1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	JEFFREY UTTECHT, SUPERINTENDENT, :
4	WASHINGTON STATE PENITENTIARY, :
5	Petitioner :
6	v. : No. 06-413
7	CAL COBURN BROWN. :
8	x
9	Washington, D.C.
10	Tuesday, April 17, 2007
11	
12	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
13	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
14	at 1:00 p.m.
15	APPEARANCES:
16	JOHN J. SAMSON, ESQ., Assistant Attorney General,
17	Olympia, Wash; on behalf of Petitioner.
18	MICHAEL R. DREEBEN, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor
19	General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on
20	behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae,
21	supporting Petitioner.
22	SUZANNE LEE ELLIOTT, ESQ., Hartford, Conn; on behalf of
23	Respondent.
24	
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1	CONTENTS	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	PAGE
3	JOHN J. SAMSON, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioner	3
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
6	MICHAEL R. DREEBEN, ESQ.	
7	On behalf of the United States, as amicus	
8	curiae, supporting the Petitioner	19
9	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
10	SUZANNE LEE ELLIOTT, ESQ.	
11	On behalf of the Respondent	29
12	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF	
13	JOHN J. SAMSON, ESQ.	
14	On behalf of Petitioner	56
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(1:00 p.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument next
4	in 06-413, Uttecht versus Brown.
5	Mr. Samson.
6	ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN L. SAMSON,
7	ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
8	MR. SAMSON: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
9	please the Court:
10	The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that
11	Mr. Brown is entitled to habeas corpus relief should be
12	reversed for three reasons. First, under section
13	2254(e)(1) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
14	Penalty Act, the trial judge's dismissal of Mr. Deal
15	from the jury is a finding of fact of substantial
16	impairment that is presumed correct unless it is
17	rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Mr. Brown
18	has not presented such evidence because the record
19	before the State court supports the decision to remove
20	Mr. Deal, especially since the trial judge had the
21	opportunity to observe
22	Mr. Deal and the defense had no objection to his
23	removal.
24	Second, under 2254(d)(2), the State-court
25	decision was based on a reasonable determination of the

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facts. Since the finding of fact was correct it is
 necessarily reasonable.

And third, under 2254(d)(2), the State-court decision was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent. Since the trial court applied the correct standard under Witt and found as fact that Mr. Deal was substantially impaired and this case is materially indistinguishable from Witt, the State court's decision was a reasonable application of clearly established Federal law.

Mr. Deal did indicate in the voir dire that he could impose the death penalty and consider it, but his other statements created an ambiguity which the trial judge was in the best position to resolve.

JUSTICE SOUTER: Counsel, may I ask you one thing, which I have assumed, and I think is correct, but I'd like to be sure of it. Is it the case, is it correct, that prior to the voir dire questions, no one had given a statement to the venire people of what the law was with respect to the imposition of the death penalty? Is that correct?

21 MR. SAMSON: Not exactly, Your Honor. Prior 22 to the individual voir dire, they were -- there was 23 instructions given to the jurors. Prior to the filling 24 out of the questionnaire --

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JUSTICE SOUTER: Were they told what the --

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1 I forget how many factors are enumerated under the 2 Washington law -- Were they told what they were? 3 MR. SAMSON: No, Your Honor, it was more a 4 general instruction regarding how the system operates. 5 JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay. 6 MR. SAMSON: In the individual voir dire of 7 Mr. Deal --8 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But one piece of 9 evidence that -- one piece of information that wasn't 10 given apparently because Juror Z didn't know about it, 11 was that life meant life without parole. Because when 12 he was questioned, he was surprised, he didn't know that 13 that was the law. 14 MR. SAMSON: Your Honor, he learned an hour 15 before his questioning that that was the law. He was 16 not informed of that -- of that law when he filled out 17 his questionnaire. But approximately an hour before the 18 individual questioning, he was informed of that, and he 19 indicated that in his questioning that he had just 20 learned an hour ago. 21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And how did he learn 22 that? 23 MR. SAMSON: He learned that from the 24 instructions given by the trial judge as well as through 25 the statements by defense counsel and by the prosecutor.

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1	And the defense counsel reminded Mr. Deal of
2	the fact that there was life without parole. She asked
3	him if he can consider both options, death and life
4	without parole. He said he could. And then defense
5	counsel asked why do you think the death penalty is
6	appropriate? And he stated again, as he stated in his
7	questionnaire, it would be a case where the person was
8	incorrigible and would reviolate if rereleased.
9	JUSTICE GINSBURG: He gave that as an
10	example. He didn't say: And that's the only
11	circumstance in which I would be willing to vote for the
12	death penalty.
13	MR. SAMSON: That is correct, Your Honor,
14	but the prosecutor in viewing Mr. Deal's responses
15	through the course of the voir dire, the prosecutor
16	viewed Mr. Deal as saying the only time, or I would have
17	great difficulty in imposing the death penalty, unless
18	the person would be released and would be in a position
19	to to reoffend or kill again.
20	JUSTICE SCALIA: Did he say, "for example,"
21	with regard to the quotation that Justice Ginsburg
22	mentioned? I didn't recall that he said "for example."
23	JUSTICE GINSBURG: He was asked to give an
24	example. He didn't say for example. And he didn't say
25	this would be the only situation in which I would vote

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1 for the death penalty.

2 MR. SAMSON: That is -- that is correct. 3 Both -- both are correct, Your Honors. At joint 4 appendix 62, he was asked for an example of why he 5 believed the death penalty was appropriate, and he says, 6 "I think if a person is or would be incorrigible and 7 would reviolate if released, then it would be 8 appropriate."

9 And, in fact, the only two examples he ever 10 gave of when he believed it would be appropriate is when 11 a defendant wants to die or a defendant would be 12 released on parole and could kill again. And the 13 prosecutor specifically asked Mr. Deal, can you think of 14 an example, or a situation of when you would be able to 15 impose a death penalty now knowing there is life without 16 parole, and Mr. Deal -- at joint appendix 71 to 72 --17 said "I would have to give that some thought. Like I 18 said up until an hour ago I did not realize that life 19 without parole was an option."

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Would you agree that if we grant your position and grant you relief, that it would be something of an extension over Witt and Darden, in that the jurors in Witt and Darden had fixed views, that they were as a matter of conscience opposed to the penalty?

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1	MR. SAMSON: Your Honor, I would agree that
2	the statements given by the jurors in Witt and Darden
3	were not exactly what Mr. Deal said. But I think the
4	general rule that the deference given to the trial judge
5	would be the same rule. And we are only asking this
б	Court to apply the rule.
7	JUSTICE KENNEDY: I understand that. But I
8	do think that the views of this juror, Deal
9	MR. SAMSON: That is correct.
10	JUSTICE KEENEDY: were somewhat more
11	equivocal than in the cases I've mentioned.
12	MR. SAMSON: They were, Your Honor. There
13	was not a statement as in Witt and Darden where the
14	jurors said that they had an opposition to the death
15	penalty and would have difficulty applying it. That is
16	correct. The statements were were different.
17	And certainly if the judge viewing a juror
18	of this type determined that the juror was not impaired,
19	then that decision would also be entitled to deference.
20	In fact, an example occurred in this case, Juror Obeso,
21	the judge there was a challenge by the prosecutor.
22	There was actually an objection by the defense. And the
23	judge said Mr. Obeso says that he can follow the law and
24	impose the death penalty and I believe that he can.
25	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: One thing I couldn't

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1 clearly discern from your brief is the significance you 2 attached to the defendant's -- defense failure to 3 object. How does that enter into our analysis? 4 MR. SAMSON: Your Honor, there's two points 5 made from the failure to object. The first is it explains why there's no evidence, expressed evidence, б 7 regarding demeanor or credibility or even an express 8 statement as to substantial impairment. The second is that as the Court stated in 9 10 Witt, it is a significant factor the court may consider 11 in its evidence that show the judge acted appropriately. 12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: It seems to me on that 13 point that the State is somewhat surprised and 14 whipsawed. And I understand that the Washington court 15 reached the issue. It is not independent State ground. 16 I take it the prosecutor had some peremptories left? 17 MR. SAMSON: Yes, Your Honor. The 18 prosecutor had two. 19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: How late in the process 20 was -- was Deal considered? Was he one of the early 21 jurors or one of the late jurors? 22 MR. SAMSON: He was one of the -- the early 23 jurors. He was on November 3rd, which was about five to six days into the individual voir dire on the death 24 25 qualification.

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1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: This was about a 17-day 2 voir dire? 3 MR. SAMSON: That is correct, Your Honor. 4 And --5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, that cuts a little bit against the peremptory. I mean, if it was early in б 7 the game the prosecutor might not have exercised the 8 peremptory. MR. SAMSON: Well the peremptories were not 9 10 exercised until the death qualification and the other 11 for-cause challenges were done. 12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Oh, I see. So the whole 13 jury is -- I see. 14 MR. SAMSON: Yes, Your Honor. So they --15 they completed all the death qualification. And then 16 those jurors that remained they had further individual 17 voir dire, and the defense and the prosecutor then used 18 their peremptories interchangeably to remove jurors. 19 JUSTICE STEVENS: May I go back to the 20 Chief's question about the failure to object? I think I 21 got the impression from Judge Kozinski's opinion that he 22 thought that the Washington Supreme Court found that 23 with respect to two out of the three jurors at issue 24 that there had been a finding that they were 25 substantially impaired, but with respect to this juror,

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1 that the Washington Supreme Court seemed to rely on the 2 failure to object as the principal explanation for their 3 decision.

4 MR. SAMSON: I would -- I would disagree 5 with that, Your Honor.

6 The -- the State Supreme Court on page 171a 7 of the petition appendix specifically was citing to Witt 8 and the rules from Witt. And that includes the rule 9 that the trial judge's exclusion of a juror constitutes 10 a finding of fact.

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I thought 12 Justice Stevens' articulation of Judge Kozinski's 13 opinion was exactly right but I thought you would in 14 response cite us to page 208a where the Washington 15 Supreme Court said that those jurors' views, including 16 Mr. Deal, "would have prevented or substantially 17 impaired their ability to follow the court's 18 instructions and abide by their oaths as jurors." 19 It seems the court of appeals judge 20 overlooked that. 21 MR. SAMSON: They did, Your Honor. They 22 did. And that is a specific finding of fact by the 23 State supreme court, in addition to --24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is it a finding? It's 25 listed under "Findings and Conclusions." Under

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1	"Findings," I thought under "Findings" the the
2	findings were that he misunderstood the standard. He
3	said beyond a shadow of a doubt, rather than beyond a
4	reasonable doubt. And what other finding of fact was
5	there? Because this one is listed under conclusions.
б	"From the facts, I conclude that he would be impaired."
7	But the impairment is a conclusion from what facts?
8	MR. SAMSON: It is from all the facts that
9	the State Supreme Court had before it. Its
10	one-paragraph analysis of Mr. Deal did not lay out all
11	the facts that were before the court. And the statement
12	208a, although it's listed as a conclusion, essentially
13	constitutes a finding of fact. And even if this Court
14	were to say that is not a finding of fact, it contains
15	with it the implicit finding of fact.
16	JUSTICE SCALIA: Well
17	JUSTICE KENNEDY: The point stands
18	JUSTICE SCALIA: Why does it have to be a
19	finding of fact? Aren't we obliged under AEDPA to give
20	deference to any reasonable conclusion from the facts?
21	MR. SAMSON: Yes, Your Honor.
22	JUSTICE SCALIA: So even if it is just a
23	conclusion, AEDPA still applies to it unless it's a
24	totally unreasonable conclusion, right?
25	MR. SAMSON: That's exactly right, Your

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1 Honor.

2	JUSTICE KENNEDY: But the point stands that
3	the court of appeals was just incorrect in in not
4	noting what's there at 208. It's just not a fair
5	summary of what the Washington Supreme Court did.
6	MR. SAMSON: Yes, Your Honor. The Ninth
7	Circuit found that the State courts made no finding of
8	fact and, as Mr. Brown has essentially admitted in his
9	response brief, there are two State court findings of
10	facts. There's one by the Washington Supreme Court and
11	one by the trial judge.
12	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is this something
13	particular under Washington procedure, this
14	summary-and-conclusion section at the end of the
15	opinion?
16	MR. SAMSON: No, Your Honor. I think this
17	is more just the style of the justice who wrote the
18	opinion and how he writes his opinions.
19	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: All right.
20	JUSTICE SOUTER: I take it your position is
21	that if the State courts had made, or had expressed, no
22	conclusion other than the final conclusion that he is
23	impaired, that that conclusion itself would be entitled
24	to AEDPA deference if the record could be read to
25	support it; is that correct?

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1		MR. SAMSON:	Yes, Your Honor.	Yes, Your
2	Honor. The	AEDPA		
3		JUSTICE SOUT	TER: If that's the	e case, then
4	AEDPA defere	ence is more	than deference, is	sn't it? AEDPA
5	deference ha	is reached or	n your view the cor	nclusion that
6	if there is	any factual	support in a recom	d, the

7 ultimate conclusion of the court will be upheld, whereas
8 I thought AEDPA deference went to factfinding and to
9 express conclusions that the court drew.

10 MR. SAMSON: Your Honor, we're not saying 11 that there will never be a case where the deference 12 given to a trial judge and the deference given to a 13 State court in factual determinations can be overcome. 14 Certainly, it's hard to think of one, but there can be a 15 case where that deference could be overcome.

JUSTICE STEVENS: Isn't this perhaps just such a case? Because this finding by the Supreme Court of the State is based only on the written record, so it does not get any benefit of observing the demeanor of the witness -- I mean, the demeanor of the prospective juror; isn't that correct?

22 MR. SAMSON: It is correct the State Supreme 23 Court --

JUSTICE STEVENS: So if we disagreed and thought there was not evidence in the written record

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1 that would support that conclusion, we should not give 2 deference to that appellate court finding. 3 MR. SAMSON: Your Honor, but the appellate 4 court finding also was based on the trial court finding 5 of fact, and the State Supreme Court recognized, as this Court did in Witt, that deference must be given to the 6 7 trial judge, who did have the opportunity to observe the 8 juror. 9 JUSTICE SOUTER: But the trial judge made no 10 conclusion about demeanor. He didn't say anything about 11 demeanor, did he? 12 MR. SAMSON: No, Your Honor, and neither did 13 the --14 JUSTICE SOUTER: If we're going to get --15 that takes -- it seems to me it takes deference yet one 16 further step. We're saying that even if there is 17 nothing on the record about demeanor, we are supposed to 18 assume that a trial judge drew a conclusion based on 19 demeanor. I mean, that is not deference. I mean, 20 that's simply imputing fiction. 21 MR. SAMSON: Your Honor, there's no evidence 22 on demeanor because the defense counsel did not object. 23 JUSTICE SOUTER: Why is it the defense counsel's obligation to object? It seems to me that if 24 25 the State is objecting, saying I want this juror

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1 removed, and the trial judge is saying, okay, I will 2 remove him, that there is an obligation to make a 3 record. 4 MR. SAMSON: Your Honor --5 JUSTICE SOUTER: Wouldn't there be? I quess my point is if there isn't, then in effect you are 6 7 making the defendant responsible for creating a record to support what the other side asks for. 8 9 MR. SAMSON: Your Honor, as this Court 10 explained in Witt, when there is no objection or no 11 dispute as to the factual issue in the trial court, the 12 judge had no reason to elaborate on his findings and 13 therefore he has no obligation to do so. 14 JUSTICE SOUTER: But that means that the --15 that the argument for sustaining the trial judge's 16 action on the ground that the trial judge could observe 17 demeanor in effect is the elimination of judicial review 18 on that subject, because we know that if the venire 19 person was present in the courtroom and the judge was 20 present in the courtroom, the judge probably looked at 21 him, and if that is enough to sustain judicial action on 22 the grounds that we defer to demeanor, then there's no

23 judicial review at all. I think that's what Judge

24 Kozinski said.

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MR. SAMSON: Your Honor, if there is

