

ASRS Database Report Set

Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) Issues

Report Set Description.....Crew Resource Management (CRM) inflight situations (conflicts, NMACs, and emergencies).

Update Number.....14.0

Date of UpdateJanuary 9, 2009

Number of Records in Report Set.....50

Number of New Records in Report Set21

Type of Records in Report Set.....For each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

TH: 262-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the reporting of a specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de- identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.



Linda J. Connell, Director
Aviation Safety Reporting System

CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

One thing that can be known from ASRS statistics is that they represent the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 1999 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 1999. Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS lies in the **report narratives**. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. The values of these narrative reports lie in their qualitative nature. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

Report Synopses

ACN: 801951 (1 of 50)

Synopsis

WEATHER, TURBULENCE, LIGHTNING AND FUEL ISSUES COMBINE TO PROVIDE AN E145 FLT CREW A LITTLE MORE THAN THEY CAN HANDLE.

ACN: 798479 (2 of 50)

Synopsis

CAPTAIN AND FO INBOUND TO HNL SUFFER BREAKDOWN IN CRM DUE TO FO FAILURE TO SLOW TO 250K BELOW 10K MSL. CAPTAIN TAKES OVER PF DUTIES AND HAS FO REMOVED FROM SUBSEQUENT FLT SEGMENTS.

ACN: 796790 (3 of 50)

Synopsis

CE560 FLT CREW DEVIATES FROM CLRED ALTITUDE WHEN CAPT AND FO CONFLICT OVER ARRIVAL PREFERENCES.

ACN: 796690 (4 of 50)

Synopsis

A B737 CREW REPORTS A CRM ERROR WHEN THE FO REPORTED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE THE RWY IN SIGHT FOR A VISUAL. THE CAPT REPORTED HE SAW THE RWY BUT HE HAD THE WRONG RWY. A LOSS OF SEPARATION RESULTED.

ACN: 795090 (5 of 50)

Synopsis

AN ACR ACFT DSNDING INTO JFK RESPONDED TO A TCAS RA. THE FLT HAD A NMAC WITH VFR TFC AT 17500 FT THAT ATC CALLED AS LATE TFC.

ACN: 794108 (6 of 50)

Synopsis

B737-700 SUFFERS FLAPS STUCK AT 10 DEGREES ON FINAL APCH. LOW FUEL STATE, DEFERRED SYSTEMS, LACK OF TIMELY SUPPORT FROM DISPATCH AND POOR FLT CREW CRM CONTRIBUTE TO AN IMPERFECT BUT SAFE RESOLUTION.

ACN: 793969 (7 of 50)

Synopsis

A FATIGUED FALCON 10 CAPT CLBED TO 2000 FT BEFORE THE 4.5 DME ON THE TEB 5 EVEN AFTER THE FO WARNED HIM OF HIS ALT.

ACN: 793841 (8 of 50)

Synopsis

A CORP ACFT CREW RECEIVED FOUR STAR CHANGES ON AN ATL ARR IN HEAVY WX. AN ALT DEV RESULTED. THE CREW BECAME TASK SATURATED AND THE FLT CREW REQUESTED VECTORS.

ACN: 793598 (9 of 50)

Synopsis

ATC QUERIED A CREW ABOUT A CROSSING RESTRICTION COMPLIANCE WHICH THE CAPT AFFIRMED THEY WOULD MAKE. THEY MISSED THE RESTRICTION AND WERE VECTORED.

ACN: 791878 (10 of 50)

Synopsis

A SMALL AIRCRAFT TAXIED ACROSS AN ACTIVE RUNWAY WITHOUT CLEARANCE.

ACN: 791642 (11 of 50)

Synopsis

A320 FO REPORTS DISAGREEMENT WITH CAPT OVER COMPLIANCE WITH COMPANY REQUIRED ENGINE WARM-UP BEFORE TKOF.

ACN: 790028 (12 of 50)

Synopsis

CRJ FLT CREW EXPERIENCES A RUNWAY INCURSION AT AEX.

ACN: 789540 (13 of 50)

Synopsis

PVT PLT UNDERGOING RECURRENT EVAL BROKE NUMEROUS FARs AND HAD A RWY INCURSION, CITING SCHEDULING PRESSURE AS THE MAIN REASON FOR ACCEPTING AND MAKING POOR DECISIONS.

ACN: 789160 (14 of 50)

Synopsis

MD11 FLT CREW EXPERIENCES NAV DEVIATION FOLLOWING FMS ANOMALY.

ACN: 788812 (15 of 50)

Synopsis

B737-700 FLT CREW DESCENDS BELOW CROSSING RESTRICTION ON LDA-A IN VMC TO LGA. CITE WORKLOAD, CRM ISSUES AND LACK OF PROCEDURE IN FMS DATABASE AS CONTRIBUTORS.

