing what you expect of that particular individual?
 13 And I was just wondering over, you know,
 14 your career, as you've observed, you know, young people
 15 coming into the fleet, what your observation is with
 16 regard to this particular generation of people that are
 17 coming through the system.
 18 CAPTAIN STARLING: The short answer to
 19 your question — and then I'll talk a little bit longer,
 20 but I think the short answer to your question is yes, I
 21 think they do a pretty good job.
 22 And this was another question I put to my
 23 chiefs the other day because, you know, I don't interact

1 on a day-to-day basis with brand new sailors that report
 2 aboard. And, unfortunately, by the time brand new
 3 sailors have to interact with me, it's normally not —
 4 it's normally not on a basis that maybe puts the Navy's
 5 best foot forward.
 6 So that was a question that I put to my
 7 chief petty officers. I said, you know, "You deal with
 8 these folks on a day-to-day basis." And I tried to frame
 9 the question to make sure that they understood: "I'm not
 10 asking you what's wrong with sailors today. I'm asking
 11 you do sailors show up with the tools that they need to
 12 do the job."
 13 And like chiefs are often wont to do, they
 14 had other answers that they wanted to give me and they
 15 kind of launched off in that direction first. And their
 16 answers were pretty enlightening because I think if you
 17 talk to any employer, Navy or civilian, you would get
 18 many of the same answers.
 19 My brother works for Frito-Lay down in
 20 Atlanta. He's a route manager, a middle manager down
 21 there, and he and I often talk and compare what it's like
 22 running a Navy organization to a civilian organization.
 23 And the complaints that I hear from him are it's hard to

1 find new workers today with a good work ethic; it's hard
 2 to find new workers today that are willing to buckle down
 3 and really turn-to the way I was ready to turn-to when I
 4 was twenty-one years old.
 5 Those are the same kind of complaints I
 6 hear from chief petty officers today about new sailors.
 7 Call it Generation X, call it whatever. I think a lot of
 8 their opinions are shaped not only by what they see with
 9 the sailors on the ship, but they're shaped by what they
 10 see in the news and what they see on television.
 11 The sailors who come in the Navy today —
 12 there is absolutely no question about it — are smarter
 13 than their counterparts were when I came in the Navy
 14 twenty-four years ago.
 15 After I let them kind of run on for a
 16 while about all the things that they'd like to see
 17 sailors today in the Navy be able to do better — that,
 18 of course, they could all do when they were that age — I
 19 said, "Now let me refresh your memory a little bit. If I
 20 pulled out my cruise book from my first appointment in
 21 1978 and I opened it up, I would see young sailors with
 22 scraggly beards. I would see young sailors that if you
 23 walked out in the passageway today and took a cross-

1 section of these sailors and put them up side-by-side and
 2 looked at them, I can guarantee you that you would be
 3 much more favorably impressed with what you see today
 4 than what you saw then." And you see them all kind of
 5 going, "Well, yeah, that's probably true."
 6 I think we get a higher cut today than
 7 we've ever gotten. I can remember that when I was a
 8 junior officer in my first tour, we would be on our hands
 9 and knees, begging anybody that wanted to get out to stay
 10 in the Navy, because we were so desperate in those days
 11 to retain people because retention was so bad. That's
 12 not the case anymore. There's a lot of problems out
 13 there in the retention world, but I am under no
 14 compulsion whatsoever to retain anybody for the issue of
 15 retention.
 16 And, you know, it used to be one of the
 17 number one bullets in a commanding officer's fitness
 18 report — was, "What were your retention statistics?"
 19 Well, retention is still tremendously important — you
 20 read about it in the Navy Times every day — but nobody
 21 around here is telling me I should retain somebody who's
 22 not going to be a good guy for the Navy.
 23 So they're better coming in. And the

1 problems that we see in the sailors today I think are
 2 generally reflective of problems that you see in society.
 3 A lot of them are not as amenable to a military
 4 lifestyle, I don't think, as people of my generation
 5 were, and I think it's more of a difference in the way
 6 that we were brought up than it is in a difference in
 7 whether they're quality people or not quality people.
 8 I mean, face it, we bring in a lot more
 9 people today from single-parent homes; we bring in people
 10 today from tough parts of the country and things that
 11 just didn't exist in the numbers they did twenty years
 12 ago when I came in.
 13 Every sailor that comes to me at mast, I
 14 make a point of looking at his record to see if he comes
 15 from a single-parent or a multi-parent home. And the
 16 numbers are pretty much overwhelmingly large that those
 17 who have problems come from a societal background which
 18 might indicate that they're going to have problems.
 19 So I think maybe I've gone on a little bit
 20 longer than I should have. I think the sailors we're
 21 getting are good. I think the challenge is to change the
 22 training system as the types of sailors change to kind of
 23 keep up with the problems that we need to keep up with to

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1 train them better when they get here.
 2 That process doesn't end when they walk
 3 out of boot camp. You know, that then becomes my
 4 challenge to keep training them after they arrive on
 5 board my ship. And we try very much to do that, but
 6 they've got to have some basics in place when they show
 7 up.
 8 At the end of the conversation with my
 9 chief petty officers, I said, "Okay. Now tell me. You
 10 know, I'm sure you all felt that boot camp was tougher
 11 when you were there." You know, everybody's memory is
 12 like that. I'm not a Naval Academy graduate, but
 13 everyone I've ever known says, "There's never been a
 14 plebe summer as hard as my plebe summer was when I was a
 15 plebe at the Naval Academy." So we all tend to remember
 16 things as being more rigorous, I think, when we were
 17 younger.
 18 But I said, "Okay. I'll put it to you
 19 this way: is the delta, do you think, in boot camp today,
 20 from the time a sailor walks in to the time a sailor
 21 walks out, worse, about the same or better than when you
 22 were at boot camp?" And the answer that they gave me was
 23 "probably about the same."

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1 MR. PANG: Thank you.
 2 You know, I think the other — I have a
 3 second question and that relates to, you know, your
 4 comment with regard to, you know, leading a gender-
 5 integrated crew. I think there's no question, you know,
 6 that that poses leadership problems — not problems, but
 7 challenges — and I was just wondering, you know, how
 8 high on the radar scope is this in your day-to-day
 9 leadership of the vessel.
 10 I mean, is this something that, you know
 11 — I mean, obviously it concerns you, but where is it,
 12 you know, in the scheme of things?
 13 CAPTAIN STARLING: On the day-to-day
 14 level, it's pretty low, because the numbers of problems
 15 that you deal with are small. And I can talk
 16 specifically if you like — you know, if somebody has a
 17 question later — about the types of things I've seen
 18 with regard to fraternization and those types of problems
 19 that we've had aboard the ship because those problems are
 20 out there, and anybody who wants to pretend they're not
 21 is never going to get ahead of the problem.
 22 So on a day-to-day basis, it's a fairly
 23 down-in-the-weeds issue. It's not something that I deal

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1 with on a daily basis. When something of significance
 2 comes up, it tends to get a lot of attention because
 3 everybody is extremely sensitive to those types of issues
 4 and those types of problems and how they are resolved.
 5 And that's true — it's true within the lifelines of the
 6 ship, and if it's a significant-enough issue, it's true
 7 outside the lifelines of the ship.
 8 So day-to-day, not much. When it happens,
 9 pretty steep — mostly because it's normally an issue
 10 that we want to resolve and we want to resolve quickly;
 11 because the worst thing that can happen with an issue
 12 like this is you let it sit out there and fester around.
 13 So, then, it's usually something I want to get up,
 14 investigated, decided and done with.
 15 MR. PANG: Thank you.
 16 DR. CANTOR: Thank you so much for coming.
 17 I especially appreciate your willingness to compare what
 18 occurs on the ship as opposed to what would occur in
 19 civilian life. I think it's a very helpful comparison.
 20 I wanted to ask, actually following on
 21 Fred's comments, about the misconduct. So you spoke
 22 about ninety-eight people, the second-most-prevalent
 23 reason in the last year — or five months, I guess. Is

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1 the ninety-eight five months?
 2 CAPTAIN STARLING: That's 1998.
 3 DR. CANTOR: That's the year. Okay.
 4 CAPTAIN STARLING: I figured I'd better
 5 come up with at least a year's worth of numbers.
 6 DR. CANTOR: Right.
 7 CAPTAIN STARLING: That's 1998.
 8 DR. CANTOR: Could you give us a sense of
 9 some of the content of that and whether you think it has
 10 any implications for our charge to look at fraternization
 11 and adultery rules and...
 12 CAPTAIN STARLING: Yes, ma'am. The exact
 13 numbers — Always be careful and bring your notes. But
 14 the misconduct discharges were ninety-eight last year,
 15 and ninety-three of those were men and five of those were
 16 women.
 17 I don't have all the reasons for that, but
 18 normally what it boils down to is by the time we decide
 19 to discharge somebody for misconduct, it's seldom because
 20 of a single act. It's not because they did something
 21 horrible that's going to get them thrown in jail and we
 22 said, "This person just needs to be out of the Navy."
 23 Normally people who are discharged on

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1 misconduct discharges are long-term people that just fail
 2 to make the change from — They entered a military world
 3 and they either can't adapt to the discipline, they can't
 4 get to work on time, they can't learn to be properly
 5 respectful with their seniors.
 6 And that being the case, I don't ever — I
 7 have never been involved with an issue where we
 8 discharged somebody over an issue that had to do with
 9 fraternization, sexual harassment, sexual assault.
 10 They're pretty much separate issues. I've never had a
 11 case that was so bad that we felt that someone had to be
 12 discharged over it.
 13 DR. CANTOR: Okay. Thank you.
 14 MR. MOORE: I'd like to welcome you and
 15 thank you for coming, too. I had the pleasure of landing
 16 on the EISENHOWER some years ago when we were —
 17 CAPTAIN STARLING: Oh, really? Well,
 18 great.
 19 MR. MOORE: — when the ship was doing a
 20 workup cruise and went out on the COD. Made the trap on
 21 the first pass, unlike my experience last week on the
 22 ENTERPRISE.
 23 CAPTAIN STARLING: We're a better ship,

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1 sir.
 2 MR. MOORE: I'm interested in the — I
 3 commend you for bringing in your chief petty officers and
 4 soliciting their views. And I think it's interesting.
 5 You said there was a breakdown. A majority approved the
 6 idea of mixed training initially or from day one in boot
 7 camp, some others did not, and you said there were female
 8 petty officers on both sides of the question.
 9 Could you give me some characterization of
 10 the reasons why the female petty officers opposed to
 11 mixed training — at least initially — offered in their
 12 discussions with you?
 13 CAPTAIN STARLING: Sure.
 14 MR. MOORE: I was surprised that they
 15 weren't sort of all on one side of the issue.
 16 CAPTAIN STARLING: Well, I was, too. And
 17 so I asked people on both sides of the issue what their
 18 rationale was, and for those who thought that gender-
 19 integrated training was — or gender-separated training
 20 early on was important — You know, I'll back up just a
 21 second if you'll allow me to and go back into one of
 22 those opinions that's formed by my experience as a dad
 23 more than my experience as a sailor.

1 My daughters — I have nineteen-year-old
 2 twin daughters and they're freshmen in college this year.
 3 And a couple years ago, they came back home and were
 4 talking about PhysEd, and I'm not sure why it didn't dawn
 5 on me until they were in the tenth grade that they were
 6 in a mixed-gender PhysEd class. And when I heard this, I
 7 went, "You're what?"
 8 You know, it was an unthinkable thing when
 9 I was in high school that we'd put boys and girls in gym
 10 class together and my daughters think absolutely nothing
 11 of it. I mean, it's the way they've grown up and it's
 12 what they're used to.
 13 So I think a lot of the issues where I
 14 would automatically default to a position of men and
 15 women separate probably are based more on my upbringing
 16 than my experience.
 17 The senior chief that said that she
 18 thought that they should be separated first, I
 19 specifically asked her: "Well, why do you feel that way?"
 20 And she said, "Well, I think there's some" — And her
 21 feelings were I think much like mine were back at this
 22 time — that there was some advantage to, at the very
 23 beginning of the game, to get men and women — if they

1 were going to be working in a close environment together,
 2 to keep them separate at first, till you had some time
 3 with them in different rooms to explain the rules and
 4 make sure that everybody understood and you say, "Okay.
 5 Now, you all understand the rules and you've learned some
 6 of the basics. Okay, now it's okay to put you together
 7 because you know the basics and we'll see how you work."
 8 But then when I turned from the senior
 9 chief who was sitting right beside me, who expressed that
 10 opinion, to the senior chief who was sitting across the
 11 table who was vehemently shaking her head "no," and asked
 12 her why she felt the other way, she said, "Well, you
 13 know, kids today," as I mentioned, "have grown up in an
 14 environment where they have been in mixed-gender
 15 everything forever.
 16 "And if we bring them into the classroom
 17 and the first thing we do is separate them, then they're
 18 going to make some assumptions that we assume men and
 19 women can't work together right, that there's something
 20 wrong with men and women being together, and they won't
 21 understand the reason.
 22 "Plus, by that time you'll have put such a
 23 mystic into it that when you put them back together,

1 you're going to have some period of time where there's
 2 going to be a period of readjustment that takes place
 3 when they come back together."
 4 And her feeling was very much just as
 5 strong that they should be together from the day they
 6 walk in the door. It's just that the first time you set
 7 them down in the classroom, probably one of the first
 8 things you need to talk about is "welcome to the United
 9 States Navy" and "let's start talking about Navy core
 10 values here a little bit — honor, commitment and courage
 11 — "and the reasons — "and how this fits into how we
 12 expect you to interact here while you're in the
 13 classroom."
 14 MR. MOORE: Thank you.
 15 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Good
 16 morning, Captain. I thank you, too, for being here.
 17 My question is do you have a standing
 18 order or policy on the EISENHOWER that prohibits
 19 consensual sex aboard the ship?
 20 CAPTAIN STARLING: Yes.
 21 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And a
 22 follow-on to that would be do you believe that the
 23 leadership — the subordinate leadership has bought into

1 that policy and, therefore, you're comfortable that it's
 2 being enforced when it needs — when they know that
 3 there's infractions?
 4 CAPTAIN STARLING: Absolutely. I mean, I
 5 brought it with me. It's in writing. I'll be glad to
 6 read it to you if —
 7 MS. POPE: Could we get a copy?
 8 DR. CANTOR: Could we get a copy?
 9 CAPTAIN STARLING: I can provide you with
 10 a copy when we're done.
 11 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: That is
 12 refreshing, by the way, because there was the word going
 13 around that there was no policy in the Navy.
 14 CAPTAIN STARLING: Sir, I won't speak for
 15 the Navy. There certainly is a policy on DWIGHT D.
 16 EISENHOWER that strictly prohibits sex on the ship, and
 17 then it delves a little bit deeper into the — And it's
 18 an instruction that's been in place for a number of
 19 years, by the way.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can I
 21 follow just quickly?
 22 CAPTAIN STARLING: Yes, sir.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: The

1 implication is — Obviously it's a DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
 2 policy.
 3 CAPTAIN STARLING: It is.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But did I
 5 take from the inference that there is not a Navy policy
 6 across the Navy as far as naval ships are concerned?
 7 CAPTAIN STARLING: I don't know that there
 8 is a written Navy policy anywhere regarding sexual
 9 activity on board ships. I don't know if there is or
 10 not.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 12 CAPTAIN STARLING: Sure.
 13 I'm sorry, I was...
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I didn't
 15 mean to —
 16 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: You were on
 17 your policy that had been in effect for many years.
 18 CAPTAIN STARLING: Oh, yes. It's been
 19 there for a number of years —
 20 DR. CANTOR: And do your subordinates
 21 believe it and enforce it?
 22 CAPTAIN STARLING: Absolutely. That's not
 23 an issue. It just is not an issue because you won't find

1 anybody on my ship that doesn't think that sexual
 2 activity on board ship is detrimental to getting the job
 3 done. It just — It gets in the way of getting work
 4 done. So support for the policy is just not an issue. I
 5 mean, it's just not something that anybody's going to
 6 question.
 7 The things that get fuzzier are when you
 8 get — I mean, everybody can agree that there shouldn't
 9 be consensual sexual activity on board ship. Where
 10 things start getting fuzzier is when you get down to off-
 11 ship-type stuff. You know, what constitutes a date; what
 12 constitutes appropriate and inappropriate types of
 13 interactions. Those things get much more subjective, so
 14 that's when leadership and judgment gets called into
 15 play.
 16 Some things are just flat-out forbidden
 17 and people clearly understand that. I won't say that
 18 that doesn't mean it doesn't happen, but it's clearly
 19 forbidden. And I feel like that when we do find out it's
 20 going on, because of that, I'm on very firm ground if
 21 disciplinary action is warranted or necessary.
 22 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I'd ask you
 23 one more question. I guess you said the STENNIS was the

1 only other ship you were on that was integrated. Is that
 2 correct?
 3 CAPTAIN STARLING: JOHN C. STENNIS was,
 4 yes, sir.
 5 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And did they
 6 also have a standing policy to the same effect?
 7 CAPTAIN STARLING: Yes.
 8 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 9 CAPTAIN STARLING: In fact, JOHN C.
 10 STENNIS — I was pre-commissioning crew on JOHN C.
 11 STENNIS as XO, and at that time, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER was
 12 just doing their integration of the crew — gender
 13 integration of the crew. So we had the benefit of
 14 watching what was going on on IKE and taking some lessons
 15 learned away from what went on over there.
 16 But, yes, there was a very strict written
 17 policy there as to what was appropriate behavior and what
 18 was not appropriate behavior.
 19 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 20 MS. POPE: My question also has to do with
 21 the pregnancy policy. And I'm not sure what is Navy
 22 policy, what is EISENHOWER policy. And when a female is
 23 pregnant and then is detached from the ship, what is the

1 back-fill policy?
 2 CAPTAIN STARLING: My understanding of
 3 Navy policy is that when they leave, the idea is that
 4 they will eventually come back to the ship from whence
 5 they left.
 6 MS. POPE: You just don't fill it?
 7 CAPTAIN STARLING: Yes.
 8 MS. POPE: Okay. I mean, you've got a
 9 department head or a senior chief or a chief. I mean,
 10 someone that is a critical position, who is pregnant.
 11 Now, most of the pregnancies don't occur
 12 at that level, but I'm talking about the readiness side
 13 of that.
 14 So you've got a critical officer,
 15 enlisted, senior enlisted, that is a female who's
 16 pregnant, and that's what I'm trying to talk about. So
 17 you've got a critical position and it happens to be a
 18 female who happens to be pregnant, married or single.
 19 CAPTAIN STARLING: I'll preface that by
 20 saying that's never happened to me.
 21 MS. POPE: Okay.
 22 CAPTAIN STARLING: We did have one officer
 23 who got pregnant last deployment and she left

1 immediately. She was not in a critical billet or one
 2 that I needed to have replaced right away. But, you
 3 know, if that were to happen — I mean, it's worthwhile,
 4 I think, looking at why Navy policy is that people come
 5 back. And the idea of that being that you don't want
 6 pregnancy to be a way that if you get to a command and
 7 don't like it, that that's a way to leave the command.
 8 Now, I'd like to add one caveat to that,
 9 and I'll say that of the women who get pregnant on my
 10 ship, I firmly do not believe that they do it
 11 intentionally. I just don't believe it. I can't believe
 12 that a woman is willing to take on the burden of a child
 13 for life to get out of a six-month deployment. But that
 14 being the case, the goal was that they would have to come
 15 back to where they were.
 16 Now, if it were somebody in — I will say
 17 I not only never lost an officer — I lost one officer.
 18 I've never lost a chief, and I have never lost anybody in
 19 a critical-skill specialty that I felt like — without,
 20 that I was going to suffer problems. Doesn't mean it
 21 couldn't happen.
 22 If that were to happen, then I would take
 23 the same sort of action that I would take if somebody in

1 that critical-skill specialty fell down a ladder and
 2 broke their leg. I'd get on the phone; I'd call the
 3 Bureau of Navy Personnel or I'd call COMMATAIRLANT and
 4 I'd say, "I lost my umpty-frat specialist and I need
 5 one," and they would get me one.
 6 You know, you don't like to think of
 7 people as spare parts, but if something — I don't carry
 8 every spare part on the ship for every airplane, and if
 9 somebody breaks hard and we don't have it, we have people
 10 whose job it is to get it to us. If I were to lose
 11 somebody in a critical-skill specialty that I needed for
 12 the functioning of my ship, I have a tremendous amount of
 13 confidence that within days I would see another one come
 14 walking over the brow.
 15 MS. POPE: But the policy is different for
 16 females who are pregnant versus male or female that is in
 17 any other medical leave issue?
 18 CAPTAIN STARLING: Yes, ma'am. But
 19 somebody who goes medically down normally is going to be
 20 down —
 21 MS. POPE: Six weeks.
 22 CAPTAIN STARLING: And the Navy — Well,
 23 it depends on what happens. If it's going to be a matter

1 of weeks, then I'm going to get that person back and I
 2 need a temporary fill. I could probably get a temporary
 3 fill.
 4 The medical community will make a judgment
 5 if somebody is going to be able to come back to you or
 6 not. If they're not, they put them on limited duty.
 7 They go away and then I never see them again. When
 8 somebody leaves on limited duty, the Navy Personnel
 9 Management System recognizes that as a loss and generates
 10 a requirement for me to get somebody else.
 11 So those people that I talked to you about
 12 in the numbers, my number one reason for losing people —
 13 medical limited duty — those are recognized as losses.
 14 And those are people that — you know, they either fall
 15 down and break a leg or they have a sports injury or they
 16 have — What you tend to see is people who have had a
 17 problem that they've nursed along for a long time. The
 18 closer deployment gets, the less able they are to cope
 19 with that problem since they spend more and more and more
 20 and more time in a demanding shipboard environment.
 21 Those people, when they're gone, they're gone, and the
 22 Navy system says they're gone. It generates a
 23 requisition and I get a replacement.

1 But that also leaves a hole. I mean, the
 2 system is designed to work over about a three to six-
 3 month window. So if somebody went limited duty on me on
 4 deployment — and that happens, too — the same sort of
 5 thing would happen. Chances are that I would not get a
 6 replacement for that person on deployment. If they were
 7 in a critical-skill specialty, then I would get on the
 8 phone and I would say, "I need one of these and I need
 9 him now," and the system would react to get me one of
 10 those from somewhere.
 11 MS. POPE: Do you think that there is a
 12 perception issue on the pregnancy policy because it's
 13 different?
 14 CAPTAIN STARLING: Yes, ma'am, I think so.
 15 I think that there are people that view the pregnancy
 16 policy as a get-out-of-jail-free card. You know, if a
 17 sailor breaks his leg and leaves, everybody kind of
 18 understands that. If a woman gets pregnant and has to
 19 leave, a lot of people don't understand that. And
 20 perceptions are bad things, because whether perceptions
 21 are true or not, perceptions are reality for the people
 22 that have them.
 23 So, yes, I think there is. I guess maybe

1 I'll leave — I'll leave it at that.
 2 MS. POPE: Okay. Thanks.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I would
 4 follow-on. How big — As the skipper of a ship, how big
 5 a problem is that from a morale standpoint — that
 6 perception?
 7 CAPTAIN STARLING: I don't think it's a
 8 big problem. It's one of those things where the majority
 9 of the women that leave, as I mentioned to you earlier,
 10 are young and they are in unskilled positions. Airmen,
 11 seamen, firemen. And so when they leave, what it
 12 probably means is you have one less person to do general-
 13 type duty around the ship and it doesn't affect people
 14 much.
 15 And it's a small city of 5,000 and people
 16 come and go all the time. So, I mean, even when we were
 17 sitting off of Iran last year, getting ready to launch
 18 strikes, people were coming and people were going.
 19 So, you know, if it were to happen to
 20 somebody in a high-vis spot, I think it would maybe get
 21 more attention around the ship than it does. But in the
 22 comings-and-goings of things, I just don't think it's
 23 something that's very high on people's radar scopes.

1 It may be something that the guys talk
 2 about sitting around the table in — Well, probably not
 3 in the wardroom, but maybe sitting around, you know, in
 4 their cabins. It may be something that guy chiefs want
 5 to wank about: "Well, that person got to leave." "Well,
 6 yeah, he did," and that's a problem that we're going to
 7 have to continue to deal with.
 8 And I don't want anybody to get the
 9 impression here that I think that it's not a problem and
 10 that it's a good thing when a woman gets to leave because
 11 she's pregnant. That's a bad thing. I just don't think
 12 that there is any other way for us right now to deal with
 13 the issue. And I don't think that because of that issue
 14 in and of itself, you know, that we should throw out the
 15 baby with the bath water.
 16 Any sort of a new policy or a change,
 17 especially one that's significant, normally comes with a
 18 lot of growing pains and it takes you a while to figure
 19 out how to get around it. And you weigh the goods
 20 against the bads and you decide that if the goods
 21 outweigh the bads, then you want to keep doing it.
 22 In this case, I think the goods outweigh
 23 the bads. But the pregnancy — the perception of

1 pregnancy and the perception of the get-out-of-jail-free
 2 card is out there and that's one of the bads.
 3 I would invite male sailors who think that
 4 women are getting a get-out-of-jail-free card when
 5 they're going to go back and have a baby — to ask them
 6 if they'd like to switch places with them. I don't think
 7 too many of them would.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My second
 9 question deals with something you mentioned concerning
 10 what I'll call sustainment training. You mentioned in
 11 your discussion with your chief petty officers your
 12 importance of follow-on training.
 13 One of the things the Department of Navy
 14 has stressed and has stressed tremendously now at Great
 15 Lakes is, of course, core values — honor, courage,
 16 commitment. What type of program do you have aboard ship
 17 that in fact continues the instruction or reinforces the
 18 core values?
 19 CAPTAIN STARLING: Every sailor that
 20 checks aboard — And I'm sure people have told you this
 21 before, but on a ship as big as a carrier, if you talk
 22 about even people who are coming in for their first tour
 23 of duty, they could be anywhere from three weeks out of

1 boot camp to a year and three weeks out of boot camp. So
 2 you get a pretty wide variety of folks that check in and
 3 you get a pretty wide variety of — across the social
 4 spectra and across the — just like we always have, all
 5 all of them do.
 6 So when every sailor checks in, they
 7 normally will spend their first close to a month on
 8 board. It's about a two-and-a-half to three-week program
 9 called "school of ship." Some schools call it
 10 "indoctrination division." And in that training, we go
 11 back over all the stuff that we hope they already know
 12 the basics of. And that's not only Navy core values, but
 13 that's sexual harassment; it's fraternization; it's how
 14 to write a check and balance a checkbook. It's all those
 15 things that we see are things that cause sailors to have
 16 problems.
 17 Once they finish that basic training, that
 18 month, and they get farmed out to their various and
 19 sundry divisions, then it becomes the responsibility of
 20 the people they work with and for as part of their
 21 general military training to continue to reinforce those
 22 kinds of values.
 23 I would also hope to think that any young

1 sailor in the Navy today would get reinforcement in those
 2 values by watching the people that he works for or she
 3 works for. If we conduct ourselves as leaders in
 4 accordance with Navy core values, then that's instruction
 5 in and of itself.
 6 So there's an awful lot that just falls in
 7 with leadership. A sailor that reports in to a ship at
 8 sea is not going to spend a whole lot of time sitting in
 9 a classroom. He is going to or she is going to get their
 10 first couple of weeks and then they are going to get
 11 farmed out, and they're going to hit the deck running and
 12 they're going to be very, very busy.
 13 So we have to hit them up quick, kind of
 14 hit them up hard, and then hope we can lead by example
 15 for the rest of the time that we've got them.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can I ask
 17 one more?
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Sure.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: You
 20 mentioned that you were prepared to discuss situations of
 21 sexual harassment aboard ship and how it's dealt with and
 22 the like. One of our charters is that clearly we have to
 23 comment on the new Department of Defense sexual

1 harassment program and policy.
 2 Is sexual harassment a problem? How big a
 3 problem is it? And what kind of form does it take aboard
 4 ship, if you can narrow it to a specific type?
 5 CAPTAIN STARLING: I don't think you see a
 6 lot of — anymore, of what you would call overt — I
 7 guess overt sexual harassment. I don't think there's
 8 anybody out there that doesn't understand anymore that
 9 the types of things that used to be commonly accepted in
 10 the workplace aren't accepted anymore. Nobody thinks
 11 it's okay to make gender-related jokes, just like they
 12 don't think it's okay to make ethnic jokes or gender-
 13 related humor. I think people understand that pretty
 14 clearly.
 15 Where you do see problems and where we
 16 have — where I have seen problems is in the workplace
 17 primarily where younger females feel that their efforts
 18 are unappreciated or that they get the impression from
 19 their seniors that they're not carrying their share of
 20 the load, or that this person has a predisposition
 21 towards the fact that, "It doesn't matter how hard I
 22 work, this guy is never going to be convinced that I can
 23 do the job."

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1 We have on a carrier — I'm lucky on a
 2 carrier because I have a lot of people whose full-time
 3 jobs are to do things that on other Navy ships are their
 4 part-time jobs. I have a full-time equal opportunity
 5 program specialist. I have an officer and several
 6 enlisted personnel who, as collateral duties, are trained
 7 as sexual assault victim intervention people. I have a
 8 lawyer. I have folks that can advise me when these types
 9 of issues show up.

10 I have dealt with it in one department on
 11 the ship since I've been there — in the five months that
 12 I've been there, and I think the issue becomes for a guy
 13 in my position — is to make sure that there's an avenue
 14 within the ship where if there are women out there who
 15 feel that way, that if they don't feel they can — If the
 16 chain of command is the problem, then they need some way
 17 to get around the chain of command, and you need to do
 18 that without presenting an avenue — I mean, because I'm
 19 a believer that if somebody has to bring a problem to me,
 20 then I've failed somewhere because the chain of command
 21 somewhere in between me should have taken care of this
 22 problem.

23 But you also have to establish an

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1 environment where if a woman feels she's being sexually
 2 harassed or if a minority member feels that he or she is
 3 being treated unfairly because of the color of their skin
 4 or whatever their ethnic background was, that they have
 5 other avenues to go. I feel we do a pretty good job of
 6 that. We have chaplains, we have counselors that are
 7 available, and that kind of stuff comes out.

8 I think in a lot of cases — again, as we
 9 talked about a minute ago — perception becomes the key.
 10 The woman may perceive that that's what their boss
 11 thinks. The boss may just be putting his mouth in gear
 12 sometimes before he puts his brain in gear. And the
 13 ideal situation would be that when that type of thing
 14 were to arise, if it could come to your attention through
 15 another one of these venues, that you could pull this guy
 16 aside, counsel him and explain to him, and that he would
 17 realize that his behavior was inappropriate and he would
 18 work to modify his behavior.

19 The longer we have worked in this
 20 environment, the less and less and less and less
 21 necessary that has become. It's one of those things,
 22 like I said, that I don't think we'll ever get rid of,
 23 but I just — Again, that's one of those things that

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1 doesn't pop up on my radar scope very often.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Could I ask
 3 you to take that one step farther since my brain housing
 4 group wasn't fully engaged? I'd like you to take that
 5 into fraternization. Is there a problem or has there
 6 been a problem of fraternization aboard? And if so, what
 7 do you see in that regard? And is the Navy's policy
 8 currently one that you can work with?

9 CAPTAIN STARLING: The "Is there
 10 fraternization?" question is kind of like the "Do you
 11 still beat your wife?" question.

12 Yes, there is fraternization that goes on.
 13 Since I've been the CO of the ship, I have taken two
 14 couples to mast for fraternization. One, an officer who
 15 was having what I would — not a sexual relationship, but
 16 an unduly familiar relationship with a petty officer, and
 17 in another case, a second class petty officer who was
 18 having a sexual relationship with a seaman who worked for
 19 him.

20 In both cases, these — or in both of
 21 these, the reason that they came to people's attention,
 22 even though these people were trying relatively hard to
 23 be discreet and out of the way, is that there are no

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1 secrets, even on a ship with 5,000 people, and folks out
 2 there realized what was going on and realized that it was
 3 wrong and brought it to the appropriate people's
 4 attention that allowed me to deal with it.

5 So, yes, it's out there. Is two cases in
 6 six months a big deal? I don't know.

7 I do feel that the Navy's policy that's
 8 out there gives me all the latitude that I need to do the
 9 things that are necessary to preserve good order and
 10 discipline. And in fact, I would be resistant, I think,
 11 to a Navy policy that put more bounds on what I had the
 12 leeway to do and not to do. I think I need to have the
 13 leeway to decide in a relationship based on how it arose
 14 and how it came to my attention, the type of effect that
 15 it had on the crew.

16 In the case of the officer, a lot of
 17 people knew it was going on. That was a big deal. In
 18 the case of the two enlisted personnel, a lot fewer
 19 people knew it was going on. So while it was still
 20 clearly a violation, it doesn't tend to have the same
 21 kind of effect around the ship and amongst the crew.

22 As the CO, the way the Navy policy is
 23 written now, I have the leeway to judge those types of

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1 things and, when I take action, to take action as it's
 2 appropriate.

3 I handled both of those cases at my level.
 4 I have never seen one that was serious enough — Let me
 5 think for a minute. I have never seen one, I don't
 6 believe — I'm thinking back now. I don't think I've
 7 ever seen one that was serious enough that we had had to
 8 send it forward to court-martial. I've always felt they
 9 were things that could be handled at my level and the
 10 appropriate punishment could be given at my level.

11 DR. CANTOR: Do you mind saying what you
 12 did in those cases?

13 CAPTAIN STARLING: Sure, I don't mind at
 14 all. In the case of the officer, it was an officer — it
 15 was a warrant officer and a second class petty officer.
 16 In this case, the warrant officer came to mast and
 17 received a punitive letter of caution in his service
 18 record — and I would like to come back to that in a
 19 minute.

20 The second class petty officer received
 21 restriction to the ship, a suspended reduction in rate —
 22 I reduced her in rate, but suspended that punishment
 23 pending continued good behavior — and I think — I think

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1 — this happened fairly shortly after I got there — a
 2 monetary fine.

3 It gets difficult when you deal with
 4 officers and enlisted to make sure — because after one
 5 of these things happens, you know, I think part of the
 6 problem used to be that everyone will keep these things
 7 under wraps. You know, we didn't want the word to get
 8 out about what was going on. Well, I feel exactly the
 9 opposite. I feel like when it happens, everybody on the
 10 ship ought to know that it happened and everybody on the
 11 ship ought to know what the outcome was.

12 With the two enlisted personnel, normally
 13 you're going to put a little bit more of the burden on
 14 the senior person, and in both of these cases I did that;
 15 because I think as a leader and the more senior person,
 16 you have a greater responsibility, especially if the
 17 junior person is very junior, which in the case of the
 18 seaman it was. I gave the senior petty officer a greater
 19 punishment than I gave the junior seaman. I gave the
 20 officer, in my view, a more severe punishment than I gave
 21 the second class petty officer.

22 Now, when you have two petty officers,
 23 it's an easy comparison to make because the punishments

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1 awarded are similar. You're fined this many dollars,
 2 restricted to the ship this many days, reduction in rate.
 3 And by definition, a reduction in rate for a senior
 4 person is the greater punishment because they lose more
 5 pay, they lose more money.

6 It gets harder with officers. I could see
 7 where an enlisted personnel might say, "Well, this
 8 officer — "all this officer got was a piece of paper in
 9 his service record. The enlisted person had to pay some
 10 money, had to stay on the ship for a month."

11 What people don't understand — and the
 12 reason I think it's important to get the word out — is
 13 that this officer — and I fully understood exactly what
 14 I was doing when I did it — is now that this officer
 15 has a punitive letter in his record, he will never be
 16 promoted again.

17 And not only that, but even though I
 18 recommended that he be continued in the service, at the
 19 next level in the chain of command when it got up for
 20 review up the chain, which all of these go up the chain,
 21 he is now going to be required to show cause as to why he
 22 should be retained in the service.

23 So in reality, his punishment will be much

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1 more severe than the petty officer with which he carried
 2 on.

3 DR. CANTOR: Thank you.

4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: May I just add? Were
 5 those two male-female pairs or...

6 CAPTAIN STARLING: Yes, both male-female.
 7 And I guess it's —

8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And could you tell me
 9 which was the senior in each case?

10 CAPTAIN STARLING: In both cases the male
 11 was senior.

12 I did have a fraternization case when I
 13 was XO on JOHN C. STENNIS that involved two males. And
 14 in this case, it was a chief petty officer and a petty
 15 officer who, in their spare time, got together and
 16 incorporated — formed a company to do — I think it was
 17 computer software stuff, electronics repair, on the side.
 18 And that is also fraternization in the Navy's eyes,
 19 especially since we draw that line in the Navy between
 20 chief petty officers and below and up, and those two
 21 wound up being charged with fraternization also.

22 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Anita, since
 23 we're on this roll, can I —

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1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yes.

2 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: The other
 3 part of this in looking at rules, policies and laws, is
 4 the adultery. And obviously you have many sailors on
 5 your ship that are married, leave families behind when
 6 they go to sea. And the current Manual for Courts-
 7 Martial and the guidance that it gives you on adultery,
 8 is it sufficient?

9 Because I'm sure that you're aware that
 10 there's some talk about inserting some additional
 11 guidance and there's been rumors that perhaps that might
 12 lessen the severity of adultery, and we'd like to hear
 13 your views on that.

14 CAPTAIN STARLING: It's an extremely
 15 politically sensitive issue and so, you know, a lot of
 16 things factor into how you feel about this kind of stuff.
 17 I've been married for twenty-three years — I'm very
 18 happily married for twenty-three years, I might add —
 19 and I personally think adultery is probably one of the
 20 most heinous things that anybody can engage in.

21 That having been said, I've been in the
 22 Navy a long time and lots of people engage in it. A lot
 23 fewer now than in the past — and dramatically so — for

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1 whatever reason. You just don't see it like you used to.
 2 You don't see a lot of things that you used to see.

3 So there is adultery that is prejudicial
 4 to the good order and discipline of your command and
 5 there is adultery that isn't. I have not had to handle
 6 — Well, that's not true. My personal feeling is — and
 7 I'd like to caveat this with "my personal feeling" — is
 8 that — and the way I try to approach cases is that when
 9 adultery — an adulterous behavior is prejudicial to the
 10 good order and discipline of my command, then I'm going
 11 to take it as a matter under my cognizance and deal with
 12 it.

13 If adultery comes to my attention through
 14 some other means that is not prejudicial to the good
 15 order and discipline of my command, then I'm probably not
 16 going to mess with it. And there are times where it can
 17 be a fine line to draw.

18 Normally when a person is engaged in
 19 adulterous behavior — I won't say "normally," but
 20 oftentimes there are accompanying things that go along
 21 with it to maybe give you other tools to deal with the
 22 situation.

23 For example, with the two petty officers

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1 that were engaged in the inappropriate sexual
 2 relationship, the senior petty officer was married. When
 3 I took him to mast, he was charged with an orders
 4 violation for having sexual relations aboard the ship; he
 5 was charged with fraternization for engaging in an
 6 inappropriate relationship; he was charged with adultery
 7 because he was married. I found him guilty of the
 8 fraternization charge and the orders violation charge. I
 9 dismissed the adultery charge.

10 And it's important to note that in the
 11 military system of justice, "dismissed" does not mean
 12 "not guilty." It means that I am not going to award you
 13 punishment based on this charge even though maybe I think
 14 you're guilty of it. Because I felt like I had all the
 15 tools that I needed to solve the problem without making a
 16 judgment — a moral judgment, if you will — on the fact
 17 that his behavior with regard to his wife was
 18 inappropriate, I didn't need to do that.

19 There are some cases of adultery that I
 20 think the Navy ought to come down and just be brutal on.
 21 When I was on JOHN C. STENNIS, we had a sailor who was
 22 having an affair with the civilian wife of another sailor
 23 on board and he was married. Well, it's clearly

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1 prejudicial to good order and discipline. Just clearly.
 2 Everybody knew it was going on and it's a problem.

3 Every now and then you'll get a call from
 4 a wife or a husband who says, "My spouse is having an
 5 affair," and if they finish that sentence with "someone
 6 on your ship" or "someone in your command," then I view
 7 that as something that I need to go look into. If it's
 8 "with the next door neighbor," then I don't think that's
 9 something I need to be looking into. That's kind of the
 10 guideline that I would draw.

11 Again, much like the issue over
 12 fraternization or sexual harassment, I think the rules
 13 are clear enough to give me the tools that I need and
 14 flexible enough to allow me to exercise the judgment that
 15 I think I need to do the right thing.

16 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you
 17 very much.

18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: In Charlie Moskos'
 19 absence, I will ask his question, which is false
 20 accusations of sexual harassment. And I will add the
 21 lawyer's addendum to that, which is to distinguish
 22 between maliciously false accusations and mistakenly
 23 false accusations.

1 Do you encounter those or do you know that
 2 the lawyers and other people on your ship encounter such
 3 issues? And if so, are they prevalent? And what gets
 4 done about them?

5 CAPTAIN STARLING: I have never personally
 6 had to deal with an issue like that, that turned out not
 7 to have some element of truth in it, I guess is the best
 8 way to say it. I have never come across one where a
 9 subordinate or a female or whatever decided that the way
 10 they were going to get back at their boss was to make a
 11 false accusation.

12 I have run across cases where — and it
 13 goes back essentially — It's happened to me one time and
 14 it was the thing I alluded to earlier where in one
 15 department on my ship junior females felt like — that
 16 their work environment was hostile, I guess for lack of a
 17 better term; that they were being forced to work in a
 18 hostile work environment.

19 In that case, the supervisor didn't
 20 understand that and he felt that it was an invalid
 21 observation on their part. We looked into both sides of
 22 the issue and the issue that we came down to was that the
 23 women were probably right.

1 In this case, the nice thing about the
 2 flexibility in the problem here is that like most things
 3 in the Navy, you desire that it be handled at the lowest
 4 level that's appropriate. Not necessarily the lowest
 5 level possible, but the lowest level that's appropriate.

6 And I don't like the term "the lowest
 7 level possible" because there are some things that
 8 shouldn't be handled at the lowest level possible because
 9 then they don't get handled right or the perception from
 10 outside of that chain of command or that area can be
 11 that, you know, "the captain should have known about
 12 this" or "the chief should have known about this and he
 13 didn't." So you don't want everything being handled at
 14 the lowest level possible but the lowest level that's
 15 appropriate.

16 And that's about as close as I've come to
 17 finding myself in that situation. I have never run
 18 across a problem where, when somebody has asked me to
 19 look into something of the types and nature that you're
 20 talking about — fraternization, sexual harassment,
 21 inappropriate sexual activity — that it's just turned
 22 other to be a blatantly false accusation.

23 Probably the closest thing that I have

1 seen of that — and you see this occasionally — happened
 2 to me on deployment last year when I had — I have a
 3 senior chief petty officer in my command who is married
 4 to another chief petty officer who is shore-stationed
 5 back home.

6 I get an irate call in the middle of the
 7 night one night from her husband. He's had a little bit
 8 too much to drink. He's making accusations that his wife
 9 is having an affair with a chief petty officer in one of
 10 the embark squadrons and he wants me to do something
 11 about it.

12 And I get calls like that — I didn't
 13 personally take this gentleman's call, but I get calls
 14 from a lot of people that want me to do something about
 15 this and some of them are valid and some of them are not.

16 Well, like every case, we looked into it
 17 and you find that there's a little more under the covers
 18 than you might suspect. The senior chief and the chief
 19 were separated. He was having a difficult time accepting
 20 that fact. She was carrying on a normal life, and as
 21 part of that, she has friends and she has acquaintances.

22 And there is no law in the Navy about
 23 males and females being friends or males and females

1 going on liberty together. We encourage that. I would
 2 rather see my sailors, male and female, going over the
 3 brow together than a bunch of guys heading off this way
 4 (Indicating) and a bunch of girls heading off that way
 5 (Indicating).

6 We looked into that. We decided that in
 7 this case, this gentleman's complaint, maybe while not
 8 completely invalid, was without merit. There was no
 9 reason for me to dive into that kind of stuff. And
 10 that's probably the closest I've come to seeing anybody
 11 making a false accusation since I've been around.

12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: May I go back to the
 13 "hostile" environment for a moment just to get a little
 14 more of an idea of — Do you mean — And again, I'm a
 15 lawyer; so, you know, we would think of a hostile
 16 environment as something that discriminates against women
 17 in some fashion. So if you have nudie pictures on the
 18 wall, then that is deemed to be hostile to women, as
 19 opposed to plain English language "hostile" in which you
 20 may have an unfriendly person who hates everybody and is
 21 gruff and, you know, not terribly friendly.

22 Can you tell me a little more about the
 23 hostile environment you describe?

1 CAPTAIN STARLING: Yes, ma'am. We don't
 2 put pictures on the walls anymore.

3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah.

4 CAPTAIN STARLING: Used to, but not
 5 anymore.

6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: It's a bulkhead, anyway.

7 CAPTAIN STARLING: Yes, that's correct.
 8 "Bulkhead."

9 In this particular case — You know, you
 10 see the types of problems that you alluded to where
 11 you've got some guy that is an equal opportunity —
 12 doesn't like anybody. So, yeah, there's a hostile work
 13 environment. It's hostile for everyone.

14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Right.

15 CAPTAIN STARLING: And that's a leadership
 16 style that I'm not too happy with when people want to do
 17 business that way and we try to square those people up.
 18 I think you do better by — People will follow you better
 19 if they want to than because they feel like if they
 20 don't, they're going to die over it.

21 The particular case that I dealt with,
 22 though — that we dealt with here, was in a particular
 23 division on the ship where the senior enlisted leadership

1 in that division felt — I won't even say that he felt.
 2 I'm not even sure that this guy had his brain engaged all
 3 the time when he was opening his mouth. But he would
 4 make remarks.

5 You know, he would — We saw a lot of
 6 discipline cases coming out of there. We saw a lot more
 7 women going to sick call out of there. You know, the
 8 little indicators that tell you that there are things
 9 that are going on down here that aren't right, and they
 10 are things that are hard to put your finger on.

11 And a lot of times, even after you sit
 12 down and you talk to the people that are involved and you
 13 talk to the seniors that are involved, again, these
 14 things are not clear-cut and it's very difficult.

15 So in this case, you know, it wasn't one
 16 where I could even set this guy down and say, "Okay. You
 17 said the following things. You know, women can't lift a
 18 fire hose. Women can't haul a hose to a jet and fuel
 19 it." It happened to be our fuels division. We didn't
 20 find that kind of stuff.

21 What we did find was a fairly gruff guy
 22 who I think was demanding on everybody, probably more so
 23 on his women in that it was the — if there was a job

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1 that he felt they couldn't do, he was a little bit
 2 quicker to express his displeasure or the fact that,
 3 "yeah, that doesn't surprise me," and those kind of
 4 people need education. They are few and far between, and
 5 the longer we do this, the fewer of them there are
 6 because they've grown up in the system.

7 But, I mean, that's what I mean by a
 8 hostile work environment. There are women who felt that
 9 this guy just — no matter what they did, already had his
 10 mind made up and they weren't going to be able to change
 11 it; and because of that, that their opportunities to
 12 advance or to get the kinds of jobs or to go to the
 13 places that they needed or the types of requests that
 14 they might put in for programs or jobs might receive less
 15 consideration.

16 This guy was not blatant. It wasn't,
 17 "Nope, I don't let women do that kind of stuff." It was
 18 — Their concern was just that — based on the way things
 19 went around work, they had concerns that that might not
 20 happen.

21 So we looked at it and we decided there
 22 was some merit to it, and we sat down and talked with
 23 essentially the entire departmental chain of command.

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1 You bring them all in. You don't bring the one person in
 2 and pound him into the floor; you bring everybody in, you
 3 talk about it, and you make sure that his superior
 4 understands that we think this condition exists. It kind
 5 of heightens everybody to the concern.

6 And then you talk to the individual and
 7 counsel him and make sure he understands that, "Whether
 8 or not you think you're doing this, the people who work
 9 for you perceive that you are doing this, so you need to
 10 be a little bit more careful about how you do your
 11 business."

12 Perceptions are important. And if the
 13 people that perceive — that work for you — I could be
 14 the most caring leader in the world. If the people who
 15 work for me don't perceive that you care for them or
 16 don't perceive that you're concerned with their well-
 17 being, then you have a problem, whether you are or not.

18 So in this case, perceptions were
 19 important.

20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Was that particular
 21 person, supervisor, counseled on the basis of sexual
 22 harassment or on the basis of kind of inadequate
 23 leadership?

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1 CAPTAIN STARLING: Both. Both. I mean,
 2 you can't separate them. A leader in today's Navy that
 3 would engage in that type of behavior is a bad leader.
 4 So to train someone, I mean, now, to be — to set an
 5 environment in your workplace — When I talk to my "I"
 6 Division folks — School of Ship folks — I tell them if
 7 I could accomplish nothing else on my ship but establish
 8 an atmosphere on board where people didn't feel afraid to
 9 speak up about things that they thought were right or
 10 wrong, then that's a big failing, because if you're not
 11 willing to have the people who work for you — if you're
 12 not willing to accept their criticism — And you've got
 13 to kind of walk around this easy. I mean, this is the
 14 Navy. This is a military organization and I don't walk
 15 around the ship inviting seamen to criticize my work
 16 every day as the captain.

17 But you have to have an environment on
 18 board where if people do see something that's going wrong
 19 or people do see things that are being done wrong, that
 20 they're not afraid to come forward and point it out to
 21 somebody. And then you have to establish a leadership
 22 atmosphere in your command where when those things do
 23 come to light, people are confident that something will

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1 be done about it. And sometimes it'll be done to their
 2 satisfaction and sometimes it won't, but at least they'll
 3 know that something was done.

4 And that tends to be 90 percent of the
 5 problem, in my view, with not just sexual harassment
 6 cases but racial-type cases. Anything where it involves
 7 an harassment issue of any sort, because of somebody that
 8 has some factor that makes them different — where they
 9 came from, where they grew up, the way they talk. If
 10 people think that you're sensitive to their needs and you
 11 go, "yep, yep, I understand that," and I either agree
 12 with you or I don't disagree with you, they've kind of
 13 had their day in court and 95 percent of the time that
 14 will solve the problem. They may not agree with your
 15 answer but at least you addressed it and they got their
 16 time in court. If your members of your command don't
 17 feel that as a leader, that you're sensitive to their
 18 needs or willing to listen to their concerns, then
 19 they'll quit, then they'll give up, and then that's when
 20 you get people crawling off in a corner and just kind of
 21 mumbling and grumbling and complaining to no constructive
 22 end and you wind up with a lot of divisions in your
 23 command.

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1 MS. POPE: I have just a quick question,
 2 and you may want to think about this and get back to us
 3 later. But — And I want to thank you because this has
 4 been a candid session and I think we wanted information-
 5 gathering and it's for that purpose.

6 As you look back on your career and your
 7 training, what do you think prepared you best to be the
 8 CO of a carrier? And maybe it's more than one thing,
 9 but...

10 DR. CANTOR: Nineteen years of parenting.

11 CAPTAIN STARLING: That's a big part of
 12 it.

13 Well, I grew up in the environment. I
 14 mean, it's where I've spent my whole Navy life — on
 15 aircraft carriers. I won't say I've always wanted to be
 16 the commanding officer of an aircraft carrier. I think
 17 if an ensign is thinking that far ahead, his sights are
 18 set too far down the road. He ought to think about being
 19 a good whatever — he — is at the time.

20 And I'll tell you that like most of us,
 21 the things that I think today are not necessarily the
 22 things that I thought five years ago, ten years ago,
 23 fifteen years ago. You're molded and shaped by your

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1 experiences.
 2 I walked into being the XO on JOHN C.
 3 STENNIS with a tremendous amount of trepidation. It's a
 4 big move for an aviator who — When you walk in to be the
 5 XO of your aviation squadron — I flew A-6's, so I had
 6 been flying A-6's for fifteen years. I had a tremendous
 7 amount of confidence that, aside from the commanding
 8 officer of the squadron, I knew more than anybody else in
 9 the squadron did about A-6's, and I might even know more
 10 than the CO did.

11 I knew without a doubt when I walked in to
 12 be the XO of an aircraft carrier that there were lots and
 13 lots and lots of people on board this ship who knew a lot
 14 more about their job than I did.

15 But all of you in this room are senior
 16 leaders of some sort. You know, you've run large
 17 organizations. You've dealt with large things. And you
 18 know that the older you get — excuse me — that the more
 19 senior you get and the more experienced that you get, the
 20 more you know about how things ought to work, the less
 21 you know about the individual bells, whistles and cranks
 22 that turn things.

23 My views on women in the service have

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1 changed over the years, I think because I have matured
 2 over the years; and as I've seen that it can work, I have
 3 become more of a fan of it, I guess is the best way to
 4 put it. I think, like most men when this initially came
 5 up, the knee-jerk reaction is, "Well, why do we need to
 6 do this?"
 7 My answer to that now is it's very easy —
 8 I have a very easy answer for that right now — two very
 9 easy answers for that. One I've already given you: why
 10 should I pass up 51 percent of the recruiting population
 11 out there? And two is because in this day and age, it's
 12 just the right thing to do. If the standards are set the
 13 same for everybody and everybody has an equal opportunity
 14 to meet the same — the same — standard, then why should
 15 anybody be denied the opportunity to meet that standard?
 16 So maybe what's prepared me best to be the
 17 CO of an aircraft carrier is the maturing process that
 18 takes place over your time in the service. As a lot of
 19 us do, when I was a junior officer, I thought I knew more
 20 than any captain running around. Now that I'm a captain,
 21 I'm not sure I know as much as a lot of my junior
 22 officers do.
 23 It's like I used to know more than my dad,

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1 and as I got older, I was surprised how much smarter my
 2 dad got. Same sort of logic.
 3 MS. POPE: Thank you.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I have one
 5 question, and it goes to your comment on demographics of
 6 "why should I pass up 51 percent of the eligible
 7 population out there that can be recruited?"
 8 One of the things we've heard from others
 9 is something called "critical mass." That there is this
 10 thing called "critical mass," of two few females or too
 11 many females. From a ship's perspective, from a
 12 captain's perspective, is there such a thing as critical
 13 mass? And if so, if 51 percent of your crew were female,
 14 would that mean that's too many or too few?
 15 There are some that — I follow this up
 16 because there are some, you know, that say there is such
 17 a thing as too few and there are others that say there's
 18 such a thing as too many.
 19 CAPTAIN STARLING: There certainly is a
 20 critical mass. One of the initial problems that we faced
 21 on JOHN C. STENNIS, until we convinced the Navy that it
 22 was the right thing to do, was because we didn't
 23 necessarily have a lot of senior enlisted women out there

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1 that could come to ships; that they just weren't out
 2 there to come.
 3 We were going to get a whole pile of
 4 junior enlisted women — by "a whole pile," I mean fifty
 5 — without appropriate senior enlisted leadership. And I
 6 was not aboard yet. The XO who was there at that time
 7 and the captain wisely put their foot down and said,
 8 "Absolutely not. Don't do that."
 9 There is some number, and I wouldn't want
 10 to put a pin on it but I can give you some bounds on it.
 11 You need to have — Primarily for enlisted personnel, but
 12 need to have senior leadership at every level. And I
 13 mean up through E-9. Gotta be there — for a number of
 14 reasons.
 15 They have to have role models, I think.
 16 They have to have women that they can look at and say,
 17 "Okay. She got there, so I can get there." And I think
 18 that's because on average, most women probably find the
 19 environment more daunting than men do because they're in
 20 a minority.
 21 You know, you can read in the magazines
 22 today about some of the problems that African Americans
 23 face when they move into a predominantly white workplace.

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1 Even though everybody welcomes them with open arms — or
 2 even if everybody does welcome them with open arms,
 3 there's a certain amount of discomfort being the only
 4 black guy in the room.
 5 Well, there's a certain amount of
 6 discomfort being the only woman on the ship, and the
 7 younger they are, the bigger that problem is. So at the
 8 enlisted ranks, I feel like we have to have enlisted
 9 leadership at every level.
 10 I feel that that's less important for
 11 officers because we tend to get an older, a little bit
 12 more mature group, and the types of problems that exist
 13 in more junior enlisted ranks, while they're certainly
 14 not not there at all in the officer ranks, they're there
 15 much less.
 16 So I don't think that's as critical an
 17 issue for officers as it is for enlisted personnel.
 18 I wish I had more women on my ship. Okay?
 19 There were 13 percent of IKE's crew of 2,700, but as I
 20 mentioned, when we were going out to sea, there were
 21 5,000. In that, in my view, women perform at almost all
 22 levels pretty much the same way that men do, then I would
 23 rather see them there in greater numbers so that the

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1 disparity between the number of men and number of women
 2 just doesn't — That, in and of itself, is an issue —
 3 that there are so few aboard.
 4 What's the right number? I don't know.
 5 You know, is fifty-fifty right? Beats me. I mean, is it
 6 right in the board room? If it's right in the board
 7 room, is it right in the military? Just because all the
 8 things that work in a civilian corporation — You know, I
 9 realize, sir, I'm preaching to the choir a little bit
 10 here, but all those things that work in a civilian
 11 corporation don't work in a military organization.
 12 I think if the standards are the same,
 13 then — and the standards are placed smart and right,
 14 that the numbers become somewhat immaterial and that
 15 there are numbers on both sides you shouldn't go below.
 16 You shouldn't have five guys in a group of fifty women.
 17 You shouldn't have five women in a group of fifty men.
 18 The real answer in there is somewhere in-between. I
 19 would much rather see larger numbers on my ship than I
 20 have now.
 21 I would much rather have had an gender-
 22 integrated air wing, which I didn't have, and, you know,
 23 those just become Navy manning issues of having enough

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1 people. The Navy has said that they will only put women
 2 onto ships when they have enough to put the critical mass
 3 — and I think the Navy ballpark number for critical mass
 4 is somewhere around ten to fifteen percent — and with
 5 appropriate top-to-bottom leadership in the enlisted
 6 ranks. That's good. I'd rather have more.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. I'm afraid we need
 9 to close out now because the CNO is arriving.
 10 CAPTAIN STARLING: I can understand that.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: But we've appreciated
 12 this visit very, very much.
 13 MR. PANG: It's very helpful.
 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And thank you for coming.
 15 CAPTAIN STARLING: My pleasure. Thank you
 16 all very much.
 17 (A brief recess was taken.)
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. We are continuing
 19 our Friday, January 29th hearings, and we're very pleased
 20 to welcome this morning the Chief of Naval Operations,
 21 Admiral Jay Johnson.
 22 Admiral, we do have your biography in our
 23 materials, so I won't spend any of your precious time

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1 going over that; but thank you very much for coming and
2 invite you to talk to us.

3 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Well, I thank you for
4 the invitation to be here and I appreciate the
5 opportunity. I would like to say a few words just to
6 perhaps frame it from my perspective; talk a little bit
7 about the Navy, my favorite subject.

8 I think to start, I would like to, if I
9 could — And I don't mean to be solicitous. I would like
10 to thank all of you for what you're doing and the way in
11 which you're doing it, and I mean that very sincerely.
12 The investment that you've made in spending time with our
13 service has been noted by the Fleet and appreciated; so I
14 thank you on behalf of all of them, and I hope what we're
15 showing you and giving you is helpful in your important
16 work.

17 To that end, I'll try to be as responsive
18 as I can to your questions and concerns. And if I don't
19 know, I'll tell you I don't know, and I'll provide you
20 answers for the record at any time.

21 I thought it might be useful if I just
22 talked a little bit about some of the macro issues that
23 we're dealing with in the Navy, and then perhaps that'll

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1 roll us into how it impacts the training and the gender
2 integration and really the readiness of the overall
3 force, and then we can maybe go from there.

4 But I first, and probably most
5 importantly, would remind everyone that the Navy is a
6 rotational force, and that carries with it some special
7 opportunities and obligations that we can talk about as
8 we go.

9 But we are indeed a rotational force,
10 sized at 325 ships today, with an active force of about
11 371,000 men and women and a reserve force of just about
12 92,000 men and women. Very much total force integration
13 there, active reserve.

14 I describe our reserves — And I know
15 that's not the topic today, but I think it's important.
16 I describe our reserves as indistinguishable from and
17 indispensable to the force — and we're really serious
18 about that — at all levels. And that's a change really
19 in the last decade or so for us, but we're very proud of
20 that.

21 But that force is employed around the
22 world 365 days a year, in carrier battle groups and
23 amphibious ready groups. We've always got them forward.

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1 You know CARL VINSON's in the Arabian Gulf. The BELLEAU
2 WOOD amphibious ready group is in the Arabian Gulf. The
3 BOXER amphibious ready group is sitting off Eritrea this
4 morning. They'll turn over with BELLEAU WOOD here in
5 another few weeks. We've got ENTERPRISE that you just
6 visited still in the Mediterranean, and we've got the
7 NASSAU amphibious ready group in the Mediterranean, and
8 so it goes.

9 The point of all that is that at any given
10 time we've got about 50 percent of the force of that 325
11 ships underway. And today's percentage is 28 percent,
12 but it averages about 30 percent forward deployed 365
13 days a year. That's about 50,000, 52,000 men and women
14 forward deployed every day of the year.

15 So the readiness implications of that
16 tasking I think are pretty obvious, and none of that, in
17 my view, will change on the downside as we go into the
18 21st Century. In fact, I am concerned that the appetite
19 suppressant is not out there to down-scale at all. The
20 requirements and the taskings just keep coming.

21 So that force is going to be forward
22 deployed as far out as I can see, and I think that's sort
23 of fundamental to everything we're going to talk about

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1 because of the readiness implications that it carries
2 with it.

3 In getting that force and in shaping that
4 force, I will tell you that one word captures for me what
5 we've been through in the last eight years — last
6 decade, essentially — and that word is "instability."
7 If you look at just the size of the Navy today and where
8 we've come from, I think it makes its own statement.
9 We were a force of about 590,000 active,
10 and today I said we're at 371,000. We're about stable
11 now. 369,000 is the number we're going to. So we're
12 about there, but it's been a tremendous down slope. Not
13 unlike my sister services, but it's been a tremendous
14 reshaping. We're coming down to 305 ships in the next
15 four years.

16 So there's been tremendous instability in
17 the force, and that's carried with it, I think, some
18 special challenges and we'll talk about some of those.

19 The "readiness" mandate I mentioned, we
20 look at our readiness in two different ways. One, of
21 course, is deployed, and the other is non-deployed,
22 because of the rotational nature of our force. My
23 assessment — and I've got the numbers and the matrix to

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1 back it up — is that the deployed readiness is good.
2 It's fine. Okay?

3 Now, in the short term, I would tell you
4 — and we can talk more about it later — that we are
5 experiencing some personnel shortages at sea. I think
6 you know about that. I would expect Denby Starling to
7 have talked to that somewhat. But that's a reality we're
8 dealing with. Nonetheless, when you look at things like
9 the execution in DESERT FOX and the things that they're
10 doing day-in and day-out out forward, our deployed
11 readiness is fine.

12 Because we're a rotational force and
13 because we've been under-resourcing certain parts of our
14 Navy with a flat top line for these many years, what that
15 has caused us to do is push the readiness forward at the
16 expense of the back-home force. So the non-deployed
17 readiness has suffered. We have paid that price for
18 several years, and that gets back to the instability
19 thing.

20 But the non-deployed readiness is a major
21 concern of ours. I describe it as a bathtub. In my
22 congressional testimony and in my talking to people all
23 around the country, we, by the rotational nature of our

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1 force, describe our readiness in deployment terms. And
2 when we come back from deployment, we step into the
3 bathtub, off the readiness train, if you will, and we
4 deliberately degrade — tier our readiness throughout the
5 next twelve to eighteen months, and then work our way
6 back up out of the bathtub to deployment readiness again.
7 All well and good. That's a great process for us.

8 What's happened, though, is because of
9 funding constraints, manning concerns, et cetera, et
10 cetera, that bathtub has gotten way too deep and the
11 erosion has been noticeable and it's impacted every piece
12 of our Navy. Okay? We're hard at work to fix that right
13 now, but you need to, I think, have that reality firmly
14 in place because it touches everything else that goes on
15 in the Navy. So readiness non-deployed is a major issue
16 of ours.

17 Then you look at recruiting, then you look
18 at retention, and the mosaic becomes even more complete.
19 The recruiting challenge for us is huge. I would expect
20 the other service chiefs to have rendered perhaps a
21 similar — Maybe the degree varies depending on who
22 you're talking to. Chuck Krulak doesn't have it the way
23 I have it, but for us — for us, it's a huge challenge.

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1 You know we missed our numbers last year
 2 by just under 7,000. We're doing — He's crossing his
 3 fingers now. We're doing better. Right now — We can
 4 talk in some detail later about the "why" there, but
 5 we've increased the recruiter force; we've put more
 6 stations on-line; we over-drew-down, if that's a proper
 7 description, in the drawdown, in my opinion; we took too
 8 many stations off-line.

9 So we've dispersed the force, we've upped
 10 the recruiters, we've changed the bonus structure, we've
 11 doubled our advertising budget; so we're working really
 12 hard at the recruiting piece, and so far — knock, knock
 13 — in Fiscal Year '99 we're making our numbers. But I do
 14 not for a second believe there's security in there
 15 because the challenge is daunting with the economy, with
 16 the competition for the same corner of the youth market
 17 that we're after. It's a huge challenge for us.

18 So I don't expect that to abate, but we're
 19 dealing with it, I think, in a very positive way right
 20 now while we're maintaining the quality.

21 The retention side related to that for the
 22 Navy, on the enlisted side, I would tell you that our
 23 first, second and third-term retention right now is

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1 running eight to ten percentage points below the steady
 2 state requirement where it needs to be, and that's a big
 3 challenge for us. The officer side, the main concerns we
 4 have are in all the warfighting communities — surface
 5 warfare officers, naval aviators, submariners, and our
 6 special warfare SEALs — and that's a big challenge.

7 Now, having said that, I will tell you
 8 that we have some time to work these issues in the Navy
 9 because most of the crisis points, if you will, within
 10 those warfare communities come in about '00 to '01, so
 11 we've got a lot working right now to fix what we see is
 12 coming a major retention challenge.

13 But, for instance, in surface warfare
 14 officers, we're retaining them at the rate of about 24 to
 15 25 percent right now and we need to keep at at least a 38
 16 percent point to make the department head requirements
 17 that we know are out there based on the ship size and all
 18 of that.

19 So we've got some challenges; there's no
 20 question about that. If you ask me to prioritize-in all
 21 of that, I would tell you that in the short term, the
 22 number one priority for us has got to be people. The
 23 pay, the REDUX reform, all of that is fundamental to

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1 everything I've talked about.

2 And they say, "Well, it doesn't impact the
 3 readiness." Absolutely it impacts the readiness. You've
 4 got to have the people; you've got to take care of them.
 5 We're committed to that. That's number one in the short
 6 term.

7 In a longer view, I would tell you that
 8 the biggest concern I have is really the recapitalization
 9 and modernization of the force, and we've been paying a
 10 price for that, as you know. You feed the operating and
 11 maintenance account so you can take care of near-term
 12 readiness in a flat top line environment, you do that at
 13 the expense of your future and we've got to fix that.
 14 We're not building enough ships. We're not building
 15 enough airplanes. And we have a recovery path, but
 16 that's fundamental to our 21st Century future and we've
 17 got to do it.

18 So that's sort of a snapshot of where we
 19 are. And if you notice, I haven't said anything about
 20 gender integration in terms of the challenges and the
 21 priorities. And I say that only to point out that it's
 22 fundamental to everything we do. Okay?

23 And it's nothing new for the Navy, by the

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1 way. There's a lot of focus on the integration, for
 2 instance, of women at sea and aviation combat relative to
 3 the "combat exclusion" law change, but, oh, by the way,
 4 for us, we've been doing this for two decades plus and
 5 we're very proud of that.

6 We have captains in command — Deb Lauer's
 7 name comes to mind right now — in command of surface
 8 vessels. And that hasn't happened since 1993; that's
 9 been working for the last two decades to get her groomed
 10 and trained to do that.

11 So we're very proud of that. We have six
 12 women in command of combatants right now. So the gender
 13 integration, if you will, is a fundamental part of the
 14 Navy.

15 I wanted to mention a couple training and
 16 readiness pieces that I think help shape the entire force
 17 that I feel very strongly about. One is the Recruit
 18 Training Command in Great Lakes. And I know you've been
 19 there, but I would just give you from my perspective a
 20 couple of observations.

21 I describe it this way. I believe very
 22 firmly that what we're doing out there now is imbedding
 23 and instilling pride in these young men and women and not

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1 fear when they come in the door, and that's very
 2 important. And once in a while I get either a question
 3 or a comment that implies that, yeah, but you've gone
 4 soft in doing all of that.

5 My response is no, I don't agree with
 6 that. And I would further state that I believe we've
 7 gone smart and not soft, and I'm very comfortable saying
 8 that. Yes, we've changed Great Lakes — all for the
 9 better, in my view.

10 And the "pride" piece is fundamental to
 11 everything. When we get them in the door, what we're
 12 concerned about as priority one is really base-lining
 13 them and imbedding in them the Navy's core values of
 14 honor, courage and commitment. Okay? You've got to do
 15 that. You have to make that investment up-front.

16 Once that happens and you've established
 17 that, you've built that foundation, now we can talk about
 18 warrior ethos, fighting skills, and the more
 19 traditionally considered matrix for getting somebody
 20 ready to go to sea. But you've got to have that
 21 underpinning. We really believe that. Otherwise, you're
 22 going to marginalize your training investment.

23 Are the kids different? Yes, they're

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1 different, and some of you understand that probably
 2 better than I. But fundamental to all of it is you've
 3 got to give them the foundation upon which to build their
 4 warrior skills and we believe we're doing that.

5 And the changes we've made in the
 6 curriculum, the fidelity we've put into the recruit
 7 division commanders, all for the better, in my view.

8 We've dogged down the physical standards
 9 once — at their request, by the way — and most of that
 10 came from the women when I went out there. They wanted
 11 it tougher. We gave it to them tougher. We're seeing
 12 how it works right now. I expect we're going to iterate
 13 it again here in the next year or so.

14 But I think we've made great strides
 15 forward, and Battle Stations is the capstone event for
 16 that. It's been a huge success and a great step forward
 17 for us. I will tell you straight up, we copied from the
 18 Marines and the Crucible. We looked at the Crucible and
 19 we said, "We like that. We're not training Marines, but
 20 is there a conceptual application we can translate here?"
 21 We did, and we're very proud of it and we think it works
 22 for us, and that's the feedback we're getting.

23 So the recruit training experience is

1 fundamental to the 21st Century Navy. I would tell you
 2 that equal to that in some sense is the whole continuum.
 3 Okay? From the day they walk in the front door at Great
 4 Lakes till the day they're assimilated on board a combat
 5 vessel at sea, that whole timeline has got to work.

6 And candidly, I will tell you that we've
 7 had some fits and starts in there. We've got the RTC
 8 piece roughly right. We'll continue to iterate it,
 9 indeed, but we've got that roughly right. Now the key is
 10 to make it a smoothly flowing continuum so that the
 11 expectations and the realities are kind of on the same
 12 page, and that hasn't always been the case.

13 We're reinvigorating or invigorating
 14 something we call Navy military training to make sure
 15 that they don't lose what they're getting at RTC, and
 16 also making a big investment on the Fleet side to ensure
 17 that the Fleet understands the product they're getting
 18 and the way they were trained.

19 And, frankly, we were lagging that for a
 20 while. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy I hope
 21 talked to you about his Back-to-the-Fleet program where
 22 he's taking the enlisted leadership out there. Ditto for
 23 the officers; ditto for the commanding officers. We want

1 them all to see what goes on out at Great Lakes.

2 So we think we're making progress. We
 3 know what remains to be done and we're hard at work on
 4 it. If you carry that continuum through a little bit
 5 further, we've also made a huge investment Navy-wide in
 6 what we call the leadership training continuum for
 7 officers and enlisted.

8 And the idea, without going into great
 9 detail, is that we will formalize leadership training —
 10 full spectrum, I call it — throughout the career span of
 11 our officers and our enlisted men and women. I think
 12 that's fundamental to everything we're doing as well.

13 And as you know, we've learned a lot about
 14 ourselves in the last decade or so in the leadership
 15 business. Okay? Some of it good, some of it un-good.
 16 And what we're trying to do — what we have done, I
 17 believe, is captured the relevant lessons of that and
 18 applied it in this leadership training continuum whereby
 19 each piece — each segment is taught by people who have
 20 had the experience. And then the subsequent one builds
 21 on the one before, and so you go throughout your career.
 22 Tremendous, powerful feedback on that. It's the right
 23 answer for us and I'm very proud of that.

1 So the leadership training continuum is a
 2 major part of our enrichment, if you will, of the
 3 fidelity of leadership at all parts of the Navy. In
 4 that, I would also tell you that we're making significant
 5 investments in empowering our commanding officers. I
 6 believe that that is a basic part of our culture that,
 7 for many reasons, we sort of lost focus on over the last
 8 decade or so.

9 What we're trying to do now is bring the
 10 focus back onto the unit commanding officer, empower
 11 them, trust them, educate them, nurture them, so they can
 12 take care of their own organizations better than I can
 13 take care of their organization from Washington or
 14 someone else can from a distance. Sounds pretty basic,
 15 but it's a cultural and institutional step that I think
 16 is going to pay us huge dividends downrange.

17 So that's probably more than you needed to
 18 hear or wanted to hear, but I think it's important to put
 19 it out there at the start.

20 And I would just tell you that really what
 21 we're after is seeing to it that our sailors succeed.
 22 That's what this is all about. We're trying to set them
 23 up for success. And it goes right back to what I started

1 with about the readiness and the mandate that's out there
 2 every day of the year for these men and women to perform
 3 and to stay ready. And you can't do that if you haven't
 4 taken care of them and nurtured them and brought them in
 5 and up the right way and we're committed to doing that.

6 Performance is still the key. Okay? And
 7 in my view, it's about performance irrespective of
 8 gender. Okay? Performance is the key.

9 So with that, I would invite your
 10 questions.

11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Thank you
 12 very much.

13 Thank you very much, Admiral. As I
 14 mentioned, our practice is to just go around the table
 15 until we run out of questions or time. And we have noted
 16 your hard departure time of 10:25 today, so I'll ask
 17 everybody to be sparing with your questions.

18 And I will start with a question that I
 19 hope won't be too detailed, but I wonder if you could
 20 give us a little more background about the Navy's
 21 recruiting philosophy today.

22 One of the provisions of our statute asks
 23 us to look at what I call today's kids, their

1 demographics, the character of young people who are the
 2 targets of recruiting efforts by the military, and I
 3 wonder if you could tell us in a little more detail what
 4 the Navy is doing in terms of positioning itself to
 5 appeal to your market today.

6 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Well, we work it
 7 internally and we work it externally, like everybody
 8 else, I guess; but, internally, some of the things we're
 9 doing I have just described.

10 In other words, we're working very hard to
 11 bring stability to the lives of our sailors and their
 12 families. We're working very hard to bring the pay up,
 13 and you know the issues that are — the things that we've
 14 got working right now with the Fiscal Year '00 budget.

15 All of that I think is important,
 16 particularly to the people who haven't even come in the
 17 front door yet because they're watching to see how — if
 18 this is the kind of life they want to be a part of.

19 That's a piece of it. But from the
 20 recruiting standpoint itself, I mentioned some of the
 21 things that we're doing to deal with it.

22 I would tell you that we have a very rich
 23 recruiting force in terms of the quality of the force and

1 I think that's really important to this. But we haven't
 2 set them up for success — my opinion. We, in the
 3 drawdown — I mentioned the number of recruiting sites,
 4 but we also did the same thing to the number of
 5 recruiters.

6 We got ourselves down in the low three-
 7 thousands for recruiters and closed over six hundred
 8 sites in the down-sizing, to our detriment, and we're
 9 digging out of that hole right now. We believe if you
 10 just look at the accession requirements for Navy that
 11 this year are in the 53,000 range and next year will be
 12 even a little higher — if you look at those
 13 requirements, you can't get it in this environment today
 14 with 3,200 recruiters.

15 So we're going to 4,500. We'll be there
 16 by this summer. Quality recruiters. We've expanded the
 17 envelope on the plus side to include E-4's as recruiters.
 18 Some of the other services have been doing that all
 19 along. We hadn't. Don't ask me why. If you really
 20 think about it, it probably makes more sense than
 21 anything because they're the closest ones to the market.
 22 Their pals are right there, and it works and the E-4's
 23 like it a lot. So we're doing that.

1 We're increasing the advertising budget,
 2 as I mentioned. And, honestly, I would tell you we've
 3 looked hard at ourselves and I think it's bigger than
 4 Navy. Probably all of DoD. But I'll just speak to the
 5 Navy and the advertising business, which I'm not a pro
 6 at.

7 But what we're trying to ensure is that
 8 our advertising connects with the market, not with guys
 9 like me sitting here in Washington. In other words, I
 10 may just love that ad and it brings tears to my eyes, and
 11 it may not mean a darn thing to a seventeen-year-old out
 12 in Illinois. Okay? So we're trying real hard to connect
 13 with them as opposed to connecting with me.

14 But you can't make it that discreet
 15 because there's also the piece that says you've got to
 16 connect to the young men and women, but you also need to
 17 connect to their parents. So we're working that and I
 18 think we're making progress in some of the things that
 19 we're doing.

20 But I would tell you based on my own
 21 experience in going out there and talking to recruiters,
 22 we're also listening to our recruiters, I think, better
 23 than we have in the past, and they've got great ideas and

1 they're the closest to the market, as they say. So we're
 2 trying to give them enough discretion and enough
 3 empowerment, and, frankly, enough money and support, so
 4 that they can apply some of their good ideas locally.

5 For instance, I was out in Wisconsin. If
 6 you're not — Charlie, you may understand this. But if
 7 you're not from out in that neck of the woods, deer
 8 season doesn't mean much to you. Out there, it's a way
 9 of life. Okay? I mean, the schools shut down and
 10 everything else. That's the way I was raised.

11 But out there, their point was, "You know,
 12 sir? If we had international orange ball caps that said
 13 'Navy' on them with a 800 number, I mean, that would be a
 14 hit like you wouldn't believe." I got it. I mean, it
 15 makes great sense. Wouldn't connect back here in
 16 Washington. People would think you've lost your mind if
 17 you brought something like that up, but that's a local
 18 recruiter who says, "Out here, that would be powerful."
 19 Okay? So we're trying to give them the discretion to put
 20 those kind of good ideas in stride.

21 The bonuses, we're upping the enlistment
 22 bonuses.

23 We've expanded the envelope to include up

1 to ten percent non-high school degree. We view that as a
 2 smart move, a prudent move. We do not view it — I
 3 absolutely do not view it as diminishing the quality of
 4 the force because the matrix becomes multi-faceted. The
 5 AFQT score remains at 50. We have not compromised on
 6 that.

7 We're looking at an older product, a
 8 better referenced product, a product — a young man or a
 9 woman who has got sort of the full package but just
 10 doesn't have the high school degree. We think that's a
 11 winner and we're going to get probably 2,000 to 2,500
 12 this year.

13 And, oh, by the way, of course, they fill
 14 in to the months that are historically our worst
 15 recruiting months, which we call the "FMAM" months — the
 16 February, March, April and May months — right this time
 17 of year.

18 So we've got a lot going, and that's
 19 probably a longer answer than you wanted.

20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.

21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Staying
 22 with recruiting, Admiral, for just a moment, we've heard
 23 of this thing called "critical mass" — either too few or

1 too many women. If the recruiting market is such that 51
 2 percent that the demographics say are eligible females,
 3 is there a critical mass in the Navy as far as how many
 4 females might be recruited? If the Navy was 50 percent
 5 or 51 percent female, would that be okay, too many, too
 6 little? That kind of answer.

7 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: I think it would have to
 8 do with lots of things, but the initial reaction to your
 9 question, Ron, is that I would say there are some
 10 practical bounds on it for us.

11 For instance, if 51 percent wanted to come
 12 into the force but the force was sized in terms of bunks
 13 at sea — okay? — modified ships — the ability to put
 14 women to sea, for instance — would only accept 14 to 20
 15 percent of the force. You may create a bigger problem
 16 that you want just in the dis-incentive of people coming
 17 in the door thinking they're going to get one thing and
 18 then ending up getting something else. So as a practical
 19 matter, my answer would be yes, I think there are bounds
 20 that have to be on it.

21 But right now, we've got about — 14
 22 percent of the force is female and the integration at
 23 sea, about 11,000 women today. And we're — I will tell

1 you another impact of the downsizing of the Navy in terms
 2 of ships and people. It has caused our integration-of-
 3 women-at-sea program to slide back, actually, somewhat,
 4 because we've taken out ships that had women on them in
 5 some numbers. Tenders are a classic example. But we
 6 accept that and we understand that and we know how to do
 7 it right, so we're still pacing ourselves correctly.

8 But I guess my — back to the beginning,
 9 my answer would be yes, there would be some bounds on it.

10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And if I
 11 could just follow-up on the leadership aspect, that
 12 clearly is something that has been in all of our
 13 discussions over the last year — is the importance of
 14 leadership.

15 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Yes.

16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And you've
 17 touched upon in that — quite frankly, that good
 18 leadership really might get rid of a lot of the things
 19 that are of concern and the like.

20 You've mentioned this leadership training
 21 continuum that you've developed. I wonder if you could
 22 tell us where that currently stands as far as what it
 23 looks like and when it will come to full fruition.

1 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: It is in in-being right
 2 now. It is — I won't say it's at full fruition because
 3 we iterate that, too. But in fact, the eight building
 4 blocks — four enlisted and four officer — all those
 5 courses are in in-being as we speak. Okay? They came in
 6 within the last year, the last one.

7 This has been working, by the way. I
 8 mean, Jay Johnson didn't invent this. This actually
 9 started back when Frank Kelso was the CNO, Mike Boorda
 10 iterated it, and I'm the guy that actually ends up just
 11 implementing it. But all eight of those pieces are in
 12 in-being right now, is the short answer.

13 But it's a very powerful program and it
 14 captures, we believe, both the officer and enlisted at
 15 key points, like when you make E-5 — okay? — when you
 16 make E-6, when you make chief, when you become a command
 17 master chief. Those points when you become a division
 18 officer, when you become a department head.

19 We have what we call the Command
 20 Leadership Course for our prospective commanding officers
 21 and their spouses, which the Marine Corps has been doing
 22 for a long time, and other services. We hadn't. We're
 23 doing it now. It's powerful beyond belief.

1 So we're very high on the leadership
 2 training continuum and we're committed to it.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 4 MS. POPE: Thank you. I want to follow-on
 5 the recruiting line and I'll save my other questions for
 6 later. But does the Navy tie recruiter credit to recruit
 7 graduation?
 8 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Yes.
 9 MS. POPE: Okay. And for how long has the
 10 Navy been doing that?
 11 So that the recruiter doesn't get full
 12 credit till the recruit actually —
 13 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Until we have a Fleet
 14 product, yes.
 15 MS. POPE: Right. So that assumes —
 16 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Well, I don't know.
 17 I'll —
 18 MS. POPE: So you're saying —
 19 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: I'll get that for you,
 20 Barbara.
 21 MS. POPE: Okay.
 22 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: I don't — I honestly
 23 don't remember how long.

1 MS. POPE: But you're saying it's not just
 2 RTC. It's also NTC, because you just said Fleet product.
 3 So either they go out of basic or "A" school?
 4 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Let me get that for you.
 5 MS. POPE: Okay. All right.
 6 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Yeah.
 7 MS. POPE: I'm just curious on when they
 8 get credit for —
 9 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: We iterated it about two
 10 years ago, I think, to make it — to improve it, we
 11 thought, to give it — not get credit for a recruit until
 12 you've actually got somebody out in the Fleet. And the
 13 checkpoints in there, to be honest with you, I can't
 14 remember, but I'll get it for you.
 15 MS. POPE: And the other is just along the
 16 lines that some of us heard — and we heard it — The
 17 MCPON addressed it yesterday. We heard it from the
 18 Fleet. We heard it from recruits — was that — not
 19 being prepared for the amount of mess duty time; not
 20 being prepared for their non-critical specialties.
 21 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Sure.
 22 MS. POPE: And nobody told them in basic
 23 how much time they were going to spend; you know, when

1 they were recruited; when they were trained; and when
 2 they actually got to the Fleet and found out that it was
 3 a significant amount of time between their training and
 4 when they actually got into a job that — And that
 5 frustration that I would suspect would impact retention.
 6 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Absolutely. I would
 7 just tell you that I mentioned early on about the
 8 personnel shortages. That's what — That's the practical
 9 translation of those personnel shortages.
 10 By design, if I go to the Fleet as a young
 11 man — in my case, to a ship — and I'm going to be in a
 12 particular rating, I'll go work in my rating for a period
 13 of time. Ninety days, whatever. At that point, then I
 14 slip back — it's my turn to go do mess duty, okay?
 15 That's always been the way.
 16 What's happened now, though, because we've
 17 got manning shortages — which I can talk to in some
 18 detail if you like — but because we've got manning
 19 shortages, we can't do it that way because they need the
 20 bodies. So when they check aboard, the poor folks are
 21 going right to mess duty and they're going, "Hey, wait a
 22 minute. I want to go be" — and in some cases they're
 23 getting double-tour. Okay?

1 We perhaps haven't explained that — I
 2 mean, the Fleet understands it well, but that may be a
 3 reverse case of what I talked about earlier on the
 4 continuum where we haven't done a very good job of
 5 explaining the short-term personnel shortage and how it
 6 manifests itself to a young man or woman coming to the
 7 Fleet. That's a good point, in fact, I'll take.
 8 But that's what it's all about. We've got
 9 — We're making progress, okay? One of the reasons we
 10 have the manning shortage — It's not a discreet case.
 11 It's very complex. And you understand our system from
 12 your time in it. But we have a shortage in people. I
 13 mentioned the recruiting shortfall last year. But we
 14 also have a distribution problem. Okay? And those two
 15 are causing us to have all these shortfalls at sea and
 16 ashore. Yet, the individuals account's got 15,000 people
 17 in it on the plus side.
 18 So we've got some internal distribution
 19 work to do in addition to bringing more people in the
 20 front door. But that's what's causing this problem.
 21 MS. POPE: Okay. Thank you.
 22 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Admiral,
 23 thanks for being here. I'm sure you didn't have anything

1 else to do today.
 2 My question has to do with — And forgive
 3 me because I was just reflecting on the fact it's been
 4 not quite, but almost a year since we were up to Great
 5 Lakes, the first place we visited, and I walked away from
 6 there with the impression that — more so for the
 7 officers that were up there in recruit training than the
 8 noncommissioned officers, but the impression that there
 9 was a stigma attached with that assignment.
 10 And I wonder if you believe there is a
 11 stigma attached to being assigned to recruit training
 12 rather than on a ship. And is the Navy moving to — All
 13 the services at one time or another have put up with this
 14 stigma. You know, you're not fighting the war. You're
 15 doing this.
 16 So your comments on that, please.
 17 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Yes and yes. Okay?
 18 The historical — I don't like the word
 19 "stigma," but I understand it. We have not serviced the
 20 training establishment the way we should have. I accept
 21 that. We are committed to fixing that. There's a
 22 numbers piece to it. There's a quality piece to it.
 23 It's a huge cultural change. Some people tell you that.

1 I don't think it's that huge, personally. But we're
 2 committed to fixing that.
 3 We've got it pretty right — and you said
 4 as much — on the RDC side, on the enlisted side. We're
 5 working real hard to do that on the officer side.
 6 I believe we've made great strides, by the
 7 way, at the RTC — okay? — with the officers.
 8 But this continuum I talk about, now I
 9 want to do the same thing in the Service Schools Command,
 10 for instance — you know, in the "A" schools and the next
 11 phase of training before they get to the Fleet. And
 12 really throughout the training establishment.
 13 Much easier to say than it is to do
 14 because everybody wants that same upper corner of the
 15 market, but we have got to do that, I believe. The
 16 investment, the training investment in the young men and
 17 women coming in the front door — officer, enlisted —
 18 you pick the program, I don't care — that investment I
 19 think has taken on much more significance than ever
 20 before, for probably fifty reasons that Dr. Moskos could
 21 elaborate about better than I. But it has to do with how
 22 they're brought it. It has to do with the complexities
 23 of their lives. It has to do with the complexities in

1 the service and the technologies and all that we're
 2 asking them to do.
 3 So it's — You need a quality cadre, if
 4 you will, to take care of those young men and women, to
 5 get them out to the Fleet, and we're working on that.
 6 We're not there yet.
 7 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 8 I'd just comment that I was impressed with
 9 the initiative that went into the construct of Battle
 10 Stations and some of the other self-help projects up
 11 there to transform an individual into a sailor. It
 12 was...
 13 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Thank you.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: We would
 15 give you a plug, though. We hope that you're financing
 16 that because we found good petty officers who were doing
 17 it off their backs and were doing a great job.
 18 DR. CANTOR: Especially the infrastructure
 19 with that.
 20 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Yeah. Well, I mean, if
 21 you've been to Great Lakes, you don't have to say another
 22 word. Just look around and you say, "You've got to be
 23 kidding me."

1 We're putting a fix on that as fast as we
 2 can. I was out there recently only to talk about that.
 3 And the long range — I mean, a decade from now that
 4 place is going to be awesome. But it's getting from here
 5 to there is the problem, and it's non-trivial. But
 6 they've got a plan that — I don't know. Has Admiral
 7 Hunter been here or is he coming?
 8 MS. POPE: He's been and he's coming.
 9 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Okay. Anyway, the
 10 vision is the right one. Okay? In the short term, we've
 11 pulled some projects forward this year, next year.
 12 Barracks, we've got to get the barracks right. We've got
 13 to get the physical training facilities right. Okay?
 14 Interestingly enough — I didn't know
 15 this. I learned this last year. Everybody says, "Oh,
 16 Great Lakes. You're going to lose all this training
 17 because of cold weather." They actually lose more
 18 training because of hot weather than cold weather out
 19 there.
 20 Anyway, we still — we've got to get it
 21 right. We don't have the shooting range, okay? We've
 22 pulled that forward. Congressman Bruyere helped us with
 23 that. But in truth, you know, we want to get back to

1 that. So we've got a lot that we're doing in the short
 2 term, but the long range vision is just — it's
 3 magnificent. We're going to make that place right.
 4 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 5 DR. CANTOR: I was gratified to hear the
 6 emphasis on Great Lakes. And so within that context, let
 7 me be candid and say that I'm surprised that you — and
 8 actually my colleague — that you view RDC as in good
 9 shape there — at least the RDC training, the RDC
 10 positions and how people are feeling.
 11 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Okay.
 12 DR. CANTOR: At least from my experience
 13 there, that visit, there's a long way to go to make that
 14 feel like an empowered position. And I don't mean this
 15 to be — Everybody's trying, and you clearly are.
 16 So having said that, I guess what I'm
 17 interested in is whether you feel you are doing enough
 18 yet at Great Lakes to make this continuum work. Both the
 19 leadership continuum, enlisted as well as officer, but
 20 also the continuum from basic to the "A" schools, to keep
 21 discipline, to keep the carryover.
 22 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: No, we're not there yet.
 23 In a word, no.

1 And I may need to clarify something. The
 2 leadership training continuum is not at Great Lakes. I
 3 should have said that before. The leadership training
 4 continuum is in lots of places.
 5 DR. CANTOR: Right.
 6 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Yes. It's in Fleet
 7 concentration areas. It's in Newport, Rhode Island.
 8 It's in lots of places. So —
 9 DR. CANTOR: I understand.
 10 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: But to your point on the
 11 RTC, SSC, apprentice training, that flow to the Fleet,
 12 no, we do not have it right yet. Conceptually we do. We
 13 know where we want to go, but we're not there yet. We
 14 haven't delivered on it.
 15 And that, in some measure, is still true
 16 with the recruit division commanders and why they're
 17 still feeling the press — because they're overworked;
 18 there weren't enough of them; we've upped the number per
 19 division and we're still trying to meet that.
 20 So we're kind of in a transition point, in
 21 my view, between kind of the old way we had it and the
 22 new vision, and we're still trying to hit our stride
 23 there.

1 But I'm not ready — I'm not ready to
 2 declare victory. Conceptually I am. I think we've got
 3 it about right conceptually, but we haven't delivered on
 4 that yet and they still feel that, indeed.
 5 DR. CANTOR: Yeah. Okay.
 6 All right. Thank you.
 7 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Thank you for being
 8 here, Admiral Johnson. I wanted to switch the discussion
 9 just a little bit away from recruiting, which I'd like to
 10 come back to maybe on another round.
 11 But one of the issues that seems to come
 12 up in our various travels is the perception of double
 13 standards between men and women, including women seeing
 14 double standards, and some of the events in the Navy of
 15 the recent past, before your watch in many cases.
 16 You know, Admiral Arthur's non-assignment
 17 to CINCPAC on the basis of a failed helicopter pilot's
 18 complaints. Pilot Haltgren's crash which was first
 19 attributed to mechanical error, then later to human
 20 error, and how the Navy, you know, didn't say the "truth"
 21 the first time around and maybe later did. The recent
 22 Annapolis case of the black midshipman and the white
 23 female midshipman.

