

ASRS Database Report Set

Maintenance Reports

Report Set Description.....A sampling of reports from aircraft maintenance personnel.

Update Number.....14.0

Date of UpdateJanuary 9, 2009

Number of Records in Report Set.....50

Number of New Records in Report Set50

Type of Records in Report Set.....For each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

TH: 262-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the reporting of a specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de- identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.



Linda J. Connell, Director
Aviation Safety Reporting System

CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

One thing that can be known from ASRS statistics is that they represent the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 1999 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 1999. Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS lies in the **report narratives**. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. The values of these narrative reports lie in their qualitative nature. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

Report Synopses

ACN: 793690 (1 of 50)

Synopsis

AN ENGINE OVERHAUL INSPECTOR IS INFORMED A RAG WAS FOUND IN THE #3 BEARING COMPARTMENT OF A CFM-56 ENGINE, CAUSING AN ENG SHUTDOWN.

ACN: 793672 (2 of 50)

Synopsis

A LINE MECHANIC REPORTS A #1 ENG INFLIGHT SHUTDOWN DUE TO OIL LOSS AND AIR TURNBACK OF AN ATR-42 ACFT HE HAD SERVICED EARLIER. ENG OIL CAP HAD POPPED OUT OF OIL TANK RECEPTACLE.

ACN: 793669 (3 of 50)

Synopsis

AFTER PERFORMING ROUTINE ENGINE OIL AND FILTER CHANGE ON A CESSNA-172, MECHANIC IS INFORMED THE ENG SUMP SCREEN COVER HAD SEPARATED DURING FLT TRAINING, CAUSING OIL PRESSURE LOSS AND PRECAUTIONARY LANDING.

ACN: 793601 (4 of 50)

Synopsis

MECHANIC IS INFORMED AN EMB145LR HAD RETURNED TO FIELD DUE TO GEAR FAILED TO RETRACT. A LANDING GEAR PROXIMITY SWITCH THAT MECHANIC HAD EARLIER RECONNECTED WAS FOUND LOOSE.

ACN: 793425 (5 of 50)

Synopsis

A CRJ-700 LEAD MECHANIC REPORTS ON BEING PRESSURED TO DEVIATE FROM MAINT PROCEDURES BY SOME OF HIS COMPANY'S MAINT CONTROLLERS, WHOM HE BELIEVES ARE ALSO BEING PRESSURED TO MEET DEPARTURE SCHEDULES.

ACN: 792995 (6 of 50)

Synopsis

A B757/B767 MECHANIC REPORTS DISCOVERING ACARS FLT PAPERS PLACED ON THE FWD CENTER PEDESTAL BY FLT CREWS HAD SLIPPED DOWN ONTO ELECTRONIC EQUIP IN THE NOSE ELECTRONIC COMPARTMENT.

ACN: 792809 (7 of 50)

Synopsis

A MECHANIC WHO HAD DEFERRED, OPENED AND COLLARED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER, PLACARDED AND LOCKED THE FIRST CLASS #2 OVEN IN THE CLOSED

POSITION, NOTICED THE SAME B767-300 ON A RETURN FLT, WITH PLACARD TORN OFF, CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED AND OVEN OPERATING.

ACN: 792796 (8 of 50)

Synopsis

MECHANIC TOWING AN MD80 INTO GATE AREA STRIKES A TRUCK. ONLY ONE WING WALKER USED.

ACN: 792784 (9 of 50)

Synopsis

A MECHANIC REPORTS HOW TWO B757-200 ACFT SUSTAINED DAMAGE WHEN THE AFT COWL LATCH ACCESS PANEL DOOR OPENS IN FLIGHT, CAUSING DAMAGE TO THE REVERSER WHEN DEPLOYED ON LANDING ROLLOUT.

ACN: 792782 (10 of 50)

Synopsis

MECHANIC IS INFORMED HE FAILED TO SEND A METER TO MAINT ENGINEERING AFTER SUMPING ALL FUEL TANKS FOR WATER ON A B777-200, AS CALLED OUT IN HIS JOB CARD. MECHANIC BELIEVED THE REQUIREMENT WAS ONLY FOR FUEL CONTAMINATION.

ACN: 792746 (11 of 50)

Synopsis

A MECHANIC AND INSPECTOR REPORT ON FORGETTING TO CALL THEIR MAINT CONTROL TO VERIFY PARTS COMPATIBILITY FOR THEIR B737-800 ETOPS ACFT, AFTER THE MAIN AND AUX BATTERIES WERE CHANGED.

ACN: 792654 (12 of 50)

Synopsis

MECHANIC REPORTS WHILE JACKING THE RIGHT STRUT OF A B737-300, IN ORDER TO CHANGE THE #3 AND #4 TIRES, THE ACFT SLIPPED OFF THE JACK, CAUSING THE JACK TO DAMAGE THE STRUT METERING VALVE CAP.

ACN: 792529 (13 of 50)

Synopsis

TWO MECHANICS (ONE A LEAD), REPORT ON THE EFFORTS TO INSTALL A NEW LEFT AVIONICS COOLING FAN ON A CRJ-200 (CL-600-2B19), THAT TURNED OUT TO BE AN INCORRECT PART, REQUIRING INOP FAN TO BE REINSTALLED.

ACN: 792501 (14 of 50)

Synopsis

MECHANIC IS INFORMED HE WAS NON-COMPLIANT WITH AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE (AD) REQUIRING THE REMOVAL OF A GROUNDING STUD FOR AN E/E COMPARTMENT BRACKET RELOCATION ON A B767-300.

ACN: 792332 (15 of 50)

Synopsis

TWO MECHANICS DESCRIBE HOW A MANDATORY B777-200 CARGO PIT FIRE BOTTLE 2C TEST PROCEDURE AND THE USE OF INADEQUATE, BUT APPROVED TEST EQUIPMENT, CAUSED AN INADVERTENT DISCHARGE OF CARGO FIRE BOTTLES.

ACN: 792145 (16 of 50)

Synopsis

MECHANIC NOTES HE MAY HAVE MISJUDGED A STALL REPORT FROM A FLT CREW AND DID NOT PERFORM AN ENGINE STALL INSPECTION BEFORE RETURNING ACFT TO SERVICE.

ACN: 792132 (17 of 50)

Synopsis

AFTER RETURNING FROM A FIELD TRIP FOR REPAIR OF #1 ENGINE FAN BLADES, ON A B737-300, MECHANIC IS INFORMED THAT THE POSITION OF THE SPECIFIC FAN BLADES REPLACED WAS NOT ENTERED IN THE COMPANY MAINT COMPUTER.

ACN: 792108 (18 of 50)

Synopsis

A FLIGHT MECHANIC EXPLAINS HIS COMPANY'S PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACFT FLYING WITHOUT A REQUIRED ETOPS VERIFICATION FLIGHT BEING ACCOMPLISHED ON THEIR B757-200 CHARTER, AFTER AN 'A' CHECK.

ACN: 792045 (19 of 50)

Synopsis

WHILE PERFORMING AN ENGINEERING CALLOUT IN MD-80 TAIL COMPARTMENT, AN INSPECTOR NOTICES AN ADDITIONAL CLAMP SHOULD BE ADDED TO SUPPORT AN ELECTRICAL WIRE HARNESS NEAR A RUDDER CABLE PULLEY ASSEMBLY.

ACN: 792030 (20 of 50)

Synopsis

MECHANIC IS INFORMED HE WAS NON-COMPLIANT WITH AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE AD HE PERFORMED ON A B767-300 ACFT BRACKET LOCATION.

ACN: 791827 (21 of 50)

Synopsis

TWO MECHANICS AND AN INSPECTOR WERE INFORMED THEY HAD USED AN INCORRECT SRM REFERENCE FOR AN EXTERNAL FUSELAGE HOLE, DOUBLER REPAIR, THAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED ON A B767-300. ALSO NOTICED WAS A ROW OF RIVETS NOT INSTALLED.

ACN: 791820 (22 of 50)

Synopsis

WHILE PERFORMING THE MAIN LANDING GEAR TACH TEST ON AN AIRBUS A320 AFTER ALL THREE GEARS REPLACED, AN AVIONICS MECHANIC FINDS CONNECTORS 15GG AND 17GG HAD BEEN SWAPPED DURING VENDOR OVERHAUL.

ACN: 791816 (23 of 50)

Synopsis

MECHANICS REPORT ON HOW THEY PERFORMED AN ANTI-SKID FUNCTIONAL TEST ON AN AIRBUS A320 AFTER A GEAR CHANGE. ACFT LATER WENT OFF THE RUNWAY UPON LANDING.

ACN: 791762 (24 of 50)

Synopsis

MECHANIC REPORTS PILOT NOTICED HOT AIR COMING FROM THE LEADING EDGE SLATS ON THE LEFT WING. SLATS WERE EXTREMELY HOT, COULD NOT BE TOUCHED. WING TAI VALVE FROZEN IN THE MID-OPEN POS AND NO INDICATION IN THE B737-400 COCKPIT.

ACN: 791503 (25 of 50)

Synopsis

A MAINT INSPECTOR MISINTERPRETED THE CLEARANCE GAP CHECK OF A SAAB 340-B, LEFT AND RIGHT LANDING GEAR SHOCK STRUT ROLLER AND PRIMARY CAM ASSEMBLY. THE CLEARANCE WAS ADJUSTED TO THE WRONG DIMENSION.

ACN: 791492 (26 of 50)

Synopsis

WHILE REMOVING THE FORWARD ENTRY DOOR UPPER HINGE BOX ON A B737-300 ACFT, MECHANIC INADVERTENTLY DRILLS THROUGH THE BOX SECTION AND INTO THE DOOR CUTOUT FRAME STRUCTURE.

ACN: 791401 (27 of 50)

Synopsis

A MECHANIC WORKING A B767 CONVERTED FREIGHTER FROM AN INTERNATIONAL AIRFRAME HEAVY MAINT AND MODIFICATION PROVIDER, REPORTS THE FLT DECK EVACUATION ROPES HAD NOT BEEN INSTALLED PRIOR TO FLT FROM INT'L STATION TO DOMESTIC POINT.

ACN: 791215 *(28 of 50)*

Synopsis

AN ACFT INSPECTOR REPORTS ON ISSUES SURROUNDING RESPONSIBILITIES BASED ON MAINT SIGNOFFS, INVOLVING A B737-300 FUSELAGE SKIN REPAIR, THAT WAS REMOVED AND NEW REPAIR INSTALLED WITH IMPROPER ENGINEERING AUTHORITY.

ACN: 790550 *(29 of 50)*

Synopsis

AN ENGINE OVERHAUL MECHANIC REPORTS ON A JOB CARD ERROR THAT DOES NOT INCLUDE SECURING THE LPT COOLING TUBES AT TWO ATTACH POINTS ON THE ENG S-FLANGE.

ACN: 790547 *(30 of 50)*

Synopsis

A LINE MECHANIC REPORTS HIS CONCERN ABOUT BOTH PILOTS LEAVING THE COCKPIT WHILE HE WAS PERFORMING A REQUIRED ENG RUN WITH CABIN CREW AND A FULL LOAD OF PASSENGERS ONBOARD AN AIRBUS A319.

ACN: 790543 *(31 of 50)*

Synopsis

A LEAD AND TWO MECHANICS REPORT ON LOCKING OUT THE LEFT ENGINE THRUST REVERSER ON A B757-200 ACFT, BUT PULLED AND COLLARED THE WRONG CIRCUIT BREAKER, RESULTING IN A 'LEFT OIL SCVG' MESSAGE AFTER TKOF.

ACN: 790542 *(32 of 50)*

Synopsis

MECHANIC IS INFORMED HE DID NOT INSTALL THE NOSE TIRES TANG TYPE AXLE SPACERS DURING A DOUBLE TIRE CHANGE ON A B767-300 ACFT.

ACN: 790471 *(33 of 50)*

Synopsis

A B767-300 ACFT ENCOUNTERED A MOMENTARY LIGHT 'SHUDDER' AND PRONOUNCED 'THUMP,' AS THE RIGHT OVERWING ESCAPE SLIDE DEPLOYED INFLT, RESULTING IN AN AIR TURNBACK.

ACN: 790411 (34 of 50)

Synopsis

FLIGHT CREW REPORTED THE FMGC FUEL PROMPT WAS INCORRECT ON THE MCDU OF THEIR AIRBUS A321 ACFT. BOTH FMGC'S WERE PREVIOUSLY REPLACED AND NAV DATABASES LOADED.

ACN: 790349 (35 of 50)

Synopsis

MECHANIC REPORTS ABOUT NUMEROUS MD-80 SLIDE RESERVOIR VALVES NOT PROPERLY PINNED, OR, THE SAFETY PINS ARE NOT IN THE RESERVOIR AT ALL. SLIDES COULD HAVE DEPLOYED FROM TIME OF REMOVAL TO ARRIVAL AT REPAIR STATION.

ACN: 790074 (36 of 50)

Synopsis

WHILE SERVICING THE #2 ENG OIL ON A B737-700, MECHANIC PLACES THE OIL CAP ON HIS WORK CART AND ACCIDENTALLY COVERS CAP WITH A WORK RAG. CHAIN LANYARD ATTACHING CAP TO OIL TANK WAS MISSING AND ACFT DEPARTS WITHOUT THE CAP.

ACN: 789592 (37 of 50)

Synopsis

AN AIRBUS A320 ACFT RETURNED TO FIELD DUE TO THE R #1 SPOILER 'FLOATING' AND INDUCING A 5-DEGREE BANK ANGLE DUE TO ACTUATOR STILL IN 'BYPASS' POS. LEAD MECHANIC SUGGESTS AIRBUS CONSIDER MODIFYING SPOILER ACTUATORS.

ACN: 789584 (38 of 50)

Synopsis

PRIOR TO INSTALLING THE RIGHT MAIN LANDING GEAR ON AN AIRBUS A320 ACFT, MECHANIC NOTICES DAMAGE TO THE AFT PINTLE PIN SPHERICAL BEARING. LANDING GEAR WAS OVERHAULED BY A CONTRACT MAINT SHOP.

ACN: 789307 (39 of 50)

Synopsis

A CARRIER MAINT REP AND A CONTRACT MAINT MECHANIC WHO WORKED AN AIRBUS A320, DESCRIBE THE EVENTS THAT LED TO THE ACFT DEPARTING AND LANDING WITH BOTH ENGINE THRUST REVERSERS INOPERATIVE.

ACN: 789185 (40 of 50)

Synopsis

MECHANIC WORKING A B757-200 INBOUND LOG GRIPE FOR AN 'AUTO-THROTTLE FAILED TO MAINTAIN REFERENCE EPR,' FAILED TO SET THE POWER SWITCH ON THE EEC MAINT PANEL BACK TO THE NORMAL POSITION. TAKEOFF ROLL ABORTED.

ACN: 789088 (41 of 50)

Synopsis

A LEAD MECHANIC AND SUPERVISOR ARE INFORMED AN INBOUND B737-800 HAD AN OIL FILTER BYPASS INDICATION AND AN AUTO SHUTDOWN OF #2 ENG ON APPROACH AT APPROX 137 FEET.

ACN: 788920 (42 of 50)

Synopsis

TWO MECHANICS ARE INFORMED THEY DID NOT REINSTALL THE RIGHT NOSE TIRE AXLE SPACER DURING THEIR TIRE CHANGE ON A B767-300ER ACFT.

ACN: 788586 (43 of 50)

Synopsis

AN AVIONICS TECH NOTICES THE 'GND MAINT TEST' PROC FOR ELEV SERVOS WILL SHOW A 'SERVO PASS' VERIFICATION DISPLAY, EVEN THOUGH A DEFECTIVE PART, OR INCORRECT PART, MAY BE INSTALLED ON DEHAVILLAND DHC-8-100.

ACN: 788504 (44 of 50)

Synopsis

DURING TAXI OUT CHECK, A CRJ-200 FLIGHT CREW NOTICED RUDDER DID NOT GO FULL LEFT AS INDICATED ON EICAS SCREEN. ITEM DEFERRED, ACFT DEPARTED. ACFT LATER FERRIED BACK TO BASE DUE TO RUDDER CONCERNS.

ACN: 788394 (45 of 50)

Synopsis

AFTER PERFORMING A HIGH POWER RUN ON A B737-700 #1 ENG, MECHANIC RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM THE AIRPORT FIRE DEPT OF THE DAMAGE TO THEIR FIRE STATION ROLL-UP DOORS.

ACN: 788304 (46 of 50)

Synopsis

MECHANIC REPORTS HE MAY HAVE INCORRECTLY INSTALLED THE LEFT HORIZ STAB TO BODY, AFT BLADE SEAL, IN THE FUSELAGE TAIL SECTION OF A B737-300 ACFT.

ACN: 788171 (47 of 50)

Synopsis

WHILE SEPARATING THE ENGINE CORE FROM THE FAN CASE OF A PRATT WHITNEY 2000 ENG, ONE BOLT WAS ACCIDENTALLY LEFT IN, RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO THE FAN CASE.

ACN: 788170 (48 of 50)

Synopsis

DURING PUSHBACK, AS CREW STARTED #1 ENGINE ON AN AIRBUS A320 ACFT, MECHANIC NOTICES THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING BYPASS PIN NOT INSTALLED. MECHANIC LATER INFORMED THE NOSE LNDG GEAR STEERING LUG PIN WAS DAMAGED.

ACN: 788126 (49 of 50)

Synopsis

TWO MECHANICS AND AN INSPECTOR REPORT ON HOW AND WHY, A L UPPER WING AILERON PCA ACCESS PANEL FOR AN EMB145LR WAS NOT REINSTALLED.

ACN: 788029 (50 of 50)

Synopsis

MECHANIC DESCRIBES HOW HIS EFFORTS TO MEET A TURN AROUND DEPARTURE SCHEDULE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS INSTALLING THE WRONG AIR DATA COMPUTER (ADC), EVEN THOUGH THE AMM TEST PROCEDURE PASSED ON A B757-200 ACFT.

Report Narratives

ACN: 793690

Time / Day

Date : 200805

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Compressor Bearing

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Inspector

ASRS Report : 793690

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.Other

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Schedule Pressure

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS NOTIFIED AT THE BEGINNING OF SHIFT THAT I WAS INVOLVED WITH AN INVESTIGATION ON AN ENG SHUTDOWN. A RAG WAS FOUND IN THE #3 BEARING COMPARTMENT AND I GAVE CLRNC FOR THE INSTALLATION OF THE #1 AND #2 BEARING SUPPORT. BUT, AS I CAN REMEMBER WHEN I GAVE THE CLRNC, THERE WAS NO DEBRIS OR FOREIGN OBJECTS IN THE AREA.

Synopsis

AN ENGINE OVERHAUL INSPECTOR IS INFORMED A RAG WAS FOUND IN THE #3 BEARING COMPARTMENT OF A CFM-56 ENGINE, CAUSING AN ENG SHUTDOWN.