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1 absolutely no evidence to support the trial judge's 2 conclusion in the record --3 JUSTICE SOUTER: I'm talking about demeanor. 4 I'm talking about demeanor. And there's nothing as I 5 understand it on the record about demeanor. 6 MR. SAMSON: Yes, Your Honor. In Marshall 7 versus Lonberger the Court said there is no requirement for explicit finding as to credibility. 8 9 JUSTICE SOUTER: And if there is no 10 requirement that there be anything on the record about 11 demeanor, then there is no judicial review on that point at all, is there? 12 13 MR. SAMSON: Not on demeanor, but there can 14 be judicial review on the other facts that are presented 15 in the record. JUSTICE SCALIA: Of course there is on 16 17 demeanor. I mean, I suppose, to begin with, is it not 18 the case that the burden is on the habeas applicant to 19 show that demeanor did not make the difference? It's 20 the burden on him to show that it was an unreasonable 21 determination. 2.2 MR. SAMSON: It is the burden on him to 23 present clear and convincing evidence. 24 JUSTICE SOUTER: And the question --JUSTICE SCALIA: And secondly, he could 25

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1 present such evidence if he showed that there was 2 absolutely no ambiguity in what the person's statements 3 said, so that demeanor could not have made a difference. 4 But in a case where the statements are seemingly 5 contradictory or arguably contradictory, demeanor is very relevant and it's the burden, it seems to me, of 6 7 the Petitioner to show that demeanor wasn't what made 8 the difference. 9 And besides which, wasn't there some part of 10 the record that you referred to where he said "and I believe him"? 11 12 MR. SAMSON: Yes, Your Honor. That's as to 13 a different juror when there was an objection, and 14 because there was no objection there was no obligation. 15 If I may --16 JUSTICE SOUTER: Is there any way that he 17 can show that demeanor didn't make a difference when the 18 record is absolutely silent on demeanor? Is there any 19 way he can show that? 20 MR. SAMSON: Your Honor, he could attempt to 21 bring evidence in a State court collateral -- he actually filed a motion for reconsideration as to 22 23 another juror. He did not do that in this case. 24 JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask to be sure I 25 understand the record, because I did miss something

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1	before. Did the trial judge say in so many words that
2	Deal's views would have prevented or substantially
3	impaired his ability to follow the court's instructions
4	and abide by the rules of the jurors?
5	MR. SAMSON: The trial judge made no such
6	express finding because there was no objection raised.
7	And if I may reserve
8	JUSTICE STEVENS: So that's the point of the
9	absence of objection. That's why he didn't make the
10	critical finding.
11	MR. SAMSON: Yes, Your Honor.
12	JUSTICE STEVENS: Because the judge didn't
13	make the critical finding.
14	MR. SAMSON: He would have made a finding if
15	there was an objection.
16	If I may reserve
17	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You may reserve the
18	remainder of your time for rebuttal.
19	MR. SAMSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
20	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Dreeben.
21	ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL R. DREEBEN
22	ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE
23	SUPPORTING THE PETITIONER
24	MR. DREEBEN: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice,
25	and may it please

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1	JUSTICE STEVENS: May I just to finish up
2	the thought because you're equally well-prepared. How
3	do we know the trial judge would have made that a
4	finding if there had been an objection?
5	MR. DREEBEN: Justice Stevens, this is a
6	record in which the trial judge showed that he was
7	meticulously careful in applying the standard from
8	Wainwright versus Witt. In the joint appendix, I
9	believe at pages 7 through 9, there's an extensive
10	discussion of how the judge is going to apply the Witt
11	standard evenhandedly. He's going to eliminate those
12	jurors who are life-biased. He's going to eliminate
13	those jurors who
14	JUSTICE STEVENS: Does that respond to the
15	possible suggestion that Judge Kozinski made that what
16	he really did was act on the basis of no objection,
17	rather than on the basis of a finding that he failed to
18	make?
19	MR. DREEBEN: I don't think so,
20	Justice Stevens, because it's very clear that he told
21	the parties, if you have any question, if you have any
22	problem with any of the objections that are made, speak
<u></u>	up and T will intervene and quarties the juwer woralf

23 up and I will intervene and question the juror myself 24 and clarify it.

And this is a judge who, against the

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1 background of the entire voir dire, clearly was making a 2 good faith effort to apply the Witt standard. There 3 were 12 objections by the prosecution to various jurors 4 that they should be excused for cause because of 5 inability to apply the law as Washington gives it. The defense objected, I believe, to seven of those; and the 6 7 prosecution lost on five of those occasions.

8 So the judge basically went with the defense 9 when the defense spoke up and objected. There were two 10 jurors that were excused over the defense objection. 11 The transcript is also in the voir dire on those and it 12 shows that the defense objected and said these jurors 13 can apply the standard under the law, and the judge 14 found that they could not and excused them.

In the case of Juror Deal there is absolutely no reason to believe that the judge wouldn't have done exactly the same thing if the defense had objected.

19 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, what is --20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: In fact the defense -- I 21 know, Justice Breyer, just on this point. The defense 22 actually volunteered "no objection."

23 MR. DREEBEN: Said "We have no objection." 24 And I think that this is one of the three significant 25 legal errors that the Ninth Circuit made in disposing of

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this challenge. This Court made clear in Wainwright versus Witt that the absence of a defense objection is very critical in assessing whether a judge's implied finding of bias is to be upheld on appeal. And it's for the reason that my colleague mentioned in part: If the judge is not asked to give a fuller explanation, there is no reason to expect --

8 JUSTICE BREYER: What has this to do with 9 the -- aside from the explanation, when I read through 10 the transcript, as I have, it seemed to me in the 11 transcript he didn't say a word that suggested he's 12 against giving the death penalty. He kept saying yes, 13 in special circumstances, not always. Then they get 14 into this thing where he's been thinking of a person who 15 will in fact commit a crime again. And then it's put to 16 him directly: Have you thought about that he won't be 17 committing a crime again if he's in jail the rest of his 18 life. He says: You're right; I hadn't really thought 19 it through.

I want to know, thinking it through, could you consider the death penalty? Do you think under the conditions where the man would never get out again you could impose it? Yes, sir.

24 So you don't think that parole is an option, 25 et cetera, repeating it. Death penalty? I could

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1 consider it. Then could you impose it? I could if I 2 was convinced that was the appropriate measure. 3 And it's absolutely clear he's not thinking 4 of the repetition. It is clear he is thinking that it's 5 some kind of a mean. And I compared that with Witt, where the person just says no, I can't, and I compared 6 7 it with this other case, Gray, and they say it's illegal 8 to push him off the jury, a woman who is confused, and 9 finally she says: I think I could. 10 MR. DREEBEN: Justice Breyer, I think your 11 question goes to the heart of the case. 12 (Laughter.) 13 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, that's probably 14 right. 15 MR. DREEBEN: But the reason it goes to the 16 heart of the case, Justice Breyer, is that you and I and 17 every other appellate lawyer and judge who has looked at 18 this is dealing with a cold record, but the only person 19 who actually saw and heard this juror give the responses 20 was the trial judge. 21 JUSTICE BREYER: So what is it that he could 22 have done? Was he shaking, making faces? Was he 23 shaking his head to indicate he believed the opposite? 24 MR. DREEBEN: Well, Justice Breyer --

JUSTICE BREYER: If something like that

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1 happens, isn't a prosecutor of any sense going to say, I 2 want it noted for the record that the witness while he 3 said these words was chortling inwardly or something 4 like that? 5 MR. DREEBEN: Well, Justice Breyer, there were five separate occasions during Juror Deal's voir б 7 dire in which he expressed either uncertainty or a 8 misconception about what the death penalty should be imposed for when measured against Washington law. 9 10 And the overarching point that I make before 11 I talk about those five instances is that this is a record in which there is confusion and uncertainty about 12 13 whether Juror Deal really can adhere to the law. And in 14 those circumstances, the only judge who can truly 15 resolve that and determine whether he should be credited 16 is the trial judge. And this Court has made that point 17 over and over again in describing its voir dire. 18 JUSTICE KENNEDY: If there is confusion, is 19 that grounds for excluding him?

20 MR. DREEBEN: Confusion alone is not. If 21 it's confusion it must rise to a level of preventing or 22 impairing the juror's ability to follow the law. 23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Dreeben, at this

24 point, this juror, he doesn't know anything about 25 aggravating circumstances. He doesn't know about

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1 mitigating circumstances. He hadn't been told what the 2 standard of -- that it was beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 And to say that he should be criticized 4 because when he was asked to give an example he said one 5 thing and not another, it seems if you just read the б transcript, that there's nothing disqualifying. So as 7 you said, everything is the weight falls on the demeanor, which an appellate court can't review. 8 9 MR. DREEBEN: I think that that's right, Justice Ginsburg. It doesn't mean that there is no 10 11 judicial review at all, in response to Justice Souter's 12 question and I think the concern underlying your own. 13 There has to be fair support in the record for the 14 conclusion that the trial judge could have resolved the 15 question of the juror's competence to sit in the way 16 that he did. 17 And if you had a record in which everything 18 that the juror said is consistent with complying with 19 State law, which I don't think this record is, and the 20 prosecutor objected, and the judge says granted, and 21 there's no explanation, I think that would be difficult 22 to uphold, even if it is possible that everyone in the 23 courtroom knew that the judge was relying on demeanor. 24 JUSTICE SOUTER: Is there anything in this 25 record to indicate that the judge did rely on demeanor?

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1	MR. DREEBEN: What is no. There's
2	nothing explicit. But this Court has said over and over
3	again that there does not have to be because in this
4	case, in particular, since there was no objection, the
5	judge did not elaborate on his reasons at all. But the
6	Court has gone further in Witt and in Darden and
7	building on cases like Patton versus Yount, and made
8	clear that it is implicit in a judge's action in
9	response to an objection that he has relied on the
10	totality of the law and his observations.
11	And here there were two instances during the
12	defense colloquy in which the juror specifically said
13	that his example of when the death penalty is
14	appropriate is a circumstance when somebody is
15	incorrigible and will reoffend if released. And then
16	three times during the prosecution's voir dire, he
17	volunteered, first of all, that it would have to be in
18	my mind very obvious that the person would reoffend.
19	And this was a particularly significant answer because
20	it wasn't given in response to a death penalty question,
21	it was given in response to whether he could apply the
22	reasonable doubt standard to the crime.
23	He again comes back to the reoffend notion
24	after having State law explained to him again and said

24 after having State law explained to him again, and said, 25 could you consider imposing the death penalty, he said I

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1 have to give that some thought.

JUSTICE SOUTER: But he had not been given, as I understand it, the explanation of what the -- I keep saying nine factors. Whatever the enumerated State factors were. He had not been told that at any point, had he?

7 MR. DREEBEN: No, but I think the important 8 point, Justice Souter, is that under Washington law 9 there were really only two alternatives, life without 10 parole or death.

JUSTICE SOUTER: Yes, but the -- the questioning was what grounds are you going to look to make that decision; and he had not been instructed on Washington law on that at all.

MR. DREEBEN: The concern that I think the prosecutor had and that the judge accepted is that this juror's vision of when capital punishment is appropriate is when somebody will get out and kill again. And under that analysis, you would never impose capital punishment under Washington law, because the defendant is never going to get --

JUSTICE STEVENS: But does it follow that his limited cases -- the views about when the death penalty is appropriate would translate into views on whether he could or could not impose the death penalty

27

1	if instructed properly by the court?
2	MR. DREEBEN: Not not automatically,
3	Justice Stevens. I mean, this is a juror
4	JUSTICE STEVENS: Doesn't it have to be
5	automatic in order to justify the result in this case?
6	MR. DREEBEN: No. What has to be the
7	case and this Court in Witt made clear that it was
8	not going to apply an unmistakable certainty
9	requirement is that the judge has to conclude that
10	juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the
11	juror in applying the law. And the judge had to make a
12	call based on what he saw and what none of us did, of
13	whether this juror's views
14	JUSTICE STEVENS: Isn't there a world of
15	difference at least it has been my experience in
16	trials like this of what a juror will do on his own
17	and what he thinks the law might be, and what is fair,
18	and so forth, as opposed to what a a juror will do in
19	response to proper instructions?
20	MR. DREEBEN: Yeah.
21	JUSTICE STEVENS: The jurors mostly are
22	pretty conscientious.
23	MR. DREEBEN: Yes, they there are. And
24	JUSTICE STEVENS: Is there any reason to
25	believe this guy wasn't?

28

1	MR. DREEBEN: Well the judge found one. By
2	excusing him after having
3	JUSTICE STEVENS: Well without because
4	there was no objection.
5	MR. DREEBEN: Well he made clear if I may
6	conclude he made clear at the outset as I think I did
7	when I started my presentation, that this record shows a
8	judge who was conscientiously applying the Witt
9	standard.
10	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
11	Mr. Dreeben.
12	Ms. Elliott.
13	ORAL ARGUMENT OF MS. SUZANNE LEE ELLIOTT,
14	ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
15	MS. ELLIOTT: Mr. Chief Justice, may it
16	please the Court:
17	There were in our view two findings by the
18	Washington courts here. The first by the trial court is
19	objectively an objectively unreasonable determination
20	of the facts in light of the evidence presented, and
21	thus the writ should be granted under 50 28
22	2254(d)(2). And the supreme court's decision and
23	I'll get to a moment to where I think their decision is,
24	in the record, which conflicts with the State's view of
25	where that is was an unreasonable application of this

29

1 Court's controlling precedent in Witt versus

2 Witherspoon.

And I would direct the Court to, in terms of the State Supreme Court's finding, to page 173a of the appendix of the petition for certiorari. But I would, of course, first like to start with the actual record in this case.

8 In this case, the Washington State trial 9 court's decision to excuse Juror Deal for cause was 10 objectively unreasonable based upon the record, because 11 Juror Deal said many times on the record, when presented 12 with the question of whether or not he could impose the 13 death penalty under the sketchy view he had of 14 Washington State's statutory capital punishment scheme, 15 that he could do so.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But that's the 17 beginning of the questioning, isn't it? It is not the 18 end of it. It is surely not the law that just, whenever 19 a juror says sure, I'll follow the instructions, that 20 he's automatically -- has to be seated?

MS. ELLIOTT: No, Your Honor. But it went beyond that. And at page 73 of the joint appendix, the very question was put to him by the prosecutor. "Now that you know that in Washington, if you find the defendant guilty, you're only going to have two choices,

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1 the death penalty or life in prison without the 2 possibility of parole, could you still consider under 3 the appropriate evidence imposing the death penalty?" 4 And Mr. Deal said, "I could consider it. Yes." 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: After several times б saying the only time he would consider it is if the 7 person is going to reoffend. I mean, if he just gets the right answer once out of six times and it's the last 8 9 time, is the judge required to ignore the prior 10 colloquy? 11 MS. ELLIOTT: No, Your Honor, but I don't 12 think he only said it once out of those times. Judge 13 Kozinski identified in his opinion six times, and those 14 are found on the record of proceedings at page 62, at page 72, and again at page 73. And he was repeatedly 15 16 asked -- and once he was asked, "First I'm going to ask 17 you if you could consider it" -- this is on page 72 --18 "and then I'm going to ask you if you could impose it, 19 Even if he would never get out." 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But look at page --21 look at page 62. He says, you know, could -- could 22 you -- when do you think the death penalty is 23 appropriate? If the person would reviolate if released. 24 MS. ELLIOTT: But that is one of, under --25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: There are others.