1 You know, is there a double standard here?
 2 I don't know the answers to those questions but I just
 3 wonder. Those kinds of incidents pop up periodically.
 4 Not just in the Navy, of course, by any means. What's
 5 your reaction to those kinds of perceptions of double
 6 standards?
 7 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Well, I understand the
 8 perceptions. We're working very hard. My answer really
 9 is that we're working very hard inside the Navy to apply
 10 standards evenly across-the-board. Much easier to say
 11 than to do, perhaps, but perhaps not.
 12 Where you get into trouble, in my view, in
 13 some cases, is trying to generalize when you're dealing
 14 with "each's." You know what I mean? And it really is
 15 hard because each one has its own merits and probably
 16 demerits, and none of them are exactly the same. Yet,
 17 they tend to get painted publicly with the same brush.
 18 And I don't know how you ever get around that, to be
 19 honest with you.
 20 So what we're trying to do very hard —
 21 And it touches back to the leadership training continuum
 22 and my comment about we've learned a lot about ourselves
 23 and the leadership business; some of it good, some of it

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 110</p> <p>1 un-good. 2 We're trying to apply that proactively and 3 constructively to the next generation of leaders, full 4 spectrum throughout the Navy, so that we minimize and 5 really eliminate this business, by perception or reality, 6 of double standards. 7 It's hard to do. And, frankly, we don't 8 get helped sometimes by the media; we don't get helped by 9 ourselves sometimes answering questions or what-have-you, 10 but we're trying very hard. 11 I don't know if that answers your 12 questions or not, but... 13 DR. MOSKOS: Thanks. 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Good to see you 15 again, sir. 16 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Thank you. 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Are you going to 18 tie the promotions to this continuum — the training 19 schools, you know — 20 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Yes. 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: So everybody's 22 going to be required to go through these — 23 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Yes.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 113</p> <p>1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Twelve big 2 carriers, though? 3 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Yes, twelve — That 4 force is going to be cored around twelve carrier battle 5 groups and twelve amphibious ready groups. Those are the 6 major combat entities, totaling about 305 ships. We need 7 to continue to look at that, honestly, because there are 8 those who say, "Hey, you've gone too far." 9 I personally believe based on everything 10 we see right now — it's very busy out there, but we're 11 still within our bounds of PERSTEMPO and not violating 12 our six-month-maximum deployments. I believe if you have 13 a 305-ship Navy that's fully manned, properly trained and 14 properly resourced, you can do the job. You pull any one 15 of those pegs out, you've got a problem. 16 But we need to keep looking at that, and 17 I'm sure the next QDR will. My sense of it would be — 18 and I've said very publicly — no mas. That's as low as 19 you can go. Any lower, I'm outside my comfort zone. I 20 believe in the future you may actually find that it will 21 go back up the other way. 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: We have to, 23 as part of the charter, comment concerning the policy on</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 111</p> <p>1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: — at some time 2 over their career? 3 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Yes. 4 Now, you know, we put a grace clause in 5 there because, frankly, we couldn't deliver if we wanted 6 to. So, I mean, we're okay with the grace clause, but, 7 indeed, the idea is if you're going here, you're going to 8 go to the leadership training continuum. 9 And again, that's a big cultural change. 10 And, frankly, it's non-trivial from dollars and manpower 11 losses, too. It's like — I think it's 56,000 people a 12 year are in that process. So it's... 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I'm sure it 14 takes — 15 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Yes, is the answer to 16 your question. 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: This is kind of 18 related, but are you experiencing pilot retention 19 problems big-time? 20 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Yes, we are indeed. The 21 difference between me and Mike Ryan, though, in the pilot 22 retention business, is that his is in his face today. 23 Okay? Mine is to a degree, but I've got a couple of</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 114</p> <p>1 fraternization — that is, that the Department of Defense 2 has now directed all the service chiefs to come in line 3 — and also the possible proposed policy on adultery. 4 I wondered if you would comment on that — 5 on both of them. Is this necessary? Is this something 6 we really need to do? 7 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Well, I don't mind — I 8 mean, personally, I don't mind the clarification of the 9 policy so long as — And the fraternization policy, I 10 think it's essentially the way we've got it, right now 11 anyway. So in terms of impact to the Navy, it's kind of 12 no change. And I don't mean that to sound glib. It's 13 just I think we've got it right in terms of the standard 14 that's going to be applied across-the-force, so I'm okay 15 with that. 16 On the adultery piece, my understanding — 17 and I guess it's still in review or public comment, but 18 it really just codifies in one place what's been there 19 available to commanding officers in terms of factors to 20 consider and all that. So I don't see a major change or 21 a major impact to us. 22 Is it necessary? I believe that it's 23 considered to be necessary. I don't have a problem with</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 112</p> <p>1 years before the year groups that are really of concern 2 — what we call the T-nots, the ones we under-assessed in 3 the drawdown — before they march through their careers 4 and get to their department heads. Most of that's going 5 to happen in '01. 6 So that's why I say we're pulling lead on 7 that right now to try to fix it. But as you know, there 8 is — and it applies to Navy, Marines and Air Force — 9 anybody who drives airplanes — there is no silver-bullet 10 solution to pilot retention. Okay? None. 11 Pay is a part of it; quality of product 12 that they fly and employ is a part of it; parts and 13 maintenance and all of that's a part of it; the training, 14 the stability of their lives — it all plays. So we're 15 attacking all of that to try to get at it. 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: And do you see 17 this 325-ship Navy staying? 18 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: No. The QDR agreement 19 was that the Navy, by Fiscal Year '03, would come down to 20 — I say 300 ships. It's actually 305 ships. That's 21 where we're going. 116 surface combatants, fifty SSN's, 22 fourteen SSBN's, twelve carriers, twelve big-deck 23 amphibians, et cetera.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 115</p> <p>1 that. But it's not an issue for us because I think it's 2 largely the way we're doing it right now. 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you. 4 MS. POPE: My next question is a very 5 specific one. And I'm not sure whether the other 6 services are on it, but the Navy has a policy — at least 7 a deployment policy for pregnancy that gaps the billet, 8 different than the male on a medical leave, that could 9 potentially gap the billet for six months. 10 Now, obviously if it's critical, the CO of 11 a ship can ask for back-fill. And I think I understand 12 the genesis of the policy, but I wonder — and as we've 13 asked, whether there's a perception versus a reality. 14 Ship CO's can ask when they need to, but 15 the perception — and I guess the words have been "get 16 out of jail free," you know — but that women can get out 17 of it, and that there's a readiness issue impacted by the 18 void that's left there because the current policy assigns 19 women back to that ship, to that position, rather than to 20 another ship or a similar position. 21 And I don't know whether the Navy is 22 looking at that policy, whether there's a sense that 23 there — What I've heard is that there's not a readiness</p>

1 impact but that there's a perception impact.
 2 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: That's almost precisely
 3 the way I hear it. I mean, if you look at the numbers
 4 and you talk to the CO's, and then you look at who
 5 leaves, be it an unplanned loss or a pregnancy, it's
 6 usually in the lower end, the more junior people, so the
 7 impact in terms of readiness really isn't there. I mean,
 8 that's what the CO's tell me.
 9 I've got to tell you, though, that we're
 10 not there yet with all of it. I mean — And this is
 11 bigger than gender integration here. I don't like — And
 12 as a former personnel guy, I would tell you that
 13 unplanned losses always drive us nuts. Okay? And
 14 whether it's six months or whether it's tomorrow, once
 15 you get inside the detailing window, you've got a problem
 16 — okay? — because you're going to gap — somebody's
 17 going to go without just because the system can't get
 18 inside itself to put somebody in there very easily. So
 19 that's a challenge for us.
 20 But I see, for instance, unplanned losses
 21 — The last numbers I had — I don't remember the
 22 numbers, but the trends that I saw, irrespective of
 23 gender, were creeping up the other way and I didn't like

1 that. Okay?
 2 So I don't — I don't have the answer to
 3 the "why." And it's not pregnancy; it's males and
 4 females. We're trending the wrong way. So I've got —
 5 we're looking at that. I don't know what it means yet.
 6 But the six-month policy was written with good intention.
 7 I think it's the proper policy.
 8 The impact on readiness is minimal to
 9 none, but I think it's fair to say we ought to keep
 10 looking and see if we've got it right. I'm not sure we
 11 do. Given the realities of our distribution system —
 12 the physical realities of that system which need fixing
 13 in the 21st Century, in my opinion — we may not be able
 14 to do much with it at this point, but it's fair to say
 15 that we ought to keep looking at it.
 16 MS. POPE: Thanks.
 17 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Admiral, one
 18 of the reasons we sit here today was a criticism by some
 19 people who, to be perfectly honest, have maligned the
 20 young generation that chooses to come into your Navy.
 21 And I for one detest the "Generation X" concept because
 22 the labels they put on them, being a father of two of
 23 those kids from that generation, do not fit.

1 I would ask your assessment of the young
 2 men and women who choose to come in the Navy.
 3 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: I love them. They
 4 absolutely water my eyes, and I mean that as sincerely as
 5 I can say it. Because I heard all that stuff, too. I
 6 mean, my daughter's twenty-eight years old. I don't know
 7 — I don't even know what generation she falls in. She
 8 falls in the twenty-eight-year-old-daughter generation.
 9 But I look at and I go see these young men
 10 and women and they absolutely blow my doors off. I just
 11 — I can't get enough of them. And I find the more I
 12 spend in this — the longer I spend in this job, I'm
 13 getting very possessive and very territorial about my
 14 young men and women because they're so good and I want it
 15 to be so right for them.
 16 Listen, the quality is there like I've
 17 never seen it. Okay? And, really, the things that trip
 18 my gyros off the line, like trying to log onto America
 19 Online or something like that, they're no-brainers for
 20 these kids. I mean, so yeah, they're different, but so
 21 what? They are more than capable of doing the job.
 22 And when you strip it all away, they're
 23 still looking for leaders; they're still looking for

1 discipline; they're still looking for a path upward for
 2 them; they're still proud to serve. It's all there.
 3 It's all there. I'm not worried about generation
 4 whatever-it-is at all.
 5 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 6 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: So that's my somewhat
 7 unimpassioned answer.
 8 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thanks.
 9 DR. MOSKOS: I love Generation X, too,
 10 having kids in that generation and all their friends.
 11 Admiral, one question on the recruiting.
 12 I had the opportunity to speak to some of the senior
 13 people a couple months ago and I said, you know, maybe —
 14 I mean, there were the things — a chart on, you know,
 15 pluses for joining the various services and the Navy did
 16 not have — You know, high-tech was Air Force and —
 17 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: The propensity, yeah.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: — was Marines, and job
 19 skills and educational benefits was Army, et cetera; and
 20 the Navy was scoring low and I said, "How about joining
 21 the Navy and see the world?" And I notice in the new
 22 ads, you know, people are on leave in Singapore and
 23 places like that. I don't know whether it's cause-and-

1 effect or not.
 2 But one question I had — and this is for
 3 other services true, maybe not the Marines — the pitch
 4 toward always saying this is a career possibility, does
 5 that exclude a large part of the population who might
 6 say, "I want a change in my life for a while" — maybe
 7 between high school and college, between college and
 8 graduate school or what have you, or college and work —
 9 "and try something new"?
 10 And these recruitment pitches sort of —
 11 you know, this is a career-career — that most people,
 12 young people, any generation, X, Y, Z, or A, B, C — say,
 13 you know, "That's not for me. I'm not going to make the
 14 military." And some will, by the way, who join.
 15 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Sure.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: We know in the draft era that
 17 ten percent of draftees became career soldiers, for
 18 example.
 19 Is there something fundamentally wrong in
 20 a recruitment appeal that's always pitching, rather than
 21 — saying this could be a citizen experience rather than
 22 being a career opportunity?
 23 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: I am very much of that

1 mind that says, "Don't pitch it as a career." Because, I
 2 mean, I look back at myself — and Bill Keys, Ron,
 3 probably the same thing. We all — I don't think the day
 4 I walked into the Naval Academy I said, "By golly, I
 5 can't wait for thirty years in the Navy." I wasn't
 6 there. But I am now. Okay?
 7 So what they tell me — what they tell me,
 8 the recruiters and the young men and women — is what
 9 really appeals to them is an opportunity. Service, yes,
 10 but education is really big. So one of the things we're
 11 doing is trying to send the message that says, "These are
 12 educational opportunities for you inside the Navy." Not
 13 "join the Navy so you can spend a career and then get
 14 educated" or "join the Navy and then go get educated."
 15 We're trying to focus on inside the
 16 lifelines and the educational opportunities that are
 17 there. I think the career then comes out of all of that.
 18 But I very much agree that pitching it ad-
 19 wise as a career is the wrong way to go.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: And it may have big gender
 21 differences, too, on that.
 22 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Yes. Yes.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: It's possible, you know —

1 yeah.
 2 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: The other thing about
 3 the education — It's interesting. I mean, the
 4 recruiters were passionate about it. They said —
 5 Because I asked them. I said, "Hey, you see the ads.
 6 You deal with these folks. Tell me what works."
 7 They say, "Do you know what would really
 8 work?" They said, "If you could show us an ad that
 9 showed a Navy man or a woman, a sailor, coming out of
 10 some ceremony with a degree." And it could be a sea
 11 school degree, it could be an "A" school, but something
 12 that says, "I've got this and I got it in the Navy."
 13 Because now — Back to what I said earlier
 14 about you've got to connect with the kids, but — young
 15 men and women — you've also got to connect with their
 16 folks. They said, "That works. It hits them both."
 17 DR. CANTOR: Could I just ask a quick
 18 follow-on to that? I mean, you mentioned earlier raising
 19 the number of non-high school degree. Are you then
 20 connecting this current line about education within the
 21 Navy —
 22 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Sure.
 23 DR. CANTOR: — to the fact that you're

1 go out after other opportunities, and I think we see a
 2 few symptoms of that.
 3 So my question to you is what are you
 4 doing to keep good people and how do you define good
 5 people, both officer and enlisted, in the Navy?
 6 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: How much time do we
 7 have?
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: That's why I reserved it.
 9 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Well, you know, it's
 10 interesting. What are we doing to keep good people?
 11 We're doing lots of things. Trying to make it right with
 12 the pay; the pay table reform and the REDUX in this
 13 year's budget is fundamental to all of it. It really is.
 14 This isn't my quote. I think Secretary Cohen said it,
 15 but it captures it perfectly. You know, you can't pay
 16 these people enough money but you can pay them too
 17 little. Okay?
 18 That's where we are now. We've got to
 19 make it right this year. That's fundamental to
 20 everything — okay? — in my view. Everything builds on
 21 that. Do you have the analysis? Do you have the
 22 granularity of analysis? My answer is probably not, but
 23 when you get it, it's too late. Okay?

1 going to have a larger group of kids with no high school
 2 degree? I mean, is —
 3 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: But the opportunities
 4 will still be there for them. And if you look at it,
 5 historically — and we did very carefully — the
 6 historical attrition on the front-end for them has been
 7 greater. And I don't remember the percentage. I'll say
 8 six to eight percent. That's close. But when they make
 9 it through, the attrition is much lower. You've got a
 10 better product.
 11 So that then would give them the
 12 educational opportunities in the service just like
 13 anybody else. I mean, they may be starting at a
 14 different place, but the idea — And our MCPON came up
 15 with this, and he won't give himself credit for it but he
 16 did.
 17 What we want to be able to do is when you
 18 join the Navy, the day you get to Great Lakes, or close
 19 thereafter, we hand you your own road map, your own
 20 educational road map. And we believe that we've got the
 21 computer systems and the technology there to do this. We
 22 want to give you your own road map that says, "What do
 23 you want? Do you want to get a bachelor's degree? Do

1 So trust me on this one because I'm
 2 talking to the Fleet; that's what they're telling me
 3 every time. So we need to fix that.
 4 But the what-are-we-doing-beyond-that gets
 5 to all that I've described, really. We've got to fix the
 6 non-deployed side of our lives in this rotational force
 7 Navy. We've got to bring stability to that.
 8 We've got a huge program in place right
 9 now — we put it in in September — to cleave off 25
 10 percent of that inter-deployment training cycle, that
 11 non-deployed side of their life when they're in this
 12 bathtub. Cleave off 25 percent of the stuff that's in
 13 there and get rid of it, and give that time back to this
 14 empowered unit commanding officer. Huge challenge.
 15 But in terms of inspections and admin
 16 requirements and the things that good-intentioned people
 17 like me have been levying on them to help them do their
 18 jobs, it's just gotten way out-of-hand. So we're as
 19 serious as we can be about killing 25 percent of that and
 20 giving it back to the CO's.
 21 That, plus proper resourcing — i.e.,
 22 raise the top line, give us enough money to properly fund
 23 operation and maintenance accounts, spare parts — all of

1 you want to get a high school degree?" Whatever it is,
 2 it will show you how to get there.
 3 That's powerful stuff. We haven't been
 4 able to deliver on that up to now. I think we can do it.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I don't have any
 6 other questions.
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Admiral, I wanted to pass
 8 last time so that the real questions could get out
 9 because I have a more philosophical question.
 10 As a corporate lawyer, I spent a lot of
 11 time advising companies during the drawdowns of the
 12 eighties and it seems many of the symptoms that I have
 13 observed in the Navy are very familiar to me on that
 14 account. I endorse your use of the word "instability" to
 15 characterize where you are right now.
 16 One of the challenges that companies face
 17 as they begin to grow and develop again after a drawdown
 18 or even to just resume normal operations is the challenge
 19 of having kept good people, kept the people that they
 20 wanted, in order to have some continuity of their culture
 21 and the things that were good about the company that may
 22 have ensured its survival; but naturally in a drawdown
 23 situation it's demoralizing and good people are liable to

1 that translates directly to the quality of their living
 2 at home — okay? — the quality of their training, and,
 3 therefore, their happiness and retention.
 4 The deployed stuff for us is not the
 5 problem. Okay? We understand that we work hard when we
 6 go on cruise. We're within our six-month matrix. Okay?
 7 That's not the problem and they'll tell you that when you
 8 go out there. You work hard when you're on cruise. They
 9 love it. It's when you're home, you shouldn't be working
 10 as hard as you were on cruise, especially when you're not
 11 resourced and you're in the bottom of that bathtub.
 12 It's very, very frustrating; hugely
 13 destabilizing to the force. That's what we're working to
 14 fix. And I believe if we do that, that alone — which is
 15 non-trivial — that will be the biggest thing we can do
 16 to keep the right people. And just the fact that we've
 17 identified it and we're working it has sent a huge
 18 positive signal to the force and they're helping us fix
 19 it.
 20 It's interesting. In the drawdown, the
 21 Navy made a commitment to itself. Way back when Mike
 22 Boorda was the Chief of Naval Personnel — I mean, that's
 23 how long this thing had been perking — that we were not

1 going to separate anybody in the drawdown that wasn't
 2 retirement-eligible. In other words, we were going to
 3 build a fence around the career force. We did that. And
 4 if you look at the distribution of our force, it shows
 5 it. We are a richer force in the senior grades. Okay?
 6 To do that in a flat top line when your
 7 in-strength is constrained causes you — I mean, there
 8 are only so many places — so many pressure relief valves
 9 you've got on the system and one of them is the front
 10 door, so you bring in fewer people. That's part of the
 11 manning shortage we've got right now. But the trade is
 12 we've got a richer force. And I personally believe that
 13 one of the reasons we're able to do all the good things
 14 that we're doing right now is because we've got that
 15 force. Okay?
 16 And then people say, "Oh, you've got a
 17 hollow force." We don't have anything like a hollow
 18 force because we have got this richness that we have
 19 protected and they're carrying huge amounts of goodness
 20 for us.
 21 So a lot of people don't understand that
 22 but that's — We're rich in the middle and weak at the —
 23 and deficient in numbers on the front end. We're working

1 me — they say, "Well, okay, Johnson. You're checking
 2 out next year. What if the next guy doesn't like it that
 3 way?"
 4 I guess that's a possibility, but I put it
 5 down in the grass because the real way you do what you
 6 asked me is that you make the richness of the experience
 7 so obvious that you just can't walk away from it. And
 8 the product sells it, the experience itself sells it, and
 9 it becomes — You say, "Hey, why would you ever walk away
 10 from something that's given us this kind of leadership
 11 product, full spectrum, throughout the Navy?" That's the
 12 way it's — It's got to sell itself in one sense. Now
 13 you've locked it in, and the leadership would be foolish
 14 to step away from that.
 15 I've got good commitment from the senior
 16 officer leadership, and also good commitment from the
 17 senior enlisted leadership. And if they can see it —
 18 and then, you know, you're investing in the whole force
 19 because they're all going through it — over time — five
 20 years, ten years or so — I think now you've really
 21 institutionalized it in a positive way.
 22 So that's the only — There are no
 23 guarantees to it.

1 to right that now, particularly as that force works its
 2 way through the career flow, but it's good for us right
 3 now.
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: You
 6 indicated on the continuum — And that's one of the
 7 things we hope to provide to the Congress, that they
 8 understand that there are four very distinct continuums
 9 of training that each one of the services has.
 10 And you've indicated at RTC what you've
 11 done and you've indicated that in the AIT area — and I
 12 don't have the proper term; I don't remember it — that
 13 you were going to a militarization of that. Could you,
 14 for the committee and for the record, show us or tell us
 15 what that will include?
 16 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Sure. I won't — We'll
 17 give you all of that, laid out very specifically for both
 18 the NMT piece of it — the Navy military training, which
 19 is the part that takes me from Recruit Training Command,
 20 into the Fleet — and we'll give you exactly what the
 21 leadership training continuum — You should have that.
 22 The curricula in each one, how each one builds on the
 23 other one. Absolutely. We'll lay all that out for you

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 2 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Admiral,
 3 focusing specifically on our charter, how much more
 4 external help do you need from the Congress and other
 5 people, and your commanders and your subordinate leaders,
 6 to get where you want to go and the direction you're
 7 moving?
 8 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Well, I believe we know
 9 what we're doing. I believe we have a clear path
 10 forward. I believe the vision is sound. I believe the
 11 programs have great integrity to them.
 12 Having said that, I never mind people
 13 looking at our stuff. Okay? I think it's constructive.
 14 Okay? I've not offended by it because sometimes even
 15 guys like me get a little bit too close to the product.
 16 You know what I mean? So I have no problem with any of
 17 that.
 18 Specifically what I would like is I would
 19 like to have the ability to come ask for help at my call.
 20 In other words, I need to move forward the construction
 21 of two barracks in Great Lakes and I need it now. Help
 22 me with the reprogramming or whatever it is. That's a
 23 programmatic piece. But to be able to get the kind of

1 — what it does very nicely, and we continue to iterate
 2 it.
 3 So I'm very encouraged by that, and the
 4 basis of my encouragement is the feedback I get from the
 5 people that are in the courses. It's like, "Wow, I can't
 6 believe — "Nobody's ever talked to me like this before.
 7 Nobody's ever showed me this before." Particularly at
 8 the commanding officer level. It's powerful.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And my
 10 follow-on to that is a very unfair question. I'm an old
 11 Pennsylvanian, you know. And if you have a big graveyard
 12 in your community, you know, you go out and you walk
 13 amongst the graves; they've got this little sign on the
 14 gravestone that says "in perpetuity," you know, meaning
 15 we're going to keep this grave up forever and ever.
 16 Obviously you've made or are making —
 17 conceptually and now practically — an awful lot of
 18 improvements, but how do we keep it in perpetuity? How
 19 do we keep it such that your successor two times from now
 20 doesn't have to face a commission like this?
 21 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Well, that's a great
 22 question. I'm not sure. My answer really is pretty
 23 basic. And I've thought about this a lot and people tell

1 responsiveness out of the Congress — and by large
 2 measure we do — is very helpful.
 3 But in terms of helping us do our job, I
 4 believe we know what we're doing and I'd just ask for
 5 their support and their trust in letting us carry it out.
 6 And hold us accountable.
 7 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: No, thank you. I don't have
 9 any more.
 10 MS. POPE: I do have one. And I guess I
 11 can't let this session close without asking one question
 12 and it has to do with the "T" word. And the Army has
 13 talked a lot about Aberdeen. In all the discussions with
 14 the Navy, nobody has mentioned Tailhook. There are a lot
 15 —
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Oh, that's the "T" word.
 17 MS. POPE: The "T" word.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: I didn't know what the "T"
 19 word was. Yeah, okay.
 20 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: I didn't either.
 21 MS. POPE: Well, then there's been a lot
 22 of progress.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: "TH" word.

1 MS. POPE: There's a lot of criticism —
 2 DR. MOSKOS: That's another one of those
 3 double perceptions, too. Go ahead.
 4 MS. POPE: Double perceptions, right.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. Yeah.
 6 MS. POPE: But a lot of criticism of the
 7 Navy that — And I think you partially addressed it when
 8 you began about twenty years of experience with women at
 9 sea — but that what the Navy has done in the nineties is
 10 pure political pressure and a reaction to outside as a
 11 result of Tailhook. I'd just — I guess I'd ask you for
 12 the record to comment on that.
 13 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: I don't agree. Did we
 14 do some things because of Tailhook? Good Lord, yes. I
 15 hope so. Okay? And it gets back to what I said before
 16 about we've learned a lot about ourselves and the
 17 leadership business in particular in the last decade.
 18 That's Johnson's way of talking about Tailhook. Okay?
 19 And that's a big part of that statement. Some of it's
 20 been good, some of it's been not good.
 21 But what we've done is we've captured what
 22 went wrong; we've captured our shortcomings, if you will,
 23 and plowed them right back into things like the

1 leadership training continuum so we don't ever go there
 2 again. And so I'm very comfortable with that. We have
 3 learned the lessons of Tailhook.
 4 And I've got to be very careful publicly
 5 to say Tailhook is over, it's behind us, because as soon
 6 as I do, somebody will drill me right between the eyes
 7 and say, "You didn't get it, did you?" You just" —
 8 That's bunk. We got it big-time — okay? — and we
 9 understand. And that's why all of this formalized
 10 leadership training and the investment in leadership is
 11 so important to us, because we've been down a path that
 12 wasn't good before and we don't ever want to go there
 13 again.
 14 But as a practical matter — as a
 15 practical matter, day-in and day-out in the Fleet — we
 16 don't talk about Tailhook anymore. Okay? The lessons
 17 are already there.
 18 Does that answer your question?
 19 MS. POPE: Yes, it does. Thanks.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: Well, let me follow on
 21 Barbara's point. One of the unintended lessons, maybe,
 22 of Tailhook was that misbehaving female officers were not
 23 officially punished; that there was a double standard.

1 You know, this is a fact — that no misbehaving female
 2 officer was, you know, taken to task officially on any of
 3 these behavior patterns. What kind of lesson is that?
 4 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Well, it's one we've
 5 cranked into our kickback that gets back to your point
 6 earlier about double standards. And right now I'll tell
 7 you if I've got a misbehaving officer, I don't really
 8 care whether it's a male or female. They're both going
 9 to get dealt with.
 10 So I can't rewrite the past, I make no
 11 attempt to do so, and I don't make excuses for anybody
 12 who's been there. I don't make excuses for any of it. I
 13 just try to capture what we can learn from it and make
 14 this place better, and that's what we're all about.
 15 And so male or female, it doesn't matter
 16 to me. They screw up, they're going to be held
 17 accountable.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you.
 19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Any more questions?
 20 Admiral, I think we're going to be able to
 21 release you on time today. But before you go, I do want
 22 to express to you on behalf of the whole Commission our
 23 gratitude for the hard work and splendid cooperation of

1 all of the Navy people that we have dealt with.
 2 And I'd particularly like to note our
 3 service representative, Captain Jim Snyder, who has been
 4 a loyal member of our team here — not too loyal — and
 5 hard-working, effective, and a person of great wisdom and
 6 experience who we've been pleased to be able to call
 7 upon.
 8 And I'd also like to mention a good friend
 9 who has helped us a lot, Captain Marty McWatters over at
 10 the Pentagon. I think she's been relieved of connection
 11 with us, which is probably a relief.
 12 But those two and all of the other people
 13 we've seen in the Fleet have been wonderful help to us
 14 and we're grateful for that.
 15 ADMIRAL JOHNSON: Great. Well, we're
 16 happy to do it. Thank you very much.
 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.
 18 (A brief recess was taken.)
 19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We have invited each of
 20 the services to give us an update on their initial
 21 training programs as well as a briefing on readiness and
 22 other assorted items, and so we're happy now to welcome
 23 representatives from the Navy.

1 We do have your biographies in our books,
 2 so I'll skip that part and let us get right into the
 3 briefing. We thank you very much for coming. Following
 4 the briefing, our practice is to simply go around the
 5 table with questions until we run out of either questions
 6 or time.
 7 So again, thank you for coming.
 8 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Thank you.
 9 Just a couple of minutes for introduction.
 10 I am the N8 on the staff who works for
 11 Admiral Johnson, who was in here, I understand,
 12 previously and talked to you about the big picture, so
 13 I'm going down one more level. I'm the gentleman that's
 14 responsible for the organizations that do assessments
 15 inside the Navy, do analyses of programs and then do
 16 analyses of readiness, which is the reason I'm here this
 17 morning.
 18 I also have the people that work for me.
 19 People who work for me do the requirements processing in
 20 the Navy, determine what types of ships and airplanes and
 21 equipment we need, and I also do the resource allocation
 22 function of where these things — where our money ought
 23 to be spent in order to produce the five-year, six-year

1 defense plan.
 2 So that's kind of where I come from, and
 3 I'm here this morning to give you a little bit of
 4 background on how we look at readiness from the macro
 5 level.
 6 I don't feel compelled to explain every,
 7 you know, line on the slides. I want to make this
 8 productive for you all, so I'm not going to try to —
 9 You've heard other services talk about readiness and
 10 obviously most of the major elements are the same. We
 11 just have some — I want to show you some of the Navy
 12 peculiarities. But if I'm going over things you already
 13 understand, push me on. If I'm going too fast on things
 14 you don't understand or you want to ask about, I'm happy
 15 to stop and deal with it.
 16 So with that, let me start.
 17 (Vice Admiral Lautenbacher offered a slide
 18 presentation concurrent with the following discussion.)
 19 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Can I have a
 20 slide? Let's see what we've got here.
 21 And I understand that you have copies of
 22 these, so you can look at them at your leisure.
 23 Next slide. [Page 2]

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1 That's the outline. And I just want to
 2 start broad and work down to the details of it, and
 3 that's kind of what that says.
 4 Next slide. [Page 3]
 5 In defining readiness, this chart is meant
 6 to give you — distinguish the difference between what's
 7 called little "r" and big "R" within the Department of
 8 Defense. Little "r," "readiness" with a small "r," would
 9 include these elements that you see on the left:
 10 personnel, equipment maintenance, supply and training.
 11 And realizing that I'm talking to a very
 12 distinguished and learned group, I don't pretend to stand
 13 up here and tell you that I can really measure readiness.
 14 I mean, readiness is an output. It's defined on how well
 15 one does one's mission. And we would like to be able to
 16 know that we are capable of completing that mission.
 17 We'd like to be able to measure
 18 everything, but you can't measure the output until you
 19 have a war. If you win, you're wonderful; your readiness
 20 was good. We are really measuring inputs to the system
 21 or intermediate level of variables that really contribute
 22 to the ultimate readiness.
 23 So I don't want to pretend to stand up

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1 do in looking at all the possible ways to assess
 2 readiness. And again, from my initial viewpoint of
 3 inputs, really. Outputs, very hard.
 4 So these are some of the mechanisms. The
 5 Joint Monthly Readiness Review, this is done internally.
 6 The Navy supports that. We send data to the Joint Staff.
 7 We send our data to the Department of Defense for the
 8 Secretary of Defense, and this is briefed at the highest
 9 levels within the Department of Defense.
 10 We have this Senior Readiness Oversight
 11 Council which not only looks at this monthly readiness
 12 review, which is our ability to fight the two major
 13 theater wars, but they look at resource-to-readiness
 14 issues, and they focus on special topics. And we have
 15 had a host of those in the last two years, I would say,
 16 and they're getting further and further down into the
 17 details of trying to get a handle on readiness.
 18 We are also under a requirement to report
 19 to Congress quarterly, and the Congress has asked us —
 20 so there are even more variables — to take a look and
 21 see what they contribute and what they might be — what
 22 their value might be in terms of measuring and looking at
 23 readiness.

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1 here and tell you that I'm measuring readiness.
 2 Now, what gets into the — what — I don't
 3 know — fuzzes up the issue a little bit is the
 4 "capability" side of it, because when people want to talk
 5 about the readiness to fight and win, they really need to
 6 know what the pieces do and what sorts of mission
 7 functions and capabilities they bring to the warfighting.
 8 That's on the big "R" side and I want to stick to this
 9 little "R" side here (Indicating) because that's what we
 10 really measure and we have the best handle on in terms of
 11 numbers.
 12 Next slide. [Page 4]
 13 That's from the service perspective. It
 14 goes even bigger than that. We then contribute to what
 15 the CINC's do — our commanders-in-chief — in measuring
 16 readiness from an exercise point of view, from an all-
 17 over warfighting point of view, and our inputs then go in
 18 to the Chairman and the Joint Staff, as well as the
 19 commanders-in-chief, and they make a readiness assessment
 20 at the Department of Defense level as to how well we are
 21 capable of carrying out our mission in our major theater
 22 wars and for our missions for shaping and responding to
 23 crises on a daily basis.

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1 So it's a very — I don't know — detailed
 2 and heavily-involved system. It's heavily-involved by
 3 all members of the Navy and the other services.
 4 Next slide. [Page 7]
 5 The Navy internally does it monthly, so we
 6 put together a monthly readiness report. It includes —
 7 And I only put that up there because the four major
 8 factors that I talked about — the personnel, the
 9 maintenance, the supply and the training — that comes in
 10 the SORTS system, which I'm sure the other services
 11 mentioned. That's the formal system that each of our
 12 units turns in reports every time status changes and on a
 13 regular basis.
 14 We also look at all of these other issues.
 15 PERSTEMPO. OPTEMPO, which I'll talk about in a few
 16 minutes. Mission capable/full mission capable; that's a
 17 rating that determines whether our aircraft are capable
 18 of handling their missions. We look at the casualty
 19 reports to all of our equipment. That actually — Some
 20 of that comes through in SORTS.
 21 Logistics metrics, our supply —
 22 availability of parts, where they're located, how fast
 23 you get them, whether they're on board the ships, whether

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1 So we're part of really a smaller system
 2 that is exercised within the entire Department of
 3 Defense.
 4 Next slide. [Page 5]
 5 This is our definition in analytical terms
 6 within the Navy and the four components that you see down
 7 there — maintenance, supply, personnel and training —
 8 and that's what we use to judge ourselves as we're
 9 building our program, ensuring that resources are put in
 10 the right places. And these are the areas that are
 11 measured, and they coincide with what the other services
 12 do as well.
 13 Next slide. [Page 6]
 14 These are the forums that we have inside
 15 the Department of Defense. I would tell you that there's
 16 been a great emphasis in the last four years on
 17 readiness, and the high-level interest and the scrutiny,
 18 the mechanisms that have been placed in the system to
 19 look at it and to improve our ability to do this work
 20 have been dramatic over the last four years.
 21 You can compare it to sort of peeling back
 22 an onion. You're just gradually working your way in,
 23 trying to get better and more refined measures of what we

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1 their next — the squadrons have access to them. You
 2 look at our Fleet readiness squadrons. Those are the
 3 squadrons that produce the pilots that go on board our
 4 aircraft, our Fleet squadrons.
 5 You look at what the issues the fleets are
 6 having in terms of equipment availability, personnel
 7 availability, and, of course, recruiting and retention.
 8 So I guess the point I'm making is there's
 9 an awful lot of things that contribute to what we look at
 10 in readiness today and they help give us a pretty good
 11 picture, I think, of our input side of what we have out
 12 there available to fight the war. And, of course, we
 13 have the mechanisms up at the top, as you can see,
 14 starting internally, all the way up to Congress.
 15 Next slide. [Page 8]
 16 I think you have seen that before, but
 17 just to make sure, we use the "C" rating system, C-1
 18 through C-5. C-1 means you're capable — full mission
 19 capable of doing what it is you're supposed to do, down
 20 to C-5, which means you're totally out of action. For
 21 us, that would be a ship in overhaul, for instance, would
 22 be rated C-5. That's a ship that is taken apart; its
 23 people are working on very detailed maintenance. You're

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1 building the boilers and engine rooms up from scratch.
 2 And in-between, C-2, C-3 and C-4. C-2
 3 means that you can do a pretty good job. And our
 4 criteria right now says that our ships and aircraft
 5 squadrons need to be at at least the C-2 level before
 6 they deploy for an extended deployment overseas. C-3,
 7 you're starting to go downhill. C-4, you've got a big
 8 problem; you're not going to be able to make your mission
 9 goals.

10 Next slide. [Page 9]

11 Personnel, important to us. And I think
 12 — I'm sure the CNO emphasized the vital importance of
 13 personnel to our readiness of our units. Well, we look
 14 at personnel in terms of both what they do individually
 15 — in other words, all the skills that you need to put
 16 into a unit — and then you look at overall levels in
 17 each area and the ship in total.

18 So our C-rating measure — and this is
 19 probably a fairly good description of it, those three
 20 bullets on the bottom there — you would look at any
 21 NEC's. For us, that's a term that means specialized
 22 skills. For a sailor, to have an NEC code means he must
 23 go to a special school and learn a skill. Computer

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1 Recruiting and retentions. I mentioned a
 2 major contributor to that turnover and perhaps the most
 3 major contributor, although all four elements show some
 4 decline, is the personnel side, and these are the
 5 recruiting and retention figures.

6 Because the strength available for each
 7 one of the ships is a major — and aircraft squadrons —
 8 is a major factor in personal readiness, obviously you've
 9 got to retain people and you've got to bring them in. We
 10 were 7,000 short in '98, and our delayed entry accession
 11 pool is still below what it ought to be, significantly
 12 below this year.

13 Although we have made our commitments,
 14 made our goals for the first four months of this year, we
 15 are now going into the four months of the year where it's
 16 very hard to recruit and this will be a test of whether
 17 we're back on track.

18 Sir.

19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: When you
 20 say you've made your goals, you've made your goals in
 21 contracting or your goals in shipping? That implies that
 22 you're short contracting but you have been making your
 23 shipping goal.

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1 maintenance, fire control maintenance, boiler technician,
 2 gas turbine technician, et cetera.

3 So all of those things are looked at —
 4 the skills mix that you need. Then you need to have the
 5 numbers of leaders that you have in those areas. So you
 6 look at the pyramid of folks that are available for you
 7 and make sure that that pyramid of command is there in
 8 each of the areas. And then, of course, you look at the
 9 overall strength.

10 So that's what goes into the C-rating for
 11 a Navy ship and personnel.

12 Next slide. [Page 10]

13 This slide has been put up in an
 14 unclassified form because we have an unclassified briefing,
 15 but to calibrate you, if you would look at this side of
 16 the chart (Indicating), you can put 1, 2, 3, 4 up and
 17 down the side there. You can do that sort of mentally.

18 But that is the overall Navy readiness
 19 picture from 1988 to 1998 for deployed and non-deployed
 20 units. This is kind of — This is the proof-in-the-
 21 pudding of what's been going on. And what you see here
 22 is at a deployed readiness level, that's our output
 23 (Indicating).

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1 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: It does. And
 2 the statistics that I have looked at are the contract
 3 rate. I can't — I'll let somebody else answer, not
 4 being, you know, the recruiter. But the totals that I
 5 have looked at, the contract goals that were set were
 6 made for the first four months.

7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 8 Thank you.

9 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Now, to be
 10 quite frank with you, that's phased over the year, as
 11 you're well aware, because the biggest — the best time
 12 of the year is when high school graduation comes in the
 13 summer part of the year. So in the early parts of the
 14 year, you don't set goals which are quite as high.

15 You really — I don't want to tell you
 16 that we're doing great. I mean, we're at least making
 17 the goal that we set for ourselves. Whether we can
 18 continue for the rest of the year, I'd like to come back
 19 and tell you that as we go — after the year moves along.

20 But in point of fact, these are the
 21 statistics that are there in terms of retention — first
 22 term, second term, third term — for enlisted. You can
 23 see that each one is below what we believe is the right

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1 We really emphasize making sure that our
 2 units are ready that are deployed. We have a cyclical
 3 readiness system and the units that are deployed are at
 4 the highest level. And so we sacrifice everything. We
 5 allocate our resources, our training, our push, our hold.
 6 Our whole mental focus is on ensuring that our deployed
 7 ships are ready.

8 What you see here is relatively, you know,
 9 a delta here that has increased over the years. And you
 10 can see as the drawdown started, we began to have a
 11 little trouble with non-deployed readiness. And what
 12 you're seeing today when the chiefs went over to the Hill
 13 and testified, you're seeing them talking about this dip
 14 over here (Indicating). You're seeing a little bit of a
 15 turn-down caused by our personnel shortages and our
 16 maintenance shortages that we've had, and it's starting
 17 to impact both not only the non-deployed side, which has
 18 become hard for the Navy, but the deployed side as well.

19 That's kind of the macro picture of why
 20 you hear what you hear when you listen to the
 21 congressional testimony and you read the things in the
 22 newspaper.

23 Next slide. [Page 11]

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1 number for a steady state to fill all of our slots. And
 2 officer retention is showing a problem as well.

3 And you see a post-drawdown requirement.
 4 Now, that's a requirement — again, a steady state
 5 requirement that we would need to have to level at in
 6 three years. So that the intermediate steps to get there
 7 are not quite as hard, but it's still a major issue when
 8 you have in surface warfare, for instance, 24 percent
 9 actual and you've got to get to a state in three years
 10 that's about 38 percent to balance out what we have.

11 So you see a flight of people in our very,
 12 what I would say, experienced levels in the enlisted
 13 folks and the mid-grade managers for officers.

14 Next slide. [Page 12]

15 MS. POPE: Could I have just a second?

16 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Yes, ma'am.
 17 Pass that back. Would you move that back,
 18 please?

19 MS. POPE: And it may not be a fair
 20 question, I mean, but I would assume that there's a lot
 21 of discussion at senior Navy level on how you improve
 22 those numbers. I mean, that's a —

23 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: There is a

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1 great — Yes. Yes, ma'am, there is. A great deal of
 2 discussion.
 3 MS. POPE: And what is the wisdom of why
 4 the number — besides the economy being good, what is the
 5 sense of the Navy on why those numbers are down by so
 6 much? Because obviously in your business it's back to
 7 the dollars, and so that's a major impact.
 8 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: When we take
 9 the surveys and look at the data, pay has been gradually
 10 coming up. Pay and retirement have been moving up to the
 11 first, second and third list. It depends on how you ask
 12 the questions and do the surveys. So we all think that
 13 the pay and the benefits are a big issue, a really big
 14 issue, and I think that's why the chiefs have made such a
 15 push in Congress to get help for that area.
 16 And that relates back to the economy and
 17 how well it's doing. We have the lowest unemployment
 18 rate since 1957 or something like that. I mean, it is
 19 really — And there is a significant difference in the
 20 salaries for what I would call our mid-level management
 21 system, so those people seem much better.
 22 But beyond that, it's the lifestyle, the
 23 pace of business. If you have to deploy six months out

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1 families and get acquainted with what life is all about,
 2 what it should be for them.
 3 So essentially those units — the
 4 reporting level of readiness goes down and people are
 5 transferred. People go to schools, people leave. So the
 6 whole thing kind of slides down. It slides down into a
 7 bathtub, as we call it, and at this point the ship's
 8 going through maintenance, people are going through a new
 9 training cycle, and they gradually then have to work up.
 10 So in-between the days listed up there
 11 (Indicating), they've got to now start from a pretty low
 12 level and get back up to C-1. And these blue areas are
 13 meant to talk about the major combined exercise and
 14 training elements that the forces have to accomplish
 15 before they can deploy.
 16 What's happened, as you saw with that non-
 17 deployed number, is that this bathtub has gotten lower in
 18 the last three to four years — and we show that on
 19 various cycles — so it's gotten harder to climb up that
 20 ramp.
 21 And from our point of view when we go out
 22 and we ask the anecdotal stories and the congressional
 23 representatives go to Norfolk and ask people what's going

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1 of every eighteen to twenty-four, be away from your
 2 families, if you don't see enough reward there, that gets
 3 very difficult.
 4 I didn't bring a particular slide with me
 5 but there's one element that — We had everybody put —
 6 We had people give their inputs on what the downsizing of
 7 the Navy and the military has meant in the last ten
 8 years. And if you look at that, what you see is an
 9 organization in many cases that has a declining —
 10 Everything has been declining for ten years. Every
 11 possible output measure has been declining.
 12 If you were a business corporation and you
 13 looked at that, you'd say, "Boy, we're really falling
 14 apart. How are we going to retain morale? How are we
 15 going to put out our product? How are we going to do
 16 business?" And I think we've done marvelously well
 17 considering the size of this drawdown that we've had to
 18 go through.
 19 So as you've done that, you've had
 20 imbalances — as you've brought the size of the Cold War
 21 force down to the current force, which has created
 22 stresses and strains in people and we've got to rectify
 23 those — you know, those tensions that have been in here

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1 on, what they're seeing is the stress and strain of this
 2 slope.
 3 It's become very hard to get up that slope
 4 and some people aren't making it until the very last two
 5 days before deployment. We're still looking for the last
 6 person to show up to make that readiness number. We're
 7 still looking — Some air crews don't have all their
 8 qualifications yet. So in some cases, people are
 9 supposed to have a break thirty days before they go on
 10 deployment.
 11 Same kind of system that we have after
 12 deployment. In other words, train up, get ready to go;
 13 and then take some leave, get your affairs in order, so
 14 to speak; do what you can to prepare yourself mentally,
 15 physically, morally, for your deployment. We have had
 16 now to cut into that thirty-day period and people have
 17 had to do training and load ordnance and do things to get
 18 to that level.
 19 So this has become very hard for us. We
 20 want to get this bathtub up a little bit and get it back
 21 to where it was and take the stress and strain off our
 22 people, which is in answer to your question on why do we
 23 think it's tough to keep people in. That's one reason.

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1 as hopefully we level out.
 2 But I think it's a combination of pay,
 3 it's a combination of working conditions, and it's a
 4 combination of the mission changing and the turmoil in
 5 the downsizing.
 6 MS. POPE: Okay.
 7 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Okay. Next
 8 slide. [Page 12]
 9 This slide is to talk to you and show you
 10 more dramatically the Navy's tiered or cyclical readiness
 11 cycle. As I said, all of our — As you can see, all of
 12 our units are not C-1 or C-2 all the time. Only the
 13 units that deploy are. Not only, but close to.
 14 What happens, what you see is a notional
 15 inter-deployment training cycle. A ship or a squadron
 16 comes back from deployment. At the end of deployment,
 17 they're at a high level of readiness. What happens is
 18 that — in the case of ships — they will go into a
 19 maintenance period normally. A number of people will go
 20 off to school. Their training regimen will go down.
 21 Well, first of all, we give people thirty
 22 days off — thirty days of much lower activity — in
 23 which people can take leave, go back and see their

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1 That's the cumulative effect of the problem.
 2 Yes, ma'am.
 3 DR. CANTOR: Could I just ask a quick
 4 point of information?
 5 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Sure.
 6 DR. CANTOR: We were just told in the
 7 session prior that there was this deal to get rid of 25
 8 percent of the stuff that people have to do in the —
 9 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Absolutely.
 10 DR. CANTOR: — low part of the bathtub,
 11 so I'm actually now confused as to how that relates to
 12 the notion of raising the bathtub level.
 13 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: It's all tied
 14 — The 25-percent reduction of activity we hope will not
 15 detract from readiness. We hope it will add to
 16 readiness. What we're trying to do with the 25-percent
 17 reduction activity is get rid of activity that's not
 18 productive. In fact, it's counterproductive to people's
 19 morale and well-being.
 20 So our Fleet operators, our Fleet
 21 commanders who determine how to get people out of this
 22 cycle, are looking for ways to make it easier on them.
 23 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: So it

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1 reduces the slope of the climb out of the bottom of the
 2 bathtub.
 3 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: It will reduce
 4 this climb out of the slope in a sense if we are able to
 5 — Say you were able to figure out how to do three
 6 training requirements for the price of two. Okay?
 7 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Right.
 8 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Okay. Then
 9 this level won't be so low. People can work at a little
 10 bit slower pace. I mean, that's how the statistics —
 11 It's how it would show up in the statistics. But there's
 12 a lot of these things that don't show up in the
 13 statistics. Okay? They don't all show up in the
 14 statistics.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I think
 16 that the thing you're trying to say is that you want to
 17 cut —
 18 DR. CANTOR: Yeah, I know —
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: You want to
 20 cut 25 percent between day 450 and 270. And then what
 21 you want to do is take —
 22 DR. CANTOR: Right. That's...
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — some of

1 training readiness will be lower because they don't have
 2 enough planes. Conversely, if there's ever — Added to
 3 that, if they don't have enough engines, then the planes
 4 sit there because there's not enough engines available.
 5 On a ship, it's the same way. And also if there's not
 6 enough people in the system, which there aren't because
 7 of our shortfalls, the people leave the system. So I've
 8 got to have those resources on this front-end to keep —
 9 DR. CANTOR: Okay. I don't want to delay
 10 —
 11 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: — this as
 12 well as —
 13 DR. CANTOR: The impression I got earlier
 14 was that it was about paperwork, not about direct
 15 training kinds of issues. I mean, the — And I guess
 16 that's really —
 17 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: It's about
 18 both.
 19 DR. CANTOR: — what I was trying to get
 20 at — is whether you're moving the actual redeployment
 21 training cycle or are you simply getting rid of some of
 22 the, you know, seemingly superfluous paperwork
 23 requirements.

1 those things you're having to do in that thirty-day
 2 period before deployment and kind of slip things into
 3 that period between 120 and thirty. Is that what —
 4 DR. CANTOR: Is that correct?
 5 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: But it's going
 6 to take resources, too. It's all tied — It's tied to
 7 resources. Part of this is tied to resources — this
 8 activity that goes on — because you can have excess
 9 activity if you don't have enough resources, you don't
 10 have enough parts —
 11 DR. CANTOR: I understand that. I guess
 12 —
 13 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: — you don't
 14 have enough equipment.
 15 DR. CANTOR: I guess I just — Again, I'm
 16 sorry to push this because I just want to —
 17 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: No, no, no.
 18 Let me try to explain. I don't want to confuse anybody.
 19 DR. CANTOR: In my terms, what I would
 20 assume you're doing is shifting the curve over. So what
 21 you're really trying to do is get the bathtub to be
 22 between — the low part of the bathtub or whatever you
 23 call it, to be between 450 and 270. You're literally

1 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: It's both. We
 2 are really trying to —
 3 DR. CANTOR: Okay.
 4 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: I mean, I
 5 believe there's superfluous things out there that we do.
 6 I mean, the organization puts requirements on that
 7 perhaps don't have the value that you're really trying to
 8 get out of them and you need to really sort through that
 9 and ensure that you're asking people to do things that
 10 make sense.
 11 So we're doing both. And I really —
 12 DR. CANTOR: Sorry to do that.
 13 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: I do want to
 14 move this slope up because I want to have my people able
 15 to take a break before they go on deployment. That's a
 16 big morale booster.
 17 DR. CANTOR: That's the question.
 18 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: A huge morale
 19 booster. The same as you want to have this break when
 20 they come back. And that's why the system has worked
 21 well over the years for the Navy, is because we've been
 22 able to do that.
 23 DR. CANTOR: Okay. Thanks. I don't —

1 shifting the curve, and so you're bringing some of the
 2 training readiness activities further down the cycle, if
 3 you will.
 4 Is that — Is that a fair — I think
 5 that's what Ron was saying. I mean...
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: That's what
 7 I thought I heard, but maybe I'm wrong.
 8 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Okay. We
 9 really do want to keep this from getting too deep as
 10 well.
 11 DR. CANTOR: Okay. Well, I don't want to
 12 keep —
 13 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Now, I guess
 14 you've asked me why —
 15 DR. CANTOR: I don't want to keep you —
 16 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Well, why does
 17 it get deep? Okay? I mean, why does it get deep? It
 18 gets deep because squadrons — if there's not enough
 19 planes to go around when a squadron comes back from a
 20 deployment, it loses planes. It sends planes to
 21 squadrons who need them to deploy or the replacement
 22 group, so there are fewer — there are fewer planes
 23 available for the folks to fly and to train. So their

1 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Is that
 2 helpful? I don't want to be —
 3 DR. CANTOR: Yes, very. I don't mean to
 4 — It's complicated. How's that?
 5 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: It is very
 6 complicated.
 7 DR. CANTOR: We'll agree on that.
 8 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: And we can't
 9 measure it all with numbers. I mean, I can't measure it
 10 all with statistics.
 11 Okay. Next slide. [Page 13]
 12 I put that up because it's something that
 13 bugs me a little bit — the difference between PERSTEMPO
 14 and OPTEMPO. In the Navy, it's — You know, the Army
 15 defines it a little bit different, but personal tempo
 16 talks about how much time that our sailors and our
 17 officers have in home port or time they have to their
 18 families, so it's a personnel measure of — I don't know
 19 — quality of life, if you want to put it as such.
 20 Now, OPTEMPO is a different deal. For us,
 21 OPTEMPO is the amount of money we put into the program
 22 and say, "You need so-many days a month to train."
 23 So what we do is fund money for operating

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1 tempo, but we have a PERSTEMPO set of rules which you can
 2 see right here: no more than six months on deployment, a
 3 minimum of a 2:1 turnaround ratio so you have time back
 4 in home port, and at least 50 percent time in home port,
 5 and you average that over a five-year period. And those
 6 are PERSTEMPO guidelines.
 7 Now, you have to match that with the
 8 funding, but, in effect, they're different. So there's a
 9 system that looks at this to make sure that we don't
 10 violate those PERSTEMPO guidelines. Your OPTEMPO is the
 11 amount of money you need to ensure that there's enough
 12 steaming time and flying time so that you can meet your
 13 training requirements, and so it's a different deal.
 14 Next slide.
 15 MS. POPE: I'm sorry, back on that last
 16 slide.
 17 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Yes.
 18 MS. POPE: Where is the Navy today on the
 19 goals — on the PERSTEMPO goals?
 20 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: We are in very
 21 good shape on these goals. We have had, if you go back
 22 over the last three or four years, only two — one to
 23 three exceptions each year for meeting those goals. So

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1 we've done very well.
 2 In fact, the last year, the two that
 3 missed them were people who were in overhaul. So they
 4 weren't deployed, they were back in the States, but the
 5 ships were in an overhaul — It was not a home port and
 6 they were a few days over their — you know, their
 7 PERSTEMPO.
 8 MS. POPE: So the complaints we hear of
 9 cross-decking and —
 10 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Cross-decking
 11 is still there. There are complaints about cross-
 12 decking.
 13 MS. POPE: But it's not impacting — Are
 14 the numbers small so it doesn't impact the overall goals?
 15 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: The numbers —
 16 On a unit — These numbers are measured on a unit basis,
 17 so there's a hole here in a sense that if you were to go
 18 out and ask individuals, some people that have been
 19 cross-decked will come and tell you, "I have deployed —
 20 "I didn't have my twelve months at home. I deployed at
 21 eleven months."
 22 We don't have a system that tags everybody
 23 in the Navy and says, "What was your individual

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1 PERSTEMPO?" It's a unit measure.
 2 MS. POPE: Does it break it down by
 3 community?
 4 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: I can —
 5 MS. POPE: By warfare?
 6 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: It breaks it
 7 down by warfare community. It breaks it down by ships
 8 and squadrons. So I can tell you each individual ship,
 9 each individual squadron.
 10 And we have an experiment going now to tag
 11 everybody in a carrier, an air wing and a ship, I guess.
 12 We've got a test going to see if we can do this and find
 13 out individually. We're running that for a year, and
 14 then that maybe will help us to deal with the problems
 15 you have when you have cross-decking. We'll be able to
 16 define it better, be able to highlight the impact of it.
 17 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Although
 18 your equations would lead one to believe that in fact it
 19 is individually focused: my night away from home versus
 20 my night at home.
 21 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Well, that was
 22 — Somebody asked us the question: "Well, if you go out
 23 on Monday morning and you come back on Friday night, is

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1 that five days out or is it four days?"
 2 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Right.
 3 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: I'm just —
 4 That's to just try to answer that question.
 5 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Right.
 6 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: It's basically
 7 four days: you go out Monday and come back Friday.
 8 That's, you know, the way the statisticians measure it
 9 for us.
 10 And I'm trying — These are unit — These
 11 are measured by unit. Nobody's trying to —
 12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 13 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: — mask that
 14 fact.
 15 MS. POPE: Well, for the warfare
 16 specialties, do the goals for the communities meet those?
 17 I mean, I'm not asking you about specific ships or
 18 carrier groups, but over all the community? Or is one
 19 community better than another community today?
 20 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: You will see
 21 — It's sort of interesting. Some of our amphibious
 22 ships have maybe the hardest time in meeting the goals or
 23 closer to the limits, you might say.

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1 MS. POPE: And that's what I'm asking.
 2 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: But generally
 3 speaking, they're within, oh, five or ten percent of each
 4 other when you look at —
 5 MS. POPE: It's not huge differences.
 6 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: There's not
 7 huge differences. It's balanced. It's balanced fairly
 8 well.
 9 Well, what's happened over the last few
 10 years is that there used to be some slack in this system.
 11 There used to — People used to have — Not everybody had
 12 to worry about the 2:1 turnaround ratio because most
 13 people — with the slack in the system, some people were
 14 home for twenty-four months or thirty months maybe. Now,
 15 everybody's getting pushed into "it's time to go again."
 16 There's no slack in the system. Every
 17 unit has to be on step and perform and come up that slope
 18 that you saw. There are times when units in the past
 19 have had trouble doing that, so we'd substitute another
 20 unit or another squadron. You don't have that
 21 flexibility anymore. Everybody has got to be there ready
 22 all the time, and that's a big tension in the system.
 23 That's different than it was during the

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1 Cold War period.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: How much
 3 impact — If I go back to your other chart and your
 4 desire for that thirty-day period after workup to go, how
 5 much impact does OPTEMPO — meaning the crises that the
 6 nation finds itself in, whereas — an example — you have
 7 a carrier battle group and an amphibious ready group on
 8 station — the unified commander desires to have a 1:1 or
 9 1:0 presence continuing —
 10 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: He wants a 1:0
 11 presence.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: —
 13 continually — how many instances or have there been
 14 instances where you've had to deploy early on the other
 15 end and cut that thirty days or cut a portion of that
 16 training to meet the PERSTEMPO of the ships that are
 17 currently on the line in the way of the carrier battle
 18 group and the ARF? Or does that happen?
 19 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Yeah. I'm not
 20 sure I followed exactly, but let me tell you what I think
 21 I heard.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What I'm
 23 saying is do you cut into your time of readiness — that

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1 is, to prepare the carrier battle group or the amphibious
 2 ready group to go —
 3 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Deploy, leave
 4 early.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Right —
 6 because you've got to deploy them early to ensure a 1:0
 7 presence, and, therefore, you're going out at a degree
 8 less readiness.
 9 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: We have not
 10 had to do that, but we have cut short the thirty-day
 11 period. And so we have moved —
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: So the
 13 readiness is there but you've cut back on the quality-of-
 14 life thirty-day period.
 15 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Absolutely.
 16 The readiness is there but you've hurt the people because
 17 you've had to — Last year, we had 2:0 presence in the
 18 Gulf for five months. That required us to deploy a few
 19 ships early.
 20 A few weeks. I mean, we're talking weeks
 21 now. We're not talking throwing this thing up in the
 22 air. I mean, we're very sensitive and the CNO goes into,
 23 you know — He's very strong about trying to keep within

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1 these limits and I think we've done very well in the last
 2 five or six years in maintaining faith to our people to
 3 ensure that they don't get overworked.
 4 But there have been times when we've given
 5 up three weeks or so and so we end up really pushing the
 6 people. Another reason why they get out.
 7 Next slide. [Page 14]
 8 We see our deployed readiness
 9 satisfactory. And I think the proof-in-the-pudding, just
 10 look at the DESERT FOX — results of DESERT FOX and the
 11 way we were able to carry that off.
 12 I will point out that the VINSON sailed
 13 into the Gulf, and on the first night in the Gulf
 14 participated in those strikes and did it perfectly,
 15 without — Just in stride. Sailed right in, bang, in
 16 line; blended into the joint strike packages and executed
 17 it, and it was — I mean, it's a beautiful thing. I
 18 mean, I really, really was impressed with that.
 19 But we're struggling with non-deployed
 20 readiness, and that's what you hear and you see and we've
 21 spent a lot of time talking about. That's why we're
 22 looking for that 25-percent reduction and we're looking
 23 for increasing pay, et cetera. Our personnel challenges

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1 are our biggest issues.
 2 And that's the global readiness picture,
 3 and I'll quit with the glossies here and try to answer
 4 any specific questions you have. Thank you for your
 5 patience.
 6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.
 7 Any additional questions on readiness?
 8 Okay. Why don't we proceed — This is
 9 probably a good system. If you all don't mind, we'll
 10 just interrupt with questions — unless the next
 11 presentation doesn't lend itself to that.
 12 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: May I just
 13 say? I have another — I have a luncheon thing to do and
 14 would like to leave by a quarter-of.
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yes. I think we're
 16 probably okay on readiness. So if you need to be
 17 excused, that's fine.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: May I ask a question, Anita?
 19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Sure.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: This is very interesting on
 21 readiness, non-deployability rates by service and gender.
 22 There's a curious anomaly. If you look at the other
 23 services, approximately five to six percent of the women

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1 are pregnant and are non-deployable. Yet, in the Navy,
 2 the figure is only 1.5 percent. It's an outlier. On the
 3 good side, I might add.
 4 It also has statistics like no female
 5 officer — ninety-seven were, you know, temporarily
 6 pregnant — whatever the word is — temporarily non-
 7 deployable.
 8 DR. CANTOR: We certainly hope it's
 9 temporary.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: Why would the Navy be so — I
 11 mean, all the other services are in the same ballpark
 12 and, yet, the Navy is down to like one-fourth or — from
 13 what the other pregnancy rates are.
 14 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Yeah. I'm not
 15 familiar with it. I'm only familiar with the overall
 16 pregnancy rates, which are around ten percent or so — or
 17 nine or ten percent. I don't know exactly what that —
 18 That says that there — there's only 1.7 percent that are
 19 not ready for deployment?
 20 DR. MOSKOS: For pregnancy reasons, yes.
 21 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: For pregnancy
 22 reasons. They must take that data right before they
 23 deploy.

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1 DR. MOSKOS: Well, in the other services,
 2 they're all five or six percent.
 3 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: I'd have to go
 4 and look at where that came from, Professor. I'm not
 5 sure...
 6 DR. MOSKOS: I was just wondering if the
 7 computations are done differently in the Navy than they
 8 are in the Army, Air Force and Marines, because it seems
 9 sort of funny.
 10 MS. POPE: Now, I just want to say we've
 11 got some — I just wanted to see if they had the data.
 12 And that was the issue, because the '98 data, the Navy
 13 looked the same as the other services.
 14 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Maybe there's
 15 something wrong with it. Maybe it's a bad calculation.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 17 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: I mean, when
 18 women are pregnant, we do take them off the unit — off
 19 the ships — and then they have to be replaced. Some
 20 call it an unplanned loss. So you can have a lower rate
 21 on ship because you're moving them somewhere else in the
 22 system, if you look at it.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: Well, maybe that's what's

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1 happening. Yeah, it could be that reason.
 2 On the question of ultimate recruitment
 3 and readiness, in the zero sum world of budget, what
 4 would you say with the proposition that we — and you
 5 have to move the money around, which is not happening in
 6 the current pay raise. We have overpaid recruits and
 7 underpaid NCO's and middle-level officers.
 8 How come there's — Would you agree with
 9 that presumption if you had — in a zero-sum world,
 10 rather than flat across-the-board increases, which —
 11 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Well, this
 12 year's proposal is not flat across-the-board. There is a
 13 pay table reform element to it and it goes up to — you
 14 will see when they roll out the budget, I guess, it's
 15 almost ten percent —
 16 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Nine-point-
 17 something.
 18 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: 9.9 percent —
 19 at what we consider the, you know, difficult reenlistment
 20 points for our folks and for officers. It's at those
 21 levels.
 22 And it's easier to track it through the
 23 officer table because the promotion points are well-

1 defined, relatively well-defined. When you go to the
 2 enlisted, it's not well-defined because some ratings or
 3 some NEC's promote faster than others, so it kind of
 4 looks like a blob of changes that are increased.
 5 But it is slanted towards the upper
 6 grades.
 7 DR. MOSKOS: Is this Navy-particular or
 8 service —
 9 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: No, this whole
 10 table is going to be — Everybody's agreed, this is a DoD
 11 proposal.
 12 And, you know, the question, you know,
 13 whether you think the recruits are overpaid or underpaid,
 14 I mean, from a, you know, morale point of view, they're
 15 underpaid. So I think we need to support pay for all of
 16 our folks. I think it would be very difficult for us to
 17 say our younger grades should —
 18 DR. MOSKOS: I mean, but who is more
 19 underpaid? The NCO or the recruit?
 20 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: The NCO. And
 21 I don't think you would find any disagreement with that
 22 if you rolled in ten naval officers — that the NCO —
 23 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: But I would

1 tell you that the way it's benchmarked addresses the
 2 NCO's because it's a retention issue. Because there's a
 3 lot of first-termers that look up at that pay grade in
 4 front of them and say, "Why should I stay?"
 5 DR. MOSKOS: That's a good point, Bob.
 6 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: It's a
 7 fifty-dollar pay raise.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Right.
 9 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I have one
 10 question for you on readiness, and that is, has the Navy
 11 benchmarked a date by which you have done your analysis
 12 of what 25 percent can be cut and kind of like an
 13 objective date when you want to institute the change to
 14 help get well in the non-deployed arena?
 15 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: The 25 percent
 16 IDC cut?
 17 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Right.
 18 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: It was
 19 benchmarked when the message came out saying "cut." So
 20 everything that was in the — everything there was fair
 21 game. So, I mean, that was — everything that was out
 22 there on the day the CNO signed the message was reviewed.
 23 What we're doing now is doing it

1 incrementally, so —
 2 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 3 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: — we're
 4 picking the low-hanging fruit. So a month later, the
 5 next message came out: "Okay. We believe we can get rid
 6 of these requirements or condense it with this." Then
 7 another one. I think we're on about the third increment
 8 of doing this.
 9 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: So where do
 10 you think you are in the process to get the bathtub
 11 shallower?
 12 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: This is really
 13 hard because, you know, a 25 percent cut in the list
 14 doesn't necessarily mean a 25 percent cut in the
 15 workload. So I don't want to — But I would say we're
 16 probably about 15 percent into this. I mean, if you were
 17 to ask me for a personal opinion subjectively of what
 18 we've been able to get rid of.
 19 And a lot of it's going to be leadership
 20 and people — the chain of command getting in the right
 21 spirit of doing this and taking care of their people. So
 22 part of it — that's going to be a big push. And I know
 23 the CNO is focused on that.

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: What are some of
 2 the things you're getting rid of?
 3 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Like our
 4 separate material management inspection or a separate 3M
 5 inspection where somebody comes on and counts all the
 6 cards that you have in your folder to see if they're all
 7 there. A separate admin inspection instead of doing it
 8 as part of the refresher training. Maybe you don't need
 9 somebody to come and check all your pubs and go through
 10 all this sort of thing.
 11 There's a lot of assist visits that have
 12 built up over the years. In other words, people get
 13 frightened because they have an inspection coming up in
 14 two months, and so, "Oh, I need an assist visit," so the
 15 system provides these assist visits. And the assist
 16 visits almost become inspections, because if you don't
 17 get a good mark on the assist visit, then, "This ship's
 18 in trouble," and then you invite more attention.
 19 And so, you know, the empire has grown.
 20 It's what I call the NASA complex. I mean, you have lost
 21 the — I mean, in the old days, you got your orders; you
 22 went to your sailing ship and off you went, and whatever
 23 you did, you were on your own. There wasn't anybody else

1 there.
 2 Nowadays, when a ship goes to sea, I mean,
 3 it's a technological marvel. It's a billion dollars
 4 worth of electronics and steel and there are lots of
 5 people interested in making sure that ship works. And
 6 you really do need lots of people to make it work. It's
 7 not like the old sailing ships.
 8 So you end up with how much personal
 9 responsibility for the crew and the CO versus the system
 10 helping them to do their job, and the balance is a
 11 delicate one and we need to work to make it right.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: So this only
 13 pertains to those that are on sea tours, so to speak?
 14 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: This pertains
 15 to our operating forces that — essentially all of our
 16 operating forces that are on a deployment cycle. So
 17 aircraft — But yes, we haven't gone to our shore
 18 stations or our bases and said, "You're doing too much
 19 work. Cut it by 25 percent." That's not been in the —
 20 That's not in this package.
 21 MS. POPE: Admiral, the slide you
 22 mentioned that had the ten points that contributed, can
 23 we get a copy of that?

1 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Absolutely.
 2 MS. POPE: No, no. It was — that you
 3 didn't bring with you. It was — that you talked about
 4 satisfaction — You said you had a —
 5 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Oh, the
 6 survey.
 7 MS. POPE: Yes. Thank you. A survey.
 8 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: The survey
 9 results? Sure, we can —
 10 MS. POPE: That there were ten issues that
 11 —
 12 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: We can get —
 13 I picked a number. I mean, surveys have different —
 14 MS. POPE: Whatever. I'm not going to
 15 hold you to that number. But whatever that —
 16 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: No, No,
 17 absolutely. We can give you — If you haven't gotten
 18 that. I just presumed that somebody had already
 19 delivered those kinds of things.
 20 We give surveys to people who are leaving
 21 the Navy, and we also give special one-time surveys to
 22 see what's going on. So we have survey data that will
 23 tell you why people are dissatisfied and why they're

1 leaving. We can certainly provide that.
 2 MS. POPE: Thanks.
 3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Thank you very
 4 much.
 5 VICE ADMIRAL LAUTENBACHER: Thank you very
 6 much. I appreciate your time and patience. Thank you.
 7 (Whereupon, Vice Admiral Lautenbacher
 8 withdrew from the hearing room.)
 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Anybody?
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Are we open
 11 for questions, or are you all going to talk about what
 12 you all have been doing?
 13 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Well, I'm here to
 14 talk to you about changes that we have made since you
 15 were briefed in June of 1998 on what we were doing at the
 16 Recruit Training Center. And I've brought a list of
 17 things to present to you and I'll be glad to take your
 18 questions on any of these.
 19 Many of these you've heard before because
 20 even in June of 1998, when you were briefed by my
 21 predecessor, Admiral Green, these things were in the
 22 planning stage, so that you've heard about these. But
 23 these are things that were either in planning or we have

1 changed or have brought to fruition since June of 1998.
 2 The first one is our Battle Stations
 3 culminating event for recruit training. We have
 4 increased the number of events from eight to twelve. We
 5 have also gone back and looked at the twelve events that
 6 we have with the question in mind "should we do more,"
 7 and we are satisfied with the twelve events. We think
 8 that's enough. We think we've fully stressed the
 9 recruits in the way that we should do it as a culminating
 10 event with the twelve events.
 11 And I'd point out that the twelve events
 12 run for about twelve to thirteen hours. That's after a
 13 full working day, so that the recruits are stressed
 14 actually over about the thirty-nine to forty-hour period,
 15 with Battle Stations as the end of that period.
 16 A second change we've made is we have
 17 revised the Recruit Division Commander instruction
 18 course. I believe I talked to you about this the last
 19 time I was here. We have instituted that now. It was
 20 begun on 1 October, 1998, when we extended the course
 21 from eight weeks to thirteen weeks so that each RDC could
 22 shadow a full course of instruction for a division of
 23 recruits to get better indoctrinated into the training

1 procedures.
 2 That's been very successful and our
 3 recruit division commanders going through the course of
 4 instruction are very satisfied with that. I get to talk
 5 to them. I talked to a class last week and addressed
 6 that issue and they think that's invaluable — to be able
 7 to do that full push of recruits.
 8 Another, and I think very important
 9 initiative that we have begun, is something called PT-
 10 zero. It's physical training zero. What we do is we
 11 bring our recruits in, and on the third day of in-
 12 processing, we put them through a physical training test
 13 — physical fitness test. Not training, but fitness
 14 test. It is not done to the standard of the Navy's
 15 physical fitness test, PFT. It's something less than
 16 that. But what it does is identify those young men and
 17 women who are not adequately fit when they arrive at
 18 Recruit Training Center.
 19 This allows us to pull them out of the in-
 20 processing procedures, put them in remedial physical
 21 fitness training for up to two weeks — and in very
 22 selected cases a little longer than that — to bring them
 23 up to what we think is an entry-level level physical

1 fitness state of readiness that will allow them to
 2 complete boot camp.
 3 And I think this is going to pay big
 4 dividends for us in bringing, if you will, the couch
 5 potatoes, you know, off the couch and up and running, to
 6 start training on day one and be able to keep up with the
 7 program rather than becoming injured or lagging behind in
 8 the training and having to go into remediation later.
 9 This will allow us to do it in a much better and smoother
 10 process.
 11 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Could I
 12 interrupt you there?
 13 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes, sir.
 14 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Is it too
 15 premature in the program to draw any analysis as to
 16 whether it has reduced injury rates or perhaps increased
 17 premature discharges because they — you know, it was
 18 kind of a shock to their ego to have to get set back like
 19 that? I just wonder if it's too early.
 20 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Captain Hanson?
 21 CAPTAIN HANSON: I think it's too early.
 22 I did have some data, but the first group that completed
 23 PT-2 after starting PT-zero — just the first couple of

1 divisions had made it through because we implemented it
 2 after the surge in October.
 3 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: May I interpose here? From
 5 the Navy Data Call response, looking at the number of
 6 stress fractures and percent returned to training, it
 7 looks like the number of women with stress fractures —
 8 which is always higher, you know, anyway —
 9 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: — those increased more than
 11 the men in recent years. According to this table, there
 12 were 217 female fractures and 114 male fractures. I
 13 mean, it's almost two to one for female. Then, of
 14 course, it's four to one, you know, in terms of male to
 15 female in total numbers. I mean, it's way out there.
 16 But that is a consistent figure of higher female fracture
 17 rates.
 18 But why do you think it's jumped up so
 19 much — the women's rate — in the last —
 20 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Let me —
 21 DR. MOSKOS: — year or two?
 22 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Let me speak to that
 23 initially, and then I'll let Captain Hanson add some

1 other things.
 2 First, we've increased the rigor of the
 3 physical training program. We went from PT three times a
 4 week to six times a week, and I think that may be the key
 5 ingredient.
 6 The second thing is that we are very
 7 sensitive to stress fractures among all our recruits and
 8 we have put together a committee to study how we can do
 9 better in our physical training to prevent stress
 10 fractures.
 11 The committee is made up of
 12 representatives from a naval hospital there at Great
 13 Lakes, people from the Naval Health Research Center. And
 14 I've just brought on board as part of my staff at Naval
 15 Training Center a Navy physiologist who has direct
 16 responsibility for looking at, monitoring and overseeing
 17 our physical training program so that we can correct some
 18 of these problems.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: I was just wondering, Admiral
 20 Hunter, when two-thirds of all the fractures are suffered
 21 by females and they make up about one-fifth of the
 22 component — I mean, have the standards been raised too
 23 much? I mean, are we breaking bones here? I mean, this

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1 really, you know, is a figure that's — In the old days,
 2 it was about 50 percent of the fractures were suffered by
 3 females. Again, disproportionate, but not like now.
 4 I just wonder if one of the unintended
 5 consequences is we're breaking bones here.
 6 Unintentionally, obviously, but something's happening.
 7 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Your question is
 8 right on the mark and very much appreciated. I've asked
 9 myself the same question. Captain Hanson's asked himself
 10 the same question. The two things we've done to look at
 11 that to get an answer is, one, the study team we have,
 12 they will come back and tell us if we need to change our
 13 physical training program, and we've instituted the PT-
 14 zero program which we hope will turn around a lot of
 15 those statistics.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 17 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: But we are very
 18 sensitive to that, I assure you.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Thanks.
 20 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Captain Hanson, do
 21 you have anything to add?
 22 CAPTAIN HANSON: Well, I think that hits
 23 it. I mean, the PT-zero program was something that we

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1 was some concern that with young bodies that —
 2 especially with an expanded PT program, need rejuvenation
 3 through sleep, that that may not be there.
 4 I wondered if you all have looked at that,
 5 whether that's even valid — that concern.
 6 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: I will make sure
 7 that that piece of it is included in the study by this
 8 group that I mentioned that's looking at the physical
 9 training program for the recruits. I honestly cannot
 10 give you an answer to that question right now.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: I want to go on the record,
 12 too, by the way, because of this fracture rate. I want
 13 to commend the Navy for presenting that data in such an
 14 accessible form that one could understand it. This is
 15 not the case with some of our sister services. So the
 16 presentation of that data was done very accessibly and
 17 one could understand it.
 18 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes, sir. Thank
 19 you.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you.
 21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I'll second that.
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And I don't

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1 thought about in the summer as we saw, you know, an
 2 increase in the injuries that you mentioned there.
 3 And the idea of PT-zero really had two
 4 pieces to it. One was having to take the recruits out of
 5 their division at the seventh or eighth week because they
 6 didn't pass the PT-2. And when I talked to the Naval
 7 Health Sciences folks, they said, "Well, you can only
 8 expect an increase of maybe a minute to minute-and-
 9 thirty-seconds every couple of weeks of training based on
 10 the rigor of your PT program."
 11 So some of those folks, based on where
 12 they start out, they weren't going to make it in the
 13 eight weeks without something stressing themselves maybe
 14 more than the normal. So the thought was that PT-zero
 15 would allow me to chip at both ends —
 16 DR. MOSKOS: What about men in PT-zero?
 17 What's the numbers there?
 18 CAPTAIN HANSON: It's about equal,
 19 actually.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: Because the mirror rate has
 21 somewhat declined over these three year periods that we
 22 have the data for of injuries.
 23 Okay. Anyhow...

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1 know that that's a problem. That's a perception.
 2 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes, sir.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And when
 4 you look at recruit training in, as an example, the Army
 5 and the Marine Corps, they have very strict rules about
 6 the amount of sleep that the recruits must receive
 7 because of the physical fitness program. So I would just
 8 commend that to you to look at. I'm not saying it's a
 9 problem, but perhaps something that should be looked at.
 10 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes, sir. I'll do
 11 that.
 12 The next change that we've made is we have
 13 — and I've talked to you about this before — our back-
 14 to-boot-camp program with our senior enlisted people that
 15 we bring back to see how we're training the recruits so
 16 that they can give us adequate feedback. Now we've
 17 instituted a program where we bring our command
 18 leadership course people back to boot camp to see what
 19 we're doing.
 20 These people are the prospective
 21 commanding officers and executive officers of our ships
 22 and squadrons. They're attending a course in Newport,
 23 Rhode Island. We fly them out to Great Lakes. They

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1 CAPTAIN HANSON: But it isn't just
 2 injuries. It's also the success of the PT-zero and the
 3 morale issues that are involved when you take somebody
 4 out of training, and so that's why it's both —
 5 DR. MOSKOS: It's another factor, of
 6 course. Right.
 7 CAPTAIN HANSON: Right.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you.
 9 CAPTAIN HANSON: Sure.
 10 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: If there are no
 11 other questions on that issue, I'll move on.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Well, if I
 13 may —
 14 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Certainly.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — since
 16 we're in that same area.
 17 There are some commissioners, after our
 18 trip a year ago, that expressed concern about sleep
 19 deprivation. Not during Battle Stations, but sleep
 20 deprivation during the training program. That with the
 21 addition of six hours of PT and the addition of other
 22 subjects, that it appeared that what needed to happen was
 23 that you extended the training day, and, therefore, there

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1 spend two or three days — about two, two-and-a-half days
 2 looking at the program —
 3 CAPTAIN HANSON: Just one day.
 4 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Just one day?
 5 Just one day — looking at our program,
 6 seeing how we're training recruits, so they'll have an
 7 appreciation for the process and the rigor and the
 8 intensity of the training these young men and women are
 9 going through. That has just begun. We had our first
 10 class about two weeks ago — Is that right?
 11 CAPTAIN HANSON: Yes, sir.
 12 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: — and very
 13 successful. They went away with a much, much better
 14 understanding of the recruit training process.
 15 Some other things that have changed are we
 16 have instituted a program of bringing recruit — excuse
 17 me — reservists on board to assist in our training
 18 during peak periods. This is paying us big dividends in
 19 terms of providing staff and instructor ratios to
 20 students that serve us.
 21 We also bring officers who are awaiting
 22 training into the Recruit Training Command to provide
 23 officer presence. We can do this most effectively during

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1 the peak periods during the summer. We expect up to
 2 15,000 recruits on board Recruit Training Command this
 3 summer, and the more officer presence we can provide
 4 gives us a better way to train the young men and women
 5 there and we're doing that.
 6 Captain Hanson has instituted a weekly
 7 round table discussion of his staff. This is part of a
 8 program of continual improvement in what we do and how we
 9 do it in the recruit training process.
 10 Do you want to talk about that for a
 11 second, Craig?
 12 CAPTAIN HANSON: Well, there are a lot of
 13 different groups there besides the people who directly
 14 work for me. From the galley to the medical-dental, all
 15 those different entities that provide pieces of the
 16 support that make the thing work right. So making sure
 17 that all those different pieces have an understanding of
 18 where the overall program is going — the surge, the
 19 manning planning — they all have to be part of that.
 20 And on the other side of it, having a
 21 clear understanding of where their issues are going to be
 22 with the changes that we're implementing allows us to get
 23 ahead of their problems and make them all feel like

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1 they're part of the team.
 2 So it just seemed like a reasonable thing
 3 to do.
 4 MS. POPE: Is something similar to that
 5 happening on the NTC side of the house?
 6 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes. In fact, they
 7 meet regularly to do those sorts of things. And we're
 8 having the same kind of curriculum reviews. They're much
 9 more detailed because we have so many different curricula
 10 at Service Schools Command, but we're looking at those
 11 things.
 12 MS. POPE: I just want to credit both of
 13 you because that was a big piece of I think what we heard
 14 — was just general frustration.
 15 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes.
 16 MS. POPE: You know. And, I mean, there
 17 was a real attitude that says you'll sleep and do
 18 whatever, but whether it was explanation or an
 19 opportunity to vent that was...
 20 CAPTAIN HANSON: There are several
 21 different ways you go about taking that on. One of the
 22 areas in which, you know, the recruit division commanders
 23 have had some amount of frustration is with the actual

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1 rules. Like we have this thing called the "red book" and
 2 it has all the rules. And so we're — right now, during
 3 our — as we come off of our peak, I've taken two RDC's
 4 out of each ship, put them on a team to basically rework
 5 and rewrite that.
 6 And, you know, I've found as I've been
 7 there that some of the best ideas that I get for how to
 8 implement the training most efficiently comes from the
 9 recruit division commanders if they just have venue to
 10 get those ideas up to me.
 11 Watch-standing, for instance. My first
 12 captain's call, I took the people that seemed to have the
 13 most controversial opinions and I put them on a group to
 14 take a look at some things like our watch-standing
 15 procedures, and what they came up with was — When we
 16 decided to go and have rovers in our ship in the
 17 evenings, from 2200 to 0400 in the morning, our command
 18 solution was assign two watches, two rovers. We already
 19 had an officer-of-the-deck but the officer-of-the-deck
 20 was sleeping at nights, so now I had three people tied up
 21 on watch.
 22 Their first recommendation was assign the
 23 OD to come on when the ship's officer leaves and come

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1 back when the ship's officer — you know, go off when the
 2 ship's officer — And he's up all night — or he or she
 3 is up all night — and then I just have to have one rover
 4 with that person, and so I've cut down on watch-standing
 5 requirements.
 6 And then a couple of other phasing things
 7 allowed me to basically provide the same kind of security
 8 and safety review as is appropriate, but with about a
 9 third less of the watches. And those are the kinds of
 10 execution ideas that come from the RDC's.
 11 DR. CANTOR: That's true.
 12 CAPTAIN HANSON: I think they have a venue
 13 to get those kind of...
 14 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Let me talk about
 15 some other things, some other changes that we've made,
 16 that I personally am very enthusiastic about.
 17 First, we are being supported by the Navy
 18 personnel system in getting the numbers of RDC's aboard.
 19 And I briefed you extensively last time on the
 20 qualifications and requirements for those people to serve
 21 as recruit division commanders, but we're getting the
 22 people in the numbers that we need to do the training
 23 exactly as we would like to do it. We're being manned to

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1 our full basic allowance.
 2 And in fact, we're getting additional
 3 RDC's to support surge periods so that we can maintain
 4 our requirement of three RDC's per division per training.
 5 Last summer, we reached that goal for the first time —
 6 the three RDC's per division — and we haven't wavered
 7 from that standard ever since. We've been able to
 8 maintain that.
 9 And it's working. It's a quality-of-life
 10 issue. It is primarily, however, a training issue in
 11 that we provide the right RDC-to-recruit ratio to make
 12 the training the most effective.
 13 Another change that has come about is I
 14 had the Navy leadership visit Naval Training Center,
 15 Great Lakes. I showed them the barracks, the recruit
 16 barracks. I think there's been some dissatisfaction in a
 17 lot of areas with the barracks that we have. The result
 18 has been that we are accelerating the construction of new
 19 barracks and I'm very enthusiastic about that.
 20 We have a goal of funding the first two
 21 new barracks in 2001. I emphasize that that's a goal.
 22 Those of you who have dealt with the budget process
 23 before know that you've got to dig your heels in pretty

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1 deep to make these things stick. But right now, the
 2 planning figure is for 2001. That's for the first two
 3 new barracks.
 4 The recapitalization will take a long time
 5 — probably ten years — to recapitalize all of those
 6 barracks. But we have managed to accelerate that to a
 7 great extent.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: The
 9 construction of those two barracks and their design —
 10 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: That's right.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — does
 12 that answer the criticisms that, for lack of a better way
 13 of saying it, the Kassebaum Committee and others have put
 14 forward as far as security in the barracks and that type
 15 of thing?
 16 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Right now, we have
 17 put together an integrated process team that has come up
 18 with a concept for the barracks and right now it's in the
 19 concept phase. We are just now bringing the architects
 20 and engineers in to make a design out of that concept.
 21 But in all of that that we've done so far
 22 and will continue to do, we have the opportunity to build
 23 in from the ground up all of the things that have been

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 200</p> <p>1 addressed in various forums about safety and security for 2 recruits. 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Will you 4 also look at, as an example, the Army and the Air Force 5 and their starship concept that — starships that were 6 built very distinctly for their recruit training process? 7 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: In fact, the initial 8 design concept we started with was the Air Force barracks 9 at Lackland Air Force Base. And our, you know, 10 integrated process team went down to Lackland about two 11 weeks ago so they could see for themselves what we had 12 been talking about in terms of concept. 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can I go 14 back one since you went from personnel to construction? 15 In the area of personnel, one could term — this is 16 officer personnel — the assignment of either screened or 17 selected officers. And have you done — You've indicated 18 what you're doing in the way of RDC's, but what about the 19 officers who are placed in the leadership as ships' 20 captains and so forth? 21 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: I've met personally 22 twice with the head of detailing, distribution, Admiral 23 Hoeing at the Navy Personnel Command, and he and I have</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 203</p> <p>1 for those that serve? Because in the past, the reality 2 is it's not career-enhancing — 3 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: That's right. 4 MS. POPE: — and that the answer has 5 always been the pipeline is too steep. And if you do 6 something like a training tour and when you look at where 7 so much of the talent is — I mean, even six months — 8 some of that talent that's in the Fleet would benefit. 9 But the long question is, is it in the 10 promotion? Is it somehow being plugged into promotion 11 opportunities? You know, we've heard that it is on the 12 enlisted side. But if it's not on the officer side, you 13 know, you're going to get a couple good people who don't 14 get promoted and then the word's going to be out, you 15 know: "Please don't detail me to training." 16 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: You're exactly 17 right, and that is the proof-of-the-pudding, if you will. 18 If they send us good people, it'll be my job to make sure 19 that they get promoted, that they get the professional 20 recognition, that I advertise the difficulty and 21 professionalism of the billet; the fact that you're 22 serving on the front line of something very, very 23 important. I need to personally advertise that to make</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 201</p> <p>1 come to agreement on a process for assigning quality 2 officers to ensure that we have quality officers, and 3 that it will become not a formal nominative process but 4 that he will talk to me about each officer that he sends 5 to the Recruit Training Center before he issues orders 6 for them. 7 And that process is going to be 8 institutionalized. It's being briefed as a process up 9 through the chain of command of the Personnel Command and 10 we hope to make that an institutionalized process. 11 But that aside, at the last Manpower 12 conference that was held at C-NET — Commander, Naval 13 Education and Training — the issue of quality personnel 14 for training across-the-board was addressed and the 15 officer piece was stressed very heavily that this should 16 be a career-enhancing, positive move for a young officer 17 or mid-grade officer in the Navy. That was stressed at 18 the Manpower conference. 19 And not only that, but the enlisted piece 20 as well. 21 DR. MOSKOS: I always wondered about that, 22 Admiral Hunter. So what becomes less enhancing? 23 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: We will —</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 204</p> <p>1 sure that promotion boards understand the contribution 2 these people are making and react accordingly. 3 But what I don't want to get and what the 4 Personnel Command is supporting me in is the officer 5 that's not promotable to begin with. 6 MS. POPE: Right. 7 DR. MOSKOS: To begin with. 8 MS. POPE: Right. 9 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Exactly. 10 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: They're the 11 one who's chosen to leave in the near term anyway, so put 12 him at Great Lakes. 13 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: That's right. 14 MS. POPE: Because that's home and — 15 Okay. 16 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: That's right. 17 MS. POPE: But it's not in precepts or 18 it's not yet — 19 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: It is not in 20 precepts. It's not being briefed to promotion boards. 21 MS. POPE: Okay. 22 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: We are working very 23 hard to move toward making it a recognizable</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 202</p> <p>1 DR. MOSKOS: You know, because somebody's 2 going to — yeah. 3 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Nothing becomes less 4 enhancing. The difficulty is in convincing people that 5 billets in the training command — I won't speak for the 6 training command. I'll only speak for Naval Training 7 Center, Great Lakes. That those billets should compete 8 against other shore-duty billets that may be considered 9 better than going to the training command. 10 It's a mindset. We're working very hard 11 to make the training command as attractive as possible in 12 terms of professional development and professional 13 satisfaction in doing a job as we possibly can and I 14 think we're having success. The leadership is on board, 15 I can tell you that. Winning the hearts and minds of the 16 officer corps, we can do that. 17 But I think we've made great strides in 18 that area. 19 MS. POPE: I want to follow-on with that 20 because the telling piece of it is promotion. 21 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: That's right. 22 MS. POPE: Promotion opportunity. And so 23 is anything being done to look at promotion opportunities</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 205</p> <p>1 professionally-enhancing job to be in the training 2 command at Great Lakes. 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And right 4 now, it's a handshake between you and Personnel. 5 MS. POPE: Right. 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But being 7 briefed about. 8 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: He has briefed me on 9 what he is briefing up his chain of command, and I hope 10 that comes to fruition. 11 CAPTAIN HANSON: Can I add just one more 12 thing? 13 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes. Please do. 14 CAPTAIN HANSON: I think — And we talked 15 about this when you were out there, you know, Christmas. 16 One of the issues I think at the core of 17 this was maybe an unfamiliarity with the officer corps, 18 as the admiral talked about, as to exactly what goes on 19 at boot camp and how important it is. 20 Starting in October, when I went back and 21 started briefing all the command leadership schools, what 22 became evident was that the brief doesn't do it. If we 23 can get them out and show them Battle Stations and the</p>

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1 graduation and what we do out there — I mean, if we
 2 bring every command leadership school out there, within
 3 the next two years you're going to have every commanding
 4 officer having visibility into what it takes to be a
 5 ship's officer at Recruit Training Command and the value
 6 of that.

7 Most communities, one job out of the
 8 warfare stream, as long as it's perceived as a good job,
 9 is, and it will be acceptable in their overall career
 10 pattern. But first you've got to have the commanding
 11 officers talking to their wardrooms about why that's a
 12 good job, why being responsible for getting a thousand
 13 young men and women started off in their Navy career
 14 right — So I think over a period of time this new
 15 program will make some strides.

16 MS. POPE: And I think you would get
 17 agreement philosophically from most of us. I would just
 18 say that 200 years-plus of history, to change the
 19 mentality of those warfare specialties, you know, is
 20 going to come down to promotion.

21 Because I agree — and I think most of us
 22 do — that that impact you have on the Fleet is so
 23 critical at the training command and the pipeline has

1 just been so steep that you haven't had — So it's not an
 2 easy job and I commend you for taking it on. And I wish
 3 you luck.

4 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: The last thing I
 5 want to talk about is some changes related to our Navy
 6 training readiness review that we did last November.

7 We do a Navy training readiness review for
 8 several areas of our training establishment. The one I'm
 9 talking about was specifically for the curriculum — It
 10 was convened to look at the graduation requirements for
 11 boot camp, look at the curriculum of boot camp to make
 12 sure that it supported the graduation requirements — and
 13 there was an adjunct to it — to look at the course of
 14 instruction for our recruit division commanders to make
 15 sure that it was adequate.

16 And this was a very straightforward,
 17 analytic review of those three things, done with people
 18 that I believe brought a tremendous amount of credibility
 19 to the process. We brought in officers who were within
 20 six months of completing a command tour. We brought in
 21 — What was the number? Sixty?

22 CAPTAIN HANSON: Thirty.

23 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Thirty — Fleet and

1 force master chiefs, including the Master Chief Petty
 2 Officer of the Navy, Master Chief Herdt, who was a part
 3 of this.

4 And the first thing we did is we asked the
 5 Fleet, "What kind of sailor do you want? What do you
 6 want from boot camp?" And then we backed up from there
 7 and we gave them a set of graduation requirements and
 8 said, "Does this validate the kind of sailor that you
 9 want?" And we got unanimous agreement that if the
 10 sailors — the recruits could pass this set of graduation
 11 requirements — and I can encapsulate those for you by
 12 saying that they're contained in Battle Stations — then
 13 that's the kind of sailor we want going to the Fleet.

14 And then we backed up from there and
 15 looked at every piece of the boot camp curriculum to make
 16 sure that every piece could be related to a graduation
 17 requirement. And not only that, but that the curriculum
 18 built in rigor and intensity from day one, all the way up
 19 to Battle Stations as a culminating event.

20 Now, two good-news stories came out of
 21 that. One was that we found some ways that we could
 22 improve the process. We could rearrange schedules; we
 23 could change some scenarios; we could change parts of

1 instruction curricula to emphasize this or that better.

2 The other good-news story was that all of
 3 those changes were minor. That the Fleet was satisfied
 4 that our curriculum was doing what it was supposed to do;
 5 the graduation requirements were the right ones; and that
 6 in the main, we're producing the right kind of sailor
 7 graduating from boot camp to go to the Fleet.

8 And the review of the Recruit Division
 9 Commander curriculum came to much the same conclusion.
 10 There may be some minor changes that we want to look at,
 11 but the course of instruction is considered very thorough
 12 and it's being done in the right way.

13 And I think that was a good-news story for
 14 us in looking at our own process. It's part of our
 15 process of continual improvement. We do these every two
 16 years. We'll do an internal one next year, just our own
 17 staff, to look at an interim snapshot of what we're doing
 18 so that we can adjust midterm, if we will, before we go
 19 through another review.

20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can I
 21 follow-up on that?

22 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Certainly.

23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And I

1 applaud that. I think that that's great. That's RTC.
 2 And what you've done is you've determined what the
 3 operator wants at the end of RTC.

4 But for your sailors, except for those
 5 that are going to spend a very short period of time and
 6 go right to the Fleet, you have differing periods of AIT
 7 or other events. How are you going to — if all of this
 8 works that you've put in, how are you going to sustain
 9 through AIT until delivery to the Fleet these things
 10 that, at the end of RTC, you say that, "Hey, we got it.
 11 They're here. This is what the commander in the Fleet
 12 wants"? How are you going to sustain that?

13 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: That's certainly a
 14 legitimate question because we've asked ourselves the
 15 same thing many times. And I think I've briefed before
 16 our Navy military training program. We have instituted
 17 it. We have implemented it. Let me give you the basics
 18 of it.

19 First, it covers subjects such as — And
 20 this we do in the Service Schools Command and in
 21 apprentice training. This is after boot camp. It covers
 22 things — It's like Boot Camp 201 in terms of subject
 23 matter. We will continue to teach naval heritage and

1 tradition, personal financial management, credit
 2 management, personal fitness. We have instructor-led PT
 3 three times a week in our Service Schools Command.
 4 Personal hygiene, shipboard procedures, watch-standing
 5 procedures. All of those things are part of the
 6 curriculum in Navy military training.

7 We took out the most important parts of
 8 it, which comes to the first eighteen hours of
 9 instruction, and we require that all of our apprentice
 10 students get that first eighteen hours before they go to
 11 the Fleet. That's the essential piece of it. And then
 12 the ship is responsible for completing the curriculum for
 13 the students in Navy military training.

14 Now, our students who stay longer — and
 15 some stay up to fourteen months in the Service Schools
 16 Command — they will get over fifty hours of instruction
 17 in Navy military training and will continue that physical
 18 training all the way through the process.

19 I don't think it's a perfect system. I
 20 think it's a vast improvement over what we used to do.
 21 And I think we will continue to stress this, build on it,
 22 and use it as sort of a polishing cloth; that we buff
 23 these students up continually as we sent them through the

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1 schools command to the Fleet.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can I
 3 follow one more time with that?
 4 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes, sir.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: You have
 6 with RTC now put in this process where you are going to
 7 continually review. You now have as part of the
 8 continuum the NMT that is supposed to sustain what you
 9 did here.
 10 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Right.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Have you
 12 built in a similar evaluation as you did for RTC with
 13 your service schools, if you will, at the end of that —
 14 or for the conclusion of the NMT portion of the service
 15 schools — I'm not talking about the sustainment in the
 16 Fleet — that does the same thing in review that you've
 17 done through your RTC?
 18 In other words, is NMT working or do I
 19 need to tweak its curriculum to meet what I said the
 20 Fleet is going to receive?
 21 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Right. We have just
 22 implemented it. It was developed from exactly that
 23 process that I talked about with RTC. It was a naval

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1 in the process of looking at recruit training since June
 2 of 1998.
 3 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I guess for
 4 the record, carrying on with the previous discussion —
 5 Because if I understand it, it's relatively new, what you
 6 did by bringing the Fleet in and saying, "Okay. What's a
 7 recruit need to do? What are the tasks," and then you
 8 went back and — When did that transpire? Obviously
 9 that's after you took command.
 10 CAPTAIN HANSON: Right. November '98.
 11 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 12 CAPTAIN ABSHIER: Actually, it's on a —
 13 Sir, actually it's on a two-week schedule. That was our
 14 second — We did a previous schedule, a nitter, two years
 15 prior to that —
 16 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 17 CAPTAIN ABSHIER: — which we brought in
 18 members from the original Blue Ribbon Panel, and we came
 19 up with — That was the major change. 177 changes came
 20 out of that.
 21 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 22 CAPTAIN HANSON: This one had specific
 23 tasks, one of which was to validate the graduation

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1 training readiness review to see how we could improve the
 2 process in Service Schools Command. Same process as we
 3 used for our boot camp curriculum, we used to develop
 4 Navy military training, and we'll continue to review that
 5 curriculum in the same fashion.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 7 CAPTAIN ABSHIER: I'm Captain Randy
 8 Abshier, the division director at C-NET for leadership
 9 continuum, which falls into that.
 10 We have implemented NMT not just at
 11 Service Schools Command but at all Navy training sites,
 12 whether or not it's a Navy-instructed school or if it's
 13 an ITRO, other service school. And we teach that at Air
 14 Force bases, Navy bases, Army bases, and all like that.
 15 On the same cycle as the RTC nitter,
 16 except that the year that the RTC nitter is internal,
 17 it's an external nitter and we bring in the Fleet and
 18 everybody else. Fleet and the school houses. And it's a
 19 continuous program of up to one year, so it's throughout
 20 the whole Navy.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And this
 22 began — This is just for the record. NMT began when?
 23 Or when was this review? What year?

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1 requirements; the process and the measurements we used to
 2 make sure we met each one of those graduation
 3 requirements. So it had a specific focus.
 4 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: One of the
 5 things that I saw — I think some other folks saw — is
 6 when you moved across the street from recruit training,
 7 into that other world, it was not totally devoid, but the
 8 ratio of a person in uniform that the student could
 9 identify with was extremely — I mean, it was a pretty
 10 bad ratio.
 11 Now, I understood Master Chief Herdt to
 12 say yesterday — I believe I understood him to say that
 13 you're bringing back some of those NCO positions that had
 14 been taken over by civilian slots. Is that to
 15 accommodate that?
 16 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: That's exactly
 17 right.
 18 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 19 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: We have identified
 20 —
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Good, Bob.
 22 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: How many billets is
 23 it, Randy?