ACN: 793672

Time / Day

Date : 200807

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : ATR 42

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Oil Filler Cap

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

Experience.Maintenance.Technician : 10

ASRS Report : 793672

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Resolatory Action.Other

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

AFTER LOADING AN ATR-42 FOR A CARGO FLT TO ZZZ, THE ACFT LEFT THE FLT LINE AND PROCEEDED TO THE RWY FOR DEP. MY FELLOW WORKER AND I LEFT TO RETURN TO OUR HANGAR AND CLOSE UP SHOP. WE MONITORED THE RADIO UNTIL WE ARRIVED AT THE SHOP AND CLOSED UP. WE DECIDED THAT WE HAD BETTER MAKE SURE THAT THE ACFT WAS OUT OF SIGHT AND WELL ON ITS WAY BEFORE WE LEFT FOR THE DAY. AS WE EXITED THE HANGAR, WE OBSERVED THE ACFT IN THE DOWNWIND LEG FOR A RETURN TO ZZZ. WE TURNED ON THE RADIO JUST AS WE HEARD THE TWR ASK, 'STATE THE NATURE OF YOUR PROB.' WE COULD NOT HEAR THE REPLY. WE BOTH JUMPED IN THE TRUCK AND HEADED FOR THE RAMP. ENRTE TO THE RAMP, WE COULD CLEARLY SEE THAT THE #1 ENG WAS SHUT DOWN. AS THE ACFT ROLLED IN TO BE PARKED, IT WAS CLR THAT IT WAS AN OIL ISSUE, BASED UPON THE AMOUNT OF OIL ON THE COWL AND THE FUSELAGE. UPON OPENING THE #1 ENG COWL, I DISCOVERED THE OIL CAP IN ITS RECEPTACLE, BUT POPPED OUT AND SLIGHTLY ASKEW. I THINK THAT THE FLAP MIGHT HAVE BEEN UP, BUT I WAS A BIT RATTLED AT THE TIME AND DO NOT REMEMBER THIS CLEARLY. THE PLT RELAYED THE EVENTS TO ME THAT UNFOLDED, THAT CAUSED HIM TO DO AN INFLT SHUTDOWN. I GOT ON THE PHONE IMMEDIATELY TO OUR MAINT CTL AND RELAYED TO THEM ALL THAT I KNEW. AFTER A FEW PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS, MAINT CTL STARTED TO SET INTO MOTION THE STEPS I NEEDED TO GO THROUGH IN ORDER TO CHK OUT THE ENG AND REPAIRS IF NEEDED. MY CO-WORKERS AND I THEN PROCEEDED TO CLEAN UP THE ENG, FUSELAGE, AND RAMP. I HAVE DONE OIL SVCING NUMEROUS TIMES ON THIS TYPE OF ACFT AND CLEARLY KNOW HOW TO INSTALL THE OIL CAP. I WAS THE LAST PERSON TO SVC THIS ENG, 2 NIGHTS BEFORE. I FOLLOWED THE COMPANY TALLY SHEET AND COMPLETED ALL OF MY TASKS. I DID NOT, HOWEVER, HAVE THE SHEET IN FRONT OF ME AT THE TIME OF SVCING DUE TO LIMITED SPACE ON THE LADDER DURING SVCING. MY BELIEF IS THAT I MAY NOT HAVE FULLY ENGAGED THE LOCKING FLAP WHILE INSTALLING THE CAP, BASED UPON THE ORIENTATION OF THE CAP WHEN I OPENED THE COWL UPON RETURN TO THE RAMP. A SVC BULLETIN FOR THAT PARTICULAR CAP WAS PERFORMED, WITH NO DISCREPANCIES NOTED. MY SUPVR, DIRECTOR OF SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE, AND DIRECTOR OF MAINT HAVE ALL DISCUSSED THIS WITH ME, AND HAVE ASKED FOR SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO AVOID THIS PROB IN THE FUTURE. I SUGGESTED THAT ON THE PLT'S PREFLT THEY ASK THE MECH ON DUTY TO CHK AND RE-VERIFY THAT THE OIL CAPS ARE ON PROPERLY AND SECURELY. I BELIEVE THAT FOLLOWING THIS PROC WILL, AND WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS SITUATION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THE OIL CAP IS ON THE OUTBOARD SIDE OF THE #1 ENGINE.

Synopsis

A LINE MECHANIC REPORTS A #1 ENG INFLIGHT SHUTDOWN DUE TO OIL LOSS AND AIR TURNBACK OF AN ATR-42 ACFT HE HAD SERVICED EARLIER. ENG OIL CAP HAD POPPED OUT OF OIL TANK RECEPTACLE.

ACN: 793669

Time / Day

Date : 200807

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.General Aviation : Personal

Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Lubrication Oil

Person : 1

Affiliation.Other : Instructional

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 793669

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : Oil Press Loss Indication

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Logbook Entry

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

DURING ROUTINE OIL CHANGE, I ALLOWED AN ASSISTANT TO REMOVE THE ENG COWLING AND DRAIN THE ENG OIL WHILE I PERFORMED OTHER MAINT FUNCTIONS. THE ASSISTANT ALSO REMOVED THE SAFETY WIRE AND LOOSENED BOTH THE OIL SUMP SCREEN COVER AND OIL FILTER. AT THIS POINT I TOOK OVER THE OIL CHANGE, CHANGING THE FILTER AND REPLENISHING THE ENG OIL. THE OWNER OF THE ACFT INFORMED ME AT THIS POINT THAT HE WOULD LIKELY NEED THE ACFT ASAP TO FLY TO A BUSINESS MEETING. AT THIS POINT, I PULLED OUT THE ACFT AND PERFORMED A RUN-UP AND LEAK CHK WHICH WAS GOOD. I DID NOT NOTICE THE OIL SUMP DRAIN COVER SAFETY WIRE WAS REMOVED AND MADE THE ASSUMPTION THE SCREEN WAS CHKED, REINSTALLED AND SECURED BY MY ASSISTANT. I THEN INSTALLED THE COWLING AND RETURNED THE ACFT TO SVC. THE OWNER DECIDED TO NOT USE THE ACFT AND IT WAS USED LATER IN THE DAY FOR FLT TRAINING. DURING THIS TRAINING FLT, A LOSS OF OIL PRESSURE WAS NOTED BY THE INSTRUCTOR AT WHICH TIME A PRECAUTIONARY LNDG WAS MADE IN ZZZ1. UPON LNDG, A MASSIVE OIL LEAK WAS NOTED. LCL MECHS REMOVED THE COWLING AND FOUND THE SUMP DRAIN COVER MISSING. LACK OF COM BTWN MYSELF AND MY ASSISTANT PLUS THE TIME PRESSURE TO GET THE ACFT RETURNED TO SVC FOR THE OWNER WERE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN THIS EVENT. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER AT LENGTH WITH THE ASSISTANT AND WE HAVE AGREED TO IMPROVE OUR COM AND DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF PASSING ALONG A COMPLETE JOB STATUS UPDATE WHEN TURNING WORK OVER AND THE DANGERS OF DISASSEMBLING ACFT COMPONENTS WITHOUT REASSEMBLY OR SOME TYPE OF DOCUMENTATION OF PARTIAL WORK ACCOMPLISHED. VALUABLE LESSONS WERE LEARNED FROM THIS EVENT BY BOTH MY ASSISTANT AND MYSELF THAT WE WILL CARY WITH US IN THE FUTURE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THE CESSNA-172 LYCOMING ENGINE OIL SUMP DRAIN COVER HAS A 1 INCH NUT THAT SECURES THE COVER, WHICH HE FAILED TO SAFETY WIRE. BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF OIL PRESSURE, HE RECOMMENDED THE ENGINE BE DISASSEMBLED BEFORE FURTHER FLIGHT. THE ENGINE CRANK JOURNAL WAS FOUND SCORED, SO A COMPLETE ENGINE OVERHAUL WAS INITIATED.

Synopsis

AFTER PERFORMING ROUTINE ENGINE OIL AND FILTER CHANGE ON A CESSNA-172, MECHANIC IS INFORMED THE ENG SUMP SCREEN COVER HAD SEPARATED DURING FLT TRAINING, CAUSING OIL PRESSURE LOSS AND PRECAUTIONARY LANDING.

ACN: 793601

Time / Day

Date : 200807

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Flight Phase.Ground : Takeoff Roll

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Indicating and Warning - Landing Gear

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 793601

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Resolatory Action.Other

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Engineering Procedure

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Manuals

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Work Cards

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS FINISHING MY MAINT WORK CARD 32-XXXX FUNCTIONAL CHK OF THE LNDG GEAR PROX SWITCHES. AFTER COMPLETING THE MAIN TASK, TASK #34 STATES TO CONNECT P0775 CONNECTOR UP TO J0775 CONNECTOR, WHICH I HAD COMPLIED WITH AND TIGHTENED P0775 TO J0775. 2 DAYS LATER, ACFT DEPARTED ZZZ ARPT. UPON TKOF, THE GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT AND CAUSED THE FLT TO RETURN TO GATE. RECONNECTED CONNECTORS P0775 AND J0775, DEPLANED PAX, DEFUELED THE ACFT, IT WAS TAXIED TO THE RON HANGAR FOR GEAR RETRACTION CHK. NO DEFECTS FURTHER NOTED. I FELT THAT I HAD SECURED THE 2 CONNECTIONS (P0775 CONNECTOR AND J0775 CONNECTOR), BUT AS STATED, THE CONNECTION WAS FOUND TO BE LOOSE. IT WOULD NOT HURT TO HAVE ANOTHER MECH (SECOND SET OF EYES) TO CHK AS WELL.

Synopsis

MECHANIC IS INFORMED AN EMB145LR HAD RETURNED TO FIELD DUE TO GEAR FAILED TO RETRACT. A LANDING GEAR PROXIMITY SWITCH THAT MECHANIC HAD EARLIER RECONNECTED WAS FOUND LOOSE.

ACN: 793425

Time / Day

Date : 200806

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Regional Jet 700 ER&LR

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Wheels/Tires/Brakes

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Lead Technician

ASRS Report : 793425

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

Consequence.Other : Emotional Trauma

Consequence.Other

Consequence.Other : Physical Injury

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Schedule Pressure

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

THIS EVENT HAPPENED WHILE I WAS WORKING ON A ROAD TRIP AT ZZZ ON ACFT X. THIS EVENT IS A SAFETY RISK THAT IS BEING CAUSED BY CTRLS. THE MAINT CTL CTRL TRIED TO TALK ME INTO DEVIATING FROM THE TECHNICAL DATA, AND WAS PRESSURING ME TO GET OUT. I WAS TOLD THAT BLEEDING THE BRAKES WAS NOT REQUIRED BECAUSE THE BRAKES HAD A SELF-BLEEDING MECHANISM, AND LATER HE SAID THAT I WOULD NOT NEED TO SVC THE HYD SYS AFTER I BLED THE BRAKES. NOTE: I BELIEVE THE PRESSURE DISTR ME TO THE POINT I HAD AN ACCIDENT WHILE BLEEDING THE BRAKES THAT CAUSED ME TO GO TO THE ER. I DETERMINED THIS EVENT OCCURRED BECAUSE I WAS READING THE TECHNICAL DATA, AND WHAT MAINT CTL WAS TELLING ME WAS INCORRECT. REF CRJ 700 AMM, TASK BLEEDING THE BRAKES. I PERFORMED THE BLEEDING TASK IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TECHNICAL DATA, NOT WHAT MAINT CTL WAS TELLING ME TO DO. THE EVENT WAS HAPPENING BECAUSE MAINT CTL WANTED THIS ACFT NOW! I BELIEVE THE CTRLS ARE BEING PRESSURED BY MAINT OPS. I AM NOT SURE WHAT TO SUGGEST FOR A REMEDY AT THIS TIME, BECAUSE THIS IS A SYSTEMIC, AND A CULTURE PROB AT OUR COMPANY THAT HAS HAPPENED MANY TIMES IN MY EXPERIENCE, AND WITH OTHER CO-WORKERS. NOTE: NOT ALL THE CTRLS AT MAINT CTL HAVE TRIED THESE TACTICS WITH ME.

Synopsis

A CRJ-700 LEAD MECHANIC REPORTS ON BEING PRESSURED TO DEVIATE FROM MAINT PROCEDURES BY SOME OF HIS COMPANY'S MAINT CONTROLLERS, WHOM HE BELIEVES ARE ALSO BEING PRESSURED TO MEET DEPARTURE SCHEDULES.

ACN: 792995

Time / Day

Date : 200805

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
ASRS Report : 792995

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE TROUBLESHOOTING A RIGHT ENG REV FAULT, I ENTERED THE NOSE COMPARTMENT TO INSPECT THE THROTTLE SWITCHES. WHAT I FOUND WAS A LITTLE SHOCKING. THERE WAS APPROXIMATELY 12 FT OF ACARS PAPER IN ABOUT 25 INDIVIDUAL SHEETS LAYING IN THE THROTTLE QUADRANT AND LINKAGES UNDER THE PEDESTAL, ON TOP OF THE RADAR TRANSMITTER/RECEIVER AND SCATTERED AROUND THE RADAR TRANSMITTER/RECEIVER ON THE COMPARTMENT INSULATION. THE PAPER IS COMBUSTIBLE AND PRESENTS A FIRE DANGER AROUND THAT TRANSMITTER/RECEIVER. ENOUGH OF IT COULD ALSO RESTRICT FREE MOVEMENT OF THE THROTTLE LINKAGE. THE 25 SHEETS WERE WEIGHT DATA, RUNWAY DATA, ATIS INFO AND TAKEOFF DATA FOR THIS AIRCRAFT DATING BACK A FEW MONTHS. THESE SHEETS ARE TUCKED INTO THE INSTRUMENT PANEL CREVICES FOR READY VISUAL ACCESS BY THE CREWS DURING THE FLIGHT. SOME OF THEM ARE FALLING BEHIND THE INSTRUMENT PANELS AND GETTING INTO CRITICAL AREAS OUT OF SIGHT OF THE CREWS. 'SUGGESTED RESOLUTION PROVIDED BY THE SUBMITTER.' THE CREWS NEED TO BE ALERTED TO THE POTENTIAL DANGERS

OF HAVING THESE SHEETS OF ACARS PAPER FALL BEHIND OR BELOW THE INSTRUMENTS AND PEDESTAL. IF SHEETS DO FALL BEHIND THE PANELS, MAINTENANCE SHOULD BE CALLED TO EXTRICATE THE MISSING PAPER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER STATED THAT ISSUE HE RAISED IS ONE OF ALERTING FLT CREWS ABOUT HOUSEKEEPING AND THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF HAVING THE PAPER FALL DOWN ONTO ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT. IF COOLING AIR IS BLOCKED, THEN A FIRE POTENTIAL DEVELOPS. THE REPORTER UNDERSTANDS THE FLT CREW'S REASON FOR PLACING THE ACARS PAPER WHERE THEY HAVE VISUAL ACCESS TO IT. HOWEVER, AT THE END OF THE DAY CREWS SHOULD INVENTORY PAPER PLACED ON THE PANEL IMMEDIATELY IN FRONT OF THE THROTTLE QUADRANT AND IF PAPER HAS DISAPPEARED HAVE MAINTENANCE LOOK FOR IT ON THE FWD SIDE OF THE ACCESS DOOR IN THE FORWARD ELECTRONICS COMPARTMENT FORWARD OF THE NOSE LNDG GEAR. ABOUT ONE THIRD OF THE PAPER THAT THE RPTR DISCOVERED WAS ON TOP OF THE RADAR AND WAS ACARS PAPER DISCOLORED TO A DARK BROWN COLOR. THE OTHER TWO THIRDS OF THE PAPER WAS IN THE THROTTLE QUADRANT AREA. THE DATES ON THE PAPER ESTABLISH THAT IT WAS SEVERAL MONTHS OLD AND VERY DRY BECAUSE OF THE EXPOSURE TO THE ACFT'S ENVIRONMENT.

Synopsis

A B757/B767 MECHANIC REPORTS DISCOVERING ACARS FLT PAPERS PLACED ON THE FWD CENTER PEDESTAL BY FLT CREWS HAD SLIPPED DOWN ONTO ELECTRONIC EQUIP IN THE NOSE ELECTRONIC COMPARTMENT.

ACN: 792809

Time / Day

Date : 200806

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Galley Furnishing

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
ASRS Report : 792809

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Non Compliance With MEL
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON JUN/XA/08, MYSELF AND AMT #2 PLACARDED THE FIRST CLASS OVEN INOP FOR A BROKEN OPERATING HANDLE. PER THE GALLEY ITEM AND SAFETY OF THE ACFT, WE OPENED AND COLLARED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER AND LOCKED THE OVEN IN THE CLOSED POS AND APPLIED INOP STICKERS. THE FOLLOWING DAY AT APPROX XA00 ON JUN/XB/08 WE WERE ACCOMPLISHING THE INTERIOR INSPECTION PER THE ETOPS PROGRAM AND FOUND OVENS WERE IN OPERATING CONDITION, BUT WITH 'INOP' PLACARDS TORN OFF, OVEN HOT, CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED, AND BROKEN HANDLE THROWN ON TOP OF GALLEY CABINET. ON JUN/XA/08 WHILE EXITING ACFT, AN ANGRY QUESTION WAS POSED TO US AS TO WHY THE OVEN WAS INOP'ED BY A FLT ATTENDANT. I TOLD HER THE HANDLE WAS BROKEN AND THE OVEN SHOULD NOT BE OPERATED BECAUSE IT COULD

OVERHEAT. THIS IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE PLACARD WITH TOTAL DISREGARD TO THE SAFETY OF THE CREW AND PAX. ON JUN/XB/08 WE WERE THE FIRST PEOPLE ON THE ACFT AFTER THE PAX AND FLT CREW DEPLANED FROM INBOUND TRIP. RETRAIN FLT ATTENDANTS TO NOT IGNORE PLACARDS FOR SAFETY REASONS. FLT CREW IGNORED WARNINGS, BYPASSED DEFERRAL AND OPENED CIRCUIT BREAKER TO OPERATE OVEN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED ONLY ONE OF THE TWO FIRST CLASS OVENS WAS PLACARDED INOP. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT WHOEVER TORE OFF THE 'INOP' PLACARD AND PUSHED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER BACK IN, TO OPERATE THE DEFERRED OVEN, DID NOT REALIZE THE SAFETY ISSUE WITH THE OVEN DOOR HANDLE BROKEN. REPORTER ALSO STATED HE HAS NOTICED WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN INCREASING DISREGARD FOR CABIN ITEMS THAT HAVE BEEN PLACARDED AND DEFERRED INOP BY MAINT, ONLY TO SEE THESE CABIN ITEMS STILL BEING USED, SUCH AS LAVS, OVENS, AND SPARKING CABIN INFLIGHT ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEMS. ALTHOUGH THESE ITEMS MAY NOT BE NECESSARILY CRITICAL FOR ACFT PERFORMANCE, USING AND RESETTING CIRCUIT BREAKERS DOES CONSTITUTE A SAFETY ISSUE FOR CREW AND PASSENGERS. OVERHEATING AND ELECTRICAL FIRES ARE POSSIBLE RESULTS OF THIS TYPE OF BEHAVIOR.

Synopsis

A MECHANIC WHO HAD DEFERRED, OPENED AND COLLARED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER, PLACARDED AND LOCKED THE FIRST CLASS #2 OVEN IN THE CLOSED POSITION, NOTICED THE SAME B767-300 ON A RETURN FLT, WITH PLACARD TORN OFF, CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED AND OVEN OPERATING.

ACN: 792796

Time / Day

Date : 200806

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground.Other

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Wingtip

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 792796

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 792797

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 792795

Events

Anomaly.Ground Encounters : Vehicle

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE MOVING AN OTS ACFT OFF THE GATE TO THE HANGAR AND ASSIGNED TO BRING A REPLACEMENT MD80, APPROXIMATING THE GATE, L WING TIP STRUCK A SVC TRUCK WHICH FROM MY VIEW LOOKED CLEAR. I CENTERED THE ACFT ON CENTERLINE AND THEN FELT THE TRACTOR SHAKE. I THEN LOOKED BACK AT THE NOSEWHEELS TO SEE IF THE TOWBAR DISCONNECTED AND AGAIN AT THE WING TIP AND SAW A MAN WAVING HIS HANDS. I IMMEDIATELY USED THE HAND BRAKE AND FOOT BRAKE TO STOP THE ACFT, BUT IT WAS TOO LATE. ALTHOUGH IT HAS BEEN STANDARD PRACTICE TO USE ONLY ONE WING WALKER HERE AT ZZZ, IN THE FUTURE I WILL ENSURE I WILL ONLY MOVE AN ACFT IF I HAVE TWO WING WALKERS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 792797: WE WERE BRINGING A REPLACEMENT MD80 ACFT BACK TO THE GATE. AS WE CAME TO THE GATE AREA, THE TRACTOR DRIVER STOPPED AND I GOT OFF THE TRACTOR AND WING WALKING ON THE R SIDE. BEFORE WE GOT ALL THE WAY ON THE GATE, THE TRACTOR DRIVER STOPPED AND I REALIZED SOMETHING WAS WRONG. WHEN I LOOKED AT THE L SIDE OF THE WING, THE ACFT HAD STRUCK A SVC TRUCK. TO PREVENT THIS, ALWAYS USE TWO WING WALKERS. THE CURRENT PROC IS TO USE ONLY ONE WING WALKER.

Synopsis

MECHANIC TOWING AN MD80 INTO GATE AREA STRIKES A TRUCK. ONLY ONE WING WALKER USED.

ACN: 792784

Time / Day

Date : 200804
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Fan Reverser

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
ASRS Report : 792784

Events

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged
Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

TWO ACFT THIS YR SO FAR HAVE SUSTAINED DAMAGE DUE TO A RECOGNIZED CONDITION ADDRESSED IN SVC TIP MAINT MANUAL WHERE THE AFT COWL LATCH ACCESS PANEL DOOR OPENS INFLT AND CAUSES DAMAGE TO THE REVERSER WHEN DEPLOYED ON ROLLOUT. THE DOOR BUMPER STOP ARM IN IPC

NOTES 2 COMPONENTS TO BE CHKED FOR WEAR IN THE SVC TIP. THESE COMPONENTS COST ABOUT \$200.00, WHERE THE REVERSER DAMAGE CAN COST \$250,000.00 CONSIDERING OUT-OF-SVC TIME, REVERSER DAMAGE, FERRY COST, ETC.

Synopsis

A MECHANIC REPORTS HOW TWO B757-200 ACFT SUSTAINED DAMAGE WHEN THE AFT COWL LATCH ACCESS PANEL DOOR OPENS IN FLIGHT, CAUSING DAMAGE TO THE REVERSER WHEN DEPLOYED ON LANDING ROLLOUT.