31

1 MS. ELLIOTT: -- Washington law it's an 2 appropriate consideration. And that's the -- and then that was the example he gave, but he didn't say but I'm 3 4 never going to do it, if he -- if my only choice is 5 death or life in prison. 6 And I think that the State's reading of the 7 voir dire here actually expands both the objection made 8 by the prosecutor and the -- the substance of the colloquy with juror Deal. 9 10 JUSTICE ALITO: What do you make of the fact 11 that twice just before his final statement he's given 12 exactly the question whether he could -- whether he 13 impose the death penalty in any situation other than 14 when the person might get out and kill again, and he --15 his answers are at best equivocal. The first time he says, "I would have to give that some thought." That's 16 17 on 72. And then he says, "I do feel that way if parole 18 is an option; without parole as an option I believe in 19 the death penalty." Which is totally ambiguous. What 20 do you make of those answers? 21 MS. ELLIOTT: I make of those answers as 22 being entirely appropriate under the questions given and 23 also demonstrating that he's clearly not a juror who is substantially impaired or whose views would prevent him 24 25 from considering the instructions that would be given to

32

1	him at the end of this case. If fact include him as a
2	
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What if the what
4	if the voir dire what if the juror said just what he
5	said on a few occasions, that I would consider it if the
6	person would reviolate? And that was all. Would That
7	be a basis for excusing him?
8	MS. ELLIOTT: Under your hypothetical, no.
9	If, however, he said I will never impose the death
10	penalty if the only choice is life without and the death
11	penalty, I think that would be problematic under
12	Washington law.
13	But he never said that. That's the reading
14	the State gives his voir dire but it's not there.
15	Because that would prevent him from making the decision
16	that Washington requires.
17	JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, you you
18	JUSTICE KENNEDY: If this juror
19	JUSTICE SCALIA: you insist that he come
20	out and say in so many words, I am going to be an
21	unreliable juror. That's that's not the way it
22	happens. And somebody has to evaluate whether indeed
23	he's shading the truth a little bit and whether, in
24	fact, he will be impaired in his service.
25	And some of these some of these answers suggest that.

33

1 And it -- it is not an easy call to simply say well, you 2 know, unless he comes out and admits yes, I'm going to 3 be a lousy juror, nobody is going to say that. 4 MS. ELLIOTT: Well, Your Honor, I agree that 5 nobody is going to say that, although in other cases, in other records and cases cited by the State here, in 6 7 fact, trial judges have made records of those kinds of 8 situations, which are not present here. And in fact, 9 for example, I believe it was Gray versus Mississippi, 10 the judge got the feeling that jurors were giving 11 answers that would get them off the panel. 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why -- why was there no 13 objection if this was so clear? If this fellow had 14 answered all the questions the way you would expect a --15 a good juror to answer, why was there no objection when 16 the State moved to dismiss him? 17 MS. ELLIOTT: It is not required under 18 Washington law. And, in fact --19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, he objected. There were 12 instances --20 21 MS. ELLIOTT: That is correct. 22 JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- in which the prosecutor 23 wanted to excuse; in seven of those, there was an objection. 24 25 MS. ELLIOTT: That's correct.

34

1	JUSTICE KENNEDY: So he certainly knew how
2	to object. And you absolutely trap the trial judge here
3	by not indicating to him that he should make some
4	further finding. In fact, the the the lawyer
5	doesn't just remain silence. He's standing and says I
6	have no objection.
7	MS. ELLIOTT: Well the question
8	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Judge Kozinski thought
9	the reason there was no objection was that this juror
10	came across as being pro-death penalty. Isn't that what
11	he said?
12	MS. ELLIOTT: That's what he said. I
13	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You don't go as far
14	as Judge Kozinski on that, do you?
15	(Laughter.)
16	MS. ELLIOTT: On two points I don't go as
17	far as Judge Kozinski. One, I believe that actually
18	there has to be some deference to implicit findings; let
19	me clarify that, and I know the State has pointed that
20	out. I think Judge Kozinski's language was a little
21	loose there. I think he probably agrees with me.
22	As to the the failure to object, first of
23	all, if the court says, first of all, are there any
24	objections; now again we have admitted that what he said
25	was I have no objection. But the under Washington

35

law, the prosecutor, the judge, and the defense attorney
 all knew that this issue could be raised for the first
 time on appeal.

The prosecutor -- and I'm not saying on habeas review, but in the trial court, a challenge for cause, the burden falls on the prosecutor to articulate a basis.

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, that's fine. But --9 but competent counsel knows that getting something 10 overturned on appeal is a lot harder than getting it 11 done right the first time. And he also knows that if 12 you raise an objection, you're more likely to get it 13 done right.

I can't imagine why if he thought this person was not properly strikeable he would have sat -indeed not just sat silent but said I have no objection. It just doesn't make any sense.

MS. ELLIOTT: Well I think he made amistake, then.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, he made the same mistake the judge did. I wonder who else was there that made the same mistake. I mean, you know, it makes you think maybe, maybe the judge was right.

MS. ELLIOTT: Well, Your Honor, the only basis we have for the trial judge's ruling is the

36

1	objection made by the prosecutor. And the assuming
2	he incorporated that as the basis for his ruling. What
3	prosecutor said was that he had two rulings. First,
4	he said I think he's overcome his problem with the
5	explanation about reasonable doubt. And so that's not
б	an issue in this case. And he said, "and I don't think
7	he has said anything that overcame this idea that of
8	he must kill again before he imposed the death penalty
9	or be in a position to kill again."
10	That, it's our position is incorrect,
11	under an incorrect summation of what happened in the
12	voir dire and, in fact
13	JUSTICE SCALIA: Where where are you
14	quoting from?
15	MS. ELLIOTT: I'm quoting from page 75.
16	Which is Mr. Matthews
17	JUSTICE SCALIA: 75 of the
18	MS. ELLIOTT: Of the joint appendix. Which
19	is Mr. Matthews' objection. And the court makes
20	basically an unadorned grant of that objection for
21	cause.
22	JUSTICE KENNEDY: And incidentally the court
23	did not say are there any objections? The court did not
24	say that.
25	MS. ELLIOTT: I'm sorry, Your Honor. The

37

1 court says, "the bailiff will excuse you. Counsel, any 2 challenge to this particular juror?" That's at the 3 bottom of page 74. And then what Mr. Mulligan says is: 4 "We have no objection." 5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, but the court didn't say is there an objection? So you're incorrect. б 7 MS. ELLIOTT: I'm sorry. So --8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Now on the that, 9 just the language you just focused on, on page 75, if 10 that was correct, you disagree with it, but if the court 11 concluded that the juror had not overcome the idea that 12 he must kill again before imposing the death penalty, 13 that would be a sufficient basis for excusing him? 14 MS. ELLIOTT: Under Washington law, I think 15 there would be a sufficient basis for excusing juror 16 Deal if he said I now know what the statutory scheme is, 17 and only if there's some possibility for release of 18 Mr. Brown and the opportunity for him to kill again, 19 would I impose the death penalty. 20 We know that would prevent him from imposing 21 Washington's statutory scheme because once finding him 22 guilty, the juror will never be released again. So the 23 possibility of release would not be there. And so he would reject the notion that you must consider 24 25 mitigating factors if there's no possibility of release.

38

1	We argue in our brief that that's not what
2	he said. And in fact, Juror Deal was a thinking juror,
3	a juror who could, in fact, consider all of the options.
4	We disagree, of course, with the prosecutor's summary
5	that this concern about recidivism was somehow central
6	or pivotal to Juror Deal.
7	JUSTICE KENNEDY: You think he could have
8	imposed the death penalty in this case?
9	MS. ELLIOTT: Yes.
10	JUSTICE KENNEDY: What's the harm then in
11	replacing him, from your standpoint?
12	MS. ELLIOTT: The harm?
13	JUSTICE KENNEDY: You're complaining about
14	the excusal of a juror who by your own submission could
15	impose the death penalty. So why am I here?
16	MS. ELLIOTT: Because there is no
17	JUSTICE GINSBURG: You say you don't need
18	harm.
19	MS. ELLIOTT: Because there is no harm in
20	analysis.
21	JUSTICE KENNEDY: I would like to hear the
22	answer.
23	MS. ELLIOTT: My answer is because it's a
24	constitutional issue and this juror could also have
25	considered the mitigating circumstances that would have

39

been proposed by the -- at that stage that were clearly
 on the table for argument in front of the jury at the
 penalty phase.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: You are pointing to this as structural error, so you have a death case, and so you have the kind of error that you don't have to prove is harmful.

8 MS. ELLIOTT: Under Gray versus Mississippi, 9 I don't have to -- Mr. Brown does not have to prove that 10 it's harmless.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: And then you're zeroing in on this particular juror and the colloquy, but shouldn't we look at the entire -- seating of the jurors, including that there were -- what were there -seven attempts by the prosecutor to have a for-cause excusal?

JUSTICE KENNEDY: There were actually 12, I think. Weren't there 12 objections by the prosecution? I was going to ask, we've already destroyed the rebuttal time of your colleagues, but it seems to me that this is a large number of challenges by the prosecutor. Can you comment on that? 12? And then the defense objected to seven, and five objections were sustained.

24 MS. ELLIOTT: I can't say in the vast 25 universe of capital cases in Washington whether that's

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1 extraordinary or not. 2 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Thank you. 3 JUSTICE SCALIA: How many days did this 4 take? 5 MS. ELLIOTT: 17, I believe. 6 JUSTICE SCALIA: 17 days? Less than one a 7 day. That's pretty good. 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yeah. How many 9 paraded by? I mean, do we know? 10 MS. ELLIOTT: I didn't count on a daily 11 basis, Your Honor. In a capital case in Washington, 17 12 days is probably pretty average, maybe a little short. JUSTICE GINSBURG: But it does seem that 13 14 this trial judge was doing a conscientious job. He 15 granted five of the -- rejected five of the 16 prosecutor's, and how many of those had been where 17 defense counsel had objected? 18 MS. ELLIOTT: In seven. 19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: He objected in seven and 20 in five of those --21 MS. ELLIOTT: No. He objected in 12, and 22 seven of those were granted, that's my understanding. 23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: No, I'm not talking about 24 the prosecutor --25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: No. I think the

41

1 prosecution challenged 12 times. There were seven 2 objections. Five were sustained. 3 MS. ELLIOTT: Excuse me. I'm sorry, Your 4 I misunderstood your question. Honor. 5 So yeah, I don't disagree that this Court should look at the entire record of voir dire, and I 6 7 don't disagree that Judge Martinez is a conscientious 8 trial judge. The problem in this case is that when he granted the challenge for cause to this juror, he did 9 10 not and he could not find that this juror was 11 substantially impaired. He could not -- he was not 12 prevented from following Washington law. 13 The --14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: In your view, do we 15 look at this any differently through AEDPA than if we 16 were looking at this on direct review? 17 MS. ELLIOTT: Well, yes. I mean, you have 18 to view it through the lens of the statute. 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So that makes a 20 difference in the standard of review that we apply in 21 this case? MS. ELLIOTT: Well, there is -- prior to the 2.2 23 enactment of AEDPA, there was -- this Court said you give deference to the trial court's findings. 24 AEDPA 25 has, of course, codified that deference by saying that

42

the trial judge has to be objectively unreasonable based
 upon the facts developed at the trial court level.

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So, does that mean
4 we give a greater degree of deference?

5 MS. ELLIOTT: I don't think this Court has said what, on balance, what the difference between the 6 7 kind of deference that was required under Witherspoon 8 is, as weighed against the kind of deference now. It's clear Congress wanted to provide a substantial amount of 9 10 deference to the trial court and limit habeas review of 11 State-court decisions. But as Judge Kozinski pointed 12 out in his opinion in this case, that didn't mean that 13 they were going to completely eliminate Federal habeas 14 review.

15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm just trying to 16 get a handle on your view as to whether the standard of 17 review with respect to deference to the State court is 18 different in this respect than it would be on direct 19 review?

20 MS. ELLIOTT: Yes. I think it's more -- I 21 think under habeas review, it's a more substantial 22 review, because we have to show not only that the 23 findings were unreasonable but they were objectively 24 unreasonable, which I think is a different standard than 25 saying you give deference to the trial court.

43

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JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask -- one of the most troubling parts about this case is the failure to object. As I understand, under Washington law, that doesn't make any difference; review is exactly the same as it would have been if there had been an objection. But under our review as a matter of Federal constitutional law, should it make a difference?

8 MS. ELLIOTT: I don't think so. I think it's one of those peculiarities of Washington law that 9 you should give respect to, but it is essentially 10 11 meaningless in the context of this case, because all the parties knew this case was going to be reviewed and 12 13 reviewed. I mean, there's automatic appellate review. 14 JUSTICE STEVENS: Do you have any response 15 to Justice Kennedy's concern that this really allows for 16 a mouse trapping of the trial judge who very likely

17 would pay less attention to the issue when the counsel 18 doesn't object, just as a realistic way that this kind 19 of thing is handled?

MS. ELLIOTT: Well, I respect his concerns about bushwhacking or mouse trapping, but the fact of the matter is that that's Washington law and the judge was well aware of it, as were the parties.

24JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, let me put it to you25this way: There's no demeanor finding here. Suppose

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44

1 the judge had made a demeanor finding. That would be 2 different, the case would be a different case, wouldn't 3 it? 4 MS. ELLIOTT: Yes, very much so. 5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And if the objection is б what prevents the demeanor finding, then maybe we should 7 be able to consider the fact that there was no 8 objection, even though Washington law doesn't require it before it will consider the issue. 9 10 MS. ELLIOTT: But there's nothing in the 11 record that says that the reason that the judge didn't 12 mention the demeanor, or the prosecutor who made the 13 objection didn't mention demeanor. Certainly, it seems 14 to me that if demeanor had been a concern based upon the 15 answers given by the juror here, and because the prosecutor had the laboring oar at the trial court to 16 17 provide a basis for the challenge for cause, he would

18 mention it.

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I thought your 20 brother made the point that there was a more elaborate 21 explanation of the trial judge's determinations when 22 there had been an objection.

23 MS. ELLIOTT: I do believe that he had a 24 more lengthy explanation where there were objections. 25 But whether or not that would have -- there was

45

1 something in the demeanor of this particular judge here 2 that he simply didn't mention, it can't be found here. 3 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, but he said for one of the other witnesses, I just don't -- I don't believe 4 5 him. And if that had been his problem here, he б presumably would have said the same thing. 7 MS. ELLIOTT: Well, presumably then, he would have said that in response to the prosecutor's 8 9 objection, which was not that we don't believe Juror 10 Deal to be credible. 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Not if there's no opposing 12 objection by defense counsel. When there was, and when 13 part of his reason for granting the motion to strike the 14 juror was demeanor, he mentioned demeanor. MS. ELLIOTT: That's correct, and here he 15 16 didn't. So I think the assumption her is he was 17 granting the objection on the basis provided by Mr. 18 Matthews, which was incorrect both under Washington law 19 and under the facts developed in the voir dire. 20 JUSTICE BREYER: Is the law on this, because 21 you've read the cases more recent probably -- I've 22 skimmed through some but not read them all, as I'm sure 23 you have. And the statement of the law that I want to know, is it still valid law, is in Witherspoon on 522, 24 25 Justice Stewart in the footnote. And what he says in

46

1	that footnote is, "the most that can be demanded of a
2	venire man in this regard is that he be willing to
3	consider," and those are his italics, "to consider all
4	of the penalties provided by State law, and that he not
5	be irrevocably committed before the trial has begun to
6	vote against the penalty of death, regardless of the
7	facts and circumstances that might emerge. If the voir
8	dire testimony in a given case indicates that venire men
9	were excluded on any broader basis than this, the death
10	sentence cannot be carried out." Is that still a valid
11	statement of the law or has it changed?
12	MS. ELLIOTT: That is still a valid
13	statement of the law.
14	JUSTICE BREYER: If that's the valid
15	JUSTICE SCALIA: Of what law? Washington
16	law?
17	JUSTICE BREYER: No, this is Justice Stewart
18	of the Supreme Court.
19	MS. ELLIOTT: This Court, which has been
20	shortened into a
21	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Substantially
22	impaired.
23	MS. ELLIOTT: substantially impaired
24	test.
25	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Which is a lot

47

1 different than irrevocably committed.

2 MS. ELLIOTT: Well, it's substantially 3 impaired is prevent or substantially impair, the 4 ability. And this juror never --

5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You would agree that 6 substantially impair is not the same as irrevocably 7 committed?

8 MS. ELLIOTT: Yes, I would agree, because 9 you could say I favor the death penalty, as this juror 10 did, and still sit on the jury.

11 JUSTICE BREYER: This doesn't say -- that's 12 one of the things it says. But the other is, "the most 13 that can be demanded of a venire man is that he be 14 willing to consider" -- that's the word that's 15 italicized -- now, is there any -- "and if you exclude 16 him on a broader ground than that, the death sentence 17 cannot be carried out". Now, is there anything in any 18 later case that suggests a change in that respect? 19 MS. ELLIOTT: No, Your Honor. In fact, the 20 cases affirm that. And in fact, this juror was 21 precisely the kind of juror that I think is appropriate

22 to sit. What he said was, I can consider.