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1 CAPTAIN ABSHIER: It actually came on
 2 board two years ago.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 4 CAPTAIN ABSHIER: But we have been
 5 bringing it in in phases because we had to create the
 6 curriculum and that kind of stuff. Basically it's a
 7 quarterly approach. As he said, everybody gets a minimum
 8 of three weeks, eighteen hours of formal training. It's
 9 actually over fifty hours of formal training, but it
 10 depends on how long you're in the pipeline.
 11 So what we've done is we've said if you're
 12 in school for three weeks, you'll get this increment; if
 13 you're in school for up to three months, you will satisfy
 14 this increment. Three months, six months, nine months,
 15 one year. And everybody has to get it.
 16 And that document that they received, that
 17 training actually follows them into the Fleet. It's both
 18 formal and informal training.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 20 Thank you.
 21 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: And that completes
 22 my summary of what we've done differently; what changes
 23 we have either implemented from previous planning or made

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1 CAPTAIN ABSHIER: It's — Well, we
 2 identified over 350 billets in the Navy as a whole. What
 3 we want to do is we want to have a minimum of one-to-
 4 fifty ratio. One military, either could be an academic
 5 or a dedicated NMT. We have some school houses that only
 6 have civilian instructors. They have some too, but I
 7 mean, actually the whole staff is civilian with the
 8 exception of a few military.
 9 We had to plus them up to where we ensured
 10 that we have a one-to-fifty ratio of military presence to
 11 student ratio to handle both the formal academic training
 12 as well as the informal PT, counseling, marshaling,
 13 mentoring, and those kind of things. We're in the
 14 process of buying those billets back right now.
 15 Great Lakes was the best or the worse
 16 case, whatever you want to say. It was the worst case
 17 for the military presence to student ratio and that's why
 18 we're passing it on —
 19 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: And I am getting
 20 plus'd up. That process is happening.
 21 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Good.
 22 MS. POPE: That's in addition to the
 23 officers that are between detailing and the reserves,

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 218</p> <p>1 right? Those are not double-counted? 2 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: That's right. 3 MS. POPE: Okay. 4 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: That's right. 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I have one question which 6 is a loose end from earlier this morning. A comment was 7 — or an observation was made that a disproportionate 8 number of pregnant sailors are very young, single 9 females, and I raised the question at that time what, if 10 any, programs are there in boot camp or otherwise for 11 counseling young sailors. Would that occur in financial 12 management or personal hygiene? 13 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Craig, I'll let you 14 answer that one. 15 CAPTAIN HANSON: I can't remember the name 16 of it but there is a program that talks about it. 17 CAPTAIN SNYDER: It's called Responsible 18 Parenting. 19 CAPTAIN HANSON: Yes, that's it. 20 DR. MOSKOS: Responsible Parenting, versus 21 Irresponsible Non-Parenting. 22 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, wait a 23 minute, Charlie.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 221</p> <p>1 in the Navy? 2 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: First I'd like you 3 to be able to say that we have given you the information 4 you need to give you confidence in the fact that we're 5 training all our sailors in the correct way. Not just 6 men sailors and women sailors, but sailors, period. That 7 the process is right, you've looked at it; we're training 8 in the correct fashion in terms of intensity, rigor, 9 moral leadership, teamwork. All of those things that 10 make a sailor, that we're doing that right. 11 The second thing is that we have looked 12 closely enough at the gender integration of men and women 13 in recruit training closely enough to say that it's being 14 done properly and with attention to the right details to 15 ensure that they get the right training as sailors; they 16 get the right safety and security for their living and 17 operating environment in boot camp as sailors, both men 18 and women, and that we have paid attention to those 19 requirements — special requirements — for safety and 20 security of women as part of our overall group of 21 recruits; that we take care of our people in the right 22 way. 23 I think if you can say those three things,</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 219</p> <p>1 Can you tell us a little bit about it? 2 CAPTAIN ABSHIER: We have it in boot camp 3 as well as in the NMT syllabus, as well as the Navy's 4 general military training. We're developing a new video 5 right now. We just put a video out last year. 6 What we're trying to teach is that there's 7 a — and it goes back somewhat to your comment — there's 8 a right time and place for pregnancy in the Navy and you 9 need to know the impact both on the Navy of becoming 10 pregnant — that you can affect your shipmates; they 11 might have to carry the load; you might miss an 12 opportunity because you perform best at sea; that's where 13 you're credited for your performance. 14 So we do a couple to three hours. I 15 believe this year there's two hours in the GMT syllabus 16 that also builds on what they're giving in boot camp. 17 NMT and GMT is designed around building what is given to 18 them in accession training and follow on that training 19 throughout their whole career. 20 And Responsible Parenting is one of them. 21 Like I said, there's two more hours of GMT that we 22 developed this year. That will be an annual all-hands 23 training that is given to all sailors, officer and</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 222</p> <p>1 I think you'll have captured what we have tried to 2 present to you to carry back to the Congress. 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: How 4 contingent on two of those points you made is the 5 appropriate funding of construction of your barracks, 6 your rifle range, et cetera? 7 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: All of those things 8 are parts of improving what we're doing now. Obviously 9 we would be well-served by having a new small-arms range 10 and we've got that planned. It's in the budget and we're 11 going to get it. There is a certain frustration in not 12 being able to make it appear right now, but we have some 13 interim processes which you've heard about before. Our 14 laser range. 15 We need to recapitalize boot camp. It is 16 recognized at the highest levels of Navy leadership, and 17 as I mentioned, the acceleration of the barracks reflects 18 the interest in that. 19 But it's more than that, too. We have 20 programmed replacement of our training facilities. Drill 21 halls, an outdoor running track, a building we call 22 triplex, which provides us indoor physical training 23 facilities — What else is in that building? There's a</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 220</p> <p>1 enlisted, male, female. 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Are the specific classes 3 mixed, male and female? 4 CAPTAIN ABSHIER: Oh, yes, ma'am. Most of 5 the time what we try to do for most of our lectures in 6 GMT, they are what we consider an all-hands lecture. We 7 provide all the training materials so it's standardized 8 throughout the Navy. If you give some lecture on sexual 9 harassment this week or a pregnancy policy, we provide 10 all the training materials, the instructor guide and a 11 student handout, if that's required, and then generally 12 you'd do it in a co-ed, gender-neutral class. 13 We're developing it both for the 14 individuals, and also for supervisors to enable them 15 better to talk about responsible parenting in those two 16 areas with their subordinates. 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you. 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Obviously 19 you gentlemen are responsible for the recruit training in 20 the Navy. 21 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Yes, sir. 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What would 23 you like us to tell the Congress about recruit training</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 223</p> <p>1 swimming pool and those sorts of things — which would 2 allow us to train more effectively. 3 And those things are resource-dependent, 4 but we're working very hard to bring them to reality. 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: How 6 important is the construction of the barracks that you've 7 proposed in answering or responding to the security issue 8 that was raised? 9 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: I don't think it's 10 essential. I think it's essential to replacing fifty- 11 year-old barracks that are a maintenance problem and have 12 become obsolete. We have back-fitted safety and security 13 measures into those buildings which are adequate to the 14 task and we've briefed you on those before. 15 So I don't think that's the real issue, 16 although we won't have to back-fit safety and security 17 into the new barracks. We'll build it from the ground 18 up. 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: You just 20 don't want me to give you the excuse for how we can get 21 the Congress to get you a building earlier, huh? Okay. 22 MS. POPE: I have two points. One is a 23 compliment, and it's back to C-NET's message that I guess</p>

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1 came out in January that I think addressed many of our
2 concerns about the gap from RTC to NTC and — Anyhow, I
3 was pleased — and I think many of us were — that there
4 were a lot of things that that memo addressed.

5 The second is a concern and a perception,
6 and it has to do with NTC. And that is — and I still
7 don't know whether it's reality or perception — about
8 the failure — zero failure rate at NTC and the mindset
9 that some sailors have figured out that they can stay
10 indefinitely at NTC and never go into the Fleet, and fail
11 five or six times in the same MOS.

12 I mean, I understand that you don't want
13 to lose somebody that potentially may become a sailor,
14 but if somebody isn't going to make it in a rating, that
15 they stay in that same training and keep getting recycled
16 and at some point — When is enough enough? Or have you
17 figured out how to gain the system that you can stay
18 there indefinitely because the Navy's not going to.

19 Now, I don't know which — how much of
20 that is perception and formal policy and how much of it
21 is reality, but it was certainly a perception when we
22 were up there — the pressure to graduate and pressure
23 not to fail.

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1 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: I have not shared
2 that perception. We do have academic failures. But I
3 will say that it would not be difficult to walk away with
4 that perception because we do try very, very hard to do
5 whatever remediation is necessary to get our people
6 through the course of instruction.

7 By the time they get to that point in
8 their Service Schools Command, we have invested a
9 tremendous amount of time and money in these people and
10 we would like to reap the benefits of that. Perhaps we
11 err on the side of caution. If we do, we should look at
12 how far we should err on the side of caution, definitely,
13 and draw a line somewhere where let's not throw good time
14 and money after bad.

15 We do that. I couldn't tell you where
16 that line is drawn, but we do have academic failures.
17 But I'll certainly look at the process.

18 DR. MOSKOS: Admiral, it's interesting
19 again on the Navy Data Call responses, female in-
20 discipline rates at Great Lakes. I commend you the fact
21 that the female in-discipline rate has basically doubled
22 between 1997 and 1998. I might add that the numbers are
23 low for both sexes, so — Does that imply maybe that

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1 there might have been a double standard in the old days?
2 Or is the woman just getting more rambunctious in the
3 current period?

4 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Well, they're on par
5 with their numbers, basically — in-discipline rates at
6 Great Lakes.

7 DR. MOSKOS: And these numbers, as I said,
8 are not huge. For '98, up through December, it was only
9 —

10 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Or a third
11 possibility is that there was a leadership philosophy
12 change.

13 DR. MOSKOS: — 65 women and 278 men.
14 What's that, Bob?

15 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Or a third
16 possibility is that there was a leadership philosophy
17 change.

18 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Craig, I'd like you
19 to address that.

20 Congratulations.

21 CAPTAIN HANSON: I frankly don't know the
22 answer.

23 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.

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1 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: I don't either, and
2 that's why I asked Craig to answer the question.

3 Master Chief?

4 OSCM SHERIDAN: Yes, sir.

5 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Have you got an
6 answer to that?

7 OSCM SHERIDAN: Well, I think it was
8 because four years ago we didn't really hold them
9 accountable as we do now.

10 DR. MOSKOS: I think this might be good
11 news, actually, if, as you say, the percentages are par.

12 REAR ADMIRAL HUNTER: Incidentally, this is
13 Master Chief Sheridan, who is the master chief of the
14 command at Recruit Training Command.

15 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you, Master Chief.

16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Do you have any
17 questions?

18 All right. Well, we thank you very much
19 for coming by. We reserve the right to send along some
20 questions later, but we appreciate your efforts today and
21 it's been very helpful for us. Thank you.

22 (Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the hearing in
23 the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at

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1 1:00 p.m., the same day.)

2 - - -

3 (AFTERNOON SESSION)

4 (1:03 p.m.)

5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Good afternoon,
6 gentlemen, and thank you for joining us. Thank you for
7 returning in a couple of cases, and "welcome" to our new
8 friends from the Air Force. We have copies of your
9 biographies, and we we'll dispense with that and jump
10 right into things.

11 And as I mentioned to you before, our
12 practice has been to hear your briefing and then open up
13 for questions. But based on experience this morning, I
14 think we will go ahead and interrupt for questions if
15 it's okay with you, if there is a particular point about,
16 for example, readiness that we can dispose of quickly
17 with a quick question.

18 So, again, welcome. Thank you for coming,
19 and we look forward to hearing from you.

20 (Lieutenant General Esmond offered a slide
21 presentation concurrent with the following discussion.)

22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Thank you,
23 Madam Chairman. We're delighted to be here. I'm Marv

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1 Esmond and I'm the OPSDEP for the Air Force. We have
2 Major General Andy Pelak, who is Commander of the 2nd Air
3 Force down at Keesler Air Force Base, and Brigadier
4 General Barry Barksdale, who is the Commander at
5 Lackland, and I think you're familiar with both of them.

6 I feel a little bit like I'm preaching to
7 the choir here today with General Christmas and General
8 Keys on the panel and the Commission, and those that know
9 readiness very well.

10 I've been asked, as I understand it, to
11 provide a definition of readiness and a little bit about
12 our state of readiness in the Air Force, and I'll be
13 delighted to do that. That's a topic much on our mind as
14 you see in the hearings in town these days. All of our
15 chiefs and our chairmen have been before Congress, both
16 the Senate and the House, to testify in that regard.

17 Without further adieu — next slide,
18 please [Readiness is Complex] — readiness, in a very
19 simple term to the Air Force, simply means to fly and
20 fight our nation's wars and to win those, and provide
21 combat capability to those who require it in support of
22 national security interests.

23 In order to do that, as you might well

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 230</p> <p>1 imagine — in order to define what really goes into 2 readiness — it's a very difficult task. These are some 3 of the things that we measure when we talk about 4 readiness. 5 And to describe a bit of those terms that 6 you may not be familiar with, "MC Rates," that has to do 7 with mission capable, what we measure our aircraft and 8 systems in terms of mission capability — Or as an 9 analogy, if your windshield wipers on your car weren't 10 working, that wouldn't be mission capable, because if it 11 was raining, you would need them. And so similar systems 12 on airplanes are valuable and that's what we mean by 13 "mission capability." 14 "O&M," operations and maintenance, 15 obvious. "DLRs," depot level reparables. Those are 16 parts that we — and spare parts that we send to the 17 depot for repair and rely on our depot system to provide 18 those kinds of capabilities back to the field once the 19 parts are repaired. 20 I think most critical — I could go on, 21 but — on this particular funnel slide — and the one 22 that I particularly pay attention to is the "people" 23 portion. And as we all know, that's really what makes</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 233</p> <p>1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: It certainly 2 would. 3 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Sir, before 4 you go on, let me ask a question. I don't want to make 5 this any more difficult than it is, but when you say your 6 readiness is down, I'm assuming that you mean, then, if 7 you took your funnel slide, all those elements that added 8 up to readiness in the Air Force's view, significant 9 parts of those have been stripped from the stateside 10 units in order to augment the overseas units. So it 11 could be people, it could be parts, it could be planes, 12 or it could be a combination of all of them; is that 13 correct? 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: That's 15 correct. 16 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: That's a fair 18 assumption. 19 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. Thank 20 you. 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Next slide. 22 [Readiness Resources] 23 These are four trend indicators that we</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 231</p> <p>1 any of our services go, are the troops; and so we're most 2 concerned in these days — and that's what you've heard 3 most about in terms of readiness before the Congress, our 4 concern for care and quality of life of our people. 5 Next slide, please. [Force Readiness] 6 In terms of mission capability and what we 7 call C-status or combat status, that's four levels — 8 actually five graduated levels of combat capability or 9 readiness. Since 1996, this chart on the left indicates 10 that the Air Force has dropped down from 90 percent to 11 just about 70 percent in the top two categories of 12 readiness or C-1 and C-2 or the highest two states of 13 readiness. So our decline has been somewhat gradual. 14 It's down 18 percent, as the slide indicates. In order 15 to do that — and the slide on the left indicates 16 worldwide readiness. In order to provide that worldwide 17 readiness, we've had to rely on stateside-based units or 18 Air Combat Command — the slide on the right — and we've 19 ridden in some ways the backs of our people in those 20 units who are stationed stateside to provide readiness 21 capability to our forces around the world. In order to 22 provide that 72-percent capability around the world, 23 we've dropped in the stateside units down to just about</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 234</p> <p>1 use in large groups to measure how well we're doing and 2 where we need to devote much of our interest. In some 3 ways, our funding is directed in these areas and related 4 to the testimonies that you've heard. 5 In the personnel category, the arrow 6 indicates we're okay but we're trending down. And that 7 to the right says in three years we'll be 2,000 pilots 8 short in the Air Force, so that's a concern, obviously. 9 That's a national concern and I'll tell you more about 10 that in a second. 11 But it also talks about our second-term 12 enlistment folks, and that's our middle-level managers as 13 you well know. They are the ones who are at the decision 14 point to separate or choose in most cases the Air Force 15 as a career, and they are, again, tending to separate. 16 And that has to do in many measures with the economy, 17 with their skill level being appealing on the outside, 18 with pay and benefits, and that's the connection to the 19 testimony that you've heard our chief give. We need more 20 pay for our troops and we need that retirement increase 21 back up. 22 Next slide. [Recruiting] 23 In terms of recruiting, the important</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 232</p> <p>1 30 percent in those top two categories, C-1 and C-2, in 2 that same time frame. 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can I ask a 4 question? 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Sure, General. 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: On the Air 7 Combat Command Stateside Readiness — and obviously ACC 8 is pushing, you know, the units in the product, if you 9 will. 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Yes, sir. 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Does that 12 figure, that downtrend, also include the Air Reserve and 13 National Guard units that you are also using as part of 14 the expeditionary forces? 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Yes, sir, it 16 does. Those that aren't online as combat capable forces, 17 those that are involved in training and — 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But would 19 that figure be in the Air Combat Command's figure? 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Yes, it would. 21 It would. 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay. 23 Thank you.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 235</p> <p>1 points to take away are in the yellow window here and 2 I'll let you read those. But the charts, by way of 3 explanation, in the lower left-hand column you can see 4 the quality of our high school graduate, our recruits, is 5 going down or has tended to go down. Again, that, we 6 think, has much to do with the economy, and that's true 7 across all the services. 8 In the upper right-hand corner, the 9 accession bank, that has our pad that we use, our delayed 10 enlistment program; that should we not make our 11 recruiting goals from time to time, we dip into that pad. 12 And we've been very successful in that approach over the 13 years, but that pad now is dwindling, so it's getting 14 smaller. 15 And then, in general, the propensity of 16 our young folks to enlist in the military has gone down 17 as well. 18 Next slide. [Enlisted Retention] 19 We had a similar phenomenon back in the 20 late seventies and early eighties. This slide simply 21 indicates the fact that we — as you can see in the blue 22 line along the bottom edge of the graph there, in 1981, 23 Congress voted an 11.7 percent pay raise; in '82, 14.3</p>

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1 percent. That had a direct correlation to recruiting and
 2 you can see that in all three: our first-term
 3 enlistments, our second-term enlistments, and our career
 4 enlistments.
 5 We think that will happen again and we're
 6 encouraged by the fact that Congress has now made motion
 7 for a 4.8 percent pay raise.
 8 MS. POPE: General Esmond, do you relate
 9 also this against the economy so that — I mean, because
 10 right now, even with the pay raise, the economy is at
 11 exceptionally high rates and so you may not get the
 12 dollar-for-dollar payback, and I just don't know if
 13 you've factored that in.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: We have
 15 factored it in. You're absolutely correct. The current
 16 proposed pay raise is not comparable to that 11 or 14
 17 percent pay raise that we got back then. It, in our
 18 estimation, may slow or stop our decline but in no way
 19 will get us on the road back up to recovery.
 20 Next slide, please. [Enlisted Retention
 21 Concerns]
 22 These are some of the critical AFSC's in
 23 random — actually AFSC's that we picked to give you an

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1 idea of those who are getting out, and the reasons, as
 2 I've suggested, are because of the economy and the skills
 3 that they possess being attractive to our industrial
 4 partners.
 5 On the left, F-16 crew chief, you can see
 6 they are about what — they're holding their own there.
 7 Avionics, F-16 Avionics, a very skilled career field —
 8 the second one — again, about the same. But in every
 9 other case we're starting to retain less and less in all
 10 those career fields.
 11 Next slide. [Officer Retention Concerns]
 12 Same is true in our officer retention
 13 trend. All three of those — actually four categories —
 14 maintenance support, our pilots, our navigators, and our
 15 non-rated Ops — are all trending down; again, related
 16 directly, we think, to the economy and the pay
 17 difference.
 18 Next slide. [Pilot Retention]
 19 Pilot retention specifically is a
 20 nationwide problem and a service-wide problem, as I think
 21 you probably know. The graph in the upper left-hand
 22 corner simply says over the next few years, the total
 23 number of pilots who are eligible to separate from a

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1 combination of all of our services could not meet the
 2 airline requirement, which is that top line across the
 3 top. So the gap is not going to lessen. We could have
 4 everybody who is eligible separate and be hired
 5 theoretically with the airline, so that pull will
 6 continue to be there.
 7 The lower left-hand category or graph
 8 simply says Requirement versus Inventory. The
 9 requirement that we have in the United States Air Force
 10 for pilots is the red line. The inventory that we have
 11 continues to go down and we see that continuing.
 12 In the upper right-hand corner, the Bonus
 13 Take Rate. We currently have a bonus system, as you well
 14 know. The take rate is a leading indicator for us of
 15 those who would choose the career path. And if they
 16 don't take the bonus, that tells us we've got some work
 17 to do, obviously.
 18 That take rate has trended down. We are
 19 encouraged in the last two months to find that 45 percent
 20 of those eligible have taken the bonus, and we think
 21 that's due to the signals being sent by Congress and the
 22 leadership that we're going to fix this problem and we're
 23 going to increase things. So we're encouraged by that.

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1 Next slide. [The Aging Force]
 2 This is a brief description of the force,
 3 its aging fleet. On the left, you can see that in the
 4 year 2000, our total fleet, all of our airplane fleet,
 5 across-the-board average, will be twenty years old. In
 6 2015, that total fleet will be thirty years old. So the
 7 age of the airplanes continues to increase.
 8 And on the right are the costs to maintain
 9 those airplanes; continues to increase, and the level and
 10 amount of work required to maintain them continues to
 11 increase as well. It may be obvious, but older equipment
 12 takes more time and money and work to maintain.
 13 Next slide. [AF TEMPO]
 14 Along with that, our tempo has increased.
 15 So a contributor to readiness and the dissatisfaction
 16 perhaps with the service life is the tempo. The left-
 17 hand graph simply says that over the past few months
 18 we've had a number of events that have increased the
 19 level of tempo that we've had to endure.
 20 And that's not only been correct in the
 21 last few months, but rather over the last few years. On
 22 the right, you can see since 1986 the tempo has
 23 increased. The big spike obviously is DESERT STORM, and

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1 we're now deployed five times more heavily than we were
 2 in 1986.
 3 Next slide. [Summary]
 4 In summary, readiness has been spiraling
 5 down. Our people who are trained and equipped and some
 6 of the best and finest in the world continue to depart
 7 for the right reasons, I'm certain, in their own minds.
 8 We think that Congress is getting that message and we're
 9 encouraged by the signals that are being sent. We are
 10 hopeful that we'll be able to stop the downturn in
 11 readiness and begin to build back in the upward
 12 direction.
 13 One thing I need to leave with you,
 14 though, is that, as always, the people are the secret to
 15 our success. They are the ones who get it done. And we
 16 believe that the seamless approach that we take to
 17 training makes them, and causes our commanders the
 18 opportunity to receive, quality individuals, both
 19 enlisted and officer, from the day one when they're
 20 required or possibly required to deploy to whatever
 21 action we may be engaged in.
 22 And so our hats are off to these two
 23 gentlemen and others who are in the training business for

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1 providing the operators the product — we think, at an
 2 early, early state — to be ready to fight when called
 3 upon to do so.
 4 Again, I thank you.
 5 MS. POPE: I just wanted to ask — I mean,
 6 I know it's a complicated question and doesn't have an
 7 easy answer, but the pay — You know, the other thing
 8 that there's been a change in the numbers five times
 9 more, deployments rate five times, that's not going to
 10 change in the future, is it?
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: We don't see
 12 that, quite frankly, no.
 13 MS. POPE: And so that's a major cultural
 14 change for the Air Force and I guess my question is —
 15 and it probably comes full cycle, is — is that being
 16 communicated to young recruits who are joining? Because
 17 it's not — deployment was not an issue for the Air
 18 Force. It now is a fact of life.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: And the
 20 Marines have been recognizing that, of course, for a
 21 number of years and that's the way they're structured and
 22 they're very good at it.
 23 MS. POPE: Right. But, I mean, has that

1 piece of recruit — has that change been communicated to
 2 recruiting and to the recruits as they come into the Air
 3 Force?
 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: General Ryan
 5 actually sent out a message not too long ago — I want to
 6 say three or four months ago — through all the major
 7 commanders, to recruiting, to in fact do that and to
 8 focus on the fact that the Air Force was now an
 9 expeditionary air force.
 10 So I suspect that we are in the transition
 11 phase now to do that. As you know, we've made some
 12 significant changes in basic training just to accommodate
 13 that.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: But let me
 15 explain a little bit. We're converting the way we think
 16 about the Air Force to an expeditionary mindset and we
 17 call it Air Expeditionary Forces. We'll have ten of
 18 those.
 19 And that gets at the tempo problem which
 20 we've largely handled through rather ad hoc-like
 21 scheduling events for our people, which keeps them in a
 22 turmoil. If we can schedule at least when you're
 23 vulnerable and your team — and we think a large-enough

1 team to cover most contingencies — is vulnerable, then
 2 at least it will put a little bit of stability in their
 3 lives and they can continue on with professional growth
 4 and with family concerns.
 5 MS. POPE: The other piece of it which is
 6 harder to capture is the folklore. I mean, you come out
 7 of basic training and "A" school and you're ready to go.
 8 And then you go into an operational command where you've
 9 got some folks who came in under the old system, that
 10 didn't deploy as often, and so they're saying, "You know,
 11 today's Air Force is terrible." And so you start
 12 listening to that group of people you're working with on
 13 a daily basis and all of a sudden you believe it.
 14 I don't know how you capture or recapture
 15 those people who said, you know, "This isn't what I
 16 signed off to do. I don't want to be an expeditionary
 17 air force." And so, you know, that rhetoric that starts
 18 and continues and defuses all the good work that you're
 19 doing...
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: There's sort
 21 of a bandwagon effect there —
 22 MS. POPE: Yeah.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: — created by

1 those who have been of that mindset.
 2 One, we think through our recruiting
 3 programs and promising them nothing but truth and what
 4 they're really going to face through the current
 5 structure, which will be expeditionary in nature. But
 6 two, allowing those who have been under a different
 7 system to understand we are concerned about that
 8 lifestyle and about that stability for their families.
 9 And transitioning again to this scheduling process, we
 10 hope that — we probably won't ever get rid of that, but
 11 hope to dispel some of that notion.
 12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Let me ask
 13 on this readiness issue, because to be perfectly honest,
 14 as I looked at the operational Air Force — and we got a
 15 small snapshot of it, believe me — but the fact of the
 16 matter is, as I looked at it when we visited and talked
 17 to the folks, it seemed to me you're in a real vicious
 18 cycle. Because first of all, you have shortages of E-5
 19 and E-6-type people which are the first-line leaders and,
 20 therefore, the role model, the mentor, for the young
 21 airmen coming out of the school base, into the
 22 operational Air Force. So that's one issue.
 23 Secondly, it appeared that where there

1 were some of the E-5 and E-6's, because of the bill
 2 you're paying overseas and because of the demand to have
 3 the experience overseas, when somebody got tapped — a
 4 crew chief, for example — to go, it was that one E-5 or
 5 E-6. Now the unit is totally devoid and the team, if you
 6 will, is broken up. The senior NCO's have to come down
 7 and try to fill the void at the same time that they're
 8 trying to do their job.
 9 It just seems to me there's a vicious
 10 circle. That unless the Air Force finds a way to bump up
 11 the numbers of E-5 and E-6 — And a couple of the
 12 services have indicated to us that they're going back in
 13 and rebuild that structure, if you will. I wondered if
 14 you're looking at the same thing.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: We're very
 16 concerned about that phenomenon. That's, indeed, alive
 17 and well.
 18 One, we think training is the bedrock,
 19 though. We have to invest our capital in training.
 20 Otherwise, we'll never get well. So we've sort of
 21 parceled that off and take that out of hide. The rest in
 22 OPSTEMPO then becomes a very rapid cycle, if you will, of
 23 rotations and we have to continue with second-term

1 training at the operation locations.
 2 So you're absolutely right, we have to —
 3 and we think if we — because of the retention problem,
 4 because they separate, if we can retain more, we'll have
 5 obviously more people to work with in that regard. So we
 6 think pay and the retirement being fulfilled back to 50
 7 percent for some of those people — and some of those are
 8 in that category — will help us retain more of those
 9 people, but that turnaround will be a slow process.
 10 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Sure.
 11 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: I might just add to
 12 that if I can, sir.
 13 You know, the issue is really going to be
 14 very dramatic from the standpoint of moving people to
 15 seven level and nine level back into the five level area
 16 because our training at that level is done in the field.
 17 We provide three levels, as you know, coming out of basic
 18 training. But with the recruiting problems you have
 19 right now, production is not what it ought to be and you
 20 have to bring in three's to make five's.
 21 So it's going to be a long-haul thing.
 22 But to get through that process, like we've done in other
 23 areas when you've brought navigators, senior navigators,

1 lieutenant colonels back to the cockpit, you're going to
 2 have to bring back senior NCO's and somehow adjust our
 3 promotion system not to disadvantage those people who are
 4 serving in a lesser job by grade level.
 5 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Absolutely.
 6 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: And that's a concern
 7 we're going to have to work with. It's a real issue
 8 we'll have to deal with and one that we're posturing for
 9 right now.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Barry will
 11 talk to you a bit about some of the local training
 12 burdens that are being offset by some of his programs
 13 while he has them, and so they come to us more ready and
 14 it takes away some of that burden.
 15 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: It's something we —
 16 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: The follow-
 17 on question to that is, then obviously you've tried very
 18 hard down there to increase your MTI strength. That
 19 takes some of that same population out of the field, but
 20 it also must mean that you may be finding it more and
 21 more difficult to increase the MTI strength.
 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Right now, I
 23 think we'll get into the 90 percent manning level at

1 about — November?
 2 COLONEL EISEN: November '99, sir.
 3 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: But you're
 4 absolutely right. We're all competing for the same
 5 people. Recruit the recruiters; recruit the MTT's.
 6 We're all looking at the same ones.
 7 And more and more career fields have been
 8 closed off to us. For example, the security forces which
 9 were traditionally the volunteers. Those are the people
 10 who man our honor guards and our elite gate guards, et
 11 cetera. Because of critical shortages in the security
 12 forces, the ones we want — the E-5's and E-6's — are
 13 closed off to us. We can't have them.
 14 So you're absolutely right.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: The tie in
 16 that case, which was my point, goes to training. We will
 17 be investing in training if there is a requirement or
 18 we'll have to figure out some other way to get it done.
 19 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: If I could
 21 ask a question concerning the aerospace expeditionary
 22 concept. And as I understand it, there will be ten of
 23 them, I believe.

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: That's right.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And if I
 3 understand the concept right, what you're going to do as
 4 you create them is basically task-organize them so that
 5 they at least have all of the basic skills that a
 6 deploying force should have, and then somehow put them
 7 into a rotational basis to the forward deployed
 8 requirements that you have. Is that —
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: That's exactly
 10 right.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay. Now,
 12 can I carry it — I'm going to get into the — Have you
 13 given any thought of — And again, this comes back to
 14 stability, but it also comes back to cohesion. Has there
 15 been any thought given that if I'm going to have ten
 16 expeditionary, you know air forces, if you will, that
 17 somehow I have a program that takes men and women who go
 18 through their training and then go to that expeditionary
 19 air force and maybe stays through a first term?
 20 Because there's a lot to say about men and
 21 women who work together for a full period of time.
 22 There's a certain cohesion that takes place. And then
 23 they go off to that maybe next tour of duty and that.

1 Have you — or is it just, you know, I need this MOS or
 2 this young woman or this young man will go there?
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: We're looking
 4 at that concept, very similar to the Marine Corps, when
 5 they spent their first three years in that same squad,
 6 you know, and they know —
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I mean,
 8 it's a personnel nightmare but it's, you know —
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: It is, but it
 10 has big dividends.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But it has
 12 dividends, yes.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: You're
 14 absolutely right. And because of that transition being
 15 fairly difficult, we're looking at the goodness of that
 16 vice how we get there. But we're trying to, as best we
 17 can, keep that team concept alive so that they go through
 18 not only training, but then on to their operational unit,
 19 at least for the first tour.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I was —
 21 And you're not the ones to — You missed your contracting
 22 for two months in a row?
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: First two

1 months, we missed recruiting.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Has that
 3 ever happened in the Air Force before? I don't think it
 4 has.
 5 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: We've had a problem
 6 with NETRES, the resident bank that the general talked
 7 about, but shipping has been pretty close to being on
 8 target.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay. So
 10 this was shipping.
 11 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: These are shipping
 12 to —
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Oh, this
 14 wasn't contracting.
 15 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: No, this is —
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: This was
 17 shipping. This was those going to —
 18 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Going into the
 19 pipeline, which means —
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — your
 21 house.
 22 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Yeah — which means
 23 if he didn't produce, I can't produce in tech training.

1 And that's a big concern of ours because you can't make
 2 — once you miss a class training opportunity, it's lost,
 3 and that's what our real concern is.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: So you've
 5 been making your contracting, those numbers, but you —
 6 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: They're a little bit
 7 behind NETRES but not —
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — but you
 9 couldn't ship.
 10 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Yeah, they're behind
 11 a little bit but not to the extent — Well, now the
 12 shipping is what's caused us to —
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I gotcha.
 14 Okay.
 15 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Yes, sir.
 16 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: The scary
 17 thing, sir, is just, like across all the services, we're
 18 entering in the traditional low months. February, March
 19 and April are traditionally low accession periods, and
 20 that bothers us also.
 21 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: And, General, you
 22 realize that recruiting — it's a three-dimensional
 23 thing. You have to have the numbers, the aptitudes and

1 the timing.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Right.
 3 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: And if we don't get
 4 the flow — I mean, they can make up the losses maybe
 5 later in the summer, but if they don't give them to us
 6 when we can produce students, you —
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And your
 8 chart shows some aptitude problems, too, doesn't it?
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: It's declining
 10 for recruits.
 11 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: We've declined in
 12 the — Yes, sir. And overall, we're well above what the
 13 DoD standard is at 60 percent in the top two percentiles.
 14 But we've always been around 85 percent. Now we're down
 15 there and getting into the 70 areas and that's of
 16 concern.
 17 Now, we —
 18 DR. CANTOR: May I ask a question on that
 19 — Oh, I'm sorry, Ron.
 20 Ron, did you...
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Go ahead,
 22 please.
 23 DR. CANTOR: I should tell you that being

1 the chief budget officer of a non-military organization,
 2 I still have a lot of sympathy with the statement in
 3 yellow. However, what I am always told in my case — and
 4 I would imagine it's true for you all — is that money
 5 doesn't solve everything.
 6 And I guess, you know, in terms of the
 7 quality issues you're talking about, what pieces of this
 8 have to do with resourcing and what pieces of it have to
 9 do with changes you're making in the culture of the Air
 10 Force, changes in training, changes — I mean, are you —
 11 do you have a plan that takes apart the statement that
 12 additional funding in FY99 through FY05 will do it?
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: We do not — I
 14 regret we haven't those charts with us, but the
 15 categories — modernization, readiness and personnel, and
 16 an infrastructure — are all four vital to us and we've
 17 got charts that show where the emphasis has been.
 18 Modernization has been — for the not-too-
 19 distant past, been our key emphasis because we leverage
 20 our capability with modernization. And if you don't do
 21 that, you know all the ramifications.
 22 Personnel has always been a very close
 23 second or number one ahead of modernization at times, so

1 those two go hand-in-hand.
 2 The readiness piece then comes to quality-
 3 of-life issues, and part of that then flows into
 4 infrastructure upgrades and family housing and upkeep of
 5 our base plats and so on and so forth.
 6 But in general terms, the level of funding
 7 that we've advocated for this year offsets our
 8 infrastructure upkeep. It's very low. And we're putting
 9 back into that in the out-years of the '00 to '05 period.
 10 DR. CANTOR: Okay.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: But we, at the
 12 expense of infrastructure and — for a number of years
 13 now, and to some degree in terms of readiness, we've
 14 taken money to put toward modernization of people, and
 15 now we simply have to continue on with readiness because
 16 we're hitting the wall now.
 17 And the way you keep up readiness is often
 18 on the backs of your people. They'll can parts, they'll
 19 do about anything you ask them to, and they've got that
 20 can-do attitude and you've seen them. And now they're
 21 voting with their feet, though, and they're saying,
 22 "Sorry, sir," and "it's just too much for me and my
 23 family."

1 DR. CANTOR: "Could do, but I won't."
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Exactly. "And
 3 you're not paying me very well either," you know. So...
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But you
 5 really are shifting this whole paradigm, you know, by
 6 having to become expeditionary as you are.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Right.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Because,
 9 you know, normally you went and you came home. Now you
 10 go and you stay for a period of time. And even with ten
 11 expeditionary forces, you're going to go and you're going
 12 to stay for that period of time, which maybe wasn't the
 13 norm before.
 14 So it's a whole change in basic...
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: It is. And I
 16 guess the point we made earlier — that now we have to
 17 admit that and we have to advertise that and we have to
 18 be honest with our people, and we have to have them come
 19 to expect that like the Marine Corps has done and include
 20 that in our training programs, which Barry...
 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: I think the
 22 biggest benefit, sir, is that our people for the first
 23 time will know "I'm vulnerable during this time frame"

1 and they can plan their lives around it. That was always
 2 the thing that bothered —
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But it is a
 4 shift. It's a shift from —
 5 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Yes, sir.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — what had
 7 been the norm for those who —
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Absolutely.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And the
 10 second part of that, it seems to me from at least what
 11 we've heard in the operating forces is that the
 12 commitments are so great, as you've indicated, General,
 13 what happens is they do it on the backs — they do it on
 14 their backs and they make it happen.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Yes, sir.
 16 Absolutely.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: You know,
 18 as they've always done. But they make it happen. But
 19 then when it comes time, and they're saying, "Well, do I
 20 want to go into this" — you know, "continue with this?"
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Yes, sir.
 22 That's the sword.
 23 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: And then just to the

1 concept of scheduling, you actually spread the wealth
 2 more because you've got the ten different teams now.
 3 Instead of having the same people going back and back
 4 again because you use the same units that have high
 5 proficiency, you spread that over time, and that gets to
 6 be an issue for —
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: And that team
 8 concept, the people and the units in that AEF — and we
 9 have ten of them — will remain constant. So they'll
 10 know who's on their wing and that's vital.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: That's
 12 ideal, sir.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Yes, sir.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: As you
 15 know.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Yes.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And your
 18 poor manpower people are going to be doing this
 19 (Indicating) to try to make that happen for you.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: That's why we
 21 pay them.
 22 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: We also have the BOS
 23 support, sir. The support people are in a robust wing so

1 they have additional manpower to make sure the people
 2 left behind aren't trying to do twice as much work as
 3 those deployed, and that's going to try and help the
 4 quality of life and should help retention —
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And that's
 6 a challenge.
 7 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Because as you know,
 8 that gets to be a real challenge for us.
 9 Ma'am, as a follow-on, I'm just going to
 10 — By way of introduction of Barry, who works for me,
 11 obviously we've been here before and talked with you and
 12 you visited Lackland, so you know Barry probably better
 13 than most, even those in the Air Force here. But what
 14 we'd like to do is link what the general has talked about
 15 in the readiness area to what we do in our training, how
 16 it ties to integrated training.
 17 We do have some experts with us. Barry,
 18 of course, runs Lackland, which is the Gateway to the Air
 19 Force.
 20 And Colonel Stef Eisen's here. He's the
 21 commander of the BMT unit in place of Colonel Steel, whom
 22 you met before. Colonel Steele has moved up in the world
 23 and she's now a wing commander for us at Goodfellow. So

1 we're very happy for her.
 2 And I also have Chief Master Sergeant Bill
 3 Milligan, my enlisted adviser.
 4 So if you have any questions that you have
 5 that cover any of those areas, we'll be more than glad to
 6 address it.
 7 Barry will give you a little rundown now,
 8 a formal briefing, and then we'll go to any Q's and A's
 9 you might have.
 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Madam
 11 Commissioner, other commissioners, I'd like to add my
 12 thanks to those of General Esmond and General Pelak for
 13 giving us an opportunity to come up one more time before
 14 you make your final report to Congress.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: We just
 16 wanted to let you know we were thinking of you.
 17 (Brigadier General Barksdale offered a
 18 slide presentation concurrent with the following
 19 discussion.)
 20 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: My
 21 presentation today will focus on three principal areas.
 22 First I'd like to once again look at the Air Force
 23 training philosophy and why we think the way we do it is

1 involves knowing how to interact with the opposite sex
 2 because our operational environments are also mixed-
 3 gender.
 4 And it also involves being able to
 5 discipline one's self in the conduct of professional
 6 relationships so that personal behavior does not impair
 7 unit discipline or mission accomplishment.
 8 Young recruits may very well be distracted
 9 by members of the opposite sex. The key issue in my
 10 mind, however, is where is the best place to deal with
 11 this challenge? I think the answer is clear: we need to
 12 use the most controlled environment we have, basic
 13 military training, and then continue to build on that
 14 foundation with our phased approach in technical
 15 training.
 16 If it's too difficult to do in this
 17 highly-structured environment, it will certainly be far
 18 more difficult when they are manning critical positions
 19 in operational units.
 20 Some of you may remember from my bio or my
 21 prior visits here or my trips to Lackland that I was an
 22 operational wing commander at Davis-Monthan Air Force
 23 Base prior to taking over at Lackland. It was one of the

1 indeed the correct way.
 2 Secondly, I'll highlight the procedures
 3 and safeguards again that we utilize in our recruit
 4 housing and training facilities to guarantee the safety
 5 and security of our recruits.
 6 And finally, I'd like to focus on the
 7 training rigor and standards that we've put in place to
 8 help our graduates attain the highest level of mission
 9 readiness possible.
 10 Next slide. [Air Force Training
 11 Philosophy]
 12 The Air Force training philosophy, as
 13 depicted, is both simple and straightforward, and yet,
 14 it's complex in that it also embodies many underlying
 15 themes like professionalism, discipline, teamwork, as
 16 well as the Air Force core values of integrity, service
 17 before self, and excellence in all we do.
 18 Our goal is to replicate as closely as we
 19 can the conditions that our graduates will encounter
 20 operationally. Quite simply, our philosophy is to train
 21 like we will fight.
 22 Next slide. [Air Force Training]
 23 As General Esmond said, the challenges

1 largest and the most highly-stressed units and Air Combat
 2 Command.
 3 For the two years I was Commander, I
 4 averaged over 700 people TDY on any given day, and during
 5 peak periods I had over 1,200 TDY, in Southwest Asia,
 6 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Bahrain, Europe, Turkey and
 7 Korea at one time.
 8 The problems that we discussed with the
 9 AEF were readily apparent after crises like Cobart Towers
 10 where I deployed one A-10 squadron to Kuwait and a
 11 Compass Call Squadron to Bahrain twenty-four hours after
 12 that. We've taken entire units without any planning or
 13 forewarning. That's the one concept that the AEF will
 14 help us hopefully to prevent.
 15 One unit I had, the 42nd Airborne Command
 16 and Control Squadron, has been TDY to Aviano, supporting
 17 Bosnia, for five-and-a-half years straight, with three of
 18 their seven aircraft as a minimum. Some of our
 19 individuals are going back to Aviano for the tenth,
 20 eleventh and twelfth times.
 21 I think our basic and technical training
 22 provides the experience and the structure to best prepare
 23 our airmen for that, to face that operational reality.

1 that we as an Air Force face have never been greater.
 2 The environments our graduates will enter is not gender-
 3 separate. In Bosnia, Southwest Asia, Korea, elsewhere
 4 around the world, men and women airmen will stand
 5 shoulder-to-shoulder in the daily execution of the Air
 6 Force mission.
 7 As you know, over 99 percent of our career
 8 fields are open to women. Trainees who can demonstrate
 9 the gender discipline necessary to work professionally
 10 with members of the opposite sex are more ready and more
 11 prepared to operate successfully in this environment.
 12 Next slide. [Air Force Training]
 13 Readiness begins in basic training. The
 14 35,000 recruits that we received last year are a
 15 microcosm of our society and reflect both the good and
 16 the bad, the diversity and the prejudices therein. My
 17 job at Lackland is to transition these individuals into
 18 Air Force professionals.
 19 Our readiness is directly impacted by our
 20 airmen's ability to conduct themselves appropriately at
 21 all times, especially when they're under stressful
 22 situations. Appropriate conduct involves accepting
 23 opposite-gender airmen as both peers and as leaders. It

1 As an operational wing commander, just
 2 like you said, sir, we don't have the supervision now
 3 because we take our strongest supervisors and we send
 4 them to our deployed operation, and I just don't think an
 5 operational wing commander would be equipped to make up
 6 if we did not accomplish the training in our basic and
 7 technical training.
 8 We give our graduates a shared common
 9 experience where the standards are the same, with the
 10 possible exception of our physical conditioning exit
 11 standards. Even this difference, however, is offset by
 12 the fact that they share common physical standards for
 13 certain career fields.
 14 For example, you have to be able to lift
 15 this weight to be a female F-16 crew chief. There are no
 16 disparities between male and female, so they do in fact
 17 share that common standard. In my mind, this shared
 18 experience is essential if our airmen are going to accept
 19 themselves as peers, and it's vital to develop the
 20 teamwork that we'll need in the Air Expeditionary Force.
 21 And finally, we have to accomplish all
 22 this in a safe and secure environment.
 23 Next slide. [Proven Philosophy]

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 266</p> <p>1 Over time, the Air Force training has 2 evolved and become institutionalized in the philosophy we 3 train the way we operate and fight, integrated from day 4 one. We now have more than twenty-two years experience 5 with gender-integrated training and remain convinced that 6 it is the correct approach. It's a training philosophy 7 that has been successfully copied in fire departments, 8 police academies, and foreign militaries throughout the 9 world.</p> <p>10 Next slide. [BMT Process]</p> <p>11 Military discipline and professional 12 behavior are the foundations upon which the military 13 depend. Foundations are built at the beginning of any 14 construction process, not in the middle or at the end. 15 Trainees need to learn from day one that their peers and 16 supervisors may be of the opposite gender. Successful 17 mission accomplishment has nothing to do with gender but 18 everything to do with genders working together.</p> <p>19 Exposure of both men and women to female 20 MTI's affords a positive role model for women and allows 21 young men to accept the fact that women will routinely 22 and successfully occupy high positions throughout the 23 United States Air Force.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 269</p> <p>1 March, we will use six of the RH&T's for basic military 2 training.</p> <p>3 The remaining RH&T that is not being used 4 will be rotated among the squadrons until we complete the 5 renovation at the rate of one a year. This is scheduled 6 to be completed in Fiscal Year '02.</p> <p>7 Next slide. [Recruit Housing & Training 8 (RH&T) Features]</p> <p>9 As you remember, each RH&T contains twenty 10 individual dormitories, with a total capacity of about 11 1,000 trainees. The overhang construction underneath 12 allows us an all-weather capability to do drill, physical 13 conditioning, and other instruction. Each RH&T has its 14 own dining facility, its own dry cleaners, its own 15 laundry, its own dispensary, et cetera.</p> <p>16 Adjacent to each RH&T is a physical 17 conditioning drill pad, capable of handling the entire 18 dorm population at one time. And, also, the 19 administrative offices for the squadron and for the CQ 20 keeps the squadron supervisors right in the RH&T where 21 the training is accomplished.</p> <p>22 Next slide. [Current RH&T Security]</p> <p>23 We take the security of our trainees very</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 267</p> <p>1 In BMT, professional behavior is taught, 2 modeled, and then reinforced. The trainee understands 3 that successful military professionals use personal 4 discipline to ensure professional conduct. This is the 5 basis for trust, trust that you can count on all the team 6 members to do their job correctly, regardless of the 7 circumstance.</p> <p>8 Next slide. [BMT Process]</p> <p>9 This trust and professionalism are 10 developed through a gender-neutral curriculum that 11 mirrors the operational environment that our graduates 12 will enter whenever possible. It embodies the concept of 13 a common shared experience, built on common training.</p> <p>14 If we conduct training in the segregated 15 environment, it would prepare our trainees for a false 16 reality and will shift the burden to the operational 17 units, as I said, that I think are ill-prepared to assume 18 the load. Even if the separate training was totally 19 equal and identical, in my opinion, it would undoubtedly 20 result in a perception that it was somehow different.</p> <p>21 Our process allows zero tolerance for 22 unprofessional behavior and is built on an effective 23 combination of education and role models. The key to our</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 270</p> <p>1 seriously, as you know. Entry to each dormitory is 2 tightly controlled through a single locked entry door 3 that is manned by a dorm guard whenever that dorm is 4 occupied. This guard has instantaneous electronic 5 communication with the two supervisors serving as CQ's 6 twenty-four hours a day. After hours, dorm guards are 7 required to conduct mandatory bed checks and report this 8 to the CQ's hourly.</p> <p>9 As a result of Kassebaum Baker, we also 10 took the additional step of clustering females on the 11 third floor in all of our RH&T's. As you may remember 12 from our first testimony, we were doing it through a slow 13 process. Now that process is complete and all females 14 are clustered.</p> <p>15 Next slide. [RH&T Security Next Step]</p> <p>16 And other measures that were added as a 17 result of Kassebaum Baker were the camera coverage of the 18 stairwells and fire escapes, and emergency fire exits are 19 also now alarmed.</p> <p>20 Next slide. [Dorm Guard]</p> <p>21 This picture just once again shows you the 22 single locked entry for each one, the typical position 23 for the dorm guard, the call box immediately above him,</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 268</p> <p>1 success has been and will continue to be our all- 2 volunteer cadre of professional military training 3 instructors.</p> <p>4 Next slide. [Recruit Housing & Training]</p> <p>5 At this time, I'd like to turn to our 6 recruit housing and training facilities because many of 7 the concerns that have surfaced in the gender-integrated 8 training to date have been centered on the security of 9 our trainees. Although I realize you spent a great deal 10 of time during your visits in the RH&T's, I'd just like 11 to briefly review some of the key points at this time.</p> <p>12 They're unique in that they were designed 13 for the purpose that they're used for. They're self- 14 contained and they are extremely safe and secure for our 15 recruits.</p> <p>16 As you know, we currently have seven of 17 these RH&T's. The four that you see here are on what we 18 call "hotel row," and then we have two approximately 1.3 19 miles to the northeast and then a final one about a mile 20 to the southwest.</p> <p>21 Four of the seven have been extensively 22 renovated, either completed or will shortly be completed. 23 With the activation of the 324th Training Squadron this</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 271</p> <p>1 fire alarm, and the access checklist and roster used to 2 gain entry.</p> <p>3 The next slide. [Closed Circuit Cameras]</p> <p>4 Three RH&T's have been modified with the 5 cameras. Quite honestly, as the cameras were being 6 installed, we found them to have a very disruptive 7 influence. Since they've been installed, the basics 8 basically ignore them.</p> <p>9 They've gotten to be very unobtrusive. 10 You'll note we have the cameras in the foyers, looking 11 into the entry door, just to cover the stairwell, and 12 also the cameras on the outside of the building that 13 cover the fire escapes.</p> <p>14 One added benefit that we have gotten is 15 they have provided a little bit of capability for 16 training as well when we do emergency fire drills, et 17 cetera, in that you have it on film. But they now — in 18 the dorms that have been completely modified, the basics 19 hardly notice them at all and just continue.</p> <p>20 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: General 21 Barksdale, I feel compelled to say something. And please 22 don't take this personally and I'm not trying to be 23 totally flippant, but prisoners eventually get used to</p>

1 being monitored.
 2 And we commented in our interim report
 3 that this was one of our concerns that we saw — that
 4 money and resources were being spent on items like this
 5 where perhaps it could better be spent on things like
 6 your FTX, to upgrade your FTX.
 7 And you've gone down the road now and
 8 you've got it. I just — I mean, I personally — If I
 9 were a parent that came to visit my young person going
 10 through training and saw this, I would have a — I think
 11 I would have a very negative reaction to it.
 12 Obviously it's too late. The money has
 13 been spent and you're doing it. And I assume that you
 14 are telling us correctly that it's no longer a negative
 15 thing in the eyes of the trainers and that, but I still
 16 have a problem with it.
 17 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: I think you
 18 know from your visit down to Lackland, and if you went
 19 back through the original testimony of Kassebaum Baker, I
 20 was in — I opposed the installation of the cameras, but
 21 the decision was made to do it. Now they are really not
 22 noticed.
 23 And I've gotten where I look more. I

1 bells or whistles go off downstairs. It's only when a
 2 trainee breaks with established rules that the CQ is
 3 alerted to somebody unusual happening.
 4 Sir, I'll counter the "prison" effect. In
 5 a prison, every time a door moves, an alarm goes off
 6 because it alerts security. In the RH&T, the only time
 7 an alarm goes off is when a trainee breaks a rule and
 8 tries to do something they're not supposed to do.
 9 Another issue we have is with safety in
 10 the stairwells. It's one of the hardest places to
 11 supervise our trainees and they go up and down those
 12 stairwells dozens of times a day. With those cameras
 13 aimed down the stairwells, we'll now catch the trainees
 14 when they break those rules — running down the
 15 stairwells, not using the handrails, all those kind of
 16 other things that we try to give them discipline.
 17 We must follow these rules because we're
 18 trying to protect you; so that when you do deploy to
 19 those austere locations and you're told to follow these
 20 rules, there's a reason behind it. There's safety.
 21 It just gives the CQ more information and
 22 a better ability to control the training environment.
 23 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. So

1 would be willing to bet that this building has them. I
 2 notice when you stay in the Hilton or a Holiday Inn now,
 3 they have those on the outside of the building.
 4 Unfortunately, it's more —
 5 DR. CANTOR: They need them there.
 6 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: But it's
 7 cause-and-effect. I mean, if I stay at the Hilton, the
 8 camera is truly as a result of some type of crime having
 9 been committed and everything. So the question then is
 10 asked, was this necessary? Was the problem of the degree
 11 that it constituted spending resources in this manner?
 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: The biggest
 13 thing, I think, to benefit — And you know how I felt
 14 about it originally. The biggest benefit, however, has
 15 been in the area of AWOL's. It really had nothing to do
 16 with providing additional security for male-female
 17 issues. But in the past we have had AWOL's where a
 18 person can go out the one-way door, the fire exit —
 19 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Right.
 20 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: As you know,
 21 you can't come back in but you can go out. And they
 22 would do so immediately after a bed check, for example.
 23 And so if the dorm guard did not hear him go out or no

1 I'll ask a question that may have a positive result out
 2 of all this. Have you then been able to start to analyze
 3 if you can reduce the duty personnel as a result of
 4 putting cameras in?
 5 COLONEL EISEN: Yes, sir. That's under
 6 revision right now.
 7 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. Thank
 8 you.
 9 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Can I add one point
 10 to this? I was involved in Kassebaum and I must admit
 11 there was a perception of security and safety concerns.
 12 We came back a number of times saying we don't have that
 13 problem, but there was a perception that, you know, our
 14 women were being raided in the dormitories.
 15 You know, I was a wing commander for two
 16 years and never had a problem like that. If you had a
 17 problem with those kind of things, it was normally
 18 consensual sex, someplace where they ought to be, but
 19 that wasn't the issue. You couldn't make the point. But
 20 we were asked to put things on the table. This is a
 21 brainstorming idea we came up with. We threw it out on
 22 the table and it got grabbed onto.
 23 Overkill? I guess I can't argue that one

1 one else woke up, then you were looking at probably an
 2 hour before it could be discovered. Now that's not
 3 possible and the CQ's will notice immediately.
 4 Our AWOL's have gone down to almost
 5 nonexistent or they're recovered very, very, very quickly
 6 because of that fact.
 7 Staff, do you have anything else from
 8 the...
 9 COLONEL EISEN: From the perspective of
 10 the CQ that's located in that central hallway, it's
 11 giving him more information — him or her, whoever the CQ
 12 is. With one glance on those two monitors, they've
 13 covered the entire building now; whereas, in the past,
 14 they were more committed to doing the checks of all the
 15 stairwells and more frequently moving out of the CQ area,
 16 which takes them away from the telephone. What it does
 17 is it enhances the CQ's ability to gather that necessary
 18 information.
 19 The other thing I'd like to emphasize
 20 about the entire security process is that it's set up,
 21 including the alarms, that if the trainees follow what
 22 they're supposed to be doing — i.e., don't go out that
 23 door; don't activate that door at night — no alarms or

1 way or the other. Senior leadership felt it was
 2 appropriate. 280K? That's a lot of money. We probably
 3 could have used it for some things, I think, better. But
 4 we got it now.
 5 But the issue, I should say, in basic
 6 training, we have these kids when they walk off of the
 7 civilian market, into the training environment. They are
 8 not yet disciplined to do what we want them to do, so we
 9 have a graduated phase training program. Very, very
 10 tightly controlled in basic.
 11 And as you get in tech training, we don't
 12 have any cameras. I mean, you know — and we have
 13 different freedoms as you get more and more responsible.
 14 So it's consistent with that thought process.
 15 At least in the beginning, the first
 16 couple days we have our CQ's — We have an MTI with those
 17 students twenty-four hours a day when they first walk in
 18 there because we just aren't sure how people are going to
 19 react to the environment, and then we kind of — it's
 20 gradually, you know, made less and less confining.
 21 Again, it's not a matter of not trust;
 22 it's a matter of somebody knowing that we are paying
 23 attention and people are looking. But, again, it's a

1 mixed bag.
 2 I can tell you, I was concerned — I used
 3 the word — and I regret that I ever used it, but I said,
 4 “We don’t have prisons.” You know, “We don’t want a
 5 prison.” The next thing you know, people like yourself
 6 are saying, “Hey, this is some type of prison.”
 7 Well, it sure does. When you look at the
 8 gate and you look at the sign — you know, the next thing
 9 you know, we’ve got barbed wire around the building and
 10 fence.
 11 But the bottom line is — I also compared
 12 this to — You know, my kids — I have three daughters
 13 that went to college and I can guarantee you your
 14 children — your daughters and sons — are much more
 15 protected in this environment than any place I’ve ever
 16 been on a college campus. I’ll tell you, guaranteed.
 17 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Sure. Sure.
 18 DR. CANTOR: I will agree with that.
 19 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Yeah. And I think
 20 most parents would do that.
 21 But the bottom line is, we’re kind of
 22 beyond the point now. If we had had some other folks
 23 that were feeling the way you felt about it — But the

1 rigor area on the things that have changed recently
 2 enough or during the time since your last visits in
 3 accordance with your request.
 4 As you know, we increased our physical
 5 conditioning program from three times a week to six times
 6 a week, and we also significantly expanded the time
 7 allocated for each one from forty-five to seventy-five
 8 minutes.
 9 We added a second confidence course run,
 10 beginning last January. And that was more — also for
 11 training rigor, but also because it was so popular with
 12 the basics and they kept requesting the chance to run it
 13 a second time. That’s been very effective.
 14 All of the changes we’ve made have
 15 improved our exit physical standards significantly. The
 16 biggest change has been we do an entry week test on their
 17 physical conditioning and that’s when the results have
 18 been dramatic.
 19 Before, our graduates were still passing
 20 the standards, but the differences between their entry
 21 level testing and now their graduation testing have
 22 improved about 20 percent across-the-board, in all the
 23 categories, which is pretty substantial.

1 Commission felt the need and we provided some options and
 2 that’s what came out of this whole thing.
 3 We tried to do it as least we could
 4 without — with the least impact on the trainee. We’re
 5 not looking in their private areas; we’re not looking in
 6 their bedrooms. It’s just all public, common use areas
 7 where you might have some problems.
 8 So again, not to defend it any more than I
 9 already have, but we were getting mixed reviews about it.
 10 We try to make the best of that.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Not to
 12 belabor this, but —
 13 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: Yes, sir.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — I guess
 15 the point that — really why it appeared in our interim
 16 report, clearly because we felt the way we felt about —
 17 that it does give a prison-type of atmosphere, and that
 18 doesn’t, in our — at least some of our judgments, isn’t
 19 what you’re really trying to incorporate at your basic
 20 training. You’re trying to build a team. You’re trying
 21 to do a lot of different things.
 22 You know, it just seems, though, that the
 23 bottom line was — and obviously we couldn’t put this in

1 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Have you
 2 seen any major increase to injuries?
 3 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: No, we
 4 haven’t. And I think that’s because we also did it very
 5 smartly in that the physical therapists and the experts
 6 helped us and we designed increased stretching exercises
 7 and warm-ups, et cetera.
 8 And that was when we found why the
 9 seventy-five-minute was necessary versus the forty-five-
 10 minute — because we wanted to take the time between to
 11 ensure they were adequately stretched, warmed-up, et
 12 cetera — even to the point where the doctors said, “You
 13 need to give them the opportunity for some juice or
 14 Gatorade or something before,” and we took that into
 15 account and did that. So I think we’ve done this one
 16 right.
 17 We’re still awaiting the results — As you
 18 know, General Eberhardt — we reported the last time the
 19 Vice Chief of Staff tasked the Brooks School of Aerospace
 20 Medicine to look not just at basic training but the
 21 entire Air Force physical fitness program — testing, et
 22 cetera. Basic training is one piece of that and we’re
 23 awaiting the results on that.

1 the report — is that perhaps what the armed forces has
 2 to do is not overreact sometimes to the results of a
 3 study.
 4 And, quite frankly — And this is my
 5 personal opinion. I don’t know about my fellow
 6 commissioners. I felt that in this case you all
 7 overreacted to that comment and then to subsequent
 8 pressure that came out in the Secretary of Defense’s
 9 report. I think you could have said “no,” you know.
 10 And I would — since this is on the
 11 record, I would just urge — this committee may come out
 12 with some recommendations that, you know, as the service
 13 chief and all who advise him might say, “No, this is not
 14 good for the United States Air Force,” or whatever. And
 15 I would just urge you heartedly to do that.
 16 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: If I could,
 17 I’d like to shift into the final portion of my briefing
 18 concerning — away from RH&T’s and cameras and into —
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Well, you
 20 know, you touched a nerve.
 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Next slide,
 22 please. [Training Rigor]
 23 I’d like to mainly focus the training

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: When do you
 2 expect to receive those results and then a decision made
 3 on it?
 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Originally
 5 the schedule was that they thought they would be done by
 6 March or April. This morning when we talked, they said
 7 “no,” and they didn’t give us a specific but it will
 8 probably be later.
 9 I’m sorry. Go ahead.
 10 LIEUTENANT COLONEL STREET: It’s ten bases
 11 that are going to be tested, basically.
 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Okay. So
 13 that’s part of the —
 14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL STREET: So they’re
 15 going to do a fine-tuning of the program.
 16 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: In effect,
 17 they’ve expanded the scope and the test bases, and that’s
 18 when they’re doing the —
 19 LIEUTENANT COLONEL STREET: The test bases
 20 have just been identified, haven’t they?
 21 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAUR: I’ll identify
 22 myself —
 23 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: I think it

1 was in the Air Force Times last week.
 2 LIEUTENANT COLONEL RUFKAUR: I'll identify
 3 myself as Lieutenant Colonel Sandy Rufkaur, Education and
 4 Training.
 5 I talked to — Do you remember Major
 6 Baumgartner who was here and testified before about the
 7 physiological study? I talked with him just yesterday to
 8 ask him what kind of progress is being made and he said
 9 that there were bases being set up to go through all the
 10 different forms of exercises to determine the appropriate
 11 levels.
 12 And he indicated at the time that he wants
 13 to make sure to do it right, to take the time to do it
 14 right, to determine what levels of fitness is appropriate
 15 to what age group and what gender, if there is a gender
 16 going to be involved.
 17 So he, too, said it could take easily
 18 another year, year-and-a-half, before the final results
 19 are announced. And he says if he's allowed to take that
 20 much time — and that gets back to the issue of doing it
 21 right.
 22 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: No, I don't think he
 23 has that much time, very frankly. I think the Vice Chief

1 low-crawl exercise have also added to training rigor
 2 while the combat retreat and POW ceremony have been
 3 invaluable in instilling patriotism and reinforcing the
 4 concept of service before self.
 5 Next slide — Yes, sir.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can I ask?
 7 Really this is just something that was told to us out in
 8 the operational forces as we visited the Air Force, and
 9 we had the opportunity to talk to a number of NCO's that
 10 had clearly participated in expeditionary operations.
 11 They had a number of suggestions as to, you know, what
 12 it's really like. I just wonder, have you all tapped
 13 that expertise? In other words, have you used the people
 14 that have now had to set up the expeditionary airfield
 15 camps and so forth?
 16 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Yes, sir.
 17 Can I skip two slides, sir? And I'll —
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Sure. I'm
 19 sorry, I shouldn't have jumped that. I didn't realize
 20 you had two more. I should have read.
 21 [Field Training Experience]
 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Because of
 23 the success of the field training exercise, we've been

1 is going to push that because he wants to get that done.
 2 He's very health-conscious and into that kind of
 3 programming.
 4 And we'd like to have consistency between
 5 them. We have a much more rigorous program at basic
 6 training than we have in the active force, I mean, and
 7 there's a disconnect. And we're working that within my
 8 command now to enhance the training at tech training. We
 9 have a follow-on program, but now we want to bring it up
 10 to the standard that we've raised basic.
 11 So we're going to have that follow-on, and
 12 then we're going to feed into an Air Force where you do
 13 an ergometry test. You know, the bicycle. Doesn't make
 14 sense in our minds that — So we want to get it across.
 15 And from what I got from General Eberhardt
 16 in discussing it with him, they're looking to go more to
 17 what the Army and Marine Corps have — running, upper
 18 body strength; you know, push-ups, sit-ups, that type of
 19 thing — to be more consistent with what we think the
 20 need might be. But I think they're going to go in that
 21 direction, probably.
 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: I don't
 23 think we've been doing it long enough to have a solid

1 working now for about eighteen months to expand the FTX
 2 into a week-long exercise which has commonly been known
 3 as Warrior Week. This evolutionary step will ensure that
 4 our airmen remain prepared to meet the challenges of the
 5 Air Expeditionary Force.
 6 One of the most frustrating things to me
 7 as an operational wing commander was the difficulty in
 8 scheduling all the required training that you had to have
 9 a person go through before you could put them on
 10 mobility. Once we implement Warrior Week, that problem
 11 will disappear.
 12 Next slide. [Next Step - Warrior Week]
 13 Warrior Week is a natural evolution and a
 14 perfect fit for AEF, and also for the concept of
 15 "training the way we fight." Beginning with mobility
 16 processing on Sunday, to the Saturday culminating event,
 17 Warrior Week will go a long way toward providing the Air
 18 Force with a more mission capable individual.
 19 Training events will include mobility
 20 briefings, processing, M-16 qualification, law-of-armed-
 21 conflict training, self-aid/buddy care, and a wide
 22 variety of threats and nuclear, biological and chem
 23 warfare training — events that to this point have all

1 statistical base to say so. I think another one of the
 2 byproducts of the going to six days a week is it kind of
 3 encourages a lifestyle change. Kind of like a jogger or
 4 a biker: if you don't do it, you feel deprived. And I
 5 think you're starting to see that a little bit more.
 6 Some of our tech trainees, even on the days they don't
 7 have to exercise, are going out and running. So that's
 8 good.
 9 [Training Rigor]
 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: I think
 11 perhaps the most significant change to basic training in
 12 recent years was the addition of the field training
 13 exercise in 1996. This thirty-six hours in austere field
 14 conditions has allowed us to expose our trainees to the
 15 operational conditions that they could face shortly after
 16 coming into their first operational unit. It sets the
 17 expeditionary mindset, shifting BMT from a sterile RH&T
 18 environment to the field conditions, while maintaining
 19 the same expectations of behavior and performance.
 20 Our trainees learn to practice field
 21 conditions, safety, hygiene and security, in an
 22 environment that is both mentally demanding and tests
 23 their physical endurance. The 5.8-mile march and the

1 been required training at first operational assignments,
 2 not as part of our basic or technical training.
 3 Saturday's final retreat ceremony will
 4 bestow "airman" status to the trainees.
 5 Next slide. [Untitled]
 6 In response to your question, how did we
 7 decide how to do it, the first thing we did, sir, was we
 8 went out to the units. I have some people like myself
 9 who came from operational units, but we went to the
 10 experts. We went to ACC and we went to Air Force CEX and
 11 we went to — actually event to the Marine experience and
 12 the Army experience.
 13 What do we need to do? How should we
 14 build the camp? We obviously can't — A bare base and
 15 shake-easy in Bahrain is not the same as a bare base in
 16 Korea, so we had to make some concessions. What emerged
 17 we — I think, is the best of both worlds.
 18 We're going to build the new Warrior Week
 19 camp, but we're also, to preserve the austerity of that
 20 bare base FOL forward based operation, we're going to
 21 keep the FTX and we're going to marry the two together in
 22 a one-week training program.
 23 So we included all the expertise we could.

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1 As we speak right now, Red Horse from Nellus is
 2 constructing the camp, and they like it because that's
 3 their primary job, but, yet, it's something they rarely
 4 get to do, which is actually construct a base base camp.
 5 Next slide. [Warrior Week]
 6 This is a notional layout that we're
 7 building right now. It may be, as far as the tent
 8 configuration, something that you wouldn't see, for
 9 example, in the desert. It's closely more to the one you
 10 might see, for example, in Korea. But we had the Red
 11 Horse with APSEA come down and say, "With the terrain and
 12 with your safety and security concerns, this is the best
 13 thing in our mind."
 14 The male tents, as you see, on the one
 15 side, with the MTI and CQ's in the middle. All the
 16 female tents and the separate female latrine will be on
 17 the eastern-most side of the camp, in the vicinity also
 18 of the academic tents.
 19 The meal service, a large number of the
 20 meals will be MRE's, but we'll also have one or two hot
 21 meals a day. But the meals will not actually be prepared
 22 there. They will be prepared by the contractor and
 23 brought out to the field.

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1 In the interests of the number of people
 2 that we're going to train per year, the MTI/CQ, the food
 3 prep and the latrines, are all going to be case-mans,
 4 more permanent, on concrete bases, just because of the
 5 numbers we're going to put through there.
 6 The tents, however, the only concession
 7 there will be the same ones we did when we went to the
 8 desert, but a concrete floor in them — again, just to
 9 increase their life span. We have the tents. The camp
 10 is being constructed. We made some decisions.
 11 Rather than use the environmental units
 12 that we use in our real deployable tents, because they're
 13 incredibly expensive, we're going to use commercial air
 14 conditioners, heat pump, because they're never going to
 15 be moved. They're going to be put on a concrete pad.
 16 And the exterior power units that we use in our temper-
 17 tents for deployment are very, very expensive.
 18 But this is the camp. We hope the Red
 19 Horse will finish in the April or May time frame. We're
 20 going to run our tests starting in June, and then
 21 actually start students — if all goes well — going
 22 through the Warrior Week around the first of October.
 23 Next slide.

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1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Excuse me, General. Is
 2 this the same location as we observed the FTX? I'm just
 3 trying to orient myself.
 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: No, no. If
 5 you remember where Wilford Hall and the confidence course
 6 — okay. Looking at — If you remember Lackland, this
 7 would be — Wilford Hall would be up here (Indicating),
 8 about probably a mile. The confidence course would be
 9 about a half-mile or so from the area. The golf course
 10 would be out in this area (Indicating). Highway 90 would
 11 be on the other side of Leon Creek, out in this area
 12 (Indicating).
 13 It's fairly heavily wooded, but, yet, it
 14 has close proximity to the confidence course, which is
 15 also going to be done.
 16 Yes, sir.
 17 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: This is
 18 interesting and it might be another difficult question.
 19 Have you considered extending the days of basic training
 20 —
 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Yes, we
 22 have.
 23 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Oh, you are?

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1 Okay.
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: No, we are
 3 not. When we started looking at — and we thought we
 4 were going to have to when we added this in, but then we
 5 started looking at the value-added, for example, of
 6 dormitory inspections in the fifth week of training and
 7 how much time we lost during transit, going and doing —
 8 out to the firing ranges and back to the RH&T's, going to
 9 the confidence course and then back to the RH&T's.
 10 Once we started to look at — Colonel
 11 Steel, and now Colonel Eisen, put together a tigers team
 12 and started looking at just the sheer fact of putting all
 13 of that training in the same week saved us a great deal
 14 of time.
 15 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. So
 16 it's a wash.
 17 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: It is. And
 18 we're refining it with what we call block scheduling and
 19 that we're going to do a better job up-front of the
 20 transition, adminis-trivia, haircuts, uniform issues, et
 21 cetera. And then once we start the training, it's going
 22 to be very structured.
 23 But, you know, if you remember, the

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1 distances involved —
 2 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Right.
 3 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: —
 4 transiting to Medina and to the confidence course are
 5 substantial. This is going to, I think, give us a lot
 6 more freedom to do what we probably should have been
 7 doing all along.
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Will they, by chance,
 9 march?
 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: They will
 11 march everywhere.
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you.
 13 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: With the
 14 exception of when they go to the M-16's, because that
 15 would be a little too excessive and right through the
 16 middle of not one of the best areas of town.
 17 But we'll bus them out to the firing
 18 ranges. And other than that, once they get there, then
 19 they will march to the FTX as part of it, march out to
 20 their pick-up point, and back into the — So we think
 21 we're getting the best of both worlds. We get the
 22 foreign, austere location of the FTX, and this was more
 23 replicative of a shake-easy or a king-fod, something with

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1 — You're living in tents, but it's certainly more
 2 typical of an Air Force deployed location.
 3 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And their
 4 final — their end-of-course test, PT and academics, will
 5 follow this?
 6 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Yes. The
 7 last week will be the first time — Some of the things
 8 we're proposing are very simple, as simple as for the
 9 first time when they finish their culminating event on
 10 Saturday — that we'll call them "airmen" for the first
 11 time. We'll give them their blue uniforms. They'll get
 12 to wear those for the first time. So when they finish
 13 Warrior Week, their next week will be graduation. That
 14 following Friday.
 15 So we don't think you have to do anything
 16 elaborate. We think just using the things that we have
 17 — We borrowed from some of the experiences of the
 18 Marines and the Army and others. We really think this is
 19 going to be a very popular —
 20 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: So I want to
 21 make sure I understand this. So on Saturday, when you do
 22 the ceremony and say, "Welcome to the Air Force, Airmen,"
 23 they will have —

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1 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: One week
 2 left.
 3 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: They will
 4 have completed all the mandatory testing events that
 5 allow them —
 6 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Physical —
 7 No.
 8 COLONEL EISEN: The Monday of week six,
 9 they'll take the academic exam where 70 percent is the
 10 minimum passing required. Currently, we do the PC eval
 11 at the end of the fourth week.
 12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay.
 13 COLONEL EISEN: And the reason we do it at
 14 the end of the fourth week is if we have problems, we
 15 have still time left in BMT to get them up to standards.
 16 We're playing with that one, whether we're still going to
 17 have that eval at the end of the fourth week. And if
 18 they fail it, do we send them to Warrior Week or do we
 19 recycle them? We have to work on that issue.
 20 But right now, PC is in the fourth week
 21 and the academic eval is the first day of the sixth week.
 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Some of the
 23 other things we've been very lucky. We now, I think — I

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1 required as I —
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Exactly
 3 right. And, sir, as you know, we can't tear down the
 4 tents every time and put them back up. It would just be
 5 too much wear-and-tear on the tent. But what we're going
 6 to do is provide them the camp security and how we're
 7 going to do — you're going to play in that role, and all
 8 the obvious, almost — For many of these kids it's going
 9 to be the first time they've ever been out in the field
 10 and the woods. So there's a great deal to be done there.
 11 Next slide. [Goal: Provide Mission Ready
 12 Airmen]
 13 That's our goal. We want to be able to
 14 give the — as I said, sir, the operational wing
 15 commander the best round that we can and the highest
 16 qualified. The bottom line for Warrior Week, it's going
 17 to be one more evolution and hopefully we'll provide the
 18 most realistic and thorough training for our trainees
 19 that we've ever attempted. Once we implement it, our
 20 graduates will be more mission-ready than ever before;
 21 and as we said, hopefully prepared to deploy immediately
 22 upon arrival at their first operational assignment to
 23 deploy as part of an Air Expeditionary Force, trained in

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1 can't remember if we had our M-16's in the FTX or not
 2 when you were down the last visit.
 3 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: No, you
 4 didn't.
 5 MS. POPE: No.
 6 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: We now have
 7 250 M-16's demil'd that we're using in the FTX site. So
 8 I have some extraordinary people there who have been able
 9 to get us a lot of things out of DRMO with little or no
 10 cost to the government.
 11 And I think this will be — I know the
 12 operational wing commanders will love it. I would have
 13 loved it when I was an operational wing commander because
 14 now they really will graduate a full round, who is not
 15 only technically qualified to do his job, but also
 16 prepared if he has to deploy shortly after arrival.
 17 Next slide. [Warrior Week]
 18 This is our notional. Obviously with the
 19 numbers involved that you're going to have, it's going to
 20 be scheduling intensive. But as I said, one of the
 21 simple things that one of our people came up with was why
 22 don't we run them through a mobility processing line so
 23 it's not the first time they see it, the first time they

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1 the conditions that they may have to fight in.
 2 Next slide. [Air Force Belief]
 3 The overriding goal of basic and technical
 4 training is to transform civilian recruits into airmen
 5 warriors, whose behavior is consistent with the
 6 standards, values and beliefs of the United States Air
 7 Force. We're a gender-integrated Air Force, with men and
 8 women working successfully shoulder-to-shoulder as a team
 9 in outposts around the globe.
 10 The foundation for this success must begin
 11 from day one, in a training environment that replicates
 12 as closely as possible the operational conditions that
 13 they will face. The FTX and Warrior Week is just a
 14 continuing evolution of the training philosophy we have
 15 successfully used for more than twenty-two years: train
 16 as we will fight, integrated from day one.
 17 Next slide. [Bottom Line]
 18 95 percent of our operational commanders
 19 and supervisors rated our graduates satisfactory or
 20 higher in job-related skills and military bearing. I
 21 think the most valuable testament to our effectiveness,
 22 however, is the success that we as an Air Force have
 23 enjoyed across the full spectrum of operations.

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1 deploy?
 2 So we're going to do that and give them
 3 the mobility briefings and the intel prep briefing and
 4 terrorism training, et cetera — the things to watch out
 5 for.
 6 The confidence course, it's already the
 7 most popular thing in basic training with the FTX.
 8 M-16, they already do. Now it's going to
 9 be packaged as part of the Warrior Week.
 10 They'll still continue to do their daily
 11 physical conditioning, security training, camp operating
 12 procedures. They'll pull dorm guard. The difference is
 13 they'll be pulling dorm guard with an M-16 and patrolling
 14 the camp.
 15 Obviously chem warfare training and self-
 16 aid buddy care. We have a natural mesh there with
 17 Wilford Hall because they are a training institution and
 18 they're excited about being given the opportunity to help
 19 us in that area and do the self-aid buddy care, and some
 20 of the other things such as the law-of-armed-conflict
 21 briefing.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I assume
 23 that the "deploy and set-up" are some of the field skills

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1 "Training like you'll fight" has helped to produce the
 2 best Air Force in the world. In my mind, it's the right
 3 thing to do.
 4 I want to thank you again for allowing me
 5 the opportunity to testify one final time, and I stand
 6 ready for any questions that you may have.
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Well, we
 8 thank you very much for coming again. We feel like
 9 you're an old friend.
 10 MS. POPE: You just like coming to
 11 Washington and getting out of San Antonio, right?
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: General, we have
 13 completed a couple of operational visits, including
 14 Langley Air Force Base, and in my case, I was able to go
 15 visit Ramstein Air Force Base over in Germany. And one
 16 of the things that I think unanimously comes from sort of
 17 supervisors and higher personnel in the field is that
 18 they do spend a lot of their time dealing with family-
 19 related issues; dealing with, you know, parents with
 20 child-care problems, single parents, and so on and so
 21 forth.
 22 And I just want to carry on a theme that
 23 I've mentioned a couple of times today, which is what, if

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1 anything, in a formal course context, is given to airmen
 2 in the training context concerning family life and
 3 parenthood?
 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Not as much
 5 as we probably should. We do focus on the things that
 6 have emerged from squadron commanders — and it's not
 7 unique to the Air Force — financial management, don't
 8 over extend yourself in credit, and life. In short, we
 9 try to protect them from the inevitable person that's
 10 going to knock on their door and sell them a zillion
 11 dollars worth of insurance that they don't need.
 12 But I think probably more because — what?
 13 Ten or twelve percent are married?
 14 COLONEL EISEN: Yes, sir. Ten to twelve
 15 percent a year.
 16 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: We probably
 17 don't focus as much in that area because the training is
 18 focused on the majority.
 19 And you are exactly right. I found as a
 20 squadron commander and a wing commander and a DO that,
 21 whereas, in the past, the first person you wanted when
 22 you deployed was your first sergeant, now you're more
 23 likely to find squadron commanders who leave their first

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1 necessarily going to listen and absorb at that point, but
 2 it does seem to me that there could be opportunities in
 3 connection with core values, for example. You know,
 4 honesty means paying your bills; honesty and respect
 5 means treating your spouse or, you know, significant-
 6 other properly.
 7 That there does seem to be a major issue
 8 out in the real world with these very young kids being
 9 very technically proficient — you know, mature on that
 10 side and perhaps not so mature on the social side.
 11 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: It is well-
 12 established: the day the husband or wife deploys, that's
 13 the day the car is going to break; the washing — It is
 14 just going to happen. And so we have — the units that
 15 do it all the time have those procedures in place.
 16 Staff, anything else you'd like to add on
 17 the BMT curriculum?
 18 COLONEL EISEN: No, sir.
 19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Thank you.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My question
 21 will be very straightforward. We have the trainers,
 22 those responsible for the training and those responsible
 23 for readiness. What would you like this Commission to

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1 sergeants at home when they deploy to take care of the
 2 issues involving the families.
 3 And that's a total mind-shift from the way
 4 we used to. That was your key or your door to your
 5 enlisted team. And I think it's probably fifty-fifty
 6 now, the commanders who will leave them at home because
 7 of those various issues, family issues.
 8 I think we do a fairly good job because
 9 we're having to do it so much. At Davis-Monthan, I had
 10 institutionalized deployment. You know, we had briefings
 11 for the wives and briefings for the kids, and a routine
 12 — we called it a parachute — to check on the people
 13 while they were gone, and in place, but it was because we
 14 were one of the most heavily tasked units in ACC with a
 15 large, large number.
 16 I think probably the ones that don't have
 17 that are the ones who don't routinely deploy. And when
 18 they do, it's not something they practice all the time.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Many of those
 20 programs are, as you've correctly surmised, inexperienced
 21 at Ramstein, institutionalized at our wings. And the
 22 operational and training level family services, family
 23 support programs, have recognized the fact that the bulk

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1 tell the Congress about the Air Force?
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Sir, I simply
 3 would like you to tell the Congress obviously the
 4 realities of your findings, but we would like to believe
 5 that we do it in a fashion that best suits our
 6 requirements. And we're very proud of the way we train,
 7 and we believe it's realistic and it's wholesome and it's
 8 useful and functional.
 9 We also realize we're in a transitional
 10 period to recognize the world environment, so we're
 11 adapting some of our training programs to match that, and
 12 we believe at a correct pace.
 13 As I've said, you can assure the Congress
 14 that the United States Air Force is ready to fight and
 15 win wherever we're called upon to do so, and it's largely
 16 due to those young men and women you've seen being
 17 trained.
 18 While we owe them much, much more in terms
 19 of reward and opportunity and training opportunity and
 20 capabilities, we feel like we're on the right track and
 21 are very proud of our programs.
 22 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: I think the general
 23 captured it very well. I would say from my perspective I

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1 of our enlisted corps is very young.
 2 But much of that parenthood training that
 3 maybe they missed at home or maybe the correct example
 4 wasn't available is provided by their commanders and
 5 their first sergeants, and I think that's true — General
 6 Christmas will back me up — in all of our services.
 7 There is a correct role model with the right standards,
 8 the right discipline, available to teach those young men
 9 and women the correct way to conduct themselves.
 10 Unfortunately, we have programs like the
 11 American Express card, which takes away some of the
 12 management responsibility and those sorts of thing, but
 13 it gives them capability that they've never had before
 14 and without the proper training to use it. So we've
 15 learned that lesson in some ways the hard way and so
 16 we're recovering from that.
 17 But there are educational programs at the
 18 first assignment locations that provide those young men
 19 and women, I think, a very credible method of
 20 understanding the realities of what they're about to
 21 enter into.
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I'm not contending that
 23 the eighteen-year-old brand new airman recruit is

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1 have to go back to the basic bottom line. We have the
 2 best Air Force in the world, we have the best military in
 3 the world, and we've gotten that way somehow. Maybe by
 4 happenstance, but I think it's more than that.
 5 I look at our service over time. We're
 6 unique. We have 99 percent of our jobs open to all
 7 genders. We're gender-blind. That's the way we should
 8 be. We should keep the emphasis away from that and build
 9 more on the team and how we perform, as to who you are or
 10 what your background might be.
 11 We've had the experience over time, since
 12 1976, to be doing this, and it's evolutionary. It's
 13 gotten to the point now where it's very commonplace for
 14 us to operate the way we do and we don't put an emphasis
 15 on the separation. And I think to go in any other
 16 direction would probably be moving — in our case, moving
 17 backwards.
 18 When you build teams, you build them based
 19 upon the capabilities of the people, and that's what we
 20 should emphasize. And I think our success has made the
 21 difference in how we operate day-to-day. It's hard to
 22 argue, you know, when you're the best Air Force in the
 23 world, that we're not doing this quite right.

1 Now, there's always room for improvement
 2 and we're constantly looking for ways to do that better.
 3 And I think whenever somebody looks at it from the
 4 outside — We are a closed society, no doubt about that.
 5 We have our way of doing business and we think we do it
 6 for the right reason, but sometimes we miss the obvious,
 7 and so we appreciate, you know, the review from the
 8 outside.
 9 But again, the bottom line is I think
 10 we've got it right. I think we're doing it right.
 11 I think if you asked most airmen, they
 12 wonder what is all the commotion about. And I've done
 13 this now since we started with Kassebaum, and when I talk
 14 to the young troops, they can't see what the issue is.
 15 It's so obvious to them that they're beyond that point.
 16 They come out of an environment where
 17 they're mixed. They come out of high school where they
 18 have that interaction. All of a sudden, you put them in
 19 the military and you can't trust them to interact because
 20 there's something mystical and magical about our
 21 environment. It's no different than the rest of, you
 22 know, the workplace.
 23 So I think it's one of those issues we

1 probably ought to move on and let us do our job and press
 2 on with what we've been doing. I think we've got it
 3 right.
 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Sir, the
 5 last thing I'd say — Obviously I agree with everything
 6 General Esmond and General Pelak said. I think the other
 7 valuable thing, though, is to make it clear to the
 8 Congress that one size does not necessarily fit all in
 9 this argument. That the services have unique differences
 10 and unique things and they need to be given the
 11 prerogative to train the way they think is the best,
 12 because I think there are subtle differences and more
 13 stringent differences in the missions that we — and the
 14 way that you should train for those.
 15 So I hope that they resist the temptation
 16 to mandate "all services will do it this way," "all
 17 services will do it this way," because I think that's the
 18 wrong answer.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 20 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I'm trying
 21 to figure out how to formulate this question so it
 22 doesn't sound Air Force-specific and I don't think I can,
 23 but I'll preface it this way. In looking at your

1 trainers — in your case, the MTI's — I found a very
 2 unique thing in the Air Force that does not exist in the
 3 other services. And to put it very tersely, the thing
 4 that's different is that the other services have their
 5 trainers in kind of a sacrosanct environment. That is
 6 their mission — their daily mission — to train that
 7 particular group of individuals.
 8 Now, either we picked up a lot of false
 9 information and emotionalism or you just manage MTI's a
 10 little bit different, but both from the airmen that we
 11 talked to and the MTI's, there seemed to be a lot of
 12 rotation of MTI's during the course of a training period
 13 which became very confusing to the airmen, very
 14 frustrating to the MTI's.
 15 And so when we asked further, some of the
 16 things we heard were that the MTI's pick up some escort
 17 duties, some base security duties, and I found that very
 18 strange because the other services guard their trainers
 19 very carefully.
 20 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: I'll start,
 21 Staff, and I may want you to jump in.
 22 You're exactly right. As a wing commander
 23 at Lackland Air Force Base — You saw the pace there.

1 And, unfortunately, if you eliminate the MTI's, then do
 2 you eliminate the MTL's also in tech training? And if
 3 you do that, that only leaves me two choices, because
 4 there's nobody there in DLI and IAFA. They're all tied
 5 up with their foreign students.
 6 So that leaves you your support group and
 7 your logistics group. High number of civilians, lesser
 8 number of blue-suit people. If I continually pick on
 9 them for all the extra things, I'd beat them to death.
 10 So I will take on occasion an MTI out of a supervisory
 11 role.
 12 I try not to take them out of straight
 13 MTI's. I leave that to my training group commander,
 14 however. I don't tell them who to take. But
 15 occasionally I will levy a requirement for them only
 16 because I just can't keep doing it to the rest of the
 17 small cadre of people I have to fill that square.
 18 On the moving, I'm not sure that's all
 19 bad. One of the things I worried about when I first came
 20 in was the fact that you have one MTI who was all-
 21 powerful and that's his empire. We hoped when we
 22 implemented the combined flights it would force the MTI's
 23 to work together because you had to. I don't think

1 that's all bad, and the most recent DACOWITS visit seemed
 2 to validate.
 3 Before, as you know, we had some of the
 4 MTI's that complained — "I don't like it" — because
 5 they were forced to work with other people. This most
 6 recent DACOWITS, we talked at length, and in the report
 7 she singled that out. She said, "Well, the MTI's
 8 reluctantly have agreed that it's been good for leveling.
 9 It's been good from the standpoint of our role in that it
 10 forces them to see how this MTI does it and this MTI does
 11 it.
 12 Now, we obviously do that very well in our
 13 MTI school, as you know. It's fourteen weeks long and
 14 eight weeks of it exposes the MTI trainee to everything,
 15 all the different techniques. But I think there's a
 16 tendency like anywhere: if you do one thing all the time
 17 and aren't exposed, you're not as good as you would be as
 18 if you borrow from everyone else.
 19 I mean, that's my philosophy. If I see
 20 somebody doing it different, I'm going to steal it and
 21 copy it myself.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Let me give
 23 you the other side of that, though. You're talking the

1 MTI borrowing —
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Right. For
 3 the trainees.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But we're
 5 talking about the trainees.
 6 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: The
 7 trainees.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And one of
 9 the observations is — and then I think probably
 10 Kassebaum made the same — is the fact that when you have
 11 a permanent cadre, they become the first leaders by
 12 example that the trainee sees. They become the first
 13 role models. And then if you constantly change those
 14 role models in that period of basic training, at least
 15 the feedback that we get is that that's debilitating.
 16 And where there's a more permanent
 17 presence, if you will, that graduate — that trainee
 18 who's now an airman or a Marine or a soldier — they look
 19 back and they say "my drill sergeant" or "my drill
 20 instructor" or my — and they emulate them and there's a
 21 certain degree of that leadership by example that rubs
 22 off.
 23 So that's the other side of this issue.

1 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Yes, sir.
 2 We've looked very hard at this because it is a continuing
 3 concern in our critiques from our students, but it's not
 4 consistent across-the-board. It just seems like we'll
 5 have the one flight where someone — the MTI has to go on
 6 emergency leave or the MTI has this or that, and that
 7 flight seems to have to go through two or three.
 8 Staff, do you...
 9 COLONEL EISEN: Sir, some of the things
 10 we've worked on is one of our largest augmentee
 11 requirements is to support the security forces, and I've
 12 gotten relief on that through the base. We still support
 13 some of the other augmentee requirements, but that was
 14 one of our biggest ones.
 15 The reason I got the relief is because my
 16 current manning's at 75 percent, and the security forces
 17 are about the same manning level on the base. And what I
 18 did there is until we get healthier, until we get more
 19 people on board to help that standardization, to get more
 20 folks lined up with their flights, to stay with their
 21 flights, the security forces folks have kind of eased off
 22 on that.
 23 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: The 75

1 percent, you need to realize also, is because we plus'd-
 2 up the MTI's by sixty-two MTI's as a result of Kassebaum
 3 Baker. We dropped flight size down to fifty-eight to
 4 forty-eight.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And it
 6 hasn't all been filled.
 7 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: It hasn't
 8 been filled. I mean, that's a fourteen-week school and
 9 recruiting and et cetera. So it's going to — it's a
 10 slow process.
 11 MS. POPE: But in terms of what I think
 12 General Christmas is asking — and it's a little bit
 13 different than the pulling out temporarily — is that you
 14 might be at the end of your commitment, and so you will
 15 move on to your next assignment totally in mid-cycle.
 16 It's one thing coming out for a temporary assignment, but
 17 it was pretty much routine and not the exception that the
 18 instructors would leave a group of recruits mid-cycle.
 19 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: It should
 20 not be routine. It's not designed to be routine. In
 21 fact, as you may remember, on your first visit we talked
 22 about having a separate cadre for Warrior Week.
 23 MS. POPE: Right.

1 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: And the
 2 MTI's rebelled and said, "No, they're mine. I want to
 3 take them from day one to the day they graduate." That's
 4 the way it's designed. Probably doesn't work as well as
 5 it should, but that's the way the process is designed.
 6 I think it works. I'm not sure you have a
 7 totally accurate picture, but I will admit it
 8 continuously comes up on critiques. It's much easier for
 9 a trainee to deal with one MTI or two MTI's than it is to
 10 deal with a wide number, and that's what generally
 11 happens.
 12 It's not that the MTI's do anything bad;
 13 it's just that this MTI may have slightly different
 14 standards than she did or than this one did. And any
 15 time you have it, it's confusing, and it's easier —
 16 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I guess one
 17 of my reasons for raising it is one of the criticisms
 18 that has brought this panel together — one of the
 19 criticisms of the services — was in some areas the lack
 20 of cohesion. And my experience tells me that as long as
 21 I have a consistent, capable leader, I can have cohesion.
 22 The subordinates can change, but I can
 23 have cohesion. But if you remove that leader from a unit

1 that's trying to accomplish a specific mission, the odds
 2 are you will break the cohesion. And that's the only
 3 reason I brought it up.
 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: It's the
 5 ideal way. It's supposed to work that way and — where
 6 they should be exposed to two MTI's.
 7 MS. POPE: Well, and maybe it goes back to
 8 your question on what do we do. I mean, is it a manpower
 9 issue? I mean, is it —
 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Yes,
 11 especially in the summers when — because that's when our
 12 MTI's — just like anyone else, they have kids and they
 13 want to take leave in the summer. So yes, there are —
 14 it's a bigger problem then.
 15 COLONEL EISEN: Part of it is a ratio
 16 issue. The Kassebaum Baker suggested — and it's
 17 actually a very good recommendation — that we reduce the
 18 number of trainees per flight. And with the increased
 19 manpower authorizations, instead of having 1.5 MTI's per
 20 flight, which is about what we have now, we'll be able to
 21 go to two MTI's per single flight.
 22 What that's going to do for us, it allows
 23 us the flexibility to keep those folks in that flight.