ACN: 792782

Time / Day

Date : 200803

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Make Model Name : B777-200

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Fuel Tank

Aircraft Component : Fuel Tank

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 792782

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Engineering Procedure

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Work Cards

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Assessments

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE WORKING ACFT X CHK JOB CARD X, ACFT EXTERIOR CHK ITEM 33, SUMP FUEL TANKS, I SUMPED ALL TANKS AND FOUND NO CONTAMINATION OF WATER. EACH TANK WAS SUMPED A MINIMUM OF 1 GALLON OF FUEL. NO OTHER CONTAMINANTS WERE FOUND IN THE FUEL SAMPLE. I ASSUMED SENDING A METER ONLY IF CONTAMINANTS WERE FOUND. FOLLOWING THE JOB CARD IS

ALWAYS OF THE HIGHEST CONCERN FOR ME. I DID NOT REALIZE THAT SENDING A METER REGARDLESS OF A SAFE CONDITION WAS REQUIRED. HAVING HAD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF THIS CALLOUT, I CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE DONE SO. I KNOW ONE OF THE HUMAN FACTORS IS COMS. HAVING GAINED A BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON HOW THIS HUMAN FACTOR HAS AFFECTED THIS JOB, I NOW SEE THAT I SHOULD HAVE INVESTIGATED THE ACTUAL INTENT OF THIS CALLOUT FOR THIS TASK. IF EVER I FIND MYSELF ASSUMING THE INTENT OF A JOB CARD, I WILL EXAMINE WHETHER I HAVE ENOUGH INFO OR DO I NEED TO INVESTIGATE IT FURTHER.

Synopsis

MECHANIC IS INFORMED HE FAILED TO SEND A METER TO MAINT ENGINEERING AFTER SUMPING ALL FUEL TANKS FOR WATER ON A B777-200, AS CALLED OUT IN HIS JOB CARD. MECHANIC BELIEVED THE REQUIREMENT WAS ONLY FOR FUEL CONTAMINATION.

ACN: 792746

Time / Day

Date : 200806

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Make Model Name : B737-800
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : DC Battery

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
ASRS Report : 792746

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Inspector
ASRS Report : 792747

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Assessments

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

ETOPS CLASS AUG/07 FIRST TIME WORKING ETOPS ACFT 10 MONTHS LATER.
CHANGED BATTERIES FOR SCHEDULED PARTS CHANGE ON ETOPS ACFT X. MAINT
AND AUX BATTERIES ARE A SIGNIFICANT SYS. VERIFIED BATTERY PART NUMBER
PER IPC. INSTALLED BATTERIES PER MAINT MANUAL. ACCOMPLISHED BATTERY
TEST PER MAINT MANUAL. AS THIS WAS THE FIRST ETOPS THAT I HAVE WORKED

ON SINCE ETOPS CLASS IN AUG/07, I FORGOT TO CALL MAINT CTL TO VERIFY PARTS COMPATIBILITY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 792747: THE FIRST ETOPS ACFT WORKED ON, JUST PLAIN FORGOT. I INSPECTED 'A' MAIN AND AUX BATTERY CHANGE ON ACFT X AND FORGOT TO CALL MAINT CTL TO RELAY IPC DATA FOR BATTERIES. I VERIFIED THIS IN THE IPC MYSELF -- JUST DID NOT CALL MAINT CTL. THE BATTERIES ARE CORRECT FOR THIS ACFT.

Synopsis

A MECHANIC AND INSPECTOR REPORT ON FORGETTING TO CALL THEIR MAINT CONTROL TO VERIFY PARTS COMPATIBILITY FOR THEIR B737-800 ETOPS ACFT, AFTER THE MAIN AND AUX BATTERIES WERE CHANGED.

ACN: 792654

Time / Day

Date : 200806

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737-300

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Main Gear

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

ASRS Report : 792654

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Training

Assessments

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE JACKING THE R STRUT IN ORDER TO CHANGE #3 AND #4 TIRES, THE ACFT SLIPPED OFF THE JACK, CAUSING JACK TO DAMAGE THE STRUT MOTORING VALVE CAP. I HAD PLACED THE JACK ON THE STRUT JACK PAD. THE ACFT BRAKES WERE RELEASED BEFORE THE JACKING STARTED.

Synopsis

MECHANIC REPORTS WHILE JACKING THE RIGHT STRUT OF A B737-300, IN ORDER TO CHANGE THE #3 AND #4 TIRES, THE ACFT SLIPPED OFF THE JACK, CAUSING THE JACK TO DAMAGE THE STRUT METERING VALVE CAP.

ACN: 792529

Time / Day

Date : 200806

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER&LR

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Cooling Fan, any cooling fan

Person : 1

Affiliation.Other : Contracted Service

Function.Maintenance : Lead Technician

ASRS Report : 792529

Person : 2

Affiliation.Other : Contracted Service

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 792528

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Non Compliance With MEL

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Non Availability Of Parts

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Logbook Entry

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

PART NUMBER OF COOLING FAN TO BE REPLACED WAS DETERMINED BY INDIVIDUAL FROM ANOTHER STATION -- LOCATION OTHER THAN AMT ACCOMPLISHING TASK. AVIONICS DISPLAY FAN MEL WAS ASSIGNED TO WORK PACKAGE FOR ZZZ STATION AND COOLING FAN, AS LISTED ON MEL RPT, WAS SENT TO STATION FOR PURPOSE OF CLRING MEL. AMT'S INSTALLED COOLING FAN AND DURING INSTALLATION PROCESS NOTICED PART NUMBERS OF NEW FAN (EFIS DISPLAY COOLING FAN VERSUS AVIONICS SUPPLY FAN) DID NOT MATCH. OPS CHK AFTER INSTALLATION CHKED GOOD AND AMT'S ASSUMED ALL WAS GOOD AND SIGNED FOR WORK AND CLRED MEL WITH MAINT CTL. I REVIEWED THE JOB CARDS ASSIGNED BY THE PLANNING PACKAGE FOR ACFT AND AFTER ENSURING DOCUMENTATION WAS COMPLETE, I SIGNED THE AIRWORTHINESS RELEASE AND RETURNED THE LOGBOOK TO THE ACFT AND CLOSED IT UP. I THEN ATTEMPTED TO MAKE ENTRIES IN MAINT DATA COMPUTER, AFTER THE FACT, FOR REMOVAL OF DEFECTIVE COOLING FAN AND INSTALLATION OF NEW COOLING FAN BUT WAS UNABLE DUE TO MAINT DATA COMPUTER IDENTING THAT PARTS WERE NOT INTERCHANGEABLE AND REJECTED MY ATTEMPTED ENTRIES. COOLING FAN WAS EFFECTIVE FOR ACFT BUT NOT INTERCHANGEABLE FOR THE INSTALLATION LOCATION. I ADVISED AMT'S OF DISCREPANCY AND P1 LOOKED UP COOLING FAN IN IPC AND VERIFIED IT WAS, IN FACT, INCORRECT WHERE IT WAS INSTALLED. WHEN P1 ASKED WHAT SHOULD BE DONE, I ADVISED HIM THE OLD DEFECTIVE COOLING FAN NEEDED TO BE REINSTALLED SINCE THE AIRPLANE COULD NOT FLY WITH AN INCORRECTLY INSTALLED PART AND THAT WE WOULD NEED TO CONTACT MAINT CTL AND RE-DEFER THE SYS UNDER THE ORIGINAL MEL ENTRY DATE. PA AND P2 IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO THE ACFT AND REINSTALLED THE DEFECTIVE FAN. I CONCURRED WITH THE SUGGESTION OF P2 THAT HE SHOULD CORRECT THE LOGBOOK AND MEL DOCUMENTATION BY SIMPLY LINING THROUGH THE LOGBOOK DOCUMENTATION WRITTEN FOR REMOVING AND REPLACING THE AVIONICS SUPPLY FAN. P2 THEN CALLED MAINT CTL AND ADVISED THEM WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND THE MEL WAS RE-ENTERED UNDER THE ORIGINAL DATE. WE THEN UPDATED THE MEL INFO IN MAINT DATA COMPUTER WITH THE CORRECT PART NUMBER FOR AN AVIONICS SUPPLY FAN AND SUBMITTED A MATERIAL REQUEST FOR THE PART. MAINT DATA COMPUTER WOULD NOT ALLOW THE NEW PART NUMBER TO BE INTERCHANGED WITH THE OLD PART NUMBER AND AFTER THE PAPERWORK HAD BEEN COMPLETED AND THE AIRWORTHINESS RELEASE SIGNED, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN INCORRECT PART HAD BEEN INSTALLED AND THE SIT NEEDED TO BE CORRECTED BEFORE THE AIRPLANE COULD FLY. CORRECTING THE ERROR IN DOCUMENTATION BECAME OUR DOWNFALL IN CORRECTING A SIT THAT COULD HAVE BEEN WORSE HAD WE NOT DISCOVERED THE DISCREPANT PART. DEFECTIVE PART WAS REINSTALLED IN ITS ORIGINAL POS AND THE SYS RE-DEFERRED THROUGH MAINT CTL. DOCUMENTATION FOR THE R&R WAS INADVERTENTLY ENTERED IN ERROR, INCORRECTLY. THE AIRWORTHINESS RELEASE HAD BEEN SIGNED PRIOR TO KNOWLEDGE OF THE MISTAKE AND NO FURTHER ACTION WAS TAKEN REGARDING THAT. THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO MANY DIFFERENT FACTORS INCLUDING HUMAN FACTORS SUCH AS LACK OF ATTN TO MINUTE, ALBEIT IMPORTANT, DETAILS, FATIGUE, STRESS, LACK OF EXPERIENCE, INSUFFICIENT STAFFING, TASK OVERLOAD, AND TIME CONSTRAINTS. INACCURATE INFO ON THE PART NUMBER ORDERED FOR THE MEL AND THE FACT THAT BOTH PARTS, EVEN

THOUGH NOT INTERCHANGEABLE, MATCHED IN APPEARANCE, INSTALLATION METHOD, ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR AND OPERABILITY IN SWAPPED POS. THESE SIMILARITIES ALLOWED THE SIT TO GET TO THE POINT OF WHERE THE DOCUMENTATION WAS ENTERED AND SIGNED OFF IN THE LOGBOOK AND THE MEL CLRED. AFTER THAT, IS WHEN THE PROB BEGINS, IN CORRECTING SUCH A PAPERWORK DISCREPANCY NIGHTMARE WHERE AT THAT TIME OF THE MORNING WITH DEP TIME NEAR, ONE JUST WANTS THE PROB TO GO AWAY. ALWAYS DOUBLECHK THE ACCURACY OF ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL'S WORK, IE, BEFORE ATTEMPTING INSTALLATION OF A PART, VERIFY THE PART NUMBER MATCHES THE IPC REF FOR THE POS AND PART NUMBER OF THE ITEM BEING REPLACED AND CHK THE PHYSICAL PART NUMBER OF THE PART BEING REPLACED. HAD THAT HAPPENED PRIOR TO THE START OF THE JOB, THE DOCUMENTATION WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AN ISSUE, SINCE AN INCORRECT PART WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INSTALLED, NECESSITATING REMOVAL AND REINSTALLATION OF THE DEFECTIVE PART. REGARDING DOCUMENTATION, SLOW DOWN AND THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT WHAT YOU ARE DOING AND DON'T FEEL RUSHED JUST BECAUSE A DEP TIME MAY POSSIBLY BE DELAYED. IF AN UNUSUAL EVENT SUCH AS THIS OCCURS, SCRUTINIZE PROCS CLOSELY AND SHOULD THERE BE ANY DOUBT, CONTACT A STATION SUPVR AND SEEK DIRECTION AND VERIFICATION FROM THEM. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 792528: THE ACFT HAD AN MEL FOR AVIONICS FAN INOP. THE WHOLE ISSUE SHOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF WE WOULD HAVE FOLLOWED PROCS FOR THAT MEL AND RE-COLLARED THAT CIRCUIT BREAKER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THE LEFT AVIONICS FAN WAS THE ONE NEEDING TO BE REPLACED. THIS IS ONE OF TWO FANS THAT PROVIDE COOLING AIR TO THE LOWER AVIONICS RACKS.

Synopsis

TWO MECHANICS (ONE A LEAD), REPORT ON THE EFFORTS TO INSTALL A NEW LEFT AVIONICS COOLING FAN ON A CRJ-200 (CL-600-2B19), THAT TURNED OUT TO BE AN INCORRECT PART, REQUIRING INOP FAN TO BE REINSTALLED.

ACN: 792501

Time / Day

Date : 200804

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Fuselage

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 792501

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Engineering Procedure

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Work Cards

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Repair

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

A CO-WORKER INFORMED ME TODAY THAT I MAY BE IN VIOLATION OF A PENDING FAA AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE AND, AFTER FURTHER RESEARCH, HE MAY BE CORRECT. THE WORK CARD WAS NOT FOLLOWED EXACTLY AS WRITTEN, AS IT WAS A BIT CONFUSING WITH THE CONFLICTING INFO PROVIDED. THE DRAWING FOR THE COMPLETION OF THIS TASK SHOWS THAT THE GNDING STUD IS NOT TO BE REMOVED, WHICH THE WORK CARD LATER STATES THAT THE DRAWING IS WRONG. I DO BELIEVE THAT I DID NOT REMOVE THE GND STUD FROM THE EXISTING BRACKET. I ALSO DID NOT APPLY ENAMEL BMS 10-11 TYPE II. I DID SIGN FOR THE PROCS BEING COMPLETED, WHICH WERE NOT. I DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE PAPERWORK AS THERE WAS CONFLICTING INFO, THEREFORE, I USED IMPROPER PROCS TO WHICH THE TASK WAS NOT COMPLETED.

Synopsis

MECHANIC IS INFORMED HE WAS NON-COMPLIANT WITH AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE (AD) REQUIRING THE REMOVAL OF A GROUNDING STUD FOR AN E/E COMPARTMENT BRACKET RELOCATION ON A B767-300.

ACN: 792332

Time / Day

Date : 200804

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B777-200

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Other Fire Extinguishing System

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 792332

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Engineering Procedure

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Manuals

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Situations

Publication : Cargo Fire Bottle Test

Narrative

WHILE ACCOMPLISHING ENGINEERING ORDER FOR CARGO PIT FIRE BOTTLE 2C CHK IN CONJUNCTION WITH ENGINEERING VARIANCE, FOUND 24.96 VDC FOR A SPLIT SECOND AT CONNECTOR FOR SQUIB FOR BOTTLE 2C WHEN FIRE BOTTLE DISCHARGE SWITCH IS PUSHED. WRITE-UP WAS MADE FOR THE PREMATURE VOLTAGE FOUND AT SQUIB CONNECTOR FOR BOTTLE 2C, WHICH I FOUND OUT THAT THE SAME THING WAS FOUND ON ANOTHER ACFT. VOLTAGE WAS DUE TO NOT HAVING SPECIFIC TEST EQUIP USED IN DOING TEST AND NOT HAVING PROPER LOAD ON MULTIMETER WHICH WAS OK DUE TO ENGINEERING ORDER AND THE ENGINEERING VARIANCE, BUT INDUCED THE PROB OF THE INITIAL VOLTAGE NOTICED AT THE START. ALL THAT SET ASIDE, MAINT MANUAL STATES TO PUSH THE DISCHARGE SWITCH ON THE CARGO FIRE/ENG CTL MODULE. THIS STARTS THE 20 MIN TIMER FOR THE DELAYED FIRING OF BOTTLES 2A,B,C. WHEN PUSHING THE DISCHARGE SWITCH, BOTTLES 1A AND 1B SHOULD FIRE. THEN WE DISCONNECT TEST CABLES AND MOVE TO BOTTLES 2A, 2B, 2C AND MAKE SURE THAT MULTIMETERS SHOW LESS THAN .5 VDC FOR 19.5 MINS. BUT IF YOU ARE BUSY MOVING TEST CABLES FROM BOTTLES 1A AND 1B DURING THE 20 MIN TIME THAT YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO BE CHKING FOR VOLTAGE ON BOTTLES 2A, B, AND C YOU MISS THE BEGINNING OF THE 20 MIN CHK FOR VOLTAGE AND THE VOLTAGE SPIKE OF 24 VDC NOTICED AT BOTTLE 2ABC WOULD BE MISSED IF MAINT MANUAL WAS FOLLOWED THE WAY IT IS WRITTEN. SUGGESTED RESOLUTION PROVIDED BY SUBMITTER: 20-MIN TIMER SHOULD BE RESTARTED AFTER TEST CABLES ARE MOVED TO BOTTLES 2A,B,C BY RECYCLING THE DISCHARGE SWITCH SO THE MULTIMETERS CAN BE MONITORED FOR VOLTAGE FOR THE FULL 20.5 MINS, OTHERWISE YOU MISS THE FIRST MINS OF LOOKING AT BOTTLES 2A,B,C AND NOT KNOWING IF THE SQUIB MAY HAVE BEEN FIRED WHEN THE DISCHARGE SWITCH WAS FIRST PUSHED. THIS NEEDS TO BE STATED IN THE MAINT MANUAL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 792331: THE B777 FLEET WAS GROUNDED TO ACP THE TEST OF BOTTLE 2C, CARGO FIRE ARM AND DISCHARGE TEST. I WAS INVOLVED IN THE TESTING OF THE ACFT IN ZZZ THAT DAY. I RAN THE FLT DECK AND MYSELF AND MY PARTNER FIRED A BOTTLE INADVERTENTLY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 792331 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED HIS MAINT STATION DID NOT HAVE THE EQUIPMENT TO PERFORM THE COMPLETE AMM CARGO PIT FIRE ARM AND DISCHARGE TEST. SO, HIS CARRIER'S ENGINEERING TRIED TO HELP BY WRITING A SPECIAL AUTHORIZATION TO SHORTEN THE AMM PROCEDURE THAT WOULD NORMALLY BE USED TO PERFORM THE FIRE TEST. REPORTER STATED THAT AS A RESULT, THEY STARTED THE PROCESS OF SETTING UP FOR THE TEST ABOUT TEN STEPS INTO THE NORMAL PROCEDURE. THIS ENGINEERING PROCEDURE ALLOWED THEM TO TEST ONLY FIRE BOTTLE 2C. BUT, THIS SHORTENED PROCESS ONLY HAD THEM PULLING ONE CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR FIRE BOTTLE 2C, NOT THE OTHER CIRCUIT BREAKER'S FOR THE REMAINING FIRE BOTTLES, INCLUDING 2A AND 2B. REPORTER STATED HE BELIEVES THIS CONTRIBUTED TO THE INADVERTENT DISCHARGE OF TWO OF THE ENGINE FIRE BOTTLES. REPORTER BELIEVES, HAD THEY FOLLOWED THE INITIAL SETUP AT THE BEGINNING OF THE AMM FOR THE TEST, THEY WOULD NOT HAVE BLOWN ANY BOTTLES. THERE WERE MULTIPLE REWRITES OF THE ENGINEERING PROCEDURE AFTER THE BOTTLES WERE BLOWN.

Synopsis

TWO MECHANICS DESCRIBE HOW A MANDATORY B777-200 CARGO PIT FIRE BOTTLE 2C TEST PROCEDURE AND THE USE OF INADEQUATE, BUT APPROVED

TEST EQUIPMENT, CAUSED AN INADVERTENT DISCHARGE OF CARGO FIRE BOTTLES.

ACN: 792145

Time / Day

Date : 200806

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737-800

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Flight Phase.Ground : Takeoff Roll

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Turbine Engine

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

Experience.Maintenance.Technician : 27

ASRS Report : 792145

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Logbook Entry

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

ACFT RETURNED TO GATE AFTER A REJECTED TKOF WITH THE FOLLOWING IRREGULARITY: TKOF ROLL AFTER PUSHING TOGA BUTTON THERE WAS AN IMMEDIATE N1 DIFFERENTIAL. L N1 WENT TO APPROX 70%, R N1 LAGGED AROUND 40% N1. TKOF ROLL ABORTED AT APPROX 30 KTS. AFT FLT ATTENDANTS SAID THEY HEARD A LOUD BOOM IMMEDIATELY BEFORE ABORT. MY CORRECTION ACTION: INSPECTED #1 AND #2 ENGS, BOTH CHK GOOD. RAN ENGS TO TKOF PWR WITH AUTOTHROTTLE ENGAGED AND ALSO MANUALLY, BOTH CHK GOOD -- N1, N2, EGT MATCH. RAN AUTOTHROTTLE BITE TEST, NO FAULTS. TORQUE TEST SHOWS #2 TAKES 1.5 IN-OZ MORE TO MOVE THRUST LEVER THAN #1. FORWARD AUTOTHROTTLE TO MCO/PLACARD PER MEL 22-00-04. AFTER THE TROUBLESHOOTING, I COULD NOT FIND A PROB WITH THE PWR PLANTS AND THE AUTOTHROTTLE OP WAS FINE. I WAS INSTRUCTED BY OUR MAINT CTL CTR TO DEFER THE AUTOTHROTTLES PER MEL AS PRECAUTIONARY. I ASKED THE CAPT ABOUT THE FLT ATTENDANT'S RPT OF A LOUD BOOM. THE CAPT STATED VERBALLY THAT HE DID NOT HEAR A BOOM. I THEN DEDUCED THAT THERE WAS NO ENG STALL AND THE RPT WAS AN OVERREACTION OF THE FLT ATTENDANT. THE MAINT CTL CTR SET UP TO PERFORM A STALL INSPECTION THE NEXT DAY. THE REASON FOR THIS RPT IS THAT I MAY HAVE MISJUDGED THE STALL RPT AND DID NOT DO A STALL INSPECTION BEFORE I RETURNED THE ACFT TO SVC.