JUSTICE BREYER: We're not supposed to - JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, he said that, but
 elsewhere he sort of indicated that he couldn't consider

48

it unless it were a situation in which this person would
 be able to commit the crime again.

MS. ELLIOTT: But none of those statements indicated he would be prevented from voting for the death penalty, or that he was substantially impaired from doing that.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Oh, I think they did indicate that unless that was the situation, he wouldn't consider imposing the death penalty. I think that's precisely what they indicate.

MS. ELLIOTT: Well, if it means only that he 11 12 would consider the issue of future dangerousness, it 13 wouldn't prevent him under Washington law. Because 14 under Washington law, first of all, the presumption is 15 for life. And second of all, the consideration of 16 whether or not a person would recidivate is both an 17 aggravating and a mitigating factor. So the fact that 18 he's concerned about reoffense is perfectly appropriate.

Where I think he could be prevented is if he said, if this -- unless this guy is going to be released in the future, and I don't think that's what he said here, Your Honor. What he said was, recidivism is important.

JUSTICE SCALIA: I like recidivate by the 25 way. I'm going to use it in an opinion. It's a very

49

1 useful verb.

2 JUSTICE STEVENS: May I go back to my 3 concern about the failure to object again. Supposing 4 this defense counsel instead of just saying no 5 objection, said no objection, I think he's a hanging 6 juror? 7 MS. ELLIOTT: I think he's a hanging juror? In other words, he thought 8 JUSTICE STEVENS: 9 contrary to the prosecutor, his appraisal of this man 10 was that he's going to be pro-death penalty, and he let 11 that be known. Would that make a difference? MS. ELLIOTT: Well, I think that --12 13 JUSTICE STEVENS: I don't think it would 14 under Washington law. I don't suppose it would. MS. ELLIOTT: Well, if the juror said -- it 15 16 would make a difference under Morgan if the juror said 17 I'm not going to consider any mitigating factor. 18 JUSTICE STEVENS: No, no. The juror just 19 did exactly what he did here, but everybody is 20 evaluating demeanor in the courtroom, and defense 21 counsel's evaluation of the demeanor is I don't want 22 that juror, he's going to hang my client, and that's 23 what he thought and he let it come out when he told the 24 judge no objection.

MS. ELLIOTT: Oh.

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50

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1 JUSTICE STEVENS: Would that make a 2 difference? 3 MS. ELLIOTT: It wouldn't make a difference 4 under Washington law because it could be raised for the 5 first time on appeal, if that wasn't what the record 6 demonstrated. 7 Did I understand your question? 8 JUSTICE STEVENS: You did. Do you think it should make a difference to us if we think that he 9 10 didn't really want this quy on the jury? MS. ELLIOTT: I don't think there's anything 11 12 in the record to suggest that, but for his lack of 13 objection. Because there's no harmless error analysis, 14 I don't think it can make a difference to this Court, 15 and because in Washington we have this peculiar rule 16 which says you don't have to object. 17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Does the fact that this is 18 structural error, that there's no harmless error 19 analysis, mean that we should be very careful to give 20 substance to the rule that there's deference to the 21 trial judge? And in fact, in the Witt case, we said that the determination to excuse a juror is based on 22 23 determinations of demeanor and credibility that are within the trial judge's province. We said that. 24 25 MS. ELLIOTT: Absolutely. And if there had

51

1 been a mention of demeanor on this record, I think this 2 Court's decision would be easy.

3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Witt presumes that there 4 is that judgment made by the district judge, whether or 5 not it's mentioned. It was not mentioned in Witt. 6 MS. ELLIOTT: Well, what Judge Kozinski then 7 says about that is if on the record -- you have a cold 8 record here which demonstrates in our view that the juror is completely qualified to serve, and nothing 9 10 about him would prevent him from serving. And you have 11 no mention of demeanor by the trial judge, but 12 speculation on the part of the prosecution, then all 13 substantive evidence review of juror challenges in 14 capital cases is dead and --15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Should I defer to Judge 16 Kozinski's observation or to the Supreme Court's opinion 17 in Witt? 18 MS. ELLIOTT: You should defer to the 19 Supreme Court's observation in Witt, but only I think if 20 there's some indication on the record that there is

21 demeanor. And --

2.2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, there's a 23 third choice which under AEDPA is the Washington 24 State-court decision to which we should defer. 25

MS. ELLIOTT: The Washington State Supreme

52

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1 Court decision? 2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes. 3 MS. ELLIOTT: The Washington State Supreme 4 Court decision suffers a different problem, I think, 5 Your Honor, which is that what the Washington State Supreme Court said on page 173 was that "on voir dire he 6 7 indicated he would impose the death penalty where the 8 defendant 'would reviolate if released,' which is not a correct statement of the law." And in fact, that is --9 10 the considerations about whether or not 11 Mr. Brown would reviolate whether in prison or not are 12 considerations under Washington law in a death penalty 13 case. 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: On page 208, though, 15 the Washington Supreme Court also stated the standard, 16 as I understand it from Witt, that Mr. Deal's views 17 "would have prevented or substantially impaired his 18 ability to follow the court's instructions." 19 MS. ELLIOTT: But -- I agree that there is a 20 summary that says that. But the substantive basis for 21 the trial court's decision -- I think -- is back at 22 page, as I said, 173a, where he --23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Isn't the number of the

23 JUSTICE GINSBORG: Isn't the number of the 24 page that you gave telling this is an appeal from a 25 capital sentence, and there are umpteen challenges made.

53

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1 So the judge is dealing with Richard Deal in one 2 paragraph. The defendant raised a host of challenges, 3 and so there's not perfect consistency with what these 4 two passages in the opinion. But mustn't we take into 5 account what this was? This was the defense brought out every objection they probably could conceive of and they 6 7 didn't put particular emphasis on this, so it comes out 8 this way.

9 MS. ELLIOTT: Well, if you're -- you mean in 10 terms of the -- in the trial court? Or in the State 11 Supreme court's opinion?

12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: In the Supreme Court. 13 Now we're talking about the Washington Supreme Court. 14 You said they got it wrong because they said in this 15 paragraph that he got the law wrong, he made an 16 incorrect statement of the law because he said he would 17 impose the death penalty where the defendant would 18 reviolate if released, which is not a correct statement 19 of the law.

We don't know exactly what that court meant by that paragraph, but we do know that the Washington Supreme Court was facing -- I don't know how many objections they were dealing with in this opinion, but a great many.

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MS. ELLIOTT: Yes, and so if you then turn

54

to the end of the opinion, if that's what you're asking, at 208, there's kind of a summary of their basis for all of the challenges made by Mr. Brown to all sorts of things in the case.

5 There were also challenges to other jurors 6 as well. And there are separate paragraphs where the 7 court -- those jurors that are mentioned in the summary 8 paragraph, where the court then explains the various 9 reasons why it's upholding the trial judge as to those 10 jurors as well.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, my point is simply that when a court is faced with so many challenges, this particular one, there had been no objection at the trial. So an appellate court might think we don't have to spend too much time on that one.

MS. ELLIOTT: That is true. It appears as though what they did was to -- because this is not what the trial judge said, this is the basis for the objection by the prosecutor, that they assumed the trial judge adopted the prosecutor's objection.

In sum, there's nothing in the record that supports a conclusion here that Juror Deal could not subordinate his personal views about the death penalty or that he would frustrate the State's legitimate purpose in carrying out the State's legitimate interest

55

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1 in a constitutional capital death penalty scheme. So we 2 would ask this Court to affirm the opinion of Judge 3 Kozinski in the Ninth Circuit and grant the writ of 4 habeas corpus in this case. Thank you. 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Ms. Elliott. 6 7 Mr. Samson, you have one minute remaining. 8 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN J. SAMSON 9 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 10 MR. SAMSON: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. 11 In response to the questions regarding the 12 Witherspoon language and whether it's still good law, 13 the Court in Witt essentially said that is no longer the 14 standard. The standard instead is the substantial 15 impairment standard, and it is not required to show that 16 the juror would never impose the death penalty or 17 automatically vote against it by unmistakable clarity. 18 And the fact that there were -- in response 19 to Justice Ginsburg's question -- the fact that there 20 were so many claims presented to the State Supreme Court 21 may explain in part the summary opinion regarding this 22 particular issue. AEDPA does not require a perfect 23 opinion by the State court to survive review. It only requires reasonableness and an objective standard. 24 25 In addition, the arguments presented by

56

1	Mr. Brown are essentially: We disagree and the Federal
2	courts should disagree with the factfinding process done
3	by the State courts. But the fact that a reviewing
4	court reviewing the same transcript may reach a
5	different factual determination is not sufficient. If
6	the view reached by the State court is supported by
7	evidence and is thank you, Your Honor.
8	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
9	The case is submitted.
10	(Whereupon, at 2:00 p.m., the case in the
11	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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23	
24	
25	

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A	ambiguity 4:12	appropriate 6:6	28:2 30:20	Breyer 21:19,21
abide 11:18 19:4	18:2	7:5,8,10 23:2	56:17	22:8 23:10,13
ability 11:17	ambiguous	26:14 27:17,24	average 41:12	23:16,21,24,25
19:3 24:22	32:19	31:3,23 32:2	aware 44:23	24:5 46:20
48:4 53:18	amicus 1:20 2:7	32:22 48:21	<u> </u>	47:14,17 48:11
able 7:14 45:7	19:22	49:18		48:23
49:2	amount 43:9	appropriately	back 10:19	brief 9:1 13:9
above-entitled	analysis 9:3	9:11	26:23 50:2	39:1
1:12 57:11	12:10 27:19	approximately	53:21	bring 18:21
absence 19:9	39:20 51:13,19	5:17	background	broader 47:9
22:2	answer 26:19	April 1:10	21:1	48:16
absolutely 17:1	31:8 34:15	arguably 18:5	bailiff 38:1	brother 45:20
18:2,18 21:16	39:22,23	argue 39:1	balance 43:6	brought 54:5
23:3 35:2	answered 34:14	argument 1:13	based 3:25	Brown 1:7 3:4
51:25	answers 32:15	2:2,5,9,12 3:3	14:18 15:4,18	3:11,17 13:8
accepted 27:16	32:20,21 33:25	3:6 16:15	28:12 30:10	38:18 40:9
account 54:5	34:11 45:15	19:21 29:13	43:1 45:14	53:11 55:3
act 3:14 20:16	Antiterrorism	40:2 56:8	51:22	57:1
acted 9:11	3:13	arguments	basically 21:8	building 26:7
action 16:16,21	apparently 5:10	56:25	37:20	burden 17:18,20
26:8	appeal 22:4 36:3	articulate 36:6	basis 20:16,17	17:22 18:6
actual 30:6	36:10 51:5	articulation	33:7 36:7,25	36:6
addition 11:23	53:24	11:12	37:2 38:13,15	bushwhacking
56:25	appeals 11:19	aside 22:9	41:11 45:17	44:21
adhere 24:13	13:3	asked 6:2,5,23	46:17 47:9	
admits 34:2	APPEARAN	7:4,13 22:6	53:20 55:2,18	C
admitted 13:8	1:15	25:4 31:16,16	beginning 30:17	C 2:1 3:1
35:24	appears 55:16	asking 8:5 55:1	begun 47:5	CAL 1:7
adopted 55:20	appellate 15:2,3	asks 16:8	behalf 1:17,20	call 28:12 34:1
AEDPA 12:19	23:17 25:8	assessing 22:3	1:22 2:4,7,11	capital 27:17,19
12:23 13:24	44:13 55:14	Assistant 1:16	2:14 3:7 19:22	30:14 40:25
14:2,4,4,8	appendix 7:4,16	1:18	29:14 56:9	41:11 52:14
42:15,23,24	11:7 20:8 30:5	assume 15:18	believe 8:24	53:25 56:1
52:23 56:22	30:22 37:18	assumed 4:15	18:11 20:9	careful 20:7
affirm 48:20	applicant 17:18	55:19	21:6,16 28:25	51:19
56:2	application 4:9	assuming 37:1	32:18 34:9	carried 47:10
aggravating	29:25	assumption	35:17 41:5	48:17
24:25 49:17	applied 4:5	46:16	45:23 46:4,9	carrying 55:25
	applies 12:23	attached 9:2	believed 7:5,10	case 4:7,16 6:7
ago 5:20 7:18 agree 7:20 8:1	apply 8:6 20:10	attempt 18:20	23:23	8:20 14:3,11
0	21:2,5,13	attempts 40:15	benefit 14:19	14:15,17 17:18
34:4 48:5,8 53:19	26:21 28:8	attention 44:17	best 4:13 32:15	18:4,23 21:15
· ·	42:20	attorney 1:16	beyond 12:3,3	23:7,11,16
agrees 35:21	applying 8:15	36:1	25:2 30:22	26:4 28:5,7
ALITO 32:10	20:7 28:11	automatic 28:5	bias 22:4	30:7,8 33:1
allows 44:15	29:8	44:13	bit 10:6 33:23	37:6 39:8 40:5
alternatives	appraisal 50:9	automatically	bottom 38:3	41:11 42:8,21
27:9	"PPI albai 50.7	untomuncany		,
	1	1	l	l

	1	1		
43:12 44:2,11	chortling 24:3	23:6	31:2,4,6,17	50:21
44:12 45:2,2	Circuit 13:7	competence	33:5 38:24	count 41:10
47:8 48:18	21:25 56:3	25:15	39:3 45:7,9	course 6:15
51:21 53:13	Circuit's 3:10	competent 36:9	47:3,3 48:14	17:16 30:6
55:4 56:4 57:9	circumstance	complaining	48:22,25 49:9	39:4 42:25
57:10	6:11 26:14	39:13	49:12 50:17	court 1:1,13 3:9
cases 8:11 26:7	circumstances	completed 10:15	consideration	3:19 4:4,5 8:6
27:23 34:5,6	22:13 24:14,25	completely	32:2 49:15	9:9,10,14
40:25 46:21	25:1 39:25	43:13 52:9	considerations	10:22 11:1,6
48:20 52:14	47:7	complying	53:10,12	11:15,19,23
cause 21:4 30:9	cite 11:14	25:18	considered 9:20	12:9,11,13
36:6 37:21	cited 34:6	conceive 54:6	39:25	13:3,5,9,10
42:9 45:17	citing 11:7	concern 25:12	considering	14:7,9,13,17
central 39:5	claims 56:20	27:15 39:5	32:25	14:23 15:2,4,4
certainly 8:17	clarify 20:24	44:15 45:14	consistency 54:3	15:5,6 16:9,11
14:14 35:1	35:19	50:3	consistent 25:18	17:7 18:21
45:13	clarity 56:17	concerned 49:18	constitutes 11:9	22:1 24:16
certainty 28:8	clear 3:17 17:23	concerns 44:20	12:13	25:8 26:2,6
certiorari 30:5	20:20 22:1	conclude 12:6	constitutional	28:1,7 29:16
cetera 22:25	23:3,4 26:8	28:9 29:6	39:24 44:7	29:18 30:3
challenge 8:21	28:7 29:5,6	concluded 38:11	56:1	35:23 36:5
22:1 36:5 38:2	34:13 43:9	conclusion 3:10	contains 12:14	37:19,22,23
42:9 45:17	clearly 4:9 9:1	12:7,12,20,23	context 44:11	38:1,5,10 42:5
challenged 42:1	21:1 32:23	12:24 13:22,22	contradictory	42:23 43:2,5
challenges 10:11	40:1	13:23 14:5,7	18:5,5	43:10,17,25
40:21 52:13	client 50:22	15:1,10,18	contrary 4:4	45:16 47:18,19
53:25 54:2	COBURN 1:7	17:2 25:14	50:9	51:14 53:1,4,6
55:3,5,12	codified 42:25	55:22	controlling 30:1	53:15 54:10,12
change 48:18	cold 23:18 52:7	conclusions	convinced 23:2	54:13,20,22
changed 47:11	collateral 18:21	11:25 12:5	convincing 3:17	55:7,8,12,14
Chief 3:3,8 5:21	colleague 22:5	14:9	17:23	56:2,13,20,23
8:25 11:11	colleagues 40:20	conditions 22:22	corpus 3:11 56:4	57:4,6
13:12,19 19:17	colloquy 26:12	conflicts 29:24	correct 3:16 4:1	courtroom
19:20,24 29:10	31:10 32:9	confused 23:8	4:5,15,17,20	16:19,20 25:23
29:15 30:16	40:12	confusion 24:12	6:13 7:2,3 8:9	50:20
31:5,20,25 33:3 35:13	come 33:19	24:18,20,21	8:16 10:3	courts 13:7,21
38:8 41:8	50:23 comes 26:23	Congress 43:9 Conn 1:22	13:25 14:21,22 34:21,25 38:10	29:18 57:2,3 court's 4:8
	34:2 54:7	conscience 7:24	46:15 53:9	11:17 19:3
42:14,19 43:3 43:15 45:19	comment 40:22	conscientious	40.13 33.9 54:18	29:22 30:1,4,9
47:21,25 48:5	commit 22:15	28:22 41:14	counsel 4:14	42:24 52:2,16
52:22 53:2,14	49:2	42:7	5:25 6:1,5	52:19 53:18,21
56:5,10 57:8	committed 47:5	42.7 conscientiously	15:22 36:9	54:11
Chief's 10:20	48:1,7	29:8	38:1 41:17	created 4:12
choice 32:4	committing	consider 4:11	44:17 46:12	creating 16:7
33:10 52:23	22:17	6:3 9:10 22:21	50:4 57:8	credibility 9:7
choices 30:25	compared 23:5	23:1 26:25	counsel's 15:24	17:8 51:23
		23.1 20.23	Counsel 5 13.27	17.0 51.25
			1	I