1 One of those two. And even if one gets pulled off to do
 2 an additional duty for a period of time, at least that
 3 other remaining person will be there. Right now, we're
 4 sharing three MTI's between two flights. And if one
 5 person gets pulled off, you tend not to back-fill.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But even
 7 with as you've described it — I reduce the number of
 8 trainees; I increase the number of MTI's — it also comes
 9 down to a personnel management issue.
 10 COLONEL EISEN: Yes, sir.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: You know,
 12 you say, "Well, he pulls off" — The ideal thing is that
 13 those trainees are there for a six-week period and if I
 14 have the same MTI's for that six weeks.
 15 Now, I schedule his or her leave as an MTI
 16 after that, before they pick up their next group, the
 17 idea being that leadership influence has been over those
 18 trainees for that solid six weeks. And no matter what
 19 you say, that leadership influence will stay with that
 20 airman. You know, whether they stay for four years or
 21 whether they stay all the way, they'll remember.
 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: I don't mean
 23 this in a derogatory manner because I think it's very

1 important, but one of the biggest manpower demands on our
 2 MTI's are the tours that we do at Lackland. And I don't
 3 just —
 4 MR. MOORE: The what?
 5 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: The tours.
 6 And I don't just mean — Like just for example, yesterday
 7 at Lackland we —
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: We fully
 9 understand that one.
 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Well, you
 11 understand, I mean, with Kassebaum and, of course, with
 12 this Commission. Yesterday I had twenty-eight
 13 congressional staffers. Last week we had the Assistant
 14 Secretary of Defense, plus additional staffers. Senator
 15 Graham and Senator Bailey-Hutchinson are coming next
 16 week. Every week we probably average three or four.
 17 MS. POPE: Maybe the Air Force can give
 18 you in protocol school an assignment — some protocol
 19 that don't take from — I mean, I think that's a —
 20 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Well, the
 21 problem is they all want to see —
 22 MS. POPE: Right.
 23 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: And

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1 rightfully so. If I can take a visit to the FTX and let
 2 them watch the basics and the FTX, if I can take them to
 3 the confidence course and if I can give them the
 4 opportunity to have lunch with the basic trainees — or
 5 breakfast or dinner, it doesn't matter — it's a
 6 successful visit because the trainees will sell
 7 themselves.
 8 And I think it's also extremely important
 9 because I don't think there's a wide understanding of
 10 what we do at basic training outside the people who have
 11 been there. So I think it's important.
 12 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: I must say as a
 13 commander, this whole — I think your point is very well-
 14 taken. I think it's a goal we should honestly work
 15 towards and try and figure out. We can do this better
 16 because it's a manpower issue once we get our manning up
 17 to where it ought to be.
 18 But we ought to make this a priority if
 19 it's a concern to our trainees, and it is a concern to
 20 us. We can manage it. We can learn from the other
 21 services, I think, and make —
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: We're not
 23 trying to tell you how to, you know —

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1 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: No, no.
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: Sir, we
 3 agree with that.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: That's
 5 something that —
 6 MAJOR GENERAL PELAK: We ought to look at
 7 it and see if we can't make it better.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL ESMOND: Yes.
 9 Philosophically, that concept is absolutely sound and we
 10 agree with it, sir. And we can learn from the other
 11 services, apparently.
 12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: To put a
 13 positive twist on this, I must tell you that in light of
 14 the disruptions that we were told about and we saw, it is
 15 amazing what your end product is.
 16 Now, that's from an Army perspective of
 17 thinking like, gee, if we had done that that way when I
 18 was a drill sergeant, I'm not sure it would have come out
 19 quite as good.
 20 So I'm not saying you're doing everything
 21 wrong.
 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL BARKSDALE: I think if I
 23 had to point to one thing that we absolutely should never

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1 change, it's never allow an MTI to be a non-volunteer. I
 2 spent three or four hours with the former Secretary of
 3 the Army, talking at length. And Mr. West met with our
 4 MTI's, was scheduled for forty-five minutes. He spent
 5 four hours trying to figure out how can we get that same
 6 level of volunteers in the Army.
 7 And I just think it's critical. Even if
 8 we have to continue to have 75 percent manning in our
 9 MTI's, I'll take 75 percent manning and all volunteers.
 10 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: That's
 11 interesting.
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Great. Well, we very
 13 much appreciate your coming one more time. As you see,
 14 we have a couple of absentees and we reserve the right to
 15 —
 16 MR. MOORE: Even some tardies.
 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And one incomplete. And
 18 we reserve the right to pass on some questions.
 19 But this has been a very informative
 20 session. We appreciate it. And we also appreciate the
 21 help that you all have been extending all along. It's
 22 been a fine friendship. Thank you.
 23 (A brief recess was taken.)

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1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Gentlemen, good
 2 afternoon, and thank you for coming to see us today. We
 3 have one old hand and one new guest of the Commission.
 4 And I'll review our procedures very
 5 briefly, which is we are taping and preparing a written
 6 transcript, so we ask the folks talking to us primarily
 7 to keep their voice up and I hope we won't be too hard on
 8 you today. We have your biographies, so I'll dispense
 9 with that part of it so that we can launch right into the
 10 substance and I invite you to make presentation if you
 11 have one.
 12 And we have been normally following our
 13 presentations with questions by the commissioners, just
 14 going around the table; however, we have found in today's
 15 discussions concerning readiness and so forth that
 16 sometimes it's better to just break in with the
 17 questions. So if you don't mind, we may stop you from
 18 time to time to clarify a point before it gets away from
 19 us.
 20 But we do thank you for coming today and
 21 welcome you and look forward to hearing what you have to
 22 say.
 23 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Thank you, ma'am.

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1 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: My name is Tom
 2 Jones. I was here before, and I'm Director of Training
 3 and Education at Quantico. Before I pass the baton on to
 4 Jan, who is going to talk about readiness, you've all
 5 been to recruit training and to SOI, the School of
 6 Infantry that deals with Marine Combat Training for all
 7 MOS's other than infantry. I don't think we have any
 8 outstanding issues from the last.
 9 I would say when I was here back in
 10 November, when we talked about reviewing Kassebaum Baker,
 11 we had a couple of issues that were still outstanding,
 12 one of which was recruiting, which we'll solve this
 13 coming summer. One was the DI's, and we have now — with
 14 the recent class of right before Christmas graduating, we
 15 have 113 female DI's in Parris Island, which is well
 16 above the required number. That's a success story.
 17 We had a question last time about the
 18 recruit — we call it PRASP — recruit leave before you
 19 get to Marine Combat Training. We didn't really have the
 20 data. I think, General Keys, you had some concern, sir.
 21 Since that last time, we've, of course, revamped —
 22 totally revamped the PRASP. Fourteen days is the limit
 23 now.

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1 In fact, both coasts report that the PRASP
 2 is really an asset because it really helps the flow of
 3 individuals into Marine Combat Training. If they didn't
 4 have the PRASP, they'd be waiting for training for
 5 lengths of time that could be as long as up to thirty
 6 days.
 7 When you compare those Marines who
 8 participate in PRASP, there's absolutely no scintilla of
 9 evidence that anything's different physically,
 10 performance-wise. In fact, ironically, the attrition
 11 rate for PRASP Marines in the last three months has been
 12 lower than those of non-PRASP Marines.
 13 So I would say it's probably — back when
 14 we had thirty, thirty-five days of people going off to
 15 recruit training, we probably had a deleterious effect.
 16 It looks like now ten to fourteen days is a good number,
 17 and it seems to be working not only well from a
 18 preparation for the next school, but also it helps us
 19 with continuing the flow into Marine Combat Training.
 20 Those are really the only issues relative
 21 to training. I'm prepared to answer any questions of —
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Are you talking
 23 about attrition after — like in SOTG?

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1 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: I'm talking
 2 about attrition, sir, at SOTG.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Yeah.
 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Individuals at
 5 SOTG.
 6 And as far as performance of the physical
 7 readiness PFT, they don't take a PFT at MCT, so that's
 8 not really a fair barometer. But as far as conditioning
 9 heights and actual success at MCT, not a scintilla of
 10 evidence there's any difference at all.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: General, this is a little
 12 off the subject but there were new physical standards
 13 going into effect October 1, as I recall, which, for
 14 women in the Marine Corps, increased their run —
 15 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Women run three
 16 miles.
 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — to three miles. And I
 18 remember hearing some concern about that and I just
 19 wonder if you have any early results of that change.
 20 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: I don't think we
 21 have any — Do you have any data, Leon, of specific
 22 results?
 23 But it's going quite well, and it's

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1 especially going well in recruit training. I don't know
 2 about the overall Marine Corps.
 3 Go ahead, Leon.
 4 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: Yes, sir. I
 5 can add a little on that.
 6 Actually, we implemented the increase to
 7 female physical fitness testing 1 January, '97, so
 8 actually we've had it almost two years. The most
 9 significant changes were to the — were directed towards
 10 women, though we made some changes for the males as I
 11 mentioned back in early November as far as pull-ups, et
 12 cetera.
 13 And in actuality, in Fiscal Year '97, the
 14 average physical fitness test scores in the Marine Corps
 15 for men and women were about the same, but for the first
 16 time in many years the women actually were out-scoring
 17 the men — just by a few points, but we think a lot of
 18 that had an impact with the dead-hang pull-ups.
 19 They're both about the same now, in about
 20 the mid-230 range, which is above first class. And an
 21 interesting point is the final PFT scores for recruits on
 22 both coasts is reflecting or mirroring just about what it
 23 is out in the operational forces.

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1 So what we're graduating to those
 2 standards — that common standard, is preparing those
 3 Marines for what they're going to face out in the Fleet
 4 as far as physical fitness.
 5 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Thanks, Leon.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Anita, are we going to go
 7 around —
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Do you want to go ahead
 9 with the readiness —
 10 DR. MOSKOS: I wanted to ask a training
 11 question first.
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Well, why don't we
 13 go ahead.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: May I give this to Colonel
 15 Pappa? The Navy gave us a table on stress fracture rates
 16 by gender, which is very understandable, and I wonder,
 17 you know, if we can get something like that from the
 18 Marines.
 19 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: I think we do
 20 have something like that.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: This is what it looks like
 22 (Indicating). And that, you know, can be in some format
 23 like that.

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1 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: Yes, sir. In
 2 fact, on the last task to the Commission we provided
 3 stress fracture rates from — on the Recruit Depot side.
 4 We haven't captured that on the operational forces.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: No, the recruit side is all
 6 we need. Yeah, that is —
 7 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: But we did
 8 provide that.
 9 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Thank you.
 10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Are there any
 11 other questions on training?
 12 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAPP: I have a copy
 13 with me. I'll get it to you at the break.
 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Why don't we
 15 proceed with the readiness brief, reserving our time for
 16 later to ask additional questions about training.
 17 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Okay. Good
 18 afternoon, ma'am, and distinguished members of the
 19 Commission. I am Brigadier General Jan Huly. I'm the
 20 Director of Operations at Headquarters Marine Corps.
 21 Readiness falls under my purview.
 22 As the nations by-law force-in-readiness,
 23 we in the Marine Corps believe that we have to maintain a

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1 semblance of readiness, to be the most ready when the
 2 nation is least ready. That means to us an expeditionary
 3 nature. That means that we've got to be prepared to go
 4 at a very short notice. And as we are the smallest of
 5 the armed forces, the majority of our people need to be
 6 prepared to deploy on short notice.
 7 Because an individual needs to be prepared
 8 on short notice, we believe that we put the primary
 9 emphasis in becoming ready and training in the training
 10 environment so that when an individual reports to a unit,
 11 he can be — he or she is ready to deploy within their
 12 occupational field or within that unit in a short period
 13 of time.
 14 What is readiness? Defining it is very
 15 conceptual. You ask any three people, you'll probably
 16 get four different answer as to what readiness really
 17 means. But generally in the Marine Corps, within all
 18 occupational fields, within all types of units, at all
 19 levels, it means generally a unit's ability to perform
 20 its wartime mission: how ready is it to do that? That's
 21 generally the way that we define readiness.
 22 We use what we call the Status of
 23 Resources and Training System or SORTS. It measures

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1 readiness in four different areas. We do this in
 2 accordance with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and everyone
 3 else. It measures training readiness, personnel
 4 readiness, and equipment and equipment-on-hand readiness
 5 — how ready is that equipment and how much do you have
 6 on hand.
 7 We do this on a monthly basis. We keep
 8 track of it by unit at Headquarters Marine Corps.
 9 Remember, I said we track readiness by unit in the Marine
 10 Corps. We do not track individual readiness. We do not
 11 track readiness by gender in the Marine Corps. So that
 12 will probably have some bearing on what we discuss today.
 13 The bottom line to it all is we do two
 14 things in the Marine Corps as represented by Tom here and
 15 myself. We train Marines, and we go out and fight
 16 battles. We hope we win them. That's what we're here
 17 about today.
 18 I have submitted a statement for the
 19 record prior to this. Thank you, ma'am.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Questions?
 21 You're going to have to excuse us. We've
 22 been asking questions for a very long time today.
 23 MR. PANG: Well, you know, I have one.

1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thanks, Fred.
 2 MR. PANG: You know, when General Reimer
 3 came before this Commission yesterday, I mean, you know,
 4 the issue of how you measure readiness was an issue he
 5 brought up, not one that we brought up, and he basically
 6 made the argument that the whole way we go about — the
 7 military goes about measuring readiness, he feels, ought
 8 to be looked at again and perhaps re-done.
 9 And he used this argument: he basically
 10 said when you look at what we call upon the military to
 11 do today, it's a whole lot different than it was before
 12 the Wall came down, and the whole system of measuring
 13 readiness that we have today was predicated on the way it
 14 was back then and really hasn't evolved much.
 15 He didn't say that you shouldn't measure
 16 units, you know, with regard to their ability to
 17 accomplish their wartime missions, but he suggested that
 18 there might be — there ought to be a measure in there
 19 with regard to the employment of forces as you use them
 20 today — you know, in the multiple operations that you
 21 conduct which he claimed, you know, or suggested was
 22 three to four times more — okay? — than it was, you
 23 know, before the Wall came down.

1 I was just wondering, you know, what your
 2 thoughts — how you would react to that sort of
 3 suggestion.
 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: I've thought
 5 about this issue long and hard since I've been in this
 6 job and actually figured out where I was supposed to park
 7 and all of those types of things to get a grasp on this.
 8 It seems that we used to have — When I
 9 first came in the Marine Corps — I don't want to sound
 10 like that was a long time ago, but maybe because I was at
 11 such a junior level when I came in, obviously as a second
 12 lieutenant, I never heard of SORTS or any of that kind of
 13 readiness.
 14 I'm not sure whether it was not in
 15 existence then — and I would defer to some of the more
 16 senior members of the panel here that — you know,
 17 whether it really existed back then or not.
 18 We didn't do that. You checked readiness
 19 by inspecting your — I won't mention any names, of
 20 course, but — You inspected your people; you went to the
 21 field with them; you participated with them on training
 22 exercises and you watched them train, and they were
 23 evaluated doing those types of things that you expected

1 them to do.
 2 It wasn't something that could easily be
 3 placed on a report that could be read in Washington, D.C.
 4 You had a feel whether your people were ready to go or
 5 not. You ran with them and those types of things. You
 6 just — You could tell.
 7 I think we had a good objective way of
 8 telling whether people were ready to accomplish their
 9 mission. But because of our centralized movements, I
 10 think, along the way we've decided, "Gee, we really have
 11 to figure out — "We have to have something we can
 12 measure back here. We need some empirical data to be
 13 able to do this. Ol' Lieutenant Huly's gut reaction of
 14 whether his unit is ready or not anymore is not
 15 sufficient for us back here."
 16 We have since gone through and evaluated
 17 the way we train. Not only the way we train our people,
 18 but how we train our people to prepare to deploy. We
 19 have institutionalized the training — the testing of
 20 that training in the various programs. We call them
 21 Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluations or we call them
 22 Special Operations Capabilities Exercises, and these are
 23 exercises and events that we put a unit through certain

1 scenarios that we think they're getting prepared for if
 2 they deploy.
 3 For instance, if I've got a Marine
 4 Expeditionary Unit in Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, being
 5 prepared to go to the Mediterranean theater and some of
 6 the things they might be prepared to do are non-combatant
 7 evacuation operations, security of embassies or
 8 humanitarian assistance operations, we will have that
 9 unit in a short period of time perform those evolutions
 10 and we will grade them. Upon completion, we determine —
 11 we certify that they're prepared to deploy. That's not
 12 necessarily something that we put in a report card and
 13 send up here and measure.
 14 So I think maybe many of our units are
 15 doing what General Reimer suggested, but we're also
 16 combining that with those requirements to feed the
 17 "question" people up here in providing answers to the
 18 empirical data to be able to help us tell our story
 19 inside the Beltway.
 20 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: And, plus, we've
 21 been deploying units routinely for better than twenty
 22 years. I'm not suggesting the Army hasn't been, but, I
 23 mean, that's been part of our way of doing things. We've

1 had unit deployment for the Marine Corps now for sixteen
 2 years and we've been deploying MEU's for over decades.
 3 And so determining whether those units are
 4 ready to go is not the difficult part. It's all the
 5 OPTEMPO, now that we have it, of the extra pop-up targets
 6 in-between. That's what causes the difficult time.
 7 MR. PANG: You know, with regard to that,
 8 you know, we've heard, you know, in walking around — and
 9 again, it's not empirical, but when you talk to people, I
 10 mean, you know, the sense that I got was that there is a
 11 significant stress on the readiness of the forces that
 12 are not deployed. I mean, you know, the ones that are
 13 back home.
 14 Because when you look at the fill rates, I
 15 mean, almost every place we went, regardless of what the
 16 service was, including the Marine Corps, I mean, you
 17 know, when you talked to leadership, they said, "We just
 18 don't have" — you know, "Here's our manning document
 19 requirement. Here's what we've got. But this is not
 20 really the number of people we've got because, you know,
 21 there's borrowed military manpower and that takes this
 22 much off and they go to work in the base details or
 23 whatever, so this is the actual number that we really

1 have."
 2 And I was just wondering, you know, how
 3 you feel, you know, with regard to the active duty
 4 strength of the Marine Corps. And, you know, is it about
 5 right or are you constrained or — How do you feel about
 6 it?
 7 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: I'll go first,
 8 Tom.
 9 I was — As a colonel, I was a beneficiary
 10 of that system because I was a Marine Expeditionary Unit
 11 commander, and my commander and all the commanders that
 12 supported me ensured that I had exactly what I needed to
 13 deploy: the quality, the quantity, and the timeliness to
 14 work with it and train it up.
 15 I will tell you I felt — I come from a
 16 large Italian family on my mother's side and I felt much
 17 like some of the kids in that family — that others in
 18 the family had to sacrifice, some of the elders, so I
 19 could be prepared to like go off to college when they
 20 didn't have that opportunity.
 21 And that's the way we do business in the
 22 Marine Corps today still. We have some units that we
 23 bring up to peak — manpower readiness, equipment-wise.

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1 We still do this. They get what's needed to go forth,
 2 and those units that just returned, who aren't as likely
 3 to go on a deployment — a scheduled deployment — aren't
 4 as ready to go.
 5 Now, the bite comes. Okay, we're doing
 6 okay at this time because there isn't the stress and the
 7 requirement for those other units to pack up and go right
 8 now. But as we saw during DESERT STORM, if somebody were
 9 to say to some of those units that just returned and
 10 whose people are attriting and their equipment needs
 11 extra work — they aren't ready to go.
 12 My observations. Do we need more people?
 13 We could certainly employ more people in the Marine
 14 Corps, the exact numbers of which would be subject to
 15 study and scrutiny by what other constraints we would
 16 have — equipment, facilities, training opportunities to
 17 do that. But right now, I have a requirement probably
 18 easily for another three, four, five thousand Marines
 19 that I could gainfully employ.
 20 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Can I
 21 follow-on to that real quick, Fred?
 22 The three sister services have testified
 23 that their first-line leader level — E-5/E-6, if you

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1 will — are critical shortages and that, inside of
 2 everything else, is one of the biggest contributors to
 3 their concerns on readiness.
 4 Is the Marine Corps — Are you
 5 experiencing the same shortage in those mid grades
 6 because of retention issues or whatever? Or are you
 7 pretty healthy?
 8 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Where we — Yes.
 9 The answer is yes, we are experiencing a critical
 10 shortage. And the reason is our drill instructors and
 11 recruiters are two big manpower consumers of our NCO
 12 ranks — our corporals, sergeants, and junior staff
 13 sergeants. That's the backbone of our recruiting force
 14 — our drill instructor force.
 15 And another force that's gained a lot of
 16 attention lately is our Marine security guards. We have
 17 some 1,100 Marines working under the purview of the
 18 Department of State, providing internal security to our
 19 embassies throughout the world. We have a requirement —
 20 a stated requirement by the Department of State — to
 21 increase that about 350 Marines over the next couple of
 22 years as they continue to open more and more embassies.
 23 Those are all corporals and sergeants that we have out

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1 there.
 2 So when you go to Camp LeJeune or Camp
 3 Pendleton and go look on a flight line or out in a squad
 4 and you say, "Gee, I remember from my days a squad leader
 5 was a buck sergeant. How come I got a lance corporal?,"
 6 it's because his buck sergeant is filling one of those
 7 1,100 or 1,200 billets that we've got in embassies out
 8 there. That comes right out of our table of organization
 9 structure.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Just to
 11 clarify, though, the problem that the other services have
 12 articulated is that their drain is from attrition; that
 13 their NCO's, their E-5's, their E-6's — they're walking.
 14 What you're saying is that's not the case.
 15 It's a matter of the Marine Corps has determined that its
 16 investment of those ranks needs to be into recruiting,
 17 into recruit training, and the added requirements of the
 18 State Department.
 19 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: That's right,
 20 sir. Like if you go to an FMF unit right now, it
 21 wouldn't be uncommon to find a sergeant. If you find
 22 sergeants, they've got probably 400 or 500 deployed days.
 23 They may have made two pumps through the Mediterranean

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1 and then maybe one to UDP to Okinawa.
 2 That's one of the real problems. They're
 3 the best and the brightest, as we talked about the last
 4 time I was here. We've got 95 percent of our people are
 5 volunteers for DI. Not so much recruiting duty, but it's
 6 the same spigot. We take the same quality for
 7 recruiting, DI, and MSG. Same criteria.
 8 And so we get a goodly number of people
 9 that, we say, volunteer, because it's very advantageous;
 10 because the percentage for advancement is so much
 11 greater, almost 30 percent greater when they come to
 12 promotion boards. But we have a significant problem when
 13 you go down to the ones that are left on deployed days
 14 and whatnot.
 15 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Overall, we are
 16 not experiencing a retention problem at the first-term
 17 level. Overall, I say. There are some individual MOS's
 18 that we're having trouble keeping aloft and those are the
 19 ones — Generally you'll find that those are the ones
 20 that we compete with the civilian community for high-
 21 paying jobs.
 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Air traffic
 23 control, radar, things of that nature.

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1 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: And computer
 2 repair folks, data-processors, those types.
 3 MR. PANG: You know, just a follow-up, and
 4 it's a general question. I mean, you know, having heard
 5 what you said, I mean, what is your assessment of the
 6 overall readiness of the Marine Corps? Has it kind of
 7 reached the point where you see it kind of level, going
 8 down and leveling off, or on the way up? I mean...
 9 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: The Commandant of
 10 the Marine Corps made a conscious decision some years
 11 back that our first priority was going to be current
 12 readiness and we were going to maintain that at all
 13 costs.
 14 What those costs have been in being able
 15 to field a fighting force of today, both putting our
 16 people there and our assets, our concerns — it has cost
 17 us in modernization terribly. We don't — Our
 18 procurement for the Marine Corps has been down
 19 significantly. It's come in our manpower costs in being
 20 able to provide those quality-of-life things to our
 21 facilities — child-care, morale welfare, recreation,
 22 those types of things.
 23 That's what's really — That's what the

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1 cost has been to us.
 2 MR. PANG: So it's driven you down. You
 3 know, I mean, I'd say — Let me kind of back up a little
 4 bit. I mean, you know, before the drawdown, I mean, the
 5 Marine Corps, as I recall, had about 182,000 or something
 6 like that on active duty. It was a pretty robust number.
 7 There was a study done at Quantico by the
 8 current Commandant and he basically said the number —
 9 you know, when they did all the math and stuff and did
 10 the thing, came out to 177,000, as I recall, or maybe
 11 even higher. I think it was 178,000 or somewhere around
 12 there.
 13 But the Congress had put a floor, you
 14 know, on the number of active duty people you could have.
 15 I remember because I was there on the Senate Armed
 16 Services Committee. We worked on that. Senator Glenn
 17 was my chairman. He said, you know, based on this study,
 18 based on today's force analysis — okay? — that was
 19 conducted, you know, you can't go below 177,000.
 20 Then the next step after that, you know —
 21 and this is after I left and was gone — I mean, the
 22 thing dropped to 174,000. So where are you now?
 23 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: We're at 174,000

1 now.
 2 MR. PANG: 174,000.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: But it wasn't
 4 DoD that dropped it, was it?
 5 MR. PANG: Will you go below that?
 6 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: We're at about
 7 172,000.
 8 MR. PANG: 172,000.
 9 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Our problem is
 10 going to be now, if we don't — if we get all these
 11 demands as Jan mentioned a moment ago on the fast anti-
 12 terrorist teams and also the MSG's, with the increase in
 13 the security on embassies, we're going to have to have an
 14 increase or then we're going into muscle and bone.
 15 MR. MOORE: You mandated in-strength is
 16 174,000. And you're saying you're going to have to have
 17 some relief on that?
 18 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: We're at
 19 174,000. We paid a bill last year to recoup some QDR
 20 monies and we gave up —
 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Our mandated in-
 22 strength — and I think where we were on 30 September
 23 this year — was 172,500, give or take.

1 MR. MOORE: Okay. See, I thought it was
 2 174,000, too.
 3 MR. PANG: So it dropped below that. I
 4 mean, you know...
 5 MR. MOORE: And so that's going to be cut
 6 even more if you have to take Marines out to go to these
 7 additional embassy billets is what you're saying.
 8 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: No, sir. That
 9 would still come out of our strength.
 10 MR. MOORE: That's what I mean. That's
 11 going to come out of your strength.
 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: We will still
 13 have that same amount of people —
 14 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Those are
 15 operational units.
 16 MR. MOORE: So you need some relief, then
 17 —
 18 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: We're buying
 19 that. But where you will take them, we'll scramble
 20 around and look to see where we can draw down other units
 21 to get those.
 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: I guess that —
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And, Jan,

1 it might be helpful — Excuse me.
 2 It might be helpful — this morning the
 3 CNO phrased their readiness situation in deployed
 4 readiness and non-deployed readiness. From a Marine
 5 Corps standpoint, when we're deployed, we're the most
 6 ready. And are we similar to the Navy — that when the
 7 force comes back, that's our non-deployed status, and,
 8 therefore, we're less ready at that time? And could you
 9 quantify that?
 10 I'm trying to help for the panel's
 11 standpoint what they might put a reference on.
 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Okay. Let's use
 13 — One of the units I'm most familiar with would be an
 14 infantry battalion. We kind of looked at it that an
 15 infantry battalion has a life cycle of approximately
 16 eighteen months. It prepares for a work-up for six
 17 months, it deploys for six months, and then it comes back
 18 for six months. Then it kind of stands down and picks up
 19 garrison-type responsibilities and training events, then
 20 it starts that cycle over again. Six months, training to
 21 go again.
 22 So if you'll see over the life cycle of
 23 two of those cycles of thirty-six months, it deploys for

1 six months, it's back for a year, it deploys for six
 2 months, back for a year.
 3 You get — An average Marine comes in, an
 4 infantryman, for a four-year enlistment. He goes to
 5 about three-and-a-half months of recruit training.
 6 Follow that on with his School of Infantry training, a
 7 little boot camp leave, go out and help the recruiter
 8 maybe; we have him for approximately three-and-a-half
 9 years. We try and cycle him into those units.
 10 And I'm sure the Commandant told you what
 11 we're trying to do with cohesion — get a large group of
 12 them, put them in through recruit training and combat
 13 training together, and then they'll all go to the same
 14 units in roughly the same sizes.
 15 Then upon the completion of their three
 16 years — we hope they're out there for three of that
 17 three-and-a-half years — they will attrit. And we hope
 18 we've got it set up that roughly half of them attrit
 19 between the two deployments; so about 40, 50, maybe 60
 20 percent of a unit is turning over in that life cycle
 21 somewhere.
 22 Now, what happens traditionally is we put
 23 those people in there, attempting to put them in before

1 their six-month work-up starts. Sometimes you're
 2 fortunate enough to get some individuals to extend to
 3 make a deployment, helping your numbers even better of
 4 keeping returning lettermen, so to speak, to go on
 5 deployments, but generally they leave the unit and
 6 transfers occur sometime right after they get back.
 7 We have seen usually personnel dips of
 8 people leaving the units for one, two, three months
 9 maybe. A unit will go from the highest of readiness
 10 ratings which are category 1 — C-1 and C-2, we call them
 11 — to sometimes down to C-3 and C-4. With cohesion,
 12 we're able to get a little bit smarter and a little bit
 13 more precise in our assignments, and the numbers of those
 14 units that actually experience large personnel turnovers
 15 is becoming fewer and fewer, and the periods of time
 16 they're in a C-3 status is getting shorter and shorter.
 17 So yes, we are seasonal, we are cyclical,
 18 we do experience some readiness decreases upon returning,
 19 but we build those up quickly.
 20 Now, those are for an infantry unit.
 21 There are other units that — there are some occupational
 22 fields I just am having a tough time getting healthy at.
 23 Intelligence analysts, air traffic controllers,

1 communication specialists, so to speak. Those have
 2 historically been short MOS's, occupational fields, and
 3 those units that have a preponderance of people in those,
 4 their readiness just doesn't ever get as high.
 5 Does that answer your question, sir?
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Hopefully
 7 that cleared the air.
 8 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, I
 9 mean, it doesn't —
 10 DR. CANTOR: It doesn't —
 11 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I'll tell
 12 you why it doesn't clear the air for me. If it is true
 13 what you're saying, especially about those critical non-
 14 commissioned officers that are — that, for the Marine
 15 Corps, probably more so than the other services, they
 16 really are the spear into the battle.
 17 So if you're missing the experience
 18 because they're being drill sergeants, recruiters and
 19 embassy guards, then to me, that equates to a readiness
 20 — I take nothing away from the capability of the Marine
 21 Corps today and what a lance corporal can do, but to me,
 22 it takes away from the readiness of a unit if you don't
 23 have that experienced squad leader available to you.

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 350</p> <p>1 And I guess what I'm hearing is because 2 you are cyclic, you're able to fill those that are 3 scheduled to deploy and operate in an environment and 4 they go pretty well full-up. 5 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Yes, sir. 6 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: While the 7 ones that are back in a training status to get ready to 8 deploy go somewhat without. 9 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: That's right. 10 In fact — 11 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: They pay the 12 bill. 13 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: In fact, Jan 14 used his example. He was a MEU commander. I was a 15 regimental commander, and I would supply battalions to 16 either go to unit deployment Okinawa or to the MEU's. In 17 my twenty-six months as a regimental commander, I even 18 deployed myself thirteen months. And the battalions, of 19 course, are going to deploy more than that. 20 And what happens — what really drives you 21 to a distraction and really impacts deleteriously on the 22 readiness is when you have all these pop-up targets. 23 When the unit comes back, as Jan said, we try to give —</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 353</p> <p>1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: And what Tom was 2 saying about deployments is true. Even though you have 3 formal fixed deployments to Okinawa and to the 4 Mediterranean, it's the in-between things that kill you. 5 When I was down in the 2d Division, the average infantry 6 Marine in the division only slept in his own bed a 7 hundred days a year. 8 Now, this is a guy that's married, 9 families, whatever. That was average. That's because of 10 those things — you know, the Haitis, whatever, whatever. 11 Plus, the one thing that's not brought out 12 here is all these damn joint exercises. And, you know, 13 we say that we're going to stop it. We don't stop it 14 because every commander says, "I want to play." 15 So, I mean, this is going to keep going. 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: The reason 17 — 18 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: And that's not 19 uncommon. That goes on. We're getting ready to 20 transition — change our rifle company that's down 21 providing security in Haiti now. They're going down I 22 believe the first week in February and they just returned 23 from a unit — six-month unit deployment in early</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 351</p> <p>1 we try to shoot for eighteen months return. Then we 2 backed off to about fourteen months return when we had to 3 do more extensive deployments in the Mediterranean and 4 whatnot. 5 Then you have the Caribbean, Haiti. I 6 participated in that — one of the battalions. That was 7 a battalion that had been back from unit deployment only 8 two MOS's. Then we had two battalions back-to-back, got 9 a chance to go down to GITMO for four months apiece. One 10 of the battalions went to GITMO for four months, got a 11 chance to come back for two months and then go to Okinawa 12 for six months. 13 So those pop-up targets, as we call them, 14 are what really exacerbate and really makes it difficult 15 then to have your units supplied with the right NCO's 16 because of the demands. But I think if we can keep the 17 pop-up targets and unexpected deployments down, you know, 18 to at least some relative norm, then we can supply the 19 units with the number of NCO's and whatnot, and staff 20 NCO's they need. 21 Now, as Jan said, he is from the Italian 22 family that gets the first pick. Some units don't get 23 that. Some of the infantry units that are going like,</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 354</p> <p>1 December. 2 So that's about the cycle. 3 DR. CANTOR: Could I ask a general 4 question on this? Maybe it's in your written testimony, 5 in which case, fine; we'll read it. But what I didn't 6 get here that I did get from the other services — and 7 maybe it's just not as much a problem — is what the 8 pressure points are. 9 I mean, in answer to questioning, you're 10 coming out with some of the issues that are pressure — 11 staffing, these other things — pop-up things. But is 12 that in your testimony? Do you give us a sense of what 13 the pressure — I mean, I know the Marine Corps is tough 14 and you can handle everything. But it would be nice to 15 know — I mean, there must be some challenges to 16 readiness. 17 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Our challenges — 18 DR. CANTOR: Some of this is coming out 19 now. It would be nice to see those catalogued. 20 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Again, my primary 21 readiness concerns are aging equipment, military 22 compensation so that I can retain good people. Those are 23 — And modernization. Those are my three primary</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 352</p> <p>1 say, to unit deployment to Okinawa, we may not stack them 2 the way we do the people going to the MEU's and whatnot. 3 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: But 4 deployments — 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: But you have a 6 — the deploying unit to Okinawa or the Med — C-2? Is 7 that what it is? 8 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Yes, sir. 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: So all it's 10 going to have is the minimum number. And what he was 11 talking about earlier was what we know as the Fleet 12 Assistance Program. I mean, it's a fact you live with. 13 You know, you have to supply the base with certain people 14 because it's these guys that are using the facilities. 15 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Right. 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: When you measure 17 readiness — what I think was missed today — you have C- 18 1, 2, 3 and 4 — personnel, whatever, whatever — but the 19 one that counts the most is the commander's evaluation. 20 That overrides everything else. At least, it did before. 21 And so if that guy says you're ready, you're basically 22 ready. 23 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Sure.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 355</p> <p>1 readiness concerns. 2 DR. CANTOR: And is that in your written 3 testimony? 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: That's not in 5 here. 6 DR. CANTOR: Okay. 7 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: But I'll be happy 8 to answer a question for the record and make sure that 9 you've got that. 10 DR. CANTOR: Great. 11 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: I think if 12 you're — 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I think that within the 14 last couple of weeks it was circulated — and I missed 15 it, too, but I'm told it was — that we received copies 16 of the Chief's testimony before the Senate which went 17 into a lot of detail about these issues. 18 DR. CANTOR: I didn't see that, so I think 19 that — 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. I'm sure they'll 21 be happy to give you another copy if — 22 DR. CANTOR: I'm sure it's there among the 23 boxes.</p>

1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Like me, yours is
 2 somewhere in the stack.
 3 DR. CANTOR: I'm fine. I just would like
 4 it to be there on the record because I'm assuming you
 5 have a program —
 6 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Again, my day-to-
 7 day readiness is not our problem. We're doing that at
 8 the expense of buying new equipment, fixing old equipment
 9 —
 10 DR. CANTOR: That's what I want to know.
 11 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: — and quality-
 12 of-life issues.
 13 DR. CANTOR: That's what I wanted.
 14 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: I think, though,
 15 in fairness, if you were to ask the operational
 16 commander, our counterparts in the field, that same
 17 question, ma'am, I think they would tell you just what
 18 General Keys articulated. You know, these pop-up
 19 targets, unexpected.
 20 I can plan for, I can deal with the
 21 individuals — And most individuals love to deploy. It's
 22 when they get back, and now you cause a little friction
 23 and whatnot when you have these unscheduled deployments

1 and whatnot.
 2 And in the last several years, we've had
 3 an inordinate number of unscheduled deployments. I mean,
 4 I think all services have. And I think probably in the
 5 next few years — That's the changing climate that
 6 somebody mentioned when we started, with the —
 7 DR. CANTOR: Right.
 8 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: — with the Wall
 9 coming down and now we've got so many of these different
 10 brush fires and whatnot. I think they're just only going
 11 to grow.
 12 MS. POPE: I don't want to belabor this
 13 question, but with the pop-up targets, I mean, has the
 14 Marine Corps quantified how many of the pop-up targets in
 15 any fiscal year is too many, that breaks — I mean, the
 16 Marine Corps is going to respond —
 17 DR. CANTOR: Right. That's the kind of
 18 thing I'm talking about.
 19 MS. POPE: — to whatever you have.
 20 That's not the question.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: But, see, you
 22 don't have — I mean, these come down from JC. That's
 23 just —

1 MS. POPE: No, no, no. I'm not saying —
 2 But I'm saying, at what point — At 172,000? 171,500?
 3 Whatever the current number is, at what point can you no
 4 longer do it?
 5 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Well, I think
 6 we've identified right now, ma'am, the fact if we have to
 7 start increasing these requirements for the Fleet —
 8 anti-terrorist teams — if we have to start increasing
 9 the security guards, especially the security guards —
 10 And that really impacts even how fast we can train them
 11 properly. I mean, that's a formal schools thing. That's
 12 a point now that you're going to explode a balloon now
 13 because the pressure is there.
 14 And that's — we're going to have to have
 15 some relief. Somebody's going to have to yell "uncle,"
 16 because what you're going to do then, you're going to —
 17 you're drawing into bone and muscle and you're going to
 18 really make — you're going to have a negative impact on
 19 operational units.
 20 I think we're there now if we hadn't
 21 gotten an increase, and I think it's in the offing.
 22 Because with the recent bombings of the embassies and
 23 whatnot, it's clearly in the offing.

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I think
 2 what's important for the Commission as we look across the
 3 armed services, the Navy and Marine Corps have been
 4 deploying and doing this for four or five decades. You
 5 know, the reality. We are now putting the Air Force and
 6 units of the Army that weren't in that role before, into
 7 that role.
 8 Those same types of experiences are
 9 experiences that air expeditionary forces like we just
 10 heard about will feel — they don't know it yet, but they
 11 will feel — and it's the same with as you put together
 12 other deploying units. And that's the real eventual
 13 readiness impact.
 14 DR. CANTOR: I understand that you've been
 15 at that a long time. I guess what I'm getting at,
 16 though, is that — I mean, even the Navy was able to give
 17 a set of things that were pressures on readiness, even
 18 though they're used to that.
 19 I mean, you say attrition is not a problem
 20 for you. Is recruitment a problem? I mean, there has to
 21 be a set of things that you are concentrating on. And
 22 maybe they are in the Chief's testimony, but —
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, yeah. I mean, but

1 the Commandant has identified aging equipment and the
 2 need for modernization —
 3 DR. CANTOR: Right. Yeah.
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — buy new planes and so
 5 forth.
 6 DR. CANTOR: And so that's what I — I
 7 mean, you know...
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. He tells a story
 9 of —
 10 DR. CANTOR: I mean, I would like to know
 11 —
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — a Marine out in
 13 Southwest Asia and he said, "Well, Marine, what do you
 14 want right now," expecting he would say a hot meal or a
 15 shower, and the Marine said, "More bullets, sir."
 16 DR. CANTOR: I'd like to know about
 17 recruitment, I guess. That was the — where I was going
 18 with this. I mean, is that an issue — is that a
 19 pressure that ultimately shows itself in readiness?
 20 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: I think —
 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: We're in our
 22 forty-third month of making it in a row. I think that's
 23 one of our success stories.

1 DR. CANTOR: Great.
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: And we are still
 3 at 97 percent high school graduates. Having been on
 4 recruiting duty twice, that can change in a nanosecond.
 5 But I think that's a real success story.
 6 But again, I think we have — the
 7 Commandant has made a concerted effort and we've paid the
 8 price. We've got some superstars out there, you know, in
 9 recruiting, but it's been a real success story.
 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: And just because
 11 we've had forty-three straight months, don't think that's
 12 easy. That's been with a lot of work, like Tom says, and
 13 that —
 14 DR. CANTOR: I would assume not.
 15 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: — that, too,
 16 comes with an expense, and that's to take those NCO's and
 17 to work them long and hard hours out there.
 18 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: And our pipeline
 19 to recruiting is the same pipeline from DI. It's the
 20 highest caliber we have and it's the toughest cut to make
 21 — DI, recruiter and MSG. Same criteria exactly. No
 22 difference.
 23 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: And that's the

1 expense that we're paying to make — If you say, "Are you
 2 ready?" Yes. My definition of readiness is to go today
 3 to — for a unit to perform its wartime mission, whether
 4 it's a squadron or not. What's the cost of that? Well,
 5 the cost is I probably don't have the seniority and NCO
 6 leadership out there. They're out on recruiting duty.
 7 DR. CANTOR: That's the kind of thing I
 8 want to know.
 9 MR. PANG: You know, I think —
 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: I'm fixing old
 11 trucks with more man hours. A lance corporal mechanic
 12 has to work more hours on that truck. He has to — We
 13 have to spend more money in spare parts. And not only
 14 are we spending more money in spare parts, but just over
 15 the last couple of years we can see that cost alone, in
 16 taking a broken truck in to — or a broken piece of
 17 equipment in to the ordnance people to repair it or
 18 whatever has increased probably — what? 35, 40 percent.
 19 But we're noticing now that our equipment
 20 is so old that it's no longer just replace the water pump
 21 or just replace a small part like that. We have to
 22 replace entire — big sections of a piece of equipment.
 23 It's no longer just replace the spark plugs and the

1 nobody will say it that way.
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: If we know, we
 3 won't tell them anyway, right?
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: That's their
 5 culture. That's what they want to be.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 7 MR. PANG: Yeah. But you know, Charlie?
 8 You can find out. Just call the American GI Forum. You
 9 know, when you go to the American GI Forum and look at
 10 who the people are — okay? — that are the heroes — and
 11 this is an Hispanic group —
 12 DR. MOSKOS: But they were all Army
 13 veterans, basically.
 14 MR. PANG: But you know what?
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. World War II-types.
 16 MR. PANG: Yeah.
 17 DR. MOSKOS: But, I mean, why are the
 18 Marines, you know, like twice to two-and-a-half times
 19 more Hispanics than the Army, which might be sort of a
 20 comparable recruiting —
 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: I have read, and
 22 by my own personal, you know, observations, I think that,
 23 first off, the Hispanics that we've got in this nation

1 wires; you've got to put an entire new engine in there
 2 and that's more expense.
 3 So that's bleeding down further our fiscal
 4 resources and investing in modernization. It's bleeding
 5 down our people's time in having to spend more time
 6 repairing things and it raises the frustration level.
 7 DR. CANTOR: Thank you. That's very
 8 helpful.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Do you have any
 10 —
 11 DR. MOSKOS: I just wanted to ask General
 12 Jones a question on the recruit trainee side of the
 13 spectrum there.
 14 The Marines have about twice,
 15 proportionately, as many Hispanics in the enlisted ranks
 16 as any of the other services. The Army's been making
 17 this a kind of priority. Do you have an opinion as to
 18 why the Marines have been so successful in recruiting a
 19 large number of Hispanics vis-a-vis the other services?
 20 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Well, I don't
 21 know. We don't really target any particular group.
 22 DR. MOSKOS: Maybe that's why.
 23 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: But I think in

1 are a tough race and they're hard people, and they like
 2 that image of toughness and hardness. And I think that
 3 some would perceive that the Marine Corps as a service
 4 offers a tougher and harder challenge and they're
 5 attracted to that.
 6 DR. MOSKOS: Well, let me just underline
 7 the thing. Do you think having gender-separated training
 8 — to the degree people even know about it — you have
 9 heard — is a plus in the Hispanic community or not?
 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: I think it's a
 11 plus to the whole community. I would assume it would be
 12 Hispanic as well. I think we've — you know, you've
 13 heard the Marine Corps testimony. I think we all believe
 14 that — I mean, we really believe it. It's the best way
 15 to start folks off in the socialization process.
 16 So I think that probably it's the same for
 17 the Hispanic as any other community.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Thanks.
 19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, a little twinge on
 20 that question, which is how do recruits react to it?
 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Excuse me?
 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Do recruits express
 23 skepticism about going into a gender-separate training or

1 southwestern states, the — we've done very well in the
 2 southwestern states obviously for a number of years. I
 3 was in the Ninth District, which is in the middle of the
 4 Heartland and whatnot, and it was always —
 5 DR. MOSKOS: What is the Ninth District?
 6 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: The Ninth
 7 District is in the middle of the Heartland. That's where
 8 the — They call it the Bloody Ninth, where the guys get
 9 fired real fast and whatnot, you know. But the
 10 unemployment rate and whatnot in the southwest was such,
 11 it was always a pretty good place to recruit and you kind
 12 of build up a momentum.
 13 They've always done well. I think that
 14 kind of builds the knowledge of the local communities on
 15 how well the Marine Corps has done and I think we've done
 16 especially well there. That may have —
 17 DR. MOSKOS: Then I wonder why no other
 18 services do well in the same environment.
 19 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: I don't know.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: That's what I wanted to know.
 21 MR. PANG: You know, Charlie, I think I
 22 have some insight —
 23 DR. MOSKOS: That's what I wanted, but

1 do recruits expect it or prefer it when they come in? As
 2 opposed to your concept that you're doing the right thing
 3 and everything, how do the folks that you recruit react
 4 to the idea that they're going to be separated, male and
 5 female, when they come in?
 6 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Well, to be
 7 honest with you, I've never really thought about it. I
 8 don't think it's — it's certainly not a — Having been
 9 on recruiting duty twice — Of course, we don't recruit
 10 that many women that you could really get a — set trends
 11 and whatnot, but I think it's just a level of
 12 expectation. I don't think it's ever been an issue.
 13 But I just recently came back from Parris
 14 Island, you know, a couple weeks ago, and I had an
 15 opportunity to stay and listen to a discussion led by the
 16 SECNAV. And he had a group of recruits and he asked them
 17 that very question about what do you think about being
 18 separated and whatnot. And I don't think they were
 19 coached. I really don't.
 20 Now, perhaps the DI's did. I don't know.
 21 But to a person — to a person — they all felt like "I
 22 am glad this is the way it is." You know, "I just feel
 23 like the socialization process is working better, you

1 know, than it would if I had had to compete," and
 2 whatnot.
 3 You know, again, I think the recruits,
 4 back even at the recruiter level, have probably already
 5 realized a level of expectation that they're going to be
 6 separated. I mean, when you talk to recruits to sell
 7 them, one of the big obstacles of selling a Marine is
 8 they know it's tough and you sell them because of the
 9 boot camp.
 10 And as we talked last time about
 11 recruiting, everybody has a certain amount of buyer's
 12 remorse. I don't care if you buy a car or you buy the
 13 Marine Corps. The success you have with the poolee
 14 program and in embracing that Marine and showing him that
 15 you really, genuinely care is what really gets him
 16 prepared for boot camp and I think it makes it a big
 17 success.
 18 So I think they know from the get-go,
 19 ma'am, that it's going to be separated.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Are those
 22 Marines that are non-deployable for different reasons —
 23 you know, do you have any data on what — whether most of

1 them are physical, whatever?
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Yes, sir, I do.
 3 I have historical data only from Southwest Asia. We
 4 don't normally track non-deployable status data, but
 5 during Southwest Asia, I've got it broken down here in
 6 rough percentages and I would say that most of them — it
 7 looked like it was either for — the largest percentage
 8 was either for administrative reasons, medical or
 9 pregnancy. Those three reasons right there probably were
 10 easily 60 to 85 percent and higher.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: By
 12 "administrative," you mean single-parent, stuff like
 13 that?
 14 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Yes, sir. Or for
 15 some other administrative reason. They were on a legal
 16 hold, perhaps.
 17 MR. MOORE: Does that include misconduct
 18 or Article 15's or —
 19 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Could be.
 20 MR. MOORE: Could be.
 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Yes, sir. It did
 22 not necessarily — It did not include the fact that a
 23 person was in an unauthorized absence or a deserter

1 status, which is a very small percentage.
 2 MS. POPE: What were the total numbers for
 3 Southwest Asia of non-deployable Marines?
 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: I have them —
 5 DR. MOSKOS: In the Gulf War? Is that
 6 what we mean?
 7 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Yes, sir.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. Okay.
 9 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Reasons for non-
 10 deployable. For an active duty male — And these are
 11 going to be rough percentages, ma'am. For an active duty
 12 male, it looks like I had about 30 percent were non-
 13 deployable because of — or were returned from Southwest
 14 Asia for medical reasons.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: 30 percent?
 16 MR. MOORE: 30 percent of the non-
 17 deployables.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: No, not 30
 19 percent —
 20 MR. MOORE: Not 30 percent of the Marines.
 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Of those that
 22 were returned. Of those that were returned.
 23 I do not have the total numbers here —

1 MS. POPE: That were non-deployable.
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: — that were non-
 3 deployable.
 4 MS. POPE: Or the percentage — Do you
 5 have the percentage —
 6 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: I just have the
 7 percentages of those that were non-deployable.
 8 MS. POPE: Yeah. I mean, could we, for
 9 the record, get what the total numbers were? I mean...
 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: I'll see if we've
 11 got that data. I do not have that with me.
 12 MS. POPE: Because it could be 30 percent
 13 of ten, 30 percent of a hundred.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. We need numbers.
 15 MS. POPE: I mean, if we had a base for —
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well, you know
 17 it's going to be smaller than the other services would
 18 be.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Well, according to one of our
 20 Data Calls, the Marines now — as of 1997, I guess —
 21 there are 7,400 Marines who are non-deployable for a
 22 variety —
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: You mean

1 throughout the Marine Corps?
 2 DR. MOSKOS: Throughout the Marine Corps.
 3 HIV, medical/permanent, hazardous duty restriction, AWOL,
 4 legal processing, pregnancy, medical, administrative, et
 5 cetera. And that number is 7,400. I mean, that we did
 6 get in our — one of those books.
 7 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: I will not be
 8 able to provide that data for you of our current non-
 9 deployable numbers because we do not track that.
 10 Now —
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Well, it's right here.
 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: — I will be able
 13 to track, well, as where I am today.
 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Where did you
 15 get that, though?
 16 DR. MOSKOS: It was one of our handouts.
 17 MS. POPE: He's talking about today. His
 18 number for today.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Oh, you mean —
 20 MS. POPE: His number for today. This is
 21 —
 22 DR. MOSKOS: It was a handout in one of
 23 our books.

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: But that's
 2 recent data, isn't it?
 3 DR. MOSKOS: Actually, I requested this,
 4 come to think of it. It was one of my individual
 5 requests. Jim Renne sent it around, I think, to
 6 everybody.
 7 It's a good table.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I mean, that's
 9 7,500 Marines —
 10 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: — that couldn't
 12 go to war today, you're saying. Right?
 13 DR. MOSKOS: That's correct. Which is,
 14 you know —
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Which for us, I
 16 mean, would be a good chunk of people.
 17 MS. POPE: That would be a big chunk.
 18 DR. CANTOR: I don't know how to —
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 20 MS. POPE: Without having you run a lot of
 21 numbers, if it's available, I think it would be of
 22 interest.
 23 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Yes, ma'am.

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 374</p> <p>1 DR. MOSKOS: 14,000 soldiers can't do it. 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: I think we 3 provided figures like this back in August of '91 to an 4 OSD tasker, so it might be there. 5 MS. POPE: Okay. 6 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: That's where I 7 got these figures from. 8 MS. POPE: Okay. That would be great if 9 it's not a lot of trouble. If it is, don't worry about 10 it. 11 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: But percentage- 12 wise, again, the majority of Marines that were non- 13 deployable were non-deployable for medical or 14 administrative reasons. That as active duty male 15 Marines. 16 Active duty female Marines had a non- 17 deployability or a return rate somewhat higher than the 18 average male did, to about three times as many. 19 DR. MOSKOS: Let me, you know, recast the 20 question. Is 7,500 Marines non-deployable as of current 21 era a problem or not? 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: It is not a 23 problem today because I would say 7,500 non-deployable</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 377</p> <p>1 took, at that time when they looked down their non- 2 deployable figures — 3 DR. MOSKOS: That's right. 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — these 5 were the people — this is how many people on that 6 snapshot of time were not deployable for the following 7 reasons. 8 DR. MOSKOS: That's right. 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: HIV, which 10 is not deployable — 11 DR. MOSKOS: That's right. 12 DR. CANTOR: Right. 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — yet, 14 there's a period of time, you know, that they have — 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: And this is all 16 the way through — colonel through private. 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Right. 18 Exactly. 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: So you're 20 talking about — 21 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. But the bulk of it is 22 enlisted, though. And it's lower enlisted at that. 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But what</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 375</p> <p>1 Marines today — I don't know where you got those 2 figures. I'm not sure what definition of non-deployable 3 you're using. Is a Marine — For instance, is a Marine 4 that's in Amphibious Warfare School as a captain right 5 now — is that non-deployable and is that included in 6 that figure? 7 DR. CANTOR: That's not — No. 8 DR. MOSKOS: Not in one of these 9 categories, no. These are negatives. 10 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Wait a 11 minute, wait a minute. He's got a valid point. There's 12 something there everybody's got to remember. That's non- 13 deployable based upon some criteria that has existed all 14 the time. But when the — 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: That could be 16 within three months of OCS you're not going to deploy. 17 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: When the 18 Joint Chiefs make a decision to deploy somebody, they 19 send out a little thing called a deployment order. And 20 in that deployment order, it gives commanders — or at 21 least it did in the Army — it allows commanders to 22 subjectively move people from a non-deployable status 23 into a deployable status because it's a crisis situation.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 378</p> <p>1 are the categories? 2 DR. MOSKOS: HIV, medical/permanent, 3 hazardous duty restriction, which is a small category — 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Right. 5 DR. MOSKOS: — AWOL, legal processing, 6 pregnancy, medical/temporary, administrative, and — 7 That's it. 8 By the way, Bob, there's the other side of 9 the coin, too. Some of these who might be moved from 10 non-deployable to deployable, there's the other side of 11 the coin, too — when the balloon goes up, there's going 12 to be some of the deployable who are going to be moved to 13 non-deployable. 14 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Oh, yeah. 15 Yeah. I mean, I'm not arguing that. 16 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. Right. 17 DR. CANTOR: We're not arguing that this 18 is high or low. 19 DR. MOSKOS: Right. 20 DR. CANTOR: We're just asking — 21 DR. MOSKOS: We just want to know, is it a 22 problem. 23 DR. CANTOR: — because it's your job to</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 376</p> <p>1 So that is, in a peaceful world, all 2 things — and it may very well include the Marines that 3 are in school and not available. 4 DR. CANTOR: Well, no. He has the 5 categories. 6 Read them off. 7 DR. MOSKOS: It doesn't — 8 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: 9 Administrative. 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Where did those 11 figures — I don't know where those figures came from, so 12 I can't — 13 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: 14 Administrative. 15 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: — sign up. 16 DR. MOSKOS: Administrative is a 17 relatively small category. 18 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: When a 19 captain in the Army — 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Why don't 21 you read off the column. I think what you have is 22 probably MNRA has provided you those figures when they 23 did the Data Call and it may be on the snapshot that they</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 379</p> <p>1 interpret that for us. 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Is that a 3 problem? 4 DR. MOSKOS: Right. 5 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: I have no 6 commander that is reporting to me "I cannot perform my 7 wartime mission because of my non-deployable Marines." 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I would 9 suspect, Charlie, what they did is they took a snapshot 10 of a given day and said, "If I look across the Marine 11 Corps, these are my non-deployables for the following 12 reasons. These people cannot deploy." 13 DR. MOSKOS: Sure. 14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Whether it 15 be their medical status, whether it be they're on 16 administrative hold, whether it be they've got HIV or 17 whatever. And that is probably not an unreasonable 18 number on a snapshot on a given day. 19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Nancy? 20 DR. CANTOR: I already tried to ask my 21 questions earlier. 22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Tom? 23 MR. MOORE: Well, yeah, I do have a</p>

1 question, I guess.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What's the
 3 matter, Nancy? Did we interrupt you?
 4 DR. MOSKOS: She asked it and didn't get
 5 an answer.
 6 MR. MOORE: I was sort of interested in
 7 the discussion in response to Fred Pang's question and
 8 Charlie Moskos. Mine sort of falls maybe in-between.
 9 I've done a lot of reading in preparation for — in the
 10 course of this Commission, a lot of military history.
 11 I've been re-reading "The Collapse of the Third
 12 Republic," by William L. Shirer.
 13 The French Army in 1940 probably would
 14 have scored very high on our SORTS readiness assessment.
 15 I mean, they were fully manned, reasonably well-trained,
 16 had lots of equipment; in many respects, a large, well-
 17 armed, well-manned force. Its equipment was as modern,
 18 in some cases superior to the German equipment. And,
 19 yet, they were a hollow force and they collapsed
 20 incredibly within six weeks of the German assault in May
 21 of 1940.
 22 And military history is full of many
 23 examples like that. Even the American Army has had its

1 problems. We haven't had such a catastrophic defeat that
 2 would have affected our nation, but certainly in the
 3 field — Korea, for example. We had units that probably
 4 were ostensibly ready, according to all the empirical
 5 measures, but were not combat effective, and so I guess
 6 what I want to talk about is combat effectiveness.
 7 I was very interested, General, in your
 8 recollection of being a young lieutenant, how you sort of
 9 did a gut-check. You went out and you trained daily with
 10 your troops and you ran with them and you did something
 11 that certainly transcended a purely empirical assessment.
 12 You might call it SORTS versus sense. I don't know.
 13 But clearly what you seemed to be implying
 14 and what was sort of implied in the discussions of these
 15 two questions is that there is a dimension to readiness
 16 or combat effectiveness that does not fall into the
 17 material category. It's a human intangible.
 18 It may be — It can be described in many
 19 ways. Some talk about the martial ethos, but, you know,
 20 it's a military, institutional, cultural sort of
 21 dimension. Toughness, courage, love of adventure, love
 22 of battle. I mean, some people like to fight, even
 23 though that's increasingly rare, perhaps, in our soft

1 age.
 2 And so my question to you is — The Marine
 3 Corps seems to at least intuitively understand it even
 4 though you haven't specifically addressed it. How
 5 important do you think these qualities are? Many leaders
 6 have said in fact that they are decisive on the
 7 battlefield; that they really are more decisive even than
 8 the material qualities or factors that can be empirically
 9 measured.
 10 And if they are important, how do you —
 11 how does a military institution foster them and encourage
 12 them to grow? And I think that is really relevant to our
 13 look at training.
 14 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: I'll give Tommy
 15 some time to think because he's the real trainer, but
 16 from the operational aspect, I think you're right on the
 17 mark, sir, when you say that there is this other
 18 intangible. Call it spirit, call it the adventure of the
 19 fight, or whatever it is.
 20 I remember reading a manual from the
 21 Second World War from the Third Marine Division. It said
 22 there comes a time in almost every battle when each
 23 commander thinks he's lost it, he's lost that battle, and

1 it's the one that presses on anyway, in spite of the fact
 2 that he's convinced he's lost it, but he continues to
 3 fight — he's the one that comes out the winner.
 4 That's the spirit that we're looking for.
 5 How you instill that in your forces today I think is
 6 through rigorous training, building confidence, imbuing
 7 your people with that spirit to win through many things,
 8 whether it's the maintaining of tradition, such as we do
 9 through our regiments and organizations, giving them
 10 those rigorous types of opportunities to train not only
 11 out in the field but — in the field, where periodically
 12 they get to do some physical contact-type of training,
 13 those types of things. That helps to imbue that, I
 14 think, warrior ethic, if you will, if that's what we're
 15 looking for. This is something that a commander has to
 16 evaluate, motivate and instill in his people.
 17 And as one of the committee members broke
 18 out, yes, when we measure our SORTS readiness, we measure
 19 personnel numbers, the training that they've received,
 20 but there is always that final intangible that the
 21 commander — his bottom-line call. He can have all the
 22 things and people that he needs, but if he doesn't feel
 23 they're ready to go, he can make that call.

1 Those are some of the things that I think
 2 — letting the commander know that that's his
 3 requirement, putting him in charge of imbuing that
 4 warrior ethic and spirit into his people, that's —
 5 that's what we do in the active side.
 6 Now, there are some things that we do
 7 institutionally that I'll defer to General Jones on.
 8 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: Well, I think
 9 Jan has pretty much hit the nail on the head. I think
 10 that, you know, there's clearly barometers that we talked
 11 about before. When a unit goes out in the field, we give
 12 them, you know, a very extensive test and whatnot to see
 13 if they in fact are up to the mark. But that's small
 14 potatoes compared to the intangible.
 15 We command-select all of our commanders.
 16 We spend a lot of energy on education. We try to
 17 replicate combat to the degree you can. We try to stress
 18 them out and make them — force them to make decisions
 19 when under stress and duress, again, to try to replicate
 20 combat as much as you can in places like the mountains of
 21 Sierra Nevadas and Yuma, Arizona, or whatever.
 22 But I think that we're blessed, you know,
 23 with a bevy of great commanders, and as Jan said, we give

1 them the baton and let them run with it.
 2 And that commander is the one that's going
 3 to be held accountable. Accountability's the thing, and
 4 you hold them accountable for making sure the unit is
 5 ready. And it starts in boot camp with the Crucible, I
 6 think, and we capitalize on that from day one.
 7 And I think you can find the same thing —
 8 You've probably seen it if you've been to Yuma. You've
 9 been to — I don't know if you went to Sierra Nevadas and
 10 saw some units in the mountains and whatnot, but I think
 11 that's the whole idea of putting a priority on training
 12 and making sure you have units that have sufficient
 13 numbers; that they can in fact do things that are
 14 rigorous, that will test the unit commanders.
 15 Because the Marine Corps is not a general
 16 or colonel-led outfit. It's a company grade. Our
 17 strength is not rank, our rank. Our strength in the
 18 Marine Corps are captains and below. What we do is
 19 hopefully give them an example that — you know, from our
 20 actions and whatnot, and our education, and our
 21 experience and whatnot, to allow them to make — You look
 22 at the decisions made in the last ten years.
 23 DESERT STORM was kind of an anomaly.

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1 DESERT STORM was regimental commanders and battalion
2 commanders and division commanders. But now with Haiti,
3 Somalia, those type of decisions they're making on a
4 daily basis, they're company commanders and below. NCO's
5 are making the tough calls.

6 So we want to try to replicate that to the
7 degree possible and I think that's what perpetuates —
8 And it is, in the Marine Corps, a lifestyle. And it's
9 not a profession. It's not even a job. It's a
10 lifestyle, and I think it's something that is very
11 intangible. I think it's very exciting. And then once a
12 guy or a gal grasps hold of that, it's unlimited what
13 they can do.

14 Hard to explain, I think, but it very much
15 is a part of this success story on readiness. There are
16 a lot of units that have been down as far as — I mean,
17 we've got units deployed at C-3 — let's not kid each
18 other — and they've done fantastic things, you know,
19 because they're well led.

20 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Last night I had
21 the opportunity — just to follow-on that one point while
22 it's still hot, I had the opportunity to attend a mess
23 night at Quantico, at the Basic School where our second

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1 lieutenants — We have a company of — 255 of them are
2 completing their training. They're within weeks of — a
3 couple weeks of graduation.

4 A mess night. This is where you get that
5 warrior ethic from, I think. It was 255 second
6 lieutenants getting ready to go to their follow-on
7 occupational schools, toasting other services, toasting
8 the leadership of our country, remembering traditions,
9 remembering history of other battles, other heroes and
10 those comrades who have fallen when they've gone before
11 us — that culminated with the Basic School chorus.

12 210 second lieutenants strong — the
13 chorus — singing patriotic but very highly motivational
14 songs. I'll tell you, everyone had chills running up and
15 down their spine. That left an impression in these young
16 leaders' minds and a spirit that will live with them
17 forever. That's where this ethic comes from, an example
18 of it.

19 DR. MOSKOS: Can I, just for the record,
20 Tom — And I notice General Jones has his Vietnam ribbon
21 on.

22 Having been in Vietnam myself, the issue
23 is if they're not demonstrating against you at home — I

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1 mean, there's another intangible — if the population or
2 a significant part of it is opposing you being there. I
3 think that undermines a lot of morale and that has to be
4 put into the — It's not either the Marines nor any other
5 services, you know, encapsulated institution, not
6 affected by what the society is defining the mission as.

7 MR. MOORE: Yeah, that's true.

8 Thank you.

9 DR. MOSKOS: That might be the ultimate
10 readiness question: Does society support you?

11 MR. MOORE: No, you're right. I mean, the
12 military doesn't exist in a vacuum. Like you termed it,
13 it's not an encapsulated institution. The question is
14 whether the military is going to become like that
15 civilian society or not, whether it can —

16 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, we can
17 have a philosophical discussion on that if you think it's
18 worthwhile, but I would submit to you that that is
19 totally dependent upon what you're doing in Vietnam.
20 Because down where the rubber meets the road at squad and
21 platoon level — on the infantry soldier, for example,
22 who was well aware there was protesting going on — that
23 did not enter into their ability to fight the battle of

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1 the day, nor was it on their mind when bullets starting
2 flying.

3 The total reliance on the man to your left
4 and right, the confidence you had in the leadership
5 around you, were the keys to how you fought that battle,
6 not what was going on at home.

7 DR. MOSKOS: Well, we'll talk about that
8 afterwards, Bob. Yeah.

9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Any more questions about
10 training or readiness?

11 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: They're probably
12 ready to go home. That's what it is.

13 MR. PANG: You know, I have an observation
14 and perhaps a comment, and you may wish to react or may
15 not. I mean, the sense I have — okay? — in stepping
16 back now and kind of looking at all the services and, you
17 know, when we were talking about readiness of the forces
18 and the things that are kind of eroding — I mean, I
19 don't think there was one service that came forward that
20 said, "Hey, we're on the upswing."

21 I mean, you know, there's still this sense
22 of erosion in readiness. And when you kind of dig down
23 to try to find out what it is that's causing it, it seems

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1 that somehow or another — And I'm not putting the blame
2 on anybody. I mean, this is — the reality of it all is
3 that the numbers of people that you have in the forces
4 today, you know — and those are determined in terms of
5 in-strength — and I know the services have to operate
6 under budgetary constraints and they have to make some
7 very difficult decisions and I think the decisions that
8 have been made, at whatever — maybe not in the services.
9 I don't know where they were made. I mean, wherever they
10 were made, have to have really reduced the strength
11 levels — okay? — of the services below a certain floor
12 that was developed based on some pretty hard work.

13 I mean, you know, the Marine Corps, when
14 it did its review, you know, under the base force plan
15 and later in the bottom-up review, came up with some
16 numbers. The Marine Corps is not at that level. None of
17 the services are at that level. They're below those
18 levels, okay? And you have to ask the question — why
19 are they below those levels?

20 Well, they were driven to it I think
21 because of, you know, budgetary constraints, allocations
22 — okay? — of resources, and some very, very difficult
23 decisions.

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1 Because I think one of the key questions
2 that I hope — okay? — that senior leadership will be
3 asked in the hearings that are to come up in the Congress
4 is what would you — I mean, if you lived within
5 constrained resources and we are willing to give you a
6 certain chunk of change — of money, okay? — would you
7 consider, given the dilemma that you all face, an
8 increase in in-strength, or are you satisfied with where
9 you are and you think you can operate at that level?

10 That will be an interesting question to
11 ask. I don't know what the answer is.

12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well, I mean,
13 they'd probably like to have the increase but they want
14 the money to go along with it.

15 MR. PANG: No, no. Don't misunderstand.
16 No, no. I'm saying, you know, if Congress said, you
17 know, "There's this amount of money that we're going to
18 plus-up over and above what the administration requests,"
19 what would you want us to put that money to? You know,
20 an increase in in-strength or —

21 MR. MOORE: Or procurement. Yeah.

22 MR. PANG: I don't know. I don't know
23 what the answer is.

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well, there is
 2 an increase going on right now that they've got a big —
 3 several million dollars. A lot of money that I think
 4 they're looking at to plus these guys up. And I can tell
 5 you for the most part they're looking at equipment.
 6 They're not looking at people.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I have one
 8 final question that — You all obviously know the charter
 9 of this Commission. And the question's a simple one:
 10 what would you like this Commission to tell the Congress
 11 about the Marine Corps?
 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL JONES: As a trainer,
 13 sir, I think that we have it right at recruit training.
 14 I think we have — I think everybody realizes that we
 15 have — we're going to have problems, you know, to a
 16 certain degree, but I think we're dealing with them
 17 pretty doggone well.
 18 I'm not saying this because I'm a Marine.
 19 I'm not talking party line. I'm talking, an old guy
 20 that's been around a long time. I think we're doing it
 21 right. I think when you spend time, it's just electric
 22 — the impact we're having on both the male and the
 23 female.

1 I think we do have work to do at the
 2 Marine Combat Training level to work towards integration
 3 and whatnot. We know that on the West Coast we have only
 4 guys, we don't have gals, and so there's going to be a
 5 socialization process that's going to come down the road
 6 at the first school and whatnot realizing that.
 7 But I think at the incipient stages of a
 8 person's training — I think it's not unit training for
 9 combat, it's preparing the individual basic Marine to go
 10 on and become a Marine and have success later.
 11 I think we're doing it right, and I think
 12 we — what I think we ought to have you say is we ought
 13 to continue to march in that regard. I think if we
 14 modify that and change that, I think it would have a
 15 significant and deleterious impact on what the Marine
 16 Corps can do for the nation. I'm not going to say we
 17 couldn't succeed because we will succeed, but the
 18 construct of the Marine Corps is not such that we need to
 19 be tampered with at recruit training.
 20 And I'm not speaking to any other service
 21 because I think personally every service ought to define
 22 their way, but I think the Marine Corps — I think we've
 23 made great strides in recruit training. I think we're

1 working very hard now to standardize recruit training on
 2 both coasts, and we're working very hard now in the
 3 Marine Corps to keep the transformation.
 4 Jan mentioned cohesion. That's our big
 5 challenge right now — once we have a success story at
 6 recruit training, passing that baton off to a school.
 7 The infantry unit is not that bad because we can take ten
 8 munchkins or munchkin-ettes and we can move them to a
 9 unit and whatnot — if they're infantry munchkins,
 10 obviously — and we're going to succeed.
 11 If we go off somewhere and send them to
 12 Pensacola and whatnot, and spend a year-and-a-half,
 13 that's the challenge that comes in. That's where the
 14 real leadership comes in. We don't have twenty-four
 15 hours, seven days a week, to give them hands-on
 16 leadership. And I think that's where we've really got to
 17 — where we're applying a lot of energies right now.
 18 But I would say, sir, that recruit
 19 training is going well. I think it's producing the
 20 product we want now, and I think I would just recommend
 21 we not tamper with it.
 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULY: Sir, I would say
 23 that the Marine Corps is ready today to do those things

1 that you expect us to do today. I don't need any help
 2 with today's readiness. I think we have the women-in-
 3 the-Marine-Corps piece just about right — the numbers
 4 that we've got. We've got them assimilated. They're a
 5 high quality and they're doing — performing admirably in
 6 some demanding, high-quality jobs across-the-board.
 7 I think where I need help is not in
 8 anything of the here and today, but it's looking out
 9 towards those things that I've attempted to elaborate on.
 10 On our modernization, I need help desperately there; in
 11 procurement of modern equipment to keep up with the
 12 changing times and to replace that aging fleet of
 13 vehicles and equipment that I currently have out there.
 14 The average truck we drive is fifteen
 15 years old. The HMMWV, which everybody still envisions
 16 as, "Whoa, we all remember the jeep, so that must be
 17 new," they're twelve years old. How many of you could
 18 run a business with twelve and fifteen-year-old vehicles?
 19 The CH-46 helicopter, aging, been around since, as you
 20 remember, the early to mid sixties.
 21 So I need help with getting those types of
 22 things and providing the facilities and quality of life
 23 to those Marines that we've got that they deserve. Those

1 are the bill-payers for our current readiness.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Any other questions?
 4 Okay. Well, we thank you very much for
 5 coming to see us. And, also, thank you for all of the
 6 fine cooperation we've had from the Marine Corps
 7 generally in the course of our Commission. It's been
 8 very gratifying.
 9 (A brief recess was taken.)
 10 (Dr. Segal was present by telephonic
 11 communication during the following discussion.)
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. It's Friday,
 13 January 29th, and the Congressional Commission on
 14 Military Training and Gender-Related Issues is continuing
 15 its hearings this afternoon.
 16 We're very happy to have a set of guests
 17 for the last panel today. Dr. Brenda Bryant, from the
 18 Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership at Mary Baldwin
 19 College in Staunton, Virginia, together with two cadets
 20 from the VWIL program, Trimble Bailey and Sherri Sharpe,
 21 are going to make a presentation first, and we'll follow
 22 with questions-and-answers from the commissioners. And
 23 then, thereafter, Elaine Donnelly will have a

1 presentation and questions-and-answers.
 2 And just so you all know, we have your
 3 biographical materials in our books, and so I'll dispense
 4 with that just for the sake of time. But I want to say
 5 thank you very much for coming up. You've driven in from
 6 Staunton today.
 7 And if I may be permitted just a word of
 8 introduction from me, I thought it would be useful to the
 9 Commission to have some information about what I believe
 10 may be one of the only all-female military programs other
 11 than basic combat training in the Marine Corps, which is
 12 the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership.
 13 The cadets we have with us today are now
 14 seniors and they are among the original class of cadets
 15 at VWIL who, under the leadership of Dr. Bryant,
 16 literally put it together as they went along. And they
 17 are now in their fourth years, with three additional
 18 years of cadets behind them coming up from below. And so
 19 I think it will be very interesting to hear about their
 20 experience and their perceptions about all-female
 21 military training.
 22 So, Brenda, please begin. Thank you again
 23 for coming.

1 DR. BRYANT: Well, thank you for the
 2 invitation, Anita. We're very pleased to be here to talk
 3 about something that is very important to the three of us
 4 and has occupied a good bit of our last four years in, as
 5 you say, inventing and bringing this program on stream
 6 and operating fully.

7 What I'm going to do is speak to you about
 8 the program, what it is, what we do, what some of its
 9 characteristics are, how it might be different from other
 10 kinds of training or other kinds of military training
 11 with which you're familiar, and talk a bit about our
 12 experience with single-sex setting and why we think there
 13 are some advantages to that. And then Sherri and Trimble
 14 will talk specifically about their experience and how
 15 they see this thing that we have designed and put into
 16 operation in the last four years.

17 The first thing I'd like to do is to
 18 emphasize the fact that the Virginia Women's Institute
 19 for Leadership is, first and foremost, a leadership
 20 development program. We focus on preparing women for the
 21 military and for service in other settings as well —
 22 business, community, et cetera. So the scope of what we
 23 are teaching and are training women for is leadership,

1 But in addition to that, they have added
 2 academic requirements in mathematics, science, foreign
 3 language and computer science. So they will go through
 4 the level of calculus in mathematics, they will take a
 5 statistics-based course, they will go through an
 6 intermediate level of a foreign language, they will take
 7 two laboratory sciences, and that will distinguish them
 8 somewhat from the traditional graduate of Mary Baldwin
 9 College.

10 In addition to that, they are required to
 11 do a minor in leadership studies. And it is an important
 12 feature of our program, I think, to know that we are very
 13 interested in the marriage of theory and practice and
 14 that we believe that practice is an important part of
 15 learning leadership. It maybe is the essence of learning
 16 leadership. But the informed practice of leadership
 17 requires an understanding of theory, and so they are
 18 required to study it as well as do it while they're in
 19 the program.

20 The second component of the program is a
 21 physical training component. It is very similar to what
 22 you might find at any military college. They are
 23 required to take a strength-and-endurance test every

1 but there is a heavy emphasis on military leadership
 2 development.

3 This program was designed by and for
 4 women, by a faculty and staff committee at Mary Baldwin
 5 College. It has been funded since the outset in a
 6 partnership with the Commonwealth of Virginia and has
 7 received support from the Virginia Military Institute
 8 Foundation. Both of those relationships are on-going at
 9 this time.

10 The program began, as Anita said, in 1995,
 11 but it wasn't until 1996 that the Supreme Court decision
 12 declared that our program was not a constitutional
 13 alternative to the Virginia Military Institute, and at
 14 that time it became possible for us to decide if what we
 15 were doing was what we wanted to continue to do since we
 16 were no longer under the supervision of the court and
 17 could in fact go in any direction that we chose.

18 In fact, the program looks very much right
 19 now like it was designed to look in 1995, before that
 20 decision was rendered. We did test and question
 21 everything that we're doing, but I would say that we've
 22 made very few changes or compromises, additions,
 23 deletions, based on the fact that we are now free to do

1 semester — one-and-a-half-mile run, sit-ups and push-ups
 2 — in something similar to the military standards which
 3 we require of them.

4 In addition to that, as freshman they
 5 engage in something called the Leadership Challenge
 6 program. And in that year, they have an opportunity to
 7 do wilderness training, ropes courses, mountain biking,
 8 mountain climbing, whitewater rafting, and all sorts of
 9 things like that, that are outdoor in focus ordinarily,
 10 but are also designed to test and challenge you, to build
 11 your confidence and to encourage teamwork and
 12 cooperation.

13 The third component of the program is the
 14 military leadership training component. It has two
 15 features. The first is the ROTC program. Our cadets are
 16 enrolled in either Army, Navy, Air Force or Marines. All
 17 of them take their ROTC courses at the Virginia Military
 18 Institute, and so all of them experience in one way or
 19 another that now-coeducational setting.

20 It was in fact this class of students that
 21 was responsible for being the first women at VMI,
 22 although they'll probably never exactly get that credit
 23 since they weren't enrolled as students there.

1 whatever we want as long as we honor our partnership with
 2 the Commonwealth.

3 I think I would like you to know about the
 4 program — that it is comprehensive and demanding and
 5 rigorous. It is not like any other military leadership
 6 training program and probably because we're trying to do
 7 a variety of things over and above that more narrow
 8 mission that a military college might have.

9 We are interested in preparing our
 10 students not only for organizations that exist in the
 11 here-and-now and leadership requirements of the present,
 12 but we're very keen to look ahead twenty and thirty years
 13 when they will be at the top of their careers and trying
 14 to show them what we think leadership is going to be
 15 demanded of them at that point in time and what kinds of
 16 things they need to be prepared for in the distant
 17 future.

18 And there are four components to the
 19 program. The first is an academic component. Not
 20 surprisingly, this is an undergraduate degree program; so
 21 all of the cadets in the program are doing their Bachelor
 22 of Arts or Bachelor of Science at Mary Baldwin College,
 23 in one of the designated majors — or in two.

1 So they do everything that everyone else
 2 does in the ROTC program. They do the field training
 3 exercises, all the classwork, all the physical fitness
 4 testing, camp requirements, et cetera. And they will
 5 talk more specifically about that, but that has been a
 6 very close collaboration and they are integrated into the
 7 ROTC units there just like all other students that are
 8 resident at VMI.

9 The other part of the program is Corps of
 10 Cadets. Just like VMI or the other military colleges, we
 11 have our own separate Corps of Cadets. This is the only
 12 all-female Corps of Cadets in the country and maybe in
 13 the world, for all we know, although we haven't really
 14 verified that.

15 The Corps of Cadets runs independently of
 16 the ROTC program and the cadets that are responsible for
 17 holding the high-ranking positions do so by going through
 18 a pretty rigorous competition with their peers and
 19 promotion boards, and also are expected to score high in
 20 areas like GPA and fitness and so on. And these two
 21 ladies with me have done that every year that they've
 22 been in the program.

23 The fourth piece of the program is what I

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1 guess I'll call residence life. It is important to us
 2 because we are on a civilian campus where we are 15
 3 percent of the students, and all of them live in a
 4 somewhat different way than the cadets in our program.
 5 We have residence requirements. They live
 6 together as freshmen and sophomores. They have study
 7 hours, they have curfews, they have room inspections, and
 8 so this isn't really the lifestyle of the average
 9 undergraduate today. And so they are in a civilian
 10 context, but very much expected to live in a different
 11 kind of way and in a way that I think is parallel to the
 12 expectations of the military college environment.
 13 So that's the program.
 14 Now, the current status is we are 120
 15 women. This is the first year that we have had all four
 16 classes in place, so 1999 is an important year for us
 17 because we will graduate our first class. We will have
 18 our first commissioning. Ten of the twenty-two
 19 graduating seniors will be commissioned, and we will do
 20 all of this at the end of May.
 21 So we're preparing for that right now and
 22 are very excited about actually having this — what feels
 23 like, I guess, the fully-formed and up-and-running

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1 students are expected to know a lot about theories
 2 related to women and women in leadership, and to
 3 challenge those and to decide whether they agree with
 4 them or not, but to be aware of what the literature is
 5 around gender; to be aware of women's experience in
 6 leadership in and out of the military.
 7 The curriculum across-the-board is pretty
 8 well sprinkled with gender-related subjects and theories,
 9 and this, we believe, is important for them to carry with
 10 them into the environments where they will be working.
 11 And finally, I think it's important to
 12 note that our program is not a hundred-percent single-sex
 13 in that the ROTC part of it is, of course, at VMI and all
 14 of those kinds of experiences related to the ROTC part of
 15 the program are coeducational. And so our students do
 16 have an opportunity to test themselves in those kinds of
 17 settings and to find out "how competitive am I" with
 18 cadets from other programs and other kinds of training
 19 experiences, and we think that's valuable. So that has
 20 been useful to us.
 21 One more thing I would like to say about
 22 what the advantages are of a single-sex program. And I
 23 think implicitly I've suggested what they are already in

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1 program and this particular event to celebrate it.
 2 I wanted to point out to you what I think
 3 some of the unique characteristics of this program are
 4 and help you get a feel for what we do that may be of
 5 interest in terms of your investigation or may set us
 6 apart in some kinds of ways.
 7 First and foremost, what we have already
 8 said — we are an all-female program, and that in and of
 9 itself is unique. I think possibly because we are an
 10 all-female program or at least partly so, we employ
 11 training and teaching methodologies and curriculum that
 12 are particularly designed for this audience.
 13 We do believe that women do thrive in a
 14 supportive kind of learning community. That's the kind
 15 of community that we create at the college and have
 16 deliberately built into this program. The methodology is
 17 somewhat different. We would use a different kind of
 18 language and really create, I think, a different kind of
 19 learning environment than a military college that is
 20 traditionally a male institution.
 21 We also blend military training with
 22 leadership training of other types. And I won't go into
 23 what that means except that we are interested in how

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1 that we have the opportunity to develop a curriculum and
 2 to implement a curriculum with methods and materials and
 3 so on that we believe are most suitable to our
 4 population. So we are able to give emphasis to things
 5 that perhaps a program that had a limited number of
 6 females would not have the time or the resources to do.
 7 But beyond that, I think it's important to
 8 ask the question about what the advantages are by asking
 9 first, "What do you think leadership development is?"
 10 And in our program, we believe that it is essentially the
 11 capacity to become fully who you are and to behave in an
 12 authentic way in the settings where you are working.
 13 And you can dress that up with all the
 14 skills and all that you will acquire in your training,
 15 but basically we encourage our cadets to become fully who
 16 they are and to know who that is. And we think that for
 17 women, a setting that is largely or perhaps even
 18 exclusively a female setting is the place to do that.
 19 The second advantage of this is that women
 20 at the age of eighteen do not come to college with the
 21 assumption that they have the right to lead. They don't
 22 have the habit of leading. They are not necessarily
 23 always as competitive in the male environment as they can

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1 organizations of various kinds are structured and process
 2 decisions and how military organizations typically do
 3 that and how other kinds of organizations do.
 4 And we want our students to be exposed to
 5 a variety of those things not only because we believe
 6 that benefits students who will move into the civilian
 7 community, but also we believe it benefits those students
 8 what will go on for military careers.
 9 Another, I think, unique characteristic of
 10 our program I referred to earlier is the academic
 11 requirements in the study of leadership. This is an
 12 unusual thing to find on an undergraduate college campus
 13 — a degree program in leadership studies — but that
 14 isn't as unique as finding a program that makes a
 15 concerted effort to marry together the practice of
 16 leadership and the study of it, and to go back and forth
 17 between the two and make sure that our students know not
 18 only how to do what they do but why they do it so they
 19 can become somewhat reflective and knowledgeable of what
 20 they're expected to do.
 21 Another unique feature of our program
 22 probably in contrast to other military schools would be
 23 that our curriculum is somewhat gender-based. Our

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1 become.
 2 The single-sex environment, I think, has
 3 given our cadets so much opportunity to lead and to
 4 experience that, that they have developed the habit and
 5 the assumption that "I can take charge." I think the
 6 all-female environment is very much responsible for that.
 7 I certainly think that probably the most
 8 obvious benefit of single-sex education that students
 9 often say is the opportunity to be focused and to develop
 10 and to focus on your training and your education and so
 11 on in a single-sex environment is a very positive thing.
 12 That there are unnecessary distractions and so on in the
 13 coeducational setting and it simply is in many respects a
 14 plus to be able to have a five-day week, anyway, that is
 15 pretty much a single-sex experience.
 16 I think I'm going to stop there and have
 17 Trimble and Sherri talk more specifically about the VWIL
 18 experience, and then come back to this subject with
 19 questions.
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Maybe I could pose a
 21 question to Trimble and Sherri to help focus your
 22 remarks, which would be — what brought you to an all-
 23 female program? You made that choice. Did it ever seem

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1 weird to you? And what has been the experience in going
2 from the all-female VWIL program, thirty miles down the
3 road to the ROTC courses, where you are with not just
4 men, but lots of men?

5 CADET BAILEY: Well, to specifically focus
6 on that question why I was brought into a female college,
7 I have to coincide with why I brought into a military
8 environment in an all-female school. And it's quite
9 unique in my situation because none of my family is
10 military. None of my family has come from an all-female
11 or an all-male school.

12 So in a way, I was very fortunate not to
13 have pulls in one direction or the other. I could
14 honestly look at it in a very objective standpoint and
15 say, "What would work best for me?" And you'll find that
16 no one says that this single-sex education is best for
17 everyone; however, we do believe that it is best for
18 those who are in the program.

19 So I decided that being in an all-female
20 institute — specifically what Dr. Bryant was talking
21 about, being able to focus throughout the week. I knew
22 that the military was an item that I might be interested
23 in. I wanted to keep these options open.

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1 So with all of those conjugating together,
2 I decided on VWIL.

3 As to why — your second part of the
4 question, how do I believe that it's helped me and how do
5 I feel like I can continue on in the military coming from
6 an all-female background, I think what you have to look
7 at is both Sherri's and my experiences, because we both
8 have not only attended almost four years now of an all-
9 female education, but we have also attended coeducational
10 environments such as airborne school, field training, her
11 advanced camp. I attended a flight training program
12 through the Air Force.

13 And the way to rate as to whether or not
14 we're capable or whether we're competitive is, well, how
15 did these students do? And if you look, the track record
16 comes from VWIL students that those students who have
17 gone through coeducational programs come out very
18 confident, quite on-the-top, the top ten percent. You'll
19 find quite often the top cadets, the top this, top that.

20 And you have to ask yourself why, and I
21 think that there's a direct correlation with the
22 education that we're getting not only in a classroom
23 setting, but also what's very important is the

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1 experiential setting in the outside.

2 Being able to hold the rank, being able to
3 take that position and lead people here at such a young
4 age I think is directly guiding us to be positive leaders
5 in the future.

6 CADET SHARPE: Well, Mary Baldwin was the
7 only all-female school that I applied to. I was on a
8 three-year advanced Army scholarship, so I knew I needed
9 to look at a place that would offer me an Army program
10 that I could enroll in and Mary Baldwin was the only
11 school that I had applied to that had small-enough
12 classrooms and also a military benefit to it.

13 I learn best in a small room where the
14 professor knows who I am, and that is one of the main
15 reasons I picked Mary Baldwin. VWIL was just an added
16 bonus to that for me.

17 As far as being more prepared than
18 students in other schools, when I first came here, I
19 dreaded the weekly trip to VMI. I felt totally
20 inadequate in being there, and now I have no qualms
21 whatsoever about walking into that classroom and teaching
22 it.

23 The confidence level that I have received

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1 has just skyrocketed from being in the program because I
2 probably wouldn't have been given the opportunities to be
3 in leadership positions and to have responsibilities and
4 to have projects that I'm solely responsible for, whether
5 they succeed or fail, if I had been at another school.

6 A benefit for me also for the VWIL program
7 is that it gave me the opportunity to not just be a ROTC
8 cadet like at some of the other coed schools. I'm
9 military every day. It's not just even a five-day-a-week
10 thing for us. One thing that we stress to everyone in
11 the Corps is that twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
12 week, I'm a cadet in the Corps and I have to uphold a
13 certain level of integrity and honor.

14 And from having this military experience,
15 when I go to places like airborne and advanced camp, I'm
16 used to the drill-and-ceremony. I'm used to the physical
17 training aspects of it that — At other schools they have
18 maybe — In ROTC class, we go over drill-and-ceremony
19 like once a semester, but in being in the VWIL program at
20 Mary Baldwin, it's an environment where I do that on a
21 daily/weekly basis and I am much more experienced in
22 that.

23 So it makes me more confident when I get

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1 in front of a group. Like my platoon at advanced camp,
2 there were ten females and there were forty-four cadets
3 in the platoon, but I didn't have any fear of standing
4 before my group of peers and giving them, you know,
5 facing movements and marching them off to PT and things
6 like that because I knew — excuse me, I have kind of a
7 cold — I have the experience from being in the VWIL
8 program of knowing what to do and that I'm comfortable
9 with it now. And I think if I had been in some other
10 school, I wouldn't have that level of confidence.

11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I take it from your
12 comments that you don't have any problem dealing with men
13 or giving men orders. Or shall we say either receiving
14 orders from men or women.

15 CADET SHARPE: Either way. I've always
16 been outranked in the Corps by another female, so —
17 We've both been in the last three years in the same
18 positions that we have in the Corps because, as the first
19 class, we've always held the highest offices. And as a
20 matter of fact, we designed those offices to include the
21 responsibilities, so I knew well in advance of getting
22 the position what it was I was going to do.

23 And as far as VMI goes, I have been the

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1 number one cadet there in our class since we were
2 freshmen. And for me, that was an added pressure,
3 actually, because I felt sometimes that the guys expected
4 me to prove to them that I was number one. And that just
5 pushed me even more to get to that comfort level, to know
6 things inside-out and backwards and forwards, so that
7 when I got put in that leadership position, I didn't have
8 to think about it; I could just do it.

9 CADET BAILEY: I think Sherri's right. It
10 all boils down to confidence. And I think the purpose of
11 being in a single-sex environment isn't to stay away from
12 the other sex, but on the other end, it is to be able to
13 focus on yourself, to be able to focus on what you want,
14 what your desires are; to build that confidence that you
15 really need, so when you do get into an environment that
16 is not the same as the environment that you trained in,
17 you can still perform at that same high level.

18 And I think that's what Sherri and I have
19 both been very capable of doing — is having this three,
20 four years experience, now we're looking at we're going
21 to be second lieutenants, can we compete, and I strongly
22 believe that both of us can.

23 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I'd like to

1 ask you both a hypothetical question. If either of you
 2 — And maybe you did, I don't know. If either of you had
 3 been given an appointment to one of the service academies
 4 — West Point, the Naval Academy or the Air Force Academy
 5 — would you have accepted that opportunity?
 6 CADET SHARPE: I would not have.
 7 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: You would
 8 not have.
 9 CADET SHARPE: No. I prefer — I prefer
 10 the small school. I also prefer — The advantages of
 11 being at Mary Baldwin are that even though I'm in a
 12 military program and I have a more disciplined structure
 13 than some of the other students there, I also have more
 14 freedom than they do at the other schools.
 15 And I think based on the fact that I did
 16 well at camp, I got the branch that I went after, if
 17 that's what going to West Point would have done for me,
 18 then I have clearly done it anyway and without having to
 19 go through quite as much rigor and strictness.
 20 I prefer living with the traditional
 21 students the way I do at Mary Baldwin. They're not all
 22 in the military. I get several different perspectives.
 23 I get to work with people who have no intentions of being

1 in the military, people who don't know anything about it.
 2 And not only can I lead in a military
 3 setting, but I'm confident in a classroom setting or any
 4 other organization on campus as well.
 5 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 6 CADET BAILEY: When I applied for schools,
 7 I did apply initially for all service academies; ended up
 8 withdrawing from all but the Naval Academy; was nominated
 9 to the Naval Academy but withdrew that last round.
 10 My reasons for withdrawing from the Air
 11 Force and the Army was that I didn't know basically what
 12 I was getting into. I wasn't sure if it's exactly what I
 13 wanted to do and I didn't feel like making that outward
 14 commitment was really what was fair for me or for the
 15 other service because I wasn't sure what I was getting
 16 into.
 17 And, of course, now I am commissioning and
 18 I am doing the same route, but I did — yes, sir — go on
 19 and withdrew.
 20 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: What kind of
 22 high school did you go to? Mixed, or was it an all-girl
 23 school?

1 CADET BAILEY: No, sir. It was a
 2 coeducational school.
 3 CADET SHARPE: Mine was coed as well.
 4 MS. POPE: I have a question. There's
 5 twenty-two in your graduating class?
 6 CADET BAILEY: Yes, ma'am.
 7 MS. POPE: And ten of you are
 8 commissioning with services.
 9 CADET BAILEY: Yes, ma'am.
 10 MS. POPE: What are the other twelve
 11 doing? Are those twelve in the ROTC program?
 12 CADET BAILEY: Yes, ma'am. It's a
 13 requirement that you are in the ROTC for that four years;
 14 however, you do not —
 15 MS. POPE: But there's not a commissioning
 16 requirement?
 17 CADET BAILEY: No, ma'am, there's no
 18 commissioning requirement. You are required to train
 19 just the same as commissioning or non-commissioning;
 20 however, when it comes down to the line, you can choose
 21 to commission or not commission. Half of us have chosen
 22 to. The other half are doing assortment, such as
 23 business management, law school, medical school —

1 MS. POPE: Is the program voluntary? I
 2 mean, so there's no service commitment and —
 3 CADET BAILEY: No, ma'am. Until you sign
 4 that specific branch's — whether it be Army, Navy, Air
 5 Force — until you sign their papers, then you have no
 6 commitment.
 7 MS. POPE: Is it funded by the services —
 8 the ROTC program — or is it funded by Mary Baldwin?
 9 DR. BRYANT: ROTC is Department of
 10 Defense.
 11 MS. POPE: Okay.
 12 DR. BRYANT: This is exactly like the
 13 Virginia Military Institute or the Citadel or any other
 14 —
 15 MR. MOORE: Yeah. It's just like being at
 16 the Citadel.
 17 MS. POPE: There's no service commitment.
 18 DR. BRYANT: Right. Only the academies
 19 have that.
 20 CADET SHARPE: Which I think is one of the
 21 unique aspects of the program, because there have been
 22 people throughout the last few years who would have liked
 23 to have commissioned but aren't medically qualified to do

1 so. And this gives them the opportunity to still get
 2 that training and that edge in whatever field they
 3 choose, that they can't get because they can't get in the
 4 military.
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Also, I just happen to
 6 know that you aren't guaranteed a commission if you want
 7 one. And that's even true in the service academies these
 8 days.
 9 CADET BAILEY: Yes, ma'am, it is very
 10 competitive. You'll find in those — the twelve that did
 11 not receive commissions, the majority of them did pursue
 12 or look at a commission but for one reason or another
 13 were not able to get it.
 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Other questions?
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah, I have a question if I
 16 might.
 17 What is your view — Since you're now in
 18 an integrated ROTC program, what's the percentage of
 19 female in your class?
 20 CADET BAILEY: One to thirty-nine, sir.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: One to thirty-nine.
 22 CADET BAILEY: I'm the one, sir.
 23 MR. MOORE: Not exactly critical mass.

1 DR. MOSKOS: No, it's not.
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: The lower —
 3 DR. MOSKOS: Would you prefer an all-
 4 female, single-sex ROTC training or not?
 5 CADET BAILEY: Considering I've never been
 6 in that environment, sir, I would say that the training
 7 that I have received for ROTC, being in a coeducational
 8 environment has been definitely beneficial for me.
 9 DR. MOSKOS: Coed has been definitely
 10 beneficial.
 11 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir.
 12 DR. MOSKOS: Right. Okay.
 13 CADET BAILEY: For me. So I can only
 14 uniquely speak on my experience.
 15 CADET SHARPE: For us, it's about —
 16 There's four of us, and there are —
 17 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. Out of?
 18 CADET SHARPE: Out of forty-seven. So
 19 there's a few more of us in the classroom, but generally,
 20 depending on schedules, you'll end up in a class where
 21 I'm usually the only female in the class; because if you
 22 can take the class one of five different days and there's
 23 four of you, the odds of ending up with another female in

1 class haven't always been that high.
 2 I prefer the way that it is. I wouldn't
 3 want to be in an all-female group —
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 5 CADET SHARPE: — partially because
 6 working with the males has challenged me to improve
 7 myself.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: What would you say about the
 9 physical standards between the men and women? Do you —
 10 Are you in a different caliber in terms of numbers of
 11 minutes to be — you know, number of miles to be run and
 12 what to — push-ups, pull-ups, all of that? What's —
 13 How do they —
 14 CADET BAILEY: By Department of Defense,
 15 the standards for Army, Navy, et cetera — each service
 16 has different standards. Different standards for men,
 17 different standards for women.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Yes.
 19 CADET BAILEY: As far as competitiveness,
 20 I think you'll find that both the males and the females
 21 are very competitive against each other. When I run, my
 22 goal is to beat them and their goal is to beat me. So —
 23 DR. MOSKOS: And who does win?