Synopsis

MECHANIC NOTES HE MAY HAVE MISJUDGED A STALL REPORT FROM A FLT CREW AND DID NOT PERFORM AN ENGINE STALL INSPECTION BEFORE RETURNING ACFT TO SERVICE.

ACN: 792132

Time / Day

Date : 200803
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-300
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Fan

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
ASRS Report : 792132

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Logbook Entry
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS SENT TO THE ARPT TO DO SOME FAN BLADE BLENDING. WHEN I LOOKED AT THE FAN BLADES ON ENG #1, 4 PAIRS HAD BEEN (8 EACH BLADES) REPLACED. I LOOKED AT THE LAST FAN BLADE #19 AND IT HAD BAD DAMAGE, OUT OF LIMITS. ITS OTHER OPPOSITE FAN BLADE HAD MINOR BLENDABLE DAMAGE. A BLADE PAIR WAS THEN REPLACED. I WAS WORKING ON OVERTIME AFTER A 10 HR

SHIFT. I WAS ASKED BY LCL MGMNT TO DO AS MUCH AS I COULD TO HELP THEM OUT. I WAS TIRED WHEN TRYING TO INPUT THE DATA AND AS I NOW UNDERSTAND THAT I AM NOW BEING INVESTIGATED. I DID NOT HAVE MUCH SUPPORT FROM ZZZ. MY INPUTS ON INFO ENTERED IN RELATION TO THE LOG ITEMS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN ACCURATE. I WAS TOLD THAT LCL MAINT WOULD TAKE CARE OF THE REST OF THE ITEMS. I THEN RETURNED BACK TO WHERE I'M BASED. I WAS NOTIFIED OF A PROB LAST NIGHT AFTER I RETURNED A PHONE CALL TO MY BOSS THAT A PROB HAS OCCURRED AND TO CONTACT LINE MAINT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I WAS TOLD THAT QUALITY CTL AND FAA ARE NOW INVOLVED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED HE HAD JUST FINISHED REPLACING THE #1 ENGINE FAN BLADE AT POSITION #19 AND THE OPPOSITE BLADE DUE TO BLADE DAMAGE WAS BEYOND THE SRM MANUAL. HE HAD NOT FINISHED SIGNING-OFF THE PAPERWORK FOR THE BLADE REPAIR WHEN HE WAS ORDERED BY THE FIELD STATION DUTY SUPERVISOR TO OPEN UP #1 ENGINE COWLING AND PREPARE ENG FOR A BORESCOPE INSPECTION. REPORTER STATED HE TOLD SUPERVISOR HE WANTED TO FINISH SIGNING-OFF THE PAPERWORK FOR THE FAN BLADE WORK FIRST, BUT WAS AGAIN TOLD TO OPEN THE ENGINE IMMEDIATELY. AS A RESULT OF BEING DISTRACTED TO PERFORM OTHER ENG MAINTENANCE AND WORKING OVERTIME BEYOND THE TEN HOUR SHIFT HE HAD JUST COMPLETED, HE DID NOT ENTER THE SPECIFIC FAN BLADE POSITIONS HE HAD REPLACED INTO HIS CARRIER'S MAINT SYSTEM DATABASE. REPORTER STATED ALTHOUGH THE ACFT HAD BEEN RELEASED INTO SERVICE, ONCE MAINT CONTROL BECAME AWARE OF THE INCOMPLETE MAINT DATA ENTRY AND THE MULTIPLE BLADE CHANGES THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED ON #1 ENGINE, A COMPANY DECISION WAS MADE TO REPLACE THE ENTIRE FORWARD FAN BLADE SECTION AT A DOWNLINE MAINT STATION.

Synopsis

AFTER RETURNING FROM A FIELD TRIP FOR REPAIR OF #1 ENGINE FAN BLADES, ON A B737-300, MECHANIC IS INFORMED THAT THE POSITION OF THE SPECIFIC FAN BLADES REPLACED WAS NOT ENTERED IN THE COMPANY MAINT COMPUTER.

ACN: 792108

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Engine

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
Qualification.Technician : Airframe
Qualification.Technician : Powerplant
Experience.Maintenance.Technician : 3
ASRS Report : 792108

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Logbook Entry
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

ACFT WAS IN 'A' CHK IN ZZZ. 'A' CHK WAS COMPLETED. ACFT WAS READY FOR DEP ON JUN/XA/08. I WAS THE FLT MECH FOR THE CHARTER FLT LEAVING ON JUN/XA/08 AND RETURNING THE NEXT DAY. THE LOGBOOK WAS SUPPOSED TO BE COMPLETED FOR THE TRIP, MEANING ALL ITEMS AND WORK CARDS FROM THE 'A' CHK AND STAGGERED CHK WERE IN THE LOGBOOK INCLUDING THE VERIFICATION FLT. I ARRIVE AT THE ACFT, DO A DAILY CHK, AND AN ETOPS PRE-DEP CHK, AND SIGN THE AIRWORTHINESS RELEASE. WE ARRIVE BACK IN ZZZ AND I WAS INFORMED BY CO-WORKERS THAT A VERIFICATION FLT WAS REQUIRED AND WAS NOT ENTERED IN THE LOGBOOK WHEN WE DEPARTED THE PREVIOUS DAY. I ALSO WAS INFORMED THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL ITEMS FROM THE 'A' CHK PACKAGE THAT WERE NOT ENTERED IN THE LOGBOOK. AS I WAS INFORMED, IF THE VERIFICATION FLT WAS NOT DONE, THEN THE ACFT DOES NOT HAVE ETOPS STATUS. THE WHOLE TRIP WAS FLOWN WITH ETOPS FLT PLANS. I THINK THE WAY TO FIX PROBS LIKE THIS AT OUR COMPANY IS TO GET A LEAD THAT IS ACTUALLY THE LEAD AND NOT ALSO A FLT MECH LIKE WE HAVE NOW WHO IS NEVER THERE SUPERVISING THE 'A' CHKS AND PAPERWORK THE WAY IN MY OPINION SHOULD BE DONE.

Synopsis

A FLIGHT MECHANIC EXPLAINS HIS COMPANY'S PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACFT FLYING WITHOUT A REQUIRED ETOPS VERIFICATION FLIGHT BEING ACCOMPLISHED ON THEIR B757-200 CHARTER, AFTER AN 'A' CHECK.

ACN: 792045

Time / Day

Date : 200806

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Rudder Control System

Person : 1

Function.Maintenance : Inspector
Qualification.Technician : Airframe
Qualification.Technician : Powerplant
ASRS Report : 792045

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other : Company Review

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Engineering Procedure
Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Manuals

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Situations

Publication : ENGINEERING ORSER

Narrative

SAFETY CONCERN REGARDING ENGINEERING ORDER. WHILE THE MINIMUM CLRNC BTWN THE PULLEY BRACKET AND WIRE HARNESSSES EXISTS, CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES MAY CAUSE THE HARNESSSES TO CONTACT THE PULLEY BRACKET. ENGINEERING NEEDS TO FIGURE OUT A WAY TO ADD A CLAMP TO MAKE SURE THIS DOES NOT EVER HAPPEN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH

RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THE ENGINEERING CALLOUT IS FOR THE AFT SIDE OF FUSELAGE STATION 1338 BULKHEAD. ACCESS TO THE WIRE HARNESSSES AND RUDDER CABLE PULLEY AND SUPPORT BRACKET IS FROM THE TAIL COMPARTMENT CATWALK, LOOKING FORWARD AND TO THE RIGHT, THROUGH A PANEL OR 'VAULT' DOOR. THE ENGINEERING ORDER REQUIRES INSPECTION TO VERIFY PROPER CLEARANCE OF THE WIRE HARNESS NEAR THE VERTICAL RUDDER CABLE PULLEY ASSEMBLY. REPORTER STATED HE HAS NOTICED DURING HIS INSPECTION OF VARIOUS MD-80 ACFT, THAT THE ELECTRICAL WIRE HARNESSSES TEND TO RELAX, OR DROOP BETWEEN THEIR FIXED HARNESS CLAMPS IN THIS AREA. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE ENGINEERING ORDER THAT ADDRESSES DISTANCE MAXIMUMS BETWEEN EXISTING CLAMPS, ONLY THAT ADEQUATE SPACE EXIST BETWEEN HARNESS AND CABLE. REPORTER ALSO STATED THERE ARE NO STANDARDS THAT EXISTS IN THE WIRING MANUAL FOR CLAMP DISTANCE. HE HAS SUGGESTED TO ENGINEERING THAT AN ADDITIONAL HARNESS CLAMP BE ADDED IN THIS AREA TO PREVENT THE DROOPING OF THE WIRE BUNDLE AND POSSIBLE CONTACT WITH THE RUDDER PULLEY.

Synopsis

WHILE PERFORMING AN ENGINEERING CALLOUT IN MD-80 TAIL COMPARTMENT, AN INSPECTOR NOTICES AN ADDITIONAL CLAMP SHOULD BE ADDED TO SUPPORT AN ELECTRICAL WIRE HARNESS NEAR A RUDDER CABLE PULLEY ASSEMBLY.

ACN: 792030

Time / Day

Date : 200803

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Airframe

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 792030

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Engineering Procedure

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Schedule Pressure

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Repair

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

IT WAS BROUGHT TO MY ATTN THAT I WAS NON COMPLIANT ON A PENDING AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE ENGINEERING ORDER, THAT I PERFORMED ON AN ACFT FROM THE B767 FLEET. ON THE ENGINEERING ORDER I MISSED THE REMOVAL OF A BOLT THAT WAS STILL SHOWN ON THE FIGURE, BUT WAS IN VERBIAGE, TO REINSTALL ONLY 2 BOLTS NOT 3. MY MEASUREMENT FOR THE LOCATION OF THE BRACKET DID NOT MATCH THE ENGINEERING ORDER MEASUREMENT. DID NOT APPLY SEALANT AROUND THE EDGES OF THE BRACKET NOR DID I USE ENAMEL OVER THE ALODINE AND PRIMER. DID NOT PUT PART NUMBER ON THE BRACKET. IN TRYING TO REMEMBER WHY I MISSED THESE STEPS, I CANNOT REMEMBER IF IT WAS THAT I WAS RUSHED, DISTR, OR GIVEN WRONG ADVICE FROM ANOTHER MECH, BUT NO EXCUSE, I KNOW BETTER THAN THAT, AND FROM NOW ON I WILL ALWAYS SPECIFICALLY READ AND ACCOMPLISH EVERY MAINT ACT TO THE EXACT VERBIAGE ON WORK CARD. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED HE IS AN AIRFRAME MECHANIC AND THE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE (AD) REQUIRED THE REMOVAL OF ONE OF THREE GROUNDING STUDS ON THE AVIONICS RACK IN THE LOWER E/E COMPARTMENT DUE TO CORROSION PROBLEMS. THE AD ALSO REQUIRED A NEW BRACKET BE INSTALLED AND THE REMOVED STUD BE RELOCATED TO THE NEW BRACKET HE HAD INSTALLED. REPORTER STATED HE DID NOT REMOVE THE THIRD GROUNDING STUD AS CALLED OUT IN THE ENGINEERING ORDER, MOSTLY DUE TO HE JUST LOOKED AT THE PICTURE, WHICH SHOWED THE THIRD STUD REMAINING IN THE ORIGINAL LOCATION. INSTEAD OF APPLYING PRIMER PAINT AND THE REQUIRED ENAMEL ON THE NEW BRACKET, HE FOLLOWED PAST PRACTICE AND APPLIED ALODINE TREATMENT AND TWO COATS OF PRIMER. THIS WAS NOT PER THE AD PROCEDURE.

Synopsis

MECHANIC IS INFORMED HE WAS NON-COMPLIANT WITH AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE AD HE PERFORMED ON A B767-300 ACFT BRACKET LOCATION.

ACN: 791827

Time / Day

Date : 200806

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : JFK.Airport
State Reference : NY
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Fuselage

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Inspector
Qualification.Technician : Inspection Authority
ASRS Report : 791827

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
Qualification.Technician : Airframe
Qualification.Technician : Powerplant
ASRS Report : 791828

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
Qualification.Technician : Airframe
Qualification.Technician : Powerplant
ASRS Report : 791829

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolutive Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Repair

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS ASSIGNED TO INSPECT A STRUCTURE REPAIR DONE ON THE FUSELAGE. I ACCOMPLISHED THE INSPECTION BASED ON THE SRM MANUAL REF PROVIDED BY THE AMT'S. IN MY OPINION, THE REPAIR WAS DONE AS SPECIFIED, AND STRUCTURALLY SOUND. WHEN THE ACFT WAS BROUGHT TO THE GATE FOR DEP, IT WAS RPTD THAT 8 RIVET HEADS WERE NOT FLUSH BUT WITHIN LIMITS. ENGINEERING WAS NOTIFIED, AND THE ACFT WAS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE IN SVC WITH THE REPAIR TO BE ADDRESSED AT A FOLLOWING SCHEDULED CHK. IN REVISITING THE REPAIR, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE INCORRECT MANUAL REF WAS USED FOR THE REPAIR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 791828: I WAS ASSIGNED TO DO A REPAIR ON ACFT ON A HOLE IN THE FUSELAGE. I ACCOMPLISHED THE REPAIR PER SRM. IN REVISITING THE REPAIR, ALSO NOTICED WAS A ROW OF RIVETS NOT INSTALLED. TECHNICAL SVCS WERE NOTIFIED AND A FOLLOW-UP ITEM TO BE TAKEN CARE OF AT THE NEXT POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 791829: REPLACE DOUBLER REPAIR AND ADD ROW OF RIVETS.

Synopsis

TWO MECHANICS AND AN INSPECTOR WERE INFORMED THEY HAD USED AN INCORRECT SRM REFERENCE FOR AN EXTERNAL FUSELAGE HOLE, DOUBLER REPAIR, THAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED ON A B767-300. ALSO NOTICED WAS A ROW OF RIVETS NOT INSTALLED.

ACN: 791820

Time / Day

Date : 200804

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : A320

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Antiskid System

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 791820

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Repair

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

ACFT WAS IN ZZZ FOR ALL 3 GEAR REPLACEMENT. I WAS TO DO THE MAIN LNDG TACH TEST, TEST CARD #4R. WHEN PERFORMING TEST STEP D, 1 THROUGH 5 FOR 21GG #2 BRAKE, FOUND THAT #2 BRAKE WAS RELEASING NOT #1. WITH WIRES FROM TACHOMETERS TO MAIN LNDG DISCONNECT BEING WRUNG OUT PRIOR TO GEAR INSTALLATION, I KNEW THE PROB WAS NOT IN THE TACH WIRING. WITH FURTHER TROUBLESHOOTING I FOUND THAT CONNECTORS 15GG AND 17GG HAD BEEN SWAPPED DURING VENDOR OVERHAUL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED HIS CARRIER HAS MADE CHANGES TO THEIR RECEIVING INSPECTION WHEN THEY RECEIVE AN OVERHAULED GEAR FROM A VENDOR. PRIOR TO INSTALLING AN OVERHAULED GEAR, AN INSPECTOR AND MECHANIC WILL WRING OUT AND VERIFY THE WIRE HARNESS IS PROPERLY ROUTED TO THE CORRECT BRAKE. ALSO, THE JOB CARD NOW REQUIRES ALL FOUR BRAKES HAVE LARGE PRESSURE GAUGES INSTALLED DURING THE WHEEL SPIN TACHOMETER AND BRAKE RELEASE TEST. THIS WOULD ALLOW MECHANICS TO ACTUALLY SEE THE HYD BRAKE PRESSURE DROP OR INCREASE TO EACH BRAKE AND HELP TO VERIFY THE ANTI-SKID FUNCTION ON EACH BRAKE IS WORKING PROPERLY. REPORTER STATED TO PERFORM THE WHEEL SPIN TACH TEST REQUIRES A MINIMUM OF FOUR MECHANICS. HE HAS ALSO FOUND THE ELECTRICAL HARNESS CONNECTORS TO THE ANTI-SKID VALVES REVERSED ON THE GEAR AFTER BEING OVERHAULED.

Synopsis

WHILE PERFORMING THE MAIN LANDING GEAR TACH TEST ON AN AIRBUS A320 AFTER ALL THREE GEARS REPLACED, AN AVIONICS MECHANIC FINDS CONNECTORS 15GG AND 17GG HAD BEEN SWAPPED DURING VENDOR OVERHAUL.

ACN: 791816

Time / Day

Date : 200802

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Make Model Name : A320

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Antiskid System

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 791816

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 791817

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Inspector

ASRS Report : 791818

Person : 4

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Lead Technician

ASRS Report : 791815

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Training

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS ASSIGNED TO PERFORM AN ANTI-SKID FUNCTIONAL TEST ON ACFT X. AS THIS JOB REQUIRES SEVERAL PEOPLE TO ACCOMPLISH I ENLISTED THE HELP OF 3 OTHER PEOPLE. ONE MECH WAS SPINNING THE TRANSDUCERS ON THE L GEAR (BRAKES #1 AND #2). ONE MECH OBSERVED THE OP OF THE BRAKES. ONE MECH WAS IN THE COCKPIT APPLYING THE BRAKES. I POSITIONED MYSELF ON THE R GEAR (BRAKES #3 AND #4) AND COMMUNICATED WITH THE COCKPIT MECH VIA RADIO. WE RAN THROUGH THE TEST AS THE JOB CARD CALLED OUT. AS WE RAN THROUGH THE PROC I WOULD COMMUNICATE WITH THE COCKPIT MECH FOR THE APPLICATION AND RELEASE OF THE BRAKES AND INSTRUCTED THE L GEAR MECH TO START/STOP THE DRILL MOTOR. AT THE SAME TIME THE BRAKE OBSERVER WOULD LET US KNOW IF THE BRAKE BEING TESTED RELEASED AT THE PROPER TIME. WE TESTED ALL THE BRAKES AND EVERYTHING PASSED AS CALLED OUT IN THE CARD. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 791817: I HELPED ACCOMPLISH ANTI-SKID TEST WITH 3 OTHER MECHS. I SPUN BRAKE TRANSDUCERS #1 AND #2 AS INSTRUCTED BY JOB CARD. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 791818: ACFT X CAME INTO ZZZ AND WENT OFF THE RWY. PRELIMINARY RPTING IS THAT ANTI-SKID TACHOMETERS WERE WIRED BACKWARDS. I DID THE RECEIVING INSPECTION ON THE GEAR BEFORE IT WAS REPLACED. THERE IS NO PROVISION IN THE JOINT DOCUMENT TO VERIFY ROUTING OF CABLES.

Synopsis

MECHANICS REPORT ON HOW THEY PERFORMED AN ANTI-SKID FUNCTIONAL TEST ON AN AIRBUS A320 AFTER A GEAR CHANGE. ACFT LATER WENT OFF THE RUNWAY UPON LANDING.