credible 46:10	37:8 38:12,19	18:5,7,17,18	10:2,17 21:1	elaborate 16:12
credited 24:15	39:8,15 40:5	25:8,23,25	21:11 24:7,17	26:5 45:20
crime 22:15,17	47:6,9 48:9,16	44:25 45:1,6	26:16 32:7	eliminate 20:11
26:22 49:2	49:5,9 53:7,12	45:12,13,14	33:4,14 37:12	20:12 43:13
critical 19:10,13	54:17 55:23	46:1,14,14	42:6 46:19	elimination
22:3	56:1,16	50:20,21 51:23	47:8 53:6	16:17
criticized 25:3	decision 3:19,25	52:1,11,21	direct 30:3	Elliott 1:22 2:10
curiae 1:20 2:8	4:4,8 8:19 11:3	demonstrated	42:16 43:18	29:12,13,15
19:22	27:13 29:22,23	51:6	directly 22:16	30:21 31:11,24
cuts 10:5	30:9 33:15	demonstrates	disagree 11:4	32:1,21 33:8
	52:2,24 53:1,4	52:8	38:10 39:4	34:4,17,21,25
D	53:21	demonstrating	42:5,7 57:1,2	35:7,12,16
D 3:1	decisions 43:11	32:23	disagreed 14:24	36:18,24 37:15
daily 41:10	defendant 7:11	Department	discern 9:1	37:18,25 38:7
dangerousness	7:11 16:7	1:19	discussion 20:10	38:14 39:9,12
49:12	27:20 30:25	describing	dismiss 34:16	39:16,19,23
Darden 7:22,23	53:8 54:2,17	24:17	dismissal 3:14	40:8,24 41:5
8:2,13 26:6	defendant's 9:2	destroyed 40:19	disposing 21:25	41:10,18,21
day 41:7	defense 3:22	determination	dispute 16:11	42:3,17,22
days 9:24 41:3,6	5:25 6:1,4 8:22	3:25 17:21	disqualifying	43:5,20 44:8
41:12	9:2 10:17	29:19 51:22	25:6	44:20 45:4,10
dead 52:14	15:22,23 21:6	57:5	district 52:4	45:23 46:7,15
Deal 3:14,20,22	21:8,9,10,12	determinations	doing 41:14 49:6	47:12,19,23
4:6,10 5:7 6:1	21:17,20,21	14:13 45:21	doubt 12:3,4	48:2,8,19 49:3
6:16 7:13,16	22:2 26:12	51:23	25:2 26:22	49:11 50:7,12
8:3,8 9:20	36:1 40:22	determine 24:15	37:5	50:15,25 51:3
11:16 12:10	41:17 46:12	determined 8:18	Dreeben 1:18	51:11,25 52:6
21:15 24:13	50:4,20 54:5	developed 43:2	2:6 19:20,21	52:18,25 53:3
30:9,11 31:4	defer 16:22	46:19	19:24 20:5,19	53:19 54:9,25
32:9 38:16	52:15,18,24	die 7:11	21:23 23:10,15	55:16 56:6
39:2,6 46:10	deference 8:4,19	difference 17:19	23:24 24:5,20	emerge 47:7
54:1 55:22	12:20 13:24	18:3,8,17	24:23 25:9	emphasis 54:7
dealing 23:18	14:4,4,5,8,11	28:15 42:20	26:1 27:7,15	enactment
54:1,23	14:12,15 15:2	43:6 44:4,7	28:2,6,20,23	42:23
Deal's 6:14 19:2	15:6,15,19	50:11,16 51:2	29:1,5,11	enter 9:3
24:6 53:16	35:18 42:24,25	51:3,9,14	drew 14:9 15:18	entire 21:1
death 3:13 4:11	43:4,7,8,10,17	different 8:16	D.C 1:9,19	40:13 42:6
4:19 6:3,5,12	43:25 51:20	18:13 43:18,24	D .C 1.7,17	entirely 32:22
6:17 7:1,5,15	degree 43:4	45:2,2 48:1	E	entitled 3:11
8:14,24 9:24	demanded 47:1	43.2,2 48.1 53:4 57:5	E 2:1 3:1,1	8:19 13:23
10:10,15 22:12	48:13	differently	early 9:20,22	enumerated 5:1
22:21,25 24:8	demeanor 9:7	42:15	10:6	27:4
26:13,20,25	14:19,20 15:10	42:15 difficult 25:21	easy 34:1 52:2	equally 20:2
27:10,23,25	15:11,17,19,22	difficulty 6:17	effect 16:6,17	equally 20:2 equivocal 8:11
30:13 31:1,3		8:15	Effective 3:13	32:15
31:22 32:5,13	16:17,22 17:3 17:4,5,11,13	8:15 dire 4:10,17,22	effort 21:2	32:15 error 40:5,6
32:19 33:9,10		5:6 6:15 9:24	either 24:7	· · · · ·
52.17 55.7,10	17:17,19 18:3	5.0 0.15 9.24		51:13,18,18
	-		I	l

		l		I
errors 21:25	excusing 29:2	57:2	45:1,6	5:4 8:4
especially 3:20	33:7 38:13,15	factor 9:10	findings 11:25	getting 36:9,10
ESQ 1:16,18,22	exercised 10:7	49:17 50:17	12:1,1,2 13:9	Ginsburg 5:8
2:3,6,10,13	10:10	factors 5:1 27:4	16:12 29:17	6:9,21,23
essentially 12:12	expands 32:7	27:5 38:25	35:18 42:24	11:24 24:23
13:8 44:10	expect 22:7	facts 4:1 12:6,7	43:23	25:10 35:8
56:13 57:1	34:14	12:8,11,20	fine 36:8	39:17 40:4,11
established 4:9	experience	13:10 17:14	finish 20:1	41:13,19,23
et 22:25	28:15	29:20 43:2	first 3:12 9:5	53:23 54:12
evaluate 33:22	explain 56:21	46:19 47:7	26:17 29:18	55:11
evaluating	explained 16:10	factual 14:6,13	30:6 31:16	Ginsburg's
50:20	26:24	16:11 57:5	32:15 35:22,23	56:19
evaluation	explains 9:6	failed 20:17	36:2,11 37:3	give 6:23 7:17
50:21	55:8	failure 9:2,5	49:14 51:5	12:19 15:1
evenhandedly	explanation	10:20 11:2	five 9:23 21:7	22:6 23:19
20:11	11:2 22:6,9	35:22 44:2	24:6,11 40:23	25:4 27:1
everybody	25:21 27:3	50:3	41:15,15,20	32:16 42:24
50:19	37:5 45:21,24	fair 13:4 25:13	42:2	43:4,25 44:10
evidence 3:17,18	explicit 17:8	28:17	fixed 7:23	51:19
5:9 9:6,6,11	26:2	faith 21:2	focused 38:9	given 4:18,23
14:25 15:21	express 9:7 14:9	falls 25:7 36:6	follow 8:23	5:10,24 8:2,4
17:1,23 18:1	19:6	far 35:13,17	11:17 19:3	14:12,12 15:6
18:21 29:20	expressed 9:6	favor 48:9	24:22 27:22	26:20,21 27:2
31:3 52:13	13:21 24:7	Federal 4:9	30:19 53:18	32:11,22,25
57:7	extension 7:22	43:13 44:6	following 42:12	45:15 47:8
exactly 4:21 8:3	extensive 20:9	57:1	footnote 46:25	gives 21:5 33:14
11:13 12:25	extraordinary	feel 32:17	47:1	giving 22:12
21:17 32:12	41:1	feeling 34:10	forget 5:1	34:10
44:4 50:19		fellow 34:13	forth 28:18	go 10:19 35:13
54:20	F	fiction 15:20	for-cause 10:11	35:16 50:2
example 6:10,20	faced 55:12	filed 18:22	40:15	goes 23:11,15
6:22,24,24 7:4	faces 23:22	filled 5:16	found 4:6 10:22	going 15:14
7:14 8:20 25:4	facing 54:22	filling 4:23	13:7 21:14	20:10,11,12
26:13 32:3	fact 3:15 4:1,6	final 13:22	29:1 31:14	24:1 27:12,21
34:9	6:2 7:9 8:20	32:11	46:2	28:8 30:25
examples 7:9	11:10,22 12:4	finally 23:9	front 40:2	31:7,16,18
exclude 48:15	12:13,14,15,19	find 30:24 42:10	frustrate 55:24	32:4 33:20
excluded 47:9	13:8 15:5	finding 3:15 4:1	fuller 22:6	34:2,3,5 40:19
excluding 24:19	21:20 22:15	10:24 11:10,22	further 10:16	43:13 44:12
exclusion 11:9	32:10 33:1,24	11:24 12:4,13	15:16 26:6	49:20,25 50:10
excusal 39:14	34:7,8,18 35:4	12:14,15,19	35:4	50:17,22
40:16	37:12 39:2,3	13:7 14:17	future 49:12,21	good 21:2 34:15
excuse 30:9	44:21 45:7	15:2,4,4 17:8		41:7 56:12
34:23 38:1	48:19,20 49:17	19:6,10,13,14	G	grant 7:21,21
42:3 51:22	51:17,21 53:9	20:4,17 22:4	G 3:1	37:20 56:3
excused 21:4,10	56:18,19 57:3	30:4 35:4	game 10:7	granted 25:20
21:14	factfinding 14:8	38:21 44:25	general 1:16,19	29:21 41:15,22

Alderson Reporting Company

r				
42:9	14:2,10 15:3	33:9 38:19	26:11 34:20	25:20,23,25
granting 46:13	15:12,21 16:4	39:15 53:7	instructed 27:13	26:5 27:16
46:17	16:9,25 17:6	54:17 56:16	28:1	28:9,11 29:1,8
Gray 23:7 34:9	18:12,20 19:11	imposed 24:9	instruction 5:4	31:9,12 34:10
40:8	19:19 30:21	37:8 39:8	instructions	35:2,8,14,17
great 6:17 54:24	31:11 34:4	imposing 6:17	4:23 5:24	35:20 36:1,21
greater 43:4	36:24 37:25	26:25 31:3	11:18 19:3	36:23 41:14
ground 9:15	41:11 42:4	38:12,20 49:9	28:19 30:19	42:7,8 43:1,11
16:16 48:16	48:19 49:22	imposition 4:19	32:25 53:18	44:16,22 45:1
grounds 16:22	53:5 57:7	impression	interchangeably	45:11 46:1
24:19 27:12	Honors 7:3	10:21	10:18	50:24 51:21
guess 16:5	host 54:2	imputing 15:20	interest 55:25	52:4,6,11,15
guilty 30:25	hour 5:14,17,20	inability 21:5	intervene 20:23	54:1 55:9,18
38:22	7:18	incidentally	inwardly 24:3	55:20 56:2
guy 28:25 49:20	hypothetical	37:22	irrevocably 47:5	judges 34:7
51:10	33:8	include 33:1	48:1,6	judge's 3:14
		includes 11:8	issue 9:15 10:23	11:9 16:15
H	I	including 11:15	16:11 36:2	17:1 22:3 26:8
habeas 3:11	idea 37:7 38:11	40:14	37:6 39:24	36:25 45:21
17:18 36:5	identified 31:13	incorporated	44:17 45:9	51:24
43:10,13,21	ignore 31:9	37:2	49:12 56:22	judgment 52:4
56:4	illegal 23:7	incorrect 13:3	italicized 48:15	judicial 16:17
handle 43:16	imagine 36:14	37:10,11 38:6	italics 47:3	16:21,23 17:11
handled 44:19	impair 28:10	46:18 54:16		17:14 25:11
hang 50:22	48:3,6	incorrigible 6:8	J	juror 5:10 8:8
hanging 50:5,7	impaired 4:7	7:6 26:15	J 1:16 2:3,13	8:17,18,20
happened 37:11	8:18 10:25	independent	56:8	10:25 11:9
happens 24:1	11:17 12:6	9:15	jail 22:17	14:21 15:8,25
33:22	13:23 19:3	indicate 4:10	JEFFREY 1:3	18:13,23 20:23
hard 14:14	32:24 33:24	23:23 25:25	job 41:14	21:15 23:19
harder 36:10	42:11 47:22,23	49:8,10	JOHN 1:16 2:3	24:6,13,24
harm 39:10,12	48:3 49:5	indicated 5:19	2:13 3:6 56:8	25:18 26:12
39:18,19	53:17	48:25 49:4	joint 7:3,16 20:8	28:3,11,16,18
harmful 40:7	impairing 24:22	53:7	30:22 37:18	30:9,11,19
harmless 40:10	impairment	indicates 47:8	judge 3:20 4:13	32:9,23 33:4
51:13,18	3:16 9:8 12:7	indicating 35:3	5:24 8:4,17,21	33:18,21 34:3
Hartford 1:22 head 23:23	56:15	indication 52:20	8:23 9:11	34:15 35:9
hear 3:3 39:21	implicit 12:15 26:8 35:18	indistinguisha	10:21 11:12,19 13:11 14:12	38:2,11,15,22
heard 23:19	implied 22:3	4:7	15:7,9,18 16:1	39:2,2,3,6,14
heart 23:11,16	important 27:7	individual 4:22	16:12,16,19,20	39:24 40:12
Honor 4:21 5:3	49:23	5:6,18 9:24	16:23 19:1,5	42:9,10 45:15
5:14 6:13 8:1	impose 4:11	10:16	19:12 20:3,6	46:9,14 48:4,9
8:12 9:4,17	7:15 8:24	information 5:9	20:10,15,25	48:20,21 50:6
10:3,14 11:5	22:23 23:1	informed 5:16	21:8,13,16	50:7,15,16,18
11:21 12:21	27:19,25 30:12	5:18 insist 33:19	22:6 23:17,20	50:22 51:22
13:1,6,16 14:1	31:18 32:13	instances 24:11	24:14,16 25:14	52:9,13 55:22 56:16
10.1,0,10 17.1	51.10 52.15	mstances 24:11	2 ··· · ·,· · · 2 2 · · · ·	50.10
	1			