1 CADET BAILEY: Sometimes I do, sir.
 2 Sometimes they do.
 3 CADET SHARPE: Like she said, you know,
 4 with the Army Department as well, it's the same — it's a
 5 different standard for the two. But a lot of times
 6 you'll notice it's not just what can you do, because a
 7 lot of times you can do a whole lot more than you thought
 8 you could do and there have been many instances where the
 9 females have outperformed the males.
 10 And when we both went to airborne school,
 11 there's only one standard there. PT is the same, male or
 12 female. The run time is the same because you run in a
 13 formation.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: Does anybody date, male and
 15 female, there in the ROTC program?
 16 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir, you do find that
 17 occasionally people will date. Quite often it's not
 18 within the same classroom. Why that is, I guess we could
 19 hypothesize all day. But we have had a few instances
 20 where cadets have dated other cadets.
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. You know, Mady's on
 22 the line, too. We should get her —
 23 DR. SEGAL: Is it my turn?

1 DR. MOSKOS: — into the act.
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Go ahead, Mady.
 3 DR. SEGAL: Okay. I have a couple of
 4 questions. First, I find this very interesting. I
 5 appreciate your coming to testify to us. Sorry I can't
 6 be there in person.
 7 Since — A couple of questions. One is
 8 that since your program is for leadership and ROTC, and
 9 includes an undergraduate degree, would you agree that
 10 it's not equivalent to military basic training but is
 11 more — would be more comparable to an academy?
 12 DR. BRYANT: It's most closely comparable
 13 to a military college, to one of the six military
 14 colleges.
 15 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Did you hear
 16 that, Mady?
 17 DR. SEGAL: No, I didn't.
 18 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: It's most
 19 comparable to military colleges.
 20 DR. SEGAL: Right. But not comparable to
 21 basic training?
 22 DR. BRYANT: Right.
 23 DR. MOSKOS: Or the academies.

1 MS. POPE: Or the academies.
 2 DR. SEGAL: Or the academies. Okay.
 3 But, of course, it would probably be more
 4 comparable, I would assume, to something like Texas A&M
 5 since you don't — not everybody is in the Corps as they
 6 are in the military academy.
 7 DR. BRYANT: Right.
 8 CADET BAILEY: Yes, ma'am.
 9 DR. SEGAL: One of you — and it's a
 10 little hard for me by phone. I can't tell which of you
 11 by name it was — said that you dreaded initially the
 12 weekly trip to VMI, but that now you feel confident.
 13 Well, you've had almost four years. How
 14 long did it actually take you to get over that dread of
 15 going to VMI for the weekly trip and what made you get
 16 over it?
 17 CADET SHARPE: I think that the big jump
 18 for me was being at airborne school — and no pun
 19 intended on that one. But being in that environment and
 20 excelling at it and succeeding there was really a big
 21 confidence boost for me because I had trained for it in
 22 the same environment as the males from our school.
 23 I went there alone. I was the first

1 female they had ever sent. There was a lot of pressure
 2 there for me. And when I came back and I was constantly
 3 on — you know, number one on the OML for them, somewhat
 4 due to GPA and physical fitness and things like that,
 5 there was pressure there for me to prove that I could
 6 live up to that expectation.
 7 So I pushed myself harder, and the more I
 8 learned and the more that I was successful in things, the
 9 more that I became confident with it. And probably by
 10 the end of my freshman year, I wasn't dreading going down
 11 there anymore, unless it was just for the fact that it
 12 was thirty minutes away.
 13 DR. SEGAL: When did you go to airborne
 14 school?
 15 CADET SHARPE: I went in May of my
 16 freshman year.
 17 CADET BAILEY: I went this past summer.
 18 DR. SEGAL: Okay. So for you, it was
 19 actually going to airborne school and being in that
 20 integrated environment and doing well at the end of your
 21 freshman year that made you more confident to then come
 22 back and be with the male cadets at VMI? Is that right?
 23 CADET SHARPE: Yes, ma'am. I think it

1 might be a little different for the cadets who came after
 2 my class because a lot of the things that we did as
 3 freshmen are very different from the things that the
 4 freshmen class does now.
 5 We didn't have the drill-and-ceremony and
 6 as much of the military knowledge. We did do it, but
 7 there wasn't — We were leading it and following it at
 8 the same time, and we were creating it as we went along.
 9 It was a lot of trial-and-error.
 10 So I think now it might be an easier
 11 adjustment for them than it was for me, just because I
 12 didn't have that background to fall back on.
 13 DR. SEGAL: Are you, as a result of the
 14 airborne experience, more confident about your ability to
 15 succeed in the military?
 16 CADET SHARPE: Well, yes, like it made me
 17 more confident, but I've had failures in the military
 18 just as well. I was also supposed to attend air assault
 19 school and I didn't get through that one. And at
 20 advanced camp, although I came out above the average
 21 standards on it, I did have a few areas that I had
 22 problems with, but it wasn't any more so me as a female
 23 than it was just me as any other cadet.

1 DR. SEGAL: I don't have any more
 2 questions. Thank you very much.
 3 MR. PANG: I just want to comment, you
 4 know, with regard to the option, you know, that your
 5 institution offers, I respect that. I think, you know,
 6 that as you point out, single-sex schools are good for
 7 some people, and if they want it — if they choose that,
 8 that's fine. You know, if it's all-male, all-female.
 9 But my view of it, I mean, the bulk of
 10 education in America today at the college level is
 11 integrated, coeducational. I'm not saying that's good,
 12 that's the way it should be for everyone.
 13 You know, I had a couple of questions with
 14 regard to — because I was not quite clear. Every person
 15 — okay? — in your institution is part of a Corps of
 16 Cadets.
 17 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir.
 18 MR. PANG: Some of the people are in ROTC.
 19 CADET BAILEY: No, sir. Every one is in
 20 ROTC.
 21 MR. PANG: So when you say the Corps of
 22 Cadets, that means all the people who are in the Corps of
 23 Cadets —

1 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir.
 2 MR. PANG: — are also in ROTC.
 3 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir.
 4 MR. PANG: So from the first day that you
 5 enter the institution —
 6 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir.
 7 MR. PANG: — with regard to the military
 8 part of it — I mean, if you were going to enter the
 9 military — you're integrated in the sense that you go to
 10 VMI and that's where you do your ROTC training. Is that
 11 correct?
 12 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir. All of the ROTC
 13 is integrated.
 14 MR. PANG: I see.
 15 CADET BAILEY: Not necessarily all of the
 16 military, because we do military things in our Corps.
 17 MR. PANG: Right. Okay. So the military
 18 aspect that is not ROTC is applicable —
 19 CADET BAILEY: Is single-sex.
 20 MR. PANG: — to the educational part that
 21 is not related to the military. Is that correct? Or how
 22 do you —
 23 CADET SHARPE: I think it's —

1 MR. PANG: — draw that line?
 2 CADET SHARPE: I think that it's both like
 3 the military things that we do just as all females; the
 4 experiences you get with that, whether it be through
 5 holding rank and conducting drill-and-ceremony or staff
 6 meetings — like she's our cadet captain and I'm S-4,
 7 like that sort of thing —
 8 MR. PANG: I gotcha. I understand.
 9 CADET SHARPE: — prepares us better for
 10 the ROTC. But for the people who aren't interested in
 11 following-up on that, it also prepares them better for
 12 just the way any typical organization that works in a
 13 hierarchy would run.
 14 MR. PANG: I see. So you have a Corps of
 15 Cadets that are all women.
 16 CADET SHARPE: Yes, sir.
 17 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir.
 18 MR. PANG: And you have a rank structure
 19 for that.
 20 CADET SHARPE: Yes, sir.
 21 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir.
 22 MR. PANG: And then when you go to the
 23 ROTC, you're integrated into the rank structure over

1 there. Is that —
 2 CADET SHARPE: Exactly.
 3 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir.
 4 CADET SHARPE: Yes, sir.
 5 MR. PANG: Is that it? I see. Okay, I
 6 understand that. So with regard to those of you who make
 7 a choice to go into the military, the training that you
 8 receive, you know, that is going to lead you to become an
 9 officer in whatever branch of service, you know, you go
 10 to, starts out from day one integrated. Is that correct?
 11 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir.
 12 MR. PANG: I think I —
 13 CADET BAILEY: For the ROTC standpoint.
 14 MR. PANG: ROTC, yeah.
 15 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir. Strictly ROTC.
 16 MR. PANG: That's interesting.
 17 MR. MOORE: You have 120 cadets in the
 18 Corps, is that right?
 19 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir.
 20 CADET SHARPE: Yes, sir.
 21 MR. MOORE: In terms of your chain of
 22 command and TO&E, how are you organized? As a battalion?
 23 A company?

1 CADET BAILEY: Well, one large company,
 2 sir.
 3 MR. MOORE: One company. So you're the
 4 company commander?
 5 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir.
 6 MR. MOORE: And then you have what is, in
 7 effect, like a battalion staff —
 8 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir.
 9 MR. MOORE: — analogously, but you don't
 10 call it that, I guess.
 11 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir. It's a
 12 commanding officer and then executive officer.
 13 MR. MOORE: Exec, right.
 14 CADET BAILEY: XO, second in command.
 15 Under her is a staff. That is what Sherri is part of.
 16 And that is an S-1 through an S-4.
 17 MR. MOORE: Right. And then what? Four
 18 platoons?
 19 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir. Four platoons,
 20 one band —
 21 MR. MOORE: Okay.
 22 CADET BAILEY: — and then a color guard.
 23 MR. MOORE: Do you have a plebe system or

1 a rat line of sorts?
 2 CADET BAILEY: Of sorts, sir. Our
 3 freshmen are called "nulls," N-U-L-L-S, and it is never
 4 capitalized. They do not go through a rat line. There
 5 is not a certain line on campus that they walk. They are
 6 not harassed. They are not bothered during academic
 7 hours, things like that.
 8 But there are certain rules and privileges
 9 that we like to say that is unique to that class.
 10 Because we do operate at VWIL on a regimental and a class
 11 system which is very much like the other academies, we do
 12 have certain class privileges. So I guess in some
 13 extents they do.
 14 MR. PANG: You know, just a follow-up
 15 question. You know, what percent of the Corps of Cadets
 16 actually go into the military through the ROTC program?
 17 CADET BAILEY: Because this is the —
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: This is the first year.
 19 MR. PANG: Oh, this is the first year?
 20 CADET BAILEY: Because this is the first
 21 year, sir, it's —
 22 MR. PANG: I see. I see.
 23 CADET BAILEY: It's 50 percent this year.

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 434</p> <p>1 MR. PANG: Okay. 2 CADET BAILEY: But we'll see in the next 3 upcoming. 4 DR. BRYANT: Probably about 20, 20 to 25 5 overall. 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But it's an 7 elected and a selected. In other words — 8 MR. PANG: Yeah. 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — first 10 you must say, "I would like a commission," and then the 11 second part is — 12 MR. PANG: Is the selection. 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — that one 14 of the departments must accept. 15 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir. 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: What kind of 17 instructors do you have or did you have over the four 18 years to teach you the military subjects? Were they 19 former military or were they just yourselves, or how did 20 you put this program together? 21 CADET SHARPE: Well, a lot of it was 22 compiled off of — Colonel Bissell is our Commandant of 23 Cadets and he's worked very closely with the Virginia</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 437</p> <p>1 CADET BAILEY: Right. Our honor code is 2 the same as the other academies and services. The cadet 3 will not lie, cheat, steal, nor tolerate those who do. 4 CADET SHARPE: Which is the same standard 5 that Mary Baldwin itself has. 6 CADET BAILEY: Mary Baldwin also has it. 7 CADET SHARPE: Mary Baldwin in itself has 8 a very unique honor and judicial system compared to most 9 other colleges. 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: How big is Mary 11 Baldwin? 12 DR. BRYANT: 900 undergraduates, 13 residential. 14 DR. CANTOR: Could you tell us a little 15 bit about how the leadership experience that is the other 16 component of your education here translates into, for 17 example, the ROTC program or you think your future in the 18 military? 19 CADET BAILEY: I think that leadership can 20 be used in any career field or in any aspect that you 21 choose to go into. So in the military, there's a 22 definite stress on what does it mean to be a leader, are 23 you a good leader, and if you're a good leader, then</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 435</p> <p>1 Military Institute, and he's also travelled widely to the 2 other major military colleges in the country and he 3 brought us a lot of literature. 4 And as freshmen, we sat down in several 5 different committees. There was a uniform committee, a 6 rank committee, an admissions committee to set — And the 7 admissions committee set the standards for what we liked 8 to look at for the cadets coming in. The rank committee 9 sat down and we decided, "Okay. This is what we 10 ultimately would like to be. This is where we're at. 11 What can we do?" 12 And we looked at the different positions 13 that we'd like to have. Like I believe that like not all 14 of our positions are what they are in regular military. 15 Like our S-1 is communications, but our S-2 is public 16 relations instead of intelligence. Our S-3 is still 17 operations, and S-4 is logistics. 18 We didn't have an XO until last year. 19 This is the first year we've had a safety officer. Each 20 year we've added a platoon. We didn't start out with a 21 band. A lot of things have been trial-and-error with 22 that. It's been "Let's try this. It's not working, 23 let's try something else."</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 438</p> <p>1 that's how you relate to your people. 2 And I think that through VWIL, because 3 we've had that experience of not only educational and 4 academic training and what are the theories of 5 leadership, what is the history of leadership, we also 6 have experiential. So we have been able to practice that 7 leadership in ways that perhaps most of our cadets 8 wouldn't be able to practice at another university or 9 college. 10 So with those two combined, I think that's 11 the key to having a successful leader. 12 DR. CANTOR: And is the experiential part 13 in a military context or — 14 CADET BAILEY: Yes, ma'am. It can be in 15 and out. We have — With the class system, there is what 16 Sherri was talking about — the Cadet Conduct Council 17 that deals with class issues. The rank system, that's a 18 definite military structure. Proper courtesies, proper 19 protocols, et cetera, all have to be followed. 20 DR. CANTOR: Thank you. 21 CADET BAILEY: You're welcome. 22 DR. BRYANT: I could add one thing to that 23 to give you an idea of how it works. The class system is</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 436</p> <p>1 This is the first year that things have 2 really run the way that we envisioned them, and even then 3 it's not necessarily what we thought it would be when we 4 set out, which is why our particular — particularly our 5 class has lost, you know, half of the people who 6 originally entered the program — because what they 7 envisioned and what we envisioned were different. 8 And that's an advantage that the classes 9 under us have had — is that they have another class to 10 get the experience from. 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Did you have 12 within your Corps a — other than the school's, do you 13 have an honor system — 14 CADET SHARPE: Yes, sir. 15 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir. 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: — that relates 17 specifically to you? 18 CADET SHARPE: We have a Cadet Conduct 19 Council that meets to address things like that. Like, 20 say, one of our nulls takes an upper-class privilege or 21 they come in after curfew. They're on their honor to, 22 you know, report about that. We try not to use honor 23 against...</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 439</p> <p>1 a non-hierarchal-kind of structure and the decision 2 process is largely a consensus one. And so we 3 deliberately have that more rigid structure on the 4 regimental side and the flatter structure on the class 5 side so they can experience both. 6 When the class meets and the classes are 7 making decisions — Trimble has no class office — the 8 class president is responsible and the class officers and 9 their committees. And it's much more of a collaborative 10 process, probably much more parallel to business and 11 industry today — at least classically so. 12 So that they have that experience. And I 13 think it's relevant to the military as well as to the 14 business world, but being able to move back and forth and 15 experience it from the perspective of the first captain, 16 and then being one of the many and seeing it from a 17 different point of view, I think that will enhance their 18 leadership capabilities, too. 19 MR. PANG: You know, given our charter and 20 just as a matter of clarification, with regard to those 21 cadets who are going to enter the military — because our 22 charter has to do with, you know, the training of people 23 who are going to go into the military — you know, my</p>

1 understanding — and correct me if I'm wrong — is that
 2 your preference — both of you, your preference is that
 3 the training, at least in ROTC, ought to be gender-
 4 integrated and not single-sex.
 5 CADET BAILEY: Well, sir, that's hard to
 6 —
 7 MR. PANG: I need to —
 8 CADET BAILEY: Yes, sir.
 9 MR. PANG: You know, we need to kind of
 10 just...
 11 CADET BAILEY: It's a hard question to
 12 answer because so much of our training cannot be
 13 separated as — Well, ROTC has simply prepared me to be a
 14 military officer.
 15 MR. PANG: Right.
 16 CADET BAILEY: No, because VWIL has also
 17 prepared me to be —
 18 MR. PANG: No, I understand that. But,
 19 you know, if the law allowed you, which it doesn't — I
 20 mean, you know, to go single-sex, okay? — would you
 21 prefer that or do you think that's the wiser thing to do?
 22 Or do you think the coed experience in the ROTC is the
 23 way to go? I mean, that's kind of the question I have.

1 DR. BRYANT: Can I answer that from my
 2 point of view and give you some time to think about it?
 3 CADET BAILEY: Sure.
 4 DR. BRYANT: You can answer it, too.
 5 I think one of the things that for us, and
 6 from my perspective on watching students go through this
 7 program, is that the chance to have all of the
 8 opportunities to be in charge — It's just almost a sheer
 9 numbers thing. Anywhere else they would go to get this
 10 kind of training, they would be in the very small
 11 minority. There would be one or two of them that would
 12 get a chance to hold rank all four years or whatever the
 13 kinds of opportunities are.
 14 Part of it is simply a numbers thing.
 15 They can step outside of the ROTC environment and have
 16 everything. They have all of the responsibilities. They
 17 run —
 18 MR. PANG: You know, I understand that.
 19 DR. BRYANT: So it's probably just that.
 20 It's partly the advantage of opportunity.
 21 MR. PANG: Yeah, because that's the
 22 objective of your institution.
 23 DR. BRYANT: Sure.

1 MR. PANG: So, I mean, I understand that.
 2 But, you know, the law basically directed us to look at
 3 the military — you know, the military training — the
 4 part that deals with people going into the military and
 5 serving in the military.
 6 DR. BRYANT: Right. And the reason I'm
 7 bringing up this point is that I think that there are
 8 real advantages to having it both ways.
 9 MR. PANG: I don't disagree.
 10 DR. BRYANT: We have really been very
 11 fortunate, I think, to be able to have our own thing and
 12 also to be able to partner with another institution. If
 13 a model like that were available in the ROTC world, that
 14 might be preferable rather than all one way or all the
 15 other. I don't think it —
 16 MR. PANG: No. You know, I —
 17 DR. BRYANT: I don't think it exists,
 18 but...
 19 MR. PANG: I think, you know — And that's
 20 my point. I mean, I respect, you know, the option that
 21 your institution offers to people who want a single-sex
 22 education. Okay? I think that's separate and apart from
 23 preparing an individual to go into the military, I mean,

1 because there are other coeducational institutions who
 2 produce people who go into the military and succeed very
 3 well and who are women.
 4 I mean, you know, so I — you know, I just
 5 wanted to kind of draw that line, at least in my mind,
 6 you know, when we get to the point of deliberating on,
 7 you know, what our recommendations are going to be with
 8 regard to that aspect of it — I mean, preparing an
 9 individual to go into the military and then continue on
 10 — because, you know, that's what we're looking at in
 11 basic training.
 12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: For the
 13 record, I'd like to — Please don't infer at all that I
 14 am attempting to disparage what you're doing. I think
 15 it's a great — any opportunity you provide somebody for
 16 an education is wonderful. But I'm having a rough time
 17 understanding — and maybe that was not the intent of
 18 today. But I think, Dr. Bryant, if I heard you
 19 correctly, your two major focuses — one is to obviously
 20 provide educational opportunities, but two is to develop
 21 leadership qualities.
 22 And because the population that you have
 23 is extremely small and I would guess you've been able to

1 be very selective on who you include in that population,
 2 you can do a lot of things outside the norm, so to speak.
 3 But I don't see any correlation to what you're doing and
 4 what our charter has asked us to look at.
 5 Now, maybe I've missing something but I
 6 don't see any connection whatsoever, because, to be
 7 perfectly honest, in all the services they don't focus on
 8 individual leadership and they obviously don't focus on
 9 higher education. They focus on education, but it's an
 10 education that's — So maybe I've missed something here,
 11 but...
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, I can cite you to a
 13 provision in the statute that asks us to look at other
 14 kinds of systems and we've looked at firefighters and
 15 things like that.
 16 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I
 17 understand.
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: But mainly, Bob, I just
 19 wanted to get away from the notion that any kind of all-
 20 female training other than the Marine Corps or even
 21 including the Marine Corps is largely about powdering
 22 your nose. So this is just simply an exposure to another
 23 kind of program.

1 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I
 2 understand. But I just wonder if there's agreement here
 3 that their process is quite unique and completely
 4 different from the processes that we have been looking at
 5 for the best part of a year.
 6 I mean, I might be wrong, but...
 7 DR. BRYANT: Well, I think the one
 8 question that encompasses all of these experiences is —
 9 is it possible for women in a largely single-sex
 10 environment to be trained and excel in the world of work,
 11 including in the military.
 12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Absolutely.
 13 DR. BRYANT: And yes, it is. I believe
 14 that very, very strongly. In fact —
 15 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I absolutely
 16 agree with you.
 17 DR. CANTOR: Just for the record, I don't
 18 mean to — I think what you're doing is terrific, but
 19 there have been single-sex colleges preparing people for
 20 the work world for a long time. So I think we have
 21 plenty of data about the ability of single-sex
 22 institutions to prepare —
 23 DR. BRYANT: But probably not the impact

1 of those experiences in this particular setting — the
 2 military.
 3 MS. POPE: There is one similarity that
 4 this ties to, and it's different because this is going to
 5 the officer corps which we really haven't looked at.
 6 And, one, I want to compliment the two of you on your
 7 success. I mean, you've accomplished a lot.
 8 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Absolutely.
 9 MS. POPE: You are two very articulate
 10 young women.
 11 MR. PANG: Absolutely.
 12 MS. POPE: And so whatever you do, you're
 13 going to be successful. I have the utmost confidence.
 14 And so I want to compliment you there.
 15 It's interesting, though — And Charlie
 16 refers to it as the "Pope theory." But as we have
 17 travelled around to the services, if the experience has
 18 been good — single-gender, integrated — people have
 19 liked the way they have been trained. And what I'm
 20 hearing is that you like it. You've grown; you've
 21 matured; you're confident in your leadership abilities.
 22 I'm sitting here thinking three weeks ago,
 23 sometime in the last month, I was at the Citadel, and if

1 you change the uniforms and your faces, I heard the exact
 2 same things coming from those women, which reconfirms my
 3 observations last year that if the experience is good and
 4 you chose this — And people in an all-volunteer force
 5 choose the service that fits them best. You chose Mary
 6 Baldwin and this program because it satisfied what — And
 7 you were mature enough to know what it is you want.
 8 I think most of the men and women who
 9 choose the military are selective. They go into the
 10 Marine Corps because of what the Marine Corps offers, you
 11 know, or the Air Force or the Navy or the Army. And I
 12 happen to think that's part of what makes this country
 13 great — is freedom of choice and the opportunity, and
 14 that one size does not fit all.
 15 But I'm sitting here, and from those young
 16 women — And they were very similar to you in that they
 17 were there from the beginning and they're growing and
 18 mistakes were made. But they liked that experience and
 19 they —
 20 DR. SEGAL: Barbara, can I follow-up that
 21 with a question?
 22 MS. POPE: Sure.
 23 But I just — I mean, it's back to the

1 point that if it's a good experience, which is a
 2 compliment to what Mary Baldwin is doing — is the
 3 experience has been good — You know, we might for the
 4 record want to ask General Reynolds and General Mace to
 5 comment on their program and what they've done because
 6 theirs is very integrated. It's different. They like it
 7 and you like it.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Mady has the floor, I think.
 9 MS. POPE: Sorry, Mady.
 10 DR. SEGAL: I just have a question. One
 11 of the cadets, when she was talking about her experiences
 12 with VWIL, she was talking about how she feels she has
 13 gotten — some things have been better for her than she
 14 would have had at one of the military academies. And I
 15 would like to ask both of the cadets — since you have
 16 been at Mary Baldwin, have you spent any period of time
 17 at any of the military academies other than VMI?
 18 CADET BAILEY: No, ma'am, other than
 19 training. I did summer training — a flight program —
 20 during the summer, but that wasn't necessarily during an
 21 academic time period.
 22 DR. SEGAL: So was it at one of the
 23 academies?

1 CADET BAILEY: Yes, ma'am. It was the Air
 2 Force Academy.
 3 DR. SEGAL: Okay.
 4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Are there any
 5 other colleges that you know of that have been looking at
 6 a program like this and are developing a pilot program?
 7 DR. BRYANT: Like this one? No, there are
 8 no others that I know of.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I think it
 10 appropriate to say that — Barbara, you've hit upon it —
 11 that, you know, one size does not fit all, and I think
 12 that you are providing, you know, an alternative to those
 13 who would seek, if you will, a single-gender education.
 14 And I believe that what I think I hear
 15 your program has done — and I applaud it tremendously —
 16 is that in teaching leadership, you've used the military
 17 model. You've used a regimented system, you know,
 18 because that's an excellent way to teach leadership, not
 19 just from a military standpoint but to carry on into the
 20 civilian community.
 21 And it seems to me that what we've been
 22 good enough to hear is the fact that as we deliberate, as
 23 we look at things, that there are a number of different

1 systems out there. And before we draw judgments on one
 2 or another or the like, we ought to understand that
 3 people should have alternatives. And I think that that's
 4 what I — that's what I hear here.
 5 And first of all, let me say I applaud
 6 this program because I think it provides a tremendous
 7 alternative and it provides, in this case, young women a
 8 choice, if you will: "I can go this way." "I can do it
 9 this way because this is best for me." And I think that
 10 that's what's important.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We have another part to
 12 this panel, so I'd like to thank you all very much for
 13 coming up. It's a long drive and, you know — But you
 14 have a lot to be proud of. I know better than anybody
 15 else at this table, at least. And we thank you very much
 16 for coming and we wish you all the best in your careers
 17 and with the program.
 18 DR. BRYANT: Thank you.
 19 (A brief recess was taken.)
 20 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We do have a copy of
 21 Elaine's statement available which we'll be handing out.
 22 And I think many of you already know Elaine Donnelly, and
 23 in any event, her bio is in the materials.

1 Thank you very much for coming, Elaine.
 2 MS. DONNELLY: Thank you, Anita. I just
 3 have to say at the outset —
 4 MS. POPE: Mady, are you there?
 5 MS. DONNELLY: Is Dr. Segal there, too?
 6 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: No, she laid
 7 her phone down for a minute.
 8 MS. POPE: She's coming back.
 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right.
 10 MS. DONNELLY: Okay.
 11 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: She'll be
 12 back.
 13 MS. POPE: She didn't hang up.
 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right.
 15 MS. DONNELLY: I just have to say
 16 parenthetically I was just so impressed with the panel
 17 just before us. I went to VWIL about, oh, four or five
 18 years ago, before the program even began. Have you ever
 19 seen a dream come true? Dr. Bryant and Cynthia Tyson,
 20 the president — I could tell right there that VWIL was
 21 going to be one of the premier institutions in the
 22 nation.
 23 And they have made a dream come true, and

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1 they did it by thinking on their own — out of the box,
 2 as they say these days — and they created something
 3 really worth admiring and I was glad to have been here to
 4 share that with you.

5 It's late in the day. I know you've been
 6 here since 7:00. And I'm not going to read the whole
 7 statement, I'll tell you that right now. I am going to
 8 jump over chunks of it as I go along, but I do want to
 9 hit some of the major points in it and I hope there will
 10 be time for some questions.

11 Those of you who don't know me, I'm
 12 Chairman of the Center for Military Readiness. And we're
 13 a public policy organization and we specialize in
 14 personnel issues in the military, and we're in all fifty
 15 states. We're supported by civilians and military alike.

16 I really appreciate the chance to speak to you today.

17 Our view of the issue that is before you
 18 begins with a very simply principle. And that is, that
 19 the purpose of basic training is not to advance
 20 sociological agendas or to teach men and women how to get
 21 along. It is to create soldiers. It's to apply a
 22 cultural shock, something that transforms young men and
 23 women into functioning, capable members of the armed

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1 has been a big success. There was a big lobbying
 2 campaign that took place in Congress last year.
 3 But I wanted to bring to your attention
 4 some figures that came out in this report. I don't know
 5 if your Commission has this yet. This is the Military
 6 Attrition Report done by the General Accounting Office.

7 According to these figures — this is
 8 September, 1998 — the attrition rate of enlistees who
 9 did not complete their first terms beyond forty-eight
 10 months of service average 31.7 percent from 1982 to 1993.
 11 Without counting first-termers who left due to the force
 12 reductions, the average attrition rates for enlistees who
 13 entered the service in Fiscal Year 1993 escalated to 35.8
 14 percent, higher than they were in over a decade.

15 The highest attrition rate, unfortunately,
 16 was registered in the Army: 39.3 percent. This is a
 17 clear indication that the Army's basic training system
 18 may be failing in its most essential task. Both the Navy
 19 and the Air Force, which also have coed training,
 20 registered first-term attrition rates of 35.8 percent and
 21 32.5, respectively. Only the Marine Corps, which retains
 22 single-gender training, registered a loss rate of 31.5,
 23 continuing a three-year downward trend.

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1 forces.

2 To be successful, basic training has to be
 3 efficient. Not only for the young people involved, but
 4 for the service as a whole. It's a building block, basic
 5 building block. And as you saw with the young women from
 6 VWIL, if you have the capability that comes from learning
 7 certain basics, you can do anything, and I think that's
 8 really the purpose of basic training.

9 Survival is number one on the agenda,
 10 certainly being transformed from a civilian into a
 11 soldier, and soldiers have to be prepared not just for
 12 the advanced training that's ahead of them but a
 13 completely different way of life.

14 But now we're seeing a number of signs
 15 that the foundations — the building block of military
 16 training — the foundations are starting to break down.
 17 And a clear indication of that, of course, was the report
 18 of the Kassebaum Baker Commission which said, "The
 19 present organizational structure in integrated basic
 20 training is resulting in less discipline, less unit
 21 cohesion and more distraction from training programs."

22 And as you know, the Commission
 23 recommended on a unanimous vote that male and female

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1 Now, using the 1998 estimates of costs-
 2 per-recruit, which according to GAO totalled \$35,532, the
 3 loss amounts to a significant figure: \$2.5 billion. I'd
 4 say that's significant.

5 Now, these figures are not broken down by
 6 gender, but the Presidential Commission learned in 1992
 7 that, on average, women cost more to recruit and to
 8 retain. A clearer picture of the percentages and costs-
 9 per-recruit would emerge if you obtained some very
 10 specific data from the Pentagon. It makes no sense, by
 11 the way, to exclude personnel losses that occurred due to
 12 pregnancy.

13 Now, those numbers are beyond the scope of
 14 my organization. But I'm sure if you asked for them, you
 15 will be able to get them from the Pentagon.

16 The services receive no return on their
 17 recruiting and training investment until the recruit
 18 performs successfully and stays in the service beyond his
 19 or her initial assignment. It's clear that gender-mixed
 20 training is not giving the military a satisfactory return
 21 on investment.

22 But it doesn't end there. To make matters
 23 worse, Army basic training drop-out rates have surged —

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1 recruits be separated in barracks and small basic
 2 training units such as platoons.

3 Now, adoption of that proposal would have
 4 been a good step in the right direction, but it was
 5 flawed. As Adam Mersereau wrote in a Wall Street Journal
 6 article which will be provided to you later, if you have
 7 three male and one female platoon in a given company,
 8 what you have and what did happen at the Basic School in
 9 the Marine Corps some years ago was constant comparisons
 10 between the female platoon and the male platoons, and
 11 that's why in the Marine Corps they abandoned the
 12 experiment in 1991.

13 So I will say at the outset that I hope
 14 that this Commission will recommend separate-gender —
 15 that the basic training programs be separated between men
 16 and women in larger company units, not just the platoons
 17 and the divisions and the flights. That we know that
 18 this is the system that is being used to great success by
 19 the Marine Corps at Parris Island.

20 And in support of that position, I'd like
 21 to just address briefly some of the major arguments that
 22 have come about during the course of this debate.

23 We keep hearing that coed basic training

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1 from 14 percent to 19 percent — since introduction of an
 2 extra week for "values" education. You may recall that
 3 was the recommendation of the Senior Review Panel.
 4 According to U.S. News and World Report, this means about
 5 a thousand recruits did not enter the service as planned.

6 Now comes the news that the situation has
 7 worsened even more since the release of the GAO report
 8 that I just cited. According to a Washington Times story
 9 only two days ago, the Army's first-term attrition rate
 10 has increased to a staggering 41 percent. In the same
 11 edition, a front-page story reported that due to
 12 persistent recruiting shortages, the Army will likely be
 13 short about 20,000 soldiers by the year 2000.

14 We know the Navy's been operating about
 15 7,000 sailors short, and we know the Air Force has got a
 16 shortage of about 800 pilots and is expected to go to
 17 2000 by the year 2002.

18 These are tangible negative trends. And
 19 as described in a confidential Army report that was
 20 obtained by the Washington Times, it was dismissed by the
 21 Pentagon as nothing more than "opinion." But according
 22 to this insider source, "We are on the verge of a
 23 sustained meltdown in our ability to keep our armed

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 458</p> <p>1 forces manned with quality personnel, and most observers 2 have failed to even notice.” 3 Losses such as these make coed basic 4 training look like a boondoggle. The services can no 5 longer afford it. Unless the program improves the 6 quality of trainees going on to advanced schools, and 7 unless its effects can be measured in higher recruiting 8 and higher retention figures, the case for continuance 9 cannot be made. 10 Now, a brief review of how we got to this 11 point might be helpful in determining what to do next. 12 In 1992, the Presidential Commission 13 asked, “Why did the Army end the first experiment with 14 coed training?” And we heard very quickly, 15 unequivocally, the reason was that men were not being 16 physically challenged enough, and they were not attaining 17 their full potential, and the finding of the Commission 18 is footnoted in my statement. A later study also 19 reported that women were suffering injuries at far 20 greater rates than the men. 21 And there were contemporaneous news 22 reports. I’ve brought some of them with me. They’ll be 23 attached to my statement. And the news reports did not</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 461</p> <p>1 Now, I do want to talk about that study. 2 The study claimed that women’s performance improved but 3 men’s stayed about the same or didn’t get any worse. The 4 problem was that certain realities didn’t change. Women 5 were indeed more subject to injury, so how do you get 6 around that? 7 Well, Army Research Institute came out 8 with a way to get around that. They sort of redefined 9 things. The answer was to de-emphasize physical 10 requirements and redefine training criteria so that women 11 would not be disadvantaged. The reported success was 12 defined by focus groups — little groups of people 13 sitting around in a circle — and the terms of 14 measurement related to sociology, not military realities 15 or the demands of combat. 16 In all phases, ARI declared the programs 17 were successful by redefining “proficiency,” and the 18 “soldierization” process in terms of women’s morale 19 instead of military necessity. 20 For example — and I won’t go into all the 21 details; they’re in my statement — the Individual 22 Proficiency Tests administered as part of the Basic 23 Combat Training Course had more to do with basic medical</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 459</p> <p>1 reflect any lack of confidence in women’s ability to 2 become soldiers. No, that wasn’t the problem. 3 During the five-year experiment, platoons 4 were single-sex, but companies, which generally included 5 three platoons of men and one of women, were gender- 6 mixed. That meant that in company road marching 7 exercises, the male platoons were held back by the women. 8 And according to a spokesman at the time, “Everyone was 9 meeting the standards, but our goal is to let people do 10 better than the minimum....We feel both sexes will 11 benefit.” 12 The rationale made sense then and it 13 should have settled the issue for good, but coed basic 14 training was reinstated in 1994. 15 No one has seen a written order that sets 16 forth a rationale for that. But we know according to the 17 Army War College account, the history account, General 18 Richard Chilcoat briefed then-Chief of Staff General 19 Gordon Sullivan about the implications of sweeping 20 assignment rule changes and suggested, “Well, the Army 21 should train as we fight,” and one thing sort of led to 22 another, it appears. 23 Never mind that certain facts of</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 462</p> <p>1 skills than “combat” requirements. And the full text of 2 the skills are listed there. The physical elements that 3 might disadvantage women were downplayed or taken out 4 altogether, and the things that women do well, like map- 5 reading, putting on protective gear, first-aid techniques 6 — those were given greater emphasis. 7 To the extent that there were physical 8 components, the scores were gender-normed. And as 9 evaluated by ARI, successful “soldierization” was 10 determined not by military criteria but by these focus 11 groups, and the focus groups were — You know how they 12 rated what they said? — was self-reported feelings. 13 “How do you feel about those things?” 14 The focus group leaders redefined unit 15 cohesion in largely civilian, emotional terms — asking 16 whether interviewees “like being in a platoon,” do they 17 “feel very close,” do they “like and trust one another,” 18 and do they “make others want to do a good job.” 19 Now, all of these criteria are 20 interesting. There’s a place for focus groups, but not 21 when you’re deciding whether or not to change a major 22 training program for the armed forces. These subjective 23 “touchy-feely” measurements have little in common with</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 460</p> <p>1 physiology remained unchanged since 1982. It appears 2 that the decision to reinstate coed training had less to 3 do with logic than with political pressures at the time. 4 One historical account published by TRADOC 5 referred to “traditional interservice rivalry, [which] 6 caused the leadership to ask, ‘Why not the Army?’” 7 Now, that speculation rings true to me 8 because I have a lot of personal experience with a 9 certain rivalry going on between the Navy and the Air 10 Force to get women into combat aviation. It was a race, 11 and it was acknowledged in the Air Wing 11 report. 12 At the same time, General Sullivan was on 13 the spot. He was resisting radical plans to put women in 14 MLRS — multiple launch rocket systems — and special 15 operations helicopters. My organization was involved at 16 that time also. Then-Defense Secretary William Perry 17 said, “Well, let’s find a compromise.” 18 Then the Washington Post reported that 19 drill sergeants who opposed the plan were given the 20 “Attila the Hun” treatment. No dissent was allowed. And 21 a great deal of misleading information was circulating 22 around about the benefits of coed training and most of it 23 was based on a study done by the Army Research Institute.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 463</p> <p>1 the classic definition of unit cohesion, and the full 2 text of it is in my testimony. It uses the word 3 “survival” no less than three times in one paragraph. 4 But the questions put by ARI to the focus groups had 5 nothing to say about things like survival and all of 6 that. 7 Then they proclaimed success in terms of 8 women’s morale. They said it went up 14 percentage 9 points in the 1993 test. Well, guess what? The morale 10 among the young men dropped by 17 points. I guess the 11 morale of the men didn’t matter as much, even though 12 their numbers — the numbers of young men were greater. 13 So that’s one problem I have with the way 14 the decision was made. 15 Then the argument was heard then and now, 16 “We must train as we fight.” I would say the military 17 should train its soldiers to serve, fight and win, if 18 called upon to engage in a military operation. 19 No one seems to notice that if we fight as 20 we train — with all of these disciplinary problems, 21 gender-normed double standards, high drop-out rates, and 22 other problems — we’re going to be in big trouble. 23 To be taken seriously, those who say we</p>

1 should train as we fight, there's one acid test of that.
 2 Let's get rid of the stools that are used to help women
 3 get over obstacle courses; let's get rid of all the
 4 gender-normed scores; let's get rid of the concept of
 5 "equal effort" being the same as "equal results." Then
 6 we can talk about "train as we fight." If you don't do
 7 that, then it's a meaningless argument.
 8 There is no gender-norming on the
 9 battlefield. Uniformed women cannot succeed if the
 10 military as a whole does not succeed.
 11 Now we're hearing that physical standards
 12 are being toughened. We've heard this before. Such
 13 promises cannot be met because we know that injuries
 14 among women would increase, sparking intense and
 15 inevitable criticism that the standards are unfair to
 16 women.
 17 Now, I'm not going to go over all the
 18 abundant evidence of physical differences between men and
 19 women. There are some tangible examples that I just want
 20 to bring briefly to your attention. You all know about
 21 the hand grenade-throwing exercise. You know that the
 22 Marines found that 45 percent of female Marines could not
 23 throw a live grenade safely beyond the bursting radius.

1 I know from personal experience with
 2 DACOWITS any time you try to have high and equal
 3 standards, the political pressure is enormous, even
 4 though an early study found that most women were unable
 5 to meet the standards for nearly 70 percent of the Army's
 6 occupational specialties. They redefined a lot of them.
 7 That was the answer.
 8 When mal-assignments occur, the transfer
 9 to another MOS costs about \$16,000.
 10 The Institute of Medicine recently found
 11 stress fractures are fewer among civilian women, much
 12 higher among military women.
 13 It goes on and on. A running gap,
 14 athletic gap. It seemed like women runners were getting
 15 closer to the men's records. That gap is not narrowing
 16 anymore, according to a very recent study.
 17 And the Naval Academy found among tears in
 18 knee ligaments requiring surgery, twice as many times —
 19 excuse me — nine times more likely, women are, to have
 20 one of those injuries.
 21 Now, these are realities. I'm not talking
 22 theory here. This is reality, and they should cause
 23 great concern, not controversy. Gender-mixed basic

1 training will always require compromises in gender-
 2 norming schemes. And anything — The problem with the
 3 schemes is that they create only the illusion of
 4 equality, and in a combat environment, that can be
 5 dangerous.
 6 I want to say something about this idea
 7 that, "Well, combat readiness will improve with morale."
 8 Adam Mersereau — again, a former Marine and attorney —
 9 published a thesis that makes a very good point:
 10 "authentic morale does not grow in its own soil, [with]
 11 combat efficiency as a mysterious by-product."
 12 "[Rather,]...high morale flows when the ranks are at all
 13 times conscious that they are serving in a highly-
 14 efficient institution."
 15 And I would add as we saw with the young
 16 women from VWIL, if you know you can do the job and you
 17 know your leadership has its act together, your morale is
 18 high. It doesn't go the other way around.
 19 "Combat efficiency yields morale, and
 20 therefore, must precede it...Morale without combat
 21 efficiency would be of little value on the basic
 22 training. Furthermore, morale without combat efficiency
 23 is most likely an inauthentic form of morale, brought on

1 by false confidence."
 2 There's some other points that I'm not
 3 even going to — we don't have time to go into — the
 4 effect of single-gender training on sexual harassment.
 5 The need for gender quotas — I'd be glad
 6 to answer questions on any of that.
 7 The politically popular but, I would say,
 8 shallow argument that the military cannot turn back the
 9 clock.
 10 I do want to say something about the fact
 11 that the Department of Defense, all the service
 12 secretaries, uniformed leaders, everybody supports coed
 13 training, so that should settle it. No, that shouldn't
 14 settle it. There is reason to believe the Pentagon
 15 doesn't always present the whole story. Many times they
 16 are expected or required to withhold information or
 17 deliberately mislead people seeking information on
 18 certain controversial issues.
 19 Now, I'm not just speaking in speculation.
 20 I have two rather lengthy appendices to my statement.
 21 One of them talks about the Senior Review Panel report,
 22 and the other one is about the Rand study that was done.
 23 In both of these studies, responsibility was diverted

1 away from real leadership.
 2 And in the Rand study, negative
 3 information that might have diverged from the argument
 4 that everything is working just fine — a lot of that
 5 material was purged from the document before it as
 6 published. And I know this because I obtained a copy of
 7 a draft and the draft — and when you compare the two,
 8 one next to each other — hold it up to the light — you
 9 can see there was an awful lot that was left out.
 10 In conclusion, I can only say it's time
 11 for a fresh start. As they did at VWIL, you need to
 12 think out of the box. You need to think, "Where are we
 13 going to be four or five years from now? Can we not
 14 improve the product from basic training?" That's what
 15 I'd like to have you start thinking about. I would love
 16 to be here four or five years — or anywhere — sometime
 17 later and say, "Wow, there's been an improvement in basic
 18 training," not just talk about problems.
 19 All of you have an independent
 20 responsibility and a wonderful opportunity to recommend
 21 effective action to remedy problems that are too obvious
 22 to ignore. It's not enough to downplay or rationalize
 23 problems, blame them on a failure of leadership,

1 recommend nothing more than a continuance of the status
 2 quo.
 3 The Center for Military Readiness urges
 4 you to recommend a comprehensive approach that begins,
 5 but does not end, with the restoration of single-gender
 6 basic training up to the company level.
 7 We hope you will also call for an end to
 8 recruiting quotas so that the numbers and assignments of
 9 women can take a more realistic course. This is
 10 important because pressures to meet quotas inevitably
 11 lead to adjustments in qualification standards.
 12 Every major report on gender integration
 13 since 1993 has mentioned the perception and the reality
 14 of double standards in training and in disciplinary
 15 matters. Many military women agree with me it's long
 16 past time to do something about these special
 17 concessions, allowances that lower standards for everyone
 18 while elevating risks in very hazardous occupations. In
 19 the same way, tolerance of consensual misconduct or false
 20 accusations of misconduct demoralizes the troops and
 21 heightens resentment between the sexes.
 22 It is a tenet of what I call social
 23 fiction, comparable to science fiction, that men and

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1 women are interchangeable beings and that human sexuality
2 is of no consequence. Instead of embracing social
3 fiction and ungendered visions that impose impossible
4 burdens on instructors and field commanders, military
5 training programs have to be realistic.

6 They have to recognize that the power of
7 sexuality and the weakness of human nature are real. You
8 have to allow for it. Gender-mixed barracks, coed field
9 housing arrangements, and overly-generous pregnancy
10 policies that encourage indiscipline and single
11 parenthood are in need of a fresh look.

12 And again, I strongly urge you to obtain
13 more hard data, broken down by gender, on the recruiting
14 and retention issues that I've mentioned in my testimony.
15 Anecdotal evidence isn't enough. You've got to have
16 something that shows "is this a success" and "is it not"
17 in this crucial policy-making area, and it must focus on
18 military necessity as its first priority.

19 Again, you have an historic opportunity
20 here and I'm afraid it's going to take a change. But,
21 you know, sometimes even successful institutions have to
22 change.

23 I mentioned in my statement what happened

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1 with NASA when they lost three astronauts very early in
2 the space program. And the reason the accident happened
3 was because of an unexpected spark and the atmosphere in
4 the space capsule was a hundred-percent oxygen.

5 And the mechanical engineers could have
6 said, "Well, we're going to re-do the spacecraft and make
7 sure that there will be no sparks, but we're going to
8 hold onto that hundred-percent oxygen atmosphere." They
9 didn't do that. They changed the atmosphere and they
10 allowed for sparks and mistakes and errors and problems
11 with the machinery, and that's why we went to the moon.

12 But now we see that civilian and military
13 leaders in the Pentagon are playing a dangerous game.
14 They're saying, "Well, we're going to put young men and
15 women in a 100-percent oxygen environment and then we're
16 going to say, 'Zero tolerance of sparks.'"

17 Well, that's not a very sensible plan, and
18 if that's the way it is now, we need to change it.
19 Military readiness depends on people, not just on the
20 ships and the planes and the weapons, and I don't think
21 that the jobs that those people have should be made more
22 difficult or more dangerous because of misdirected
23 priorities and misguided policies.

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1 Congress and the nation are looking to you
2 for leadership and good advice. I know you'll give that
3 to them, and I'm more than happy to help in any way I
4 can.

5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you, Elaine.

6 MS. DONNELLY: Thank you.

7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And thank you for talking
8 fast at this hour of the day. I'm sure you can use a
9 drink of water at this point.

10 And I'm not sure if I mentioned earlier,
11 but our practice has been to just pass around the table
12 with questions from commissioners until we run out of
13 time or questions. And I will mention as you noted, we
14 have been here for a long time today, and so please don't
15 be insulted if there are fewer questions than you might
16 like.

17 We do have your —

18 MS. DONNELLY: I understand.

19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We do have your paper and
20 your materials.

21 And I would like to start off with a
22 question which you may want to defer and answer later,
23 which is are you — do you know of any published

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1 critiques of the ARI report? You've mentioned several
2 issues with that survey or that study, and I wonder if
3 you could direct us, whether now or, you know, with a
4 submission later, to any publications that include a
5 fuller discussion of those issues.

6 MS. DONNELLY: Believe me, I have tried to
7 find more and I was quite surprised to see that there
8 isn't anything. I think I'm one of the very few people
9 who have actually read the thing. And when you read it
10 and you see little sound bites in there that sound good
11 when taken out of context, you can see why just that
12 report, with only certain parts of it put forward in an
13 argument, could be misleading.

14 It's too bad. I wish that it had gotten
15 more attention. I wish a more critical view had been
16 taken of it at the time. Maybe it was criticized at the
17 time. The slides that I've attached to my testimony were
18 presented to a group of congressional staffers and they
19 were appalled by what they saw. They told me they
20 couldn't believe that such flimsy arguments were being
21 used to promote this as a success.

22 And, yet, was anything said publicly about
23 it? No. Did Congress have hearings on it? No, not

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1 until this last year, and I put it into my testimony at
2 this time last year — last March.

3 So I think it does deserve a lot more
4 attention, but you have to keep the criteria in mind.
5 How do you define "success"? That's the key question.

6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Thank you.

7 MR. PANG: Elaine, you know, thank you for
8 joining us. I appreciate your comments. You know, we
9 have, as a Commission, proceeded to gather a great deal
10 of information and I think it's fair to say that we
11 probably have contributed to the wealth of whoever makes
12 these folders; because we have gone to the services with
13 an exhaustive list of questions and requests for data and
14 the challenge is for staff and for us to go through all
15 of that.

16 The other method of trying to accomplish
17 our mission has been to go out and talk to the people in
18 uniform — seniors, all the way down to the entry-level
19 people, including the military chiefs — and I think it's
20 probably fair to say that the vast majority of the people
21 that we've talked to have told us that the way basic
22 training is being conducted today in each one of the
23 separate services is the way to go. Okay?

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1 And, you know, we have asked them
2 questions with regard to "what effect does the way you
3 conduct basic training have on readiness," and, you know
4 — and, in fact, "in the way you train men and women,"
5 which are different among the services — "what kind of
6 effect does that have on readiness?" "Does it degrade
7 it?" "Are you concerned about it?" "Are you satisfied?"
8 "Tell us," I mean, you know.

9 And basically I think what we've heard —
10 okay? — is that people are pretty happy — "happy" is
11 the wrong word — are satisfied that the training
12 establishment is producing the types of people they need
13 to field a force that can go into Bosnia and do the
14 mission.

15 And they point this out. I mean, I'm
16 saying this — I mean, I'm telling you what I've heard.
17 You know, go into Bosnia and perform the mission. They
18 can go out to the Sinai and perform the mission, you
19 know.

20 And today we had the Marine Corps over
21 here. They said the same thing. You know, that foreign
22 deployed readiness is their utmost concern; that the
23 Marine Corps is ready to fulfill that mission.

1 There are some concerns, but when you ask
 2 what the concerns are, the concerns really have to do
 3 with resource shortfalls. You know, insufficient people.
 4 You know, expanding missions — okay? — and not a
 5 commensurate increase in the force structure and things
 6 like that.
 7 So, you know, I mean, that's what we've
 8 heard overwhelmingly.
 9 MS. DONNELLY: Fred, I understand.
 10 MR. PANG: So, you know, I have to ask
 11 you, you know, why do you think that's so? I mean, you
 12 know, these are people that have to — They're in
 13 uniform. They've got to go into battle with these people
 14 that they've got, that are coming out of the training
 15 pipeline, and certainly you wouldn't go into battle with
 16 somebody you don't think is ready because you can get
 17 killed, you know.
 18 So when they —
 19 MS. DONNELLY: Fred, believe me —
 20 MR. PANG: — say those things, I mean,
 21 you know, it has a tremendous impact on us, I mean, as
 22 commissioners, because these are — you know, when you
 23 look at the chests, I mean, you know, of these people and

1 the ribbons that are on there, I mean, I saw Purple
 2 Hearts, Silver Stars and all that. I mean, so I don't
 3 think these are people who are cowards and would not
 4 state their views.
 5 MS. DONNELLY: Fred, that's not a word I
 6 would use. I know exactly what you're talking about.
 7 But you have to remember — just ask yourself what would
 8 happen if someone — especially over a certain level, if
 9 they expressed a different view? What do you think would
 10 happen to their career? Are they really free to be
 11 candid with you?
 12 Now, on the Presidential Commission in
 13 1992 — I think it was probably — We had an advantage
 14 that this Commission doesn't have, and it's this: we
 15 really had a mandate — indeed, total green light
 16 permission for everybody to be totally frank, and that's
 17 why the information we gathered then is just as valid now
 18 as ever — most of it.
 19 And I remember in particular we went out
 20 to the carrier JOHN F. KENNEDY. The captain of the ship
 21 did a video presentation to everybody on the ship and he
 22 said, "You are free to say anything you please to these
 23 commissioners. Here's why they're coming. You can say

1 you're pro-women in combat, you can say you're against
 2 it, you can say you don't care — as long as you have a
 3 rationale," and it was the best two days we spent on any
 4 of our installation visits.
 5 I don't think you have that same freedom
 6 now, and I really don't hold the people involved
 7 accountable so much as the politics of the Pentagon. And
 8 you know as well as I do what the politics of the
 9 Pentagon is. It's just the way it is.
 10 But one way you could give permission to
 11 many of these people to start being more candid is to
 12 look at this issue objectively, to issue a report that is
 13 brutally candid about some of these things. You know,
 14 the original version of the Rand report was — Why were
 15 certain things stripped out if things were going to well?
 16 Yes, the resource shortfalls — I hear a
 17 lot about that, too. Believe me, I'm been hearing about
 18 these —
 19 MR. PANG: But, you know —
 20 MS. DONNELLY: — engines being
 21 cannibalized for years.
 22 MR. PANG: — who stripped that out? I
 23 mean, you know, when you say somebody stripped the thing

1 out of the Rand —
 2 MS. DONNELLY: I wish I knew. I'm not on
 3 the inside of the Pentagon. All I know is I saw the
 4 original and I saw the amended copy, and you put them
 5 next to each other and you can see —
 6 MR. MOORE: Is that what's in your —
 7 MS. DONNELLY: The excerpts are there in
 8 my statement.
 9 I would just say that you've still got to
 10 look — and regardless of the anecdotal evidence, you've
 11 got to look at those attrition and recruiting figures.
 12 That is crucial to readiness because you can't fight a
 13 war with just ships alone. It's the people.
 14 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I'd like to
 15 interject something for the record. I don't think
 16 anything that any one of us could say, Ms. Donnelly,
 17 unless you agreed with it, would change your mind because
 18 you're very passionate in how you state things, and I
 19 appreciate that and that certainly is American.
 20 Unfortunately, I have a serious problem
 21 with the assessment that morale courage is gone, because
 22 if you truly —
 23 MS. DONNELLY: I didn't say that.

1 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, I
 2 think you did; because when Fred brought up the point
 3 that these leaders, we felt, were speaking very freely
 4 and openly, you alluded to — maybe I misunderstood you,
 5 but alluded to that they're speaking that way out of fear
 6 of reprisal to their career.
 7 Now, I may have misunderstood you.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: I agree with you.
 9 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Now, if I
 10 did misunderstand you, I apologize. If I did not
 11 misunderstand you, then the issue goes far beyond gender-
 12 integrated training in terms of the future of the armed
 13 forces.
 14 If morale courage is dead, if we can no
 15 longer trust those that have been entrusted with
 16 leadership of our young men and women, if what they say
 17 cannot be considered to be truth until proven opposite,
 18 we are in dire straits, and you are absolutely correct,
 19 we need to do something very quick.
 20 But gender-integrated training is a very
 21 small portion of that if morale courage is dead.
 22 And I just wanted to get that on the
 23 record. Thank you very much.

1 MS. DONNELLY: Again, I don't use
 2 prejudicial words like that. That's just not my way.
 3 All I'm telling you is what I have observed since 1984 as
 4 a member of DACOWITS.
 5 I remember when I would raise certain
 6 questions, someone would come up to me and say, "You were
 7 exactly right on what you said." And back then, what did
 8 I know? I was a civilian, brand new to DACOWITS. And I
 9 would say to them, "Well, why didn't you say that
 10 publicly?" And they would say, "Oh, no. I've got kids
 11 in college. I can't afford to do that. I've got my
 12 career to think about."
 13 And I never held that against them because
 14 I had more freedom than they did.
 15 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I wish you
 16 would have done the service a favor, whoever it was, and
 17 told them to leave, because —
 18 MS. DONNELLY: No, I wouldn't do that.
 19 Instead —
 20 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: — they
 21 would have been much better off.
 22 MS. DONNELLY: — I did something better.
 23 I formed my own organization. And that's —

1 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, that's
 2 good, too.
 3 MS. DONNELLY: That's why I'm able to
 4 speak freely as I do, and I have support of military and
 5 civilian around the country.
 6 You know, it's a very complicated thing.
 7 Congress has a role; this Commission has a role;
 8 uniformed military has a role, and certainly the civilian
 9 leadership; ultimately, the Commander in Chief. So it
 10 isn't fair to say that any particular person should get
 11 the total blame here.
 12 All I'm saying is put that aside. Blame
 13 is not what I'm here to talk about today. I'm talking
 14 about a fresh start. I'm talking about the opportunity
 15 that you have to put this in an objective light, without
 16 being judgmental about it. It's not the women's fault.
 17 I mean, they just want to serve their country. It's not
 18 the men's fault.
 19 MR. PANG: You know, I think what Bob is
 20 getting at — and I agree with him — I mean, is that we
 21 have inherently trusted, you know, our military
 22 leadership to be frank and tell us — okay? — when they
 23 are in in extremis, and they have been, in my view,

1 MS. DONNELLY: Well, on the grenade issue,
 2 I checked less than a week ago and found that, yes, you
 3 do have the throwing of the live grenade. And I made a
 4 special trip all the way to Quantico to check this out
 5 myself when I was on the Commission.
 6 And, yeah, you have the throwing of a live
 7 grenade, but there is no requirement to throw it a
 8 certain distance. And if you don't do it successfully,
 9 if you pass —
 10 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Ms.
 11 Donnelly, you're mistaken.
 12 MS. DONNELLY: If you pass some other
 13 exercises, you have to —
 14 DR. CANTOR: There is in the Army.
 15 MS. DONNELLY: You can negotiate the
 16 course —
 17 DR. CANTOR: There is in the Army.
 18 MS. DONNELLY: — and you can have a way
 19 of, by other means, getting through.
 20 Now, if you have more up-to-date
 21 information, fine, but I'm not sure that the capability
 22 to throw a live grenade is that much different now than
 23 it was when the Marines tested and found that 45 percent

1 pretty frank.
 2 I mean, you know, there was testimony just
 3 recently on the Hill, you know, with regard to the
 4 adequacy of readiness and I think the service chiefs were
 5 quite frank about what they saw as their highest
 6 readiness concerns.
 7 MS. DONNELLY: And you know why they were?
 8 Because Congress gave them permission to be frank. Back
 9 in April, they were not.
 10 MR. PANG: But, see, they never said
 11 anything —
 12 MS. DONNELLY: They didn't have the
 13 opportunity to say that. And remember how Senator Smith
 14 got so angry with them?
 15 MR. PANG: Well, you know, but they —
 16 MS. DONNELLY: This is the politics of the
 17 Pentagon.
 18 MR. PANG: But, you know —
 19 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: But, Ms.
 20 Donnelly, I'd like to go back — If you don't mind,
 21 Anita, or anyone else — I'd like to go back, though, to
 22 your statement as you addressed training.
 23 And, incidently, I found it interesting

1 of the women could not do it safely.
 2 It may have improved somewhat because
 3 women are better conditioned these days, but there still
 4 is an upper-body difference. It isn't going to change.
 5 So —
 6 DR. SEGAL: Anita, can I ask a question?
 7 MS. DONNELLY: Sure.
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Mady.
 9 DR. SEGAL: Ms. Donnelly, I appreciate
 10 your coming to talk with us. I have followed your work
 11 over the years in your Center for Military Readiness.
 12 You seemed to — in your testimony, you
 13 spent a great deal of time talking about the attrition in
 14 the services, in first-term and in basic training, and
 15 the changes in attrition.
 16 In your Center for Military Readiness,
 17 have you done any careful analysis of the multiple
 18 reasons that there might be changes in attrition and
 19 first-term? You seem to attribute all of the problems
 20 with first-term attrition and any changes that have taken
 21 place to the fact that there is gender-integrated
 22 training.
 23 MS. DONNELLY: I'm not in a position to

1 that the majority of comments I heard you make were
 2 focused directly towards the Army. I didn't hear you say
 3 much about the Air Force training concept or the Navy.
 4 But for an example, the problem I have
 5 with this is we have attempted to be extremely thorough
 6 in what we've done, so I speak only as Commissioner Dare,
 7 not for anybody else in this room. But I never saw a
 8 stool at an obstacle course. In fact, the Army requires
 9 both male and female trainees to throw a grenade — live
 10 grenade — the same distance, the thirty-five meters or
 11 further, or they don't graduate.
 12 In fact, many mistakes were uncovered
 13 through some of these processes and, in my view, the
 14 services have done yeoman work in the last year to
 15 eighteen months to correct some of the major shortfalls
 16 that were leading some to believe that the military was
 17 unraveling.
 18 And so the problem I have with this is
 19 although I don't argue that some of your documentation
 20 and your support happened at some time, I question
 21 whether it is a valid indictment today because so many
 22 changes have been made. And that's the problem I have
 23 with it.

1 know all of the details. There's lots of different ways
 2 to check the data. The GAO report has a column with
 3 about, oh, seven or eight different reasons. There are
 4 some differences whether it occurs during the basic
 5 training or in the months through the — the rest of the
 6 forty-eight months of the first enlistment.
 7 This is a very detailed kind of thing.
 8 I'm just looking at the bottom line. And that's why, as
 9 I said earlier, it's in the purview and the scope of this
 10 Commission to get those figures.
 11 DR. SEGAL: Okay. So you have not
 12 actually looked to see —
 13 MS. DONNELLY: Oh, I've seen the figures
 14 that say so much for pregnancy —
 15 DR. SEGAL: You seem to be attributing all
 16 of the bottom line, though, to gender-integrated
 17 training.
 18 MS. DONNELLY: I'm sorry, I didn't mean to
 19 speak over you.
 20 DR. SEGAL: It seems that you have been
 21 attributing all of the bottom line, as you put it, to the
 22 fact that some of the services are training gender-
 23 integrated.

1 But in order to establish what proportion
 2 of the problem would be due to gender-integrated versus
 3 segregated training, you actually would have to not look
 4 at the bottom line but compare the attrition of those
 5 people who are in gender-integrated training with those
 6 who are in gender-segregated training.
 7 MS. DONNELLY: Well, we know that the
 8 Marine Corps system comes up with a lower attrition rate
 9 than the other services do.
 10 DR. SEGAL: But the Marine Corps is a
 11 different service and recruits from a different
 12 population, has a different size, and so on.
 13 MS. DONNELLY: Oh, there's lots of
 14 different reasons, but the bottom line is there and it's
 15 getting worse.
 16 DR. SEGAL: So you have to, for example,
 17 compare the combat arms units that have gender-segregated
 18 training. You have to look at the combat support and
 19 combat service support units that have those gender-
 20 integrated and gender-segregated training. Actually,
 21 they have gender-integrated and they have all-male, so
 22 you could look at the male attrition and see how it's
 23 different.

1 MS. DONNELLY: Again, I think because the
 2 volunteer service is very much at risk — the future of
 3 it is very much at risk, it really requires more study.
 4 That's exactly what I said. And you can't just go on
 5 anecdotes alone.
 6 All of the various issues listed by GAO
 7 are there. I don't have to make them up. They're there.
 8 I mean, they've done that study. It's quite
 9 comprehensive.
 10 But nobody seems to be saying, "Is this
 11 really the best we can do?" Why not improve the system
 12 so we have better retention rates, and better recruiting
 13 rates also?
 14 The money issue is part of it, perhaps,
 15 but I don't think it's everything. We're losing so many
 16 pilots right now. Yes, that's a much more advanced
 17 system, but we can't afford to lose the sailors that we
 18 need on the ships either.
 19 DR. SEGAL: And I completely agree with
 20 you that retention and recruitment —
 21 MS. DONNELLY: And we can't afford to lose
 22 the —
 23 DR. SEGAL: — are much more important

1 issues, and they are more important in terms of bottom
 2 line. And the attrition is not due to the differences in
 3 the degree of integration and the training —
 4 MS. DONNELLY: Well, if that's the
 5 argument, then you have to show that. I mean, you have
 6 to show something objective. What I brought here today
 7 are some objective numbers, compiled by the GAO, and I
 8 suggest that there's a need for more.
 9 But we've got to improve the situation.
 10 It can't get much worse.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Elaine, can I — I want to
 12 say — I want to commend you —
 13 MS. DONNELLY: Thank you.
 14 DR. MOSKOS: — that you have been
 15 fighting the official establishment heroically. And
 16 without you —
 17 MS. DONNELLY: Actually, I'm on the side
 18 of the leadership of the services. I am not an
 19 adversary.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: Well, I'm thinking more of
 21 the political establishment.
 22 But, Elaine — And without your CMR work,
 23 a lot of this data and — you know, would never have been

1 made publicly available.
 2 MS. DONNELLY: Thank you, Charlie. I
 3 appreciate your work, too.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Well...
 5 I was just wondering, would you be
 6 satisfied with a Kassebaum-like resolution to some — You
 7 know, obviously there are different services. The
 8 Marines are going to do it their way. The Air Force.
 9 I'm looking at the Army; to some degree, the Navy.
 10 MS. DONNELLY: No, and I'll tell you why.
 11 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 12 MS. DONNELLY: And I'm sorry, I didn't
 13 answer the rest of the question about the Navy and the
 14 Air Force. The reason I've concentrated primarily on the
 15 Army is because I'm most worried about the Army. The
 16 Navy and the Air Force functions are — not quite as much
 17 the Army and the Marine Corps — are closer together, and
 18 I'm real worried about the Army. It's the biggest
 19 service. It seems to me that whatever we do has got to
 20 improve the product. And until we get to that point,
 21 then it's just — we can't continue to claim success.
 22 I would suggest that the Kassebaum Baker
 23 recommendations — again, they would have been a step in

1 the right direction, but having a female platoon
 2 competing with three male platoons in the same company is
 3 going to create inherent problems.
 4 It would be better to follow the Marine
 5 Corps model. We know it works. And I don't buy the
 6 argument that the Army, because it's bigger, cannot adapt
 7 to make it work. I'm just not convinced by that. I've
 8 heard that argument. I think the problems might be less
 9 severe in the Navy and in the Air Force, but why not have
 10 a better system there, too?
 11 I say go for excellence. Why have
 12 mediocrity? Why not have the best possible training
 13 system you can have at every stage — the basic building
 14 block, advanced training, and so on down the line? Why
 15 not go for the best? I think that would be the best
 16 boost for morale and recruiting and retention. Word-of-
 17 mouth is what you need.
 18 Young people are getting frustrated.
 19 They're walking away after they've tried the service.
 20 Forty percent leaving the Army is not good. Not
 21 everybody is going to stay, of course. A certain
 22 percentage are going to leave anyway. But those kind of
 23 numbers, we can't go much higher.

1 DR. MOSKOS: Thanks, Elaine.
 2 MS. DONNELLY: Thank you.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I don't have
 4 anything specifically. I appreciate the detail. I'd
 5 like to be able to call you maybe later and ask you some
 6 questions.
 7 MS. DONNELLY: Yes.
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Nancy?
 9 MS. POPE: No.
 10 MR. MOORE: Well, thanks for coming. I
 11 appreciate this very thorough statement and I look
 12 forward to reading it, too.
 13 And I'm not here to debate other members
 14 of the Commission. I guess we'll have plenty of time for
 15 that when we're in Williamsburg. But for the record,
 16 also, I want to just take some issue with my friend Bob
 17 Dare.
 18 I don't know why he is particularly
 19 surprised that there is at least some concern on the part
 20 of people following this issue that we're not always
 21 being told the truth when, frankly, that's been my
 22 experience. And, frankly, one of my deepest underlying
 23 concerns about the whole gender issue in the Army is that

1 it surfaces an integrity problem.
 2 Now, that's not to say that everybody at
 3 the institutional flag level is lacking in morale courage
 4 or is a liar, but that phenomenon does exist and I have
 5 experienced it personally working on Capitol Hill in
 6 relation to other issues as well as the gender issue.
 7 And I have had plenty of feedback from people that we've
 8 encountered on our many trips who will come and say, "I
 9 can't talk about this publicly. I'm afraid for my
 10 career, but this is the way it is."
 11 Now, you know, no one likes to impugn a
 12 whole institution. No one likes to generalize. But I
 13 think clearly there is a problem to some degree — and I
 14 can't quantify it — with lack of candor and lack of
 15 morale courage in facing the problems as well as the
 16 successes of this unprecedented thing that we're doing in
 17 gender integration.
 18 So having said that for the record to
 19 respond to you, Bob — I do have a question for you,
 20 though, Elaine, and that is this — There are, by the
 21 same token, a lot of people in uniform who believe this,
 22 have bought into it. Whether it's a lack of morale
 23 courage or whether they are really convinced, I can't

1 say.
 2 Frankly, one misconception I had coming
 3 into this has been corrected to a large extent. I
 4 believed coming into this that this was all being coerced
 5 and that everybody was sort of being forced at the point
 6 of a bayonet to walk in lock-step and assent to a policy
 7 that they did not agree with, and, quite frankly, I don't
 8 think that that is the case.
 9 That may have been the case ten years ago,
 10 but we are a generation beyond that now where many
 11 people, even down to the company grade rank, are buying
 12 into this and do believe it and are quite sincere, and I
 13 don't think they are all guilty of either lack of candor
 14 or lack of morale courage. They really believe that this
 15 is working and you have to accept them at face value.
 16 And so that's a phenomenon that I think
 17 supports Bob Dare's observation.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: But they can't
 19 compare either.
 20 MR. MOORE: Well, that being the case, how
 21 do you then go back and sort of — I don't like the term,
 22 you know, "turn back the clock" either. To me, it's not
 23 so much a question of turning back the clock. It is a

1 question of whether we're going in the right direction,
 2 and if we're not, can we change direction?
 3 But when you have an institutional
 4 momentum such as we have with a lot of people truly
 5 believing that this is the right thing to do, how to you
 6 then impose a change of direction and get people to
 7 suddenly accept it and buy into it? That's my question
 8 to you.
 9 MS. DONNELLY: You know, I understand what
 10 you're talking about, too, Tom. I think a lot of people
 11 can be persuaded or believe that, yeah, this is great.
 12 Everybody likes each other. We stick together. All the
 13 touchy-feel emotions I mentioned before. You can become
 14 comfortable in that sort of culture as opposed to a
 15 previously traditional military culture.
 16 But even the Senior Review Panel report
 17 came up with some numbers that are kind of contrary to
 18 that. It said among the men surveyed, 60 percent were
 19 either not sure or disagreed that the "soldiers in this
 20 company have enough skills that I could trust them with
 21 my life in combat." The combined figure for the women
 22 was 74 percent.
 23 So what you're hearing may be a reflection

1 of peacetime realities rather than what it might be in
 2 combat.
 3 Another one said — Another question —
 4 Here's the question: "I'm impressed with the quality of
 5 leadership in this company and the officers in this
 6 company could lead well in combat." Sixty-one percent of
 7 the men said they were not sure or disagreed, and the
 8 respective figures for women were 70 and 66 percent.
 9 So again, I think the reality of combat
 10 versus the peacetime military — they may be two
 11 different kinds of things.
 12 MR. MOORE: Well, I would certainly agree
 13 with that. In fact, I would even say that it's going to
 14 be a combat situation that will be the real test of
 15 whether —
 16 MS. DONNELLY: Well, some people think
 17 we'll never —
 18 MR. MOORE: — this is working out.
 19 MS. DONNELLY: — we don't have to worry
 20 about having another war and most wars are going to be
 21 fought on computer screens.
 22 MR. MOORE: Yeah.
 23 MS. DONNELLY: Some people believe that,

1 too. A member of Congress said that on national TV:
 2 "Well, the next war is going to be fought on computer
 3 screens." No, I don't buy that. You can ask the people
 4 who served in Somalia or any other hot spot in the world.
 5 This is still a reality.
 6 And that's why this Commission — being
 7 responsible people as you are, you need to provide
 8 leadership here and not just go with the focus groups.
 9 MR. PANG: You know, I'd just like to —
 10 DR. SEGAL: Excuse me. I don't mean to
 11 interrupt but I have to go and I just wanted to thank Ms.
 12 Donnelly for coming —
 13 MS. DONNELLY: Thank you.
 14 DR. SEGAL: — and sharing her views with
 15 us.
 16 MS. DONNELLY: I'm glad you could
 17 participate.
 18 DR. SEGAL: Okay. I look forward to
 19 seeing all of you in Williamsburg.
 20 MR. PANG: I think I, you know — I mean,
 21 this is a good discussion. You know, I have — But, you
 22 know, one thing that is bothering me is this. I mean, if
 23 the way we train people in the military is so fractured,

1 I mean, how can — how in the heck can we have the
 2 military we have today? I mean, you know, it's doing all
 3 the things we call upon them to do.
 4 You know, I get confused by it because,
 5 you know, they're in Bosnia. I mean, gosh, you know,
 6 they're all over the place. The Sinai. I mean, we're
 7 putting extraordinary demands on people. I mean, you
 8 know, I know the Chair and others were out in Bosnia and
 9 they saw, you know, men and women operating together and
 10 they're, you know, young people.
 11 And if our basic training and, you know,
 12 the way we train people is somehow fractured, I mean, you
 13 know, how could that be? I mean, how can — I mean, you
 14 would expect that there would be huge disasters of some
 15 kind or another out there and, you know, we've not
 16 discovered any of that.
 17 MS. DONNELLY: Well, that's a good
 18 observation, Fred. We do have the best military in the
 19 world. But General Sullivan, in a paper he wrote for
 20 AUSA, made a very good point. He said if you look at an
 21 egg, you see something that is solid. It's beautifully
 22 designed. And, yet, if it's going to crack, you don't
 23 know when it's going to crack, but when it does, it can't

1 be repaired.
 2 When DESERT ONE — the disaster in the
 3 desert occurred under President Jimmy Carter, it sparked
 4 this nation: "Oh, my gosh, we have a hollowed-out force."
 5 We don't know — When the planes come back and the parts
 6 are short and you have to cannibalize one plane so that
 7 the next plane can go on the next deployment — These
 8 people are working so hard to maintain the machines and
 9 they're working way overtime.
 10 The horrible disaster recently on the
 11 carrier ENTERPRISE —
 12 MR. PANG: But, see, I don't know if
 13 that's the way —
 14 MS. DONNELLY: — two planes collided.
 15 MR. PANG: But is that a result, do you
 16 think, of —
 17 MS. DONNELLY: People were very
 18 overworked.
 19 MR. PANG: — of the gender-integrated
 20 training?
 21 MS. DONNELLY: No. But, you see, when the
 22 force is getting smaller, the budget's getting smaller
 23 and the demands are getting greater, all the more reason

1 you know, I might have erred?"
 2 You know, with regard to DESERT ONE, I
 3 think DESERT ONE was more a function of the stovepipe
 4 nature of the services. I mean, it was the inability of
 5 the Air Force and the Navy, for example, to interact
 6 together.
 7 MS. DONNELLY: Absolutely.
 8 MR. PANG: Because I remember the
 9 hearings. I mean, gee whiz. I mean, you know, they had
 10 this helicopter that they put up there on the carrier and
 11 the Navy person said, "Get that thing down below," and so
 12 they couldn't exercise the chopper. I mean, that was
 13 crazy. I mean, you know, so all these things came out
 14 and it eventually led to Goldwater-Nichols, which was, I
 15 think, a different issue.
 16 But the thing that we're —
 17 MS. DONNELLY: I'm familiar with the
 18 issue. The inefficiency caused disaster and it involved
 19 a small number of people.
 20 MR. PANG: Yeah.
 21 MS. DONNELLY: I think we have a huge
 22 inefficiency. It's going to someday cause an awful lot
 23 of huge problems, maybe cost lives. The time to deal

1 to improve efficiency. And if gender-based training is
 2 inefficient for any reason, then it has to be fixed.
 3 MR. PANG: Well, you know, let me get back
 4 to one point you made, you know, and that's General
 5 Sullivan. And he sat right where you are and we asked
 6 him point-blank — okay? — and he — I mean, you know,
 7 here's a person that — I mean, he's not going to become
 8 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so he can speak
 9 frankly, I mean. And he said, you know, if I heard him
 10 right — I mean, he said, "Hey, we're doing it about
 11 right. Don't mess with it. Leave it the way it is."
 12 I mean, with regard to —
 13 MS. DONNELLY: Could you imagine, though?
 14 It would be a very difficult thing, having been there
 15 when the decision was made, to all of a sudden backtrack
 16 and say, "Oh, we made a mistake." I don't think that's
 17 going to happen.
 18 MR. PANG: Well, do you think that's —
 19 MS. DONNELLY: It's a lot to ask of
 20 somebody.
 21 MR. PANG: Yeah, that's a fair —
 22 MS. DONNELLY: And as I said, the
 23 political pressures on General Sullivan were so intense

1 with it is now. And it does take morale courage to do
 2 it, yes.
 3 MR. PANG: I think for us the challenge is
 4 going to be, you know, any time you look at this issue —
 5 And I've been around a long time and looked at this
 6 thing. I mean, the question is going to be — You know,
 7 we've had this type of training for a long time. It was
 8 not yesterday, okay? These policies were instituted and
 9 there's been an expansion of the role of women in the
 10 military — to the dismay of some and to the delight of
 11 others. I mean, there's no question.
 12 I mean, so we need to understand that and
 13 I think we do. But, you know, given the fact that this
 14 training has been going on for this long a period of
 15 time, we've got people now who have got twenty-plus years
 16 — okay? — who have been trained under this system. You
 17 know, how —
 18 MS. DONNELLY: Well, the first experiment
 19 lasted five years before they ended it, too.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: In the Army.
 21 MS. DONNELLY: And they just did it.
 22 MR. PANG: But, you know, where is this
 23 erosion? I mean, you know, where is this — you know,

1 at the time and the need for a compromise was made. Did
 2 that have some role in the way the decision was made?
 3 You know how Sara Lister was. What did that have to do
 4 with it? She was involved in that process. It wasn't an
 5 easy time for him, I'm sure.
 6 So you just have to — I'm not in his
 7 shoes and I wasn't then.
 8 MR. PANG: No, no. I understand. I mean,
 9 you know, I don't disagree with you. I mean, you know,
 10 if I was seated there and somebody said, "Well, you made
 11 this policy decision back then," sure you're going to —
 12 MS. DONNELLY: You're going to defend it,
 13 right.
 14 MR. PANG: You're not going to say you
 15 made a mistake. I mean —
 16 MS. DONNELLY: See, I have the freedom to
 17 speak candidly and I'm not sure that people who were
 18 there at the time can.
 19 MR. PANG: But I hope — I think I would
 20 have the morale courage. I mean, I have in the past
 21 said, "Hey, you know, I made a policy decision and it's
 22 the wrong one." I mean, you know, these are — I mean, I
 23 don't know. What does he lose, I mean, by saying, "Hey,

1 somehow or another, I mean, if you can make a case —
 2 okay? — the case has to be, "You've been doing this all
 3 along and look at what we've got here. We've got this
 4 disaster on our hands. We've got an Army that can't
 5 fight. You've got a Navy that can't go to sea, a Marine
 6 Corps that can't function and an Air Force that can't
 7 fly." I mean, you know — and I just don't know how you
 8 address it.
 9 MS. DONNELLY: Let's put it this way.
 10 What you need to have are soldiers — The smaller the
 11 force is, the more valuable each one is. And they need
 12 to be the most deployable, the strongest, the most
 13 versatile; the kinds of soldiers that can do more with
 14 less as they're being asked to do.
 15 To deliberately — I mentioned quotas
 16 before. We didn't talk about that before. But if you
 17 had a large cohort of soldiers known to be less
 18 deployable, less strong, less versatile, how does that
 19 make the force more efficient? It makes it harder on
 20 everyone else.
 21 I mean, I've heard some real horror
 22 stories about what's going on in the Fleet when you don't
 23 have enough crews to go around the clock and you've got

1 planes landing without the instrument radar that they
 2 need during the day and they only have instrument radar
 3 at night. Why? Because of personnel shortages.
 4 This is serious stuff. This is life-and-
 5 death.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I guess the
 7 question I would have for you, Elaine, in that regard, I
 8 think you're asking us as part of our charter to say that
 9 basic training, as it currently exists across the armed
 10 forces, is inefficient. I think that's what I —
 11 MS. DONNELLY: That's exactly right.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And I think
 13 the other side of what I'm hearing is — is we don't —
 14 right now, there does not appear to be any proof that
 15 training is inefficient. The —
 16 MS. DONNELLY: The proof is in the
 17 attrition and the recruiting numbers.
 18 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Well, but
 19 here's the problem. I mean, here's the challenge to
 20 that. What are the reasons for attrition? What are the
 21 reasons why recruiting is more difficult? And I think
 22 you're asking us to say that these problems exist because
 23 we have this gender-integrated training.

1 I'm just trying to get your conclusion on
 2 this for my own benefit.
 3 MS. DONNELLY: Well, the numbers are on
 4 pages 30, 31 —
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I know what
 6 the numbers are. I mean, we've —
 7 MS. DONNELLY: I mean, there's a long
 8 list.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: We've gone
 10 into that in great detail. But are you saying to me that
 11 the reason we have this much attrition, the reason we
 12 can't recruit, is because we have gender-integrated basic
 13 training?
 14 MS. DONNELLY: I think it may have
 15 something to do with it because the Marine Corps, the
 16 only service that does not have gender-integrated
 17 training, has lower numbers than the other services and
 18 the trend is downward rather than upward.
 19 So, I mean, you have to — The numbers are
 20 there and I don't see any compelling explanation for
 21 saying that the case for —
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And what
 23 you're saying is the system is — the recruit training

1 system is broken in the armed forces.
 2 MS. DONNELLY: It is, I think, somewhat
 3 seriously undermined. I think the decision, when it was
 4 made in '94, was largely driven by political reasons
 5 rather than objective reasons, and that decision needs to
 6 be revisited as it was in 1982. And that takes some
 7 morale courage to do, but I think it needs done. And I
 8 think the overall product, if that is done, will be much
 9 better five years down the road than the way it is now.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I would
 11 just make a statement, if I can, and it just goes back to
 12 some comments that were made over here. And the
 13 statement is — is that sometimes there's an assumption
 14 that everyone who goes before the Congress and provides
 15 their statement and the like is simply following the
 16 party line. There may be a case that they actually
 17 believe what they've said and they defend that to the
 18 point that they believe in that.
 19 So I think it's a very dangerous thing —
 20 And I am not pointing this at you, Elaine. I'm talking
 21 to my fellow commissioners. I think it's a dangerous
 22 thing to make an assumption that the individual who has
 23 presented that statement, whatever that might be, does

1 not necessarily believe in that statement but is doing it
 2 only because they've got to salute and say, "Aye, aye."
 3 That's not always the case.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: But, Ron, to be the middle of
 5 the road, that's the kind of person who genuinely
 6 believes that he gets promoted to those senior positions,
 7 though.
 8 MR. PANG: But, you know, let me say this
 9 —
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Or it may be
 11 priorities. He's not going to go to war with this
 12 particular individual because he —
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: You know, folks, I sense
 14 that there's kind of a movement to get on to dinner
 15 tonight. I'd be happy to excuse anybody who needs to
 16 leave, and if you want to continue on the record —
 17 (Discussion off the record.)
 18 MR. PANG: Let me say this one thing,
 19 though, Elaine. And I want to make this point because,
 20 you know, I've worked with General Christmas — okay? —
 21 for a long time. He's testified before the Congress many
 22 times. I have never known General Christmas to pull any
 23 punches, you know, when asked. I was on the other side

1 of the aisle. We had issues that we disagreed with and,
 2 you know — So you have a person, I mean, who's in the
 3 military and not afraid to state his views, I mean.
 4 And the same is true with General McPeak
 5 when he was asked about whether or not we ought to repeal
 6 the laws with regard to women flying combat aircraft, he
 7 said "no." And the question was, "Why do you say 'no'?"
 8 And he said, "That's my feeling."
 9 So, you know, I think it is a very
 10 dangerous ground that we walk on when you kind of infer
 11 — okay? — that the senior military people don't have —
 12 are afraid to state their views and have the courage of
 13 their convictions.
 14 I mean, some may. You know, I'm not —
 15 We're human beings and people are going to make mistakes
 16 and may be careerists in their thinking, but it bothers
 17 me that, you know, there's this notion — okay? — that
 18 the vast majority of the people who we've called forward
 19 are lying to us.
 20 I mean, I don't believe that. I mean, I
 21 have a hard time believing — okay? — that people are
 22 going to come forward and lie to you.
 23 MS. DONNELLY: And that's not a word that

1 I use, but I think a lot depends on what questions are
 2 asked and how you define "success." And if "success" is
 3 defined in terms of equal opportunity and things like
 4 that — I would remind you the Navy's policy on
 5 pregnancy, for instance, has a little stipulation in
 6 there that negative comments are forbidden about the
 7 consequences of pregnant soldiers being out temporarily.
 8 So, I mean, sometimes it's written in
 9 policy, sometimes it's not. The effect is there. It's
 10 just something you have to keep in mind. It's just
 11 there. It's reality.
 12 MR. PANG: But let me say I take seriously
 13 your comments. I mean, you know, I think, you know, the
 14 Commission is going to have a difficult task, I mean, in
 15 kind of bringing this thing all together.
 16 MS. DONNELLY: Believe me, I've been
 17 there. I know.
 18 MR. PANG: I know you know. But I just
 19 wanted to get —
 20 MS. DONNELLY: Been there, done that.
 21 MR. PANG: I just wanted to get the point
 22 in, though, that, you know, I — you know, I have quite a
 23 bit of faith and confidence in our military leadership

1 and in them telling us the truth when it comes to
2 readiness.

3 And we cast our questions — And if you go
4 back and check the — I mean, you won't — If we go back
5 and check the record, we always cast it in terms of the
6 readiness of our forces and, you know, does this system
7 — okay? — that you have in effect produce the type of
8 people that you really need — okay? — to maintain and
9 sustain the readiness of your forces?

10 You know, I mean, that's how we posed it
11 to them. So we'll just have to bridge that gap.

12 MS. DONNELLY: Thank you.

13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Thank you very much for
14 coming, Elaine.

15 MS. DONNELLY: My pleasure.

16 MR. PANG: Elaine, thank you.


17 (Whereupon, at 6:43 p.m., the hearing in
18 the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at
19 8:30 a.m., the following day.)

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CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES

Saturday, January 30, 1999

1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 940

Arlington, Virginia

JAN. 30, 1999

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 2</p> <p>1 Those present: 2 Anita K. Blair, Esquire - Chairman 3 The Honorable Frederick F.Y. Pang - Vice Chairman 4 Nancy Cantor, Ph.D. - Commissioner 5 LtGen George R. Christmas, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner 6 CSM Robert A. Dare, Jr., USA(Ret) - Commissioner 7 LtGen William M. Keys, USMC(Ret) - Commissioner 8 Thomas Moore - Commissioner 9 Charles Moskos, Ph.D. - Commissioner 10 The Honorable Barbara Spyridon Pope - Commissioner 11 --- 12 Stephen C. Fogleman, Esquire - Executive Director 13 Susan L. Fry - Executive Assistant 14 Capt J.S. Snyder, USN - Service Representative 15 LtCol Brenda L. Harris, USA - Service Representative 16 LtCol Mary Street, USAF - Service Representative 17 Maj R. Scott LaShier, USMC - Service Representative 18 --- 19 20 21 22 23</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 5</p> <p>1 I think you've all received a report from 2 the committee and I guess they can guide us as to how 3 much we should follow along and how much we should pay 4 strict attention to what they're saying. 5 So, again, thank you all very much for 6 coming. 7 And why don't you start, Jim. 8 MR. RENNE: Okay. Thank you. 9 You should have in front of you a summary 10 of the legal research process; and also a copy of the 11 report from the consultants, which is a thick binder 12 (indicating), and included with that, an addendum by Mr. 13 Hamilton which goes into further detail on his opinion. 14 Well, congratulations on a successful set 15 of hearings and welcome to your last one. I know that's 16 music to Steve's ears, at least. Today we'll hear from 17 the legal consultants on their report. And I'm just 18 going to first run through the legal research outline and 19 process before I turn it over to Charles Gittins, and he 20 will introduce the rest of the legal team and begin the 21 presentation on the final report. 22 As you can see from the summary outline, 23 research kind of had a late start after the commencement</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 3</p> <p>1 Also present: 2 Review and Discussion with 3 Legal Consultants on SEC.562.(a)(1)-(3) 4 James Renne, Esquire - Staff Counsel and Secretary 5 6 Col Thomas G. Abbey, USAF(Ret) 7 8 BG Thomas R. Cuthbert, USA(Ret) 9 10 Charles W. Gittins 11 12 LTC Henry L. Hamilton, USA(Ret) 13 14 15 CAPT Gerald J. Kirkpatrick, USN(Ret) 16 17 --- 18 19 20 21 22 23</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 6</p> <p>1 of the Commission. The first three months were 2 organizational meetings, from April till June, and from 3 June till September were trips, one week after the next, 4 and start-up administrative procedures that took a lot of 5 time. 6 So it really wasn't until September that 7 the research was able to be commenced. And even after 8 that, it wasn't until even farther along that the legal 9 research was begun. And I think given the time frame, 10 this is an excellent product that this team has put 11 together and I'm really — I've actually been glad to be 12 able to meet everyone and proud to be sort of the 13 assistant to this consultant commission, this consultant 14 team here. 15 As you can see, the legal research took 16 second priority to the other research that was the main 17 focus of the Commission — the gender-integrated training 18 and the basic training. The first set of questions that 19 went out in September did include some broad legal 20 questions. 21 We asked OSD three broad inquiries. One 22 was identify the regulations that apply on cross-gender 23 relations. They did an adequate summary of that and</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 4</p> <p>1 PROCEEDINGS (8:30 a.m.) 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: It's Saturday, January 3 30th, 1999. This is the Commission on Military Training 4 and Gender-Related Issues. We are gathered together 5 today to hear a report from our committee of legal 6 counsel who we have asked to look into the requirements 7 of Subsection (a) of our statute governing cross-gender 8 relations. 9 First of all, I'd like to thank you all 10 for coming in on a Saturday — everybody, for doing that 11 — to enable us to meet our pretty close deadline of 12 finishing up the work we need to do. And I'd especially 13 like to thank our legal counselors, who I know have done 14 an amazing amount of work in a short time, and we are 15 lucky to have people with such experience and expertise 16 to share with us and who are able to produce work like 17 that. 18 The agenda this morning will be first to 19 hear from Jim Renne, who will give us an overview of the 20 process that we've used for evaluating this part of the 21 statute, and then we will hear from the legal counsel, in 22 brief, from each of them. Thereafter, we'll open it up 23 for questions and discussion.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 7</p> <p>1 provided that to us, which was a good road map for 2 further inquiry. 3 We asked them point-blank: are the laws 4 consistently applied between the three areas? You know, 5 the sex, the rank and the service? And they said it is. 6 Point-blank, they said "yes," with the caveat that 7 officers obviously have different rules and regulations 8 that apply to them — different laws — than enlisted, 9 and services have different regulations among themselves. 10 So absent that, they are applied equally. And they said 11 they were gender-neutral, so according to gender they are 12 definitely applied equally. 13 Following on that inquiry — We received 14 that back in October, and then October 12th, we had our 15 first hearing from the TJAG's or the JAG's of the 16 services. And we had another hearing on November 17th, 17 which was from former JAG's; some colorful hearings and 18 testimony at times from a former JAG and a former IG. 19 Immediately following that, we hired the 20 consultants. We have Charles Gittins, Tom Cuthbert, 21 Henry Hamilton — to my left — and Thomas Abbey and 22 Jerry Kirkpatrick. They came aboard, they looked at the 23 statute, and they put together a request for documents in</p>

1 an expedited time frame to review just the minimally
 2 necessary information so that they could put together a
 3 report. And we really did scale this down to its bare
 4 bones.

5 On December 11th — you can see it follows
 6 onto the next page — there were two sets of requests
 7 that went to OSD and another one that went to the
 8 services.

9 The OSD inquiry asked four broad
 10 categories of policy and data information. The first was
 11 a follow-up to reproductive rights, an issue that came up
 12 during the testimony. The Army said that they had found
 13 four opinions on that issue. And we asked for those
 14 twice and they haven't provided those, but they did
 15 identify that the four did exist. None of the other
 16 services had any data on that. OSD checked their Deputy
 17 General Counsel's office and they had nothing in that one
 18 office of OSD.

19 The next broad category we asked for was
 20 false accusations prosecuted, which was an issue that
 21 Commissioner Moskoss brought up. The Army found twenty-
 22 one cases over the last two years of prosecutions for
 23 this. The Air Force found thirteen, and the Navy and

1 Marine Corps found zero for that same period.

2 We then asked for total prosecutions —
 3 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Excuse me,
 4 Jim. Just for clarification, is that cases that by
 5 virtue of the outcome were determined false? Or were
 6 they cases of people that made false accusations and then
 7 were prosecuted?

8 MR. RENNE: Those were cases where people
 9 that made false — knowingly false accusations were
 10 prosecuted.

11 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. Thank
 12 you.

13 MR. RENNE: You couldn't prosecute if you
 14 made a false accusation but your intent was ignorance of
 15 the law.

16 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Right.

17 MR. RENNE: I thought it was a violation,
 18 but it wasn't.

19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: The Navy and
 20 Marine Corps did in fact — They didn't submit them? Or
 21 they just didn't have them?

22 MR. RENNE: The indication is they didn't
 23 have any and they may — Their check and their response

1 to us was "we didn't find any."

2 DR. MOSKOS: Not one false accusation?

3 MR. RENNE: Not one.

4 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.

5 MR. RENNE: And then the Navy was the
 6 same.

7 DR. CANTOR: Prosecuted? Not one
 8 knowingly false prosecution?

9 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: They didn't
 10 prosecute.

11 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.

12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: That may not
 13 mean that there weren't any.

14 DR. CANTOR: That doesn't mean there
 15 weren't...

16 MR. RENNE: Well, yeah, no criminal —

17 DR. CANTOR: Right.

18 MR. RENNE: — false allegations or
 19 accusations were prosecuted that they found, right.

20 DR. MOSKOS: These are all guilty cases,
 21 then, that you're talking these numbers?

22 MR. RENNE: It's mixed. I have a brief
 23 summary of each one. Some were — Most were found guilty

1 or were taken to NJP and sort of either settled or
 2 determined by the commander to be culpable enough that
 3 they be punished for it. Some were separated from the
 4 service. I don't know if there's any with any jail time.

5 DR. MOSKOS: No. That's all right.

6 MR. RENNE: Okay.

7 MS. POPE: Jim, I'm sorry I'm late but —
 8 and maybe you went over it, but the Navy and Marine Corps
 9 — at least the Department of Navy — has a statement
 10 when you file an allegation that you are not knowingly
 11 filing a false accusation. Does the Army and Air Force
 12 have a similar statement?

13 MR. RENNE: I'm not sure about that.

14 MS. POPE: Because that may be —

15 MR. RENNE: Actually, we can ask the
 16 consultants here.

17 MS. POPE: I mean, you actually sign —

18 DR. CANTOR: That might be why these are
 19 all zero.

20 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: It would
 21 depend in large part on who you were giving your
 22 statement to. If you made a complaint to the Army IG,
 23 for example, they've got that language in their forms in

1 a standard fashion. If you were making a complaint that
 2 the CID investigated, you essentially sign that same
 3 statement.

4 If you walked in to your sergeant major or
 5 your battalion commander and said "I was molested" or "I
 6 was harassed," I doubt that you would go through quite
 7 that same exercise.

8 MS. POPE: Because we may want to look at
 9 it because — And that may be why you don't have it with
 10 the Navy and Marine Corps, because you actually do have
 11 to sign a statement.

12 And I think it's actually in the EEO
 13 process that says once you say you want to file a formal
 14 complaint, you know — And you can file it. You can just
 15 make a verbal complaint — that you sign a statement
 16 saying — And it's explained that there's a difference
 17 between — as you just put it in whatever those legal —
 18 right words are, that, you know, ignorance of the law is
 19 one thing, but knowingly filing a complaint against
 20 somebody — So a member of the military signs a statement
 21 saying they are not knowingly filing a, you know, false
 22 accusation.

23 DR. MOSKOS: How would anybody do

1 otherwise? I mean, knowingly signing a false complaint,
 2 it's —

3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well, the
 4 hotline. You can do the DoD hotline without signing a
 5 complaint.

6 MS. POPE: Yeah, you can do a hotline and
 7 just make a false accusation against somebody.

8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: You'd never know
 9 who it is.

10 MS. POPE: I mean, there's a difference
 11 that says, you know, it's misinterpretation or — But,
 12 you know, you may want to ask that from each of the
 13 departments, the services.