ACN: 788592 (16 of 50)

Synopsis

CITATION FO REPORTS DESCENDING BELOW MSA WHILE VISUALLY SEARCHING FOR TVL ARPT.

ACN: 788268 (17 of 50)

Synopsis

BEECHJET 400 FLT CREW REPORTS ENGINE ROLL BACK DURING DESCENT. ENGINE IS SHUT DOWN AND RESTARTED WITH NO FURTHER PROBLEMS.

ACN: 788259 (18 of 50)

Synopsis

B757 CAPT REPORTS TRACK DEV AND LOST COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTING ZZZZ.

ACN: 785954 (19 of 50)

Synopsis

INEXPERIENCED PLTS OF C172 CLB INTO IMC WHILE ATTEMPTING TO GET AN IFR CLRNC.

ACN: 785307 (20 of 50)

Synopsis

B737 FLT CREW DEPARTS RWY 7L AT A6 IN LAS WITHOUT ASSOCIATED DATA.

ACN: 784963 (21 of 50)

Synopsis

B737-800 FLT CREW OPERATED A REVENUE FLT WITH THE WRONG ACFT.

ACN: 784629 (22 of 50)

Synopsis

A G150 PLT MISREAD A PDC FORMATTED WITH A CHANGE AND PRESENTED ON AN FMC CDU WITH NO PRINTED COPY. ACFT TURNED INCORRECTLY AFTER TKOF BECAUSE THE ORIGINAL ROUTING WAS IN THE FMC.

ACN: 782091 (23 of 50)

Synopsis

A320 FO ASKS FOR 7000 VICE 8000 PASSING BENGL ON THE ILS 34R APCH AT DEN.

ACN: 775593 (24 of 50)

Synopsis

B737-400 FLT CREW, UNAWARE OF NOTAM CONCERNING PARTIAL RWY AVAILABLE, DEPARTED FROM INTERSECTION IN OVERWEIGHT CONDITION.

ACN: 768385 (25 of 50)

Synopsis

EMB170 WAS CLEARED FOR A VISUAL APCH, BUT INITIATED APCH INTO NEARBY ARPT WITH SIMILAR RWY CONFIGURATION. THE ERROR WAS DISCOVERED, AND AN APCH WAS CONDUCTED TO THE DEST ARPT.

ACN: 764199 (26 of 50)

Synopsis

LEAR FO REPORTS DUAL ENGINE FLAME OUT AFTER MAX EFFORT STOP. FUEL STARVATION IS SUSPECTED.

ACN: 762945 (27 of 50)

Synopsis

AN ACR CREW APCHING SEA REPORTS A CLB RA ON FINAL WHILE THE TCAS DISPLAY INDICATED THE TFC WAS NEARLY DIRECTLY ABOVE THEM. THE FLT CONTINUED TO LNDG.

ACN: 758526 (28 of 50)

Synopsis

UNEXPECTED LATE CHANGE FROM ATIS ADVERTISED VISUAL APCH RWY 22 TO AN ILS RWY 31C, CIRCLE TO LAND RWY 22 RESULTS IN BREAKDOWN IN CRM, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND, ULTIMATELY, BUSTING AN ALT RESTRICTION ON THE ARRIVAL.

ACN: 756622 (29 of 50)

Synopsis

B757 FLT CREW REPORTS GENERATOR FAILURE AT TOP OF DESCENT AFTER BEING DISPATCHED WITH APU INOPERATIVE. FLT CREW LANDS AT NEAREST SUITABLE WHICH IS NOT THEIR FILED DESTINATION.

ACN: 754680 (30 of 50)

Synopsis

FLIGHT LEAD FOR A FLIGHT OF THREE FA-18'S DEPARTED USING AGL AS PRIMARY ALT SOURCE FOR INSTRUMENT REFERENCE. AS A RESULT, THE FLIGHT OVERSHOT THE INITIAL ALT CLRNC ON DEP FROM A HIGH ALT ARPT.

ACN: 754397 (31 of 50)

Synopsis

CE550 FO RPTS THE INABILITY OF THE CAPT TO LEVEL OFF AT ASSIGNED ALT DUE TO LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN ACFT TYPE.

ACN: 750993 (32 of 50)

Synopsis

BOTH GENERATORS OF LR 24 TRIPPED OFF LINE CAUSING THE IAS, THE AFDS, AND ALT HOLD TO FAIL. AN ALT DEVIATION RESULTED AS THE ACFT CLBED UNNOTICED BY CREW DURING TROUBLESHOOTING.

ACN: 748106 (33 of 50)

Synopsis

A330 ECAM INDICATED 'REAR CARGO DOOR' WARNING DURING CLIMBOUT. FLT CREW RETURNED TO DEP ARPT AND LANDED OVERWEIGHT.