1	_	<u>.</u>	_	-
jurors 4:23 7:23	37:22 38:5,8	kinds 34:7	47:11,13,15,16	21:1 23:22
8:2,14 9:21,21	39:7,10,13,17	knew 25:23 35:1	49:13,14 50:14	33:15
9:23 10:16,18	39:21 40:4,11	36:2 44:12	51:4 53:9,12	man 22:22 47:2
10:23 11:15,18	40:17 41:2,3,6	know 5:10,12	54:15,16,19	48:13 50:9
19:4 20:12,13	41:8,13,19,23	16:18 20:3	56:12	Marshall 17:6
21:3,10,12	41:25 42:14,19	21:21 22:20	lawyer 23:17	Martinez 42:7
28:21 34:10	43:3,15 44:1	24:24,25 30:24	35:4	materially 4:7
40:14 55:5,7	44:14,15,24	31:21 34:2	lay 12:10	matter 1:12 7:24
55:10	45:5,19 46:3	35:19 36:22	learn 5:21	44:6,22 57:11
juror's 24:22	46:11,20,25	38:16,20 41:9	learned 5:14,20	Matthews 37:16
25:15 27:17	47:14,15,17,17	46:24 54:20,21	5:23	37:19 46:18
28:10,13	47:21,25 48:5	54:22	LEE 1:22 2:10	mean 10:6 14:20
jury 3:15 10:13	48:11,23,24	knowing 7:15	29:13	15:19,19 17:17
23:8 40:2	49:7,24 50:2,8	known 50:11	left 9:16	23:5 25:10
48:10 51:10	50:13,18 51:1	knows 36:9,11	legal 21:25	28:3 31:7
justice 1:19 3:3	51:8,17 52:3	Kozinski 16:24	legitimate 55:24	36:22 41:9
3:8 4:14,25 5:5	52:15,22 53:2	20:15 31:13	55:25	42:17 43:3,12
5:8,21 6:9,20	53:14,23 54:12	35:8,14,17	lengthy 45:24	44:13 51:19
6:21,23 7:20	55:11 56:5,10	43:11 52:6	lens 42:18	54:9
8:7,10,25 9:12	56:19 57:8	56:3	level 24:21 43:2	meaningless
9:19 10:1,5,12	justify 28:5	Kozinski's	life 5:11,11 6:2,3	44:11
10:19 11:11,12		10:21 11:12	7:15,18 22:18	means 16:14
11:24 12:16,17	K	35:20 52:16	27:9 31:1 32:5	49:11
12:18,22 13:2	KEENEDY 8:10		33:10 49:15	meant 5:11
13:12,17,19,20	keep 27:4	L	110 11 100 10	
13.12,17,17,20	-		life-biased 20:12	54:20
14:3,16,24	KENNEDY	L 3:6	light 29:20	54:20 measure 23:2
	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12	L 3:6 laboring 45:16		
14:3,16,24	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12	L 3:6 laboring 45:16 lack 51:12	light 29:20	measure 23:2
14:3,16,24 15:9,14,23	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2	L 3:6 laboring 45:16 lack 51:12 language 35:20	light 29:20 limit 43:10	measure 23:2 measured 24:9
14:3,16,24 15:9,14,23 16:5,14 17:3,9	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18	L 3:6 laboring 45:16 lack 51:12 language 35:20 38:9 56:12	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8
14:3,16,24 15:9,14,23 16:5,14 17:3,9 17:16,24,25	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22	L 3:6 laboring 45:16 lack 51:12 language 35:20 38:9 56:12 large 40:21	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12
14:3,16,24 15:9,14,23 16:5,14 17:3,9 17:16,24,25 18:16,24 19:8	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22	L 3:6 laboring 45:16 lack 51:12 language 35:20 38:9 56:12 large 40:21 late 9:19,21	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2
14:3,16,24 15:9,14,23 16:5,14 17:3,9 17:16,24,25 18:16,24 19:8 19:12,17,20,24	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22 38:5 39:7,10	L 3:6 laboring 45:16 lack 51:12 language 35:20 38:9 56:12 large 40:21 late 9:19,21 Laughter 23:12	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12 little 10:5 33:23	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2 52:1,11
14:3,16,24 15:9,14,23 16:5,14 17:3,9 17:16,24,25 18:16,24 19:8 19:12,17,20,24 20:1,5,14,20	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22 38:5 39:7,10 39:13,21 40:17	L 3:6 laboring 45:16 lack 51:12 language 35:20 38:9 56:12 large 40:21 late 9:19,21 Laughter 23:12 35:15	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12 little 10:5 33:23 35:20 41:12	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2 52:1,11 mentioned 6:22
14:3,16,24 15:9,14,23 16:5,14 17:3,9 17:16,24,25 18:16,24 19:8 19:12,17,20,24 20:1,5,14,20 21:19,20,21	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22 38:5 39:7,10 39:13,21 40:17 41:2,25 44:24	L 3:6 laboring 45:16 lack 51:12 language 35:20 38:9 56:12 large 40:21 late 9:19,21 Laughter 23:12 35:15 law 4:9,19 5:2	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12 little 10:5 33:23 35:20 41:12 Lonberger 17:7	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2 52:1,11 mentioned 6:22 8:11 22:5
14:3,16,24 15:9,14,23 16:5,14 17:3,9 17:16,24,25 18:16,24 19:8 19:12,17,20,24 20:1,5,14,20 21:19,20,21 22:8 23:10,13	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22 38:5 39:7,10 39:13,21 40:17 41:2,25 44:24 45:5 51:17	L 3:6 laboring 45:16 lack 51:12 language 35:20 38:9 56:12 large 40:21 late 9:19,21 Laughter 23:12 35:15 law 4:9,19 5:2 5:13,15,16	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12 little 10:5 33:23 35:20 41:12 Lonberger 17:7 longer 56:13	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2 52:1,11 mentioned 6:22 8:11 22:5 46:14 52:5,5
14:3,16,24 15:9,14,23 16:5,14 17:3,9 17:16,24,25 18:16,24 19:8 19:12,17,20,24 20:1,5,14,20 21:19,20,21 22:8 23:10,13 23:16,21,24,25	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22 38:5 39:7,10 39:13,21 40:17 41:2,25 44:24 45:5 51:17 52:3,15	L 3:6 laboring 45:16 lack 51:12 language 35:20 38:9 56:12 large 40:21 late 9:19,21 Laughter 23:12 35:15 law 4:9,19 5:2 5:13,15,16 8:23 21:5,13	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12 little 10:5 33:23 35:20 41:12 Lonberger 17:7 longer 56:13 look 27:12 31:20	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2 52:1,11 mentioned 6:22 8:11 22:5 46:14 52:5,5 55:7
14:3,16,24 15:9,14,23 16:5,14 17:3,9 17:16,24,25 18:16,24 19:8 19:12,17,20,24 20:1,5,14,20 21:19,20,21 22:8 23:10,13 23:16,21,24,25 24:5,18,23	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22 38:5 39:7,10 39:13,21 40:17 41:2,25 44:24 45:5 51:17 52:3,15 Kennedy's	L 3:6 laboring 45:16 lack 51:12 language 35:20 38:9 56:12 large 40:21 late 9:19,21 Laughter 23:12 35:15 law 4:9,19 5:2 5:13,15,16 8:23 21:5,13 24:9,13,22	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12 little 10:5 33:23 35:20 41:12 Lonberger 17:7 longer 56:13 look 27:12 31:20 31:21 40:13	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2 52:1,11 mentioned 6:22 8:11 22:5 46:14 52:5,5 55:7 meticulously
14:3,16,24 15:9,14,23 16:5,14 17:3,9 17:16,24,25 18:16,24 19:8 19:12,17,20,24 20:1,5,14,20 21:19,20,21 22:8 23:10,13 23:16,21,24,25 24:5,18,23 25:10,11,24	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22 38:5 39:7,10 39:13,21 40:17 41:2,25 44:24 45:5 51:17 52:3,15 Kennedy's 44:15	L 3:6 laboring 45:16 lack 51:12 language 35:20 38:9 56:12 large 40:21 late 9:19,21 Laughter 23:12 35:15 law 4:9,19 5:2 5:13,15,16 8:23 21:5,13 24:9,13,22 25:19 26:10,24	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12 little 10:5 33:23 35:20 41:12 Lonberger 17:7 longer 56:13 look 27:12 31:20 31:21 40:13 42:6,15	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2 52:1,11 mentioned 6:22 8:11 22:5 46:14 52:5,5 55:7 meticulously 20:7
14:3,16,24 15:9,14,23 16:5,14 17:3,9 17:16,24,25 18:16,24 19:8 19:12,17,20,24 20:1,5,14,20 21:19,20,21 22:8 23:10,13 23:16,21,24,25 24:5,18,23 25:10,11,24 27:2,8,11,22	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22 38:5 39:7,10 39:13,21 40:17 41:2,25 44:24 45:5 51:17 52:3,15 Kennedy's 44:15 kept 22:12	$ \frac{\mathbf{L} \ 3:6}{\mathbf{laboring} \ 45:16} \\ \frac{\mathbf{laboring} \ 45:16}{\mathbf{lack} \ 51:12} \\ \frac{\mathbf{language} \ 35:20}{\mathbf{38:9} \ 56:12} \\ \frac{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21}{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21} \\ \frac{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21}{\mathbf{late} \ 9:19,21} \\ \frac{\mathbf{Laughter} \ 23:12}{\mathbf{35:15}} \\ \frac{\mathbf{law} \ 4:9,19 \ 5:2}{\mathbf{5:13},15,16} \\ \frac{\mathbf{8:23} \ 21:5,13}{\mathbf{24:9},13,22} \\ 25:19 \ 26:10,24 \\ \mathbf{27:8},14,20 \\ \end{array} $	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12 little 10:5 33:23 35:20 41:12 Lonberger 17:7 longer 56:13 look 27:12 31:20 31:21 40:13 42:6,15 looked 16:20	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2 52:1,11 mentioned 6:22 8:11 22:5 46:14 52:5,5 55:7 meticulously 20:7 MICHAEL 1:18
14:3,16,24 15:9,14,23 16:5,14 17:3,9 17:16,24,25 18:16,24 19:8 19:12,17,20,24 20:1,5,14,20 21:19,20,21 22:8 23:10,13 23:16,21,24,25 24:5,18,23 25:10,11,24 27:2,8,11,22 28:3,4,14,21	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22 38:5 39:7,10 39:13,21 40:17 41:2,25 44:24 45:5 51:17 52:3,15 Kennedy's 44:15 kept 22:12 kill 6:19 7:12	L 3:6 laboring 45:16 lack 51:12 language 35:20 38:9 56:12 large 40:21 late 9:19,21 Laughter 23:12 35:15 law 4:9,19 5:2 5:13,15,16 8:23 21:5,13 24:9,13,22 25:19 26:10,24 27:8,14,20 28:11,17 30:18	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12 little 10:5 33:23 35:20 41:12 Lonberger 17:7 longer 56:13 look 27:12 31:20 31:21 40:13 42:6,15 looked 16:20 23:17 looking 42:16 loose 35:21	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2 52:1,11 mentioned 6:22 8:11 22:5 46:14 52:5,5 55:7 meticulously 20:7 MICHAEL 1:18 2:6 19:21
$\begin{array}{c} 14:3,16,24\\ 15:9,14,23\\ 16:5,14\ 17:3,9\\ 17:16,24,25\\ 18:16,24\ 19:8\\ 19:12,17,20,24\\ 20:1,5,14,20\\ 21:19,20,21\\ 22:8\ 23:10,13\\ 23:16,21,24,25\\ 24:5,18,23\\ 25:10,11,24\\ 27:2,8,11,22\\ 28:3,4,14,21\\ 28:24\ 29:3,10\\ 29:15\ 30:16\\ 31:5,20,25\\ \end{array}$	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22 38:5 39:7,10 39:13,21 40:17 41:2,25 44:24 45:5 51:17 52:3,15 Kennedy's 44:15 kept 22:12 kill 6:19 7:12 27:18 32:14	$ \overline{ L 3:6 } $ $ \overline{ laboring 45:16 } $ $ \overline{ lack 51:12 } $ $ \overline{ language 35:20 } $ $ \overline{ 38:9 56:12 } $ $ \overline{ large 40:21 } $ $ \overline{ late 9:19,21 } $ $ \overline{ late 9:19,21 } $ $ \overline{ laughter 23:12 } $ $ \overline{ 35:15 } $ $ \overline{ law 4:9,19 5:2 } $ $ \overline{ 5:13,15,16 } $ $ \overline{ 8:23 21:5,13 } $ $ \overline{ 24:9,13,22 } $ $ \overline{ 25:19 26:10,24 } $ $ \overline{ 27:8,14,20 } $ $ \overline{ 28:11,17 30:18 } $ $ \overline{ 32:1 33:12 } $	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12 little 10:5 33:23 35:20 41:12 Lonberger 17:7 longer 56:13 look 27:12 31:20 31:21 40:13 42:6,15 looked 16:20 23:17 looking 42:16 loose 35:21 lost 21:7	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2 52:1,11 mentioned 6:22 8:11 22:5 46:14 52:5,5 55:7 meticulously 20:7 MICHAEL 1:18 2:6 19:21 mind 26:18 minute 56:7 misconception
$\begin{array}{c} 14:3,16,24\\ 15:9,14,23\\ 16:5,14\ 17:3,9\\ 17:16,24,25\\ 18:16,24\ 19:8\\ 19:12,17,20,24\\ 20:1,5,14,20\\ 21:19,20,21\\ 22:8\ 23:10,13\\ 23:16,21,24,25\\ 24:5,18,23\\ 25:10,11,24\\ 27:2,8,11,22\\ 28:3,4,14,21\\ 28:24\ 29:3,10\\ 29:15\ 30:16\\ 31:5,20,25\\ 32:10\ 33:3,17\end{array}$	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22 38:5 39:7,10 39:13,21 40:17 41:2,25 44:24 45:5 51:17 52:3,15 Kennedy's 44:15 kept 22:12 kill 6:19 7:12 27:18 32:14 37:8,9 38:12	L 3:6 laboring 45:16 lack 51:12 language 35:20 38:9 56:12 large 40:21 late 9:19,21 Laughter 23:12 35:15 law 4:9,19 5:2 5:13,15,16 8:23 21:5,13 24:9,13,22 25:19 26:10,24 27:8,14,20 28:11,17 30:18 32:1 33:12 34:18 36:1	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12 little 10:5 33:23 35:20 41:12 Lonberger 17:7 longer 56:13 look 27:12 31:20 31:21 40:13 42:6,15 looked 16:20 23:17 looking 42:16 loose 35:21	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2 52:1,11 mentioned 6:22 8:11 22:5 46:14 52:5,5 55:7 meticulously 20:7 MICHAEL 1:18 2:6 19:21 mind 26:18 minute 56:7 misconception 24:8
$\begin{array}{c} 14:3,16,24\\ 15:9,14,23\\ 16:5,14\ 17:3,9\\ 17:16,24,25\\ 18:16,24\ 19:8\\ 19:12,17,20,24\\ 20:1,5,14,20\\ 21:19,20,21\\ 22:8\ 23:10,13\\ 23:16,21,24,25\\ 24:5,18,23\\ 25:10,11,24\\ 27:2,8,11,22\\ 28:3,4,14,21\\ 28:24\ 29:3,10\\ 29:15\ 30:16\\ 31:5,20,25\\ 32:10\ 33:3,17\\ 33:18,19\ 34:12\\ \end{array}$	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22 38:5 39:7,10 39:13,21 40:17 41:2,25 44:24 45:5 51:17 52:3,15 Kennedy's 44:15 kept 22:12 kill 6:19 7:12 27:18 32:14 37:8,9 38:12 38:18	$ \frac{\mathbf{L} \ 3:6}{\mathbf{laboring} \ 45:16} \\ \frac{\mathbf{laboring} \ 45:16}{\mathbf{lack} \ 51:12} \\ \frac{\mathbf{language} \ 35:20}{38:9 \ 56:12} \\ \frac{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21}{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21} \\ \frac{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21}{\mathbf{late} \ 9:19,21} \\ \frac{\mathbf{Laughter} \ 23:12}{35:15} \\ \frac{\mathbf{law} \ 4:9,19 \ 5:2}{5:13,15,16} \\ \frac{\mathbf{s}:23 \ 21:5,13}{24:9,13,22} \\ 25:19 \ 26:10,24 \\ 27:8,14,20 \\ 28:11,17 \ 30:18 \\ 32:1 \ 33:12 \\ 34:18 \ 36:1 \\ 38:14 \ 42:12 \\ \end{array} $	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12 little 10:5 33:23 35:20 41:12 Lonberger 17:7 longer 56:13 look 27:12 31:20 31:21 40:13 42:6,15 looked 16:20 23:17 looking 42:16 loose 35:21 lost 21:7	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2 52:1,11 mentioned 6:22 8:11 22:5 46:14 52:5,5 55:7 meticulously 20:7 MICHAEL 1:18 2:6 19:21 mind 26:18 minute 56:7 misconception 24:8 Mississippi 34:9
$\begin{array}{c} 14:3,16,24\\ 15:9,14,23\\ 16:5,14\ 17:3,9\\ 17:16,24,25\\ 18:16,24\ 19:8\\ 19:12,17,20,24\\ 20:1,5,14,20\\ 21:19,20,21\\ 22:8\ 23:10,13\\ 23:16,21,24,25\\ 24:5,18,23\\ 25:10,11,24\\ 27:2,8,11,22\\ 28:3,4,14,21\\ 28:24\ 29:3,10\\ 29:15\ 30:16\\ 31:5,20,25\\ 32:10\ 33:3,17\\ 33:18,19\ 34:12\\ 34:19,22\ 35:1\end{array}$	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22 38:5 39:7,10 39:13,21 40:17 41:2,25 44:24 45:5 51:17 52:3,15 Kennedy's 44:15 kept 22:12 kill 6:19 7:12 27:18 32:14 37:8,9 38:12 38:18 kind 23:5 40:6	$ \frac{\mathbf{L} \ 3:6}{\mathbf{laboring} \ 45:16} \\ \frac{\mathbf{laboring} \ 45:16}{\mathbf{lack} \ 51:12} \\ \frac{\mathbf{language} \ 35:20}{\mathbf{38:9} \ 56:12} \\ \frac{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21}{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21} \\ \frac{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21}{\mathbf{late} \ 9:19,21} \\ \frac{\mathbf{Laughter} \ 23:12}{\mathbf{35:15}} \\ \frac{\mathbf{law} \ 4:9,19 \ 5:2}{\mathbf{5:13},15,16} \\ \frac{\mathbf{8:23} \ 21:5,13}{\mathbf{24:9},13,22} \\ 25:19 \ 26:10,24 \\ 27:8,14,20 \\ 28:11,17 \ 30:18 \\ 32:1 \ 33:12 \\ 34:18 \ 36:1 \\ 38:14 \ 42:12 \\ 44:3,7,9,22 \\ $	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12 little 10:5 33:23 35:20 41:12 Lonberger 17:7 longer 56:13 look 27:12 31:20 31:21 40:13 42:6,15 looked 16:20 23:17 looking 42:16 loose 35:21 lost 21:7 lot 36:10 47:25 lousy 34:3	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2 52:1,11 mentioned 6:22 8:11 22:5 46:14 52:5,5 55:7 meticulously 20:7 MICHAEL 1:18 2:6 19:21 mind 26:18 minute 56:7 misconception 24:8 Mississippi 34:9 40:8
$\begin{array}{c} 14:3,16,24\\ 15:9,14,23\\ 16:5,14\ 17:3,9\\ 17:16,24,25\\ 18:16,24\ 19:8\\ 19:12,17,20,24\\ 20:1,5,14,20\\ 21:19,20,21\\ 22:8\ 23:10,13\\ 23:16,21,24,25\\ 24:5,18,23\\ 25:10,11,24\\ 27:2,8,11,22\\ 28:3,4,14,21\\ 28:24\ 29:3,10\\ 29:15\ 30:16\\ 31:5,20,25\\ 32:10\ 33:3,17\\ 33:18,19\ 34:12\\ 34:19,22\ 35:1\\ 35:8,13\ 36:8\\ \end{array}$	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22 38:5 39:7,10 39:13,21 40:17 41:2,25 44:24 45:5 51:17 52:3,15 Kennedy's 44:15 kept 22:12 kill 6:19 7:12 27:18 32:14 37:8,9 38:12 38:18 kind 23:5 40:6 43:7,8 44:18	$ \frac{\mathbf{L} \ 3:6}{\mathbf{laboring} \ 45:16} \\ \frac{\mathbf{laboring} \ 45:16}{\mathbf{lack} \ 51:12} \\ \frac{\mathbf{language} \ 35:20}{38:9 \ 56:12} \\ \frac{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21}{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21} \\ \frac{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21}{\mathbf{late} \ 9:19,21} \\ \frac{\mathbf{Laughter} \ 23:12}{35:15} \\ \frac{\mathbf{law} \ 4:9,19 \ 5:2}{5:13,15,16} \\ \frac{\mathbf{s}:23 \ 21:5,13}{24:9,13,22} \\ 25:19 \ 26:10,24 \\ 27:8,14,20 \\ 28:11,17 \ 30:18 \\ 32:1 \ 33:12 \\ 34:18 \ 36:1 \\ 38:14 \ 42:12 \\ 44:3,7,9,22 \\ 45:8 \ 46:18,20 \\ \hline \end{tabular} $	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12 little 10:5 33:23 35:20 41:12 Lonberger 17:7 longer 56:13 look 27:12 31:20 31:21 40:13 42:6,15 looked 16:20 23:17 looking 42:16 loose 35:21 lost 21:7 lot 36:10 47:25 lousy 34:3 <u>M</u>	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2 52:1,11 mentioned 6:22 8:11 22:5 46:14 52:5,5 55:7 meticulously 20:7 MICHAEL 1:18 2:6 19:21 mind 26:18 minute 56:7 misconception 24:8 Mississippi 34:9 40:8 mistake 36:19
$\begin{array}{c} 14:3,16,24\\ 15:9,14,23\\ 16:5,14\ 17:3,9\\ 17:16,24,25\\ 18:16,24\ 19:8\\ 19:12,17,20,24\\ 20:1,5,14,20\\ 21:19,20,21\\ 22:8\ 23:10,13\\ 23:16,21,24,25\\ 24:5,18,23\\ 25:10,11,24\\ 27:2,8,11,22\\ 28:3,4,14,21\\ 28:24\ 29:3,10\\ 29:15\ 30:16\\ 31:5,20,25\\ 32:10\ 33:3,17\\ 33:18,19\ 34:12\\ 34:19,22\ 35:1\end{array}$	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22 38:5 39:7,10 39:13,21 40:17 41:2,25 44:24 45:5 51:17 52:3,15 Kennedy's 44:15 kept 22:12 kill 6:19 7:12 27:18 32:14 37:8,9 38:12 38:18 kind 23:5 40:6	$ \frac{\mathbf{L} \ 3:6}{\mathbf{laboring} \ 45:16} \\ \frac{\mathbf{laboring} \ 45:16}{\mathbf{lack} \ 51:12} \\ \frac{\mathbf{language} \ 35:20}{\mathbf{38:9} \ 56:12} \\ \frac{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21}{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21} \\ \frac{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21}{\mathbf{late} \ 9:19,21} \\ \frac{\mathbf{Laughter} \ 23:12}{\mathbf{35:15}} \\ \frac{\mathbf{law} \ 4:9,19 \ 5:2}{\mathbf{5:13},15,16} \\ \frac{\mathbf{8:23} \ 21:5,13}{\mathbf{24:9},13,22} \\ 25:19 \ 26:10,24 \\ 27:8,14,20 \\ 28:11,17 \ 30:18 \\ 32:1 \ 33:12 \\ 34:18 \ 36:1 \\ 38:14 \ 42:12 \\ 44:3,7,9,22 \\ $	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12 little 10:5 33:23 35:20 41:12 Lonberger 17:7 longer 56:13 look 27:12 31:20 31:21 40:13 42:6,15 looked 16:20 23:17 looking 42:16 loose 35:21 lost 21:7 lot 36:10 47:25 lousy 34:3	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2 52:1,11 mentioned 6:22 8:11 22:5 46:14 52:5,5 55:7 meticulously 20:7 MICHAEL 1:18 2:6 19:21 mind 26:18 minute 56:7 misconception 24:8 Mississippi 34:9 40:8
$\begin{array}{c} 14:3,16,24\\ 15:9,14,23\\ 16:5,14\ 17:3,9\\ 17:16,24,25\\ 18:16,24\ 19:8\\ 19:12,17,20,24\\ 20:1,5,14,20\\ 21:19,20,21\\ 22:8\ 23:10,13\\ 23:16,21,24,25\\ 24:5,18,23\\ 25:10,11,24\\ 27:2,8,11,22\\ 28:3,4,14,21\\ 28:24\ 29:3,10\\ 29:15\ 30:16\\ 31:5,20,25\\ 32:10\ 33:3,17\\ 33:18,19\ 34:12\\ 34:19,22\ 35:1\\ 35:8,13\ 36:8\\ \end{array}$	KENNEDY 7:20 8:7 9:12 9:19 10:1,5,12 12:17 13:2 21:20 24:18 33:18 34:19,22 35:1 37:22 38:5 39:7,10 39:13,21 40:17 41:2,25 44:24 45:5 51:17 52:3,15 Kennedy's 44:15 kept 22:12 kill 6:19 7:12 27:18 32:14 37:8,9 38:12 38:18 kind 23:5 40:6 43:7,8 44:18	$ \frac{\mathbf{L} \ 3:6}{\mathbf{laboring} \ 45:16} \\ \frac{\mathbf{laboring} \ 45:16}{\mathbf{lack} \ 51:12} \\ \frac{\mathbf{language} \ 35:20}{38:9 \ 56:12} \\ \frac{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21}{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21} \\ \frac{\mathbf{large} \ 40:21}{\mathbf{late} \ 9:19,21} \\ \frac{\mathbf{Laughter} \ 23:12}{35:15} \\ \frac{\mathbf{law} \ 4:9,19 \ 5:2}{5:13,15,16} \\ \frac{\mathbf{s}:23 \ 21:5,13}{24:9,13,22} \\ 25:19 \ 26:10,24 \\ 27:8,14,20 \\ 28:11,17 \ 30:18 \\ 32:1 \ 33:12 \\ 34:18 \ 36:1 \\ 38:14 \ 42:12 \\ 44:3,7,9,22 \\ 45:8 \ 46:18,20 \\ \hline \end{tabular} $	light 29:20 limit 43:10 limited 27:23 listed 11:25 12:5 12:12 little 10:5 33:23 35:20 41:12 Lonberger 17:7 longer 56:13 look 27:12 31:20 31:21 40:13 42:6,15 looked 16:20 23:17 looking 42:16 loose 35:21 lost 21:7 lot 36:10 47:25 lousy 34:3 <u>M</u>	measure 23:2 measured 24:9 men 47:8 mention 45:12 45:13,18 46:2 52:1,11 mentioned 6:22 8:11 22:5 46:14 52:5,5 55:7 meticulously 20:7 MICHAEL 1:18 2:6 19:21 mind 26:18 minute 56:7 misconception 24:8 Mississippi 34:9 40:8 mistake 36:19