ACN: 791762

Time / Day

Date : 200806

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-400
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Pneumatic Control Valves

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
Qualification.Technician : Airframe
Qualification.Technician : Powerplant
ASRS Report : 791762

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Manuals
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Situations

Publication : Boeing MM Proc

Narrative

RESPONDED TO A CALLOUT ON ACFT X. THIS WAS AN RON ACFT AND DURING THE PREFLT WALKAROUND THE PLT NOTICED HOT AIR COMING FROM THE LEADING EDGE SLATS ON THE L-HAND WING. SEVERAL TECHNICIANS AND I RESPONDED AND SUSPECTED THE L-HAND WING TAI VALVE. THE LEADING EDGE SLATS WERE EXTREMELY HOT AND COULD NOT BE TOUCHED, WE IMMEDIATELY TURNED OFF APU BLEED AND VERIFIED L-HAND WING ANTI-ICE SWITCH WAS IN OFF POS. WE REMOVED THE PANEL TO GAIN ACCESS AND FOUND THE VALVE FROZEN IN THE MID-OPEN POS. 'MANUAL OVERRIDE LEVER WOULD NOT MOVE.' WE VERIFIED THE L-HAND WING ANTI-ICE SWITCH WAS INDEED OFF BUT NOTICED THE INDICATOR LIGHT WAS ALSO OFF. THIS WAS TROUBLESOME BECAUSE PER X DESCRIPTION AND OP THE INDICATOR LIGHT SHOULD HAVE BEEN BRIGHT TO INFORM THE PLTS THE VALVE WAS IN A POS THAT DID NOT AGREE WITH SWITCH POS. I PROCEEDED TO CHANGE THE VALVE AND OPS CHK REF X ALL OPS NORMAL. AT THIS POINT THE VALVE AND INDICATION ARE GOOD AND MY CONCERN WAS WITH POSSIBLE HEAT DAMAGE TO THE LEADING EDGE. MAINT CTL WAS BROUGHT IN TO TRY AND FIND A CONDITIONAL INSPECTION FOR THIS SITUATION AND THEY RPTED THAT THERE WERE NONE. I FELT SOME TYPE OF INSPECTION HAD TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BECAUSE AT A MINIMUM THAT WING WAS COOKING ALL MORNING FROM APU BLEED, AND WITH FALSE INDICATION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THIS WAS A SERIOUS SITUATION FOR MULTIPLE REASONS. WITH THE LEFT WING TAI VALVE FROZEN IN THE MID-OPEN POSITION, ON THE B737-400, HOT BLEED AIR FROM THE APU OR ENGINES, IF RUNNING, WILL BE PRESENT IN THE LEFT WING. THERE ARE NO OVERHEAT SENSING ELEMENTS IN THE WING LEADING EDGES, OUTBOARD OF EITHER ENGINE. THE ONLY OVERHEAT PROTECTION/DETECTION IN THIS AREA, IS THE THERMAL SWITCH IN THE TAI VALVE ITSELF THAT SHOULD CLOSE THE VALVE, WHEN THE APU OR ENGINE BLEED AIR REACHES 255 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT IN THE WING DUCT. REPORTER STATED IF THE VALVE SEIZES IN THE MID-OPEN POSITION, AS THIS ONE DID, THE THERMAL PROTECTION BECOMES NON-EXISTENT. THE EXCESSIVE HEAT BUILDUP ALSO CAUSED THE TAI VALVE INTERNAL POSITION SENSOR FOR THE COCKPIT BLUE LIGHT TO FAIL ELECTRICALLY, RESULTING IN THE BLUE LIGHT GOING OUT, INDICATING VALVE HAD CLOSED, WHICH WAS NOT THE CASE. ALTHOUGH THERE IS A VISUAL AND NON-DESTRUCTIVE TESTING (NDT) INSPECTION PROCEDURE REQUIRED TO INSPECT FOR HEAT OR METAL DAMAGE, IF ONE OF THE SLAT TELESCOPING TAI DUCTS SHOULD RUPTURE, NO PROCEDURE CURRENTLY EXISTS FOR A FAILED TAI VALVE IN THE OPEN POSITION. REPORTER STATED THE ACFT WAS RELEASED WITHOUT ANY VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE FIXED WING SURFACES, WHICH ARE COMPOSITE MATERIAL AND SUSCEPTIBLE TO EXCESSIVE HEAT. THE SLATS ARE ALUMINUM. AFTER RETURNING FROM HIS DAYS OFF, REPORTER STATED HE INSISTED HIS COMPANY DO AT LEAST A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE FIXED WING LEADING EDGE COMPOSITE MATERIAL, WHICH WAS ACCOMPLISHED LATER.

Synopsis

MECHANIC REPORTS PILOT NOTICED HOT AIR COMING FROM THE LEADING EDGE SLATS ON THE LEFT WING. SLATS WERE EXTREMELY HOT, COULD NOT BE TOUCHED. WING TAI VALVE FROZEN IN THE MID-OPEN POS AND NO INDICATION IN THE B737-400 COCKPIT.

ACN: 791503

Time / Day

Date : 200806

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : SF 340B

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Main Gear

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Inspector

ASRS Report : 791503

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Manuals

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Schedule Pressure

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

HANGAR ACFT WAS IN FOR BOTH L AND R GEAR TIME CHANGE. DURING CLRNC
CHK OF SHOCK STRUT ROLLER AND PRIMARY CAM, THE CLRNC WAS ADJUSTED TO

THE WRONG DIMENSION AT 0.016 INCHES. THE CLRNC REQUIRED IS 0.14 + 0.03 INCHES AS PER THE SAAB 340 AMM 32-11-05-04 STEP 19. REGIONAL MGR WAS NOTIFIED WHO THEN NOTIFIED MAINT CTL WHO NOTIFIED ZZZ TO HAVE ACFT LOOKED AT AND REPAIRED. MISINTERPED PUBLISHED DIMENSION INFO. SLOW DOWN AND INTERP PUBLISHED DIMENSIONS CORRECTLY.

Synopsis

A MAINT INSPECTOR MISINTERPRETED THE CLEARANCE GAP CHECK OF A SAAB 340-B, LEFT AND RIGHT LANDING GEAR SHOCK STRUT ROLLER AND PRIMARY CAM ASSEMBLY. THE CLEARANCE WAS ADJUSTED TO THE WRONG DIMENSION.

ACN: 791492

Time / Day

Date : 200805

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737-300

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Fuselage Door Frame

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

ASRS Report : 791492

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Schedule Pressure

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Repair

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS REMOVING THE FORWARD ENTRY DOOR UPPER HINGE BOX AND THE DRAIN FITTING WAS DOUBLE FLUSH RIVETED AND I COULDN'T SEE THE RIVETS, SO I TRIED TO DRILL THE LAST HILOC SECURING THE BOX OUT, WITH A 1/2 INCH DRILL BIT AND CURVE IT PAST THE DRAIN FITTING. I DIDN'T REALIZE I HAD SLIPPED OFF OF THE HILOC RIVET UNTIL I STOPPED TO CHK MY DRILL BIT'S PROGRESS. WHEN I SAW I HAD SLIPPED OFF THE HILOC AND DRILLED THE BOX, I GROUND THE HILOC HEAD OFF AND PUNCHED THE SHANK OUT. IT WASN'T UNTIL I HAD REMOVED THE BOX THAT I SAW I HAD DRILLED THROUGH THE HINGE BOX AND INTO ACFT STRUCTURE. I IMMEDIATELY TOLD MY SUPVR AND MGR.

Synopsis

WHILE REMOVING THE FORWARD ENTRY DOOR UPPER HINGE BOX ON A B737-300 ACFT, MECHANIC INADVERTENTLY DRILLS THROUGH THE BOX SECTION AND INTO THE DOOR CUTOUT FRAME STRUCTURE.

ACN: 791401

Time / Day

Date : 200804

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Escape Rope

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company.Other
Function.Maintenance : Technician
Qualification.Technician : Airframe
Qualification.Technician : Powerplant
Experience.Maintenance.Technician : 20
ASRS Report : 791401

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

ZZZ FLT TEST HAD RECEIVED A B767 CONVERTED FREIGHTER FROM ZZZZ2 IN ZZZZ2 TO PERFORM SMOKE TESTS AND TO VALIDATE CONFIG FOR CERTIFICATION. AFTER ARR AT ZZZ, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE FLT DECK EVAC ROPES HAD NOT BEEN INSTALLED PRIOR TO THE FLT FROM ZZZZ2 TO ZZZ. THERE WAS NO INSPECTION CALLED FOR TO VERIFY IF THE EVAC ROPES WERE INSTALLED BUT THEY WERE DISCOVERED MISSING WHEN MECHS WERE INSTALLING OVERWING ROPES AND WENT TO LOOK AT THE FLT DECK INSTALLATION AS A REF. IT WAS AT THAT POINT THAT THE MISSING INSTALLATION WAS DISCOVERED. IT WAS UNCLR WHAT CORRECTIVE ACTION OR NOTIFICATION HAD TAKEN PLACE. IT WAS VERY APPARENT THOUGH THAT THE FLT HAD OCCURRED WITH NO DOCUMENTATION ALERTING THE CREW TO THE MISSING EVAC ROPES ON AN UNCERTIFIED ACFT. SOMEHOW THE INSTALLATION HAD BEEN OVERLOOKED IN THE PROCESSES AT ZZZZ2 AND THE ROPES THEMSELVES WERE IN FACT STILL AT ZZZZ2 AND HAD TO BE DELIVERED TO ZZZ FOR INSTALLATION BEFORE WE COULD FLY AGAIN.

Synopsis

A MECHANIC WORKING A B767 CONVERTED FREIGHTER FROM AN INTERNATIONAL AIRFRAME HEAVY MAINT AND MODIFICATION PROVIDER, REPORTS THE FLT DECK EVACUATION ROPES HAD NOT BEEN INSTALLED PRIOR TO FLT FROM INT'L STATION TO DOMESTIC POINT.

ACN: 791215

Time / Day

Date : 200712

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737-300

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Fuselage Skin

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Inspector

Qualification.Technician : Inspection Authority

ASRS Report : 791215

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Engineering Procedure

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Work Cards

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Repair

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Situations

Publication : Engineering Order

Narrative

A FUSELAGE SKIN REPAIR WAS REMOVED AND A NEW REPAIR WAS INSTALLED STA 727 15 STRINGER 14R WITH AN IMPROPER ENGINEERING AUTH. I WAS INVOLVED IN THE LAST 2 INSPECTION BUY-OFFS PERTAINING TO 1) REINSTALLING AN INTERIOR SIDEWALL, AND 2) MAKING SURE THE NON-ROUTINE CARD WAS SIGNED OFF PER THAT ENGINEERING AUTH. THIS REPAIR WAS COMPLETELY FINISHED AND INSTALLED AND BOUGHT OFF BY OTHER MECHS AND INSPECTION BEFORE I WAS INVOLVED. I FEEL THAT BECAUSE MY STAMP WAS THE LAST ONE INVOLVED THE LETTER OF INVESTIGATION CAME TO ME. WHEN WE FOLLOW REPAIR INSTRUCTIONS FROM AN ENGINEERING AUTH THAT ENGINEERING GIVES US, IT IS A MULTI-STEP SIGN-OFF PROCESS THAT GETS BOUGHT OFF AS THE REPAIR PROGRESSES. BECAUSE A DAY LATER I HAPPEN TO BE THE INSPECTOR TO CLOSE OUT THE NON-ROUTINE CARD. I DON'T FEEL THAT MY RESPONSIBILITIES ARE TO REVIEW THE COMPLETE REPAIR BECAUSE IT WAS ALREADY FINISHED AND BOUGHT OFF DURING THE MULTI-STEP SIGNOFFS. I'M NOT SURE HOW THIS EVENT WAS FOUND. I THINK WHOEVER ISSUED THE IMPROPER ENGINEERING AUTH IS THE #1 CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THE ISSUES AROSE WHEN HE WAS INFORMED HE HAD SIGNED AND CLOSED A NON-ROUTINE MAINT CARD FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF A FUSELAGE SKIN REPAIR ON A B737-300, WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO A MAINT PROCEDURE. THIS SKIN REPAIR INCLUDED A SEVENTEEN PAGE ENGINEERING ORDER (EO), THAT ALLOWED FOR DEVIATIONS AROUND VARIOUS ACFT SIDEWALL COMPONENTS AND INTERNAL STRUCTURES IN THE REPAIR AREA OF STRINGER 14-RIGHT. BUT, THE EO DID NOT SPECIFICALLY REFER TO ANY AMM PROCEDURE OR STRUCTURAL REPAIR MANUAL (SRM), AS THE BASIC REPAIR PROCEDURE TO FOLLOW, WHEN USING THE EO FOR DEVIATIONS AS NEEDED. REPORTER STATED EVEN THOUGH HE WAS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH THE PROGRESSIVE SIGN-OFFS OF THE REPAIR ITSELF, HE WAS BEING HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE REPAIR BEING ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT ANY SPECIFIC REPAIR PROCEDURE NOTED ON THE ENGINEERING ORDER, BECAUSE HE WAS THE LAST ONE TO CLOSE-OUT AND SIGN THE NON-ROUTINE CARD.

Synopsis

AN ACFT INSPECTOR REPORTS ON ISSUES SURROUNDING RESPONSIBILITIES BASED ON MAINT SIGNOFFS, INVOLVING A B737-300 FUSELAGE SKIN REPAIR, THAT WAS REMOVED AND NEW REPAIR INSTALLED WITH IMPROPER ENGINEERING AUTHORITY.

ACN: 790550

Time / Day

Date : 200805

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Aircraft : 1

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Engine Air Pneumatic Ducting

Aircraft Component : Engine Air Pneumatic Ducting

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 790550

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Engineering Procedure

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Work Cards

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Repair

Assessments

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

SUPVR WAS MADE AWARE OF JOB CARD ERROR FOR INSTALLATION OF LPT COOLING TUBES. NO FURTHER ACTION WAS TAKEN. INSTALLED COOLING TUBES ON ENG PER JOB CARD XYZ. THERE ARE 2 POINTS WHERE ONLY THE COOLING TUBES ARE SECURED TO THE S-FLANGE (1:45 AND 6:30). NOWHERE ON JOB CARD IS IT MENTIONED TO SECURE THESE 2 POINTS. ENG WAS COMPLETED AND WENT THROUGH A AND E INSPECTION WITHOUT NOTICE. TODAY, ENG IS IN TEST CELL. CORRECT JOB CARD TO CORRECT THESE POINTS OF CONTACT FOR THE COOLING TUBES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THE JOB CARD WAS SUDDENLY CHANGED

TO INCLUDE SECURING THE LPT COOLING TUBES ON THE S-FLANGE, AFTER HE SHOWED ENGINEERING THE LPT COOLING TUBES WERE STILL NOT SECURED, EVEN AFTER BEING IN THE TEST CELL AND GOING THROUGH FINAL INSPECTION.

Synopsis

AN ENGINE OVERHAUL MECHANIC REPORTS ON A JOB CARD ERROR THAT DOES NOT INCLUDE SECURING THE LPT COOLING TUBES AT TWO ATTACH POINTS ON THE ENG S-FLANGE.

ACN: 790547

Time / Day

Date : 200805

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : A319

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Engine

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 790547

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Manuals

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

AFTER CHANGING A COCKPIT TRIM AIR VALVE, AN ENG RUN WAS REQUIRED TO VERIFY THE FIX. I WENT UP TO THE COCKPIT WHERE I FOUND CAPT AND FO IN THEIR SEATS. I TOLD THEM WE REPLACED THE VALVE AND WOULD NEED TO RUN THE ENG. THE PLANE WAS ALREADY LOADED AND CAPT JUMPED OUT OF HIS SEAT AND STATED HE WOULD NOT RUN THE ENG. I SAID I WOULD. I SAT DOWN AND STARTED TO SETUP THE COCKPIT FOR THE RUN. FO WAS STILL IN HIS SEAT. JUST PRIOR TO ENG START FO GOT UP AND WAS STANDING BEHIND ME OR SO I

THOUGHT. I STARTED THE ENG AND WHEN I TURNED AROUND TO TELL FO THE VALVE WAS GOOD HE WAS NOT THERE. FO HAD LEFT THE COCKPIT WITHOUT SAYING HE WOULD NOT BE THERE FOR THE ENG RUN. I IMMEDIATELY SHUT DOWN THE ENG AND FOUND BOTH PLTS OUT IN THE JETBRIDGE. WHEN I QUESTIONED ABOUT WHY THEY LEFT THEY SAID IT WASN'T THEIR RESPONSIBILITY TO RUN THE ENG, AND I STATED 'MAYBE NOT BUT YOU KNEW I WAS GOING TO RUN THE ENG AND YOU WALKED OFF THE ACFT KNOWING YOU WERE SETTING ME UP.' HE SHRUGGED HIS SHOULDERS AND WALKED OFF. I FEEL WHEN FO WALKED OFF WITHOUT ADVISING ME, HE WAS SETTING ME UP TO MAKE A POINT TO THE COMPANY. MORE IMPORTANTLY I THINK HE COMPROMISED THE SAFETY OF ALL THE PAX AND CREW ONBOARD WHOM ASSUME THEY WERE IN A SAFE ENVIRONMENT WHILE THEY WERE ONBOARD. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED HE FELT THE FIRST OFFICER SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST REMAINED IN THE VICINITY OF THE COCKPIT DURING THE ENGINE RUN, IN CASE SOME EVENT REQUIRING AN EMERGENCY PROCEDURE INVOLVING PASSENGERS OR CABIN CREW MIGHT HAPPEN. REPORTER STATED HE WAS TOLD LATER, HE SHOULD HAVE FORMALLY ASKED THE FO, IF THE FO WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CABIN CREW AND PASSENGERS DURING THE ENGINE RUN. IF THE FO REFUSED, THEN REPORTER WOULD BE REQUIRED TO HAVE THE ENTIRE CABIN OFF-LOADED.

Synopsis

A LINE MECHANIC REPORTS HIS CONCERN ABOUT BOTH PILOTS LEAVING THE COCKPIT WHILE HE WAS PERFORMING A REQUIRED ENG RUN WITH CABIN CREW AND A FULL LOAD OF PASSENGERS ONBOARD AN AIRBUS A319.

ACN: 790543

Time / Day

Date : 200804
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Circuit Breaker / Fuse / Thermocouple

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
ASRS Report : 790543

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Lead Technician
ASRS Report : 790544

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
ASRS Report : 790545

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Non Compliance With MEL
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Manuals
Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Schedule Pressure

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE WORKING WITH ANOTHER MECH ON MEL PROC LOCKING OUT L THRUST REVERSER THE WRONG CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS COLLARED RESULTING IN A STATUS MESSAGE AFTER TKOF. THE FLT CONTINUED ON WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE REST OF THE MEL PROC WAS COMPLIED WITH. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 790544: ACFT RTB DUE TO 'L ENG REV CONT' EICAS MESSAGE. AS LEAD ON DUTY I ASSIGNED 2 AMT'S TO DEFER THE L THRUST REVERSER. I PREPARED THE DEFERRAL ENTRY INTO THE MAINT CPU AS THE WORK PROGRESSED. UPON CONFERRING WITH THE AMT'S INVOLVED I COMPLETED THE ENTRY. I LATER RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM LINE MAINT CTL THAT THE CIRCUIT BREAKER PULLED FOR THE DEFERRAL WAS INCORRECT AND HAD CAUSED ANOTHER MESSAGE, 'L OIL SCVG' UPON TKOF. THE ACFT CONTINUED ON ITS TRIP. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 790545: THE ACFT CAME BACK TO THE GATE WITH A L ENG REV CONT STATUS MESSAGE. WE CONFERRED WITH MAINT CTL AND HE ADVISED US TO LOCK OUT THE L THRUST REVERSER PER THE MEL PROCS. WE WERE TRYING TO DO THIS AS SAFELY AS POSSIBLE BUT ALSO WE WERE WORKING IN A TIME SENSITIVE MANNER. WE READ AND REREAD THE MEL BUT IT IS VERY LENGTHY AND CAN BE SOMEWHAT CONFUSING. ONE OF THE LAST PROCS IS TO LOCK OUT A CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR THE SYNC LOCK ON THE P6-2 PANEL. AS I ENTERED THE FLT DECK I LOOKED UP ON THE P11 PANEL FOR THE BREAKER THINKING IT WAS THERE, THE D12 BREAKER IS A CONT BREAKER WHICH MATCHED THE STATUS MESSAGE WE HAD, SOMEWHAT, AND THIS IS WHAT I BELIEVED WAS THE CORRECT BREAKER. THINKING WE HAD FOLLOWED THE MEL PROC CORRECTLY, WE RELEASED THE ACFT. WE LEARNED LATER, THAT THE CREW GOT A SCAVENGE CONT STATUS MESSAGE AFTER TKOF AND CONTINUED ON TO THEIR DEST. THE REST OF THE MEL PROC WAS ACCOMPLISHED PER THE MEL CORRECTLY.

Synopsis

A LEAD AND TWO MECHANICS REPORT ON LOCKING OUT THE LEFT ENGINE THRUST REVERSER ON A B757-200 ACFT, BUT PULLED AND COLLARED THE WRONG CIRCUIT BREAKER, RESULTING IN A 'LEFT OIL SCVG' MESSAGE AFTER TKOF.

ACN: 790542

Time / Day

Date : 200803

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Nose Gear Tire

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

Experience.Maintenance.Technician : 41

ASRS Report : 790542

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

DURING A DOUBLE NOSE TIRE CHANGE ON ACFT X I FAILED TO NOTICE THE TANG WASHERS WERE MISSING WHEN I REMOVED THE OLD TIRES AND INSTALLED THE

NEW TIRES WITHOUT THEM. THERE WERE NO TANG WASHERS INSTALLED ON THE OLD TIRES AND THE NIGHT BEFORE THEY HAD BEEN RETORQUED AT THE HANGAR. I CHKED THE AREA AFTER THE TIRE CHANGE AND THERE WERE NO PARTS AROUND SO I ASSUMED THE TIRE CHANGE WAS COMPLETE. WHEN THE WASHERS WERE MISSING WHEN I REMOVED THE TIRES I BECAME CONFUSED WITH THE THREAD TYPE BTWN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL.