14 MR. RENNE: We could follow-up if you'd
 15 like. I think that they knew the nature of the inquiry.

16 I was hoping that they would provide some context and
 17 they didn't, but we could follow-up with that.

18 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: But I can't
 19 imagine, even if you call the hotline — What that does
 20 is start an investigation in some cases. At a certain
 21 point in the investigative process, CID or the equivalent
 22 of it in a service normally gets involved. Somebody gets
 23 involved and requires you to make a sworn statement —

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 14</p> <p>1 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.</p> <p>2 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: — and affix</p> <p>3 your signature to it, and I can't imagine anything going</p> <p>4 to trial without that process in it.</p> <p>5 MR. RENNE: Well, I think most —</p> <p>6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: I don't think</p> <p>7 that's true, Bob.</p> <p>8 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, I</p> <p>9 don't know.</p> <p>10 MR. RENNE: Well, that depends on the</p> <p>11 nature of the investigation. But there's another</p> <p>12 commission that's — and Tom is actually associated with</p> <p>13 that commission — that's looking into formal</p> <p>14 investigations of sexual misconduct or sexual crimes in</p> <p>15 the military.</p> <p>16 DR. MOSKOS: Is that right, Tom?</p> <p>17 MR. RENNE: And I think that the — when</p> <p>18 it's the level of a felonious activity, when it's non-</p> <p>19 consensual, forcible sexual assault, I would imagine that</p> <p>20 it almost always involves CID or the professional</p> <p>21 investigative arm. And at that point they have</p> <p>22 procedures, and I would assume they always would probably</p> <p>23 —</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 17</p> <p>1 And there is much more information than</p> <p>2 I've put down on this summary. This is a very, very</p> <p>3 brief summary.</p> <p>4 MR. PANG: Well, what is the — you know,</p> <p>5 what is the general conclusion with regard to this?</p> <p>6 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.</p> <p>7 MR. RENNE: Well, that's for the five</p> <p>8 consultants —</p> <p>9 DR. CANTOR: What are we —</p> <p>10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah.</p> <p>11 DR. CANTOR: What are we asking here?</p> <p>12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Right now, Jim is just</p> <p>13 kind of outlining the process for us —</p> <p>14 MR. RENNE: I'm just outlining the —</p> <p>15 inventorying the information.</p> <p>16 MR. PANG: Oh, okay.</p> <p>17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — and we will be getting</p> <p>18 the substance from the lawyers.</p> <p>19 MR. RENNE: Yeah. Let me read through</p> <p>20 this and get into the real —</p> <p>21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Actually, there's a lot</p> <p>22 more meat and substance to come, so why don't we move on.</p> <p>23 MR. RENNE: Exactly. I'll just skim</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 15</p> <p>1 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: It's routine</p> <p>2 among the major criminal investigative organizations of</p> <p>3 all the services and the Secretary of Defense office.</p> <p>4 The place where you won't find it in most cases is where</p> <p>5 there's a local command investigation. And in those</p> <p>6 cases, it's usually a commander who essentially makes the</p> <p>7 allegation, not the victim.</p> <p>8 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Let me tell</p> <p>9 you why you would not want to take statements from a</p> <p>10 prosecutrix, a complainant. A sharp prosecutor would not</p> <p>11 want to get multiple statements if she has already said</p> <p>12 — made her complaint on a number of different forms</p> <p>13 because that would subject her to repeated cross-</p> <p>14 examination for inconsistency at trial.</p> <p>15 So a sharp prosecutor will ask CID not to</p> <p>16 take statements because she doesn't want any more</p> <p>17 inconsistencies.</p> <p>18 COLONEL ABBEY: I also used to participate</p> <p>19 in Inspector General inquiries and investigations and</p> <p>20 typically we would always — we would always give an oath</p> <p>21 to a witness before we would take the statement.</p> <p>22 Now, you may not always reduce it to</p> <p>23 writing and have them sign it. You might summarize it.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 18</p> <p>1 through it.</p> <p>2 We had two other questions. One was the</p> <p>3 prosecutions for — We had a list of crimes that we felt</p> <p>4 would — that came under the statute that we were given</p> <p>5 by Congress. There were about eight of those, all</p> <p>6 including illicit male-female sexual relations that were</p> <p>7 crimes in the military. And of those, we asked for an</p> <p>8 approximation of the total number of prosecutions</p> <p>9 involving those. Very inconsistent data.</p> <p>10 And the data aspect is something that the</p> <p>11 consultants will go into. They, I believe — I don't</p> <p>12 want to speak for them and they will say it — they'll go</p> <p>13 into more detail, but the lack of data is an issue in</p> <p>14 this case. There's no way to make any assessment to a</p> <p>15 certain degree on these things without that, and it may</p> <p>16 be something the Commission might want to recommend in</p> <p>17 some form to Congress to remedy.</p> <p>18 The last inquiry to OSD, we asked for the</p> <p>19 documents regarding the adultery review and the</p> <p>20 fraternization task force, and they did an excellent job</p> <p>21 on the adultery review of providing terrific detail of</p> <p>22 all the documents involved.</p> <p>23 And the task force, they did it as well,</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 16</p> <p>1 But usually in your investigation you would always make</p> <p>2 sure the substance of it was agreeable to the witness.</p> <p>3 MR. PANG: Well, you know, based on the</p> <p>4 information that's provided under D(1)(a) and (b), you</p> <p>5 know, and (c), you know, over here in this summary, I</p> <p>6 mean, you can't arrive at any conclusion. I mean, I</p> <p>7 don't know how you would. I mean, it's incomplete</p> <p>8 information and there's no way to reach any kind of sound</p> <p>9 conclusion on it.</p> <p>10 I mean, basically what this says is that</p> <p>11 there were in the Army twenty-one false accusations</p> <p>12 prosecuted. I don't know what the results were of those</p> <p>13 prosecutions. The Air Force, thirteen of them. Navy and</p> <p>14 Marine Corps, zero. And then when you go down, you know,</p> <p>15 and kind of read all this stuff, I mean, basically what</p> <p>16 you're saying here is you have some information but not</p> <p>17 enough to make any kind of conclusion.</p> <p>18 Is that correct? Or —</p> <p>19 MR. RENNE: Actually, we do have the</p> <p>20 details of the Army and the Air Force prosecutions — the</p> <p>21 allegations and a final result of those. Obviously, in</p> <p>22 the Navy and the Marine Corps, they said there were none</p> <p>23 that existed, so there wasn't anything to report on that.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 19</p> <p>1 except for one key set of documents they left out were</p> <p>2 the proposals from the services back to OSD that would</p> <p>3 put them in compliance with Secretary Cohen's order to</p> <p>4 equalize and to come into compliance. They refused to</p> <p>5 provide that, for whatever reason I can understand. It's</p> <p>6 still not final by OSD, but we were kind of looking for</p> <p>7 the draft so we could understand where we were working</p> <p>8 from. We don't have that.</p> <p>9 Also, we asked for sexual harassment</p> <p>10 compliance data, which a law was passed last year, a Navy</p> <p>11 study, an '89 fraternization study and related</p> <p>12 congressional inquiries on that.</p> <p>13 The second set of data requests was the</p> <p>14 real crux of the analysis. We asked — In each service,</p> <p>15 we picked out several bases or one base. And it's not a</p> <p>16 scientific sampling, necessarily, but it is a minimally</p> <p>17 sufficient sampling to make some kind of a study on</p> <p>18 what's going on on the ground, in the field. And we</p> <p>19 asked them for courts-martial data just relating to the</p> <p>20 offenses that we outlined before and limited that to '96</p> <p>21 to '98 and the bases listed here.</p> <p>22 Basically, we received all that back in</p> <p>23 the last two weeks, several of which we received this</p>

Page 20

1 week, so — And the team has done an excellent job. And
 2 they're trial attorneys — some of them — and attorneys,
 3 so they're able to take the information, analyze it and
 4 put it down concisely in a short amount of time, and
 5 they've done that and produced a great product.
 6 And what I will do, if there's no other
 7 questions regarding the outline, I'll just briefly
 8 introduce Charles Gittins and turn it over to him.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I just have
 10 one question.
 11 MR. RENNE: Sure.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: This
 13 implies the Marine Corps gave an incomplete response. Is
 14 that incomplete after the telephone call to the counsel
 15 for the Commandant? Or was it fulfilled?
 16 That's just for my personal information.
 17 MR. RENNE: Under 4, actually the follow-
 18 up request provided sufficient data.
 19 Charles, that was...
 20 MR. GITTINS: From the Navy. We actually
 21 — General, I was working the Marine Corps issue. We
 22 asked for data on twenty-one specific officer
 23 fraternization cases, asking —

Page 21

1 MR. RENNE: Follow-up questions.
 2 MR. GITTINS: Follow-up questions —
 3 asking for the data on what happened to the co-actor.
 4 We were talking about consensual sexual
 5 activity like adultery or fraternization. We have pretty
 6 good data on what occurred with the officer. We asked
 7 the Marine Corps to come back and tell us what happened
 8 in those twenty-one cases to the enlisted person to
 9 determine whether or not there was a consistent
 10 application based on rank, gender, et cetera.
 11 The Marine Corps' response was
 12 disappointing, frankly, sir. I think what they did was
 13 checked the officer misconduct file and determined that
 14 that information wasn't contained in the officer
 15 misconduct file and went no further. I think a call to
 16 the base where the individual officers were prosecuted or
 17 received the administrative punishment would have told us
 18 what the outcome was for the enlisted person as well and
 19 it just wasn't done.
 20 So we don't have any —
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And that
 22 was not provided is what you're saying.
 23 MR. GITTINS: It was not provided, sir.

Page 22

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 2 Thank you.
 3 MR. FOGLEMAN: If I could be allowed to
 4 ask a question of Mr. Gittins?
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Sure.
 6 MR. FOGLEMAN: Sir, is there a Marine
 7 Corps order about that information?
 8 MR. GITTINS: Yes, sir. That's kind of
 9 why I was disappointed about it. The Marine Corps order
 10 on equal opportunity actually provides — and if I could
 11 — It's Marine Corps Order 5354.1(c), the Marine Corps
 12 equal opportunity program. Paragraph 3012 requires
 13 Marine Corps commands to monitor disciplinary statistics
 14 for possible trends of unequal treatment, and further, to
 15 ensure that military justice and administrative
 16 separation functions are actually performed free of
 17 discrimination.
 18 That implies that someone collects data
 19 and analyzes it, and apparently that's not being done.
 20 And there's no way to actually perform that function
 21 despite the fact that the Marine Corps order requires it.
 22 MR. FOGLEMAN: Would that include co-actor
 23 information? I mean, in your professional —

Page 23

1 MR. GITTINS: Yes, sir. That would
 2 clearly, in my view, include co-actor information. If
 3 you've got two people engaged in adultery and one of them
 4 is prosecuted, the obvious answer is what happened to the
 5 other one if they're on military status? And,
 6 unfortunately, we don't have that information.
 7 MR. FOGLEMAN: Does the order state that
 8 the information as to gender has to be kept?
 9 MR. GITTINS: No.
 10 MR. FOGLEMAN: It doesn't.
 11 MR. GITTINS: No. And I think that that
 12 would be a useful recommendation from this commission —
 13 that that kind of information actually be kept so that
 14 policy-makers — Congress — can make a determination on
 15 whether or not these laws are actually being applied
 16 fairly and according to gender, race, rank.
 17 MR. FOGLEMAN: And to fully complete the
 18 answer to your question, General, there was supplemental
 19 information provided after your phone call.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Was it enough,
 21 though? Was everything —
 22 MR. FOGLEMAN: Well, it wasn't quite — it
 23 wasn't enough in twenty-one of the cases.

Page 24

1 Is that correct, Mr. Gittins?
 2 MR. GITTINS: Right. We went back with
 3 specific questions on twenty-one particular cases and we
 4 got basically nothing in response.
 5 MR. FOGLEMAN: There was supplemental
 6 information provided —
 7 MR. GITTINS: Right.
 8 MR. FOGLEMAN: — after General Christmas
 9 called, and then there were additional questions you had
 10 because the information was not complete —
 11 MR. GITTINS: Right.
 12 MR. FOGLEMAN: — for your analysis.
 13 MR. GITTINS: Right. Right.
 14 MR. FOGLEMAN: And in twenty-one cases,
 15 you didn't get enough information to make a full
 16 analysis; is that —
 17 MR. GITTINS: We got no information back,
 18 basically.
 19 MR. FOGLEMAN: Okay. Thank you.
 20 MR. RENNE: There was a similar situation
 21 with the Navy as well. We went back with maybe fifty
 22 follow-up questions and —
 23 MR. GITTINS: Twenty-five, actually.

Page 25

1 MR. RENNE: Twenty-five.
 2 MR. GITTINS: We did the same thing with
 3 the Navy — asked them to tell us what happened in the
 4 twenty-five cases involving officer-enlisted
 5 fraternization. They were able to actually tell us
 6 exactly what happened.
 7 And what we found was that in largely the
 8 enlisted side, which involved the junior side of the
 9 officer-enlisted relationship, the junior side was a
 10 woman usually. In thirteen of the twenty-five cases, no
 11 disciplinary action or administrative action of any kind
 12 was taken against the junior person involved in the
 13 adultery, fraternization, consensual sodomy — They were
 14 all consensual-type offenses.
 15 MR. RENNE: Why don't I —
 16 MR. GITTINS: A very interesting data
 17 point, anyway.
 18 MS. POPE: Which service was it that said
 19 there is no consensual...
 20 DR. CANTOR: Reimer.
 21 MS. POPE: Was it Reimer? I was trying to
 22 remember if it was —
 23 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: In the

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 26</p> <p>1 training base. 2 DR. CANTOR: Reimer said it. 3 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: In the 4 training bases. In the training centers. 5 MR. RENNE: That's the issue of 6 constructive force and constructive rape. 7 DR. CANTOR: Power differential. He 8 talked about the power differential. 9 MS. POPE: Right. 10 MR. RENNE: And that's something that we 11 just received data back from OSD on — or the Army — on 12 that yesterday and I will compile some kind of summary 13 and provide that to you in the next week. 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Well, that's an 15 outline of the process that we've been following so far. 16 And as you can see, it's almost ongoing in the sense that 17 we have recently received data that is still being 18 analyzed, and we are aiming to be able to complete those 19 reports in advance of our retreat next week so that, you 20 know, we hope to be able to sit down with as much 21 information as we're going to get, anyway, next week. 22 The next step on our agenda was to hear 23 from the consultants, and I wonder if our first speaker</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 29</p> <p>1 Naval Academy. He trained as a naval flight officer, a 2 radar-intercept officer, which is a back-seater, much 3 like our Major LaShier — except different planes, 4 obviously. 5 He was — Interesting enough, he was a 6 legal officer for his unit before he went to law school, 7 I believe. 8 MR. GITTINS: That's correct. 9 MR. RENNE: Which I've never seen that 10 before. He must've been a good lawyer before he went to 11 law school. 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Actually, my husband was 13 also a legal officer for his unit before he went to law 14 school, so there's a precedent. 15 MR. RENNE: He's a graduate of the 16 Catholic University School of Law. One of the nation's 17 best law schools, if I might add. I happen to be a 18 graduate as well. He was a defense counsel in Japan, and 19 left active duty in '92 and joined Williams & Connolly, a 20 large law firm downtown. And now he is in private 21 practice, well-known in the trade, and spends 60 percent 22 of his time defending military personnel against 23 consensual and non-consensual sexual charges — sexual</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 27</p> <p>1 could just refresh us a little bit on the requirements of 2 the statute first so that we can kind of put this in 3 context. 4 And I will ask folks to let the 5 presentation progress as much as possible, because I 6 think that if you have a question, it will probably 7 momentarily be covered — lawyers just think in the 8 opposite sequence of normal people — and I think it will 9 enable us then to get the big picture a little better. 10 MR. RENNE: Do you want me to review the 11 statute very quickly? 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah, if you will. 13 MR. RENNE: Very quickly, the statute — 14 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And if you want to just 15 read it... 16 MR. RENNE: Yeah, except I don't have it 17 here. But I know it off the top of my head. 18 There's three sections to it. It says 19 first review the laws, regulations, policies, directives 20 and practices of the armed forces in regard to military 21 law on interpersonal male-female relations in the 22 military. The second was assess whether the laws, 23 regulations, policies, directives and practices are</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 30</p> <p>1 crimes, I guess. 2 And with that, I'll turn it over to 3 Charles. 4 MR. GITTINS: Thank you. 5 Madam Chairman and Commissioners, I 6 appreciate the opportunity to have worked with the 7 Commission. These subjects are matters of interest to me 8 in that I practice in this area and deal with it every 9 day, so it was with enthusiasm that I came to this 10 project. 11 I also had the good fortune to meet for 12 the first time the gentlemen that I worked with. I had 13 never met them before. To my left, of course, is General 14 Tom Cuthbert, who was the former Chief Judge and Director 15 of the Army Legal Services Agency while on active duty. 16 He was also the Director of the Army Review Board's 17 agency. 18 Colonel Tom Abbey, again to my left, a 19 practitioner with Abbey & Arquilla, one of my competitors 20 in the area, but also a career military Air Force officer 21 who served as the Director of Legal Policy in the Under 22 Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, a 23 position actually shared by General Cuthbert.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 28</p> <p>1 applied consistently irrespective of rank, sex or 2 service. 3 And then the third was assess the reports 4 of the independent panel, which we've taken that out of 5 there and put into the other two sections. The 6 independent panel was the Kassebaum Baker Commission. 7 And so we took that out. We did not deal with that one, 8 and that's in the other report — the other section of 9 research. 10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: To the degree that it 11 concerns male-female relations. 12 MR. RENNE: Yeah. That's all — 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: So we're kind of, for our 14 purposes, covering that under gender integration. 15 MR. RENNE: Yeah. And, also, it says 16 assess the report of the task force on fraternization and 17 the adultery review, and that's what the report does 18 touch on. 19 So with that, I'll briefly introduce 20 Charles Gittins. And I've taken up too much time, I 21 apologize. 22 Charles Gittins is a Marine. He's a Naval 23 Academy grad, 1979 — the last all-male class of the</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 31</p> <p>1 Jerry Kirkpatrick, to Tom Abbey's left as 2 well. Jerry Kirkpatrick's a Navy captain, retired; 3 served in a variety of legal positions, including that 4 Director of Legal Policy position in the Under Secretary 5 of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 6 And to my right, Hank Hamilton, a retired 7 lieutenant colonel in the United States Army who served 8 as virtually all the military-justice-type positions in 9 the Army. He served in a classified unit in Vietnam — 10 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Not in 11 Vietnam. 12 MR. GITTINS: Not in Vietnam. I'm sorry 13 — in a classified unit, and is now in private practice 14 in Columbia, South Carolina, also engaged in military 15 justice matters. 16 We came to the project — I think all of 17 us — with an enthusiasm for the subject. We had the 18 expertise, obviously, of the individuals who had worked 19 in the OSD policy office. And Hank and I didn't have 20 that background, necessarily, so we thought the division 21 of responsibility would best be served by having the 22 experts in a policy background to look at the policies 23 across the services in OSD.</p>

1 And that was essentially the way we
 2 divided the labor, although I did review the Marine Corps
 3 orders because that was my background. General Cuthbert
 4 led the policy review that included DoD, Navy, Marine
 5 Corps, Air Force and Army regulations, and Hank and I
 6 reviewed the "consistent application" aspect, basically
 7 looking at the data that we received.

8 For reasons that relate to my ongoing
 9 representation of former Sergeant Major of the Army, Gene
 10 McKinney, I did not review Army actions that involved
 11 what I would consider to be the leadership of the Army's
 12 decision-making process. And I would say that that
 13 really just included officer cases. I did not review any
 14 Army officer cases to make a judgment about whether or
 15 not there was consistent application. That was left to
 16 Hank Hamilton and actually General Cuthbert to perform
 17 that review.

18 In terms of the data we collected, we
 19 asked the Army to provide us information on — all the
 20 services, actually — to provide us information from 1
 21 July, 1996 to 1 December, 1998 regarding the following
 22 offenses: sexual harassment, sodomy, orders violations in
 23 which the order violated would be some sort of

1 fraternization or improper relations between instructors-
 2 type order, adultery and fraternization, indecent
 3 language, indecent acts, rape, assault with intent to
 4 commit the sexual offenses that I've already discussed,
 5 and attempts.

6 We got mixed results in terms of the data
 7 we received back. The Army and the Air Force — The Air
 8 Force actually, I would say, probably has the most high-
 9 tech ability to produce data. It's basically all in
 10 computer databases. And Tom Abbey will be able to talk
 11 about that. He analyzed the data fairly closely.

12 Next we had — we received from the Army
 13 information on military justice actions for those
 14 offenses at Fort Bliss, Fort McClellan, Fort Leonard Wood
 15 and Fort Gordon, and we thought that would give us a
 16 satisfactory mix of basic training bases and bases that
 17 do advanced training, and then bases that involve — that
 18 don't really have a training function.

19 For the Navy and Marine Corps — At the
 20 Navy, we asked the Navy to provide us information on
 21 military justice actions for those offenses related to
 22 Naval Base Norfolk; again, a base that has what the Navy
 23 calls "A" school training as well as active duty line

1 units. For the Marine Corps, we asked for the same type
 2 of information from Camp LeJeune, which is, I would say,
 3 largely an equivalent type base to Norfolk for the Navy.

4 The Navy and Marine Corps excepted from
 5 the document production requirement certain units that
 6 were either on deployment, getting ready to deploy or had
 7 just come back from deployment. So we did not get a
 8 complete snapshot of the data available from those bases,
 9 and I think that was a perfectly valid exclusion of data,
 10 I think. We didn't want to interfere with the mission
 11 accomplishment of those units.

12 I touched already a little bit on the
 13 "consistent application," an area that I concentrated on.
 14 The "consistent application" portion of the statute,
 15 562.(a)(2), requires the Commission to assess the extent
 16 to which the laws, regulations, policies and directives
 17 have been applied consistently throughout the armed
 18 forces, without regard to the armed force, grade, rank or
 19 gender of the individuals involved.

20 Because of the nature of the data that we
 21 asked for — And it's, what I would say, not complete.
 22 It was basically asking for enough data so that we could
 23 make some assessments. That's what we chose to do. We

1 made an assessment based on a review of all of the data
 2 to see if we could find trends that the data would show.

3 The review shows, I think, generally the
 4 following. In basic training environments and in
 5 environments which involve junior enlisted people,
 6 consensual sexual conduct between very junior enlisted
 7 people in a training environment or other environments
 8 such as a unit on board ship, people of equal ranking
 9 involved in consensual sexual offenses at the very low
 10 enlisted level are treated exactly equally. The Navy
 11 data from the USS NIMITZ showed exactly that.

12 People — a female and a male — caught
 13 behind a locked door, not caught actually engaging in sex
 14 but they violated the shipboard regulation that says you
 15 will not be behind a closed door with a member of the
 16 opposite sex, they were punished exactly equally.

17 The same result generally obtained in the
 18 Army cases from the training bases and at the Marine
 19 Corps Schools Command at Marine Corps Base Camp LeJeune,
 20 as well as in the Air Force. So I think that data point
 21 is pretty well established.

22 As you go — As the differential in rank
 23 between the male and female increases, the results become

1 more difficult to assess. For consensual sexual offenses
 2 involving training situations in which, for example, a
 3 drill instructor engages in some sort of consensual
 4 activity with a trainee, the trainee generally receives
 5 an Article 15 that does not follow them out of — an
 6 Article 15 or other punishment that does not follow them
 7 out of the training command. The trainer, the drill
 8 instructor or other person in a supervisory relationship,
 9 generally finds himself at an Article 15 or a court-
 10 martial, and sometimes at a general court-martial.

11 So the disparity in forum in which the
 12 conduct is addressed and the disparity in the punishments
 13 is significant.

14 DR. CANTOR: Are we — Is it all right —

15 MR. GITTINS: Please.

16 DR. CANTOR: — if we ask questions as —

17 MR. GITTINS: Please, if you'd like.

18 DR. CANTOR: I guess I'd like a little
 19 context around the notion of disparity there. I mean,
 20 you're reviewing for inconsistency. But if, for example,
 21 there's a shipboard policy, let's say, that gives the
 22 commanding officer some leeway in assigning punishment
 23 and the commanding officer believes, as we were told in

1 several instances, that there is no such thing as
 2 consensuality when you have a power differential in rank,
 3 then would you call that inconsistency or you would — I
 4 mean, it's a little tricky, right?

5 MR. GITTINS: It is tricky. I will tell
 6 you adultery, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
 7 is a consensual offense. There is nothing that's going
 8 to change that. No commander's opinion is going to
 9 change that. That is a fact.

10 DR. CANTOR: Yes. But —

11 MR. GITTINS: Adultery is consensual.

12 DR. CANTOR: But you can find someone
 13 guilty without — What I understand to be this point of
 14 flexibility given to the commanding officer is the
 15 assessment of punishment.

16 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: But if you
 17 have an NCO who's punished in any way, he will be
 18 eliminated from the service over time. If you punish a
 19 private, that record does not even follow the private out
 20 of the unit. So —

21 DR. CANTOR: I understand.

22 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: So any
 23 punishment for —

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1 DR. CANTOR: That's not my —
 2 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: — an NCO is
 3 the death sentence.
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Maybe I can help clarify,
 5 Nancy. I think what Charlie is doing right now is to
 6 just look at, you know, literally the instances of
 7 discrepancy or differential without making a judgment as
 8 to whether there is a rationale for it. You know, for
 9 example —
 10 DR. CANTOR: Well, but —
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — in this training
 12 situation, you know, we might very well say, "yeah, they
 13 land hard on the trainer, but that's reasonable and we
 14 expect to see a differential like that."
 15 MR. PANG: Well, isn't there — You know,
 16 just a question. You know, in most consensual cases —
 17 okay? — you know, the presumption I would have is that,
 18 you know, there was fraternization involved. And the way
 19 the — As I recall the way the fraternization rule is
 20 written — okay? — the senior is held accountable — I
 21 mean, isn't that true? — in the —
 22 DR. CANTOR: That's what I'm trying to get
 23 at.

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1 MR. PANG: — in the Uniform Code of —
 2 DR. CANTOR: That's exactly what I'm
 3 trying to get at. I mean —
 4 MR. PANG: — the Manual for Courts-
 5 Martial or whatever it is?
 6 MR. GITTINS: Fraternization is an offense
 7 if you're the junior person involved. There is no
 8 distinction made in the Manual for the junior person
 9 basically getting de facto immunity for participation in
 10 that relationship.
 11 And you see that in some of the data. In
 12 the twenty-five cases that we asked about for the Navy,
 13 we got data back that indicated in some commands the
 14 junior person in that relationship was punished in a way
 15 that I would consider significant. Article 15 for an E-
 16 7, for example, is a career-ending event. You will not
 17 make E-8 and you're probably on your way out the door.
 18 So I don't think that it's necessarily
 19 true, sir, that you get a pass if you're the junior
 20 person involved in a fraternization —
 21 MR. PANG: Well, not a pass. But the way
 22 the thing was — I think I read this thing some time ago
 23 about fraternization —

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1 MS. POPE: But let me ask on that specific
 2 case because I just — I mean, it gets confusing and I
 3 think — You know, if you're an E-7, did you look at what
 4 position — It may have — If you looked at the case —
 5 And the commanders are given authority to make a
 6 distinction on good order and discipline. If that E-7
 7 was in a leadership position, then even though you've got
 8 a rank and a fraternization issue, you also have good
 9 order and discipline and impact on morale.
 10 So that E-7 may well have been in a
 11 leadership position that was sending a message, so
 12 appropriately was come down hard on. And I think we've
 13 had some good reaction from the services on why you would
 14 do that.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: What if he was
 16 the junior man in the relationship?
 17 MS. POPE: But there's two different
 18 issues. One is senior-to-junior, and then the other is
 19 if both of these people are in leadership positions —
 20 one in the enlisted community and one in the officer
 21 community — I would expect a commanding officer to come
 22 down hard on both those people.
 23 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: Absolutely.

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1 DR. CANTOR: And we had testimony to that
 2 effect.
 3 MS. POPE: You know. And so that's part
 4 of what Nancy's asking.
 5 DR. CANTOR: That's what I'm asking,
 6 because we had testimony to that effect — that good
 7 order and discipline —
 8 MS. POPE: I mean, I would be concerned if
 9 it were otherwise. And I guess as we come down — And I
 10 know that's kind of what Anita was asking, is when we get
 11 to the end of the day, do we have those kinds of
 12 differentiations that...
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: That are reasonable.
 14 MS. POPE: Yeah, that make — I mean, that
 15 would make sense to me.
 16 DR. CANTOR: Right. Right.
 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: But recall that the
 18 statute just asks us to assess the differences, and so we
 19 need to know what the results — you know, what the
 20 inputs and outputs of these different cases are, and then
 21 I think we can come back and say, "Well, it was —"
 22 MS. POPE: Right.
 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — reasonable here. It

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1 was not reasonable there."
 2 DR. CANTOR: Exactly.
 3 MR. GITTINS: And I'm not — and I don't
 4 intend to say I'm critical of any commander who made
 5 those judgments. We were provided basically records of
 6 nonjudicial punishment redacted of all identifying
 7 information and we, of course, had no context of the
 8 relationship. We don't know if this relationship was one
 9 that tore up a unit, for example. We just know these are
 10 the actions; here's the co-actor information; this is
 11 what happened. You can't really make a judgment as to
 12 whether the commander was out in left field or not based
 13 on the information we had.
 14 And I would submit that the commander has
 15 to have the opportunity to determine an appropriate
 16 punishment based on the circumstances. We didn't have
 17 that information to consider. We're just looking at the
 18 raw data. And is there an indication that people are
 19 punished differently based on rank? Yes, that's what the
 20 data shows.
 21 DR. CANTOR: Yes. I wasn't contesting
 22 your —
 23 MR. GITTINS: Okay.

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1 DR. CANTOR: I'm trying to put a context
 2 around it for us to come back to it.
 3 MR. GITTINS: Right. And I don't dispute
 4 that.
 5 Now, I will point out, though, that when
 6 you get to the officer-enlisted cases — and the Navy
 7 data was very helpful in this instance — some of those
 8 people that I indicated were not punished on the enlisted
 9 side of that fraternization officer-enlisted relationship
 10 were very senior enlisted people — E-7, E-8, E-6 — who
 11 were not held accountable for their conduct, and that, in
 12 my view, leads me to wonder why.
 13 I mean, we're not talking about a
 14 relationship between an officer and an E-1 or an E-2.
 15 We're talking about somebody who's on their second
 16 enlistment, at least, and should know better and
 17 basically gets the walk. And I don't know how you
 18 justify to the officer who lost his career, sometimes at
 19 the seventeen-year point or the sixteen-year point — how
 20 do you justify, for consensual sexual activity, his
 21 career was terminated but the enlisted person's was not?
 22 And that's what the Navy data tended to
 23 show in at least half the cases that we specifically

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1 asked about, that involved solely consensual-type
2 offenses, what happened.
3 MS. POPE: In those kind of data calls,
4 did it tell you whether it was aboard ship, whether it
5 was shore? I mean, if you're talking specific Navy —
6 MR. GITTINS: Some of them did involve
7 shipboard. And I will tell you the shipboard cases are
8 the ones in which the people were punished, both sides.
9 DR. CANTOR: Both sides.
10 MR. GITTINS: Both sides.
11 MS. POPE: Right.
12 MR. GITTINS: And it's not clear in every
13 case where the event took place. But when the data
14 provided by the Navy indicated it was a shipboard event
15 and we could identify what happened to the other person,
16 the junior person in the relationship, it almost
17 invariably — I can't think of a case where the enlisted
18 person was not punished at least at a mast in that
19 circumstance.
20 MR. PANG: I think that came out yesterday
21 in the testimony, you know, when we had the Navy captain
22 here. And basically he said, you know, they come down
23 real hard because there's a prohibition there. But, you

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1 know, when they're on liberty and doing something else, I
2 mean, that's a different story.
3 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: May I jump in, too, with
4 another process comment?
5 MR. PANG: Certainly.
6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Which is that in the
7 beginning we asked the services for essentially their
8 work papers, which we felt would be the best description
9 in all of the detail of all of these situations. They
10 strenuously resisted giving us their work papers, and the
11 compromise we arrived at was that they themselves
12 provided us summaries with what they represented to be
13 the salient points of the story.
14 And so we may very well have questions
15 sitting here now as to whether was this on a ship — you
16 know, what were some more details of the story — but
17 because of the deal we worked out with the services, we
18 may very well just be unable to say. You know, questions
19 that come up right now simply did not come to us in the
20 summaries we received.
21 So, you know, it may be a good question
22 and it may be something that we wish we could answer but
23 were just unable to because of the limitations on our —

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1 DR. CANTOR: I'm not trying to drag this
2 out. I just wanted to understand your last comment about
3 the officers terminated and the enlisted not. But that's
4 not on shipboard cases as far as you know. Is that what
5 you were just saying?
6 MR. GITTINS: The officer on the shipboard
7 cases invariably received Article 15 —
8 DR. CANTOR: Right.
9 MR. GITTINS: — and a board of inquiry,
10 which may or may not result in the termination of their
11 career.
12 DR. CANTOR: But you then said, as far as
13 you could tell in the Navy data, on shipboard cases,
14 enlisted were also punished?
15 MR. GITTINS: That's correct.
16 DR. CANTOR: Okay.
17 MR. GITTINS: In the cases where they
18 identified the enlisted person who was punished as being
19 on board the ship with the officer, or, for example, the
20 officer's — the data provided with the officer indicated
21 that the relationship took place on ship, we were able to
22 determine kind of the circumstances in which the offense
23 occurred.

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1 DR. CANTOR: Right. So just the earlier
2 statement about there being a discrepancy between
3 officers terminated and enlisted not is not shipboard as
4 far as you know?
5 MR. GITTINS: As far as I know.
6 DR. CANTOR: Okay.
7 MR. GITTINS: As far as the data provided
8 by the Navy allowed —
9 DR. CANTOR: Right.
10 MR. GITTINS: — us to make that
11 evaluation.
12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Charlie, let
13 me ask a question and solicit the opinion of everyone
14 here since all of you have worn a uniform. And given the
15 experience you have, I would guess that it was
16 predictable to see what you saw if the services provided
17 — The culture of the military is one that it's somewhat
18 predictable that a senior person is going to get hammered
19 a little bit harder than a junior person.
20 And I can understand your surprise, as I
21 am, in the Navy, where a senior enlisted and an officer
22 had a case and only the officer was punished. I find
23 that surprising, too. But it seems to me not only could

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1 that be predictable, would you agree that it's also an
2 expectation in the culture of the military that people
3 who are senior are held to a higher level of conduct and
4 accountability?
5 You know, I just kind of frame it for
6 discussion today.
7 MR. GITTINS: I think that's true. That's
8 the typical argument that a prosecutor gives when you're
9 in a court-martial for an officer or a senior enlisted
10 person involved in a relationship.
11 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: That's
12 correct.
13 MR. GITTINS: You hear it all the time,
14 and I think that's true.
15 But we're talking about criminal conduct.
16 And if we're going to criminalize sexual intercourse
17 between consenting adults, it's no less a crime because
18 the junior person was junior. It's still the crime.
19 And, you know, when you give somebody a federal
20 conviction for consensual sexual activity and you let the
21 other person take a walk on it, you know, that to me —
22 as a practitioner and as a military officer, gives me
23 some concern.

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1 MS. POPE: But let me make the point —
2 and this is in the case that — I'm not the lawyer here
3 but I certainly do a lot of work in this area — that the
4 appearance of power — and it is always brought up in the
5 case that the appearance of power, whether it's military
6 or civilian, is a reality and that — and the military
7 has certainly used this argument that says, you know,
8 consensual/consensual, it doesn't equate in the military
9 because the senior is responsible. The senior is more
10 powerful and just the appearance of the power makes it
11 unequal.
12 MR. GITTINS: Here's where I — you know,
13 I tried to report on what the data we collected showed
14 and without —
15 MS. POPE: No, I understand that.
16 MR. GITTINS: — without injecting my
17 personal opinions into the mix. I would tell you that I
18 believe that to be a false distinction in practice.
19 People who engage in adulterous conduct are not concerned
20 about the rank differential. People who engage in
21 multiple acts of adultery, for example, or a long-term
22 fraternizing relationship, that rank disparity is no
23 longer in the mix. It is solely a matter of relationship

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 50</p> <p>1 and pleasure at that point. 2 You know, I'm not talking about one act. 3 MS. POPE: Right. 4 MR. GITTINS: I'm talking about — A usual 5 adultery case involves multiple acts. It's usually 6 charged on diverse occasions. There is no rank — in my 7 view, no rank component to that mix anymore. 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I think we 9 would accept that as your personal opinion — 10 MR. GITTINS: Indeed, sir. 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — and 12 there may be other opinions on that same subject that are 13 held either by the commissioners or these lawyers up 14 front, and I think we should identify that as such. 15 DR. CANTOR: Exactly. 16 MR. GITTINS: Yes, sir. 17 MR. PANG: You know, I'd like to just 18 raise, you know, a point here. You know, I was reading 19 through the report here and there are some conclusions — 20 okay? — that are made in this report. I mean, it's not 21 just the mere setting out of, you know, there's rank 22 disparity. 23 Because, you know, I note here on Page 20</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 53</p> <p>1 is not consistent with the basic training mission. 2 For reasons that aren't too clear to me, 3 this appears to be only happening in the Army, and I'm a 4 little embarrassed about that because I did spend a 5 couple years of my life around a basic training 6 installation. 7 But I would tell you that if you even 8 divide women and men up in a basic training outfit to the 9 point they're not supposed to talk to each other 10 socially, you're going to lose something out of basic 11 training. And you either have to figure out a way to do 12 it so they can talk socially or you figure out a way to 13 train them as men and women separately. 14 I think the issue needs to be addressed. 15 I don't think the solution is necessarily to train them 16 separately, but you've got to figure out the way to 17 establish an environment in which young men and young 18 women who are essentially peers and not senior- 19 subordinate — these are peers I'm talking about — don't 20 get an Article 15 for smiling at one of their peers or 21 talking to them about something other than a duty 22 problem. 23 DR. CANTOR: I don't want to — May I just</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 51</p> <p>1 that, you know, there's a — In the first paragraph, it 2 says, "While equality of punishment for junior enlisted 3 co-actors regardless of gender clearly is practiced in 4 the field by the services, the frequency with which 5 commanders are required to turn their attention from the 6 mission of the organization to address these relatively 7 minor disciplinary issues detracts from mission 8 effectiveness and accomplishment. The bulk of these 9 relatively minor offenses would be eliminated by 10 instituting gender-separate basic training, indicating 11 that the issue of separate basic training among the sexes 12 should be further considered." 13 I don't grasp that. I mean, you know — I 14 mean, is this — Do we have a huge amount of these things 15 going on or just a few? 16 MR. GITTINS: Yeah, I can comment on that. 17 What we see is at the training bases, the commander's 18 time is — based on the sheer number of these kind of 19 disciplinary infractions, the commander's time — 20 MR. PANG: How many are there? Do you 21 have some idea? I mean, when you say "sheer numbers," I 22 mean, lots of them? I mean... 23 MR. GITTINS: Hundreds, maybe thousands, I</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 54</p> <p>1 say that — 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: Sure. 3 DR. CANTOR: — I am not doubting the 4 genuineness or expertise on which that statement is made. 5 I am simply asking for the record that we underscore that 6 that is again a personal assessment based on how things 7 are happening in training and based on your experience. 8 But that is not what I understood Jim to 9 just say was the task here. I understood the task to be 10 to assess the consistency of — what the policies and 11 practices are and the consistency of the application. 12 MR. RENNE: True. And you'll see that 13 that was mentioned in the back of the report and it's not 14 the primary focus of this report. However, from the 15 experience — 16 DR. CANTOR: Well, but — 17 MR. RENNE: But if you look at Section 18 562.(a)(3), part of that is assessing the report of the 19 Kassebaum Baker Commission and also the consistent 20 application — 21 DR. CANTOR: But we were told that that 22 was being taken out and put in the other piece. 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, I mean, that's not</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 52</p> <p>1 would say, just in the data that we pulled. 2 DR. CANTOR: But could I ask a point of 3 information about the point of this legal assessment? I 4 mean, that statement strikes me as going well beyond what 5 you were asked to do or what I assumed you were asked to 6 do. I mean, that's a statement that, frankly — I mean, 7 that's your speculation — 8 MR. PANG: I hope it's supported by — 9 DR. CANTOR: — that somehow will — 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: Some of that 11 comes from the analysis I did, so let me try to interject 12 what led me to say something like that in my — the part 13 that I wrote. And I really feel badly about coming at 14 this whole issue from that perspective because I think 15 that's a minor problem among what is largely a successful 16 effort to provide gender-integrated training. 17 What I saw in the regulatory environment 18 out at Fort Leonard Wood — and I have been told by 19 others is practiced at Fort Jackson — essentially is an 20 effort within gender-integrated basic training to prevent 21 any social conversation or discussion between males and 22 females — the so-called "no smile" rule. A guy is not 23 allowed to smile at a woman, and vice versa, because that</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 55</p> <p>1 what the Congress did. The Congress put that reference 2 in Section (a). 3 DR. CANTOR: But you said over here — 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: But for our purposes, we 5 have tried to divide this up into a workable, you know, 6 sort of work plan, and so that's where we are. 7 Let me just — 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can I make 9 a recommendation? 10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Ron, one second before — 11 Let me just state that this is a report of the 12 consultants. It is in no way, shape or form the 13 recommendations or reports or adopted position of this 14 Commission. We are hear to here these experts' 15 recommendations, to talk with them. 16 And then, as I have said numerous times, 17 every commissioner here will be entitled to make his or 18 her own decision about each of these issues. And so the 19 fact that a sentence appears in a memorandum has no 20 binding effect whatsoever on any commissioner. 21 MR. PANG: You know, that's great. I 22 mean, you know, and I — But it's, I think, legitimate 23 for Nancy to raise the issue because, you know — and to</p>

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1 understand what underlies this.
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Well, Fred, I think the
 3 answer has been made that this is one sentence on page 20
 4 of 30, and, you know, if we can move on, I think we will
 5 get the gist of the entire report.
 6 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: But before
 7 —
 8 DR. CANTOR: But wait a minute. I mean —
 9 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Hang on one second. Ron
 10 would like —
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: If I could
 12 make a recommendation. I think that maybe from a matter
 13 of procedure what we might wish to do is let these
 14 gentlemen go through all of what they have to say, draw
 15 their conclusions, and then let us, as we take our notes,
 16 go ahead and go back.
 17 I don't — I think that that will be the
 18 best way for us to gather what they have to say, whether
 19 we agree or disagree with what they say. They'll tell us
 20 why they've drawn their conclusions. I think I see a
 21 minority report, which means they don't all agree with
 22 each other. We ought to listen to that, if I may, and
 23 then we can start firing. I think that that might be

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1 helpful.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: This is what
 3 we've heard from several people we've had testimony from.
 4 The sergeants major and the senior NCO's said, when you
 5 ask them would they in fact — would it be easier in a
 6 single-sex training environment, you'd have less
 7 problems. All that does is point that out.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: How about
 9 if we just listen to them.
 10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Bob.
 11 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I just want
 12 to make one point and I think it's a very important
 13 point. If there is a documented case of a soldier or a
 14 service person receiving nonjudicial punishment or severe
 15 punishment for smiling at one another, I would like that
 16 information entered on the record, because I would be the
 17 first one to take it to the Halls of Congress and say,
 18 you know, this is wrong, if in fact there is a documented
 19 case.
 20 Now, that has been submitted by General
 21 Cuthbert that — I think I understood him to say smiling
 22 —
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: But there must

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1 be a regulation against it.
 2 MR. RENNE: Not necessarily an NJP, but
 3 there were from anecdotal interviews some poking-in-the-
 4 stomach Article 15's.
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Now, I'll tell
 6 you, I'd like to second Ron's recommendation that we
 7 proceed with the briefing —
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I'm just
 9 going to try to say, guys, we're never going to get
 10 anywhere if we don't listen and let them have their say
 11 and then let's go after them.
 12 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah. Let's proceed with
 13 the briefing. Please hold your questions until they've
 14 completed their —
 15 DR. CANTOR: Well —
 16 MR. PANG: I think you'd better read...
 17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We will make as much time
 18 as we need for questions, challenges, whatever —
 19 discussion. But I think if we try to do it as we go
 20 along, we will never be able to get through the material
 21 that we need to get through.
 22 MR. GITTINS: Yes, ma'am.
 23 On the subject that we just discussed, I

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1 would just like to say that the data suggested that
 2 commanders in training environments are spending an
 3 inordinate amount of time handling what I personally
 4 consider to be trivial offenses. We came to the
 5 conclusion relatively minor, but trivial offenses in many
 6 cases. That suggests that that is detracting from the
 7 unit commander's ability to do the mission.
 8 We were also asked to look at the issue of
 9 the modification of Article 134 adultery offenses to add
 10 the Department of Defense suggestions to further amplify
 11 the crime of adultery under Article 134. Three of us
 12 agreed on — and I'll discuss how we agreed, but myself,
 13 Mr. Hamilton and Jerry Kirkpatrick, we came to a
 14 conclusion that's found at — and rationale that's found
 15 at Page 21 of the report.
 16 The Manual for Courts-Martial changes
 17 involve changes only to the offense of adultery under
 18 Article 134, and Article 134 is the general article that
 19 prohibits conduct prejudicial — minor disorders that are
 20 prejudicial to good order and discipline in the military
 21 or are of a service-discrediting nature.
 22 The near-unanimous — According to the
 23 Department of Defense General Counsel's opinion, the

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1 near-unanimous guidance or opinion of the commanders in
 2 the field was that the current guidance on Article 134
 3 set forth in the Manual for Courts-Martial is clear and
 4 understood and no change is necessary.
 5 That, in my view — in our view, the three
 6 of us who agreed with this opinion — suggests that there
 7 is no military or legal need to change only the Article
 8 134 offense of adultery to make it "more clear." It's
 9 apparently clear to the people who have to work with it,
 10 including the commanders and staff judge advocates and
 11 lawyers that are required to do so.
 12 We also agreed that a change to the Manual
 13 solely for Article 134 adultery offenses would be
 14 unhelpful in fact because all offenses under Article 134
 15 are governed by the same standard, and that standard is
 16 you have to assess good order and discipline and the
 17 effect of the offense on good order and discipline. And
 18 if you're going to change that explanation only for
 19 adultery, you've left out what would be helpful
 20 amplifying information for all offenses under Article
 21 134.
 22 If it's applicable and explains how
 23 conduct of adultery could be prejudicial to good order

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1 and discipline, it has universal effect and shouldn't be
 2 confined solely to the adultery offense defined by the
 3 President. It should be included in the general
 4 discussion to Article 134 so that it is applicable to all
 5 offenses under Article 134.
 6 And finally, we recommend that the
 7 Commission recommend against adoption of these changes
 8 for the reason that the timing and the reasoning for
 9 these changes come about. When you are addressing
 10 particular cases — And you may recall that the call for
 11 changes to the Article 134 offense came about following
 12 the very highly-publicized Kelly Flinn case and the case
 13 — Her name escapes me. The lieutenant colonel.
 14 COLONEL ABBEY: Tew.
 15 MR. GITTINS: Tew — who was convicted of
 16 adultery and then committed suicide. That's not a good
 17 reason to change Article 134. Article 134 adultery
 18 offenses have been defined and have been prosecuted
 19 without any difficulty — and not prosecuted without any
 20 difficulty where appropriate — since the Uniform Code of
 21 Military Justice was enacted.
 22 It's not appropriate to change the Uniform
 23 Code of Military Justice because of a couple of highly-

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1 publicized cases that maybe the wrong decision was made.
 2 And I don't draw that conclusion. I'm just saying
 3 reasonable people could differ.
 4 So we recommend — the three of us — Mr.
 5 Hamilton, myself and Mr. Kirkpatrick — recommend that
 6 the Commission recommend to Congress that Congress, I
 7 guess, recommend or legislate that the Department of
 8 Defense not adopt those changes to Article 134 at this
 9 time.

10 At this point, I would like to turn over
 11 the floor to General Cuthbert, who will address some of
 12 the policy issues.

13 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: And it's
 14 really a pleasure for me to be here. I have a War
 15 College classmate sitting down at the end of the table
 16 and — Ron Christmas. I coached one of his youngsters in
 17 a basketball team about twenty years ago, as I recall.

18 Professor Moskos was one of my teachers up
 19 there. I don't know if Ron ever took a course from him,
 20 but — And, of course, I spent four years in the
 21 Secretary of Defense's office as a colleague of Fred
 22 Pang, who was clearly the best colonel in the crowd.
 23 That's why he did a little better than the rest of us.

1 It's really a pleasure for me to talk with
 2 you about this, and I would like to at least make one
 3 mention of my perspective on these issues and try to put
 4 a little more Olympian perspective on how most of us who
 5 practice law in our lives and in the armed forces think
 6 about them.

7 I spent about fifteen years in the Army
 8 when it was an all-male institution, essentially.
 9 Indeed, my first responsibility as a staff judge advocate
 10 occurred in 1974, when I was the senior lawyer out at
 11 Fort Leonard Wood and we were just starting to bring
 12 women into the armed forces in large numbers.

13 I spent the next twenty-five years of my
 14 career — and it was twenty-five more years — in
 15 essentially trying to bring women into the armed forces
 16 in a way that made the Army better and let them reach
 17 their expectations.

18 That's been a long struggle, but in my
 19 assessment, it's been a very successful one, and I don't
 20 think we ought to lose sight of that basic fact as we go
 21 through some of the problems that I'll raise and others
 22 will raise about the rules and their enforcement.

23 It's just a better Army, and if you don't

1 believe that, I think you've got a jaundiced view of
 2 what's going on. I wouldn't minimize the fact that there
 3 have been some casualties in what is really a sexual
 4 revolution inside the Army. There's some great sergeants
 5 who would never have been in trouble but for the fact
 6 that they had to deal with the problems of gender
 7 integration.

8 There's some very fine young women whose
 9 egos and bodies were occasionally battered because they
 10 were part of that revolution. They had career
 11 expectations, too, and maybe they weren't met the way you
 12 and I would like them to be.

13 But the bottom line of all that is it's
 14 been a vastly successful effort. And while we perhaps
 15 didn't really know what we were doing when we entered
 16 that era, the folks in charge of the Army that I know do
 17 know what they're doing now and are succeeding at it, and
 18 that's the most important issue to be involved.

19 Let me turn to the legal issues because
 20 I've not been talking much about that, although I really
 21 have been talking about how this revolution has occurred
 22 in a legal environment that's been changing during those
 23 twenty-five years.

1 I will tell you that as I went through the
 2 statute, the Uniform Code and what other law there is,
 3 and the DoD directive and the major service regulations,
 4 while they all come at the problem a little differently,
 5 they wind up with basically the same substantive result.
 6 And yes, you can sit and pick regulations apart from one
 7 service to another and you can compare one Army
 8 installation to another and find differences in their
 9 regs.

10 What they're really trying to do is sort
 11 of build a little protective cocoon around young people
 12 who don't know how to play the game by the rules in the
 13 armed forces. And until they have been taught the basic
 14 rules of behavior, you give them some extra protections
 15 that you don't give to other people. And the rules that
 16 prohibit, for example, a relationship between cadre and
 17 trainee, they're there to allow people to learn how to
 18 say "no" in an environment they just never had any
 19 experience with.

20 And for me, it's hard to explain just how
 21 intensive basic training is. And it doesn't make any
 22 difference whether you went through Beast Barracks as I
 23 did at West Point or you're out at Fort Leonard Wood as a

1 young enlisted person or you're in OCS. You don't really
 2 understand how intense that is until you're years past
 3 it.

4 Those kids at Leonard Wood will never
 5 forget the name of that drill instructor. And I get a
 6 little emotional about this, I guess, because I can tell
 7 you with a straight face I know real well who that guy
 8 was who was my Beast Barracks squad leader. And when I
 9 got a chance to do that a few years later, I know where
 10 all eight of those kids are today. They're not kids
 11 anymore. They're — most of them — retired colonels.

12 But you go through a metamorphosis in that
 13 environment that is very, very hard to articulate and,
 14 yet, it's very, very important. And when you're doing
 15 that, you need some special protections.

16 As I've indicated in the written response,
 17 there are some minor modifications that need to be dealt
 18 with. Hopefully you folks will make some
 19 recommendations. I think you could probably ignore
 20 everything I say and the armed forces will get along just
 21 fine.

22 I'm a little troubled by the statutory
 23 rape law that exists today because when I hear phrases

1 like "constructive force" or "constructive rape," I know
 2 the lawyers and the judges are playing games with what is
 3 just good old fashioned law.

4 And what I would suggest would be a better
 5 way to do that is to have someone like the Joint
 6 Committee sit down and accept some reforms that are
 7 fairly commonly found in civilian jurisdictions in which
 8 you treat the spectrum from, you know, physical, harsh,
 9 forcible rape, through date rape, all the way down to
 10 what I would call post-coital remorse, in a way that's
 11 greeted.

12 So the stuff that causes great physical
 13 violence to a young woman gets treated as harshly as it
 14 is today — By the way, there's a death penalty for rape
 15 in the armed forces if you didn't realize that — and,
 16 yet, things that are on the other end of the spectrum get
 17 treated with an appropriate sanction that's far less
 18 serious.

19 In fact, that sort of happens in the
 20 courts today with the sentencing authority, but I think
 21 it would work better if the law really reflected the
 22 practices and people didn't have to do a little legal
 23 interpolating — or more extrapolating really is what it

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1 is.
2 I would also like to see you, as you're
3 dealing with this fraternization issue, at least give
4 some serious consideration to letting the Army go the way
5 it's gone for the last twenty or thirty years. The Army
6 has given a lot of thought to the issue of
7 fraternization.

8 Some very smart people have spent many,
9 many hours dealing with all aspects of that problem,
10 issue, and to try to resolve fundamental human relations
11 problems on the basis of a pre-World War II dichotomy
12 between officer and enlisted is, to my mind, not very
13 practical. It just doesn't track with the way soldiers
14 think about themselves.

15 There is a real distinction between
16 novices and pros. There isn't any question about that.
17 Between basic AIT trainees, for example, and people who
18 have been around for a while. But if you would believe
19 that a second lieutenant would be able to hornswoggle an
20 experienced NCO as opposed to the opposite where it
21 happens all the time, it's just a false dichotomy.

22 And if you take a look at some of the
23 really highly organized groups where teamwork is

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1 to keep quiet about things that are as important as what
2 you're working on.

3 So let me summarize. I really think the
4 sexual revolution in the armed forces is about over. The
5 major battles have been decided and the armed forces have
6 won. Let me make that clearer. The women who serve
7 today make the Army better than the one I served in, and
8 they have done this in the same way that minorities who
9 have prospered in the Army have done it over the years:
10 they're just better than the people they replaced.

11 So if you're concerned about who they are
12 and what they're doing, you've got to understand that
13 they do these things better than my generation was able
14 to do them. I served in an Army in the fifties and in
15 the sixties that just couldn't, you know, do the things
16 that the Army can do today. And while they did some very
17 tough things, they did it with a lot more people; they
18 did it with a lot more in-discipline, with courts-martial
19 in much larger numbers, and that's not true today.

20 It's been a struggle to craft the rules to
21 deal with these problems, but it's not been an
22 insurmountable struggle. And it's a struggle to enforce
23 them in a way that's fair to everyone, but that's not

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1 important, like Special Operations Forces, officer and
2 enlisted distinctions are, frankly, just nonexistent.
3 They're real pros who deal with each other based on their
4 expertise and their professionalism counts more than what
5 you've got on your collar.

6 As I say, the Army rejected in terms of
7 its fraternization policies that dichotomy about twenty
8 years ago. To ask them to essentially ignore that
9 history I think is maybe a step beyond what is necessary.
10 Could they work with it? Yeah, they could, but I think
11 they will be rejecting some of what they've learned in
12 the last twenty years.

13 I also mentioned the business about the
14 "no smile" rules. What led me to that phrase was not
15 something I saw at a particular Article 15, but when we
16 got the Article 15 collection from Fort Leonard Wood,
17 there literally is a stack of ten, fifteen of those,
18 maybe even more, of nonjudicial punishment of basic
19 trainees who are found guilty of violating company or
20 battalion policies for having a social conversation with
21 a basic trainee of the opposite sex.

22 I was a little bit skeptical because, of
23 course, we had only asked for those from Fort Leonard —

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1 impossible either and it's what attracts people to
2 positions like Ron's held most of his life.

3 It's hard to be a good commander, but it's
4 fun, too. And it's hard to be a good lawyer, but it's
5 fun, too. And so I'll just leave you with that.

6 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: General Cuthbert, would
7 you like to comment about the Article 134 adultery
8 guidance? Or is that on the agenda for somebody else?
9 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: Well, you
10 know, the differences there are like counting angels on
11 the head of a pin. They're just not very important. I
12 would tell you some smart people struggled to get to
13 these reforms, I would call them. They're not real big
14 reforms but they do reflect real practice.

15 I was never involved in prosecuting
16 anybody in a court-martial for just plain adultery. It
17 is not a big problem in the armed forces. It doesn't
18 have that big an impact on morale and discipline.
19 And most of the prosecutions that were
20 part of adultery were serious sexual offenses like rape,
21 coupled with adultery because you knew the defendant was
22 going to get on the stand and say it was consensual, and
23 if he did, he was going to at least admit he committed

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1 or from the basic training units, and I would gather the
2 only one we could expect to see those from was Leonard
3 Wood. I found later in talking to Jim Renne that there
4 was some field commentary by some of the sergeants down
5 there that they also had a little trouble with the "no
6 social contact" rule.

7 It's my assessment that basic training is
8 so fundamental that if you can't talk with your peer
9 socially, you maybe shouldn't be in that peer group. But
10 it's one of those things that the real problem is the "no
11 social contact" rule. You really ought to be able to
12 deal with them as peers. And if you can't smile and you
13 can't joke, they aren't true peers. But it, too, is one
14 the Army is struggling with.

15 And I don't think the real solution,
16 though, is to essentially segregate basic trainees based
17 on their sex. If they can't — Well, let me rephrase
18 that. The basic solution is if you can't let them
19 interact socially, then they shouldn't be together as a
20 matter of structure.

21 I was asked to talk for five minutes and I
22 think I've talked for longer than that. When you've
23 spent as much time around the Army as I have, it's hard

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1 adultery and a jury would then be able to sentence him up
2 to a year for what was somewhere between rape and
3 adultery. It's sort of a practical solution to a
4 difficult charging problem.

5 I think these reforms are useful. I think
6 they reflect what's going on out in the Army, in any
7 event. Are they necessary? Probably not. The people in
8 the field say they're doing just fine with the rules they
9 have now. But I think it would be a little better
10 practice to do it the way they have proposed, and I'd
11 just leave it that way.

12 And I don't know, Tom, if you — I'm
13 through, so I guess it's Tom's turn.

14 COLONEL ABBEY: On that particular point,
15 the reason I agreed is that I looked at all the comments
16 that were coming in from the Air Force and the law, the
17 judge advocates, wing commanders, and I thought the whole
18 process was a very deliberative process. And there's a
19 lot of very good analysis and I thought they came up with
20 some rules that helped clarify the application of the
21 adultery rules. I think that — And for that reason,
22 that's why I thought the DoD proposal had some benefit
23 and value to it.

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1 Also, I think that on adultery, there's —
 2 I totally agree that adultery alone rarely ever gets to a
 3 court-martial. And I reviewed all the statistics on
 4 Article 15's in the Air Force for the last three years
 5 and I looked at courts-martial records and reports of it.
 6 It's typically — In a court-martial, if it's with
 7 fraternization, false statements, some kind of deceit,
 8 maybe misuse of government resources in connection with
 9 carrying on the matter, that I think adultery is not a
 10 big problem and I think the DoD report helps give
 11 commanders guidance.
 12 I think the major deficiency of the
 13 recommendation is they need to make conforming changes to
 14 make sure that all Article 134 offenses — there has to
 15 be that direct impact, not just something indirect and
 16 remote. And you shouldn't have to go to the cases and
 17 the bench book that the judges use to have a Manual for
 18 Courts-Martial that has kind of centralized guidance.
 19 And adultery potentially is a high-publicity, high-
 20 public-scrutiny type of an offense, so I have no
 21 reservations about centralizing some guidance on
 22 adultery.
 23 Just to give a little bit about myself and

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1 a few comments, I also felt like I was in mostly an all-
 2 male environment. Of course, when I went to the Academy,
 3 it was all males. My first assignment was in Vietnam for
 4 about nineteen months. Very few women in the military.
 5 There was a lot of illicit sexual activity that had been
 6 generally involved; military to military type of
 7 activity.
 8 And then I spent the next couple years
 9 travelling in the intelligence community to different
 10 installations and there was, I suspect, a very high level
 11 of infidelity and sexual activity at those installations
 12 that I saw, but not that many women were in uniform.
 13 I think in terms of my legal experience
 14 that helped me analyze this, I served as a defense
 15 counsel for two years in the Pacific in the late
 16 seventies, but again, I dealt with very few cases that
 17 dealt with these gender problems. The big problems back
 18 then were drugs.
 19 And, also, as a staff judge advocate
 20 running a military legal office for three years, we
 21 didn't have that many problems with adultery or
 22 fraternization. It started to be more of a problem, I
 23 think, after the Johanns case. The Air Force was

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1 struggling for defining a custom of the service when it
 2 came to professional and unprofessional relationships and
 3 fraternization, and, of course, then there started to be
 4 more women and men in the service.
 5 And so I think the last ten years in the
 6 area of fraternization, professional/unprofessional
 7 relationships, the Air Force has struggled to try to
 8 develop a policy that was clear, was understood, could be
 9 internalized in terms of accepting those standards,
 10 internalized in terms of commanders taking action against
 11 that.
 12 And I somewhat agree that the officer-
 13 enlisted distinction is somewhat artificial, but I don't
 14 think the officer-enlisted distinction has become an
 15 anachronism. I think it's what — We've had NCO's that
 16 have positions of important stature and influence, and so
 17 you can have unprofessional relationships between senior
 18 officers-junior officers, between senior enlisted and
 19 junior enlisted.
 20 But not everyone likes just to have
 21 adjudicative principles: it's wrong if it only has
 22 adverse impact on the unit. I think there's some need
 23 for some bright lines. So the Air Force, in its

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1 prohibitions, has set certain bright lines in terms of
 2 officer-enlisted conduct, and then the guidance is
 3 generally very centralized.
 4 You don't get a lot of supplementation at
 5 the lower level, so I think that helps to have a better
 6 uniform understanding and application of the principles.
 7 Where you do find the supplementation is at the training-
 8 type base where you have the relationship between staff
 9 and faculty and new people coming into the service who
 10 don't really know all the rules, written and unwritten,
 11 and it takes time for them to adopt the values and to
 12 know what the playing field rules are.
 13 On the issue of sexual harassment, it
 14 seems the guidance is very clear. It's typically a zero-
 15 tolerance thing. So I think in that area the Air Force
 16 has done very well.
 17 In terms of the possible concern about
 18 disparity of treatment that, say, more senior people get
 19 off easier or between ranks, when I was on the Air Staff
 20 before going to Department of Defense, I spent three
 21 years in the General Law Division working on personnel
 22 policies and actions, so any officer administrative
 23 actions that were coming up in the Air Force I had the

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1 opportunity to review. Also, I spent about two years
 2 reviewing any inquiry or investigation of alleged
 3 misconduct on the part of senior officials, general
 4 officers and SES.
 5 I can say from that experience that I
 6 believe there is an extremely high level of
 7 accountability and responsibility for senior officers.
 8 And if there is a disparity between seniors-get-off and
 9 enlisted or lower-ranking people don't, I think a lot of
 10 it is just that they're not aware of the consequences and
 11 the actions that have been taken against the senior
 12 people.
 13 And in terms of the data response that the
 14 services made to the requests from this Commission, I
 15 would invite your attention to that section that showed
 16 the "senior official unfavorable information" files and I
 17 think it shows that commanders, senior people, are tough
 18 against other senior people. If you looked at the
 19 Article 15 data and the court-martial data, the more
 20 senior the person, the more likely the severity of the
 21 punishment.
 22 That's, I'm sure, more than my five
 23 minutes. Thank you.

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1 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: Good morning, Madam
 2 Chair and members of the Commission. I'm Captain Gerald
 3 Kirkpatrick, JAG Corps, U.S. Navy, Retired, legal
 4 consultant to the Commission. My C.V. has been provided
 5 to the Commission and I'm a signatory to the main legal
 6 consultants' report which I helped prepare.
 7 Like my colleagues, my Navy career started
 8 at an early age. I joined the Naval Reserve at the age
 9 of seventeen, left for boot camp the day after I
 10 graduated from high school, spent two years at sea on an
 11 aircraft carrier, running around the flight deck, being
 12 hit by jet blasts without protective clothing in those
 13 days, and being almost knocked over the side —
 14 fortunately into netting — by an Air Force exchange
 15 officer who was serving with our squadron when he turned
 16 the wrong way on the flight deck. But he was a great
 17 guy, though.
 18 So I spent two years on active duty, left
 19 active duty, and I joined the police department in
 20 Philadelphia where I'm from originally; fraternized with
 21 a female police officer, we married, and we're married
 22 for thirty-two years. And then —
 23 MR. RENNE: And then had to leave the

1 police force.
 2 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: And left. And then
 3 I resigned. Right, then I resigned.
 4 I resigned, finished college, went to law
 5 school, and spent twenty-one years on active duty as a
 6 naval judge advocate, six of my years in naval service
 7 having been spent at sea in an all-male environment on
 8 combatants.
 9 I just want to make one point about
 10 training. All my officer training, including basic
 11 officer training, was gender-integrated. So the Navy's
 12 been doing this for quite some time and, based on the
 13 data that has been provided to us and my own twenty-one
 14 years experience and observations as a judge advocate,
 15 getting better at it all the time.
 16 My last tour on active duty, as was
 17 pointed out, I served as Director of Legal Policy in Ed
 18 Dorin's office, Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and
 19 Readiness. In that capacity, I was a counsel to DACOWITS
 20 for two years; attended their quarterly meetings, served
 21 on their committee dealing with training issues.
 22 Just one point, if I may, since we are on
 23 the record, with regard to a process issue. I was the —

1 Among us consultants, I was the main recipient of Navy
 2 data. It did take us a few tries to get what we needed,
 3 but my view is that we got almost everything we needed.
 4 I understand why we did not get what we needed. There
 5 are some systemic problems in the data collection area.
 6 We addressed those in the report and we hope we'll get
 7 some support out of the Commission on that.
 8 I'd like to thank the Judge Advocate
 9 General of the Navy, John Hudson, with whom I served for
 10 many years and know well. He gave me a lot of time. He
 11 made his deputy available, and he made the legal counsel
 12 to the Chief of Naval Personnel, Captain Bill DeCicco,
 13 who I know has testified before your Commission,
 14 available. We had lengthy discussions, fruitful
 15 discussions, and they shared some very important insights
 16 with me which I tried to incorporate into those sections
 17 of the report which I wrote.
 18 How is the Navy doing in the area of
 19 gender integration? Well, based on the data that we
 20 have, the Navy's working through it. And again, you
 21 know, I stand by my comment — the Navy has been doing
 22 this for a long time.
 23 Jim mentioned to me yesterday there was

1 some interest in the Commission on the part — or I
 2 should say concerning the Owens v. Brown case. I don't
 3 know if you've gotten a dump on that. I've prepared a
 4 little something on that which I'd be happy to make
 5 available.
 6 MR. RENNE: Just briefly, that was the
 7 case that the Navy was sued over their policy of total
 8 prohibition on females aboard ships at sea. And they
 9 were sued on that. It was in the District Court of D.C.
 10 It was overturned as unconstitutional and the regulation
 11 was changed accordingly. It was totally wiped away and
 12 it was allowed.
 13 And Jerry was in the Navy at the time and
 14 remembers that. So if there's any questions on that,
 15 he's researched it.
 16 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: I've got a little
 17 one-page brief sheet I'll be happy to make available to
 18 the Commission.
 19 One comment — And I think, you know, I'd
 20 have to give the Navy high marks on this. The Marine
 21 Corps as well. I think it's part of the tradition of the
 22 naval service on how regulations are promulgated.
 23 The Navy is very highly centralized in the

1 area of promulgating regulations. And so when you look
 2 at the areas of sexual harassment, adultery, generally
 3 rights and responsibilities of servicemembers, you have
 4 very strong guidance being given at the most senior level
 5 if you'll look at the SECNAV Instructions and the OPNAV
 6 Instructions in this area.
 7 And what you'll see as you go down the
 8 chain of command, in some cases you'll see portions of
 9 the directives from higher authority actually appended to
 10 the local implementing instructions and say, you know,
 11 "do what the enclosure says to do," with amplifying
 12 guidance on how to implement that particular directive at
 13 the local command level.
 14 In the instances where the portions of the
 15 directives from higher authority are not actually
 16 appended to the local implementing directives, there is a
 17 very liberal lift in language from the directives of
 18 higher authority and they are quoted most often verbatim,
 19 sometimes paraphrased, again with the tailored portions
 20 of the local implementing directives for carrying out the
 21 policy at the local command level.
 22 Where the Navy, quite frankly, is not
 23 deserving of a real high mark — and, you know, this is

1 no surprise. We saw it come to work as we tried to
 2 collect the data — is in the area of data collection,
 3 and we make some recommendations in there that some
 4 consideration be given to developing standardized,
 5 computer-based systems for collecting the data that we
 6 all know, you know, we need.
 7 And those of us around the table here who
 8 have served in the Office of Legal Policy at the OSD
 9 level, you know, have a feel for how important it is from
 10 the standpoint of managing the Department of Defense that
 11 some of this data be collected and acted upon in policy
 12 formation.
 13 I'd like to just share with the Commission
 14 what some of the data that was made available to me
 15 showed in the area of offenses having to do with gender
 16 integration. If we're talking officer and enlisted,
 17 we're talking about a violation of Article 133 of the
 18 UCMJ, "conduct unbecoming an officer."
 19 Orders violations. Charlie mentioned the
 20 NIMITZ instruction, which, by the way, is fairly typical
 21 aboard ship now where you have both sexes represented in
 22 the ship's crew — is that there are regulations about
 23 being behind a locked door of a compartment with a member

1 of the opposite sex unless there's a good reason for it.
 2 Obviously skiffs and that sort of thing
 3 where you have, you know, classified material, restricted
 4 access bases, are another matter. But, generally
 5 speaking, you'll find these shipboard regulations with a
 6 high degree of consistency on the subject of how to live
 7 together, you know, aboard ship.
 8 And again, as I read these instructions —
 9 I retired from active duty in 1995. The Navy has come a
 10 long way in the intervening three years in working
 11 through, you know, how to integrate crews aboard ship.
 12 And, of course, anyone familiar with the Navy knows, I
 13 mean, that's where the real Navy is. The Navy is
 14 organized, trained and equipped for prompt and sustained
 15 combat at sea. The emphasis is on the afloat forces.
 16 Now, the data with regard to the offenses
 17 that are implicated in gender integration show that at
 18 least based on the data provided — you know, it's not a
 19 scientific sample. It's a broad sampling from
 20 CINCLANTFLT commands. Not only Naval Base Norfolk, but
 21 operational commands that are home-based in Norfolk and
 22 deploy.
 23 The most offenders are in the pay grades

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1 of E-4 and E-5. It's almost like a bell-shaped curve,
 2 you know, if you look at it. Then you start going down,
 3 then you find the E-7's. Not too many E-8's and E-9's,
 4 but there are E-7's represented in the sample. And then,
 5 interesting enough, when you get down below E-3, there is
 6 a little smattering of — below E-4, correction — a few
 7 smatterings of E-3, and then an interesting
 8 representation of offenders in pay grade E-1.
 9 But the documents that we had were kind of
 10 spotty sometimes in terms of what blocks were filled out.
 11 But from the documents we have, when you look at the E-1
 12 cases, there was an interesting representation of
 13 offenders who were E-1 before they committed that
 14 offense, which meant they were recidivists. You know,
 15 they had a history which caused them to have reductions
 16 in pay grade.
 17 Punishments consisted in reduction in
 18 grade, forfeiture of pay, and sometimes restriction.
 19 This is for offenses not involving any kind of violence.
 20 Inject violence into the offense, and then those cases
 21 resulted in confinement and a punitive discharge, as well
 22 as reduction in grade and a forfeiture of pay.
 23 On the officer side, the Navy provided 187

1 cases summaries involving offenses of conduct unbecoming
 2 an officer, adultery and fraternization.
 3 Now, all of these offenses, of course,
 4 were not present in every case, but at least one and in
 5 most cases more. There were multiple offenses. These
 6 are — as my colleagues and co-consultants pointed out,
 7 these offenses usually go together.
 8 Of the 187 cases, 96 resulted in
 9 separation. All at the flag level, and most at the O-1
 10 and O-2 levels.
 11 MS. POPE: Can I — 96 cases of
 12 separation, most at the flag level, and this is —
 13 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: No, no. No, I'm
 14 sorry.
 15 MS. POPE: Okay.
 16 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: Let me clarify that.
 17 Of the 187 case summaries the Navy provided — okay? — I
 18 went through them and 96 of the 187 resulted in some form
 19 of separation.
 20 MS. POPE: Okay.
 21 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: Either an early
 22 retirement, a resignation in lieu of a board of inquiry
 23 or court-martial, or separation pursuant to a board of

1 inquiry. So —
 2 MS. POPE: But then you said the majority
 3 of those were flag officers.
 4 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: No. In every flag
 5 case there was —
 6 MS. POPE: Oh, in every flag case. Okay.
 7 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: In every flag case,
 8 the flag officer was gone.
 9 MS. POPE: Because I thought...
 10 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: Out of the 187 cases
 11 — okay? — everyone at the flag level resulted in
 12 separation of the flag officer, and most — overwhelming
 13 majority — at the O-1 and the O-2 levels where those
 14 flag officers serve as probationary officers.
 15 So they were on probation. You know, they
 16 were saying, "Well, you know, we're going to look you
 17 over, you're going to look us over, and if you don't do
 18 the job right, you're out." And so it's somewhat
 19 understandable when you plug in that dimension that these
 20 were probationary officers, that there would be such a
 21 high level of separation for those officers.
 22 About half of the O-3's and O-4's were
 23 separated as a result of reported offenses in the sample,

1 and about one-third of the O-5 and O-6 cases, you know,
 2 in the Navy.
 3 Now, when you control for pay grade —
 4 Again, you know, I'm not a statistician but, I mean, this
 5 is, you know, just, you know, my review of the data. But
 6 when you control — when I control for pay grade, it
 7 appeared to me that the separation rates for men and
 8 women officers were about equal.
 9 Now, at the O-1 — This was an interesting
 10 data point for me. I was surprised until I looked and I
 11 saw the commands represented. At the O-1 and O-2 pay
 12 grades, women officer offenders slightly outnumbered
 13 their male counterparts. But there was a
 14 disproportionate number of medical community cases in the
 15 sample, so that might explain it because of the
 16 hospitals. You have the clusters of junior women
 17 officers.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Those are absolute numbers?
 19 There were more women —
 20 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: In the sample. In
 21 the sample provided. You'll look at the numbers,
 22 slightly higher for women at the O-1 and O-2 levels. But
 23 then I went back and — I said, you know, what's this? I

1 went back and I looked at the cases, where these cases
 2 emanated from, and the medical community was
 3 disproportionately represented in the sample.
 4 If I could just make a couple quick
 5 comments on two other areas and then I'll wrap, because I
 6 don't — you know, I don't want to take up too much time
 7 here as well — at the risk of being corrected, which I
 8 would welcome, actually, by my colleagues and co-
 9 consultants, to try to get a handle on something that was
 10 discussed early on.
 11 And that is, whether or not there's any
 12 disparity in treatment grade-wise concerning the adultery
 13 cases in the Navy that we're talking about. The one
 14 where you had — There was some surprise mentioned when
 15 there was an adultery case involving senior officer-
 16 senior enlisted. The senior officer got hammered and
 17 nothing happened to the senior enlisted.
 18 I would have to say that based on — And
 19 I'd have to go back and look. I have that data in here
 20 and I actually read through all these things pretty
 21 carefully.
 22 Based on my experience as a naval judge
 23 advocate and, again, six years at sea — okay? — I would

1 have to say that that's got to be an aberration. That is
 2 not the norm. And to try to put some legal structure on
 3 what we're talking about at that point of the discussion,
 4 the way military law — the UCMJ — is made up — okay?
 5 — there are elements of offenses and you either have the
 6 elements of the offense present or you don't. And if you
 7 have the elements of the offense present, then you've got
 8 a basis for a conviction of that offense.
 9 Okay. Then what comes into play are what
 10 are known as matters in either aggravation or extenuation
 11 and mitigation — what makes this misconduct so important
 12 vis-a-vis other types of misconduct or other infractions
 13 of the same article of the UCMJ? Well, one of the things
 14 that would make it very, very important is the status of
 15 the individuals involved.
 16 So when you have someone involved in an
 17 adulterous act, for example, or an adulterous
 18 relationship, who is senior versus the co-actor who is
 19 junior — okay? — not only do you have the potential
 20 aggravating factor of maybe some influence of rank — And
 21 I would have to respectfully, you know, differ a little
 22 bit with Charlie on this one. I think when you have an
 23 adulterous relationship and you have a disparity in rank,

1 that's — in the military culture, particularly the Navy
 2 and Marine Corps, that's out there some where. That
 3 doesn't go — I mean, based on my experience. I'm just
 4 saying again in my years as a naval judge advocate and
 5 time in operational commands. It doesn't go away.

6 I mean, the relationship gets more
 7 familiar; the more familiar it gets, the more familiar
 8 the interaction, you know, between the parties. But I
 9 don't believe it — again, based on my experience — that
 10 it ever really goes away. In most cases it's there and I
 11 think it's significant.

12 On the issue of — Did I cover my point?
 13 Yeah. So you've got that. So you've got the potential
 14 for some undue influence there.

15 But equally as significant — at least in
 16 my mind when you're talking about an offense involving
 17 the disparity between rank — not only on the part of the
 18 senior partner in that relationship do you have the
 19 difficulty of potential undue influence, you also have
 20 the difficulty of a breach of trust and confidence that
 21 goes with that senior person's level of authority, and
 22 that's something that I at least believe — again, based
 23 on my experience again, which is within the culture

1 officer the Navy and Marine Corps — is significant and
 2 must be significant in looking at these offenses.

3 Finally, if I can just comment on two
 4 other things. With regard to gender-integrated basic
 5 training, the data that we have, my informal polling on
 6 this issue — because I knew it was one of importance —
 7 is that it's not easy but it's working; it's getting
 8 better. The Navy is learning a lot of lessons as it goes
 9 on with the experience. Commanding officers and
 10 commanders have the authority, they have the experience,
 11 they have the knowledge to make it work, and there are
 12 some very good reasons for making it work.

13 On the other hand, if it's not working,
 14 then I would hope that the leaders of the naval service
 15 — particularly the Navy, since the Marine Corps doesn't
 16 do it — they would be forthright with you and come
 17 forward in telling you and say, "Look, this is not
 18 working. We've studied this hard. We've really pulled
 19 the string on it. In our view, it can't work." I don't
 20 think you've seen that, at least based on the inputs that
 21 I'm getting.

22 Then on adultery, there's only one comment
 23 that I'd like to make because we've kind of worked this

1 issue — not to death, because it is an important issue.
 2 If you look at the history of how this OSD initiative
 3 arose, it did arise in reaction to a drum beat by the
 4 media over these cases.

5 The issue is, you know, is it necessary?
 6 My view on it: no, it's not necessary. General Cuthbert
 7 pointed out it's probably harmless. At least one can
 8 make the argument it's harmless because as a practical
 9 matter, when you get down to individual cases, when you
 10 have an adultery alone offense, chances are that's not
 11 going to result in a dishonorable discharge anyway, and
 12 the reduction in punishment that's in the proposal is
 13 from a dishonorable to a bad conduct discharge.

14 But —
 15 DR. MOSKOS: I thought that was dropped —
 16 that part of it.

17 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: It's still in the...

18 MR. RENNE: It's still unclear.

19 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: I believe
 20 it's still in the —

21 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: It's in our
 22 submissions, I'll put it to you that way, Dr. Moskos.

23 The point that I'd like to make and my

1 closing point —
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: The part that
 3 I know was dropped was the service-discrediting change,
 4 the change that would have eliminated that as one of the
 5 bases where you could charge adultery.

6 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: Okay. But maybe
 7 that's just something we — Our submissions still show
 8 that as being in there; that change in the reduction in
 9 punishment, if you will, as it's sometimes labeled.

10 Some say that it might be impossible to
 11 prevent adultery in the military. I don't believe that.
 12 You're not going to prevent it in all cases. I saw an
 13 interesting tape by this Ph.D. who writes books and does
 14 tapes and all on family and marriage and family and that
 15 sort of thing, and he characterized an adulterous
 16 relationship as starting with the "tingles." Okay? And
 17 that kind of term just kind of stuck with me.

18 I don't think you're ever going to
 19 eliminate the tingles, no matter what you do. But one
 20 principle I think that is overriding and I think we can
 21 all agree on is in the military community, in the
 22 military culture, what gets emphasized gets done. Okay?
 23 You make an item one of high command interest, it's going

1 to get attended to, and there is a potential for doing
 2 that in the military services.

3 When I went through the Navy directives, I
 4 found very thick directives on sexual harassment. Very
 5 thick directives. And the ones on sexual harassment,
 6 lots of examples, red lights, green lights. I mean, it
 7 was all laid out there. Sexual harassment, the same
 8 thing. Great amplification on the policies and so on.

9 You get into adultery, it's either not
 10 mentioned at all — it was mentioned in less than five
 11 percent of our sample — either not mentioned at all, if
 12 it's mentioned, it gets a sentence or two. It says
 13 "adultery is prohibited by the UC MJ," and some of the
 14 directives will define adultery. It will say, "This is
 15 what adultery is." That's it. End of discussion.

16 When you look at it, in addition to the
 17 personal tragedy involved in the offense of adultery, the
 18 family tragedies, there's also a down side for military;
 19 because when you look at these cases, particularly the
 20 celebrated cases involving very senior personnel — okay?
 21 — what do you find here? You find early termination of
 22 that individual's career. You find flag officers who
 23 could have served for another three, four, five, six

1 years. You find senior colonels and Navy captains who
 2 could have served for several more years, who have
 3 talent, who have experience, who have knowledge, and the
 4 service loses that.

5 So there's a good reason for the services
 6 to go after that, and one of the ways you do it is you
 7 simply sensitize the issue. You tell them that, you
 8 know, adultery is not going to be tolerated. They
 9 already know that. Our polling shows everybody knows
 10 what adultery is. But what our data don't show and none
 11 of the instructions seem to emphasize is the career-
 12 termination factor.

13 This — Just like a collision at sea can
 14 ruin a sailor's whole day, an act of adultery, you know,
 15 can ruin a senior officer's career, and the service loses
 16 that senior officer's expertise and talents garnered over
 17 a long period of service, in addition to all the family
 18 and personal tragedies that go along with it.

19 They're the comments I have, Madam Chair.
 20 Thank you.

21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. I'll tell you
 22 what I'd like to do is if we can finish up with Hank and
 23 then take a break.

<p style="text-align: center;">Page 98</p> <p>1 And, Hank, we're waiting on you to be able 2 to take our break. No pressure. 3 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: What I will 4 do is go down some of my observations, articulate them, 5 and then if you have questions, you can follow-up after 6 the break. 7 By way of introduction, I want to say that 8 the distinguishing point between me and my colleagues is 9 that my military career was singularly mediocre. 10 Let's talk first about adultery. I think 11 this is a bad time to change the adultery situation. It 12 sends a wrong signal to military families. Military 13 families are under enough stress right now with the 14 gender integration and the various issues raised by it. 15 Adultery is essentially a crime against the family and I 16 don't think it should be tinkered with at this point. 17 The reason adultery is charged in addition 18 to other offenses is quite simply so that it becomes then 19 a vehicle for the prosecutor to have access to the wife 20 to testify against the husband. The spousal immunity 21 under the rules of evidence disappears when you can make 22 the spouse the victim, and that's why it's charged so 23 much. So it's more of a tactical thing. There's no</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 101</p> <p>1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Is it just 2 black? 3 DR. CANTOR: — across all services? Did 4 you all find that — 5 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: I only 6 studied — I only did the Army. 7 DR. CANTOR: Do you agree with with that? 8 MR. GITTINS: From my point of view, it 9 was difficult to ascertain that from the data we were 10 provided. But I would say that my personal experience — 11 DR. CANTOR: From the Navy, did you find 12 that? 13 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: We didn't get race 14 data because they don't collect it centrally. 15 DR. CANTOR: It's a very serious 16 allegation, so we need some, you know — 17 COLONEL ABBEY: Yes, it is. 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I note, too, that it's 19 extra-statutory in our case. You know, we went ahead and 20 pursued it because we had some interest from — 21 DR. CANTOR: I understand. I didn't raise 22 it. He did. 23 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — commissioners as well</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 99</p> <p>1 reason to dicker with it right now. 2 With respect to Army fraternization 3 policy, I see no reason why the Army needs to be 4 different, separate and distinct from all the other 5 services. If it's good for the Marines, a land force, 6 and the various other services which the Army coordinates 7 with and runs operations and training with, joint 8 operations, I don't see why the Army needs its own 9 special dispensation for fraternization. Every other 10 service can make it work, and there's no articulable 11 reason why the Army can't make it work either. 12 I'd like to talk about what I think is the 13 guts of what the Commission asked us to look at, and 14 that's 562.(a)(2), "unequal treatment." I believe there 15 is unequal treatment. I believe there's unequal 16 treatment with respect to three characteristics: sex, 17 rank and race. I don't know the reasons for the unequal 18 treatment on race but it's there and everybody knows it's 19 there, and the NCO's know it's there. And I don't know 20 how to find out why, but it's there. 21 Now, you have a situation in any unit 22 where you have unequal treatment and it is going to 23 dramatically affect military readiness. If you have, as</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 102</p> <p>1 as, you know, the fact that it's another one of those 2 headline things; that it would be a little odd to look at 3 these without at least acknowledging that issue. 4 DR. CANTOR: I understand. I just want to 5 get the data. 6 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: And I would 7 tell you you've got two Army lawyers here and you have 8 two different opinions on that issue. 9 MS. POPE: Well, then I would just ask a 10 question. 11 DR. CANTOR: Well, I think that's 12 important for the record. 13 MS. POPE: As you got the information, was 14 it broken down by — 15 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Some, but 16 not all, say that's — 17 MS. POPE: I mean, I would think we'd 18 almost have to go back and get it broken down; because if 19 you're talking about drill sergeants, there's a 20 disproportionate number of African Americans who are 21 drill sergeants, so that would skew the number. I mean, 22 I think we'd have to go back to make sure what the 23 numbers represent.</p>
<p>0100</p> <p>1 I did when I came in post-Vietnam when there were 2 significant racial tensions — if you had 20 percent of 3 your unit or 15 percent of your unit thinking that they 4 were not getting a fair shake day-in and day-out, you're 5 going to have riots; you're going to have fraggings; 6 you're going to have people shot in the back; you're 7 going to have equipment in the motor pool intentionally 8 sabotaged. It is going to be the out-working of great 9 discontent. 10 So I don't know what the reason is for 11 that aspect of unequal treatment, but it's perceived as 12 existing and I believe it in fact does exist. 13 MR. PANG: Unequal treatment with — 14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: With respect 15 to race. 16 MR. PANG: — with regard to race. 17 Meaning blacks get more — you know, more severe 18 punishment? 19 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Yeah. 20 Blacks are — The rate of black prosecutions for gender- 21 related crimes substantially exceeds that of the rate of 22 whites. 23 DR. CANTOR: Is that true —</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 103</p> <p>1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Could we move on towards 2 our break without — 3 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Sure. 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We'll save the discussion 5 for afterwards. 6 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Now, with 7 respect to that, I throw that out simply because somebody 8 needs to look at it. 9 Now, with respect to gender and rank, I 10 believe that the officer corps is being properly examined 11 and punished in the Army, but I believe there's a 12 disproportionate — I believe there's an inherent 13 inequity in the manner in which drill sergeants — who 14 are male, by and large — are punished in relation to the 15 female soldiers-in-training with whom they have 16 consensual regulatory sexual or gender violations. 17 And I believe that the Army has taken in 18 certain instances an up-front decision never, in some 19 installations, to punish the female soldier-in-training 20 but will, at the same time, court-martial the male drill 21 sergeant for consensual sexual acts. 22 I've cited there in my separate opinion — 23 and you can see it involving five of the Army submissions</p>

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1 — a regulation which says that these gender policies do
 2 not apply to soldiers-in-training.
 3 Now, the Judge Advocate General can tell
 4 you that that's gender-neutral because it doesn't apply
 5 to male or female soldiers-in-training. That's like
 6 saying that all bald-headed trial lawyers are disbarred
 7 and it's gender-neutral. You know, only males are bald-
 8 headed. So let's use some common sense here.

9 DR. CANTOR: I'm sorry, I really didn't
 10 understand that.

11 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Okay.

12 There's a regulation that says that it will not serve as
 13 —

14 DR. CANTOR: I understood the regulation.
 15 But why is that not gender-neutral?

16 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Well, it's
 17 not gender-neutral in its application. It's gender-
 18 neutral only on its face, for when you go behind you,
 19 you're taking a characteristic that applies
 20 disproportionately to one group.

21 DR. CANTOR: But —

22 MS. POPE: Yeah. I mean, there are cases
 23 where female drill sergeants —

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1 And you have then a regulation that says
 2 if you have a consensual sexual or gender violation, only
 3 the drill sergeant, which is almost always the male, will
 4 be punished. That is inherently unfair to the drill
 5 sergeant. Moreover, it says that the girl cannot handle
 6 herself and she's not responsible —

7 DR. CANTOR: Excuse me.

8 MS. POPE: Yeah. But wait a minute.

9 You're saying —

10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Can we save the argument
 11 until later? Just proceed with the briefing and then we
 12 —

13 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: So that's
 14 inherent.

15 And the standard in sexual harassment
 16 cases is not zero. It is a statistical one. You can't
 17 just say there's one, and then it eviscerates the
 18 argument, as some of you practice in sexual harassment.

19 So I think that needs to be looked at.

20 But I think the issue for this Commission is General
 21 Reimer's pronouncement that rank disparity absolves all
 22 further inquiry into unequal treatment.

23 Now, keep in mind, unequal treatment goes

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1 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Not many.

2 MS. POPE: Well, because there aren't
 3 many. But there are cases —

4 DR. CANTOR: Well, because there aren't —
 5 there aren't many.

6 MS. POPE: I mean, if you had no cases of
 7 a female drill instructor hitting on, for lack of a
 8 better word, a male —

9 DR. MOSKOS: Recruit.

10 MS. POPE: Recruit. Thank you.

11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Or a female.

12 MS. POPE: Or a female. Right. I mean,
 13 it goes both ways, for both genders.

14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Well, as you
 15 know —

16 MS. POPE: So what I'm saying is if you
 17 had zero statistics that there were no female drill
 18 instructors who had hit upon a male recruit, then I think
 19 there might be an argument that it's not gender-neutral.

20 But you do have cases. The Army has had cases of
 21 females. I mean, it's power. It is senior-to-junior.

22 And, I mean, the Chief of Staff yesterday
 23 said to us that there is no consensual — And I think the

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1 to morale and readiness and discipline within a unit and
 2 it is very, very important in a military situation.

3 All right. In line with that, I'd like to
 4 talk about General Reimer's taking the notion of
 5 constructive rape to the next level where even on
 6 consensual offenses there is constructive force, even
 7 when force isn't required, if there is a male, for
 8 instance, who outranks a female.

9 What this does, at some point it collapses
 10 of its own weight. It trivializes real rape by saying
 11 that, you know, an E-4 with an E-3, well, that's rape
 12 because they're of an unequal rank. At some point that
 13 trivializes real rape, and this is why General Cuthbert
 14 has requested the Commission look at the criminal laws in
 15 the states that pertain to sexual offenses — first
 16 through fourth degree sexual offenses, for instance —
 17 instead of calling date rape of post-coital remorse rape
 18 and making no distinction between it and what we would
 19 consider to be real rape.

20 My next point deals with bright line
 21 rules. In the Army, every installation has its own
 22 regulations which implement on a punitive basis gender
 23 policies. That means that the "no smile" rule at one

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1 Navy would agree with that, and I think all the services,
 2 if asked specifically, would say in the training
 3 environment there is not junior-to-senior. The senior —
 4 The instructor is god for most of these and that's part
 5 of the training experience.

6 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Well, I
 7 think that's the issue that this Commission has to
 8 grapple with. What this Commission — What General
 9 Reimer is saying is that the rank disparity takes away
 10 all responsibility from female soldiers-in-training, and
 11 that is out of touch —

12 DR. CANTOR: It's a gender-neutral
 13 regulation.

14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: These people
 15 are not all —

16 DR. CANTOR: It's a gender-neutral
 17 regulation.

18 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: No. These
 19 people are not off an Iowa farm. They're as precocious
 20 as any college student. They are — They know how to use
 21 sex appeal. They know how to get over in the training
 22 environment and they know how to entice men just like any
 23 college student does.

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1 installation would be okay — you could smile at another
 2 installation. Why, pray tell, would an engineer basic
 3 trainee — why should she be protected from smiling,
 4 whereas a signal corps trainee should not?

5 What we need is standardization throughout
 6 the Army on how we're going to have gender policies in
 7 the gender-integrated environment, if it remains, for all
 8 the policies. There's no rational reason to make it an
 9 ad hoc thing where you go from installation to
 10 installation.

11 Now, when you have different regulations
 12 pertaining to gender policies, it makes it impossible to
 13 train the regulations. Nobody knows what the rules are.
 14 If you had a centralized policy — and TRADOC has many
 15 centralized policies, down to the fifteen-minute
 16 increment of how you train someone in basic training.
 17 But they need to make their punitive gender violations
 18 regulations uniform as well throughout the Army.

19 Bright line rules. Soldiers understand
 20 those. They do not understand the nuances and the
 21 vagaries of one thing one day and one thing another.
 22 There's a lot of turbulence in this regard.

23 I believe that gender-integrated initial

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1 entry training is a mission distractor. Why is it a
 2 legal issue? Because gender integration has manifested
 3 itself in multiple punitive regulations which have
 4 resulted in courts-martial and nonjudicial punishment.
 5 All policies in our society implement
 6 themselves in law. At the gender-integrated initial
 7 entry training environment currently in the Army, you
 8 have three great mission distractors. One, the sexual
 9 attraction between soldiers-in-training — male private,
 10 female private. Two, the inherent problems between male
 11 drill sergeant and female soldier-in-training. And
 12 three, everybody running around trying to implement all
 13 these convoluted rules which change almost on a monthly
 14 basis.
 15 All these things are nonproductive to the
 16 product that you're trying to get, which is a trained
 17 soldier who can then go out and perform a defense
 18 mission. I believe that gender-integrated initial entry
 19 training is not required except to further a political
 20 ideology.
 21 Those are my comments, and they're set
 22 forth as well in my separate report. And at your
 23 leisure, I'll answer any questions.