	1	1	1	1
misunderstood	41:17,19,21	38:21	pages 20:9	PENITENTI
12:2 42:4	objecting 15:25	one-paragraph	panel 34:11	1:4
mitigating 25:1	objection 3:22	12:10	paraded 41:9	people 4:18
38:25 39:25	8:22 16:10	operates 5:4	paragraph 54:2	peremptories
49:17 50:17	18:13,14 19:6	opinion 10:21	54:15,21 55:8	9:16 10:9,18
moment 29:23	19:9,15 20:4	11:13 13:15,18	paragraphs	peremptory
Morgan 50:16	20:16 21:10,22	31:13 43:12	55:6	10:6,8
motion 18:22	21:23 22:2	49:25 52:16	parole 5:11 6:2	perfect 54:3
46:13	26:4,9 29:4	54:4,11,23	6:4 7:12,16,19	56:22
mouse 44:16,21	32:7 34:13,15	55:1 56:2,21	22:24 27:10	perfectly 49:18
moved 34:16	34:24 35:6,9	56:23	31:2 32:17,18	person 6:7,18
Mulligan 38:3	35:25 36:12,16	opinions 13:18	part 18:9 22:5	7:6 16:19
mustn't 54:4	37:1,19,20	opportunity	46:13 52:12	22:14 23:6,18
►	38:4,6 44:5	3:21 15:7	56:21	26:18 31:7,23
$\frac{\mathbf{N}}{\mathbf{N}\mathbf{O}(1,1,2,1)}$	45:5,8,13,22	38:18	particular 13:13	32:14 33:6
N 2:1,1 3:1	46:9,12,17	opposed 7:24	26:4 38:2	36:15 49:1,16
necessarily 4:2	50:5,5,24	28:18	40:12 46:1	personal 55:23
need 39:17	51:13 54:6	opposing 46:11	54:7 55:13	person's 18:2
neither 15:12	55:13,19,20	opposite 23:23	56:22	petition 11:7
never 14:11	objections 20:22	opposition 8:14	particularly	30:5
22:22 27:19,20	21:3 35:24	option 7:19	26:19	Petitioner 1:5
31:19 32:4	37:23 40:18,23	22:24 32:18,18	parties 20:21	1:17,21 2:4,8
33:9,13 38:22	42:2 45:24	options 6:3 39:3	44:12,23	2:14 3:7 18:7
48:4 56:16	54:23	oral 1:12 2:2,5,9	parts 44:2	19:23 56:9
nine 27:4	objective 56:24	3:6 19:21	passages 54:4	phase 40:3
Ninth 3:10 13:6	objectively	29:13	Patton 26:7	piece 5:8,9
21:25 56:3 noted 24:2	29:19,19 30:10	order 28:5	pay 44:17	pivotal 39:6
	43:1,23	outset 29:6	peculiar 51:15	please 3:9 19:25
noting 13:4 notion 26:23	obligation 15:24	overarching	peculiarities	29:16
38:24	16:2,13 18:14	24:10	44:9	point 9:13 12:17
November 9:23	obliged 12:19	overcame 37:7	penalties 47:4	13:2 16:6
number 40:21	observation	overcome 14:13	penalty 3:14	17:11 19:8
53:23	52:16,19	14:15 37:4	4:11,20 6:5,12	21:21 24:10,16
55.25	observations	38:11	6:17 7:1,5,15	24:24 27:5,8
0	26:10	overlooked	7:25 8:15,24	45:20 55:11
O 2:1 3:1	observe 3:21	11:20	22:12,21,25	pointed 35:19
oar 45:16	15:7 16:16	overturned	24:8 26:13,20	43:11
oaths 11:18	observing 14:19	36:10	26:25 27:24,25	pointing 40:4
Obeso 8:20,23	obvious 26:18	P	30:13 31:1,3	points 9:4 35:16
object 9:3,5	occasions 21:7 24:6 33:5	P 3:1	31:22 32:13,19 33:10,11 35:10	position 4:13 6:18 7:21
10:20 11:2	24:0 33:5 occurred 8:20	page 2:2 11:6,14	37:8 38:12,19	13:20 37:9,10
15:22,24 35:2	Oh 10:12 49:7	30:4,22 31:14	39:8,15 40:3	possibility 31:2
35:22 44:3,18	50:25	31:15,15,17,20	47:6 48:9 49:5	38:17,23,25
50:3 51:16	okay 5:5 16:1	31:21 37:15	49:9 50:10	possible 20:15
objected 21:6,9	Olympia 1:17	38:3,9 53:6,14	53:7,12 54:17	25:22
21:12,18 25:20	once 31:8,12,16	53:22,24	55:23 56:1,16	precedent 4:4
34:19 40:22	GHCC 31.0,12,10		55.25 50.1,10	
		l	I	I