Synopsis

MECHANIC IS INFORMED HE DID NOT INSTALL THE NOSE TIRES TANG TYPE AXLE SPACERS DURING A DOUBLE TIRE CHANGE ON A B767-300 ACFT.

ACN: 790471

Time / Day

Date : 200806

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 20000

Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 21000

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Escape Slide

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Inspector

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

Experience.Maintenance.Technician : 29

ASRS Report : 790471

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

Experience.Maintenance.Technician : 23

ASRS Report : 789518

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

Experience.Maintenance.Technician : 23

ASRS Report : 790134

Person : 4

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 300
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 19300
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 6000
ASRS Report : 791499

Person : 5

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
Qualification.Technician : Airframe
Qualification.Technician : Powerplant
Experience.Maintenance.Technician : 19
ASRS Report : 790133

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter.Other
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EICAS
Message
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 4
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 5
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport
Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative

I WAS ASSIGNED TO ACFT X AND GIVEN THE TASK OF INSPECTION OF THE R OVERWING ESCAPE SLIDE DOOR LATCH MECHANISM. AN INSPECTOR AND I FOUND SEVERAL RODS, ROD ENDS, JAM NUTS, AND 1 LATCH TO BE CORRODED. OVER THE COURSE OF 4 DAYS, I HELPED REPLACE THE CORRODED PARTS WITH NEW PARTS. THE INSTRUCTION CARDS ACCOMPANY THE ROUTINE INSPECTION CARD AND MAINT MANUAL REFS WERE ADHERED TO IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THESE TASKS. EXTREME CARE WAS TAKEN TO MAINTAIN THE ORIGINAL DIMENSIONS ON ALL PARTS REPLACED. THERE WERE INSPECTION BUYBACKS FOR EACH PART REPLACED. ON DAY #1, I ALSO CLOSED AND LATCHED THE R OVERWING ESCAPE SLIDE DOOR, AGAIN FOLLOWING THE PROC SPELLED OUT IN THE ROUTINE WORK CARD. ANOTHER A&P MECH ASSISTED ME BY TUCKING IN THE SEAL ALONG THE LEADING EDGE OF THE DOOR, ASSURING THAT THE LEADING EDGE OF THE DOOR WAS NOT OVER FLUSH. THE LEADING EDGE OF THE DOOR WAS, IN FACT, SLIGHTLY UNDER FLUSH. THE CLOSING OF THE DOOR AND THE LATCHING AND LOCKING PROC WAS WITNESSED BY AN INSPECTOR. 2 DAYS LATER, DURING ITS THIRD FLT FOLLOWING THE AFOREMENTIONED MAINT ACTIONS, THE R OVERWING EMER EXIT SLIDE DEPLOYED AND WAS TORN FROM

THE ACFT. THE ACFT RETURNED SAFELY TO ZZZ. AFTERWARDS, I WAS ABLE TO EXAMINE THE EMER ESCAPE SLIDE DOOR. IT IS CLR, UPON INSPECTION OF THE DOOR, THAT THE DOOR HAD BEEN SECURELY LOCKED. ALL 4 LOCK PINS BROKE WHEN THE DOOR WAS FORCED OPEN. 2 OF THE LOCK PINS WERE STILL HELD IN THE JAWS OF THE LATCHES. GIVEN THAT I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE LEADING EDGE OF THE OVERWING SLIDE DOOR WAS NOT OVER FLUSH, AND THAT THE 4 DOOR LATCHES WERE SECURE, I AM CERTAIN THAT THE ESCAPE SLIDE INFLATED AND BROKE THE ESCAPE SLIDE DOOR OPEN. I UNDERSTAND THAT IN THE PAST THERE HAVE BEEN INSTANCES ON OTHER ACFT WHERE SLIDE BOTTLES WITH DEFECTIVE VALVES SLOWLY LEAKED INTO THE SLIDE. THIS APPARENTLY CAUSED THE SLIDE TO EXPAND ENOUGH TO BREAK OPEN THE EMER ESCAPE SLIDE DOOR. THIS SCENARIO SEEMS TO FIT THIS INCIDENT. IF IT IS FOUND THAT THERE IS INDEED A HISTORY OF THESE VALVES LEAKING, IT SEEMS APPARENT THAT THESE SAME VALVES MUST BE REPLACED WITH SOME OTHER TYPE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 789518: AFTER SLIDE DEPLOYMENT THE DOOR LATCH PINS WERE FOUND SHEARED AND NO BOTTLE SQUIBS OR SPOILER BLOW DOWN SQUIBS HAVE BEEN FIRED WHICH INDICATES THE SLIDE INFLATED INSIDE THE COMPARTMENT ON ITS OWN. A POSSIBLE CAUSE COULD BE A LEAKY INFLATION VALVE. IF THE VALVE HAD A SMALL LEAK IT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME BEFORE THE SLIDE PRESSURIZED ENOUGH TO BREAK THE DOOR LATCH PINS OUT OF THE DOOR AND DEPLOY THE SLIDE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 790134: I WAS WORKING A NON-ROUTINE CARD TO REPLACE LINKAGE THAT WAS CORRODED ON THE R OVERWING SLIDE SYS. TO REPLACE THE LINKAGE, I USED THE MAINT MANUAL REF TO REMOVE AND INSTALL THE DOOR OPEN ACTUATOR. THE LINKAGE WAS REPLACED USING A TRAMMEL BAR TO KEEP THE REPLACEMENT LINKAGE AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE ORIGINAL LINKAGE, IF NOT EXACT. THE R OVERWING SLIDE DEPLOYED INFLT RESULTING IN AN AIR TURN-BACK. I CAME TO WORK THE NEXT MORNING AND WAS INFORMED OF THE INCIDENT. LOOKING AT WHAT WAS LEFT OF THE SLIDE PACK AND DOOR ASSEMBLY (DOOR WAS INTACT, EXCEPT FOR LATCH HOOKS THAT WERE SHEARED OFF: 2 RECOVERED, 2 MISSING). MY CONCLUSION IS THAT THE BOTTLE FAILED INFLT RESULTING IN THE SLIDE INFLATING IN THE STORAGE AREA, WHICH IN TURN FAILED THE LATCH HOOKS AND DEPLOYED THE SLIDE PACK. AS TO HOW TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN, AN EDUCATED GUESS WOULD BE TO REDESIGN THE BOTTLE FIRING MECHANISM CABLE AND BOTTLE CAM TO PREVENT THIS PROB. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 791499: APPROX 50 NM NNE OF ZZZ, WHILE CLBING THROUGH FL200-FL210, THE ACFT ENCOUNTERED A MOMENTARY LIGHT SHUDDER FOLLOWED BY A THUMP IN THE REAR OF THE ACFT. THE FLT ATTENDANT CREW AND NUMEROUS PAX ALSO CONFIRMED THIS THUMP. IT WAS DESCRIBED AS PRONOUNCED AND OCCURRED ON THE R AFT SECTION OF THE ACFT. CONCURRENTLY, THE 'R WING SLIDE' EICAS MESSAGE ILLUMINATED. THIS LIGHT WOULD REMAIN ON FOR THE DURATION OF THE FLT. ALL FLT CHARACTERISTICS WERE NORMAL. THE FLT CREW PERFORMED A VISUAL INSPECTION AND EVERYTHING THAT COULD BE SEEN APPEARED NORMAL. THE QRH WAS REFED AND WE CONTACTED FLT CTL (DISPATCH) AND MAINT TO DISCUSS AVAILABLE OPTIONS. IT WAS UNANIMOUSLY DECIDED BY THE TEAM THAT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE TO RETURN TO ZZZ. A DIVERT TO ZZZ WAS COORD WITH ATC. AN EMER WAS DECLARED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 1) THE QRH INDICATED CONSIDERING A NONSTANDARD FLAPS SETTING FOR LNDG. 2) THE SLIDE MAY HAVE DAMAGED OR WAS ENTANGLED WITH THE TAIL SECTION. (HOWEVER, THIS WAS THOUGHT TO BE HIGHLY UNLIKELY AS THERE WAS NO UNUSUAL VIBRATION OR OTHER UNUSUAL FLT CHARACTERISTICS.) AT THIS POINT, EVERYTHING APPEARED NORMAL EXCEPT

FOR THE EICAS MESSAGE. 3) WE WERE GOING TO DUMP FUEL. 4) WE WERE GOING TO CONDUCT A FLY-BY BY THE ZZZ TWR FOR AN EXTERNAL INSPECTION. 5) WE WERE GOING TO BE CONDUCTING AN OVERWT LNDG. A FLY-BY BY THE TWR ON THE S SIDE OF THE FIELD WAS CONDUCTED. THE TWR AND OTHER ACFT ON THE GND RPTED NOTHING ABNORMAL. THE APCH, LNDG, AND TAXI-IN WERE ALL NORMAL. TOUCHDOWN AND LNDG WERE EXTREMELY SMOOTH. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 790471 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED WHEN THEY SAW THE RIGHT OVERWING SLIDE COMPARTMENT DOOR WITH THE LATCH HOOKS SHEARED OFF, THEY IMMEDIATELY REALIZED THE SLIDE PACK COMPARTMENT DOOR WAS FORCED OPEN FROM INSIDE. REPORTER ALSO STATED ANY CABLE LINKAGE ASSOCIATED WITH THE SLIDE BOTTLE VALVE, OR THE VALVE ITSELF LEAKING, COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE SLIDE BOTTLE SLOWLY INFLATING THE SLIDE AND OVERRIDING THE LOCKING DOOR LATCHES.

Synopsis

A B767-300 ACFT ENCOUNTERED A MOMENTARY LIGHT 'SHUDDER' AND PRONOUNCED 'THUMP,' AS THE RIGHT OVERWING ESCAPE SLIDE DEPLOYED INFLT, RESULTING IN AN AIR TURNBACK.

ACN: 790411

Time / Day

Date : 200806

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : A321

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

ASRS Report : 790411

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : MCDU Fuel

Prompt

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

2 FMGC COMPUTERS NEEDED TO BE INSTALLED ON ACFT X DUE TO A ROB ACTION. 2 NEW FMGC'S WERE INSTALLED, AND SOFTWARE WAS UPLOADED. THE EVENT WAS TRIGGERED BY THE COMPANY'S OPTION SELECTABLE SOFTWARE NOT

BEING UPLOADED TO THE NEW FMGC'S. OCCURRED AT THE LINE MAINT HANGAR. I WAS THE ONLY MECH DOING THE REPLACEMENT AND SOFTWARE UPLOAD. THE CREW RPTED THAT THE FMGC FUEL PROMPT WAS INCORRECT ON THE MCDU. THE TECHNICIAN THAT MET THE ACFT RELOADED THE AMI AND OPC SOFTWARE INTO THE FMGC'S. THE EVENT WAS CAUSED BY THE ABSENCE OF THE COMPANY SELECTABLE SOFTWARE OPTIONS NOT BEING UPLOADED TO THE COMPUTERS. THE 2 SOFTWARE DISCS I HAD WITH ME WERE LABELED 'NAV DATABASE.' THIS SOFTWARE WAS UPLOADED AND CROSSLOADED WITHOUT INCIDENT. NO ERROR MESSAGES WERE GENERATED. READING THE TASK PROCS, AND BASED ON MY EXPERIENCE WITH LOADING FMGC COMPUTERS WHICH REQUIRED ONLY THE NAV DATABASE TO BE UPLOADED, I FELT THAT THE 2 DISCS LABELED 'NAV DATABASE' CONTAINED ALL MENTIONED INFO NEEDED BY THE FMGC'S. THE FMS2 SYS IS NEW AND HAS NEED OF ADDITIONAL SOFTWARE WHEN A CLEAN INSTALL (2 NEW COMPUTERS FROM THE MAINT FACILITY) OCCURS. THIS IS A DEP FROM MY EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING (OJT) ON SOFTWARE UPLOADS FOR THE FMGC SYS. SINCE BOTH INSTALLED FMGC'S HAD IDENTICAL DEFAULT SOFTWARE, NO ERROR MESSAGES WERE GENERATED. I PERFORMED A HARDWARE TEST, AND CERTIFICATION TEST WITHOUT INCIDENT. WHEN PERFORMING TASK PROCS, MAKE SURE THE DATA IS CLR BEFORE PROCEEDING. IF NOT, ASK FOR HELP. WHEN WORKING ON A NEW SYS, ASK FOR TRAINING MATERIALS, AND OJT IF NECESSARY FROM AN EXPERIENCED MECH OR FROM THE TRAINING DEPT. IF THE MECH'S EXPERIENCE OF TRAINING MAY BE OUT OF DATE, ASK FOR A RECURRENT TRAINING SESSION FROM THE MAINT TRAINING DEPT OR YOUR SUPVR. I MYSELF WILL DO ALL THE ABOVE TO ASSURE THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THE FLIGHT CREW NOTED THE FUEL PROMPT ON THE AIRBUS A321 MCDU WAS INCORRECT, BECAUSE THE FUEL READINGS WERE IN KILOGRAMS, INSTEAD OF POUNDS. REPORTER STATED, HAD HE READ FURTHER INTO THE MAINT PROCEDURE, AFTER HE HAD UPLOADED THE NAV DATABASE INTO THE TWO NEW FMGC'S HE INSTALLED, HE WOULD HAVE SEEN THE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT TO LOAD THE COMPANY'S SELECTABLE SOFTWARE OPTIONS. THIS ADDED DATA WOULD HAVE CHANGED THE FUEL LOAD READINGS FROM KILOGRAMS INTO POUNDS. REPORTER ALSO STATED THE MCDU'S ON THEIR A321 ACFT ARE THE LCD TYPE DISPLAYS, NOT THE OLDER CRT TYPE MCDU'S.

Synopsis

FLIGHT CREW REPORTED THE FMGC FUEL PROMPT WAS INCORRECT ON THE MCDU OF THEIR AIRBUS A321 ACFT. BOTH FMGC'S WERE PREVIOUSLY REPLACED AND NAV DATABASES LOADED.

ACN: 790349

Time / Day

Date : 200805

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Escape Slide

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 790349

Events

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Training

Assessments

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

ACR SHOP X HAS HAD NUMEROUS MD80 RESERVOIR VALVES NOT PROPERLY PINNED ON THE SLIDES. THE SAFETY PINS EITHER ARE NOT IN THE RESERVOIR VALVE AT ALL OR IMPROPERLY PINNED. THESE SLIDES COULD HAVE VERY EASILY BEEN DEPLOYED FROM TIME OF REMOVAL TO FINAL ACCEPTANCE AT THE REPAIR STATION THUS CREATING AN UNSAFE SITUATION. THE PROPER PROC FOR THIS CAN BE FOUND IN THE ACFT MAINT MANUAL AND GENERAL PROC MANUAL. THIS

WAS BROUGHT TO MY ATTN THROUGH AN EMPLOYEE THAT HAS BIG CONCERNS FOR EVERYONE'S SAFETY. THE RESOLUTION FOR THIS ITEM SHOULD BE A LOT OF TRAINING AND COM. THIS COULD CAUSE SERIOUS INJURY TO SOMEONE.

Synopsis

MECHANIC REPORTS ABOUT NUMEROUS MD-80 SLIDE RESERVOIR VALVES NOT PROPERLY PINNED, OR, THE SAFETY PINS ARE NOT IN THE RESERVOIR AT ALL. SLIDES COULD HAVE DEPLOYED FROM TIME OF REMOVAL TO ARRIVAL AT REPAIR STATION.

ACN: 790074

Time / Day

Date : 200806

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737-700

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Oil Filler Cap

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

ASRS Report : 790074

Events

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Assessments

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

ACFT X CALLED FOR OIL. I WENT AND SVCED THE OIL AT XA15. #2 ENG OIL CAP CHAIN WAS BROKE SO I PUT THE CAP ON MY GOLF CART. AFTER SVC I PUT A RAG ON MY CART AND THE RAG COVERED THE CAP. I MISSED PUTTING THE CAP BACK ON. ABOUT XP30 I WAS MOVING STUFF ON MY GOLF CART AND FOUND THE CAP. I CALLED MY CTL AND GAVE A LIST OF PLANES THAT COULD BE MISSING THE CAP. AT XH30 IN ZZZ, THEY FOUND ACFT X AND REPLACED THE CAP. I FEEL IF THE CAP CHAIN WAS NOT BROKE THIS COULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED.

Synopsis

WHILE SERVICING THE #2 ENG OIL ON A B737-700, MECHANIC PLACES THE OIL CAP ON HIS WORK CART AND ACCIDENTALLY COVERS CAP WITH A WORK RAG. CHAIN LANYARD ATTACHING CAP TO OIL TANK WAS MISSING AND ACFT DEPARTS WITHOUT THE CAP.

ACN: 789592

Time / Day

Date : 200805

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : A320

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Takeoff Roll

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Speedbrake/Spoiler

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Lead Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

ASRS Report : 789592

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

APPROX XA00 AM I RECEIVED A CALL THAT ACFT X WAS RETURNING TO THE FIELD DUE TO A FLOATING R #1 SPOILER. THE ACFT WAS FLYING ENRTE TO ZZZ1. THERE WAS A SPOILER FAULT INDICATED. PAX NOTED THE SPOILER SOMEWHAT RAISED. A 5 DEG ROLL WAS INDICATED IN THE COCKPIT. ACFT RETURNED TO THE FIELD BECAUSE OF THE R #1 SPOILER 'FLOATING' INFLT AND INDUCING A 5 DEG BANK ANGLE. THIS WAS VISUALLY CONFIRMED. I PULLED UP THE AMM PROCS FOR R AND R OF THE SPOILER TO GIVE THE MECHS SOME INITIAL REF TO THE JOB AT HAND. HEARING THAT THE ACFT WAS IN RANGE I WENT TO HANGAR TO OBTAIN THE SPECIAL TOOL. I WAS GIVEN THE TOOL AS WELL AS A HOMEMADE TOOL MANY MECHS USED. I WAS ALSO ALERTED TO THE FACT MANY MECHS IN BASE WOULD LOCK THE SPOILER IN BYPASS WHILE REPLACING A MAIN LNDG GEAR. UPON ARRIVING BACK AT THE GATE, THE MECHS ADVISED ME THAT IN FACT THE SPOILER WAS STILL IN BYPASS. I GAVE THE MECH THE PROPER TOOL BUT IT COULD NOT BE INSERTED WITH THE SPOILER IN BYPASS. I THEN GAVE THE MECH THE HOMEMADE TOOL TO USE TO TAKE THE SPOILER OUT OF BYPASS. SEVERAL MECHS THEN TOOK TURNS USING THE CORRECT TOOL TO LOCK AND UNLOCK THE SPOILER TO GET THE FEEL OF IT. SO WHILE THE HOMEMADE TOOL WAS USED TO TAKE THE SPOILER OUT OF BYPASS, THE CORRECT TOOL WAS USED TO MAKE THE FINAL STEP IN LOCKING THE SPOILER IN THE PROPER POS. I THEN WENT INSIDE TO PULL UP THE REF FROM THE MEL BOOK FOR MEL'ING A SPOILER, BUT BARELY GOT INSIDE THE DOOR WHEN THE MECHS CALLED ON THE RADIO THAT THE JOB WAS COMPLETE. I HAD THEM CONFIRM THE SPOILER OP WAS VISUALLY CORRECT OUTSIDE, ON ECAM AND THAT NO FAULTS DISPLAYED. I ALSO HAD THEM TRY TO PHYSICALLY LIFT THAT R #1 SPOILER BUT IT REMAINED DOWN AS IT SHOULD HAVE. I THEN SCANNED THROUGH THE MAINT MANUAL SPOILER ACTIVATION/DEACTIVATION PAGES AND DETERMINED ALL NECESSARY STEPS HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. WHEN I TOLD PERSON X WE DID NOT USE THE REFED MAINT MANUAL PAGES, IT WAS BECAUSE WE DID NOT HAVE IT AT THE ACFT OR FOLLOW IT STEP BY STEP. I DID USE IT TO VERIFY THE NECESSARY STEPS TO CONFIRM PROPER OP OF THE SPOILERS. I SIMPLY NEGLECTED TO INCLUDE THE TASK REF IN MY SIGN OFF. THE ACFT HAD BEEN IN HVY MAINT FOR MAIN LNDG GEAR REPLACEMENT. AN UNKNOWN MECH USED A HOMEMADE TOOL TO PUT THE R #1 SPOILER IN BYPASS TO FACILITATE THE GEAR REPLACEMENT. NO PAPERWORK WAS GENERATED TO CALL THIS TO ANYONE'S ATTN. THE SPOILER WAS NEVER RESTORED TO FLT CONDITION. THERE IS NO FOOLPROOF WAY OF PREVENTING SUCH INCIDENTS ASIDE FROM MODIFYING THE SPOILER ACTUATOR TO CREATE A FAULT SIGNAL WHENEVER THE SPOILER ACTUATOR IS NOT IN THE FLT POS.