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1 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. Thank you all
 2 very much. We will take a break and come back at a
 3 quarter-of. Thank you.
 4 (A brief recess was taken.)
 5 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. We have a limited
 6 amount of time. We have a lot of experience and legal
 7 firepower here at our disposal for a limited amount of
 8 time and I want to try to get to everybody's questions
 9 and try to make this a useful and productive experience
 10 for the commissioners here so that next week, when we get
 11 the chance to argue and state our opinions as fully and
 12 forcefully as we want to, we will be well-informed.
 13 So I want to request that questions be, if
 14 at all possible, aimed at factual and informational
 15 matters. If you are requesting an opinion from our
 16 experts, please say you're requesting his opinion, and we
 17 will all take due note that it is that expert's opinion;
 18 it is not imputed to any of the commissioners or, indeed,
 19 any of the other experts unless they specifically sign on
 20 to it.
 21 I know a lot of people have a lot of
 22 questions and I will just ask that we try to keep the
 23 questions brief. Try to avoid speechifying if you can

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1 because, again, the speeches are to be made among the
 2 commissioners and we will, I promise, have time for that
 3 next week. But let's make the best use we can of the
 4 availability of these experts.
 5 Just a side point. Jim has a two-pager on
 6 the Owens case that was mentioned yesterday in case that
 7 is of curiosity to anybody. We're just going to pass out
 8 that paper and you can read it at your leisure.
 9 So we'll do the questioning now. And
 10 again, I would just ask everybody to try to be succinct.
 11 I will also ask the consultants that if
 12 there is a piece of your prepared remarks that responds
 13 to it, maybe the quick response might be to refer us to
 14 that Page or something like that and we can take note of
 15 it and then move on. Again, I want to get in everybody's
 16 questions as much as we can, so please keep that in mind.
 17 I won't take up any more time. I will
 18 waive my question and start with Fred.
 19 MR. PANG: Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
 20 I just want to, as a matter of clarity —
 21 You know, there are two issues that were addressed in
 22 your briefings to us this morning. One has to do with
 23 the fraternization policy and the other one has to do

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1 with the adultery policy that is being considered in the
 2 Office of the Secretary of Defense, which has not been,
 3 as far as I know at this point in time, implemented.
 4 They're in the process of doing that.
 5 And it's my understanding from the
 6 briefing you gave us and my quick read of what you've
 7 presented, that it is the majority opinion that with
 8 regard to the fraternization policy you don't see any
 9 need for that. I mean, I know there's a minority view,
 10 but you don't see any need for that. And with regard to
 11 the second part of it, which is the adultery part of it,
 12 that the majority opinion is that you don't see any need
 13 for that as well.
 14 Is that correct? Is my understanding
 15 correct?
 16 COLONEL ABBEY: Three out of the five
 17 indicated on adultery there's no need —
 18 MR. PANG: Right.
 19 COLONEL ABBEY: — for any change. And
 20 then on the fraternization policy, I think it allowed the
 21 services to —
 22 MR. PANG: Yeah. You know, I mean, what's
 23 the vote among you all? Because —

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1 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: I think it's four to
 2 — it's four to one on the latter, isn't it?
 3 MS. POPE: On fraternization?
 4 MR. PANG: Four to one on fraternization.
 5 Okay.
 6 MR. GITTINS: The services should be free
 7 to promulgate their own policy based on their own service
 8 needs.
 9 MR. PANG: Right. Okay. You know, the
 10 other thing — and I'll cease after that and move on
 11 quickly —
 12 DR. MOSKOS: Who's the one minority on
 13 that?
 14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: I am.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: You are.
 16 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: I think the
 17 bright line rules.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 19 MR. PANG: — is that, you know, as we
 20 have — as I listened to the briefing and as I went
 21 through the paper, basically what you're doing is you're
 22 making, you know, recommendations or observations and
 23 findings with regard to, one, a legal analysis, and

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1 making legal recommendations on the one hand, and on the
 2 other, policy recommendations.
 3 And I think, you know, what would be
 4 helpful to us is if you would take this, you know, paper
 5 — and, you know, you've done a lot of work on this,
 6 there's no question about it — and try to break that
 7 out, you know, so that when we talk about this, we know
 8 what are the policy recommendations and what are kind of
 9 the legal recommendations, because they're kind of all
 10 mixed in there now and it's kind of hard to decipher as
 11 you go through this thing, and then all of a sudden you
 12 see a sentence and it creates, you know, some angst among
 13 us.
 14 So, you know, I was hoping, Madam Chair,
 15 that we could instruct them to do that.
 16 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I think the miracle of
 17 word processing —
 18 MR. PANG: Can do that.
 19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: — should allow us to do
 20 that and I'll ask Jim to work with it.
 21 MR. RENNE: Very briefly, the task of the
 22 consultants — it's difficult to divorce those two in
 23 this context because there's no real legal issue before

1 the consultants. A legal issue would be a matter of
 2 what's the status of federal law —
 3 MR. PANG: No. But, I mean, the legal
 4 analysis of the application —
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Can I make
 6 a recommendation?
 7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah.
 8 MR. PANG: — of this thing is one part,
 9 and the other part —
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I support
 11 what Mr. Pang has indicated. It would be very helpful in
 12 one sheet, or if it has to be two, two. But as I look at
 13 the statute, the three things that you were required to
 14 look at, I think it really breaks out evenly as you have
 15 laws and regulations and you have policies and
 16 directives, and you made collectively some
 17 recommendations in those two areas.
 18 So if you could break it down for us and
 19 say the consultants — you know, four of us favor in the
 20 laws and regulations areas these things, one does not, we
 21 can go to what has been submitted, you know, to get the
 22 rationale or the reasoning. When we go to policies and
 23 directives, you know, by three to two or whatever it

1 might have been, you know, here's what we think about the
 2 fraternization policy; here's what we think — That just
 3 — Call it the score card, if you will. Call it, you
 4 know, the box score. I don't care.
 5 It just would be, I think, very helpful as
 6 we go into our deliberation.
 7 MS. POPE: I mean, I also think — and I
 8 want to add to that. All of you who were JAG's were
 9 asked throughout your careers to do that, to separate out
 10 what was strictly legal and what was your personal,
 11 professional advice to your client, and I guess that's
 12 what we're asking, you know, so we understand.
 13 And the vote is important to understand
 14 where each of you come from, and minority comments on
 15 that are helpful for us.
 16 Can we have this before we go next Friday
 17 — their comments — so we can discuss —
 18 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Yeah, I hope so. I'm not
 19 sure about availability but certainly I can work with Jim
 20 and, you know, we'll do our best to just reorganize the
 21 paper so that it's a little clearer.
 22 MR. PANG: You know, along the lines that
 23 General Christmas, you know, outlined, because we really

1 need to know where you all come from individually. I
 2 mean, that would be helpful — you know, who supports —
 3 because it makes a difference, I think.
 4 MR. RENNE: Would it be okay to get back
 5 and report that to the — by next weekend?
 6 DR. CANTOR: Yes.
 7 MR. RENNE: Okay.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: It would be
 9 helpful.
 10 DR. CANTOR: It would be very helpful.
 11 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: And this is not to
 12 denigrate the efforts to turn this out.
 13 MR. PANG: No. I mean, you had a very
 14 short time.
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: I am thrilled to get
 16 thirty pages on this and I know that you had to work very
 17 hard and put aside other things in order to do it.
 18 MR. PANG: And I must say, you know, this
 19 is a contentious issue and we know that. I mean, you
 20 know, there's contention among yourselves; there's going
 21 to be contention among us, I'm almost certain of that.
 22 And, you know, your work —
 23 DR. CANTOR: No.

1 MR. PANG: — you know, I think, is going
 2 to be very, very helpful if you can kind of lay it out
 3 that way for us.
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Bill.
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well,
 6 notwithstanding, I'm satisfied with the report as it is.
 7 And I don't have a specific question, but
 8 I would like to comment in support of the testimony of
 9 John Miller and General Trefry on training. I think
 10 clearly the fact of taking the regular officer
 11 establishment out of the legal process the last twenty
 12 years has hurt immeasurably, you know, discipline,
 13 morale, and everything. And I don't know how you go
 14 about getting that back in, but clearly I think that's
 15 been a factor.
 16 I mean, when I was a young guy, I acted as
 17 defense counsel and trial counsel; so you really get a
 18 feel for this stuff early on and you get a feel what in
 19 fact you should do later on as a commanding officer,
 20 commanding general, when you make these decisions. These
 21 kids aren't getting this experience today.
 22 So I think your point is well made and I
 23 think I would like to see this Commission make some kind

1 of statement on that.
 2 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: All right. In the
 3 interest of time, I'll ask you guys not to react, but
 4 pass on to the next question. Thank you.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: I have two factual questions.
 6 We were told in an earlier meeting that adultery is
 7 defined in the military as sexual intercourse as opposed
 8 to oral sex or sex — I don't know if that — You know,
 9 is anal sex sexual intercourse? What's your
 10 understanding of what constitutes adultery?
 11 MR. GITTINS: Sexual intercourse in the
 12 conventional sense defines the act that constitutes
 13 adultery. Other sexual offenses are dealt with in the
 14 sodomy statute —
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Is oral sex considered
 16 sodomy?
 17 MR. GITTINS: It is.
 18 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 19 MR. GITTINS: Anal or oral sex is sodomy
 20 under the military statute, and that is separate — That
 21 is not adultery. That's separately punished. The
 22 maximum sentence for consensual sodomy is five years.
 23 The maximum sentence for adultery is one year.

1 DR. MOSKOS: Oh, so sodomy is worse than
 2 adultery.
 3 MR. GITTINS: Yes.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 5 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: For your
 6 report, you may want to also note that sex with animals
 7 is sodomy.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 9 MR. MOORE: What kind of animal? Is there
 10 a gradation in the animal?
 11 DR. MOSKOS: How about the ugly one? You
 12 know the old joke about the sheep on the island. But,
 13 anyway...
 14 The other question I wanted to ask was —
 15 because there was some controversy here — this Fort
 16 Jackson regulation that says trainees shall — you know,
 17 we've had some discussion as to what exactly that means
 18 — that no trainee in a gender-related situation can be
 19 punished vis-a-vis a superior, you know, drill sergeant.
 20 Is that your understanding? That this is
 21 a regulation that exists at Fort Jackson?
 22 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Yes. It's
 23 Fort Jackson Reg 600-3. And the latest version, however,

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1 does invite people to go to the SJA and see if there's a
 2 way to avoid that, but it's not practiced.
 3 The immunity is granted in the regulation,
 4 and I believe that the reason for it is to obtain the
 5 cooperation of the female trainee. In other words, if
 6 she's read her rights — she makes a complaint or it
 7 comes to somebody's attention there was consensual sexual
 8 violations, and she's read her rights and she clams up,
 9 there's no case.
 10 Well, what this has the effect of doing is
 11 giving a blanket, up-front immunity, and the female
 12 trainees know this. So they basically know that by
 13 regulation, unless an exception is triggered — an
 14 extraordinary exception — they cannot get in trouble for
 15 getting on a drill sergeant.
 16 DR. MOSKOS: Do you know if there have
 17 been any punishments of a female trainee of any sort —
 18 Article 15? I mean, I'm not talking about court-martial.
 19 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: There are
 20 punishments of female —
 21 DR. MOSKOS: I mean, a consensual
 22 relationship between a male sergeant and a female
 23 trainee. Has any woman been punished for that behavior

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1 in any form?
 2 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: I'm not
 3 aware of any. I'm sure there are at some point —
 4 DR. MOSKOS: You're sure there are. Okay.
 5 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: — but we
 6 didn't see any. I didn't see any.
 7 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. Thank you.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: May I have
 9 a follow-up just for clarification?
 10 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I thought I
 12 heard you say that — Has there been a change to that
 13 regulation? Could you explain that?
 14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Yes, sir.
 15 The former regulation basically said this regulation with
 16 respect to drill sergeant-female soldier or drill
 17 sergeant/soldier-in-training gender violations is not
 18 punitive toward the soldier-in-training. The latest
 19 iteration of that says, "However — I'm paraphrasing this
 20 — "However, see the SJA if we want to reverse that in
 21 this case. If you think you have a case where you want
 22 to..."
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay. So

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1 the regulation now has been changed to give another
 2 option? Is that a valid —
 3 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: To give an
 4 option, but —
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Is that a
 6 valid...
 7 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: By
 8 exception, you'd have to go up and talk to somebody about
 9 it and try to get an exception to it.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: So if I
 11 were — I can't remember. We went to every one of them
 12 and I can't remember. The equivalent — If I'm
 13 equivalent to the company commander or a series
 14 commander, whatever — okay? — at Jackson — what I
 15 heard you say now — it's not black-and-white anymore.
 16 If I have a case where I think the female recruit was
 17 egregious, that this was something else, I now have an
 18 option to seek —
 19 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Correct.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 21 Thank you.
 22 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Can I
 23 follow-up just — I wasn't going to do this but just for

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1 clarification now.
 2 It was my understanding — and I read the
 3 old policy, but it was my understanding that what was
 4 prohibited was the charging of the trainee with a charge
 5 under that policy that clearly laid out — It did not
 6 prohibit a commander from charging a trainee under other
 7 articles of the UCMJ. Is that a correct statement?
 8 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: I believe it
 9 is.
 10 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. So it
 11 only prohibited the charge of violating that regulation.
 12 It did not prohibit her from being charged for other
 13 violations of the UCMJ.
 14 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Right.
 15 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 16 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: But the
 17 violations in view here are like social relationships,
 18 talking, you know, which are defined only by that
 19 regulation.
 20 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I
 21 understand.
 22 MS. POPE: And this regulation only exists
 23 at Fort Jackson?

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1 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: To my
 2 knowledge, yes. That's in Volume V —
 3 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: You have the
 4 same dilemma at every installation, and so you have regs
 5 and practices that essentially do the kinds of things
 6 that Hank is describing. But, frankly, I see no harm in
 7 that. I mean, the evil you're trying to get at is the
 8 misuse of authority for a trainee.
 9 And it doesn't have to do with sex
 10 necessarily. It has to do with taking money from the
 11 trainee for being able to go get a haircut or —
 12 MS. POPE: Which is I think why the reg
 13 got started.
 14 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: — auctioning
 15 off drill sergeants' hats or — You know, you name the
 16 things that have gone on in training establishments over
 17 the existence of the American armed forces. And what you
 18 see after you get through with that is that you have to
 19 build a little protective cocoon around the trainee, and
 20 that's what that reg is.
 21 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And,
 22 General, another point for clarification. Those policies
 23 I believe are written by the general court-martial

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1 convening authority.
 2 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: That's right.
 3 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And I think
 4 that's important to know because in most cases that is a
 5 two-star post commander and the Army invests in that
 6 particular individual the responsibility to adjudicate
 7 justice on his or her installation.
 8 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: That's right.
 9 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: Well, one more clarification.
 11 When did this reg, do you think, at Fort Jackson start?
 12 Is this a gender-integrated — post gender-integrated
 13 thing, or has it always — something like it always been
 14 around?
 15 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: I don't
 16 know.
 17 DR. MOSKOS: You don't know that. Okay.
 18 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: I wrote the
 19 one at Fort Leonard Wood twenty-five years ago.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: And I think
 22 Fort Jackson had a similar one written very similarly
 23 after that. We just happened to be the first guys to get

1 the chance to write about it.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: Thank you.
 3 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: I mean, we
 4 had our own little drill sergeant scandal about twenty-
 5 five years ago that made a page in Time. It didn't make
 6 the Washington Post every day, but — And it was mostly
 7 non-sexual relationships, although there was a little bit
 8 of that. But this is not a new problem, and it is an
 9 authority — senior-subordinate problem.
 10 DR. CANTOR: I just have two simple points
 11 of clarification that go back to the earlier conversation
 12 before the break and relate to this point.
 13 We were having an earlier conversation
 14 about gender, the degree to which this regulation — this
 15 protective cocoon that you've referred to — was gender-
 16 neutral or not. I simply want to ask you for the record
 17 as a lawyer whether you are giving your legal opinion
 18 when you say that this is not applied in a gender-neutral
 19 fashion.
 20 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Yes, I
 21 believe it's not applied in a gender-neutral fashion.
 22 DR. CANTOR: And what are the data — Will
 23 the data be included in your report?

1 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Well, we
 2 don't have — The data is in volumes 1, 2 and 3 of the
 3 Army submissions. The problem is it's not sociometric
 4 data that can be exhaustively analyzed because in some
 5 instances we don't have the co-actor, we don't know the
 6 facts behind it; in some cases there are more than one
 7 offense charged on a particular Article 15.
 8 DR. CANTOR: Okay. So then on what basis
 9 are you making your statement — your legal statement
 10 that —
 11 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Oh, I think
 12 if you —
 13 DR. CANTOR: — it is not applied in a
 14 gender-neutral fashion?
 15 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Yes. I
 16 think if you look through it, it becomes pretty clear
 17 that the drill sergeants are punished as opposed to the
 18 women who have gender violations with the drill
 19 sergeants. And I think it's also pretty clear as a trend
 20 that the —
 21 DR. CANTOR: Well, could we take it —
 22 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: So it's the
 23 males that are the noncommissioned officers.

1 DR. CANTOR: — piece by piece, then?
 2 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Sure.
 3 DR. CANTOR: I mean, the drill sergeants
 4 could in principle be either male or female, and the
 5 soldier-in-training could in principle be either male or
 6 female.
 7 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Yes.
 8 DR. CANTOR: The fact —
 9 MR. RENNE: But from the data provided, we
 10 didn't know — in the individual cases he's referring to,
 11 we did know the gender of the co-actor.
 12 DR. CANTOR: But have you corrected for —
 13 You earlier said you were not a statistician but you
 14 could assess. Well, I am a statistician and I can
 15 assess. Have you corrected for the fact that there is a
 16 very large frequency discrepancy between the number of
 17 male drill sergeants and the number of female drill
 18 sergeants?
 19 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: I haven't
 20 sociometrically corrected for it in a statistical way,
 21 no. I'm not capable of doing that.
 22 I think —
 23 DR. CANTOR: So I guess —

1 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: I think the
 2 conclusion remains valid, though. If you would just look
 3 through those three volumes, it becomes quite apparent
 4 that drill sergeants are punished and males are punished
 5 with greater frequency than the female soldiers-in-
 6 training.
 7 DR. CANTOR: Male soldiers-in-training are
 8 punished?
 9 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Well, male
 10 soldiers-in-training are — The only time I've seen them
 11 punished is when they have some type of violation with a
 12 female soldier-in-training, and in those instances
 13 they're punished the same. But that's not what we're
 14 talking about. We're talking about drills and training.
 15 DR. CANTOR: Well, we are talking about
 16 that. We're talking about the application of a policy
 17 intended to protect soldiers-in-training. So if male
 18 soldiers-in-training are not disproportionately punished
 19 relative to female soldiers-in-training, then that's
 20 precisely —
 21 DR. MOSKOS: Of the same rank.
 22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: You're talking
 23 about the same offense, though.

1 DR. MOSKOS: Same rank.
 2 DR. CANTOR: No, no. Just wait. In cases
 3 where drill sergeant and soldier-in-training violations
 4 occur. You would have to have that to make the argument
 5 that this is not applied in a non-neutral way.
 6 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Mine was by
 7 rank and gender.
 8 DR. CANTOR: I understand that.
 9 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Not E-1 and
 10 E-1.
 11 MR. GITTINS: Could I just jump in? I
 12 don't think — We don't all agree with that finding, but
 13 I think we all do agree that the data is not collected by
 14 the Department of Defense so that useful and meaningful
 15 judgments can be made. And one of our recommendations is
 16 for this Commission to request that the Department of
 17 Defense begin collecting that data so that future policy-
 18 makers —
 19 DR. CANTOR: Excellent. That's exactly
 20 why I'm pushing this point. I'm really not doing this to
 21 be obnoxious. I'm pushing this point —
 22 MR. GITTINS: Yes, ma'am.
 23 DR. CANTOR: — because I agree completely

1 with you that the data are not there to make a judgment
 2 and should be there, in fact.
 3 But I simply would like to point out that
 4 we're being told that there is a clear pattern. You
 5 can't have a clear pattern without data.
 6 MR. GITTINS: Well, I will tell you —
 7 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: I said
 8 there's a clear perception and I agree with that
 9 perception.
 10 DR. CANTOR: Fine.
 11 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: I don't see
 12 how you would come to a contrary perception reviewing the
 13 data. I mean, it's not so difficult —
 14 DR. CANTOR: We were just told the data
 15 are not here.
 16 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: You don't
 17 have to have a statistical certainty to make a
 18 conclusion.
 19 MR. GITTINS: Ma'am, in my opinion, you
 20 can't draw the statistical — you can't make a
 21 statistical judgment. I will tell you that the trend
 22 appears to support that theory.
 23 DR. CANTOR: Fine. I would like to see,

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<p style="text-align: center;">Page 134</p> <p>1 then, those data summarized in the report. 2 And this goes back to an earlier question. 3 Are you doing — When you do, thankfully, as you said you 4 would, the separation of policy from legal opinion, will 5 that also be done in minority reports? I mean, did I 6 take your report, Mr. Hamilton, to be a minority report? 7 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Actually, I 8 believe — 9 DR. CANTOR: Somebody said that. I don't 10 know if that was... 11 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: It was a 12 separate report for the reasons I stated in the 13 introduction. I don't disagree with most of the stuff 14 that's in the main report at all. 15 DR. CANTOR: So then that will be 16 incorporated, then, into what General Christmas has asked 17 for. 18 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: That's 19 right. 20 DR. CANTOR: Okay. Thank you. 21 MR. MOORE: Part "A" of my question is 22 factually really for clarity. Part "B," I guess, would 23 call more for a judgment or evaluation.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 137</p> <p>1 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: It could be a 2 series of things. I mean, you could charge it as 3 indecent assault; you could charge it as a violation of a 4 battalion policy; you could charge it as a violation of a 5 regulation, a sexual harassment regulation. There's a 6 lot of freedom to do that. 7 But what also is in here — and I didn't 8 count them but I would tell you it's probably somewhere 9 between a quarter and a third of the stack — is a series 10 of nonjudicial punishment for violating the battalion 11 policy that prohibits social relationships between 12 trainees. 13 And when I mentioned this to one of the 14 folks who had visited Fort Jackson, they said, "Oh, yeah. 15 That's the 'no smile' rule." You get an Article 15 or 16 you get counseled for starting to get a little too 17 friendly with a soldier of the opposite sex, and it's as 18 simple as that. 19 That's what I'm saying is a bridge too 20 far. If you can't smile at a fellow trainee, if you 21 can't have a social conversation over a cup of coffee on 22 Saturday afternoon when the sergeants aren't around, then 23 perhaps there is some reason to consider single-sex basic</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 135</p> <p>1 General Cuthbert, Bob Dare and I are a 2 little confused about a point that was made and we're not 3 sure exactly about what you cited with regard to the 4 "smile" rule. 5 Now, I think we've all encountered some 6 informal cases where there's a sort of informal 7 prohibition on social interaction among trainees. 8 Frankly, with Bob, I would be very shocked to learn that 9 there was an Article 15 ever given for a trainee smiling 10 at another, but I'm not sure that's what you actually 11 said. Would you clarify your analysis of the "smile" 12 rule — 13 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: What I said 14 was — 15 MR. MOORE: — versus what formal TRADOC 16 or even individual installation rules that may exist 17 regarding interaction? 18 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: What I said 19 in the report, in the part that pertains to the analysis 20 of the regulations, was that I found at Leonard Wood a 21 policy prohibiting social relationships between trainees 22 in basic training. 23 MR. MOORE: That's an installation policy.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 138</p> <p>1 training. 2 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Can I follow 3 that up real quickly, Tom, please? 4 MR. MOORE: Sure. 5 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Did I 6 understand you to say, General, that the basis of your 7 conclusion was based upon trainees saying, "Oh, that's 8 the 'no smile' rule"? 9 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: I believe the 10 conversation accurately was a sergeant complaining about 11 the difficulty of having to enforce that rule. 12 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. But 13 did you talk — 14 MS. POPE: One conversation. 15 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Did you talk 16 to any of the commanders whose signature were on those — 17 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: No. 18 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: — policy 19 letters to understand what the meaning — 20 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: No. 21 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. Thank 22 you. 23 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: I got these</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Page 136</p> <p>1 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: Well, it's 2 not an — Curiously, it's not an installation policy. It 3 is a series of battalion and company policies. 4 MR. MOORE: Okay. 5 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: The 6 installation regulation doesn't deal with it and 7 essentially deals with the sergeant and the trainee 8 problem. 9 What has occurred at Leonard Wood is a 10 substantial number of the units there have prohibited 11 social relationships between trainees in the same basic 12 training category, and what I have here in about a two- 13 inch-thick dump (Indicating) is the nonjudicial 14 punishment for about the past three years at Fort Leonard 15 Wood, well over half of which is stuff that — It's not 16 just social relationships. It's pinching somebody on the 17 backside, touching somebody in the wrong place, making an 18 indecent proposition to them, stuff that's properly 19 involved, you know, at the company level as — or 20 battalion level as nonjudicial punishment. 21 MR. MOORE: And the basis of the 22 punishment would be based, then, on violation of 23 battalion orders?</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Page 139</p> <p>1 letters about twelve days ago. 2 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Thank you. 3 MR. MOORE: Well, part "B," then, is sort 4 of evaluating that. I've noticed in all the visits that 5 I have been on — and this is primarily, I guess, 6 directed to our Army representatives — that there 7 clearly is, either formally or informally, a whole 8 convoluted thicket of policies, regulations, directives 9 and orders that do prohibit that kind of interaction. 10 And it may vary according to the 11 personality of the commander or the guidance of the post, 12 but it does exist in some form or other and it's part of 13 what I — it's half of what I call the "grand paradox," 14 because the other half is the Army is saying that we are 15 putting men and women together in order to immediately 16 begin to foster the proper attitudes of professional 17 respect. They're going to have to serve together and 18 operate together, so we are going to start right now in 19 training them together. 20 And, yet, these two concepts seem to be 21 mutually antithetical. I mean, we've based our whole 22 policy upon a vast contradiction. 23 And so what I'd like you to do for me is</p>

1 evaluate to what extent, at least in terms of legal
 2 activity — nonjudicial punishment and the ability of —
 3 the necessity to enforce the code — to what extent you
 4 feel that really is a mission distractor for the training
 5 base and the training cadre.
 6 And I'd like to ask both of you to respond
 7 on that basis.
 8 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: Well, I would
 9 tell you frankly it was beyond the scope of this study
 10 and particularly beyond the scope of the time we had to
 11 address it, but I would try to answer your question this
 12 way.
 13 And this will give me a chance to say
 14 something else that I think is important to say because
 15 Hank's view of this is different from mine. He would
 16 essentially make all initial entry training single-sex.
 17 My suggestion is that by the time they get
 18 to advanced individual training, which is part of initial
 19 entry training, you can — At that point, they have the
 20 basic soldier skills to know when to say "no," to know
 21 how to say "no," to deal with others in uniform of a
 22 different rank structure. Mine only extends to basic
 23 combat or basic training, essentially.

1 And I think what I see going on in that
 2 initial eight-week basic combat training is just a little
 3 bit too much of an information overload that causes it to
 4 be confusing to the sergeants and the privates and the
 5 others.
 6 That's not a great step and it certainly
 7 is not inconsistent with the basic idea that you train as
 8 you fight. I mean, nobody fights as a basic combat
 9 training outfit. They don't learn how to really fight
 10 until they get to their final unit. But you've got to
 11 make this process a graded one, a graded difficulty
 12 exercise, and you can do that business of learning how to
 13 relate to your peers I think better in AIT than you can
 14 in basic combat training.
 15 And that's just one — And that's opinion.
 16 That's professional opinion. I've been around those
 17 outfits. I've been at Leonard Wood. But I can see how
 18 pros would differ over that.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Tom, can I just also follow
 20 on Tom's question? You've got three inches there — Tom
 21 Cuthbert — and you said about a third of those are
 22 dealing with social relations violations. What is a
 23 social relationship violation? Do we have some data

1 there on what a social relation violation is?
 2 MS. POPE: Or a definition?
 3 DR. MOSKOS: Or definition, yeah.
 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: I don't have
 5 it in this volume. There is another volume that
 6 literally has all these command policies, and so we can
 7 dig a couple of those out and you can see what they are.
 8 I mean, they're essentially talking with someone of the
 9 opposite sex about anything other than business.
 10 DR. MOSKOS: Okay.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My question
 12 is just a follow-on for fact, if you will. You looked at
 13 a period, '96 to '98, in this one-third of those "no
 14 smile," social, whatever you want to call them. Is there
 15 a volume of them that's in 1968 and a few in —
 16 MS. POPE: '96.
 17 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Or 1996.
 18 And, you know — Do you see where I'm going? Where I'm
 19 going with this, in the early years of '96, are there
 20 more than the later years of '98 as this whole training
 21 business has evolved?
 22 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: I didn't look
 23 at that issue but my sense is frankly that this has

1 increased, not decreased.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 3 MS. POPE: It would be helpful to have —
 4 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: By the way,
 5 it's easy to sit here and go through this stack and
 6 essentially give you a time frame for it.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: The method
 8 to the madness, and why, is the simple fact is one of the
 9 things the Commission has observed is an awful lot of
 10 changes that have occurred in the last eighteen to
 11 twenty-four months, and obviously if there's a skew
 12 there, that indicates something. That may indicate —
 13 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: The best
 14 evidence I saw in the materials I looked at was to look
 15 at the dates on those battalion and command policies and
 16 see when they started, because they obviously started in
 17 response to some kind of problem, and then we can go
 18 through and count the Article 15's after that.
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Great. Great.
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you.
 21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. We have a pending
 22 request of Hank.
 23 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: What was the

1 question?
 2 MR. MOORE: Well, I was interested, again,
 3 because there seems to be this vast contradiction between
 4 the goal of gender integration versus how it's actually
 5 being implemented, and the result is this huge,
 6 convoluted series of laws, regulations, orders and
 7 policies, and that has to be, it seems to me, difficult
 8 to deal with.
 9 And I just wondered, since you defend a
 10 lot of these people, how much, at least from a legal
 11 sense, is it a distractor to drills and even officer
 12 cadre —
 13 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Sure.
 14 MR. MOORE: — in getting their way
 15 through the thicket.
 16 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: All right.
 17 As I — What you call the "grand paradox," as I
 18 understand it, is the inconsistency of saying men and
 19 women need to train together, and then when they're
 20 together, you write a thousand rules for why they can't
 21 be together.
 22 MR. MOORE: Precisely.
 23 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: And then you

1 tell the cadre to enforce those rules.
 2 And I believe they are training
 3 distractors. The sex among the trainees, the sex with
 4 drills, and also perhaps more oppressive would be the
 5 constant desire to figure out what these regs are du jour
 6 and implement them.
 7 Now, by way of anecdote I will tell you
 8 that I get calls from NCO's that I don't even know, that
 9 ask me questions about a new thing that's been put out,
 10 and I just say, "I don't have any clue. If there's any
 11 doubt, don't even go near it." But, I mean, I don't even
 12 know these people. They were not former clients. They
 13 were not clients of my firm, but they're just asking for
 14 a legal opinion, which is why, again, all this translates
 15 into legalities.
 16 It's not just policies in our society.
 17 Policies are implemented through law. I believe that the
 18 combination of these distractors makes basic training in
 19 a gender-integrated way non-productive.
 20 I will agree with Tom Cuthbert that there
 21 is a better argument to be made for gender-segregated
 22 training at the basic training level than at the AIT
 23 level. It remains my opinion that both should be gender-

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1 segregated, but there's a much better argument at the
 2 basic training level.
 3 The sound bite you hear on TV — "Well,
 4 you know, we're going to train like we fight" — what
 5 planet is this from? Nobody fights, nobody does anything
 6 like basic training once they get out of basic training.
 7 That's nonsense.
 8 MR. MOORE: Thank you.
 9 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I'm going to
 10 refrain from asking a question. I just want to make a
 11 request on the record. I want to see the policy letters
 12 that have the 1,000 reasons why trainees can't interact.
 13 Now, I've seen the policy letters that
 14 have been provided up-to-date. I personally have heard
 15 three-star generals, two-star generals, sergeant majors
 16 and colonels, state that there are no such policy
 17 letters; that appropriate professional relationships are
 18 encouraged, not denied. So I would like to see those
 19 policy letters that are being cited that prohibit it.
 20 DR. MOSKOS: That's good.
 21 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: That's easy.
 22 MS. POPE: Yeah. I —
 23 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: But what I'll

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1 daughters of that age said, "Get that smirk off your
 2 face." It wasn't one gender. It was — And it's an
 3 evolutionary learning process.
 4 I personally would be of the mind — and
 5 would appreciate some feedback — that maybe it is time
 6 to go back to these instructors and give them some credit
 7 for some leadership, good judgment. I think most of the
 8 people we talked to five years ago, three years ago,
 9 would have said, "Go back to basic." The comment — And
 10 the majority — and there are some people who don't like
 11 it today — have said — and we heard this at Fort Hood
 12 — that "I will take these problems today versus what I
 13 had as an instructor in the Army where I had to go into
 14 the barracks with a gun." You know, twenty years ago.
 15 They said, "Yeah, it's different. It's
 16 not easy. That's what I'm paid for. But all things
 17 being equal, I would take today's problems as opposed to
 18 putting my life in my own hands." And we did hear this
 19 consistently. I mean, the Navy comment was if you
 20 breathed, you could get into the Navy, you know, twenty
 21 years ago.
 22 So when you talk to the individuals who
 23 were there on the deck, you know, daily dealing with

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1 tell you is we didn't get that kind of information from
 2 every installation. What we did get was a good feed from
 3 Leonard Wood and you can see the ones there. And they're
 4 all a little different, but they're pretty similar. And
 5 I would hate to see them made the scapegoat of this just
 6 because they went a little farther than some others in
 7 giving us everything that occurred.
 8 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: That'll teach them.
 9 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: No good deed
 10 goes unpunished.
 11 MS. POPE: One of the things that has
 12 occurred, at least for me personally, as we've spent the
 13 last — I don't know how long it's — Eight months? It
 14 seems like a year, but —
 15 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Eight months to life.
 16 MS. POPE: But one of the things that has
 17 been consistent across the services — And let me start
 18 by saying that I am in agreement with you — both of you
 19 that are of the mind that there are too many regulations
 20 because I think there are too many regulations. I think
 21 it is inevitable in a process that you don't know where
 22 it's going, to put some rules in.
 23 But having said that — And I think some

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1 instructors, nobody argues it's not difficult; but given
 2 a choice of going back twenty years or dealing with
 3 today's issues, there was a resounding majority. And
 4 there are people who wouldn't, who think it would be.
 5 Anyhow, I just — some of those
 6 regulations that maybe it's time to roll back, that would
 7 give instructors what they're paid to do — And one of
 8 the things that we haven't done yet, that probably is the
 9 next mission, is to look at instructor training and what
 10 is applicable and what do today's instructors need,
 11 because I'm of the mind that most of these people are
 12 pretty good. They have good heads and, given the
 13 opportunity, make the right decisions.
 14 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: If I could
 15 have a second to just say "amen" to that. It doesn't
 16 need much more than that, but I will tell you that when I
 17 was dealing with that drill sergeant scandal at Leonard
 18 Wood twenty-five years ago, which really was unrelated to
 19 sex — it had to do with guys misusing power with respect
 20 to young men for almost — I'd say 95 percent of it was
 21 that — I would force myself to go watch a graduation
 22 parade once a week and I'd see five to seven hundred kids
 23 walking out successfully.

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1 of those could be taken back at this point from what I've
 2 seen today in the last eight months because the thing
 3 that has impressed me is the leadership at the instructor
 4 level threw up common sense.
 5 And I guess we go back to leadership, and
 6 some of what I think I've heard you say is it's hard
 7 being a leader because of rules, and I would tend to
 8 agree with you because the good leaders out there are not
 9 worrying about what the rules are. They're not worrying
 10 about punishment. They're worrying about what's good for
 11 the soldier, sailor, airman and Marine, and I think that
 12 is what has impressed me over the last eight months to
 13 life. And so I think there may be a time to look at what
 14 kinds of rules could be rolled back.
 15 The other thing is that, at least at
 16 Jackson, the policy that has two recruits that go to an
 17 instructor, you know, of opposite gender, was in place to
 18 protect both the recruits and the instructor. The "no
 19 smile" policy I think evolved out of protection — well-
 20 meaning protection — that said if you smile — You know,
 21 we heard lots of anecdotes that said the female
 22 instructors caught the females doing that and said, you
 23 know, "Get that smirk off your face." The males who had

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1 I'd see — I would guess we probably had
 2 four to five hundred sergeants involved with the training
 3 arrangement there at Leonard Wood and we had twenty-five
 4 guys who would abuse their authority — who got accused
 5 of abusing their authority. Several of them walked out
 6 of the court-martial "not guilty." And we didn't court-
 7 martial very many of them. Most of them we just did
 8 administrative action and reassignment.
 9 But it's working. It was — you know,
 10 those are really good people who do the right thing
 11 almost all the time. And if you really push hard on what
 12 motivates people, it's never the military justice system.
 13 It's something that mothers and fathers taught them about
 14 doing things the right way.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: That kind
 16 of leads in — I was going to leave this — I have three
 17 points and I'll try to just cover one, Madam, and I'll
 18 wait for my next shot at it.
 19 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Ron, I'm not going to
 20 hold you to the rules. You've been good all morning.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But it's a
 22 comment that leads to something that I would lay out to
 23 you. And there seems to be a bit of a mixed opinion

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1 concerning Article 134 of the Manual for Courts-Martial
 2 and whether or not changes should be made.
 3 What I thought I heard was a general
 4 consensus that maybe as far as adultery, it's not really
 5 needed, but it might be nice to have these guidelines. I
 6 think I heard from the other side, "But if you're going
 7 to have the guidelines, well, you need to have the
 8 guidelines across Article 134 and all those things that
 9 Article 134 pertains." I think that's basically what I
 10 heard and I would ask that do.
 11 And then I heard that, "Gee whiz, to make
 12 the change really probably would be harmless," and I'd
 13 like to throw something back to you, having been a
 14 commander a long, long time.
 15 And I will tell you I agree with Bill Keys
 16 that one of the hardest things is for younger officers
 17 today to truly understand the UCMJ because as younger —
 18 you know, and even now, lieutenant colonels and colonels
 19 — because they were not brought up being legal counsels
 20 and defense counsels, and having their own Manual for
 21 Courts-Martial all marked where they go, et cetera, et
 22 cetera, and I don't need to go any farther than that.
 23 But it seems to me that there are an

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1 And, again, we've got to start relying on
 2 them. I mean, these are the people with the authority.
 3 The UCMJ gives them the authority. Service regulations
 4 give them the authority to do the right thing. By the
 5 time they're in command positions, there's a great deal
 6 of trust and confidence that's placed with them and we
 7 have to assume they have the knowledge and experience to
 8 act as commanders when they're actually placed in command
 9 assignments.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Is there a
 11 contrary opinion?
 12 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: Not much of
 13 one. As I tried to say and didn't say very well when I
 14 started into this, I've struggled as part of the Joint
 15 Committee on Military Justice and as Action Officer in
 16 the Office of Secretary of Defense, trying to keep the
 17 law up-to-date with reality in the armed forces and also
 18 with the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the armed
 19 forces. And I think what has happened in this case — at
 20 least as the change to 134 is presently written — is
 21 they've tried to make the language in the judges' guide
 22 match up to what's in the Manual for Courts-Martial.
 23 So in other words, the commander who flips

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1 intended consequences when you screw with Article 134.
 2 It seems to me that Article 134 is really the commander's
 3 article. It's the article by which the commander doesn't
 4 just issue punish but enacts leadership. It seems to me
 5 that if you lay out guidelines for all of 134 or just for
 6 adultery, that really you're getting into a checklist
 7 mentality. That you're trying to make things black-and-
 8 white in the world of leadership where things aren't
 9 black-and-white.
 10 And I'd ask that you comment on that
 11 collectively.
 12 MR. GITTINS: I'll take a crack at that.
 13 I think you're exactly right, General. There has been as
 14 many challenges to Article 134 on constitutional grounds
 15 as there are prosecutions under Article 134. They never
 16 succeed. It's intentionally left to be vague for exactly
 17 the reason you gave, sir.
 18 And if you're going to import into that
 19 presidentially — You know, the code is vague. The
 20 President has developed offenses under Article 134. The
 21 enumerated offenses under 134 are promulgated by the
 22 President. So if you start importing into 134 a
 23 checklist like you suggest, it's not going to be vague

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1 out his manual when he's trying to figure out what
 2 adultery really is all about can see the same rule that
 3 the judges and the lawyers are using.
 4 I don't think it's much more complicated
 5 than that right now. When it started out, it was a far
 6 different thing. But where they are in the process now
 7 is just making sure that the lawyers and the commanders
 8 are operating off the same set of rules.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I'll be
 10 honest with you, that's not what I heard from our
 11 briefing that we were given. Now I realize we've also —
 12 we're kind of in a never-neverland and we don't really
 13 know what it now currently looks like, and I know we —
 14 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: And I'm
 15 operating in that same never-neverland.
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Right. And
 17 I know we've asked that — we're going back to Department
 18 of Defense and see where this stands, but that does make
 19 a very big difference if it's changed that much.
 20 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: Commanders
 21 don't worry too much about that kind of language, I'll
 22 tell you. In the Army, the rule really is — for senior
 23 commanders when they're looking at adultery behavior —

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1 anymore and there are going to be tests that a court-
 2 martial will be asked to judge conduct by and you will
 3 lose the commander's ability to use Article 134 to
 4 maintain good order and discipline in his unit, I
 5 believe.
 6 I do not think that you need to change
 7 Article 134. You certainly don't need to change it for
 8 adultery only. But if you're going to change it in some
 9 way, it ought to be changes that are generally applicable
 10 to the entire — all the provisions in Article 134, all
 11 the enumerated offenses.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Other
 13 opinion?
 14 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: General, I agree
 15 wholeheartedly with Charles on this one. Article 134 is
 16 the leadership article. Commanders know what's
 17 prejudicial to good order and discipline. They know it
 18 when they see it. They know what is service-
 19 discrediting. They know it when they see it. This just
 20 goes down the road toward telling commanders how to suck
 21 an egg, and it's just not a good idea, you know, at this
 22 point, because it erodes the level of discretion that
 23 commanding officers have and must have.

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1 "I'm not going to go looking for it, but if you do it
 2 under my flag pole, don't expect any mercy."
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 4 Thank you.
 5 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: And it's a
 6 pretty good rule.
 7 MR. GITTINS: And there was a Department
 8 of Defense regulation —
 9 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: And it's
 10 unforgettable.
 11 MR. GITTINS: — that prohibits commanders
 12 from seeking out adultery unless they've made a judgment
 13 that there's a command reason to do it.
 14 MS. POPE: Does that regulation exist?
 15 MR. GITTINS: That regulation is in
 16 existence. It requires a judgment to be made by a
 17 commander that it's worthwhile from a command perspective
 18 to expend resources — investigative resources — to
 19 pursue consensual sexual activity.
 20 Yes, that regulation does exist. I don't
 21 have the number at the tip of my tongue but I'll provide
 22 the number to the Commission.
 23 MS. POPE: That would be great. Thank

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1 you.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: The Chair
 3 said I could have another one.
 4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: No, I'm going to exercise
 5 command discretion and give you my question.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My second
 7 question really I think would be very helpful to us and
 8 it deals with disparate justice between officer and
 9 enlisted, and it's a thing to me that I don't think
 10 really came out. And that's the whole show-cause
 11 procedure that an officer must face if an officer is
 12 accused in any way, you know, and/or convicted of a
 13 crime.
 14 And I think it might be helpful to our
 15 Commission if it was understood that if Second Lieutenant
 16 Ron Christmas, you know, goes out and screws up, you
 17 know, I'm going to go through a show-cause and someone
 18 all the way up to the top — in the Marine Corps, it's
 19 going to be the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower
 20 Reserve Affairs after it's gone through all its wickets
 21 in the chain of command — that's going to make a
 22 determination as to whether or not that officer has to
 23 show cause as to whether —

1 DR. MOSKOS: Clarify for me, Ron, what
 2 "show cause" means.
 3 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: "Show
 4 cause" means whether I —
 5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Should stay in
 6 the service.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: — should
 8 remain in the service or not, or be dismissed.
 9 DR. MOSKOS: All right. Thank you.
 10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And, you
 11 know, that is a very strict and defining legal process.
 12 And that if, in fact, it's determined at that high level
 13 yes, that officer is to show cause, that then there is a
 14 continuing legal process that that individual goes
 15 through, but that there is a caveat. If it in fact goes
 16 to that board, as you indicated, if the board comes back
 17 and recommends retention, now the command's — i.e., the
 18 Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Chief of Staff of the
 19 Army or whatever — their hands are tied. That
 20 individual will not be dismissed. So there may be
 21 appearances of disparate judgment.
 22 I think it's awfully important to
 23 understand that there are by law differences between our

1 officer and enlisted justice, if you will, and I'd ask
 2 you to comment on that.
 3 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: Let me just
 4 — That's a good description of basically what "show
 5 cause" is. And let me tell you that Second Lieutenant
 6 Christmas doesn't even get a show-cause hearing. He is a
 7 probationary officer —
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Right.
 9 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: — in today's
 10 Marine Corps.
 11 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I should
 12 have made myself a field grade.
 13 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: And he really
 14 just gets a — If he gets any kind of an adverse action
 15 like a letter of reprimand or an Article 15 for adultery,
 16 he will wind up in all likelihood being sent out of the
 17 Marine Corps or the Army for not meeting his probationary
 18 obligations.
 19 Once he gets to career status, he is in
 20 this show-cause arena. It's administrative. It's
 21 separate from the military justice business. And it's
 22 routinely done. I have about a page-and-a-half of data
 23 from the Army in the past year dealing with that kind of

1 action against officers. And that's if you don't go the
 2 court-martial route.
 3 It's essentially an administrative
 4 process. It's got some due-process protections built
 5 into it, but it still leads you to being separated from
 6 the service with an appropriate character discharge.
 7 So if it's really serious misconduct — if
 8 it's adultery with Sergeant Jones' wife, for example —
 9 you can leave the service with an other-than-honorable-
 10 conditions discharge, which doesn't help you when you
 11 want to find a job within the Department of Defense or a
 12 school board or somewhere else.
 13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: The problem with
 14 that is — I think, anyway — is if I as a commanding
 15 general don't want to send it forward, I have no choice,
 16 and I think that's wrong.
 17 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: I've seen
 18 commanders send it forward, "I'm directed to send this
 19 forward," you know, and you have a subtle message —
 20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Well, I've done
 21 that, too. But I don't think it should be mandatory that
 22 I have to do this.
 23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Of course,

1 that's what the law says. And the only reason I bring it
 2 up is because I think it does impact clearly on what we
 3 have been looking at. There is this other administrative
 4 type of procedure that impacts on, you know, what in fact
 5 we've been charged to look at because many times those
 6 particular cases end up being handled in that particular
 7 way.
 8 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: And I would
 9 tell you with a straight face that I sort of come down on
 10 General Keys' side on whether those have to be forwarded.
 11 But by the same token, the value in
 12 forwarding all of them is it really means there's going
 13 to be even enforcement across an individual service or a
 14 department among the officer corps. So the lieutenant
 15 who does it at Jackson gets in as much trouble as the one
 16 who does it somewhere in Germany or in Korea, and there
 17 is that evening effect.
 18 I did that for about a year-and-a-half
 19 after I retired from active duty and worked as an SES in
 20 the Army and, you know, that does have a good effect in
 21 regard to making sanctions equal. It also takes away the
 22 discretion from some commanders who probably understand
 23 the problem a hell of a lot better than the guy in

1 Washington who's dealing with it.
 2 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Although
 3 if, in fact, determined to go show cause, it goes back to
 4 the commander and the commander forms that group who in
 5 fact will then pass judgment.
 6 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: He forms one
 7 board, but there's another one, I think, isn't there?
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: No. If the
 9 board that you formed said "not dismissal," then the
 10 individual is not dismissed. It is dropped.
 11 MS. POPE: If there's a dismissal, can you
 12 appeal it to the Board of Appeals?
 13 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Fred.
 14 MR. PANG: I don't know. Ron, do you have
 15 another question?
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: My final
 17 one, and it —
 18 MR. PANG: I defer to you.
 19 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And it
 20 really — it was partially answered but I just want to
 21 clarify. I thought that what I heard was that we were
 22 talking — or one of your recommendations concerned
 23 regulations and that what you determined was that the

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1 regulations across the training base were not
 2 standardized. They were all different.
 3 And what my clarification is — and one of
 4 your recommendations is that TRADOC have standardized
 5 directives in this area across the training bases?
 6 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: That was my
 7 recommendation.
 8 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay.
 9 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: And again, I
 10 just reviewed the Army. It's my understanding the other
 11 services basically have a substantially more
 12 standardization than does the Army.
 13 The problem — and this goes back to the
 14 sergeant major's point — it's not always the CG at an
 15 installation that's promulgating policy. As General
 16 Cuthbert pointed out at Ford Leonard Wood, you get
 17 battalion commanders putting it out, too, and that's an
 18 Article 92 violation if the drill sergeant's informed of
 19 it.
 20 So you have not only variance among
 21 installations, within an installation you can have
 22 variance between battalions.
 23 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I'm sorry

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1 for interrupting here. The fact of the matter is that's
 2 a policy letter, not a regulation. And I understand what
 3 you're saying. And most battalion commanders that I know
 4 in any service, but for sure in the Army, before they
 5 publish it, they've had legal opinion as to — And I'm
 6 sure that in your careers you've opined on that to
 7 battalion commanders and brigade commanders, and you've
 8 opined whether or not the policy letter is a valid one to
 9 be published.
 10 So, I mean, there is a process that I have
 11 always lived with in the structure of the Army — a
 12 check-and-balance, so to speak — to keep renegades from
 13 simply habitually putting out policies that made no sense
 14 or were borderline unconstitutional, if you will.
 15 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: And you're
 16 right, usually lawyers screen those. But they
 17 occasionally get the same question asked of them that you
 18 asked of us: "tell me whether it's legal and then tell me
 19 whether it's a good idea," and most good lawyers try to
 20 draw you that line. But things that are legal frequently
 21 are not good ideas, and you try to make that point as
 22 clearly as you can to the commander you're talking with.
 23 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Well, my

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1 over-emotional view is the fact that you bring into the
 2 next element of military life the big "L" word,
 3 "leadership." And we've spent a lot of money educating
 4 battalion commanders to be decision-makers and sometimes
 5 have to make some absolutely harsh decisions. And they
 6 sometimes take the extreme route in doing so, but we
 7 invest in them that ability. To withdraw that
 8 opportunity from a battalion commander, in my view, in
 9 fact does more to damage good law, order and discipline
 10 than it does to add to it.
 11 I may be totally wrong in my assessment,
 12 but twenty-eight years, of which twenty-seven of it was
 13 leading, leads me to believe that in fact you get more
 14 good rather than more bad out of the ability of a
 15 battalion commander to exercise leadership and judgment
 16 in the process of his duties.
 17 MR. GITTINS: I reviewed the policies at
 18 Marine Corps Base Camp LeJeune and there's a fairly
 19 extensive school command there.
 20 Now, it's not basic training in terms of
 21 initial entry training right off civilian life, but my
 22 sense was that there's a whole bunch of schools there
 23 that are all governed by the schools command regulation

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1 and that those regulations are consistent; they are —
 2 there's not a change — there's not a different policy
 3 from the admin school to the engineer school or whatever.
 4 The fact of the matter is it seems to work
 5 well. You have a basic policy. That's the policy and
 6 you follow it. And you teach it.
 7 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I guess
 8 where I'm going is this trying to — I thought I heard at
 9 least one recommendation was that perhaps TRADOC needed
 10 to have a standard regulation across the training bases.
 11 I've just heard — I think I heard Navy-Marine Corps say
 12 "no, you don't need that." I don't know the Air Force
 13 and I'm not sure if you have consensus on the Army.
 14 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: Well, let me
 15 talk —
 16 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: But I guess
 17 where I'm going is, what are you asking us to do?
 18 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: Let me talk
 19 to that a little bit because I don't come down on the
 20 side that Hank does, although I think you could find a
 21 common ground there and it would do something useful.
 22 As he described and as I wrote in the
 23 portion of the paper that addresses it, TRADOC has a

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1 detailed regulation that essentially tells you how to do
 2 it but doesn't put any proscriptions in it, and they
 3 leave the negative stuff to the local commands so that
 4 the local command reg matches the local command
 5 environment.
 6 You could put a model reg in the TRADOC
 7 document that this is how you ought to do it unless you
 8 have a reason to do it separately, and let the local
 9 commands do it with the model or without as they saw fit.
 10 To me, that would be useful.
 11 When I have examined these regulations
 12 around the installations, there are literally no two of
 13 them alike — no two of them identical, but they go at
 14 the same misbehavior of the senior NCO or the senior
 15 officer in a way that essentially gets you to the same
 16 result. It's a matter of telling two-star generals and
 17 their staffs that you have to do it TRADOC's way.
 18 I wouldn't go quite that far. Hank would.
 19 And I think that probably puts the issue as clearly as I
 20 know how to put it.
 21 It wouldn't hurt — As a matter of fact, I
 22 sort of made a little note to myself to call the lawyer
 23 down at TRADOC after this is over and say, "Might be a

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1 good idea to give them a model to depart from." Doesn't
 2 mean they're stuck with it.
 3 COLONEL ABBEY: The Air Force essentially
 4 has a four or five-page regulation. It's very
 5 centralized. I think that's good for people as you go
 6 from place to place, command to command. You have a good
 7 idea as to what the rules are, what the principles are,
 8 and then you get the supplementation generally in the
 9 training environment.
 10 So the Air Training Command is going to
 11 have something that sets out more detailed rules on
 12 faculty and staff and how they interact with trainees and
 13 so forth. But you're not going to find as many different
 14 iterations and permutations, I think, in the Air Force.
 15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: So is there
 16 a need for a standardized or is it fine as it is?
 17 COLONEL ABBEY: I think the Air Force
 18 pretty much is standardized and they allow more
 19 flexibility to the training commands to add maybe some
 20 extra prohibitions.
 21 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Thank you
 22 very much. I have nothing else.
 23 MR. PANG: You know, I just have one

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1 question and that has to do with, you know, General
 2 Cuthbert's, you know, I think well-stated view with
 3 regard to the cocoon that you build around trainees. And
 4 I think this cocoon probably is general in nature in that
 5 it covers all senior-to-subordinate type of relationships
 6 where you try to protect the junior person.

7 In reading the report here — Well, let me
 8 just read it because I think it's important for us all to
 9 be on the same — or you can read it. It's on page 20.

10 DR. MOSKOS: No, read it aloud.

11 MR. PANG: But it says, "As the rank
 12 disparity between the co-actors increases, however, the
 13 data provided the Commission indicates a potentially
 14 statistically significant disparity in the punishments
 15 received as well as the seriousness of the forum for the
 16 proceeding. For example, for consensual sexual offenses
 17 between trainees and instructors across the services, the
 18 instructor is likely to face significantly harsher
 19 punishment than the trainee and frequently at a
 20 significantly more serious forum (such as general court-
 21 martial).

22 "While this may reflect the military
 23 society's view that the instructor should have been in a

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1 position to control his actions, the fact remains that
 2 consensual sex is just that — consensual. In the
 3 absence of quid pro quo sexual harassment, it is
 4 difficult to justify imposing a federal conviction and a
 5 potential term of confinement for one actor in consensual
 6 sex while the other actor receives little more than a
 7 reprimand. Although trainees are youthful, they still
 8 are required, no less than instructors, to comply with
 9 the rules governing their conduct once they have been
 10 told what the rules are."

11 Okay. So that's what you have in this
 12 report. I think, you know, what this then kind of tells
 13 me is that, you know, if you had co-actors, one senior
 14 and one subordinate, and they were found to have violated
 15 the fraternization policy or whatever, that you would
 16 expect that the punishments would be identical. And I
 17 find that, you know, kind of disturbing and I just wanted
 18 to get your views on it, because it would seem to me —
 19 okay? — that the senior person, you know, always has the
 20 power and has the responsibility to be able to tell a
 21 subordinate who may make an advance to him or her, "Hey,
 22 we can't do this."

23 You know, I was in — I served in the

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1 military and I must be — I'll be frank with you. I
 2 mean, there were a couple of situations where I was in a
 3 senior position and there was a female, junior, who, you
 4 know, said something or, you know, I viewed as coming on,
 5 and as a senior, you just say, "Hey, you can't do that."
 6 "We can't do that." I mean, that's your job as a leader
 7 to say "stop." And I think you have a greater
 8 responsibility, you know, in these sorts of relationships
 9 than the junior has and you can say "stop."

10 You know, I think, you know, if there's
 11 seduction — okay? — and this is what this is getting to
 12 involve — I mean, I would hope — okay? — that the
 13 person who had the power and was the senior would
 14 understand that and know how to stop it. And that does
 15 not excuse the subordinate, you know, from whatever
 16 actions that that person was taking — okay? — with
 17 regard to it.

18 But, you know, as a commander and having
 19 sat in that chair, you know, when you're faced with these
 20 kinds of cases, I mean, I think you naturally say to
 21 yourself, you know, "I expect the senior to be more
 22 responsible in those situations." And if you're going to
 23 then take disciplinary action, the disciplinary action

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1 tends to be — And I would do that, I mean, as a
 2 commander, because I would make that judgment — you
 3 know, "this person, you know, had this responsibility,
 4 knew this thing was wrong, and, therefore, I'm going to
 5 exact, you know, more stringent punishment on that
 6 individual than the junior."

7 And I'm just wondering, you know, if you
 8 expect, you know, identical —

9 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: I'll let
 10 Charles defend it first, but I would like to — since he
 11 wrote it, but I would like to address it.

12 MR. GITTINS: My concern, I think shared
 13 by some of the — is that when you're talking — These
 14 offenses — consensual offenses are not defined by a
 15 differential status. Okay? The elements of adultery are
 16 you had sex with a woman not your wife, the sex was
 17 wrongful, and it was conduct prejudicial to good order
 18 and discipline. There's nothing in there about
 19 differential status.

20 When you criminalize to the point of a
 21 felony conviction for consensual sexual activity for one
 22 party but not the other, it seems to me that you have a
 23 problem in proportionality of punishment.

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1 I don't disagree that you may view from a
 2 command perspective one more seriously than the other,
 3 but the stigma of a federal felony conviction for
 4 adultery, I would submit, is somewhat out-of-line with
 5 the gravity of the offense. When we're talking about
 6 consensual sexual activity, by definition, is desire on
 7 both sides of the act. That's all I'm saying.

8 Once you're told what the rules are, even
 9 if you're a little girl in basic training, at some point
 10 you have been — you are required to comport your conduct
 11 to those regulations that have been defined.

12 MR. PANG: And I don't disagree with that.

13 MR. GITTINS: Okay. But that's all that's
 14 being said there.

15 MR. PANG: I don't disagree that you have
 16 to, you know, comport with the rules. I mean, the rules
 17 apply equally to both. But, you know, what I get down
 18 to, though, when I read this, is that you expect the
 19 punishment to be identical. I mean —

20 MR. GITTINS: Not identical.

21 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: It says some standards.

22 MR. GITTINS: Proportionate.

23 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: Some punishment.

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1 MR. PANG: Yeah. But, you know, it says
 2 — So if I punish somebody by a reprimand and another by,
 3 you know, some more serious punishment, I mean, you find
 4 that —

5 MR. GITTINS: I find it offensive to put
 6 someone in jail for a term of years for consensual sexual
 7 offense when the other party who engaged in the same
 8 criminal conduct was not punished in any way. A slap on
 9 the hand. A reprimand.

10 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: There are two
 11 things I would like to say to address that. First, the
 12 real gravamen of the offense you're dealing with in that
 13 context is not the adultery. It's the willful
 14 disobedience of a rule established by proper authority.

15 And when you have the disobeyer, someone
 16 like Major Cuthbert or Sergeant Cuthbert or — yeah,
 17 Colonel Cuthbert — and the other disobeyer is Specialist
 18 or Second Lieutenant or whatever, it's a far more serious
 19 offense when Colonel Cuthbert disobeys that rule relating
 20 to adultery, yes, but it's the disobedience when you knew
 21 full well what the rule was that does damage to morale
 22 and discipline in the armed forces, and that's what
 23 you're getting at. It happens to relate to adultery in

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1 this case, but it could relate to some other things.

2 But commanders aren't — I mean, they
3 think their way through this thing. And the best example
4 that I can think of is one that I dealt with a long time
5 ago. It happened in an academy and there was a young
6 woman officer who was having relations with a few of her
7 students who happened to be cadets. And as you look at
8 this from a senior-subordinate thing, of course, the
9 principal offender is the instructor.

10 But the cadets aren't exactly innocent in
11 this process and you do things — You know, the
12 commander, after telling his lawyer that, "Yes, I agree
13 with your approach to the captain. Now tell me what I do
14 to those young men" — Good commanders deal with these
15 problems all the time. They deal with them fairly, and
16 then they ask the lawyer to make sure that the fair
17 result is within the rules.

18 And what I sense as we just keep agonizing
19 over this same ground over and over is that we're —

20 MR. PANG: But could a —

21 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: — sort of
22 losing sight of the fact that the commanders get to a
23 fair result pretty well and they ask the lawyers to help

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1 degree of disparity, for lack of a better word, between
2 what a commanding officer will do while deployed versus a
3 commanding officer — and I would not be surprised to see
4 that kind of data come back.

5 MR. GITTINS: The Navy supports the
6 suggestion — it's not, you know —

7 MS. POPE: Right.

8 MR. GITTINS: We haven't done a
9 statistical analysis, but the data supports if it's a
10 shipboard offense in the Navy, it's treated more harshly
11 on both sides of the offense. That's clear.

12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I've lost
13 the bubble, okay?

14 MR. GITTINS: Yes, sir.

15 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What is it
16 we're really trying to say? I've lost it. Are we trying
17 to say that there should always be punishment given to
18 both the senior and the junior? Or what is it —

19 MR. GITTINS: I think you have to —

20 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: What is it
21 you're trying to say?

22 MR. GITTINS: I think you have to realize
23 — I think — This goes to the idea of the perception of

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1 them to comply with the rule.

2 MR. PANG: But let me ask you this, then.

3 You know, could a fair result be that the senior is
4 punished more harshly —

5 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: Sure.

6 MR. PANG: — than the junior? And, you
7 know, so I just —

8 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: I would tell
9 you with a straight face what happened in that case that
10 I just posed to you. You know, the officer got
11 reassigned and she got a very bad efficiency report, and
12 she left the Army a year later. The cadets spent a long
13 time walking up and down the area with rifles on their
14 shoulders, but they went on and finished — I suspect
15 finished their careers as cadets and are somewhere out
16 there in the officer corps these days.

17 MR. GITTINS: One of the cases we were
18 provided included an officer — it was a Navy case — an
19 officer case involving a midshipman at the Naval Academy.
20 The officer received Article 15 punishment, BOI, was
21 separated. The midshipman was separated from the Naval
22 Academy. And a \$70,000 payback. That made her probably
23 a junior.

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1 military justice as a fair process and some of what Hank
2 said. If you have consensual activity and one party is
3 punished, the other party is not punished, it leads to
4 the perception that it's not fair.

5 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Okay. But
6 it has nothing to do with the disobedience — You're
7 saying that because both have disobeyed an order, that,
8 therefore, both should be punished.

9 Are you in your recommendation or in your
10 thoughts weighing the position of the individual? And I
11 want to say —

12 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: General
13 Christmas —

14 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: And I
15 heard, you know, let's just keep it enlisted. Let's just
16 keep it in the training for a moment. A drill instructor
17 or drill sergeant or RPI and PI — you know, I keep
18 getting — Okay. And a recruit. Okay.

19 MR. GITTINS: They should both be
20 punished.

21 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: My point is
22 that taking into account the disparity in rank and
23 responsibility and all that, the soldiers-in-training are

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1 MS. POPE: But I lost the point in that
2 case.

3 MR. GITTINS: Well, the point there is
4 you've taken the same — you've made the midshipman
5 responsible for her own conduct. You've punished her —
6 You punished both harshly.

7 MS. POPE: Right. Okay.

8 MR. GITTINS: And they're relatively —
9 They're not disproportionate punishments.

10 MS. POPE: All right. I thought you were
11 saying there was a disparity there, so I didn't — Is
12 there a distinction that you are making between senior
13 and junior in a training environment and senior and
14 junior in the operational side and in a shore
15 establishment? At least from a legal perspective?

16 MR. GITTINS: Not at all.

17 MS. POPE: But I would expect commanding
18 officers who are deployed to be relentless. I think with
19 commanding officers in a shore assignment, in a garrison
20 command, that there is more flexibility because of
21 leadership's judgment, because of overall impact, morale,
22 good order and discipline, and operational expectations.
23 So I would expect there would also be some

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1 not punished. They're just not punished.

2 DR. MOSKOS: Should not be?

3 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: No. They
4 are not punished.

5 DR. MOSKOS: Oh, they are not.

6 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: And they
7 should be. So it's not a disparity in punishment; it's a
8 disparity of whether one is punished and the other is
9 not.

10 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: So you're
11 saying the trainees should be held accountable.

12 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Yes, sir.

13 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Do I hear,
14 though — And this is part of the getting this bubble
15 back into level. Do I hear you saying that the drill
16 sergeant — the trainer — is being disproportionately
17 punished?

18 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: In some
19 cases that's true. General court-martial, for instance,
20 for consensual sex, that's fairly — that's out of
21 control.

22 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: Do we —

23 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: I don't agree

1 with what he's saying and I don't think that he's got
 2 data that can support it; because I know from my own
 3 personal experience of going through that process of
 4 advising a commanding general in a basic training
 5 environment, the general, probably even more than I,
 6 would focus on the needs of the command and the needs of
 7 those two individuals, and really Olympian fairness
 8 issues, and I would focus more on did they play by the
 9 rules or not.

10 And one of these that just comes to mind
 11 is when we first started with women in the AIT outfits.
 12 We had a case that was about to go to a court-martial.
 13 We had a sergeant who had sexual relations with one of
 14 the women in his AIT unit and I brought it into the
 15 general's office with the idea that I was — As a matter
 16 of fact, I probably did recommend a court-martial.

17 But in his asking me questions about it, I
 18 pointed out that it was fairly well established in the
 19 record that out of fifteen women in this unit, ten of
 20 whom had thrown ten bucks in the pool to see who got the
 21 drill in the sack first, it sort of shocked me but it
 22 didn't make his relationship with her court-martial-free.

23 That was just too much for him. He said,

1 "Tom, I'm not going to send that to court. I'll reassign
 2 him out of the training base. But that's just a little
 3 too much for me to criminalize." And I think convening
 4 authorities and staff judge advocates go through that
 5 exercise every day.

6 MS. POPE: But I think it's important —
 7 why it's important for us to have policy and legal
 8 advice, I mean, we had the Chief of Staff say to us —
 9 and this is where we get to policy — that from his
 10 perspective, agree or disagree, it is Army policy that
 11 trainees — I'm losing my...

12 DR. MOSKOS: Are not culpable.

13 MS. POPE: Thank you. Thank you.

14 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: No, they did
 15 not say that.

16 MS. POPE: Consensual. He said —

17 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: He said
 18 there's no such thing as consensual sex in the training
 19 centers.

20 MS. POPE: Right.

21 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: And he
 22 stated it as a Reimer position. I'm not sure you'll find
 23 that in writing.

1 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: But one of those
 2 guys said — I don't know whether it was Sergeant Major
 3 Hall or — somebody said, based on the same question,
 4 that yes, there was the inference that the trainee was
 5 not punished.

6 Now, one of those active duty guys said
 7 that.

8 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: No, the Navy
 9 guy said that that could be.

10 MR. GITTINS: That's the sense. And our
 11 recommendation arising from this portion of our analysis
 12 of data which we will stand up and tell you is incomplete
 13 and is not comprehensive — our recommendation is that
 14 such data should be collected.

15 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: But,
 16 Charles, let me be hypothetical for a minute.

17 MR. GITTINS: That's the recommendation
 18 that comes out of this section. Let me just finish, Bob.

19 In the analysis that leads to that
 20 recommendation, I provide an assessment of what I get the
 21 feeling of. I'm not saying that's a fact. I'm saying I
 22 get the feeling of that from the data that I'm looking at
 23 that I know is incomplete. That's why our recommendation

1 is to collect the data.

2 And that is our recommendation on that
 3 because it is not available from any service with any
 4 degree of reliability and frequency as it stands right
 5 now and the policy-makers should have that data.

6 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: I believe
 7 that the Reimer policy, whether written down or oral, is
 8 inherently unfair.

9 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: Okay. But
 10 let me be hypothetical for a minute. And I'm only using
 11 my life experience and I don't profess to understand law.
 12 But I would bet any one of you in the legal profession
 13 right here that should the case come to pass in a
 14 training center where we decide to take this approach and
 15 you charge a young trainee and she goes to JAG, as she's
 16 going to be told to go by her commander, a defense lawyer
 17 is going to jump at the opportunity and tell her to take
 18 a court-martial.

19 And I will be willing to bet any of you in
 20 here, if you really think carefully, in a court of
 21 military law, the defense will be that she was a soldier,
 22 relatively new to the service; here was this leader; that
 23 regardless of whether she walked in front of him naked,

1 it was his responsibility to defer that type of activity.
 2 And I'm telling you, you would have to — you would knock
 3 me over with a feather if the finding was not "not
 4 guilty." And I'm not sure that what any of you right
 5 here, if you were offered the opportunity to defend that
 6 type of case, wouldn't grab it immediately and argue it
 7 from the same point of view.

8 And so that's why I think General
 9 Christmas' point about can we discern between a training
 10 base, a brand new individual trying to be inculcated with
 11 the values and the discipline of military life, is there
 12 not a difference to that relationship, consensual or
 13 otherwise, than the individual that is now trained and is
 14 maturing in a regular force and something occurs.

15 I mean, maybe I'm missing something.

16 CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK: No. May I speak to
 17 that?

18 The first point I'd like to make is
 19 accountability does not always equate to punishment.
 20 Okay? I mean, you could even have a sentence of "no
 21 punishment" in a court-martial.

22 So these — I'll go back to just my legal
 23 framework on that. You know, assuming you have the

1 elements of the offense on both sides, both parties are
 2 guilty of committing the offense. Then you get into
 3 matters of aggravation or extenuation and mitigation.
 4 Matters in extenuation and mitigation could well cover —
 5 Particularly in a case of accession training. You've got
 6 somebody brand new to the military, hasn't been
 7 socialized in the military culture, and has committed an
 8 offense. Well, that's a matter in extenuation that
 9 explains it.

10 You know, a matter on the other side of
 11 the equation, you have matters in aggravation because
 12 you've got a leader in whom trust and confidence is
 13 placed and who most likely used his or her leadership
 14 position is perpetrating the offense.

15 So I don't know that I would agree — In
 16 fact, I know. I will get in on record: I do not agree
 17 with the recommendation that would say, you know, punish
 18 the junior person in every instance. Yes, hold the
 19 person accountable, but maybe holding the person
 20 accountable means giving that person a little special
 21 education or a little special training and not something
 22 that does not necessarily equate to punishment. And then
 23 I think you get where we're all trying to go.

1 COLONEL ABBEY: And, of course, the
 2 commander has all kinds of tools other than the Article
 3 15 and the courts-martial and in the case like that, I
 4 would say most often they'd get a letter of reprimand,
 5 counseling. It's something that they can't demand a
 6 court-martial for, but I think clearly the more senior
 7 person is, in 90 percent of the time, going to be seen as
 8 more culpable.
 9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I think you
 10 raised a very important point that maybe needs to go on
 11 the record, and it seems to be something that's being
 12 forgotten — is that there are other tools and those
 13 tools are used or should be used — and in those cases I
 14 think probably are — as far as accountability is
 15 concerned, and I think that's the key. Accountability
 16 and good order and discipline, you know, in the training
 17 base, is the simple fact of the responsibility, which is
 18 really a very unique one for a noncommissioned officer.
 19 But I think that one of the things that
 20 perhaps is not recognized is we — at least from
 21 commissions like ours and the Department of Defense in
 22 whatever — reacting to a situation — that they're
 23 looking for black-and-white: there wasn't a court-

1 martial, there wasn't this, there wasn't that.
 2 But there are many tools. The fear is —
 3 And I don't mean to editorialize but I'm going to anyway.
 4 The fear is, is that we take these tools away. That, in
 5 fact, these are no longer tools because we have
 6 legislated what commanders must do. And I would contend
 7 to you when you start to do that, then you will start to
 8 cut down on that commander's ability on the battlefield
 9 when the commander has to make some very unfair
 10 decisions. Unfair which regiment or brigade goes first;
 11 unfair, you know, who's going to sit in this. Decisions
 12 that have to be made that aren't necessarily fair.
 13 So my concern is, you know, in all of what
 14 we do, we'd better not be so proscriptive that we start
 15 to take away the tools that leaders need. And one of the
 16 things we've heard throughout our entire process is
 17 leadership is basically much of the answer to this whole,
 18 you know —
 19 DR. MOSKOS: Yeah. May I ask a factual
 20 question? On the most publicized case, the Aberdeen
 21 incidents, where some of the women were enticing their
 22 superiors and there was some atrocious behavior done by
 23 some of the NCO's and others, was any female who

1 misbehaved punished in any form?
 2 MR. GITTINS: There was an administrative
 3 punishment of one or two women. I don't think anybody
 4 went to court-martial, but the general may know.
 5 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: I have just
 6 received an Army report about that and it didn't deal
 7 with that issue. I can find the answer before you get
 8 down to Williamsburg —
 9 DR. MOSKOS: Well, I mean, these are real
 10 cases that people pay attention to. I mean, sergeants
 11 read the Army Times or whatever and say, "Wait a second,"
 12 you know.
 13 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: My
 14 recollection —
 15 DR. MOSKOS: I think, by the way, one way
 16 of cutting the Gordian knot is I think most of us might
 17 go along with something that says, listen, the
 18 subordinate who — consensual stuff — the subordinate
 19 who misbehaves should be punished in some way, but it
 20 doesn't have to be proportionate to the punishment given
 21 to the superior. But there has to be some kind of, you
 22 know, mutual punishment at a different level.
 23 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: No, I won't

1 agree to that.
 2 DR. MOSKOS: She should always be off?
 3 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: No, I didn't
 4 say that.
 5 DR. MOSKOS: Oh.
 6 COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR DARE: I agree with
 7 the assessment right here that a commander has the
 8 ability to make those tough decisions and make a
 9 determination whether it's appropriate.
 10 MS. POPE: We're getting into
 11 proscription.
 12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: A major
 13 consideration is accountability.
 14 MS. POPE: Accountability.
 15 DR. MOSKOS: Okay. And let me ask another
 16 question here, a factual one. We talked about the "no
 17 smile" regs and all that — or policies, whatever they
 18 are.
 19 Tom, is there a rule on no — in the
 20 training environment, no consensual sex among trainees?
 21 Is there something written down? I mean, is it you can
 22 have sex but not smile? I mean, what's — I didn't quite
 23 understand. Yeah.

1 MR. MOORE: It's called grim sex.
 2 LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAMILTON: Yes, there
 3 are such rules — sex between trainees.
 4 DR. MOSKOS: And this is post-based?
 5 Battalion-based? What?
 6 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: Yes, it's
 7 installation-based. It's not Army-based.
 8 DR. MOSKOS: It's not Army policy.
 9 Okay. Thank you.
 10 BRIGADIER GENERAL CUTHBERT: And I'll try
 11 to get you an answer on the Aberdeen one as to what
 12 actually occurred with respect to the women.
 13 But what I was going to interject was
 14 there's a real legal reason why actions aren't taken
 15 against some of these junior people: they're the only
 16 witness to the offense. And if you want them to testify,
 17 even if you want to just interview them, you have to warn
 18 them that they may be subject to criminal prosecution and
 19 they have an absolute right under Article 31 in the Code
 20 to say nothing.
 21 And it's a much stronger right in the
 22 military community than it is in the civilian world. You
 23 don't have to give that warning if you're a civilian cop

1 until you're about to arrest somebody. If you're a
 2 military commander or a policeman, if you suspect when
 3 that person walks in the door that they may have
 4 committed an offense, you stop and you warn.
 5 And if they're a reasonably bright young
 6 person, they're going to say, "Oops, I'd better not say
 7 anything unless somebody immunizes me." And, of course,
 8 the only way you get her version at that point is with a
 9 grant of immunity, and that will explain why frequently
 10 there isn't any action against the person that Charles
 11 wants to hold accountable.
 12 MR. GITTINS: Well, but that's a
 13 formalized process and I support that process. I
 14 represented a female recruit who testified against some
 15 female drill instructors. She was granted transactional
 16 immunity and she testified. Perfectly — You can
 17 understand the judgment then and the reason therefor.
 18 It's within the system. You've used the system. I don't
 19 dispute that at all.
 20 MS. POPE: Well, is there a way as you all
 21 give us — I'm sorry, Nancy, but at this point I'm going
 22 to lose my thoughts.
 23 As you give us a refined report, revised,

1 that separates policy — that you can somehow articulate
2 how complicated this process is? Because when — I would
3 wager that each of you, when you were JAG's in your
4 respective services, would have recommended to whoever
5 your client was that you go nonjudicial, an article
6 versus a court-martial, for the very reasons on the
7 outside that's used, because for all of — and again, I'm
8 not faulting the lawyer — it is very hard to prove those
9 situations. Those tools are in commanders', you know,
10 access today.

11 So most of you in the very cases —
12 because you know the law, you know when you've got a good
13 case that you take on on the outside, where the services
14 have screwed up and where they've got a weak case, so you
15 would have advised your client to use another process.
16 And all of that is very unique to the military and it is
17 very misunderstood on the outside that says they got away
18 with it, where there was a legal decision, opinion made,
19 that said you will never be successful in court-martial,
20 let's do another option.

21 And I guess that's part of my frustration
22 that — and I think part of what I heard Ron saying, is
23 that those are tools, and there is vast ignorance out

1 that the Commission as a whole thanks you very much for
2 all of your hard work.

3 MS. POPE: Tough job.

4 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: This has been extremely
5 helpful to us. We look forward to getting a little
6 reorganization in the couple of things that have been
7 asked for. We appreciate your continuing emergency
8 assistance to us as we face a bad deadline, and, you
9 know, just thank you once again.

10 (Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the hearing in
11 the above-entitled matter was concluded.)

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1 there about that.

2 And, you know, if there's some way to
3 articulate that as you give us your recommendation, that
4 would be helpful, because it sounds like it is just
5 arbitrary, it's capricious; you pick from here, I like
6 this officer, I like this enlisted; you know, I'm afraid
7 of political pressure, so I'm not going to, you know,
8 punish the female because she's junior, where there has
9 actually been some legal opinions made for a lot of — on
10 good judgment.

11 I mean, things are taken out of context,
12 and I think we've all seen where there's also been over-
13 regulations, over-policies, to react to a single case or
14 a couple of cases when the majority of them work. And
15 it's just very complicated and I'm afraid that this will
16 once again get taken out of context.

17 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Can I interject? Before
18 you all have a heart attack about the extra work, we did
19 have a brief which I think should be in our archives
20 about just the scheme of the process. Beyond that, the
21 actual decisions was something that we asked for in the
22 work papers and couldn't get. But I think what's being
23 requested is just from your personal experience as a

1 litigator, and if you can give a paragraph about the
2 factors that militate on one decision or another —

3 MS. POPE: And if it could be so that a
4 non-lawyer could understand it, I think that would be
5 helpful as it's, you know, excerpted from our report.
6 Thank you.

7 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: We skipped over Bill.
8 Did you have anything, Bill?

9 LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEYS: No.

10 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay.

11 DR. MOSKOS: I said mine.

12 LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHRISTMAS: I have
13 really nothing else except to say that I appreciate this
14 report. You've had to do an awful lot in a very short
15 period of time, based on data that's come, you know, kind
16 of helter-skelter and all that kind of thing. And it is
17 a very emotional issue. It's one that I would imagine
18 we're going to have a hell of a time wrestling with
19 because it is those kind of issues, and those things that
20 you've provided to us, at least from my perspective, are
21 very helpful and I thank you.

22 CHAIRMAN BLAIR: Okay. Well, I see a lot
23 of heads nodding, which I will just convey to the record

Legal Consultants' Reports

**REPORT TO THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER RELATED ISSUES—A LEGAL
PERSPECTIVE**

SUBMITTED BY:

Colonel Thomas G. Abbey, USAF (Retired)
Brigadier General Thomas R. Cuthbert, USA (Retired)
Mr. Charles W. Gittins
Lieutenant Colonel Henry L. Hamilton, USA (Retired)¹
Captain Gerald J. Kirkpatrick, USN (Retired)

¹ Mr. Hamilton concurs with many points, but fully explains his findings and recommendations in his memorandum at page 574.

INTRODUCTION

Task

This report is prepared in response to the request of the Commission that we review, from a legal perspective, the laws, regulations, policies, directives and practices that govern personal relationships between men and women in the Armed Forces. You have also asked us to review how these regulatory authorities govern personal relationships between members of the Armed Forces and nonmilitary personnel of the opposite sex.

We conducted this review as follows: Tom Cuthbert and Hank Hamilton focused on the Army and the rules, regulations and policies applicable to that Service. Jerry Kirkpatrick focused on the Navy, Charles Gittins on the Marine Corps, and Tom Abbey on the Air Force, respectively, and the applicable rules, regulations, and policies. Tom Cuthbert, Jerry Kirkpatrick, and Tom Abbey focused mostly on policy aspects, and Charles Gittins and Hank Hamilton primarily examined aspects of enforcement. All consultants, however, did attempt to assess the consistency of enforcement of the laws, regulations, policies, directives and practices within the Services, primarily with respect to enforcement against officers. We reviewed the reports of the independent panel and the Department of Defense task force and the existing guidance on fraternization and adultery.

The discussion that follows represents a consensus of our views on the matters addressed except where reservations are noted. In conducting our review, we looked for any substantial flaws in those laws, regulations, policies, directives and practices that could adversely affect good order and discipline in the Armed Forces today or in the future.

Panel

This panel of legal consultants represents a wide variety of military experience. Each Service is represented, and we have served at every level of the Department of Defense. Our service has spanned the latter half of this century, yet we all remain currently involved with military legal issues. We have served in peace and war, as line officers and as lawyers, and we have served throughout the world. The issues we address are issues we have faced as counsel for individual servicemembers, as staff judge advocates to our commands, and as policy shapers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

About the Consultants

Charles Gittins

I am a Marine, currently serving in the Marine Corps Reserve as a Lieutenant Colonel. I enlisted in the United States Navy Reserve in May 1974, attended the Naval Academy Preparatory School, Newport, Rhode Island and attended the United States Naval Academy. I graduated in May 1979 -- the last all male class graduated by the institution. Accordingly, I was present for three years while women were integrated into the Brigade of Midshipmen and

I observed first-hand, in that leadership laboratory, the problems and triumphs associated with that process.

Following graduation and commissioning as a Second Lieutenant of Marines, I attended the Basic School, Quantico, Virginia. My further assignments included training in Pensacola as Naval Flight Officer, training as an F-4J/S Radar Intercept Officer (RIO) and a follow-on tour as a RIO with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 and Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 312, MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina. I was the Squadron Legal Officer and Assistant Administrative Officer in both units and I was, therefore, responsible for administration of legal and disciplinary actions in the units. These duties provided me with my first experience with fraternization as I was responsible for processing an enlisted female Corporal for discharge and Captain (Naval Aviator) for NJP and separation through resignation upon the disclosure of their personal relationship that resulted in the birth of a child and their subsequent marriage.

I was selected to attend law school under the Marine Corps Funded Law Education Program in May 1984. I attended Catholic University, Columbus School of Law, was Managing Editor of the Catholic University Law Review (Volume 36) and was awarded the Faculty Award at graduation for the highest scholastic standing in the graduating class. My first assignment as a Marine lawyer following Naval Justice School was as a Defense Counsel and later, as the Senior Defense Counsel, 3rd FSSG, Okinawa, Japan. While assigned as a defense counsel, I tried approximately 25 contested jury trials, including cases of adultery, fraternization, rape and other consensual and non-consensual sexual offenses.

I left active duty in December 1992 and joined the law firm of Williams & Connolly as an associate. While at Williams & Connolly, I successfully represented Commander Robert Stumpf, USN, the Commanding Officer of the Navy's Blue Angels in his Navy Court of Inquiry for alleged misconduct at the 1990 Tailhook Symposium. Thereafter, I opened my own law practice limited to representation of military men and women in military justice and administrative matters. My practice involves representation of military personnel around the world and involves frequent travel to Japan and military bases throughout the United States. In March 1998, I obtained acquittal of the former Sergeant Major of the Army, Gene C. McKinney, on 18 of 19 counts of alleged misconduct and all charges involving his alleged conduct with six female military women. In October 1998, I also successfully defended a Marine Major, Presidential helicopter pilot accused of adultery by the Marine Corps.

On a day-to-day basis, I review, advise, and at times confront, on issues involving sexual conduct, both consensual and non-consensual. In the past two years, whether as a result of my success in the McKinney trial or because the military has focused more attention and military resources on ferreting out and prosecuting sexual conduct of military members, I have seen the percentage of my law practice involving such issues rise dramatically so that at this time more than 60% of my open cases involve either consensual or non-consensual sexual conduct (including sexual harassment).

Tom Cuthbert

My curriculum vitae is enclosed with this paper, but a few words about how I grew up in the Army will disclose more about my perspective and potential biases than a dry resume. I joined the Wisconsin National Guard as a high school boy and served as a loader and as a gunner in a tank crew. I was a member of the Tank Company of the 128th Infantry Regiment. Thereafter, I attended West Point for four years and graduated as a Second Lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers. Following attendance at the Engineer Officer Basic Course and Airborne School, my first assignments were as a bridge platoon leader and as a combat engineer platoon leader in the combat engineer battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division. We were stationed along the demilitarized zone in South Korea. My primary additional duty throughout this fifteen-month tour of duty was as either the battalion defense counsel or as the battalion trial counsel (prosecutor).

My next lengthy exposure to military justice and military discipline in the field was as the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate of the 101st Airborne Division in Vietnam during 1969 and early 1970. Subsequently, I spent three years serving with the post-Vietnam Army in the field in Germany in the early 1970s. All my service to this point was in what was essentially an all-male Army. Yes, there were women in uniform in the hospitals and at some headquarters. Except for a few young women serving with the Red Cross, however, there were no women in the field Army in which I served.

When I returned to the United States from Germany in 1974, I was given the opportunity to serve as the Staff Judge Advocate of the training center at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. At this time women were finding their way into the field Army, and in particular, into Advanced Individual Training units at Fort Leonard Wood. Leaders at Fort Leonard Wood and throughout the Army were tasked with changing an all-male institution into one where women would play an increasingly important role in performing the Army's mission. It is fair to say, in retrospect, that we were not prepared for this task. My superiors and I had spent our military careers preparing for the last battle of the last war rather than the first battle of the next war. And let there be no mistake about our dilemma, we were immersed in the sexual revolution, and we were on our own.

What follows is my impression of how well the Armed Forces are doing today, twenty-five years after my initial exposure to these issues. I would say at the outset that I am very optimistic about the role of women in the Armed Forces. I feel compelled to add that it would be nearly tragic to reject the progress that has been gained through the pain, sad experience and occasional bursts of intelligence that have been the hallmarks of this progress.

Jerry Kirkpatrick

Like General Cuthbert and Colonel Abbey, my military service started in my youth. At the age of 17, while still in high school, I joined the Naval Reserve. Six months later, after graduation, I served on active duty for two years, on board an aircraft carrier. I traveled a lot, saw a lot, and learned a lot. This was the days when "old Navy" was not a clothing store. A drinking fountain was a scuttlebutt, and sailors went topside and below, fore and aft. A young

sailor quickly learned that it was not a good idea to use landlubber terms aboard ship, or for that matter in Navy buildings ashore.

I left active duty after my two-year tour, spent five years as a police officer in Philadelphia, attending college at night (when I could), resigned from the police department, finished college, and enrolled in law school at the College of William and Mary, and went back into the Naval Reserve, this time as an ensign. From law school graduation in 1974 through 1995, I was on active duty, retiring as a captain, USN. Since that time, I have been in the private practice of law in Philadelphia and Northern Virginia.

During my career as a judge advocate, I was a trial and defense counsel, staff judge advocate during two tours totaling four years at sea, executive assistant to the Judge Advocate General, academic director at the Naval Justice School, senior military assistant to the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and director of legal policy in the office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). During my last assignment, I served as a counsel to DACOWITS and a member of its committee dealing with training issues.

As an officer in the Navy, all the service schools I attended, including basic officer training, were gender integrated. All my service at sea was in combatants, in a male-only environment. I recall that during my service as a trial counsel at Norfolk, I prosecuted two, and maybe three, cases of attempted rape, involving as perpetrators enlisted sailors and Marines. Also, when I was the staff judge advocate aboard USS INDEPENDENCE, I worked up at least three administrative discharge cases against officers (one I recall was a commander) for fraternization with enlisted women who were assigned to commands ashore.

Finally, during my career as a naval officer, I was associated with three officer-enlisted married couples. Regarding each, my observations were the same: (1) the couples were discreet and understated in their social dealings, (2) nonetheless, some officers and their spouses seemed uneasy in the presence of the enlisted spouse at officer gatherings, (3) the officers and their spouses were uniformly polite to the enlisted spouse, and (4) some officers and their spouses gossiped liberally about the inappropriateness of the presence of the enlisted spouse, questioning the judgment of the officer half of the couple, and not blaming the enlisted spouse. For me, these were interesting recollections that no doubt colored my perception of current issues of gender integration.

Tom Abbey

My first association with the military--the Air Force-- began shortly after I graduated from high school in Kansas when I entered the Air Force Academy in 1966. Graduating in 1970, I received training in air intelligence, and spent the next 19 months in Vietnam, mainly at Cam Ranh Bay Air Base and in Saigon. At Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, for the succeeding two years, I visited most Air Force installations in the Far East in intelligence-related duties. There were not many women in uniform except in medical units. I did not need to be involved in military justice to know there was much illicit sexual activity and treatment of the opposite sex that would not pass muster in today's military.

After law school and two years as a judge advocate at a large industrial base, I became more involved in military justice, two years solely as a defense counsel in the Pacific area, and then two years at Homestead Air Force Base, prosecuting cases. Then, the central disciplinary problem related to drugs. I then served as a staff judge advocate at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, followed by another three-year tour on the legal staff at Strategic Air Command. We frequently visited legal offices of the 25 bases within the command, providing a means to assess leadership, management, morale, and discipline throughout the command. While assigned to the General Law Division in the Office of The Judge Advocate General from 1990 to 1993, most of my work dealt with officer personnel actions and military personnel policies. I also reviewed all Inspector General inquiries into alleged misconduct of officers in the grade of colonel or higher and helped develop the Senior Officer Unfavorable Information File system. As Director of Legal Policy in DoD (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness) from 1995 to 1997, I frequently participated in reviews, discussions and activities (such as DACOWITS) relating to gender issues.

During my period of active duty, there has been a dramatic change in the roles and contributions of women in uniform in the Air Force for the good of the Air Force and nation. I strongly believe that the culture within the Air Force promotes professionalism in general and professional relationships in particular between persons of different rank, color, or gender. Most organizations, especially military ones, to be effective, require strong teamwork. It is without question that some types of personal relationships strengthen mission-oriented teamwork; others weaken it. The people who serve as leaders and followers must continually assess how their relationships are affecting the team and its performance. People differ in these assessments, quite often based on how they have adapted to military life and inculcated some of the values constantly emphasized in military training and education. As expected, people do not always adhere to the standards they know are right. I think all but a few know the standards pertaining to adultery and professional relationships, they understand them, accept them, and enforce them within reasonable bounds of discretion. Few offenders should be surprised by adverse consequences for breaches. Overall, I believe that Air Force members embrace the positive human relations climate in which they serve--both men and women. It compares favorably to most other living and work environments, but there is always room for improvement.

METHODOLOGY

During the initial meeting of the legal consultants we divided the labor. Charles Gittins, who was asked by the Chairman of the Commission to lead the consultants, would work with Henry Hamilton to assess the issues relating to consistent enforcement of laws and policies. Tom Cuthbert was asked to lead the group of Tom Abbey, Jerry Kirkpatrick and himself in an effort to assess the legal and regulatory environment, to include recent revisions relating to adultery and fraternization.

Based upon the foregoing division of labor, the consultants recommended a request for documents and data that would permit a comprehensive regulatory review, and would sample available enforcement data at selected installations. By 12 January 1999, the Services responded. In our assessment, the regulations provided by the Services provide a complete disclosure of the relevant materials. While additional time might have been helpful in assessing actual compliance with the regulatory framework, *i.e.*, issues relating to consistent enforcement of the laws, we believe we have had an adequate opportunity to assess the strengths, weaknesses, and comprehensive character of the statutory and regulatory guidelines.

Individual Approaches

Tom Cuthbert

I started my review of Army activity with a brief interview with the Army Judge Advocate General. He was well aware of this Commission and its objectives. He and his staff have been fully cooperative in obtaining materials and data throughout this study.

Following my assessments of the documents and the data, I conducted a three-hour interview with The Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Army and a member of his staff. Again, the atmosphere was cooperative. While the opinions that follow are my own, I believe that any differences between existing policy and my views will be accepted as within the realm of reason and not without a basis in fact or in law.

The portion of this report that relates to the Army regulatory environment is my assessment of the regulatory environment that exists today. The analysis begins with an assessment of the statutory framework established by Congress, and works its way down through each level of military authority to an assessment of some company level policies. These company level policies reflect an effort at one installation to deal with the issues relating to the personal relationships between men and women who are peers and who are engaged in initial entry training.

Jerry Kirkpatrick

In preparing this report on laws, policies, regulations, and directives governing gender integration in the United States Navy and problems of assaults of a sexual nature committed upon or by servicemembers, sexual harassment, adultery, and fraternization, I reviewed

applicable laws, policy statements, regulations and directives, and engaged in discussion with the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Counsel to the Chief of Naval Personnel, Staff Judge Advocate to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and various Navy servicemembers, both officer and enlisted. Additionally, data provided by the Navy on officer misconduct cases handled administratively, and officer and enlisted misconduct cases resulting in non judicial punishment or courts-martial, were analyzed and considered in preparing this report.

Requests for data upon which this report is based were addressed by the Commission to the Secretary of the Navy. It is my understanding that the requests were then forwarded respectively to the Chief of Naval Personnel in his capacity as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower and Personnel), Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), and on to CINCLANTFLT subordinate commands, both shore and afloat. Summaries of officer cases were provided by the Chief of Naval Personnel. Identity of CINCLANTFLT responding commands, their size and mission, is not indicated in the data, nor are command-selection criteria. Data collected by CINCLANTFLT was forwarded by the Staff Judge Advocate to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, who then forwarded the data directly to the Commission. The time frame for collection of requested data was constrained, and the timing of the Commission's request proved difficult because of the Holidays and attendant stand-down period for high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO commands. Data collection was further hindered because of a lack of computer-based systems, necessitating manual review of paper files, copy assembly, photocopying, and mailing or delivery by messenger. CINCLANTFLT subordinate commands provided copies of command directives on gender-related subjects, redacted to eliminate command identifiers. Similar directives and policy documents from the Naval Academy and Navy-wide training organizations were provided with identifying information intact.

Tom Abbey

I started this task by meeting with members of the Legal Policy Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense to update myself on developments on professional and unprofessional relationships and treatment of adultery, and to determine what materials would be readily available for review. I also had discussions with the Deputy Judge Advocate General. I met with the Chief of the Military Justice Division who gave testimony to the Commission. I also met with the Director of the General Law Division and his staff. I had a brief discussion with the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy. All parties were open and cooperative. I read working papers compiled by the Air Force in connection with the reviews directed by the Secretary of Defense on matters of fraternization, including working papers for implementation of the recommendations of the DoD panel. I read applicable opinions of the General Law Division, and reviewed selected records of trial involving fraternization and adultery, namely those involving female officers because these cases seemed to elicit the greatest public scrutiny. I reviewed statistical data maintained by the Military Justice Division, trying to ascertain trends and to determine disparate treatment based on gender or rank. In addition, I examined documentation submitted by the Air Force in response to requests from the Commission. I found the synopses of administrative actions to be particularly helpful in evaluating the consistency of enforcement. I found the samples

from individual bases of less value in trying to assess enforcement of policies. The court-martial records provided valuable information on the rationale and many considerations causing the case to be prosecuted.

In view of the availability of Air Force-wide data on Article 15 actions, I did not limit my analysis to sample data provided with regard to the bases of Langley, Keesler, and Travis. To this extent, my review of military justice actions differs from what could be done with respect to the other Services. If the Air Force information management system had included data on victims and co-actors, an analysis more responsive to the Commission's concerns would have been possible.

REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

Introduction

This section of our assessment is intended to provide a general understanding of the laws and regulations that govern personal relationships between men and women in the Armed Forces and between military personnel and civilians of the opposite gender. The legal framework for this law was established long before women were integrated into the Armed Forces, but was established in the context of military personnel and civilians of the opposite gender. The origins of this framework lie, of course, in the Common Law and the Military Law of the British Army and laws governing the Royal Navy.

Statutory Law-The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)

The most serious crimes within this category are nonconsensual crimes of violence. Rape, under the UCMJ, is essentially identical to its common law counterpart, except that in 1995, rape was made gender neutral and the spousal exception was removed. Recently, some states have modified their penal codes to permit prosecution for unwanted sexual intercourse when the indicia of consent or its absence did not meet common law standards. The intent of these reforms generally is to reduce the prosecution's burden of proof on the issue of consent while at the same time reducing the ultimate penalty for conviction of a less serious offense. Some of the misconduct that arose at Aberdeen Proving Ground could be described in similar terms.

In our view, it would be appropriate for the Department of Defense, acting through the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, to give active consideration of these civilian reforms. However, we believe that the legal tools discussed below, are adequate to deal with problems arising from consent issues in cases of unwanted sexual intercourse.

Military law also proscribes attempted rape or forcible sodomy and assault with intent to commit rape or sodomy. The sodomy statute proscribes both oral and anal intercourse. These are serious offenses in military law regardless of the status of the victim.

Similar to a lesser form of the civilian offense of sexual battery, the military offense of indecent assault comprises any unwanted touching done with intent to gratify lust or sexual desire. Because Congress did not specify indecent assault as a crime, it is prosecuted under Article 134, the general article. As is the case with all general article offenses (including adultery, fraternization, indecent acts, indecent exposure, indecent language, prostitution and pandering) the Government must establish that the conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the Armed Forces.