	•	I		
30:1	57:2	question 10:20	37:5	relief 3:11 7:21
precisely 48:21	proper 28:19	17:24 20:21,23	reasonableness	rely 11:1 25:25
49:10	properly 28:1	23:11 25:12,15	56:24	relying 25:23
present 16:19,20	36:15	26:20 30:12,23	reasons 3:12	remain 35:5
17:23 18:1	proposed 40:1	32:12 35:7	26:5 55:9	remainder
34:8	prosecution	42:4 51:7	rebuttal 2:12	19:18
presentation	21:3,7 40:18	56:19	19:18 40:19	remained 10:16
29:7	42:1 52:12	questioned 5:12	56:8	remaining 56:7
presented 3:18	prosecution's	questioning	rebutted 3:17	reminded 6:1
17:14 29:20	26:16	5:15,18,19	recall 6:22	removal 3:23
30:11 56:20,25	prosecutor 5:25	27:12 30:17	recidivate 49:16	remove 3:19
presumably	6:14,15 7:13	questionnaire	49:24	10:18 16:2
46:6,7	8:21 9:16,18	4:24 5:17 6:7	recidivism 39:5	removed 16:1
presumed 3:16	10:7,17 24:1	questions 4:17	49:22	reoffend 6:19
presumes 52:3	25:20 27:16	32:22 34:14	recognized 15:5	26:15,18,23
presumption	30:23 32:8	56:11	reconsideration	31:7
49:14	34:22 36:1,4,6	quotation 6:21	18:22	reoffense 49:18
pretty 28:22	37:1,3 40:15	quoting 37:14	record 3:18	repeatedly
41:7,12	40:21 41:24	37:15	13:24 14:6,18	31:15
prevent 28:10	45:12,16 50:9		14:25 15:17	repeating 22:25
32:24 33:15	55:19	R	16:3,7 17:2,5	repetition 23:4
38:20 48:3	prosecutor's	R 1:18 2:6 3:1	17:10,15 18:10	replacing 39:11
49:13 52:10	39:4 41:16	19:21	18:18,25 20:6	require 45:8
prevented 11:16	46:8 55:20	raise 36:12	23:18 24:2,12	56:22
19:2 42:12	prospective	raised 19:6 36:2	25:13,17,19,25	required 31:9
49:4,19 53:17	14:20	51:4 54:2	29:7,24 30:6	34:17 43:7
preventing	prove 40:6,9	reach 57:4	30:10,11 31:14	56:15
24:21	provide 43:9	reached 9:15	42:6 45:11	requirement
prevents 45:6	45:17	14:5 57:6	51:5,12 52:1,7	17:7,10 28:9
principal 11:2	provided 46:17	read 13:24 22:9	52:8,20 55:21	requires 33:16
prior 4:17,21,23	47:4	25:5 46:21,22	records 34:6,7	56:24
31:9 42:22	province 51:24	reading 32:6	referred 18:10	rereleased 6:8
prison 31:1 32:5	pro-death 35:10	33:13	regard 6:21 47:2	reserve 19:7,16
53:11	50:10	realistic 44:18	regarding 5:4	19:17
probably 16:20	punishment	realize 7:18	9:7 56:11,21	resolve 4:13
23:13 35:21	27:17,19 30:14	really 20:16	regardless 47:6	24:15
41:12 46:21	purpose 55:25	22:18 24:13	reject 38:24	resolved 25:14
54:6	push 23:8	27:9 44:15	rejected 41:15	respect 4:19
problem 20:22	put 22:15 30:23	51:10	release 38:17,23	10:23,25 43:17
37:4 42:8 46:5	44:24 54:7	reason 16:12	38:25	43:18 44:10,20
53:4	p.m 1:14 3:2	21:16 22:5,7	released 6:18	48:18
problematic	57:10	23:15 28:24	7:7,12 26:15	respond 20:14
33:11	<u> </u>	35:9 45:11	31:23 38:22	Respondent
procedure 13:13	Q	46:13	49:20 53:8	1:23 2:11
proceedings	qualification	reasonable 3:25	54:18	29:14
31:14	9:25 10:10,15	4:2,8 12:4,20	relevant 18:6	response 11:14
process 9:19	qualified 52:9	25:2 26:22	relied 26:9	13:9 25:11
	I		I	l

	I	I	1	
26:9,20,21	rulings 37:3	second 3:24 9:9	49:1,8	4:8 9:13,15
28:19 44:14		49:15	situations 34:8	11:6,23 12:9
46:8 56:11,18	S	secondly 17:25	six 9:24 31:8,13	13:7,9,21
responses 6:14	S 2:1 3:1	section 3:12	sketchy 30:13	14:13,18,22
23:19	Samson 1:16 2:3	13:14	skimmed 46:22	15:5,25 18:21
responsible 16:7	2:13 3:5,6,8	see 10:12,13	Solicitor 1:18	25:19 26:24
rest 22:17	4:21 5:3,6,14	seemingly 18:4	somebody 26:14	27:4 30:4,8
result 28:5	5:23 6:13 7:2	sense 24:1 36:17	27:18 33:22	33:14 34:6,16
reversed 3:12	8:1,9,12 9:4,17	sentence 47:10	somewhat 8:10	35:19 43:17
review 16:17,23	9:22 10:3,9,14	48:16 53:25	9:13	47:4 52:25
17:11,14 25:8	11:4,21 12:8	separate 24:6	sorry 37:25 38:7	53:3,5 54:10
25:11 36:5	12:21,25 13:6	55:6	42:3	56:20,23 57:3
42:16,20 43:10	13:16 14:1,10	serve 52:9	sort 48:25	57:6
43:14,17,19,21	14:22 15:3,12	service 33:24	sorts 55:3	stated 6:6,6 9:9
43:22 44:4,6	15:21 16:4,9	serving 52:10	Souter 4:14,25	53:15
44:13 52:13	16:25 17:6,13	seven 21:6 34:23	5:5 13:20 14:3	statement 4:18
56:23	17:22 18:12,20	40:15,23 41:18	15:9,14,23	8:13 9:8 12:11
reviewed 44:12	19:5,11,14,19	41:19,22 42:1	16:5,14 17:3,9	32:11 46:23
44:13	56:7,8,10	shading 33:23	17:24 18:16	47:11,13 53:9
reviewing 57:3,4	sat 36:15,16	shadow 12:3	25:24 27:2,8	54:16,18
reviolate 6:8 7:7	saw 23:19 28:12	shaking 23:22	27:11	statements 4:12
31:23 33:6	saying 6:16	23:23	Souter's 25:11	5:25 8:2,16
53:8,11 54:18	14:10 15:16,25	short 41:12	speak 20:22	18:2,4 49:3
Richard 54:1	16:1 22:12	shortened 47:20	special 22:13	States 1:1,13,20
right 11:13	27:4 31:6 36:4	show 9:11 17:19	specific 11:22	2:7 19:22
12:24,25 13:19	42:25 43:25	17:20 18:7,17	specifically 7:13	State's 29:24
22:18 23:14	50:4	18:19 43:22	11:7 26:12	30:14 32:6
25:9 31:8	says 7:5 8:23	56:15	speculation	55:24,25
36:11,13,23	22:18 23:6,9 25:20 30:19	showed 18:1	52:12	State-court 3:24
rise 24:21	31:21 32:16,17	20:6	spend 55:15	4:3 43:11
ROBERTS 3:3	35:5,23 38:1,3	shows 21:12	spoke 21:9	52:24
5:21 8:25	45:11 46:25	29:7	stage 40:1	statute 42:18
11:11 13:12,19	48:12 51:16	side 16:8	standard 4:5	statutory 30:14
19:17,20 29:10	52:7 53:20	significance 9:1	12:2 20:7,11	38:16,21
30:16 31:5,20	SCALIA 6:20	significant 9:10	21:2,13 25:2	step 15:16
31:25 33:3	12:16,18,22	21:24 26:19	26:22 29:9	Stevens 10:19
35:13 38:8	17:16,25 33:17	silence 35:5	42:20 43:16,24	11:12 14:16,24
41:8 42:14,19	33:19 34:12	silent 18:18	53:15 56:14,14	18:24 19:8,12
43:3,15 45:19	36:8,20 37:13	36:16	56:15,24	20:1,5,14,20
47:21,25 48:5	37:17 41:3,6	simply 15:20	standing 35:5	27:22 28:3,4
52:22 53:2,14 56:5 57:8	46:3,11 47:15	34:1 46:2 55:11	standpoint 39:11	28:14,21,24
rule 8:4,5,6 11:8	48:24 49:7,24	sir 22:23	stands 12:17	29:3 44:1,14
51:15,20	scheme 30:14	sit 25:15 48:10	13:2	50:2,8,13,18 51:1,8
rules 11:8 19:4	38:16,21 56:1	48:22	start 30:6	Stewart 46:25
ruling 36:25	seated 30:20	situation 6:25	started 29:7	47:17
37:2	seating 40:13	7:14 32:13	State 1:4 3:19	strike 46:13
51.2		1.17 52.15	State 1.7 J.17	501 INC TO.13
L				l

	1	1		I
strikeable 36:15	supported 57:6	testimony 47:8	21:24 26:16	two 7:9 9:4,18
structural 40:5	supporting 1:21	thank 19:19,24	time 6:16 19:18	10:23 13:9
51:18	2:8 19:23	29:10 41:2	31:6,9 32:15	21:9 26:11
style 13:17	supports 3:19	56:4,5,10 57:7	36:3,11 40:20	27:9 29:17
subject 16:18	55:22	57:8	51:5 55:15	30:25 35:16
submission	suppose 17:17	thing 4:15 8:25	times 26:16	37:3 54:4
39:14	44:25 50:14	21:17 22:14	30:11 31:5,8	type 8:18
submitted 57:9	supposed 15:17	25:5 44:19	31:12,13 42:1	
57:11	48:23	46:6	told 4:25 5:2	U
subordinate	Supposing 50:3	things 48:12	20:20 25:1	ultimate 14:7
55:23	supreme 1:1,13	55:4	27:5 50:23	umpteen 53:25
substance 32:8	4:4 10:22 11:1	think 4:15 6:5	totality 26:10	unadorned
51:20	11:6,15,23	7:6,13 8:3,8	totally 12:24	37:20
substantial 3:15	12:9 13:5,10	10:20 13:16	32:19	uncertainty
9:8 43:9,21	14:17,22 15:5	14:14 16:23	transcript 21:11	24:7,12
56:14	29:22 30:4	20:19 21:24	22:10,11 25:6	underlying
substantially	47:18 52:16,19	22:21,24 23:9	57:4	25:12
4:6 10:25	52:25 53:3,6	23:10 25:9,12	translate 27:24	understand 8:7
11:16 19:2	53:15 54:11,12	25:19,21 27:7	trap 35:2	9:14 17:5
28:10 32:24	54:13,22 56:20	27:15 29:6,23	trapping 44:16	18:25 27:3
42:11 47:21,23	sure 4:16 18:24	31:12,22 32:6	44:21	44:3 51:7
48:2,3,6 49:5	30:19 46:22	33:11 35:20,21	trial 3:14,20 4:5	53:16
53:17	surely 30:18	36:18,23 37:4	4:13 5:24 8:4	understanding
substantive	surprised 5:12	37:6 38:14	11:9 13:11	41:22
52:13 53:20	9:13	39:7 40:18	14:12 15:4,7,9	United 1:1,13,20
suffers 53:4	survive 56:23	41:25 43:5,20	15:18 16:1,11	2:7 19:22
sufficient 38:13	sustain 16:21	43:21,24 44:8	16:15,16 17:1	universe 40:25
38:15 57:5	sustained 40:23	44:8 46:16	19:1,5 20:3,6	unmistakable
suggest 33:25	42:2	48:21 49:7,9	23:20 24:16	28:8 56:17
51:12	sustaining 16:15	49:19,21 50:5	25:14 29:18	unreasonable
suggested 22:11	SUZANNE 1:22	50:7,12,13	30:8 34:7 35:2	12:24 17:20
suggestion	2:10 29:13	51:8,9,11,14	36:5,25 41:14	29:19,25 30:10
20:15	system 5:4	52:1,19 53:4	42:8,24 43:1,2	43:1,23,24
suggests 48:18		53:21 55:14	43:10,25 44:16	unreliable 33:21
sum 55:21	T	thinking 22:14	45:16,21 47:5	upheld 14:7
summary 13:5	T 2:1,1	22:20 23:3,4	51:21,24 52:11	22:4
39:4 53:20	table 40:2	39:2	53:21 54:10	uphold 25:22
55:2,7 56:21	take 9:16 13:20	thinks 28:17	55:9,14,18,19	upholding 55:9
summary-and	41:4 54:4	third 4:3 52:23	trials 28:16	use 49:25
13:14	takes 15:15,15	thought 7:17	troubling 44:2	useful 50:1
summation	talk 24:11	10:22 11:11,13	true 55:16	Uttecht 1:3 3:4
37:11	talking 17:3,4	12:1 14:8,25	truly 24:14	
SUPERINTE	41:23 54:13	20:2 22:16,18	truth 33:23	V
1:3	telling 53:24	27:1 32:16	trying 43:15	v 1:6
support 13:25	terms 30:3	35:8 36:14	Tuesday 1:10	valid 46:24
14:6 15:1 16:8	54:10	45:19 50:8,23	turn 54:25	47:10,12,14
17:1 25:13	test 47:24	three 3:12 10:23	twice 32:11	various 21:3
				55:8
L	1	1	1	1

vast 40:24	1:9,19 5:2 9:14	witnesses 46:4	41:11	
venire 4:18	10:22 11:1,14	Witt 4:6,8 7:22	17-day 10:1	
16:18 47:2,8	13:5,10,13	7:23 8:2,13	171a 11:6	
48:13	21:5 24:9 27:8	9:10 11:7,8	173 53:6	
verb 50:1	27:14,20 29:18	15:6 16:10	173a 30:4 53:22	
versus 3:4 17:7	30:8,14,24	20:8,10 21:2	19 2:8	
20:8 22:2 26:7	32:1 33:12,16	22:2 23:5 26:6		
30:1 34:9 40:8	34:18 35:25	28:7 29:8 30:1	2	
view 14:5 29:17	38:14 40:25	51:21 52:3,5	2:00 57:10	
29:24 30:13	41:11 42:12	52:17,19 53:16	2007 1:10	
42:14,18 43:16	44:3,9,22 45:8	56:13	208 13:4 53:14	
52:8 57:6	46:18 47:15	woman 23:8	55:2	
viewed 6:16	49:13,14 50:14	wonder 36:21	208a 11:14	
viewing 6:14	51:4,15 52:23	word 22:11	12:12	
8:17	52:25 53:3,5	48:14	2254(d)(2) 3:24	
views 7:23 8:8	53:12,15 54:13	words 19:1 24:3	4:3 29:22	
11:15 19:2	54:21	33:20 50:8	2254(e)(1) 3:13	
27:23,24 28:10	Washington's	world 28:14	28 29:21	
28:13 32:24	38:21	wouldn't 16:5	29 2:11	
53:16 55:23	wasn't 5:9 18:7	21:16 45:2		
vision 27:17	18:9 26:20	49:8,13 51:3	3	
voir 4:10,17,22	28:25 51:5	writ 29:21 56:3	3 2:4	
5:6 6:15 9:24	way 18:16,19	writes 13:18	3rd 9:23	
10:2,17 21:1	25:15 32:17	written 14:18,25	5	
21:11 24:6,17	33:21 34:14	wrong 54:14,15		
26:16 32:7	44:18,25 49:25	wrote 13:17	50 29:21	
33:4,14 37:12	54:8		522 46:24	
42:6 46:19	weighed 43:8	X	56 2:14	
47:7 53:6	weight 25:7	x 1:2,8	6	
volunteered	well-prepared		62 7:4 31:14,21	
21:22 26:17	20:2	<u> </u>	02 7.4 31.14,21	
vote 6:11,25	went 14:8 21:8	yeah 28:20 41:8	7	
47:6 56:17	30:21	42:5	7 20:9	
voting 49:4	Weren't 40:18	Yount 26:7	71 7:16	
	We'll 3:3	Z	72 7:16 31:15,17	
W	we're 14:10	$\frac{\mathbf{Z}}{\mathbf{Z}5:10}$	32:17	
Wainwright	15:14,16 48:23	zeroing 40:11	73 30:22 31:15	
20:8 22:1	54:13	Zeroing 40.11	74 38:3	
want 15:25	we've 40:19	0	75 37:15,17 38:9	
22:20 24:2	whipsawed 9:14	06-413 1:6 3:4	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
46:23 50:21	willing 6:11 47:2		9	
51:10	48:14	1	9 20:9	
wanted 34:23	Witherspoon	1:00 1:14 3:2		
43:9	30:2 43:7	12 21:3 34:20		
wants 7:11	46:24 56:12	40:17,18,22		
Wash 1:17	witness 14:20	41:21 42:1		
Washington 1:4	24:2	17 1:10 41:5,6		