Synopsis

AN AIRBUS A320 ACFT RETURNED TO FIELD DUE TO THE R #1 SPOILER 'FLOATING' AND INDUCING A 5-DEGREE BANK ANGLE DUE TO ACTUATOR STILL IN 'BYPASS' POS. LEAD MECHANIC SUGGESTS AIRBUS CONSIDER MODIFYING SPOILER ACTUATORS.

ACN: 789584

Time / Day

Date : 200804

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : A320

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Main Gear

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 789584

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Repair

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

PRIOR TO THE INSTALLATION OF THE R-HAND MAIN LNDG GEAR I NOTICED DAMAGE TO THE AFT PINTLE PIN SPHERICAL BEARING. IT APPEARS A USED BEARING WAS ACCIDENTALLY INSTALLED ON THIS MAIN LNDG GEAR LEG. THE BEARING APPEARS BADLY DAMAGED FROM WEAR AND ALSO WAS COVERED IN

SEALANT. UPON REMOVAL OF THE SEALANT I DISCOVERED THE DAMAGE TO THE BEARINGS INNER AND OUTER SURFACES.

Synopsis

PRIOR TO INSTALLING THE RIGHT MAIN LANDING GEAR ON AN AIRBUS A320 ACFT, MECHANIC NOTICES DAMAGE TO THE AFT PINTLE PIN SPHERICAL BEARING. LANDING GEAR WAS OVERHAULED BY A CONTRACT MAINT SHOP.

ACN: 789307

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Reverser Lockout

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Inspector
Qualification.Technician : Airframe
Qualification.Technician : Powerplant
Experience.Maintenance.Technician : 23
ASRS Report : 789307

Person : 2

Affiliation.Other : Contracted Service
Function.Maintenance : Technician
ASRS Report : 789856

Events

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Manuals
Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Work Cards
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

ACR Y WAS CONTRACTED TO WORK ON ACR X ACFT X ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE XA THRU JUN XB. THE MORNING OF JUN/XB/08 I, A REP FOR ACR X, WAS ASKED BY ACR Y TO OK FOR CLOSE-UP ON THE PYLONS AND ENGS AFTER WORK WAS COMPLETED BY THEM. THE WORK SCOPE IN THAT AREA WAS TO TAKE OUT THE FIRE BOTTLES FOR A TEST OF THE LINES AND REMOVE FUEL LINES FOR RESEAL. BEFORE WORK WAS TO BE PERFORMED, SEVERAL WORK CARDS CALL OUT TO DEACTIVATE THE THRUST REVERSERS AS PER THE AMM AND ACR X HANGAR PREP CARD AND TO USE A LOCK OUT PIN. THESE WORK ITEMS ARE ALSO RII BY ACR X, EXCEPT THE THRUST REVERSERS REACTIVATION. DURING THE INSPECTION OF THESE AREAS OF THE PYLONS I ALSO LOOKED OVER TO CHK THE THRUST REVERSER HCU TO SEE IF THE LOCKOUT PIN WAS REMOVED. AT THAT TIME LOOKING AT HCU I DIDN'T SEE THE PIN OR THE STREAMER. ALSO THE ANGLE AT WHICH I WAS IN, THE VIEW WAS NOT CLR AND I DIDN'T MOVE TO A CLR POS TO TAKE A CLOSER LOOK AT THE HCU TO SEE IF THE PINS WERE REMOVED. SO I ASSUMED THAT THE ACR Y MAINT PERSONNEL ALREADY DEACTIVATED THE THRUST REVERSERS. SO I OK'D FOR BOTH ENGS AND PYLONS TO BE CLOSED. TO BRING THE ACFT BACK TO SVC THERE IS A HANGAR CHK RETURN TO SVC CARD THAT ACR X USES. THAT HAS TO BE SIGNED BY ACR Y MAINT PERSONNEL TO VERIFY THAT PINS ARE PULLED AS REQUIRED AND STOWED AND OTHER PROCS ARE COMPLIED WITH. THE PERSON THAT SIGNS WAS NOT TRAINED ON ACR X PAPERWORK AND REQUIRES AN ACR X REP TO BACK SIGN FOR VERIFICATION OF WORK COMPLIED WITH. THE ACR Y MAINT PERSONNEL SIGNED, SAYING THAT HE PULLED THE PINS AND I SIGNED SAYING THAT HE DID. AS MENTIONED ABOVE, I DIDN'T SEE THE PINS OR STREAMER, ASSUMING THAT IT WAS COMPLIED WITH ALREADY. THE ACFT DEPARTED AND UPON LNDG THE THRUST REVERSERS DID NOT OPEN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 789856: AIRPLANE HAS BEEN IN THE HANGAR FOR 4 SHIFTS. I WAS ASSIGNED #2 ENG FIRE BOTTLE LEAKAGE CHK. #2 ENG WAS CLOSED AND LATCHED, I UNLATCHED BOTH FAN AND REVERSER ON #2 ENG AND SECURED THE HOLD OPEN RODS, PERFORMED THE ENG FIRE BOTTLE CHK AND THEN CLOSED AND SECURED REVERSER AND FAN COWLING. THERE WAS NO REVERSER PIN WITH A STREAMER LOCKING OUT #1 OR #2 ENG. ACFT DEPARTED HANGAR ON SHIFT, AND ON LNDG BOTH REVERSERS DID NOT DEPLOY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THERE ARE TWO DIFFERENT PINS THAT CAN BE USED TO LOCK OUT THE THRUST REVERSERS. AIRBUS HAS A LOCKOUT PIN FOR EACH ENGINE THAT IS STOWED WITH THE REVERSER HYDRAULIC CONTROL UNIT (HCU) IN THE PYLON, SECURED BY A LANYARD, BUT NO STREAMER. THIS PARTICULAR LOCKOUT PIN IS USED IN SITUATIONS, SUCH AS OFF-LINE STATIONS, WHERE A REVERSER MAY NEED TO BE DEACTIVATED, AND THIS STOWED PIN IS THE ONLY ONE AVAILABLE. REPORTER STATED AIRBUS ALSO HAS A LOCKOUT PIN WITH AN EIGHT FOOT STREAMER THAT IS PART OF HIS CARRIER'S STORES TOOL SUPPLY AND WAS AVAILABLE, BUT NOT USED. THIS WAS THE LOCKOUT PIN AND STREAMER HE EXPECTED TO SEE INSTALLED IN HIS COMPANY'S ENGINES. REPORTER STATED SINCE THIS INCIDENT, HIS COMPANY HAS ADDRESSED SOME OF THE PAPERWORK DISCREPANCIES WITH AIRBUS, REGARDING INCONSISTENT REFERENCES TO WHICH TYPE OF REVERSER LOCKOUT PIN IS BEING NOTED DURING THE MAINT PROCEDURES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER ACN 789856. REPORTER STATED THE CONTRACT MAINT HE PERFORMED ON THE AIRBUS A320 HE WAS ASSIGNED TO DID NOT INVOLVE INSTALLING THE THRUST

REVERSER LOCKOUT PIN AT EACH ENGINE HYDRAULIC CONTROL UNIT (HCU). HE WAS INFORMED THE LOCKOUT PINS THAT WERE LATER FOUND INSTALLED, PREVENTING THRUST REVERSER DEPLOYMENT, DID NOT HAVE ANY STREAMERS ON THEM. REPORTER STATED THAT SOMEHOW, THESE UNFLAGGED PINS WERE INSTALLED JUST PRIOR TO, OR WHILE, THE CONTRACT ACFT WAS BEING SERVICED IN HIS COMPANY'S HANGAR. HE DID NOT SEE ANY PAPERWORK THAT REFERENCED REVERSER PINS HAVING BEEN INSTALLED OR TO REMOVE THEM FROM THE HCU IN EACH PYLON. REPORTER STATED WHEN MAINT WORK IS PERFORMED ON HIS COMPANY'S ENGINE REVERSERS, ALL THEIR LOCKOUT PINS HAVE STREAMERS (FLAGS) ATTACHED TO THEM.

Synopsis

A CARRIER MAINT REP AND A CONTRACT MAINT MECHANIC WHO WORKED AN AIRBUS A320, DESCRIBE THE EVENTS THAT LED TO THE ACFT DEPARTING AND LANDING WITH BOTH ENGINE THRUST REVERSERS INOPERATIVE.

ACN: 789185

Time / Day

Date : 200804
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Make Model Name : B757-200
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Autothrottle/Speed Control

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
ASRS Report : 789185

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

ACFT HAD AN INBOUND LOG GRIPE 'AUTOTHROTTLE FAILED TO MAINTAIN REF EPR.' I PERFORMED MAINT CTL DISPLAY PANEL TEST 02 AND 10 PER MAINT MANUAL X TO UPDATE DEFERRAL WITH TROUBLESHOOTING INFO. PART OF THIS TEST HAS YOU SET THE PWR SWITCH ON THE EEC MAINT PANEL TO THE ALTERNATE POS FOR TROUBLESHOOTING PURPOSES. THIS SWITCH NEVER GOT PUT BACK TO THE NORMAL POS. THIS WENT UNNOTICED UNTIL TKOF ROLL, WHICH WAS ABORTED. ACFT DID NOT RETURN TO THE GATE, CREW PUT SWITCH TO NORMAL THEN DEPARTED.

Synopsis

MECHANIC WORKING A B757-200 INBOUND LOG GRIPE FOR AN 'AUTO-THROTTLE FAILED TO MAINTAIN REFERENCE EPR,' FAILED TO SET THE POWER SWITCH ON THE EEC MAINT PANEL BACK TO THE NORMAL POSITION. TAKEOFF ROLL ABORTED.

ACN: 789088

Time / Day

Date : 200805

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737-800

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Oil Filter

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Lead Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

Experience.Maintenance.Lead Technician : 13

Experience.Maintenance.Technician : 8

ASRS Report : 789088

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Inspector

Function.Oversight : Supervisor

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Inspection Authority

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

Experience.Maintenance.Lead Technician : 2

Experience.Maintenance.Technician : 4

ASRS Report : 789087

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : Oil Filter
Bypass

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

I RECEIVED A HEADS-UP FROM MAINT (CTL) CTR THAT ACFT X WAS INBOUND TO GATE AND HAD AN OIL FILTER BYPASS INDICATION AND AN AUTO SHUTDOWN OF #2 ENG. I DEBRIEFED FLT CREW. DURING DEBRIEF, WE DISCUSSED THE ENG INDICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE. THE CREW LEFT. I READ THE WRITE-UP AND FOUND THE CREW WROTE UP #1 ENG. I CONFERENCED WITH MY SUPVR. I TOLD HIM THE WRITE-UP IS ON THE #1 ENG AND THAT DURING DEBRIEF OF FLT CREW WE DIDN'T DISCUSS ENG #1 OR #2 JUST THE PERFORMANCE. SUPVR ASKED ME TO CHANGE THE WRITE-UP TO REFLECT #2 ENG, WHICH I DID. I TURNED THE ACFT OVER TO THE NIGHT SHIFT LEAD. I TOLD THE LEAD OF THE LOGBOOK CHANGE TO REFLECT TECHNICAL OPS SYS LOG. I PICKED UP ON THE ACFT PAPERWORK THE FOLLOWING MORNING AND CLOSED OUT THE ACFT LOG. I SHOULD HAVE HAD THE INBOUND FLT CREW CALLED BACK FOR VERIFICATION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 789087: THE LEAD WENT TO THE ACFT AND DEBRIEFED THE CREW. AFTER DEPARTING THE ACFT WITH THE LOGBOOK, THE LEAD INFORMED ME THAT THE WRITE-UP WAS FOR THE #1 ENG, NOT THE #2 ENG. I THEN CALLED THE ENG DESK AT MAINT CTL AND SPOKE TO XXX REGARDING THIS DEVELOPMENT. HE INFORMED ME THAT ACCORDING TO THE LOGBOOK HISTORY, IT WAS INDEED THE #2 ENG AND IT SHUT DOWN AT 137 FT, NOT 500 FT. WE MADE A FEW COMMENTS ABOUT THE FACT THAT THE CREW WOULD NOT HAVE HAD TIME TO REACT AT THAT PHASE OF FLT AND ENDED THE CALL. I THEN INFORMED LEAD TO CHANGE THE WRITE-UP FROM #1 ENG TO #2 ENG BASED ON THE INFO I RECEIVED FROM THE ENG DESK AT MAINT CTL. NO ACTION WAS TAKEN BY MYSELF, HOWEVER, THE ACFT HAD ANOTHER INDICATION 3 DAYS LATER THAT RESULTED IN AN AIR RETURN. THE OIL FILTER BYPASS WAS ADDRESSED AGAIN AT THAT TIME FOR #1 ENG. THERE WERE SEVERAL INSTANCES OF FAILED COM IN THIS INCIDENT. MY BELIEF IS THE CREW EITHER FAILED TO GIVE THE CORRECT ENG INFO TO BOTH THE CTL CTR AND MAINT CTL OR THEY BOTH MISUNDERSTOOD THE INFO. WHEN I CALLED THE MAINT CTL ENG DESK HE EITHER MISREAD THE INFO TO ME REGARDING WHICH ENG FAILED OR I MISUNDERSTOOD HIM. AND LASTLY, SINCE THE RELIABILITY OF THE CREW WAS IN QUESTION, I SHOULD HAVE CALLED THEM BACK TO THE ACFT AND VERIFIED WITH THEM WHICH ENG HAD SHUT DOWN. I ALSO BELIEVE THE TECHNICIANS WERE NOT NEGLIGENT IN THEIR ACTIONS, AND THEY RESPONDED APPROPRIATELY WITH THE INFO THEY WERE GIVEN. I ALSO RESPONDED WITH THE BELIEF THAT I HAD CORRECT INFO AS TO WHICH ENG WAS INDEED SHUT DOWN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 789088 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THE LACK OF CORRECT INFORMATION COMPOUNDED THIS SITUATION. EVEN THOUGH THE FLIGHT CREW WROTE-UP #1 ENGINE HAVING THE OIL BYPASS FILTER, THE ENG DID NOT INITIATE AN AUTO

SHUTDOWN. THE FLIGHT CREW ACTUALLY SHUT DOWN #1 ENG. WHY THE FLIGHT CREW DID THIS FOR AN OIL FILTER BYPASS INDICATION WHILE ON APPROACH IS STILL UNKNOWN. SOMEHOW, MAINT CONTROL, THROUGH ACARS AND COMMERCIAL RADIO, ENDED UP BELIEVING #2 ENGINE WAS THE ONE THAT HAD AN AUTO SHUTDOWN. REPORTER STATED HE KNEW SOMETHING WASN'T RIGHT, WHEN HE INTERROGATED THE #2 ENGINE EEC, AND DID NOT FIND ANY LATCH MESSAGES THAT WOULD INDICATE AN ENG FAULT.

Synopsis

A LEAD MECHANIC AND SUPERVISOR ARE INFORMED AN INBOUND B737-800 HAD AN OIL FILTER BYPASS INDICATION AND AN AUTO SHUTDOWN OF #2 ENG ON APPROACH AT APPROX 137 FEET.

ACN: 788920

Time / Day

Date : 200805

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Nose Gear Tire

Person : 1

Affiliation.Other : Contracted Service
Function.Maintenance : Technician
ASRS Report : 788920

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
ASRS Report : 786755

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS TOLD THAT THE R NOSE TIRE THAT WE CHANGED ON ACFT X WAS FOUND TO NOT HAVE THE SPACER. NOSE AXLE NUT LOCKING FEATURE OLD TYPE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 786755: WITH MULTIPLE CONFIGS THIS ITEM SHOULD BE AN RII SO THAT THE INSPECTION/VERIFICATION IS SEPARATE FROM THE MAINT PROCESS.

Synopsis

TWO MECHANICS ARE INFORMED THEY DID NOT REINSTALL THE RIGHT NOSE TIRE AXLE SPACER DURING THEIR TIRE CHANGE ON A B767-300ER ACFT.

ACN: 788586

Time / Day

Date : 200805

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Dash 8-100

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Autopilot

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

Experience.Maintenance.Avionics : 4

Experience.Maintenance.Technician : 6

ASRS Report : 788586

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Manuals

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Work Cards

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Situations

Publication : Gnd Test Maint

Narrative

THIS IS MY ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS CONCERNING DHC-8-200 ACFT. I ARRIVED AT THE ZZZ MAINT BASE OF ACR X. ACFT WAS BROUGHT INTO THE HANGER FOR MAINT WITH A DISCREPANCY 'AUTOPLT WILL NOT STAY ENGAGED.' I WAS THE AVIONICS TECHNICIAN ON DUTY AND I PERFORMED THE MAINT ON THIS DISCREPANCY. I DETERMINED THROUGH THE GND MAINT TEST THAT THERE WAS A HARD FAILURE MSG OF 'R/H COMMAND CW AND CCW FAIL' IN THE ELEVATOR SERVO TEST AREA INDICATING A NEED TO REPLACE THE ELEVATOR SERVO. IN RESEARCHING THE IPC, I FOUND THAT THERE ARE TWO PART NUMBERS FOR THE SERVO IN MAINT MANUAL. THERE IS A PRE-MODSUM 8Q101245 AND A POST-MODSUM 8Q101245. THE MODSUM CHAPTER OF THE AMM DOES NOT CALL OUT A SERIAL NUMBER IDENTIFIER FOR THE DIFFERENCE, ONLY THAT 'AUTOFLT -- TO ELIMINATE UNCOMMANDED AUTOPLT SM300 SERVO ENGAGEMENT.' I USED A 'PARTIAL PART NUMBER SEARCH' IN PART ORDERING COMPUTER TO CHK THE AVAILABILITY OF THE PART AND FOUND THAT THERE ARE INDEED MULTIPLE PART NUMBERS. IN BRINGING DOWN THE CURSOR TO X OR HIGHLIGHTING THE PART NUMBER AVAILABILITY AT ZZZ, I MAY HAVE ENTERED THE X ON THE WRONG LINE. IN CHKING THE TWO 'CLASS CTL NUMBERS' FOR THIS SERVO I FOUND ONE MARKED 'DO NOT USE ON DHC-8-300'S' IN THE STORES COMMENT AREA. AS THERE ARE PRE-MODSUM AND POST-MODSUM ENTRIES, THIS MADE SENSE TO ME. I ORDERED THE PART IN PARTS ORDERING COMPUTER BY 'CUT AND PASTE' OF THE CCN AND PROCEEDED TO R&R THE PART IAW AMM. AFTER INSTALLING THE SERVO, I PERFORMED THE 'GND MAINT GND POWER-UP TEST' CONCERNING ELEVATOR SERVOS GETTING A DISPLAYED MESSAGE, 'LEFT ELEVATOR SERVO PASS,' AND 'RIGHT ELEVATOR SERVO PASS.' THIS MESSAGE WAS THE BASIS FOR MY CONTINUING THE PROCESS OF INSTALLATION. I COMPLETED MY TASK BY CLOSING THE PANELS, CHECKING FOR RETURN OF TOOLS USED, AND MAKING PAPERWORK ENTRIES IN THE ACFT LOG BOOK AND ON THE ROTABLE TAG. I RECORDED THE PART NUMBER FROM THE OLD PART AND NOTICED THAT THE PART NUMBERS WERE DIFFERENT AS I FILLED OUT THE ROTABLE TAG, BUT AS I HAD PREVIOUSLY SEEN TWO PART NUMBERS IN THE IPC AND IN PARTS ORDERING COMPUTER, I WAS NOT ALERTED TO THIS AS A CONCERN. I HAVE SINCE FOUND THAT THERE ARE TWO SERVO TYPES: SERVOS THAT CAN BE USED IN EITHER THE ELEVATOR OR AILERON POSITION, BUT ONLY ON DHC-8-300 SERIES, AND SERVOS THAT CAN BE USED ONLY IN THE ELEVATOR POSITION ON DHC-8-100/200 SERIES. THIS INFO IN THE 'STORES COMMENT' WOULD HAVE ALERTED ME TO INVESTIGATE THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PART I USED ON THIS ACFT. THE PART I DID USE HAD A COMMENT '-300 ONLY' AND THE PART ITSELF HAD A LABEL '-100/200 ONLY' ON IT, AND THE DIFFERENCE IN THE PART NUMBERS THAT I ENTERED ON THE ROTABLE TAG WAS CONSISTENT IN MY MIND WITH THE TWO PART NUMBERS CALLED OUT IN THE IPC. I HAVE ALSO LEARNED THAT THE GND MAINT TEST FOR ELEVATOR SERVOS ONLY TESTS THAT THE SERVO HAS RECEIVED A COMMAND TO POWER THE MOTOR TO ROTATE AND HAS REPORTED BACK THE COMMAND AND RESPONSE BY THE SERVO. THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SERVO CLUTCH MAY NOT HAVE ENGAGED IS NOT REPORTED, AND A DEFECTIVE SERVO MAY BE INSTALLED AND STILL PASS THE TEST. IN LIGHT OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE GND MAINT TEST FOR ELEVATOR SERVOS PASSING A SERVO THAT DOES NOT MOVE THE FLT CONTROL SURFACE, A DEFECTIVE PART AND AN INCORRECT PART WILL TEST THE SAME. THIS RESULTED IN A DISPLAYED MESSAGE, 'LEFT/RIGHT ELEVATOR SERVO PASS.' I HAD FOLLOWED THE TEST PROCEDURE AS WRITTEN AND DECIDED THAT THE INSTALLATION WAS GOOD AND CONTINUED WITH THE PROCESS OF COMPLETING THE MAINTENANCE. IF AN

ERROR WAS COMMITTED, IT WAS IN NOT VERIFYING BEFORE ORDERING THE PART NUMBER BOTH IN THE IPC AND PARTS ORDERING COMPUTER, BUT AS WELL AS CHECKING THE PART NUMBER TAKEN FROM THE REMOVED PART BOTH IN THE IPC AND IN THE PARTS ORDERING COMPUTER FOR THE CORRECTNESS OF THAT PART. I WILL DO THIS IN THE FUTURE.