The military offense of cruelty or maltreatment of a subordinate can be used in cases of sexual harassment or misuse of authority to obtain sexual favors. This is a serious offense under the UCMJ and does not require violence or physical mistreatment of a subordinate. This charge would clearly be appropriate where a subordinate consented to sexual relations with a military superior who used his authority to obtain an advantage in the relationship.

The UCMJ also makes criminal some so-called victimless crimes such as adultery. These crimes are called victimless when all parties consent or there is no human victim. These crimes may involve military or civilian personnel. Consensual sodomy, whether homosexual or heterosexual, is such a crime. Indecent language, indecent acts with another, prostitution and pandering also fall within this category of proscribed activity.

Conduct unbecoming an officer is also an offense under the UCMJ which may be used to deal with dishonorable or disgraceful conduct by the officer when the conduct involves a member of the opposite gender regardless of military or civilian status. Engaging in a romantic, but not necessarily an adulterous, relationship with the spouse of a subordinate would be such an offense.

Fraternization is also criminal under the UCMJ when an officer fraternizes with an enlisted member on terms of military equality to the prejudice of good order and discipline or under circumstances that may discredit the Armed Forces. A similar offense may be committed by an enlisted member with enlisted member, or officer with officer, under certain circumstances.

In sum, the UCMJ provides many tools with which to approach the issues surrounding gender integration and gender relationships. These tools are flexible, but they require use by experts and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. These restrictions cause commanders to use UCMJ tools sparingly. Moreover, the whole system of regulating behavior in the Armed Forces relies on the UCMJ as a last resort. That portion of military discipline that can be described as a cheerful, willing obedience to authority is found in closer proximity to enlightened leadership than to the UCMJ. Notwithstanding these restraints, good commanders use all the available tools. Failure to do so quickly erodes morale and discipline among those who would otherwise enthusiastically meet high standards of conduct.

Other Statutory Law

Section 591 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY 1998) directed specific actions by commanding officers, timeliness for commencing and completing investigations, pre- and post-investigation reporting of allegations, reporting of investigation results and actions taken, and a report to Congress on sexual harassment complaints for 1998 and 1999.

Regulatory Law-Department of Defense Directives

In addition to the specific prohibitions of the UCMJ and other proscriptions given effect through Articles 133 and 134, the UCMJ gives criminal sanctions to general punitive regulations that are promulgated by a limited number of senior commands. Most senior among this group is the Department of Defense (DoD).

The Department of Defense role in the regulatory scheme of the Armed Forces has always been limited. In truth, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has no need to promulgate its own punitive regulations because it essentially controls all changes to the

UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial. In addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has full authority to direct the Services to change or adopt new regulations. Accordingly, the field of DoD regulation of individual conduct or relationships is relatively sparse.

In the realm of governing the relationships between men and women in the Armed Forces and the relationships between members of the Armed Forces and non-military personnel of the opposite sex, there is a DoD directive relating to sexual harassment. DoD Directive 1350.2 defines sexual harassment as:

- (1) A form of sex discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when:
 - (a) Submission to or rejection of such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person's job, pay or career, or
 - (b) Submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for career or employment decision affecting that person, or
 - (c) Such conduct interferes with an individual's performance or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment.
- (2) Any person in a supervisory or command position using or condoning implicit or explicit sexual behavior to control, influence, or affect the career, pay, or job of a military or civilian employee. Similarly, any military member or civilian employee making deliberate or repeated unwelcome verbal comments, gestures, or physical contact of a sexual nature.

Under this provision military personnel may be prosecuted or administratively disciplined. Civilian employees may be administratively disciplined. Their treatment under civil criminal law is beyond the scope of this discussion.

DoD Directive 1350.2 is directive on the Military Departments. The Services have issued regulations containing prohibitions outlined in the directive.

We would note in passing that another regulation of importance with regard to individual conduct and relations is DoD 5500-7.R, Joint Ethics Regulation.

Finally, with respect to the Section 591 reporting requirements noted above concerning sexual harassment, DoD issued a directive-type memorandum on 25 February 1998, to which the Services responded by issuing implementing instructions. Regulatory Law-Army Regulations

Regulatory Law-Army Regulations

Army Regulation 600-20 (Command Policy) is the only regulation promulgated by Headquarters, Department of the Army that deals punitively with the subject matter of this study. The basic thrust of this regulation, as well as Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-35 (Relationships Between Soldiers of Different Rank) is to give commanders guidance and examples of proper treatment of senior-subordinate relationships. The focus is not male-female; the focus is senior-subordinate.

Under the Army regulations Commanders are enjoined to counsel or take other action as appropriate, if relationships between soldiers of different rank—

- Cause actual or perceived partiality or unfairness.
- Involve the improper use of rank or position for personal gain.
- Create an actual or clearly predictable adverse impact on discipline, authority or morale.

Clearly, these rules relate to adverse impact on military efficiency and are essentially gender free.

This regulation also contains a flat prohibition against social relationships between permanent party personnel and Initial Entry Trainees. Again, the prohibition is gender free.

It is our assessment that the regulatory framework provided by Headquarters, Department of the Army is a successful, working structure. The policies focus more on how to do things correctly than on a list of prohibitions. Except for the bright line prohibition concerning permanent party and Initial Entry Trainees, these policies provide a nuanced approach that can be used throughout the full range of Army activities. Indeed, this approach is as applicable to civilian-military relationships as it is to officer-enlisted or senior enlisted-junior enlisted relationships. While there is a legitimate craving for bright lines among substantial portions of the military population, this craving usually diminishes greatly when the bright line leads to substantially diminished personal freedom. It is the assessment of all consultants except Mr. Hamilton that there is no compelling need to abandon the Army framework to join a uniform approach with the rest of the DoD on the subject of officer-enlisted relationships.² The Army approach is consistent with all customs of that Service, and it is the product of careful thought. The abiding virtue of the Army approach is that it grants the appropriate commander full discretion to shape a remedy in an individual case or establish a command policy that meets the needs of the command. A bright line rule eliminating all officer-enlisted relationships will diminish this valuable command authority.

² *Ibid* at page 574.

Regulatory Law-Training and Doctrine Command

Almost all new members of the Army serve their initial entry training tour somewhere within the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Thus, TRADOC is an appropriate level of command to promulgate regulatory policy concerning the relationships under study in this assessment. And while TRADOC has established substantial regulatory authority concerning the conduct of initial entry training within the command, TRADOC Regulation 350-6, Initial Entry Training Policies and Administration, is not punitive in nature and cannot be used as a basis for punitive action against a soldier. This regulation is prescriptive in nature and gives detailed guidance on the positive steps that a subordinate command must take to establish a sound and successful initial entry training program. TRADOC Regulation 350-6 appropriately leaves to the training installation commanders the authority to prohibit relationships between men and women that adversely affect morale and discipline within their commands.

Regulatory Law-Installation and Command Regulations

Within the Army many installations and separate commands have their own regulations to deal with these issues. These regulations have the same force and effect as an Army Regulation. However, it is true that no pair of these command or installation regulations is exactly alike. Where installations or commands have similar missions, there is a strong similarity between regulatory efforts to deal with problems arising between soldiers and civilians of the opposite sex.

For purposes of analysis, regulatory efforts are divided into three categories. First, installations that conduct basic combat training. Second, installations that conduct Advanced Individual and Basic Officer Training. Third, installations and commands that support field Army units.

Basic Combat Training Installations

Installations with a substantial number of basic combat trainees, such as Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, or Fort Jackson, South Carolina, essentially build a protective regulatory cocoon around the basic trainee. The cocoon prohibits all social contact between the trainee and others on the installation. Even those soldiers and civilians who have no duties to perform with the trainee may not have social contact with the trainees. These “no social contact” rules are intended to prevent a variety of trainee abuse, but sexual abuse is clearly one of the targets of these rules.

Interestingly, at Fort Leonard Wood the formal rules described above are supplemented with battalion and company policies that prohibit unofficial social contact between initial entry trainees of the opposite sex. The purpose of this set of rules is understandable. Perhaps the purpose is even laudable, although we are skeptical about the enforceability of such rules. However, it seems that if regulations need to go so far as to forbid social contact between trainee peers of the opposite sex, then a better solution would be

to make basic training a single sex program. Bonding between peers is an essential part of basic training. To divide a basic training unit by sex defeats this purpose.

Fort McClellan, Alabama, which has a mission similar to Fort Jackson and Fort Leonard Wood, has nearly identical rules for dealing with permanent party-initial entry trainee issues. However, Fort McClellan has also specifically prohibited instructor-student social relationships. These prohibitions also affect officer and noncommissioned officer students. Unlike Fort Leonard Wood, Fort McClellan does not attempt to restrain social relationships among military peers.

Advanced Individual Enlisted Training and Basic Officer Training

The Army's Medical Center at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and the Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, face similar training challenges. Both installations provide advanced individual training to enlisted soldiers and basic and advanced training for officers. While both installations provide identical cocoon-like protection for advanced individual trainees, they go on to provide similar protections for all students to proscribe all social relationships with the permanent party. Fort Huachuca goes even further and prohibits social relationships between:

- Officer students and enlisted students
- Noncommissioned officer students and officer students
- Noncommissioned officer students and enlisted students
- Any student and USMA and ROTC cadets.

Fort Sam Houston relies on more traditional Army rules of fraternization in dealing with these latter issues. While the detailed prohibitions that apply at Fort Huachuca may be enforceable in the short run for brief temporary duty courses, we are skeptical about their effectiveness among soldiers of any grade who are assigned together for any lengthy period of time.

At Fort Bliss, Texas, there is a unique blend of field Army units and initial entry training. The protective cocoon for advanced individual trainees is consistent with the installations discussed above. But Fort Bliss also extends protections to all soldiers "new to the military" including students in the Officer Basic Course. Thereafter, Fort Bliss relies on traditional Army rules for dealing with senior-subordinate relationships. In doing so, however, the Fort Bliss regulation provides additional useful descriptions of specific prohibitions rather than relying on service custom. From our perspective, the Fort Bliss approach is clearly on target. The Fort Bliss approach is not a panacea, but it does not attempt to regulate where enforcement is impracticable and it provides the rationale for the prohibitions as well as announcing the prohibitions.

Traditional Field Army Units

At the level of the traditional field Army, there are few prohibitions relating to this topic other than those basic rules applicable to the entire Army. However, several commands have seen a requirement for regulating punitively the use of quarters and sleeping areas.

These rules, such as those imposed at Fort Lewis, Washington, for example, usually restrict visitation in the barracks. The rules routinely prohibit visitors of the opposite sex from staying in a room past midnight regardless of the military or civilian status of the visitor. Similar rules exist in Korea and other overseas locations, but enforcement of such rules is problematic. In our experience, punitive action for violations of visitation rules occurs only as a last resort and then only when visitation disturbs other soldiers occupying adjacent sleeping areas.

Regulatory Law—Navy

The policy and regulatory regime in the Navy regarding gender-related issues appears highly centralized. Navy-wide policy, implementing laws and regulations of the Department of Defense, is stated with clarity and disseminated throughout the Service, where in some cases, directives from higher authority are appended in whole or in part to local implementing instructions. In other cases, the language contained in directives of higher authority is repeated verbatim or paraphrased, with varying degrees of attribution. In all instances where copies of directives were provided to the Commission, it is our opinion that laws, directives, and policies of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy were promulgated clearly and forcefully at the local command level, often with specific examples of permissible and impermissible conduct, and admonitions to seek command guidance and direction, or direction from higher authority, where questions might remain in the minds of individual servicemembers or commanders.

In testimony before the Commission, Captain William DeCicco, Counsel to the Chief of Naval Personnel, outlined the laws and regulations governing conduct of Navy servicemembers in the area of gender-related issues. Specifically, he talked about Articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including Article 92, which prohibits the violation of lawful general regulations, Article 93, which prohibits cruelty and maltreatment of subordinates, Article 120, which criminalizes rape, Article 125, which criminalizes sodomy, Article 133, which criminalizes conduct unbecoming an officer, and finally, Article 134, the general article, which makes conduct found to be prejudicial to good order and discipline and conduct that is service-discrediting a criminal offense. Such conduct includes adultery, indecent assault, assault with intent to commit rape or sodomy, bigamy, wrongful cohabitation, prostitution, indecent acts, and fraternization. In examining the regulations governing Navy personnel in these areas, it is our opinion that such prohibitions are clearly and well stated, and that, assuming these regulations are taught to all personnel again and again throughout their periods of service, and demonstrated by personal example through leadership, there should be little, if any, confusion, ever, on the part of any Navy servicemember regarding required conduct.

The bedrock directives governing fraternization and sexual harassment in the Department of the Navy are Navy regulations, Articles 1165 and 1166, respectively. Article 1165 states that “Personal relationships between officer and enlisted members that are unduly familiar and that do not respect differences in grade or rank are prohibited.” Moreover, Article 1165 prohibits personal relationships between officers or between enlisted members that are unduly familiar and do not respect differences in grade or rank, where such relationships are prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit on the Naval Service.

Article 1166 prohibits (a) sexual harassment, (b) reprisal action against a person who provides information on an incident of alleged sexual harassment, (c) knowingly making a false accusation of sexual harassment, and (d) while in a supervisory or command position, condoning or ignoring sexual harassment of which the person has knowledge or has reason to have such knowledge.

Sexual harassment in the Navy is prohibited by SECNAVINST 5300.26C. This is a Department-wide directive that has been implemented further by the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy’s Equal Opportunity Manual. As noted by Captain DeCicco in his testimony, the Navy-wide directive adds requirements for training in the area of sexual harassment, counseling for victims, and investigation of complaints. Examination of implementing directives at subordinate levels of command shows that policy statements on this subject usually restate language from the SECNAV instruction, provide avenues for bringing complaints to command attention, provide for investigation of such complaints, and address administrative or disciplinary action for offenders.

Similar to sexual harassment, it appears that a policy prohibiting fraternization is stated forcefully and consistently throughout the Navy. The prohibitions in Navy regulations, Article 1165, are amplified in OPNAVINST 5370.2A, which is entitled, “Navy Fraternization Policy.” This instruction contains detailed background and discussion regarding conduct that constitutes fraternization, and is, therefore, prohibited, and assigns action and responsibility to seniors throughout the Navy chain of command to “ensure that all members of the command are aware of the [stated policy],” prevent fraternization in their respective commands, and take appropriate action to address offending conduct. The instruction also establishes grades E-7 through E-9 as a separate category for purposes of the fraternization policy. Examination of implementing directives of the Naval Academy, Navy Recruiting Command, various training commands under the cognizance of the Chief of Naval Education and Training, and commands subordinate to CINCLANTFLT indicate that the policies and accountability provisions of OPNAVINST 5370.2A have been clearly and consistently restated for applicability at the local command level.

It appears that the subject of adultery gets far less treatment in the Navy’s regulatory regime. It is mentioned in less than five percent of the sample of Navy directives provided to the Commission and made available to the authors of this report. In the sample directives wherein the subject is mentioned, it is covered very briefly. Without further discussion, adultery is stated as prohibited conduct, punishable under the UCMJ, and, often, the term is defined.

Regulatory Law - Marine Corps

Like the Navy, the Marine Corps is guided by the largely shared and highly centralized Navy-wide directive system. For the Marine Corps, the same authorities, Article 1165 and Article 1166, U.S. Navy Regulations, govern relationships and sexually oriented conduct between military members, regardless of gender. In addition, SECNAVINST 5300.26C, a Navy Department-wide regulation sets forth the Marine Corps policy on sexual harassment and, as a punitive order, provides a mechanism to prosecute violators (Violation of a lawful general order or regulation) under Article 92, UCMJ. The maximum punishment for a violation of this (or any other general order) is a Dishonorable Discharge, confinement for not more than two years, reduction to the lowest enlisted paygrade (for enlisted personnel) and total forfeitures of pay.

Unlike the Navy, the Marine Corps has not published a separate "Fraternization Policy" directive. The Marine Corps policy on fraternization is one of long-standing prohibition which is instilled in recruits and officer trainees from the first day of basic training. For those who have experienced Marine training, it is unlikely that any trainee could convincingly claim ignorance of the Marine Corps fraternization policy of prohibition.

A sampling of directives obtained from Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, demonstrates that the Marine Corps major subordinate commands follow varying approaches in publication of orders, as would be expected of commanders each with distinct and unique command philosophies. Those commands choosing to publish specific command directives appear careful to follow the language of the Navy-wide regulations. Other commands appear content -- and properly so -- to rely on the Navy regulations and Navy-wide directives. All of the major commands -- and subordinate commands down to at least the battalion level -- publish a Commander's Equal Opportunity Policy, which are conspicuously posted on command bulletin boards for the information of all personnel.

The Commission also was furnished command directives issued by the Marine Corps Base Schools Command. The Marine Corps schools aboard Marine Corps Base train Marines in a variety of military occupational specialties as a follow-on training to Marine Boot Camp. The mission of these schools, generally to provide initial skill training to inexperienced junior enlisted Marines, apparently generated the requirement to publish regulations amplifying and clearly articulating the standards of conduct between school attendees and between instructor cadre and trainees. These regulations reflect the legitimate command concern for appropriate professional relationships between trainees and between trainees and instructors.

The shared sexual harassment policy of the Navy and Marine Corps, promulgated in the punitive order, SECNAVINST 5300.26C provides the Navy and the Marine Corps with an effective method of prosecuting or disciplining administratively violators of the sexual harassment policy. However, in addition to prosecution under the Navy punitive order, the Manual for Courts-Martial provides for prosecution of sexual harassment under Article 93, UCMJ (Cruelty or Maltreatment of a subordinate). While either prosecution for a violation of a general order or prosecution under Article 93 provides a viable means of imposing disciplinary action in sexual harassment, the punishment for a violation of a general order

carries as its maximum punishment confinement for two years while a violation of Article 93, UCMJ carries as a maximum punishment one year confinement. Thus, the very same conduct -- sexual harassment -- may subject the alleged offender to double the maximum punishment based solely on the whim of the commander or the charging authority (usually the prosecutor or Military Justice Officer) in choosing which Article under which to charge the conduct. The Commission should recommend that the Department of the Navy review this anomaly in maximum punishments for alleged sexual harassment.

Regulatory Law – Air Force

As for all the military services, Air Force members may be punished for the offense of fraternization under Article 134 of the UCMJ, as that offense is defined in the MCM.

The Air Force also has adopted a regulation, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2909, entitled Professional and Unprofessional Relationships. The present regulation in force is a version dated May 1, 1996. It superseded a version dated February 20, 1995, entitled Fraternization and Professional Relationships. A revised regulation is being staffed.

The Instruction defines the terms “professional relationships,” “unprofessional relationships,” and “fraternization.” Detailed, general guidelines are provided on situations likely to lead to unprofessional relationships. Except for specific prohibitions applicable to officers such as “officers will not engage in sexual relations with or date enlisted members,” punitive actions normally would be preceded by a lawful order to cease an unprofessional relationship or refrain from certain conduct. In specific guidance for responding to unprofessional relationships, the regulation states (paragraph 8):

If good professional judgment and common sense indicate that a relationship is causing, or may reasonably result in, a degradation of morale, good order, or discipline, corrective action is required. Action should normally be the least severe necessary to correct the relationship, giving full consideration to the impact the relationship has had on the organization.

The regulation recognizes that rules regarding relationships must be somewhat elastic to accommodate differing conditions, the “underlying standard is that Air Force members are expected to avoid those relationships that negatively affect morale and discipline.”

The instruction requires training on the concepts of unprofessional relationships and fraternization in various education and training programs and requires that commanders ensure their personnel are trained at least annually.

AFI 36-2909, paragraph 5, in setting forth specific prohibitions in officer/enlisted relationships, states that the custom against fraternization in the Air Force “extends beyond organizational and chain of command lines.” As to officer/enlisted marriages, such members are “expected to respect all customs and courtesies observed by members of different grades when they are on duty or in uniform in public.”

Except for installations and commands that are responsible for the bulk of training and education (AETC), it appears that policy promulgation is highly centralized with little or no amplification of policy promulgated by Headquarters, United States Air Force. The centralization of policy promulgation, without significant supplementation by lower echelon commands, contributes to a common understanding by Air Force members of what is permissible and what is not. Further, centralization of guidance seems important for a consistent enforcement of policy.

Supplemental guidance in certain training, school, and educational environments is justified because personal relationships between students and instructors or staff in the training and school environment present particular risks and are especially likely to result in abuse of position, partiality or favoritism by instructors or staff, or create the appearance of such.

ATC Regulation 30-4, addressing professional conduct and relationships, lists specific prohibitions applicable to faculty and staff and others applicable to trainees. Of the three bases sampled, that regulation was applicable only to Keesler AFB, Mississippi, where the 81st Training Group also promulgated a publication called Military Training Policy and Airman Handbook containing guidance on professional relationships and sexual harassment among other topics.

In response to the Commission's request for guidance at the installation level, we received a letter from the Wing Commander, issued in April 1997, to commanders, encouraging them to have each officer read the Air Force instruction on professional and unprofessional relationships.

On the subject of unlawful discrimination, sexual harassment, and equal opportunity, the Air Force has promulgated Policy Directive 36-27, dated 3 September 1993. Among other things, it states:

Whenever unlawful discrimination is found, the Air Force immediately eliminates it and neutralizes the effects. Commanders or supervisors who are aware of unlawful discrimination by subordinates but fail to take action may be disciplined.

A memorandum for all Air Force personnel, dated 28 February 1995, signed by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff, is characteristic of policies in this area:

Air Force policy on discrimination and harassment is very clear.
No amount of any kind will be tolerated.

It distributed a pamphlet in a very readable, understandable format to enhance sensitivity to indicia of inappropriate conduct and methods for dealing with it.

AFI 36-2706 provides more definitive guidance and implements the aforementioned DoD Directive 1350.2. It sets forth detailed education requirements and specific guidance for

handling of complaints, investigations and inquiries for military personnel. AFI 26-2707 is directed at nondiscrimination on a wider scale, *e.g.*, in administration of Air Force programs with contractors.

CONSISTENT APPLICATION

Consistent Application of Laws, Policies, Regulations, Policies and Directives

Section 562(a)(2) of the Commission's implementing legislation calls upon the Commission to:

Assess the extent to which the laws, regulations, policies, and directives have been applied consistently throughout the Armed Forces without regard to the armed force, grade, rank, or gender of the individuals involved.

Given the time constraints imposed by the project, the holiday period, and the time required for the Services to respond to data calls from the Commission, the consultants concluded that the best way to provide the Commission with an assessment of whether there is consistent application of law, policy, and regulation, *etcetera*, without regard to Armed Force, grade, rank or gender, was to ask the Services for disciplinary action data for a small, but representative group of military installations from each of the Military Services. Additionally, the Commission asked the Military Services to provide data on officer misconduct cases adjudicated by each of the Military Services. The Commission request for data was restricted to certain sexual offenses including rape, adultery, indecent acts, indecent language, sodomy, and fraternization and further requested information on the co-actor in cases involving consensual sexual offenses between military personnel.

Based on our review of the data provided by the military services, some trends are apparent. Generally speaking, the more junior the enlisted accused and co-actor engaged in prohibited sexual conduct, the more likely they will receive generally equal punishments. This was particularly true for consensual sex-related offenses involving junior enlisted personnel involved in training environments punished for violations of training regulations and on board ship for violations of shipboard regulations governing conduct between the sexes. For the sampling of bases we reviewed, each of the Services generally imposed equal punishment in the same forum (usually non-judicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ) for consensual sexual activity between junior enlisted personnel. For the Navy, for example, males and females of equally junior enlisted rank caught violating the shipboard order not to be behind a locked door with a member of the opposite sex were punished identically regardless of gender. The same result generally obtained in each of the other services where junior enlisted trainees engaged in prohibited relations with another trainee. While equality of punishment for junior enlisted co-actors regardless of gender clearly is practiced in the field by the services, the frequency with which commanders are required to turn their attention from the mission of the organization to address these relatively minor disciplinary issues detracts from mission effectiveness and accomplishment. The bulk of these relatively minor offenses would be eliminated by instituting gender-separate basic training, indicating that the issue of separate basic training among the sexes should be further considered.

As the rank disparity between the co-actors increases, however, the data provided the Commission indicates a potentially statistically significant disparity in the punishments received as well as the seriousness of the forum for the proceeding. For example, for consensual sexual offenses between trainees and instructors across the Services, the instructor is likely to face significantly harsher punishment than the trainee and frequently at a significantly more serious forum (such as general court-martial). While this may reflect the military society's view that the instructor should have been in a position to control his actions, the fact remains that consensual sex is just that -- consensual. In the absence of *quid pro quo* sexual harassment, it is difficult to justify imposing a federal conviction and a potential term of confinement for one actor in consensual sex while the other actor receives little more than a reprimand. Although trainees are youthful, they still are required, no less than instructors, to comply with the rules governing their conduct once they have been told what the rules are.

Finally, in cases of fraternization, adultery and other consensual sexual acts between officers and enlisted personnel, there appears to be little uniformity of disciplinary action between the co-actors. For example, among Navy officer disciplinary cases, the Commission requested information concerning the disciplinary disposition of the enlisted co-actor for 25 cases involving consensual sexual activity. The Navy's response to this request indicated that of these 25 cases, no disciplinary action of any kind was taken for 13 of the enlisted personnel involved as a co-actor in the consensual sexual relations.

Similarly, among the Marine Corps officer disciplinary cases involving consensual sexual offenses, the Commission requested information relating to the disciplinary disposition, if any, of the co-actors in the sexual conduct in only 21 cases. The Marine Corps provided no substantive responses to this request for data. It is unclear whether the Marine Corps took this request seriously. The response provided the Commission -- repeated seriatim -- was that "our records do not contain information regarding what disciplinary or administrative action was taken against the [enlisted co-actor]."

The Marine Corps response was unfortunate because Marine Corps Order 5354.1C (The Marine Corps Equal Opportunity Program), ¶ 3012, requires that Marine Corps commands monitor disciplinary statistics for possible trends of unequal treatment and further that Marine Corps commands ensure that military justice and administrative separation functions are actually performed free of discrimination. The Marine Corps apparently is unable to determine whether the officer/enlisted co-actors in only 21 cases were disciplined in a fair and discrimination-free manner by providing basic disposition data in these cases. Thus, the Marine Corps response to the Commission suggests that the Marine Corps has no mechanism for review and evaluation of disciplinary and administrative separation actions in order to comply with MCO 5354.1C.

The Military Services do not maintain meaningful information on the disciplinary dispositions of co-actors involved in consensual sexual activity. The Commission should recommend to Congress that the Services maintain such data (free of personal identification data) so that the chain of command, Congress, and the public may be informed as to whether co-actors in consensual sexual offenses are receiving comparable disciplinary actions.

ADULTERY

The Opinion of Mr. Gittins, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Kirkpatrick -- Adultery

Although the proposed changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) regarding adultery can be fairly touted as “not changing a thing,” it begs the question – why do it? The Pentagon claims that the amendments will provide needed “guidance” to commanders in the field. Yet, when the General Counsel’s review panel queried commanders in the field, the near-unanimous response was “current guidance is clear and understood—no change is necessary.” The adultery review panel received literally hundreds of such comments during the process.

In his 7 June 1997 announcement, Secretary Cohen “instructed the General Counsel of the Department of Defense to review the clarity of existing guidance on adultery.” Secretary Cohen took great strides to emphasize that the “language of the Code” would not be changed but that instructions for implementing Article 134 as it pertains to adultery would be “examined” for “clarity.” Changes to the MCM were only to be considered “if necessary.” Irrespective of the fact that the “Code” could not be changed unilaterally by the Secretary, it becomes further perplexing that when overwhelming numbers of commanders indicated no need for further “clarification,” proposed changes to the MCM continued their way towards approval. To date, public comments have been received and upon Secretary Cohen’s approval the proposed amendments to the adultery provision under Article 134, MCM will await approval from the President.

That commanders overwhelmingly indicated no need or desire for clarifying language augers for caution in re-writing the MCM provision on adultery. And, the fact that Pentagon officials adamantly claim that no legally substantive changes are being made, establishes that no legal or military reason exists to justify this re-write of the MCM adultery provision. The real impetus for change is seemingly found in Secretary Cohen’s own public statement in which he cites recent media attention. Although the media can play an important role in informing the nation of public events, media attention or even public sentiment has little relevance to the MCM amendment process absent a clearly articulable military or legal necessity. No such legal or military necessity exists according to those required to work with the current codification.

From a technical standpoint, the “guidance” provided in the MCM proposed amendments, for the most part, are factors which could apply to all good order and discipline offenses under Article 134. Therefore, it is particularly odd for the proposed amendments, which are approximate restatements of current military court precedents, to be buried exclusively within the adultery subsection of Article 134. In context, the proposed mitigating factors apply to each of the approximately eighty other Article 134 offenses. This special attention in re-writing the MCM to add mitigating conditions to the offense of adultery to the exclusion of all other offenses under Article 134 may send a significant but unintended message – “do not enforce this offense if you can help it!”

Any amendment to the MCM, if at all, should be made at the beginning of Article 134 under paragraph 60(c)(2)(a) – a section specifically intended for considerations and circumstances which make conduct subject to prosecution or which are intended to be mitigating considerations. If placed in this location, they would provide useful instructions to commanders and judges pertaining to all Article 134 offenses. Importantly, paragraph 60(c)(2)(a) already includes significant portions of the proposed language, thus further questioning the need or purpose for these proposed changes.

Another reason that compels caution in adoption of this initiative, however, is its timing. A change to the MCM requires an Executive Order signed by the President of the United States. An Executive Order promulgated by the President “clarifying” standards for prosecution of adultery could send the wrong message to military personnel that the high standards of conduct expected of them are subject to political whim or the media image of the moment. Some could even view it as a mockery of those very same high standards.

With no legitimate legal or military necessity for amendment of the MCM provision on adultery, a near-unanimous message from the field that no further clarification of the offense of adultery is required, and with the potential for demoralization of military members expectant of uniquely high moral standards, there is a legitimate and overarching concern for the wisdom and necessity of these changes. This proposed re-write should die an ignoble death. We strongly recommend the Commission concur in recommending to Congress that it be opposed.

The Opinion of Mr. Cuthbert and Mr. Abbey -- Adultery

Mr. Cuthbert and Mr. Abbey generally agree with the approach adopted by the Department of Defense with respect to the proposed changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial on adultery. However, making changes only to the adultery provision should not be done without making conforming changes to other Article 134 offenses, where applicable.

We concur that adultery should not be decriminalized under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts-Martial. We believe that outright decriminalization would be offensive to many military members and their families and deprive commanders of an important disciplinary tool to deal with incidents of adultery that adversely impact the military mission. However, all consultants except Mr. Hamilton believe that the proposed reduction in the maximum penalty for adultery will be largely acceptable to those who administer and live under the UCMJ. It appears that adultery alone, without aggravating factors, if punitive action is warranted, usually is handled by an Article 15 rather than court-martial. In other words, the reduced maximum sentence should not have a significant impact on current practice. In the Air Force, at least, it appears that many of the officer adultery cases evoke a command response including an Article 15 action followed by an administrative action to separate the officer.

Military training and education emphasizes leadership by example, integrity, self-discipline, accountability and responsibility. Adultery involves a breach of trust, and is seen

by many as an integrity issue, and under many circumstances, adultery can have significant disruptive effects on morale and unit cohesion.

Administration of discipline requires the exercise of discretion by a commander. The DoD approach allows exercise of discretion, but, by highlighting adjudicative principles and factors that require a commander to assess the impact of misconduct of adultery on the military mission, more uniform application of discretion may be achieved. Improved uniformity, although uniformity is not an absolute tenet for the administration of justice, may reduce perceived disparities of sanctions against adulterous conduct.

The DoD approach continues to allow adultery to be punished if it is merely discreditable and prejudicial to good order and discipline. We believe that this is sensible. There may be instances of adultery that cause disrepute to the military, and particularly if committed in certain areas outside of the United States, cause disrepute to the United States.

While there may be more tolerance for adultery in society at large, and the military is a microcosm of larger society, the consultants believe that the demands of military service justify a discipline system that may impose "tougher standards" than what would be acceptable outside of the military environment.

All consultants believe that emphasis on prevention has some potential for reducing the incidents of adultery that result in punishment. Servicemembers clearly should be placed on notice that under many circumstances that the offense of adultery can end a military career.

Air Force-Wide Nonjudicial Punishments (Adultery)

The information management system for tracking Article 15 actions permitted system-wide collection and evaluation of disciplinary data for the Air Force that was not available for the other Services.

Adoption of similar automation by the other Services would facilitate analysis of disciplinary trends. Information systems that capture the military status, and rank, or other relationship to the military would facilitate evaluation of disciplinary actions involving adultery.

Absent victim and co-actor data contained in the military justice reports, the more detailed factual descriptions contained in synopses of adverse actions, provide a basis for generalizations on the military status and gender of victims and co-actors.

For the period of January 1, 1996 through December 1, 1998, the Air Force provided computerized statistical reports for actions that included at least one specification of actual or attempted sexual harassment, sodomy, fraternization or unprofessional relationships, adultery, indecent language, or rape.

During this period, other records of the Air Force showed a decline in these kinds of cases and in the overall number of Article 15 actions:

1996	1997	1998
371 (9,265)	242 (8,293)	185 (7,098)

Synthesis of the data in the computerized records revealed the following information with respect to adultery:

Year/Quarter	Total	Male	Female
96/1	67	57	10
96/2	70	55	15
96/3	55	45	10
96/4	75	59	16
97/1	44	35	9
97/2	51	42	9
97/3	43	35	8
97/4	32	27	5
98/1	30	22	8
98/2	41	31	10
98/3	17	14	3
98/4	31	26	5
Average/Mean	46.08/43.5	37.5/35.0	8.83/9.0

Enlisted Data:

Year/Quarter	E1-E3 (Male/Female)	E4-E6 (Male/Female)	E7-E9 (Male/Female)
96/1	22/4	25/4	3/0
96/2	14/5	34/8	5/2
96/3	11/3	26/6	2/0
96/4	13/6	34/9	8/0
97/1	9/3	18/5	6/1
97/2	15/5	19/3	3/0
97/3	10/4	18/4	2/0
97/4	7/0	15/4	1/0
98/1	4/3	15/5	2/0
98/2	10/8	18/2	1/0
98/3	3/2	11/1	0/0
98/4	5/4	17/1	1/0
Totals	123/92	250/56	34/3

Officer Data:

Year/Quarter	O1-O2 (Male/Female)	O3-(Male/Female)	O4-O5(Male/Female)
96/1	1/1	3/1	3/0
96/2	0/0	1/0	1/0
96/3	0/0	2/1	2/0
96/4	1/0	3/1	0/0
97/1	1/0	1/0	0/0
97/2	2/0	3/1	0/0
97/3	0/0	3/0	2/0
97/4	0/0	1/1	2/0
98/1	0/0	1/0	0/0
98/2	1/0	1/0	0/0
98/3	0/0	0/0	0/0
98/4	1/0	1/0	0/0
Totals	7/1	20/5	10/0

LEGAL CONSULTANTS' REPORTS

During the period, there were four male colonels punished by Article 15 for adultery.

Comparison of the Article 15 data with demographic data provided by the Air Force, broken down by grade and gender, indicates that junior enlisted females receive a relatively high percentage of the Article 15s for adultery for junior enlisted members.

Comparison with approximate courts-martial data involving officers, based on tracking sheets of the Military Justice Division, indicates that, in 1996, there appeared to be approximately 22 such cases resulting in preferral of charges to trial (includes the offenses of fraternization, adultery, sodomy, conduct unbecoming, failure to obey a regulation). Two of the accused were female captains. The males prosecuted ranged in grade from second lieutenant to colonel. The more senior the officer-accused, it appears more likely that dismissal is included in the sentence. In this context, we note that for all the Services, the case data show that particularly for senior personnel, adultery has been a career terminator in many instances, resulting not only in personal tragedy but also in the loss of seasoned talent and experience for the Services.

In 1997, it appears that there were about 24 cases resulting in preferrals for similar offenses. Six involved females, including two cases that resulted in considerable publicity (a lieutenant colonel who committed suicide after her conviction and a lieutenant cited for failure to obey the Air Force instruction, false statement, adultery, conduct unbecoming who had a resignation in lieu of court-martial approved by the Secretary of the Air Force).

Air Force-wide nonjudicial punishments (fraternization)

For purposes of comparison, the following table shows numbers punished for fraternization during the same period:

Year/Quarter	Total	Male	Female
96/1	4	3	1
96/2	1	1	0
96/3	6	5	1
96/4	12	11	1
97/1	8	5	3
97/2	6	6	0
97/3	6	5	1
97/4	4	3	1
98/1	5	2	3
98/2	3	3	0
98/3	5	5	0
98/4	12	11	1
Average	6	5	1

It appears that all offenders were officers except starting in the second quarter of 1998, some of the offenders (seven) are enlisted, normally coded as a violation of Article 92. There appeared to be no enlisted offenders for fraternization in the 1996 and 1997 data. Of the officers receiving Article 15s for fraternization, most were lieutenants and captains.

TRAINING

One area of particular concern in achieving effective gender integration in the Services is the need for more and better training throughout the chain of command. This is tied closely to the need for personnel at all levels to be intimately familiar with military law and the military justice system, to understand how and why these differ from civilian life, and how the peculiarities of military law and the military justice system contribute to good order and discipline in the Armed Forces.

In testimony before the Commission, General Trefry and General Miller spoke to a general erosion of experience with the military justice system on the part of today's officers and noncommissioned officers. As they noted in their testimony, some of this erosion can be attributed to changes to the UCMJ, which mandated roles for lawyers serving as military judge, trial and defense counsel, and provided for an accused to have the opportunity to request trial by a military judge alone, as opposed to court members. These developments have contributed to a diminution of the role of line officers in the court-martial system, with the attendant result that increasingly fewer line officers have ever sat as a member of a court-martial. General Trefry provided an example when he related that recently, he addressed a group of Army officers newly promoted to general-officer grade and asked how many had ever served as members of a court-martial. Out of about 90 officers present, 5 hands went up. Informal polling of officers in the other Services suggests that this proportion is fairly representative across the board.

Interestingly, while both Generals Trefry and Miller would support a recommendation to "put regular line officers back on courts," each recognized significant problems this recommendation could pose. Neither was willing to ignore the shortcomings of the old system, including lack of sufficient legal education and training for presidents of courts, law officers, trial and defense counsel. Additionally, there was concern over fairness and impartiality, and perceptions that these were often lacking under the old system. General Miller summed up his thinking on the subject when he stated, "I would not recommend that we put officers back into special courts-martial because there's some times you just cannot walk the dog back on that issue. It would be too revolutionary, in effect, for the military services to go back to that." See Volume II, "Transcripts" page 103, (17Nov98, page 132).

There are, however, two areas in Generals Trefry's and Miller's testimony that are addressed extensively throughout and should form concrete recommendations to be made by this Commission. The first is to increase training at all levels in military law and the military justice system. Consideration should be given to mandating an increased level of instruction annually on the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial for all military personnel. At the very least, such instruction should cover the punitive articles, non judicial punishment, levels of courts-martial and penalties, roles of participants, and selected issues of command interest and concern. Oversight as to content should be provided by the respective Judge Advocates General.

In his testimony, General Miller commented that 20 years ago, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College devoted about 5 per cent of the curriculum to military justice,

and now instruction in this area is limited to “a day or two.” Based on our collective knowledge and experience, and some informal polling, this pattern of reduction in training appears to be representative of the Services. Generally, line officers and enlisted personnel have progressively been getting less training in military law and the military justice system, from entry-level training to senior service schools. Again, based on our collective knowledge and experience, and informal polling, we believe that if someone were to randomly administer a test to measure an appropriate level of working knowledge to personnel up and down the chain of command, the results would be disappointing.

Allied to the need for more formal education, is a need for line officers and enlisted personnel throughout the chain of command to acquire hands-on experience as participants in the military justice system. This was testified to extensively by Generals Trefry and Miller, complete with examples of how this can be accomplished. Accordingly, the subject requires little amplification here, except to suggest that the Commission formulate a recommendation for legislation mandating the Secretary of Defense to develop requirements and guidelines for increasing participation in the military justice system by line and non-lawyer staff personnel, officer and enlisted, throughout the chain of command. This should include participation as investigating officers/noncommissioned officers (including Article 32, UCMJ, investigating officers), serving as members of courts-martial, and assignment as assistant trial and defense counsel.

Again, based upon our collective knowledge and experience, if authorities at the highest levels do not mandate these reforms, they are not likely to happen, because in some cases, they will be difficult to accomplish. Many commands are hard pressed to meet their commitments. Added training in military justice and hands-on participation in courts-martial take time. No doubt, these considerations will be voiced. Also, as alluded to by General Miller in his testimony, the trend over at least the past 20 years has been to institutionalize military justice as the domain of lawyers, while minimizing the role of commanders and command personnel. Concomitantly, there has been a trend toward consolidating convening authorities, thereby precluding widespread experience on the part of commanders in convening courts. These factors, and others, will militate against institutional acceptance of our proposals.

Nonetheless, despite some possible short-term challenges in implementation, the Services and their personnel can benefit considerably from increased formal training in military law and continuing practical experience as participants in the military justice system. The purpose of the military justice system is to ensure good order and discipline in the Armed Forces within the framework of our country's Constitution and body of law. It is first and foremost a tool of command. If, however, it is to be truly effective, it must be a tool that is firmly in the hands of knowledgeable and experienced commanders.

While there is a proper role for lawyers, this role is not and should not be dominant. Under the UCMJ, commanders investigate the charges. Commanders convene the courts. Commanders approve the findings regarding each charge and specification, and, commanders approve the sentence. To do these things competently, and with an appropriate level of consistency, takes knowledge and experience gained over time. That is why education in

military justice should not simply be an “add-on” in the curricula of Service schools. Rather, it, along with regular, practical experience, needs to be an integral part of every officer’s and noncommissioned officer’s formation as a military leader. Attendance at courts-martial by junior officers and first-term enlisted personnel as a part of regular professional military education would also go far in educating military personnel on the importance and fairness of military justice. This can go a long way in creating an improved climate of good order and discipline, which will benefit the Armed Forces overall, and in which gender integration can proceed in a healthy and positive manner.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has reviewed the laws, regulations, policies, directives and practices that govern personal relationships in the Armed Forces. It has addressed the differences between Service policies on fraternization.

We will not attempt to summarize the descriptive materials in this report, but we will restate the key points of the critical commentary.

First, it is important to recognize that the Armed Forces have made great progress in dealing with these issues over the past 25 years. What has occurred has been part of a revolution, a revolution that is not yet finished. However, the rules for behaving in the military community are now well established. These rules are generally uniform, although they sometimes overreach. Minor adjustments will always be necessary, but the fundamentals are established.

We suggest a possible revision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice with regard to the crime of rape. Military law, with its maximum penalty of death for rape, deals well with brutal, forcible rape. Military law does not, however, deal as well with the spectrum of conduct that runs from brutal, forcible rape through date rape to post-coital remorse. Some fine-tuning along the lines followed in a variety of civilian rape law reforms may be appropriate. This is only a lacuna. Experienced prosecutors can use the other provisions of military law to deal with serious misconduct, but we believe this issue is worthy of serious technical review.

Excepting Mr. Hamilton, we do not perceive a strong need for uniformity among the Services as indicated by the Department of Defense direction on the rules governing personal relationships between members of the Armed Forces.³ In particular, we see little value arising from a presently directed but not yet implemented change to the Army's policy on fraternization. First, the experience in the American Army since the outbreak of World War II is that the distinction between officers and professional enlisted personnel is an increasingly false distinction. The real distinction lies between the professional and the novice. Even more importantly, the current Army policy gives commanders, at every level, the discretion to deal with the issue of personal relationships in his or her unit based upon the needs of morale and discipline in that unit. The need for proscribing personal relationships tends to relate far more to the mission and the character of the unit than on the officer-enlisted dichotomy. Moreover, the command discretion basis for having a flexible policy applies in all the Services, not just the Army. Accordingly, we urge the Commission to carefully consider rejecting the current DoD initiative on fraternization. At a minimum, we recommend that you seek to let the Army retain its existing approach.

This being said, when members of different Services live and work together, there may need for accommodations. These accommodations can be worked by commanders at the

³ *Ibid* at page 574.

appropriate level. The above comments should not be construed to mean that the officer-enlisted designation has become an anachronism. What has happened is that the stature and influence of non-commissioned officers have increased in the all-volunteer force. There can be many instances of relationships among enlisted members and among officers that are prejudicial to good order and discipline, whether or not they are in the same unit.

With respect to the training establishment, it is the shared view of Mr. Cuthbert, Mr. Gittins, and Mr. Hamilton that the issues with which we struggled so seriously twenty-five years ago have been substantially resolved. However, the difficulties of gender integrated basic training continue to be significant. In their shared opinion single sex basic training is clearly preferable to attempting to prohibit social relationships between trainee peers of the opposite sex. The current practice at Fort Leonard Wood, which attempts to prohibit social relationships between trainees of a different sex, is of questionable practical enforceability and substantially undercuts a primary value of gender integrated basic training. Train as you fight is a sound principle, but no basic training unit fights as a unit. It is their assessment that the Armed Forces would be better served by single sex basic training.

To this assessment of single sex basic training, Jerry Kirkpatrick and Tom Abbey express reservations. Mixed gender training and education seems workable in many institutions throughout the country, including the Service academies. The solution to problems in mixed gender training environments, in their opinion, is to develop rational rules that are understood and enforceable with consistency.

While we perceive other minor shortcomings in the regulations addressing these important and contentious issues, we see none that pose a substantial threat to morale, good order or discipline in the Armed Forces.

**REPORT TO THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING
AND GENDER RELATED ISSUES -- A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE**

REPORT SUBMITTED BY: HENRY L. HAMILTON

INTRODUCTION

I generally concur with the main report submitted by Mr. Gittins, Brigadier General Cuthbert, Captain Kirkpatrick and Colonel Abbey. I submit this separate report to highlight certain matters about which there may not be consensus and for the practical reason that I was unable to travel to Arlington, Virginia to fully cooperate in the preparation of the main report. The portions of the main report with which I disagree are set forth in this separate report.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

I retired from the Army in March 1994 after serving 22 years on active duty including 14 years as a judge advocate. My Army career involved serving in armored cavalry and air cavalry troop units through 1976 followed by law school under the Funded Legal Education Program at the University of Texas. With one interruption, I prosecuted and defended soldiers at courts-martial from 1979 through 1986. From 1986 through 1990, I served in special operations units, including a classified unit, at Fort Bragg. From 1990 through my retirement in 1994, I served as the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate at Fort Jackson and implemented policies for gender segregated and gender integrated initial entry training at that installation. All my active duty experience with violations of gender policies and related sex crimes predates the Aberdeen courts-martial.

I am currently a partner with the law firm of Ratchford & Hamilton, LLP in Columbia, South Carolina, a firm with 6 attorneys. My practice involves only litigation and criminal defense. Approximately thirty percent of my clients are military and approximately fifteen percent of my practice involves criminal defense of soldiers and officers for violations of gender policies and related sex crimes. The vast majority of the soldiers I represent at courts-martial are stationed at Fort Jackson; however, I also represent soldiers at other installations from time to time such as Fort Gordon and Fort Bragg.

METHODOLOGY

I reviewed Volumes I, II, III and V of the Army's submissions ("Army submissions") except for documents which could reasonably pertain to individuals who might have been my past clients. I scanned the submissions from the Air Force and Marine Corps, as well as the truncated, incomplete and unhelpful submissions from the Navy. Due to court appearances in the last portion of January, I was unable to receive, review or scan any other submissions.

In addition to the Army submissions, I relied on my experiential observations of violations of gender policies and related sex crimes from 1990 through the present. As part of my law practice, I speak several times each week with noncommissioned officers, and

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company and field grade officers within the Fort Jackson community. With less frequency, I speak with lower enlisted soldiers at Fort Jackson and noncommissioned officers and officers at Fort Gordon, Fort Bragg and other installations as well as soldiers and officers in the Army Reserve and National Guard. This separate report is based on my experience with Army gender procedures, their implementation, and their violations; experience was gained from my interactions with Army personnel other than clients who have been accused of violations of gender policies and related sex crimes. In the event that my experiential observations were clearly inconsistent with conclusions that could be drawn from the Army submissions, I declined to set forth such observations.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Unequal Treatment Based on Sex, Rank and Race. There clearly exists the perception by a substantial number of Army personnel, and I believe it is in fact the case, that violations of gender policies and related sex crimes are not treated equally with respect to factors of sex, rank, and race. With respect to sex, females are punished at a rate less often as males. With respect to rank, noncommissioned officers are clearly punished with substantially greater frequency than soldiers in training.¹ With respect to race, particularly among noncommissioned officers, the rate of punishment of black noncommissioned officers exceeds the rate of punishment of white noncommissioned officers.

Soldiers-in-training are generally unaccountable for violations of gender policies and related sex crimes when drill sergeants are involved. In some instances, such as at Fort Jackson, the regulation which makes punitive violations of gender policies grants, in effect, up-front blanket anticipatory immunity to soldiers-in-training who engage in relationships with drill sergeants.² Even when a gender policy regulation does not grant immunity, prosecutors typically seek immunity for soldiers-in-training in order to obtain their testimony against accused drill sergeants. In any event, soldiers-in-training are seldom punished for engaging in gender policy violations or consensual sex acts with drill sergeants.

The disparate punishment of noncommissioned officers is also demonstrated when a drill sergeant and a soldier-in-training are both punished by the same vehicle, say, an Article 15. An Article 15 for a soldier-in-training is essentially meaningless and cannot become a part of the soldier's permanent record. In contrast, an Article 15 for a noncommissioned officer ensures that that noncommissioned officer will eventually undergo processing for QMP separation. In other words, an Article 15 for a noncommissioned officer is a gut shot which bleeds until it kills his career.

¹ I did not review submissions pertaining to general officer misconduct and decline to observe whether officers of higher rank are punished less often than personnel of other ranks for violations of gender policies and related sex crimes. Brigadier General Cuthbert, who has studied Volume IV of the Army's submissions, informs me that officers appear to be punished more frequently and harsher than they had been punished a short time ago for the same misconduct.

² Although the latest version of Fort Jackson's gender policies regulation permits coordination with the Staff Judge Advocate to avoid application of the general immunity for soldiers-in-training, this step is seldom carried out.

With respect to unequal punishment based upon sex, it is perceived, and I believe it is accurate, that males are punished at a rate more frequent than females with perhaps one exception: a male soldier-in-training engaging in a gender policy violation with a female soldier-in-training. In such a scenario, the male and the female are typically both punished in the same manner.

With respect to unequal treatment based upon race, there exists an almost unanimous perception among black noncommissioned officers, which I believe is accurate, that they are punished at a far greater rate than white noncommissioned officers for gender policy violations and related sex crimes.

2. Assumptions that Gender Policy Violations By Males Always Involve Force. The Aberdeen scenario rendered the notion of “constructive rape” vogue. Rape in common law, as well as in Article 120 of the UCMJ, has always required force and a lack of consent. After Aberdeen, the mere disparity in rank is routinely urged as sufficient force to constitute the requisite force in a rape offense. Of course, the individuals prosecuted at Aberdeen were males.

What underlies the assumption that disparity in rank constitutes force? I do not believe it can simply be explained by the authority inherent in the position of male drill sergeant, especially in the AIT context as at Aberdeen.³ Instead, the matter rests on the feminist assumption that all sexual intercourse involves some degree of force by men, i.e. that, to one extent or the other, all men are latent or overt predators. In some feminists' ideology, all sex, even consensual sex, necessarily involves force. This assumption, which has now been institutionalized, helps explain why males receive harsher and more frequent punishment than females for violations of the same gender policies.

3. Need for Bright Line Rules. Soldiers understand consistent and clear rules, but experience difficulty with vague and nebulous nuances. The Army gender policies concerning drill sergeants and soldiers-in-training vary dramatically from installation to installation. Moreover, the same gender policy may be interpreted differently among noncommissioned officers acting in good faith at the same installation. In short, the Army has so many policies, most of which are convoluted to one degree or another, that the Army's gender policies concerning drill sergeants and soldiers-in-training are in chaos.

There is no rational explanation why TRADOC cannot formulate one punitive gender policy for initial entry training to be implemented at all the Army's installations. No valid argument exists why gender policies should vary by installation.

The Army permits each training installation to craft its own punitive policy concerning relationships between soldiers-in-training and drill sergeants. In addition to lacking coherence, this means that drill sergeants and commanders cannot be trained in a universal

³ AIT soldiers are “Army-wise” and are generally incapable of being unduly influenced by drill sergeants. By the time a soldier arrives at AIT, she knows what the rules are, what she can get away with, and what her drill sergeant is supposed to do or not do.

policy at, say, the TRADOC pre-command course. Instead, each drill sergeant and commander must adapt to the nuances of his or her installation. TRADOC should craft a uniform punitive regulation governing gender policy at all initial entry training installations.

I do not concur with the main report's conclusion that the Army should be granted a special dispensation concerning fraternization. Bright line rules should also be implemented pertaining to fraternization throughout the Armed Forces. Opposition to implementation of Secretary Cohen's standardized fraternization directive cannot be justified on the basis of any circumstances which exist in the Army but which do not exist in the Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force. Standardization among the Services becomes even more important as joint operations and training increase.

4. Gender Integrated Initial Entry Training Is a Mission Distracter. Opinions on this issue have been published for the last several years. It is my observation that gender integration makes no sense from a military or common sense perspective. Gender integrated initial entry training is, quite simply, driven by a feminist agenda in order to incrementally achieve the goal of placing women in combat.

Meanwhile, gender integration creates substantial distraction from effective initial entry training at two levels: sexual attraction between drill sergeants and soldiers-in-training of the opposite sex, and sexual attraction between soldiers-in-training of the opposite sex. Both of these distractions degrade training effectiveness and fail to produce the training quality that could otherwise be achieved if initial entry training were gender segregated.

To avoid the dangers faced by male drill sergeants in training females, male drill sergeants often decline to legitimately interact with or correct female soldiers-in-training to the same extent they interact with and correct male soldiers-in-training. This provides a lower quality of training for females but is perceived by male drill sergeants, to one degree or another, as a prudent course of action given the dangers in being accused of sexual advances toward a female during initial entry training.

5. Comparing Race Integration to Gender Integration Is a False Analogy. The Army's outstanding success with racial integration cannot be logically argued to push gender integration. With racial integration there were no different rules for black and white soldiers in the integrated Army; nor did rules exist to prohibit or govern the mixing of races in the integrated Army.

In contrast, with gender integrated initial entry training, there exists a plethora of disparate rules and standards for males and females, e.g. physical training requirements. In addition, there exists a web of convoluted, non-standardized rules which prohibit or set limits on relationships in the gender integrated environment. Accordingly, the Army's outstanding success in integrating the races lacks meaningful analogy to gender integrated initial entry training.

6. Adultery as a Crime Under Article 134, UCMJ. To the extent that the main report recommends that the maximum punishment for adultery be reduced, I nonconcur.

Adultery should remain a crime and its punishment should not be changed because adulterous acts degrade and destroy military families. The multi-point analysis offered by Secretary Cohen to determine whether adultery should be punished or prosecuted defies intelligent implementation at the unit level. Secretary Cohen, while pretending to maintain adultery as a crime, has essentially erected a decision tree which is so convoluted that it will deter punishment of adultery. A military judge's instruction to court-martial members embodying Secretary Cohen's decision factors could be the longest jury instruction in the history of courts-martial. The decision factors are simply too numerous and, therefore, unworkable.

To my knowledge, it has not been emphasized that adultery is frequently accompanied by violent crimes, especially among lower enlisted soldiers and noncommissioned officers. Adultery should remain a viable punishable offense because the commission of adultery often leads to crimes of violence in the military.

RATCHFORD AND HAMILTON, LLP

Columbia, South Carolina
January 29, 1999

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TALLY OF CONTESTED VIEWS
LEGAL CONSULTANTS

This tally only includes those issues of disagreement. Other than these listed below, the consultants concur in the findings and recommendations. See attachments for further explanations of views.

- 1. Recommend the Commission oppose Secretary Cohen's order requiring the Services to make policies and regulations more uniform regarding relationships commonly referred to as "fraternization."**

Agree: Gittins, Cuthbert, Abbey, Kirkpatrick

Disagree: Hamilton

- 2. Recommend the Commission oppose the proposed changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial regarding adultery as neither necessary nor justified by a legitimate military or legal rationale.**

Agree: Gittins, Hamilton, Kirkpatrick

Disagree: Cuthbert, Abbey

- 3. Recommend separation of the sexes during basic training to save trainers and commanders valuable and substantial time in the area of regulating male/female social relations and because the regulations have gone too far in criminalizing otherwise harmless and beneficial social interaction engendering disrespect for the law and, in the long-term, failing to be efficacious.**

Agree: Gittins, Cuthbert, Hamilton

Disagree: Abbey, Kirkpatrick

- 4. Mr. Hamilton's addendum and supplemental memorandum detail his views on matters he raised during testimony. Other than testimony, the other consultants did not offer positions on these issue.**

**SUMMARY ADDENDUM
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

**CONCERNING THE REPORT TO THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES----A LEGAL
PERSPECTIVE**

INTRODUCTION

The Legal Consultants' Report was prepared in response to the request of the Commission that we review, from a legal perspective, the laws, regulations, policies, directives and practices that govern personal relationships between men and women in the Armed Forces. The Commissioners also asked the Legal Consultants to review how these regulatory authorities govern personal relationships between members of the Armed Forces and nonmilitary personnel of the opposite sex.

FINDINGS CONCERNING THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

1. The Uniform Code of Military Justice proscribes forced sexual conduct such as rape, forcible sodomy, indecent assault, and sexual harassment (in the form of maltreatment of a subordinate) as well as consensual sexual conduct including, *inter alia*, adultery, sodomy (oral or anal intercourse) and indecent acts, which are considered conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline or of a nature to be service discrediting. The Uniform Code of Military Justice also proscribes certain unprofessional relationships between officer and enlisted personnel, which are considered "fraternization" when the conduct is prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting. In training environments particularly, relationships between the genders are considered unprofessional due to the particular environment (shipboard or entry level training, for example). Such relations may be proscribed by regulation punishable as disobedience of a lawful order.

2. Section 591 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY 1998) directed specific actions by commanding officers, timeliness for commencing and completing investigations, pre- and post-investigation reporting of allegations, reporting of investigation results and actions taken, and a report to Congress on sexual harassment complaints for 1998 and 1999.

3. The legal consultants reviewed the regulations of each of the Military Services. All of the services regulations reviewed were consistent with Department of Defense policies concerning equal Service regulations differed from one Service to the next, the overarching principles were consistent across the services. Uniformity is not a requisite from one service to the other. Four of the five legal consultants believe that each Service should have the flexibility to promulgate regulations that best reflect the needs of the individual Services. Mr. Hamilton believes that uniform standards should be applied across the board to all of the Services.

4. Department of Defense Directive 5505.8 requires that before military criminal investigators may investigate consensual sexual activity, the Commanding Officer of the military member concerned must believe credible information of consensual sexual misconduct exists and that the expenditure of investigative resources is appropriate under the circumstances.

5. The legal consultants agree that the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Service promulgated regulations have proven equal to the challenge of enforcing discipline in the Armed Forces and providing a mechanism for punishing consensual and non-consensual sexual relations between military personnel.

Legal Consultants' Policy Recommendations Regarding Law/Regulations

1. Congress should consider amending Article 120, UCMJ (forcible rape) to mirror the civilian criminal laws encompassing the crime of rape. Amending the statute to encompass a range of maximum punishments depending on the seriousness of conduct (the maximum sentence under the UCMJ is presently death or life imprisonment) may have a salutary impact on military justice. As it stands now, there is no incentive for military members accused of "date rape" to admit guilt because of the relatively draconian potential penalty. Adjusting the maximum penalty by legislating "degrees" of punishable conduct are likely to improve the functioning of the military justice system by encouraging prosecutors to charge the most appropriate offense with the most appropriate penalty and by encouraging military personnel accused of the less violent forms of non-consenting sexual intercourse to admit their guilt with knowledge that they will not face the death penalty or life imprisonment.

2. The majority of the legal consultants believe that Secretary Cohen's proposed changes to the offense of adultery should be rejected. If not rejected outright, the proposed changes should be made to paragraph 60(c)(2) of the Manual for Courts-Martial, which provide the explanation of Article 134 relevant to *all* 85 offenses punishable under Article 134, UCMJ. OSD has failed to articulate any legitimate legal or military necessity for amendment of the Manual provision on adultery; near unanimous responses from the field indicate that no further clarification of the military offense of adultery is required by the end-users; and, amendment of the Manual to address transitory concerns based on cases that have attracted unfavorable public and media attention is simply unjustified.

3. The Navy and Marine Corps presently punish sexual harassment as a violation of the Secretary of the Navy Instruction (5300.26C) prohibiting sexual harassment in the Navy (maximum confinement, 2 years) or as Maltreatment of a Subordinate under Article 93, UCMJ (maximum confinement, 1 year). Thus, the very same conduct -- sexual harassment -- may subject the alleged offender to double the maximum punishment based solely on the whim of the commander or the charging authority (usually the prosecutor or Military Justice Officer) in choosing which Article under which to charge the conduct. The Commission should recommend that the Department of the Navy review this anomaly in maximum punishments for alleged sexual harassment depending solely upon the charging decision.

FINDINGS CONCERNING TRAINING ENVIRONMENT

Installations providing basic combat training in the Army, and other services, build a protective regulatory cocoon around the basic trainee. The cocoon prohibits all social contact between the trainee and others on the installation. These “no social contact” rules are intended to prevent a variety of trainee abuse and mission distracting personal relations, but sexual abuse is clearly one of the targets of these rules. In fact, formal Army regulations typically are supplemented with battalion and company policies that prohibit unofficial social contact between initial entry trainees of the opposite sex. These local regulations and their enforcement are of dubious legal efficacy and result in expenditure of time and resources otherwise available to perform the training mission of the organization rather than imposing discipline for these relatively minor transgressions.

Legal Consultants' Policy Recommendation Concerning Basic Training

1. Three of the legal consultants (Cuthbert, Gittins, and Hamilton) urge that the Commission should consider recommending to Congress the separation of the genders for initial entry-level basic training as we believe that this separation will enable the trainees to concentrate on socialization in the military environment without the inherent distraction of inter-gender relations and the real potential for punitive actions for otherwise trivial social interaction between the sexes. Separation of initial training by gender is likely to result in less command time devoted to resolution of the large number of relatively minor disciplinary infractions relating to violation of the social relations orders and policies governing conduct between the genders in basic training. This time, which our experience has shown is a resource to be husbanded, could be more productively spent training and educating the basic trainees.

2. Two of the legal consultants (Kirkpatrick and Abbey) do not believe that same-sex basic training is required and do not join this recommendation.

FINDINGS ON CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF LAW AND REGULATION

1. Generally speaking, the more junior the enlisted accused and co-actor engaged in prohibited sexual conduct, the more likely they will receive generally equal punishments. This was particularly true for consensual sex-related offenses involving junior enlisted personnel in training environments punished for violations of training regulations and on board ship for violations of shipboard regulations governing conduct between the sexes. For the sampling of bases we reviewed, each of the Services generally imposed equal punishment in the same forum (usually non-judicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ) for consensual sexual activity between junior enlisted personnel.

2. As the rank disparity between the co-actors increases, however, the data provided the Commission indicates a potentially statistically significant disparity in the punishments received as well as the seriousness of the forum for the proceeding. This may reflect proper

consideration of rank as an aggravating factor in dispensing punishment, although insufficient information was provided by the services to fully evaluate this consideration.

3. The Military Departments do not maintain information on the disciplinary dispositions of co-actors involved in consensual sexual activity, despite Congressional intent and service regulations requiring the Services to ensure that military justice and discipline are imposed in a non-discriminatory manner.

Legal Consultants' Policy Recommendation Concerning Consistent Application

1. The Commission should recommend to Congress that the Services maintain such data (free of personal identification data) so that the chain of command, Congress and the public may be informed as to whether co-actors in consensual sexual offenses are receiving comparable disciplinary actions for comparable violations of military law.

2. The Commission should recommend to Congress that entry level enlisted personnel and officers be provided more than the present cursory training in military law. Leaders at every level need to know and understand how military law operates. Consideration should be given to including as a Professional Military Education requirement including more comprehensive instruction in military justice as well as attendance at a court-martial for each first term enlisted member and junior officer to enhance their understanding of the operation of military justice and its importance to good order and discipline in the Armed Forces.

Attachments:

1. Memorandum from BG Thomas Cuthbert, USA (Ret) on Law and Policy Distinction.
2. Memorandum from BG Thomas Cuthbert, USA (Ret) on Constructive Force (Constructive Rape).
3. Memorandum from BG Thomas Cuthbert, USA (Ret) on regulations and cases cited in making his recommendations.
4. Memorandum from CAPT Gerald Kirkpatrick, USN (Ret) on Law and Policy Distinction and further views and explanations.
5. Memorandum from LTC Henry Hamilton, USA (Ret) on cases cited in making his recommendations.
6. Memorandum from LTC Henry Hamilton, USA (Ret) with his further views and explanations.
7. Memorandum from COL Thomas Abbey, USAF (Ret) with his further views and explanations.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES

FROM: TOM CUTHBERT
SUBJECT: LAW AND POLICY DISTINCTIONS

In our discussion on 30 January 1999, you requested that we identify those recommendations that we made as either "legal recommendations" or "policy recommendations." It is worth noting at the outset that the distinction between law and policy is not always clear at the highest levels of the government. Frequently, the distinction between the two is difficult to identify, and occasionally the distinction is meaningless. Nevertheless, what follows are our best efforts to comply with your request. We hope this will assist you in your analysis of the issues and our work. A principal recommendation from our group was that the Commission support a modernization of military rape law that would bring the Uniform Code of Military Justice more in consonance with rape law found in progressive civilian jurisdictions. The Model Penal Code, for example, provides an example of rape law that fits the spectrum of criminal behavior from brutal, forcible rape through date rape to post-coital remorse. While changing rape law could be considered a policy choice, this recommendation should properly be considered a legal recommendation. A majority of our panel also recommended that the Commission support a position that would permit each Service to continue its own approach to the issue of fraternization. This recommendation lies closer to a policy recommendation than the previous one, but we are compelled to add that the new DoD policy on fraternization will make criminal some behavior in the Army that was not previously criminal. Accordingly, the legal effects of this policy choice are substantial. To make criminal some human behavior that has been lawful in the past and is not inherently immoral is far more than "new policy," and it should be recognized as such.

Even closer to the realm of pure policy is the recommendation that the Commission scrutinize practices at Army Training Centers that prohibit social relationships between Basic Trainees. We went on to recommend that, if these practices are to be continued, the Commission should support single sex Basic Training. The practices we criticized have resulted in the criminalization of basic social relationships between peers in the basic training process. This criminalization engenders disrespect for the law, and, in our view, will be of questionable long-term efficacy. We made this policy recommendation, not because we hold any expertise in military training, but because we have some special expertise in efforts to use the criminal law to enforce prohibitions against conduct that is not inherently criminal. It is our professional opinion that the policies we criticize will be counter-productive because of the way the criminal law operates in the military community.

Our recommendation to increase training in military law is clearly a policy recommendation for which we make no apologies. The generation of military and naval officers that understood this law because of their hands-on experience as junior officers is now retired. Leaders at every level have a need to know how military law operates, and yet far too few of them have the essential training and experience necessary to use military law effectively and fairly. We believe the Commission can and should support such an increased training effort because we believe the goals of the Commission will be more achievable if the leadership of the Armed Forces has a better working knowledge of their legal environment.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES

SUBJECT: CONSTRUCTIVE FORCE - Sometimes referred to as Constructive Rape

In response to a request from the Commission, the discussion that follows sets forth the law of constructive force under military law, and then goes into a brief discussion of three leading cases concerning constructive force.

Both force and lack of consent are necessary to the offense of rape. In the law of rape, various types of conduct are sufficient to constitute force. The most obvious type is physical force, that is, the application of physical violence or power, which is used to overcome or prevent active resistance. Actual physical force, however, is not the only way force can be established. When intimidation or threats of death or physical injury make resistance futile, it is said that "constructive force" has been applied, thus satisfying the requirement of force. Hence, when the accused's actions and words or conduct coupled with the surrounding circumstances, create a reasonable belief in the victim's mind that death or physical injury would be inflicted on her and that resistance would be futile, the act of sexual intercourse has been accomplished by force.

If the alleged victim consents to the act of sexual intercourse, it is not rape. The lack of consent required, however, is more than mere lack of acquiescence. If a person who is in possession of her mental and physical faculties, fails to make her lack of consent reasonably manifest by taking such measures of resistance as are called for by the circumstances, the inference may be drawn that she consented. Consent, however, may not be inferred if resistance would have been futile under the totality of the circumstances, or where resistance is overcome by a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm, or where she is unable to resist because of the lack of mental or physical faculties. (From time to time this latter factor becomes controlling to show an absence of consent when the victim is comatose from the abuse of alcohol. This factor does not have much to do with constructive force.)

Constructive force arises where there is evidence that an accused used his military position or rank or authority in order to coerce the victim to have sexual intercourse. The fact finders in the court-martial may use the evidence to decide whether the victim had a reasonable belief that death or great bodily harm would be inflicted upon her and that resistance would be futile.

Under this test, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has found constructive force in a rape case where a drill sergeant of the victim's husband confronted the victim in a secluded trailer, threatened to take disciplinary action against the victim's boyfriend if she did not have sex with him, alternated a loud and demanding voice with reasonable civilian conversation, and employed language directly exploiting his status as a drill instructor. This court also upheld a rape conviction when the section leader of the victim's boyfriend first met and confronted the victim in an area that was unfamiliar to her, created a coercive atmosphere by threatening to report her boyfriend, spoke in a commanding and authoritative tone, and

indicated an intent to use whatever force was necessary to have sexual intercourse with the victim.

In a subsequent case, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces upheld a rape conviction on a constructive force theory where there was substantially less intimidation. In this case, *US v. Clark*, 35 M.J.432 (1992), the victim attended basic training at Fort Jackson after graduating from high school. With less than thirty days in uniform, she was assigned kitchen duties under the supervision of the defendant, a Sergeant First Class. The victim testified that the sergeant had scared her and made personal remarks to her during the day. She also testified that he ordered her to clean some equipment in a shed that was not occupied by any other personnel. After following him to the shed, he entered behind her and shut the door in a small, pitch-black room with brick walls. She was 5'1" and 120 pounds. He was 5'8" and 210 pounds. He grabbed her arm and kissed her. She did not return his kiss and stiffened her body. She did not verbalize an objection. The defendant exposed his penis and rubbed the victim's hand back and forth on it. He then directed her to unbutton her trousers. She unbuttoned only the top two buttons, hoping that he would be unable to get her trousers down and would stop. He was able to pull her trousers down below her buttocks but was unable to engage in intercourse. He then ordered her to turn around and bend over. The defendant then penetrated her vagina and engaged in intercourse while roughly grabbing her breast. She then made her first verbalization, telling the appellant to stop by stating "Someone may come." The defendant then stopped, looked out the door, and let her leave.

While the Clark case clearly represents an extension of the "constructive force" theory, it does not represent the proposition that any sexual relationship between a cadre member and a basic trainee amounts to rape. Indeed, the two concurring opinions in the case make this essential point clearly. Accordingly, any testimony you have received to the effect that all sexual intercourse between trainees and cadre amounts to rape should be viewed as an incorrect oversimplification.

Respectfully submitted,

TOM CUTHBERT

February 3, 1999

MEMORANDUM

TO: Commissioners
FROM: BG Tom Cuthbert
RE: Citation of Data and Regulations

Attached are three separate, but similar, policy statements regulating social relationships among basic trainees that have been promulgated by units at Fort Leonard Wood. Other similar policies can be found in the Leonard Wood section of Volume V of the Army submission.

The language I have highlighted is of questionable legal enforceability. Even if the language is punitively enforced, I question whether such language creates respect for law or supports good order and discipline.

In the Fort Leonard Wood submission, I found forty-six (46) Article 15s that pertain to the “no social relationships” policies. Twenty-nine (29) of these Article 15s rely on the Battalion or Company policies cited above. Seventeen (17) Article 15s cite a Fort Leonard Wood regulation that does not limit trainee-to-trainee relationships. There were also nine (9) Article 15s for intimate letters between trainees and seven (7) Article 15s for social notes from one trainee to another.

Note to readers:

1. “Highlighted language” referenced in this memorandum is indicated in bold and italics on the attached three documents.
2. The attached memoranda are replicas of Army documents . The content is unchanged, however, the format may be slightly altered due to report formatting.

ATZT-TC-E

23 July 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR All Soldiers, 1st Battalion, 48th Infantry Regiment

SUBJECT: Command Policy Memorandum #12, Trainee Sexual Misconduct and Harassment Policy

1. Purpose. To outline the policy pertaining to sexual misconduct and harassment between Initial Entry Training (IET) soldiers.
2. General. Basic Combat Training (BCT) and sexual activity, misconduct, and/or harassment are incompatible. The rigors of BCT demand soldiers' full attention. Further, this unit's gender integrated living conditions require that soldiers feel a sense of security and freedom from sexual misconduct. Therefore, sexual activity or harassment between IET soldiers is prohibited and will not be tolerated. This policy pertains to all IET soldiers in this Battalion, regardless of marital status.
3. Specific policy.

a. Sexual misconduct within this Battalion is defined as any action that involves a non-professional, social relationship of a personal nature between IET soldiers during BCT. This includes but is not limited to:

- (1) *Dating.*
- (2) Any type of sexual activity or involvement, to include kissing.
- (3) Any touching of a sexual nature.
- (4) Hugging of a sexual nature.
- (5) Intimate hand-holding or physical caressing.
- (6) *Meeting privately* and/or intimately *with another-trainee.*
- (7) Entering into the sleeping area of trainees of the opposite sex unless authorized by unit SOP.
- (8) Entering into latrines designated for members of the opposite sex.

b. Sexual harassment will also not be tolerated within this Battalion. Sexual harassment is discrimination and destroys unit cohesion and morale. It can be defined as any unwelcome gestures, comments, looks, or anything else considered offensive to a soldier.

4. Punitive action. Sexual activity and/or misconduct, whether consensual or nonconsensual, and sexual harassment between IET soldiers are punishable under UCMJ. Violations of this policy may result in punitive actions. All soldiers will read this policy memorandum and acknowledge understanding by signing the attached roster.

5. Dragoons do not fail those with whom they serve.

By Force and Valor!

Atch

CHRISTIAN e. De GRAFF
LTC, IN
Commanding

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Company C, 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry Regiment
United States Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473

ATZT-TC-CC

27 March 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLIE COMPANY, 2-10 INFANTRY

SUBJECT: Sexual Behavior Policy Letter #17

1. Purpose. To establish basic guidelines that govern sexual misconduct and sexual harassment of/by IET soldiers. This memorandum is to be read verbatim to all IET soldiers and posted on unit bulletin boards.

2. Standards. This is a Basic Combat Training (BCT) Environment. BCT and sexual activity/harassment are incompatible. The following standards must be followed to the letter by all IET soldiers in this command, regardless of marital status:

a. No physical sexual contact will occur in the Charlie Company barracks (or anywhere else) between individuals of the same or opposite sex. ***Sexual misconduct within this company is defined as any action that involves a nonprofessional, social relationship of a personal nature between IET soldiers during BCT. This includes, but is not limited to any of the following:***

- 1) Hugging/Kissing
- 2) Holding Hands/Physical Caressing
- 3) Any touching of a sexual nature
- 4) Private meetings of a sexual nature
- 5) Entering the sleeping area of a trainee of the opposite sex
- 6) Lying/sleeping on the bed together
- 7) Entering a latrine designated for a trainee of the opposite sex
- 8) Love letters/*notes*
- 9) ***Dating***
- 10) Any other type of intimate sexual contact/activity

b. Sexual Harassment will not be tolerated by this command. It is discrimination and destroys unit cohesion and morale. Sexual Harassment is defined as any unwelcome gestures, comments, looks, or any other offensive actions of a sexual or gender-related nature. It is important to remember that sexual harassment is acknowledged from the perception of the individual harassment and not the one committing the harassment.

3. No soldiers will communicate with soldiers from other companies in the barracks. There is no reason for soldiers of other companies to be trespassing in unauthorized areas of the barracks comforting each other, passing notes, or any other type of communication. Emergencies, such as fires are the only exception to this policy.

4. None of the above activities in "part 2a" will occur between soldiers while on brigade or post pass.

5. Off Post Pass. During the evening of the off-post pass just before graduation IET soldiers may be permitted to leave the installation with there visiting family member spouse or out-of-town guest. During this off-post pass soldiers must realize that they represent the US Army to the civilian community. At that time, the IET soldiers are warned to behave in a mature and disciplined fashion. Each soldier must be properly signed out in accordance with unit policy. All soldiers not on an off-post pass must comply with the standards listed above in paragraph #2.

6. Violations. Any violation of this policy directly constitutes a basis for disciplinary action under UCMJ and a basis for adverse administrative action to include the characterization of discharge.

MICHAEL L. BRETL
CPT, EN
Commanding

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Company D, 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry Regiment
United States Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473

ATZT-TC-CD

24 September 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR Delta Company Personnel

SUBJECT: Sexual Behavior Policy (Policy Memorandum #6)

1. Purpose. To establish basic guidelines to govern sexual misconduct and sexual harassment of Initial Entry Training (IET) soldiers. Read this memorandum verbatim to all IET soldiers and post on unit bulletin boards.

2. Standards. This is a Basic Combat Training (BCT) environment. Basic Combat Training and sexual activity harassment are incompatible. All IET soldiers in this command, regardless of their marital status, will abide the following standards:

a. No physical sexual contact will occur in the Delta Company barracks, or anywhere else, between individuals of the same or opposite sex. ***Any action that involves a personal nonprofessional, social relationship between IET soldiers during BCT is sexual misconduct. This includes, but is not limited to:***

- (1) Hugging / Kissing
- (2) Hand Holding / Physical Caressing
- (3) Any touching of a sexual nature
- (4) Private meetings of a sexual nature
- (5) Entering the sleeping area of an opposite sex trainee
- (6) Lying / Sleeping on the bed together
- (7) Love Letters / ***Notes***
- (8) Entering a latrine designated for the opposite sex
- (9) ***Dating***
- (10) Any other type of intimate sexual contact / activity

b. Sexual harassment will not be tolerated by this command. It destroys unit cohesion and morale.

Sexual harassment is any unwelcome gesture, comment, look, or offensive action of a sexual or gender-related nature. Army policy defines sexual harassment from the perception of the individual harassed, not the one committing the harassment.

2. No IET soldier in this command will communicate with a soldier from another company in the barracks. There is no valid reason for soldiers of other companies to trespass in unauthorized areas, pass notes to or comfort Delta Company soldiers, or attempt communication with IET personnel.

3. None of the activities described in 2.a. will occur between soldiers while on brigade or post pass.

4. Off-Post Pass. During the off-Post Pass period prior to graduation, IET soldiers may be permitted to leave the installation with their visiting family member, spouse, or out-of-town guest. During this, pass, soldiers must represent the United States Army with pride and dignity. Mature, disciplined behavior which follows the regulatory guidelines of Wear and Appearance of Uniforms, AR 670-1, and paragraph 2.a. is the only acceptable behavior for IET soldiers.

5. Violations. Any violation of this policy directly constitutes a basis for disciplinary action under the Uniformed Code of Military Justice and a basis for adverse administrative action to include the characterization of discharge.

Heidi S. Dillard
CPT, AG
Commanding

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February 2, 1999

Jim Renne
Counsel, Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues
1235 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 940
Arlington, VA 22202-3283

Re: Report of Legal Consultants

Dear Mr. Renne:

I have not heard from Mr. Gittens or received his draft supplement to our report for markup. Accordingly, following is my input in which I address relevant issues and questions raised by the Commissioners last Saturday.

First, regarding legal v. policy advice. In most instances, there is no clear line of demarcation. Legal advice usually has policy implications, and policy advice has legal implications. That being said, in my view, the closest we come to traditional legal advice is in the report's discussion of rape.

The report recommends that the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice examine initiatives in the civilian sector to deal with the consent issue. This seems appropriate, especially given the Commission's interest in getting its arms around this very delicate issue, which has broad policy implications for the military training environment. Apparently, the Army Chief of Staff told the Commission that, in his view, there can never be consensual sex between an instructor and a military trainee. In my opinion, such a position is neither good law nor good policy.

From the legal standpoint, intercourse gained through force or threat of force is an element of the offense of rape. Whether or not there is force or the threat of force in a given

case is a factual matter that must be examined on a case-to-case basis. Certainly, relative status between the accused and the victim is a factor that should be taken into account when examining each particular case. If there is evidence of force or threat of force, and the other elements of the offense are present, then there may follow a proper charge of rape. If not, then the focus of inquiry may turn to other possible charges under the UCMJ.

Now, again, from a legal standpoint, there is a way to really get at this issue. It involves two steps: (1) ascertain whether under current military law there is a presumption of force in the instructor-trainee situation, and (2) if there is not (and I suspect this is the case), have the Joint Service Committee study the issue and make findings and recommendations. This is my own thought and proposal for the Commission's consideration. I have not discussed it with any of the other consultants.

Another item involving both law and policy is the issue that was discussed at some length on Saturday regarding whether a junior co-actor should be punished in every instance where there is rank disparity in an adultery or fraternization situation. One of the consultants offered his perspective that the junior co-actor should be punished in every case in which the senior co-actor is punished. I respectfully disagree and offer two points of a legal nature in support of my position. The first concerns non judicial punishment under UCMJ, Article 15, and the other concerns courts-martial.

Article 15 focuses on punishment, and not findings of guilty or not guilty. Servicemembers' records contain information on punishments that have been awarded to them. If there is no award of non judicial punishment, then there should be no entry of the NJP proceedings in the member's record, regardless of whether the commander found that the accused committed the offense or offenses alleged. The Article 15 formulation suggests broad latitude on the part of commanders to examine an accused's conduct and then determine whether or not to impose punishment.

Concerning courts-martial, a permissible sentence, after a finding of Guilty, is "No Punishment." A blanket policy mandating punishment in a particular class of cases would be of dubious legality, given the wide discretion afforded to commanders and courts-martial under the existing Code. On the policy side, I would only ask the Commission to consider whether it wishes to focus on accountability or punishment and whether, as a matter of policy, accountability should equate to punishment in every instance of misconduct.

Several Commissioners noted the discretion of commanders to select administrative processing in misconduct cases, in lieu of punitive action under the UCMJ. Ms. Pope enumerated several considerations that might lead a commander to take the administrative route in a given case. General Christmas outlined the administrative-separation process applicable in officer cases. This discussion appeared particularly helpful in framing the context for understanding the complexities often faced by commanders in dealing with offenders. Based on my experience in advising commanders and learning of their decisions, commanders took to certain factors, including: (1) do I want the offender out of the Service?, (2) do I want the offender out of my command, and if so, how quickly?, (3) do I necessarily want the offender punished, and if so, how severely? (4), if I court-martial the offender, can I

prove my case?, and (5) if a court-martial convicts the offender, what is the likely sentence? In some cases, burden of proof is the compelling factor in choosing which avenue to take. In others, expediency of action is of paramount concern. In still others, administrative processing for discharge follows punitive action under the UCMJ.

Finally, at Saturday's session, Mr. Pang noted that it would be helpful for the consultants to note their individual votes regarding positions stated in the consultants' report. Following are my vote and a brief rationale for each:

a. Fraternization. Policy on a "bright line" prohibition of officer-enlisted fraternization should be left to the Services. Rationale: each Service has its own customs and traditions. Prohibition of officer-enlisted fraternization has long been a custom and tradition in the Naval Service. The Air Force has issued a strong policy prohibiting such fraternization. Based on the Army's policy now under review, and an extensive tutorial by General Cuthbert, it appears that the Army's policy allows for more flexibility and has worked well for the Army. Of course, there is concern about different rules in a joint environment. This issue should not be over-riding. It is a matter of leadership in the respective Services. One need only ask a Marine about whether there is any confusion on his or her part about applicable physical fitness or grooming standards while serving in a joint command. Admittedly, this issue is harder, but not so hard that it warrants turning the Army's long standing policy on its head.

b. Adultery. The Commission should not endorse the Secretary of Defense's initiative to change the Manual for Courts-Martial. Rationale: first, the impetus for this change came from the popular media, and not the military establishment, the courts, or the legal community, (2) inputs from commanders in the field are heavily weighted in favor of there being no need to fix something that is not broken (see OSD binder on adultery), and (3) most importantly of all, Article 134 may be characterized as a "special breed of animal" in the UCMJ. It is the Article written for, and to be used by, commanders, with latitude and discretion.

Commanders decide, either in charging an offense or imposing punishment, whether in a given set of facts and circumstances, the conduct of an accused is prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting. The problem with this initiative is that in a very heavy-handed manner, and in an extremely visible way, it moves the military justice system down the road toward restricting a commander's latitude and discretion in determining when conduct is prejudicial or discrediting. In the words of, my most respected boss in my whole military career, "You don't have to tell a commander how to suck an egg."

c. Single-Gender- Basic Training. I joined with Tom Abbey in expressing a reservation to language in the report that said the Services would be better served by single-gender basic training. Three points: (1) such a statement seems to me to be too broad sweeping, (2) I have not seen any data from the Services on this issue, and (3) mixed-gender education and training is increasingly the norm in Service schools, the Service Academics, and law enforcement training centers, including the FBI Academy. The "train" is clearly moving in this direction, and it is probably only a matter of time before all the Services are on board.

d. Unequal Punishment Based Upon Gender. In the separate report that accompanied the main consultant's report, the author states, "With respect to unequal punishment based upon sex, it is perceived, and I believe it is accurate, that males are punished at a rate more frequent than females..." I do not concur in this statement. I do not know upon what grounds the statement is based, and I have not seen any data to support this statement.

Please contact me if you have questions or need further information.

Very truly yours,

Gerald J. Kirkpatrick, Esquire

MEMORANDUM

TO: JIM RENNE

FROM: HENRY HAMILTON, LEGAL CONSULTANT

RE: CASES CITED IN MAKING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DATE: 3 February 1999

What follows is a list of Army cases cited in making my finding and recommendations to the Commission. Contrary to observations otherwise, there are a plethora of examples clearly indicating unaccountability for female trainees engaged in consensual sexual or even social relations with drill sergeants, a disproportionate number of whom are black. There are no cases in which a female trainee is punished but not a drill sergeant. There is one case in which a female trainee was punished for consensual sexual relations with four permanent party male trainers and staff (see Vol. I, Tab F, 82). All cases cited involved consensual sexual activity between male drill sergeants and female trainees.

See Army Volume I, Tab E: 41, 53-54, 72-73, 77-80, 94-95, 103-104

See Army Volume I, Tab F: 41-42, 77-78, 92-93

See Army Volume II, Tab H: 36-37, 40-41, 264-267

See Army Volume II, Tab I: 3-4, 15-16

See Army Volume II, Tab J: 1

See Army Volume II, Tab K: 12-16

See Army Volume II, Tab L: 1-2, 6-7, 9-10, and 15

[by Henry Hamilton]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES

SUBJECT: DISPARATE IMPACT CONCERNING VIOLATIONS OF GENDER POLICIES AND CONSENSUAL SEX ACTS

In my separate report, I noted that there exists the perception by a substantial number of Army personnel, which I believe is true, that violations of gender policies and consensual sex acts were not treated equally with respect to factors of sex, rank and race. The purpose of this brief memorandum is to elaborate on those observations.

First, no consultant is a statistician; nor were funds provided to the consultants to conduct surveys and assemble statistics. As stated in my separate report, my methodology involved my experiential observations from 1990 through the present, as well as my review of Volumes I, II, III and V of the Army's submissions. Nevertheless, many Army submissions reflect my observations: Volume I, Tab E, Pages: 41, 53-54, 72-73, 77-80, 94-95, 103-104; Volume I, Tab F, Pages: 41-42, 77-78, 92-93, Volume II, Tab H, Pages: 36-37, 40-41, 265-267, Volume II, Tab I, Pages: 3-4, 15-16; Volume II, Tab J, Page: 1; Volume II, Tab K, Pages: 12-16; Volume II, Tab L, Pages: 1-2, 6-7, 9-10, and 15.

As the foregoing submissions exemplify, noncommissioned officers are punished with greater frequency and severity than soldiers-in-training with respect to violations of gender policies and *consensual* sex acts.¹

The reasons why noncommissioned officers, almost always male, are perceived to be and are apparently punished with greater frequency and severity than soldiers-in-training, almost always female, for violations of gender policies and consensual sex acts revolve around the disparity between their respective responsibilities. However, at some point, female soldiers-in-training can become wholly unaccountable for their consensual sexual conduct with noncommissioned officers. With respect to perceived and apparent disparities in punishment rates for black noncommissioned officers versus white noncommissioned officers, I have no explanation for this perceived and apparent disparity; however, I am convinced that it is not the result of any intent by the Army or Army leaders at any level to discriminate on the basis of race.

¹ The Commission appeared particularly interested in General Reimer's opinion that there are no consensual sex acts between noncommissioned officers and soldiers-in-training, or that all sex acts between noncommissioned officers and soldiers-in-training involve force. General Reimer's perspective is not the law anywhere and has never been the law anywhere. Indeed, the Army submissions which address consensual sex acts between noncommissioned officers and soldiers-in-training demonstrate that the law recognizes that sexual acts between noncommissioned officers and soldiers-in-training can be consensual.

It is my understanding that the Commission has contracted for the preparation of statistical samples concerning gender-related issues. I assume that these samples will explore perceptions among noncommissioned officers as to whether there exists disparate impact based on race, sex, and rank. If such data has not been gathered already, perhaps the Commission could recommend that such data be gathered in the future.

RATCHFORD AND HAMILTON, LLP

Columbia, South Carolina
February 4, 1999

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**SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON
MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES**

SUBMITTED BY: COL (RET) THOMAS G. ABBEY, U.S. AIR FORCE

DATE: February 4, 1999

Purpose

The purpose of this supplemental report is to clarify any portions of the report, from my individual perspective, that may assist the Commission in fulfilling its charter. This submission takes into account some of the concerns and questions raised during our testimony on Saturday, January 30. Specifically, I understood that the Vice Chair wanted to know how the consultants, individually, supported specific findings or recommendations contained in the joint report that we submitted. He also requested that we delineate between our legal and policy issues and analysis.

Legal/Policy Distinction

The legal/policy distinction, in the context of our joint report, seems to ask that we distinguish between findings and our recommendations. Stated another way, what is, and what should be.

In the context of advising a commander what to do in a particular case, the legal issue is what the commander can do or can't do, what prescriptions and proscriptions govern his decision-making, versus what he should do or what is the right or best decision under the circumstances.

In the context of my former duties as the Director of Legal Policy in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, I saw the distinction between legal and policy matters somewhat as a delineation of who had responsibility for a decision. If it was a legal issue, primary responsibility rested with the lawyers, namely, the Office of General Counsel. If it was a policy issue, primary responsibility rested with the Under Secretary or with one of the Assistant Secretaries (e.g., Assistant Secretary for Force Management Policy, Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, or Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs).

Statutory Law

Our discussion of statutory law focused on the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). As you know, that is essentially the code of substantive and procedural criminal law for the military.

By Executive Orders, the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) has been promulgated and amended. The MCM consists of a Preamble, the Rules for Courts-Martial, the Military Rules of Evidence, the Punitive Articles (Offenses), and Nonjudicial Punishment Procedures. It must be applied consistent with the purpose of military law: "to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and

effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States.”

I emphasize that the objectives of military law can be furthered by many administrative tools available to a commander. Administrative actions often are an appropriate response to misconduct or inappropriate conduct, provided the administrative response sufficiently furthers the purpose of military law. Administrative actions may be taken in combination with nonjudicial or judicial actions (courts-martial). Administrative actions include, but are not limited to, counseling, reprimand, creation of an unfavorable information file, removal from position, reassignment, demotion, delay of or removal from a promotion list, adverse or referral comments in performance reports, and administrative separation.

Our focus on statutory law, the UCMJ, therefore, should not obscure the fact that commanders have a vast array of measures, not necessarily or exclusively statutory in their origin, for dealing with personal relationships.

Further, administrative sanctions taken against a particular individual in a particular case can be more severe than the punishment that could or would be imposed under the UCMJ.

Synopsis of Recommendations

I would classify the following items to be (or to be suggestive of) “policy” issues or recommendations (I have added comments where I wanted to clarify my position or rationale):

1. The Air Force information management system for military justice does not include co-actor or victim information. Modifying the system to include such data would facilitate the analysis of cross-gender relationships and provide a better quality of data for assessing inconsistencies, if any, based on gender or rank.
2. The other Services do not appear to maintain comparable automated information systems relating to military justice statistics. Comparable and compatible systems among the Services would facilitate an analysis of disparities between the armed service. From my perspective as a former staff member in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, more compatibility in information systems would help senior Defense officials formulate policy and to address some of the high profile issues that have generated the level of interest in the Congress or in the media that require prompt, informed answers by senior officials.
3. In view of reforms in rape law in civilian jurisdictions, it may be worthwhile for the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice to give consideration to these reforms—however, we believe that the legal tools in the military are adequate to deal with unwanted sexual intercourse.
4. The consultants, except for Mr. Hamilton, recommended no change to the overall Army regulatory framework (page 12 of report). In conjunction with this recommendation, there is the following statement: “A bright line rule eliminating all officer-enlisted relationships will

diminish this valuable command authority [referring to a commander's discretion]. In my opinion, upon reflection, this statement is overly broad. The propriety of the officer-enlisted relationship depends on the nature of the relationship and the surrounding circumstances. The relationship may be professional or unprofessional, and in the latter case, it would require command attention. I agree that the presence of a senior-subordinate element is a key factor in assessing the relationship and its impact. In agreeing with this recommendation, I have a bias in favor of allowing the Services to define their policies regarding professional and unprofessional relationships. As military members progress through their careers, they develop an increasing identity with their branch of the armed forces. Members increasingly identify with the customs, traditions, and practices of their Service. Although members work with members of another Service, they typically do not see themselves as "purple-suited." [By this, I mean that they do not identify themselves more closely as members of the military establishment as contrasted with their own Service, e.g., an Air Force member seeing himself as "blue-suited."]

5. There is a recommendation on page 17 that the Department of Navy review the "anomaly in maximum punishments for alleged sexual harassment." If charged as a violation of Article 92, the maximum punishment is a Dishonorable Discharge and two years of confinement, and if charged as a violation of Article 93, the maximum confinement is one year.

6. In describing Air Force policy on professional and unprofessional relationships, I noted the value of centralized promulgation of guidance, believing this leads to more uniform understanding and enforcement. I recognized the need for more tailored guidance in training environments. My comment may be viewed as critical of the Army approach—there appear to be many different sources of guidance issued in the Army. Thus, I, individually, believe that the Commission should consider whether the Army more standardization within the Army is advisable.

7. On page 20 of the report, it is stated that the "frequency with which commanders are required to turn their attention from the mission of the organization to address these relatively minor disciplinary issues detracts from mission effectiveness and accomplishment. The bulk of these relatively minor offenses would be eliminated by instituting gender-separate basic training, indicating that the issue of separate basic training among the sexes should be further considered." This can be construed as a recommendation for gender-segregated training. I do not join in this recommendation. Moreover, I do not consider all consensual sex cases to be "relatively minor offenses." It depends on the circumstances. Sometimes, such offenses can be highly detrimental to mission effectiveness, unit cohesion, etc. Furthermore, I can not assess the frequency issue. In terms of Air Force-wide Article 15 statistics, it does not appear to be a frequent distraction. However, such statistics do not show the true level of commander attention (or distraction) because they do not reflect administrative responses by command. My experience as a judge advocate in the field is that sex offenses as the subject matter for Article 15 or court-martial actions had a low incidence rate as compared with other offenses such as drugs, failure to repair, alcohol-related offenses, etc.

8. Also on page 20 of the report, it is stated generally that it is hard to justify a conviction for a senior co-actor and only a reprimand for the other more junior one. I believe that senior

members reasonably expect more severe punishment for breaches of standards. Further, this is a norm within a structure such as the military with increasing levels of accountability and responsibility as one rises through the ranks. This does not mean that a subordinate should be held blameless. As a practical matter, in many cases, the sanction against the senior person requires cooperation of the junior person, e.g., testimony. To the extent that this portion implies that there needs to be more restriction on punitive action a commander may impose, I do not believe such a change would be beneficial.

9. The majority of consultants (Gittins, Hamilton, and Kirkpatrick) recommend no changes to the MCM for adultery. Tom Cuthbert and I expressed an opinion in favor of change as proposed by the Department of Defense. The basis for my recommendation is that I believe the matter received careful and deliberate consideration, is workable, and is helpful to commanders and their legal advisors. Such changes, however, should be accompanied by conforming changes to overall Article 134 guidance in the MCM.

10. The consultants agree that training on military law needs emphasis. In my opinion, based on the allocation of roles and responsibilities among the Department of Defense and its components set forth in Title 10 of the United States Code, training primarily is a responsibility of the Service Secretary. I do not believe this requires any legislative change.