Synopsis

AN AVIONICS TECH NOTICES THE 'GND MAINT TEST' PROC FOR ELEV SERVOS WILL SHOW A 'SERVO PASS' VERIFICATION DISPLAY, EVEN THOUGH A DEFECTIVE PART, OR INCORRECT PART, MAY BE INSTALLED ON DEHAVILLAND DHC-8-100.

ACN: 788504

Time / Day

Date : 200805

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER&LR

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Rudder

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

ASRS Report : 788504

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EICAS
Indication

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Resolatory Action.Other

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Repair

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

ACFT WAS IN REMOTE AREA VERY CLOSE TO TXWY AND EMER EQUIP IN AREA FOR ANOTHER ACFT. FLT WAS PUSHED BACK FROM GATE AND TAXI CHK BY FLT CREW REVEALED RUDDER INDICATION DID NOT GO FULL L. UPON BOARDING ACFT, I VISUALLY SAW THE INDICATION ON EICAS SCREEN. APPEARED TO BE 'DCU 1 ISSUE.' R&R'ED DCU 1, DID NOT CHANGE INDICATION. REINSTALLED ORIGINAL DCU, INDICATION DID NOT CHANGE. MAINT CTLR SAID ITEM WAS DEFERRABLE PER MEL, SO WE BEGAN WITH THE DEFERRAL. FROM THE GND WITH THE RUDDER L, THE INSPECTION STRIPE APPEARED VISIBLE, NOT KNOWING WHETHER THE CREW HAD FULL DEFLECTION OR NOT. WITHOUT COM TO THE FLT CREW THEY THEN WENT RUDDER R AND AGAIN THE INSPECTION STRIPE APPEARED VISIBLE AND PARALLEL. NOTIFIED CREW THAT ITEM WAS DEFERRABLE AND WAS BEGINNING PAPERWORK WITH MAINT CTL. WITNESSED CREW APPEARED TO BE VERIFYING RUDDER DEFLECTION WHILE I WAS COMPLETING DEFERRAL. DISCUSSED THE DEFERRAL WITH THE FLT CREW AND THEY FELT COMFORTABLE AND CONFIDENT WITH IT AND HAD NO QUESTIONS. MAINT CTL CONTACTED ME LATER IN THE DAY AND TOLD ME THAT ACFT WAS FERRYING BACK TO ZZZ BECAUSE THE CREW WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE INDICATION FOR L RUDDER TRAVEL. APPARENTLY, ACFT WAS MODIFIED TO INSTALL THE WITNESS INSPECTION STRIPES FOR RUDDER TRAVEL INDICATION TO ALLOW FOR THE DEFERRAL PROCESS. THE ACFT WENT IN FOR PAINT JOB IN APRIL 2008 AND SOMEWHERE BTWN MODIFICATION DATE AND APRIL 2008 THE INSPECTION STRIPE FOR L RUDDER INDICATION HAD BEEN MOVED FROM ITS ORIGINAL LOCATION. SO WHEN VISUALLY CHKING RUDDER TRAVEL INDICATION FROM THE GND, L RUDDER TRAVEL WAS NOT FULLY PARALLEL WITH THE WITNESS STRIPE. IT WAS LATER FOUND RUDDER CTL SYS WAS FREE OF ANY DEFECTS. THE RUDDER INDICATION POTENTIOMETER WAS ADJUSTED, AND THE WITNESS STRIPE WAS REPOSITIONED TO THE CORRECT INSTALLATION.

Synopsis

DURING TAXI OUT CHECK, A CRJ-200 FLIGHT CREW NOTICED RUDDER DID NOT GO FULL LEFT AS INDICATED ON EICAS SCREEN. ITEM DEFERRED, ACFT DEPARTED. ACFT LATER FERRIED BACK TO BASE DUE TO RUDDER CONCERNS.

ACN: 788394

Time / Day

Date : 200805
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Holding
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
ASRS Report : 788394

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

ACFT WAS GROUNDED IN ZZZ DUE TO #1 ENG WOULD NOT MAKE TKOF PWR AND I WAS ASSIGNED TO R&R THE FUEL PUMP AND HYDROMECHANICAL UNIT ON THE #1 ENG. WHEN WE COMPLETED THE REPLACEMENT OF THE FUEL PUMP AND HYDROMECHANICAL UNIT. WE TAXIED THE ACFT TO THE GND RUN-UP ENCLOSURE FOR A HIGH PWR ENG RUN. WHEN WE PARKED WE HAD A XWIND THAT WOULD NOT ALLOW US TO SAFELY REACH TKOF PWR. I CALLED SUPVR TO INFORM HIM OF OUR SITUATION AND HE CONTACTED OPS, WHO INSTRUCTED US

TO THE VICTOR RUN-UP AREA. MY SUPVR AND MYSELF WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH THE VICTOR RUN-UP AREA SO WE ASKED FOR DIRECTIONS. RELAYED DIRECTIONS TO US AND WE TAXIED TO THE VICTOR RUN-UP AREA. AS WE APCHED THE AREA, I TAXIED THE ACFT INTO POS AND IT APPEARED THAT WE WERE CLR OF ANY OBSTRUCTIONS BEHIND THE ACFT WITH THE ACFT FACING INTO THE WIND. THE HIGH PWR ENG RUN WAS SUCCESSFUL AND WE TAXIED THE ACFT BACK TO ITS PARKING SPOT. WE LATER RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM THE ARPT FIRE DEPT THAT WE HAD DAMAGED THEIR ROLL-UP DOORS.

Synopsis

AFTER PERFORMING A HIGH POWER RUN ON A B737-700 #1 ENG, MECHANIC RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM THE AIRPORT FIRE DEPT OF THE DAMAGE TO THEIR FIRE STATION ROLL-UP DOORS.

ACN: 788304

Time / Day

Date : 200805
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-300
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Horizontal Stabilizer Control

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
Qualification.Technician : Airframe
Qualification.Technician : Powerplant
ASRS Report : 788304

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

I WORKED OVERTIME. WAS ASSIGNED TO 'C' CHK ACFT TAIL. I REMOVED THE L HORIZ STABILIZER TO BODY BOARD SEAL ON THE LOWER AFT SURFACE OF THE L HORIZ STABILIZER PER THE TASK CARD. UPON REINSTALLATION OF THE BLADE SEAL, I BELIEVE I MAY HAVE INCORRECTLY POSITIONED THE METAL BLADE SEAL BEHIND THE TRACK ASSEMBLY INSTEAD OF IN THE TRACK ASSEMBLY. THIS WOULD CAUSE THE METAL BLADE SEAL ASSEMBLY TO RUB AGAINST THE FUSELAGE AND COULD CAUSE WEAR. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS EVENT COULD BE: NOT HAVING REMOVED THIS BLADE SEAL AND PANEL IN RECENT MEMORY, AND NOT HAVING WORKED A 'C' CHK IN ABOUT 9 YRS. MAINT CTL ADVISED THAT HE WOULD HAVE CONTRACT MAINT INSPECT AFFECTED STABILIZER BLADE SEAL WHEN ACFT OVERNIGHTED TONIGHT AND TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION IF NECESSARY.

Synopsis

MECHANIC REPORTS HE MAY HAVE INCORRECTLY INSTALLED THE LEFT HORIZ STAB TO BODY, AFT BLADE SEAL, IN THE FUSELAGE TAIL SECTION OF A B737-300 ACFT.

ACN: 788171

Time / Day

Date : 200804
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Fan Case

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
ASRS Report : 788171

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Assessments

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE SEPARATING AN ENG CORE FROM THE FAN CASE, 1 BOLT WAS ACCIDENTALLY LEFT IN, RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO THE FAN CASE. IN THE PROCESS OF REMOVING BOLTS, I STOPPED AND WALKED AWAY FROM THE AREA FOR A MIN. WHEN I RETURNED, MY WORK PARTNER WAS REMOVING THE REMAINING BOLTS. WE THOUGHT WE HAD REMOVED ALL OF THEM. THIS ENG WAS UNDER INVESTIGATION BECAUSE IT BLEW UP IN THE TEST CELL AFTER AN OVERHAUL. THERE WERE MANY PEOPLE LOOKING AT THE DISASSEMBLY, WHICH

ADDED SOME DISTR. LEAVING MY AREA FOR A MIN ACTUALLY BROKE UP MY WORK FLOW, ALSO CAUSING ME TO MISS THE BOLT AND NOT DOUBLECHK MY WORK. MY WORK PARTNER LOOKED AT THE WORK ALSO, CAUSING ME NOT TO DOUBLECHK MY WORK. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THIS WAS A PRATT WHITNEY 2000 ENGINE. THIS ENGINE WAS BEING DISASSEMBLED AFTER EXPLODING IN THE ENG TEST CELL DURING FINAL RUNS AFTER COMING OUT OF A COMPLETE OVERHAUL. THE CAUSE OF THE ENGINE FAILURE IN THE TEST CELL HAS NOT BEEN DISCLOSED, AT THIS TIME.

Synopsis

WHILE SEPARATING THE ENGINE CORE FROM THE FAN CASE OF A PRATT WHITNEY 2000 ENG, ONE BOLT WAS ACCIDENTALLY LEFT IN, RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO THE FAN CASE.

ACN: 788170

Time / Day

Date : 200804

Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : A320

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Flight Phase.Ground : Pushback

Flight Phase.Ground.Other

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Nose Gear

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

ASRS Report : 788170

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Schedule Pressure

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Assessments

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

I HOOKED UP THE TOW BAR TO ACFT X FOR A PUSH OUT OF THE HANGAR TO DO LEAK CHKS AFTER COMPLETION OF AN 'A' CHK. I AM USUALLY IN THE COCKPIT DRIVING BUT NOT THIS DAY. I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BE IN A BIT OF A HURRY AND MISSED PUTTING THE BYPASS PIN IN. I DID THE PUSH AND NOTICED THEY WERE STARTING #1 ENG. AT WHICH POINT I NOTICED THE PIN WAS NOT IN. I QUICKLY STRAIGHTENED OUT THE BAR AND STOPPED THE PUSH. XXXX RELEASED THE BAR AND WE DID OUR LEAK CHKS. WHEN THAT WAS FINISHED WE SENT

THEM ON THEIR WAY. NEITHER XXXX OR MYSELF NOTICED ANYTHING DAMAGED. I WAS NOTIFIED TONIGHT BY MY FOREMAN XXXXX ABOUT THE DAMAGED LUG. AND HE ASKED IF I WOULD GIVE HIM A STATEMENT ABOUT WHAT WE HAD DONE THAT MORNING. THIS JUST A REMINDER TO MYSELF AND MY CREW THAT NO MATTER HOW MANY YRS WE DO THIS JOB THAT WE STILL HAVE TO KEEP OUR HEAD IN THE GAME. TAKE THE TIME TO DO IT SAFE AND RIGHT.

Synopsis

DURING PUSHBACK, AS CREW STARTED #1 ENGINE ON AN AIRBUS A320 ACFT, MECHANIC NOTICES THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING BYPASS PIN NOT INSTALLED. MECHANIC LATER INFORMED THE NOSE LNDG GEAR STEERING LUG PIN WAS DAMAGED.

ACN: 788126

Time / Day

Date : 200805
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Wing Access Panel
Aircraft Component : Wing Access Panel

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
ASRS Report : 788126

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician
ASRS Report : 788422

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Inspector
ASRS Report : 787976

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Scheduled Maintenance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

I ARRIVED AND CLOCKED IN AT XA53 ON MAY/XA/08. I CHKD THE BOARD FOR MY ASSIGNMENT. I WAS PAIRED WITH PII ON THE PHASE AILERON CHKS. HE HAD STARTED WITH THE REQUIRED ZONE 500--600 OPEN UP ACCORDING TO WORK CARD ABC. I TOOK OVER ON THE L-HAND SIDE AND REMOVED THE L-HAND AILERON LOWER SHROUD. AROUND XB30 PII REINSTALLED THE R-HAND UPPER PCA PANEL AFTER RECEIVING A CLR TO CLOSE. WE CONTINUED WORKING ON THE AILERON CHKS ACCORDING TO WORK CARDS ABC. AFTER FINISHING THE CHKS I STARTED HELPING WITH THE PANEL CLOSE UP, STARTING WITH THE R-HAND LOWER WING PANELS ZONE 500--600 CLOSE UP AND WORKED OVER TO THE L-HAND LOWER WING PANELS. I FINISHED THE R-HAND PANELS BUT NEEDED HARDWARE TO FINISH THE L-HAND SIDE SO I PLACED AN ORDER FOR NEW HARDWARE. WHILE WAITING I WENT TO HELP SIGN OFF THE AILERON CHK CARDS THAT WE HAD COMPLETED. DURING THE SIGN OFF AND COMPLETION OF THE WORK CARDS I WAS ASKED IF THE R-HAND UPPER PCA PANEL WAS ON. I CHKD AND SAID YES, BUT FAILED TO GO CHK THE L-HAND SIDE TO ENSURE IT WAS PUT BACK IN PLACE AND SECURED. ONCE THE NEEDED HARDWARE ARRIVED I INSTALLED IT TO FINISH UP THE ZONAL INSPECTION. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE SIGNING OF THE AILERON WORK CARDS PII AND I CLEANED UP. WHILE I ROLLED MY TOOL BOX BACK OVER TO WHERE THE REST OF THE TOOL BOXES ARE KEPT PII TURNED IN THE SIGNED AILERON CHK WORK CARDS AND WENT TO SIGN OFF THE INSTALLATION OF THE ZONE 500-600 PANELS BUT FAILED TO CHK TO SEE THAT THE PANELS HE WAS SIGNING FOR WERE PUT BACK INTO PLACE AND SECURED. I FAILED TO CHK THE PANELS BEFORE LEAVING THE WORK AREA. QUALITY CTL THEN MISSED THE PANEL DURING THE END OF THE NIGHT ACFT RELEASE. GOING UNNOTICED BY THE 2 MECHS AND THE QUALITY CTL THE PANEL WAS NEVER REINSTALLED AND SUBSEQUENTLY DEPARTED THE TOP OF THE WING WITH ATTACHING HARDWARE SOMETIME AFTER DEPARTING THE MAINT HANGAR. IT WAS LATER DISCOVERED MISSING BY GND CREWS AT ANOTHER STATION. I RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM MY SUPVR AN HR BEFORE I WAS TO BE INTO WORK THE NEXT NIGHT. ONCE NOTIFIED WE SPOKE WITH THE CREW SUPVR AND THE SUPVR'S BOSS WHO DISCUSSED THE EVENTS BRIEFLY TO TRY TO ASCERTAIN WHAT HAD TAKEN PLACE SO THAT THEY COULD TRY TO LOCATE A PROB AND RECTIFY IT. THE PANEL WAS NOT REINSTALLED AND SECURED DUE TO PERSONAL DISTRS AS WELL AS WORK DISTRS AND FRUSTRATIONS FROM DIFFICULT TO INSTALL HARDWARE. IT WAS ALSO MISSED BECAUSE PII AND I DIDN'T DOUBLE-CHK EACH OTHERS' WORK TO ENSURE THAT WE HAD BOTH INSTALLED AND SECURED THE PANELS THAT HAD BEEN OPEN FOR THE X PHASE CHK. IT WAS LATE IN THE WORK DAY AND WE WERE BOTH GROWING TIRED AND FRUSTRATED WITH THE JOB AND DIDN'T GO BACK AND DOUBLE-CHK OUR WORK AREA FOR ANY LOOSE OR MISSING HARDWARE OR ANY HARDWARE THAT DIDN'T GET INSTALLED. THE PANEL WAS ALSO MISSED BECAUSE QUALITY CTL FAILED TO CLOSELY CHK THE TOP OF THE WING DESPITE KNOWING THAT EARLIER IN THE EVENING, THE TOP OF THE WING HAD PANELS THAT HAD BEEN REMOVED FOR THEIR INSPECTION OF ATTACHING FLT CTL HARDWARE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 788422: AROUND XA00, WE WERE FINISHING UP OUR WORK CARDS

FOR THE EVENING AND I ASKED PI IF THE L-HAND UPPER PCA ACCESS PANEL HAD BEEN INSTALLED, HIS RESPONSE WAS NO. ONCE ALL WORK CARDS WERE COMPLETED, WE RECEIVED OUR CLR TO CLOSE PANELS. PI PANELED UP THE L-HAND WING AND I PANELED UP THE R-HAND WING. PI FINISHED UP THE L-HAND WING AND CAME OVER TO THE R-HAND WING AND INSTALLED THE 2 UNDER WING PANELS WHICH WERE REMOVED EARLIER FOR QUALITY CTL INSPECTION. ONCE COMPLETED, WE SIGNED OFF OUR WORK CARDS AND I SIGNED THE PANEL SHEET FOR THE INSTALLATION OF ALL PANELS. I SIGNED OFF THE INSTALLATION OF ALL WING PANELS BELIEVING ALL WING PANELS WERE REINSTALLED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 787976: WHEN PERFORMING FINAL INSPECTION OF PANELS INSTALLED, I FAILED TO CHK THE OVERWING PCA PANELS FOR PROPER INSTALLATION. AT THIS TIME I WAS BUSY WITH THE ACFT RELEASE, ALONG WITH SEVERAL MECHS WHO NEEDED AN INSPECTOR. TOO MANY DISTRS.

Synopsis

TWO MECHANICS AND AN INSPECTOR REPORT ON HOW AND WHY, A L UPPER WING AILERON PCA ACCESS PANEL FOR AN EMB145LR WAS NOT REINSTALLED.

ACN: 788029

Time / Day

Date : 200805

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B757-200

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Air Data Computer

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Maintenance : Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

ASRS Report : 788029

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Manuals

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Schedule Pressure

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

EVENTS TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE: ACFT X ARRIVED ON FERRY FLT. ACFT FERRIED WITH OPEN MAINT ITEM X. CAPT'S AIRSPD INDICATOR READS 60 KTS NOT MOVING, ACFT COPLT'S WAS 90 KTS AND INCREASING. ACFT ALSO REQUIRED DAILY CHK, HAD ADDITIONAL WRITE-UP ON L WING NAV LIGHT AND WHAT WAS THOUGHT TO BE DAMAGE BY JETWAY. OPS WANTED ACFT TURNED IN APPROX 30 MINS. IN THE RUSH OF THINGS, I INSTALLED WRONG ADC. WRONG EFFECTIVITY, SHOULD HAVE BEEN Y. ALTHOUGH WRONG EFFECTIVITY INSTALLED, A COMPLETE CHK WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AMM WITH NO FAULTS INDICATED. PART WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CHANGED WITH CORRECT ONE. ACFT RECORDS/QUALITY ASSURANCE DISCOVERED. I SHOULD NOT HAVE FELT PRESSURE TO GET ACFT OUT. HAD I SLOWED DOWN AND TOOK TIME TO VERIFY PART NUMBER, THIS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. ALSO, I WAS MULTI-TASKING, HAD MORE THAN 1 THING AT A TIME ON MY MIND, WITH THE ADDITIONAL WORK ON ACFT.

Synopsis

MECHANIC DESCRIBES HOW HIS EFFORTS TO MEET A TURN AROUND DEPARTURE SCHEDULE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS INSTALLING THE WRONG AIR DATA COMPUTER (ADC), EVEN THOUGH THE AMM TEST PROCEDURE PASSED ON A B757-200 ACFT.