ACN: 745610 (34 of 50)

Synopsis

AN AIRBUS A320 ACFT SEAT ROW 9-ABC WITH PASSENGERS, SEPARATED FROM TRACK MOUNT AFTER TKOF. CAPTAIN WOULD NOT RETURN TO FIELD. FLT FULL. FIVE HOUR FLT CONTINUED TO DESTINATION.

ACN: 745449 (35 of 50)

Synopsis

A PLT RPTS TAXIING ONTO SJC RWY 11/29 AT TXWY F AFTER LEAVING THE FBO RAMP IMMEDIATELY SE OF THE SJC TWR.

ACN: 745235 (36 of 50)

Synopsis

DA42 INADVERTENTLY PENETRATED CLASS B AIRSPACE DURING INSTRUCTIONAL FLT.

ACN: 744781 (37 of 50)

Synopsis

AN EMB145 PILOT REPORTS THAT FOLLOWING AN EICAS DISTRACTION DURING TKOF THE LNDG GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT BECAUSE OF EXCESSIVE SPD. AN EMER WAS DECLARED WITH A RETURN TO LNDG.

ACN: 744494 (38 of 50)

Synopsis

CRJ200 FO WAS ORDERED TO EXIT ACFT ON TAXIWAY TO VISUALLY CHECK FLAPS AFTER AN ALTERNATE FLAP SETTING WAS MADE.

ACN: 743714 (39 of 50)

Synopsis

CL65 FLT CREW EXECUTES TERRAIN AVOIDANCE MANEUVER AFTER RECEIVING EGPWS TERRAIN WARNING ON NIGHT VISUAL TO RWY 33 AT BTV.

ACN: 743035 (40 of 50)

Synopsis

A B767-300 FO REPORTS AN APPARENTLY LOOSE ENG MOUNT ALLOWING EXCESSIVE LATERAL ENG MOVEMENT. THE CAPT WOULD NOT DIVERT TO INSPECT ACFT.

ACN: 740530 (41 of 50)

Synopsis

A G IV PILOT REPORTS FATIGUE LEADING TO AN UNSTABILIZED APCH TO LFMN.

ACN: 737582 (42 of 50)

Synopsis

DURING TAXI IN TO THE FBO A CE525 FLT CREW HAS THE RIGHT WING TIP CONTACT THE PROPELLER SPINNER OF A C172 PARKED ALONG THE TXWY.

ACN: 736051 (43 of 50)

Synopsis

A320 ENG #1 AND #2 OIL PRESSURE INDICATION FAILURE DURING TKOF ROLL AND ELECTS TO CONTINUE. AFTER TROUBLESHOOTING WITHOUT SUCCESS CREW RETURNS TO DEP ARPT.

ACN: 736028 (44 of 50)

Synopsis

FLT CREW REPORTS NMAC WITH ULTRALIGHT ACFT 10 NM NE OF RIC AT 3000 FEET.

ACN: 734002 (45 of 50)

Synopsis

CREW ELECTS TO REJECT THE TAKEOFF AFTER ROTATING DUE TO WINDSHEAR ENCOUNTER THAT CAUSES ACFT TO SETTLE BACK ON THE RWY.

ACN: 732207 (46 of 50)

Synopsis

CL65 CREW DOES NOT USE BEFORE START CHECKLIST AND ATTEMPTS TO TAXI WITH THE HYDRAULIC PUMPS OFF. STEERING AND BRAKES ARE INOPERATIVE AND THE ACFT GOES OFF THE TAXIWAY.

ACN: 730780 (47 of 50)

Synopsis

B737-800 FLT CREW EXPERIENCES PRESSURIZATION FAILURE LIKELY RELATED TO WATER SPILL IN AFT CABIN OVER PRESSURIZATION OUTFLOW VALVES DURING PREFLT IN VERY COLD CONDITIONS. CRM AND SOP ISSUES ARE MAGNIFIED DURING PERFORMANCE OF CHECKLISTS AND EMERGENCY DESCENT.

ACN: 729594 (48 of 50)

Synopsis

A CL60 CREW USING AN ELECTRONIC FLT BAG WAS CONFUSED ABOUT AN LAS RNAV CROSSING ALT. A LOW TIME FO AND NEW EFB CONTRIBUTING TO THE HIGH WORKLOAD.

ACN: 728727 (49 of 50)

Synopsis

WW24 CREW ENCOUNTERS SEVERE TURB AND ICING AT 14000 FT.

ACN: 727937 (50 of 50)

Synopsis

BEECH 1900D FLT CREW OPERATED ABOVE MTGW.

Report Narratives

ACN: 801951

Time / Day

Date : 200808
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Intersection : KASPR
State Reference : MN
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 32000

Environment

Flight Conditions : Mixed
Weather Elements : Thunderstorm
Weather Elements : Turbulence

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZMP.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level
Route In Use.Enroute : Direct

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Air Data Computer

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 190
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3500
ASRS Report : 801951

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Turbulence
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerB : 2

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude
Consequence.Other : Emotional Trauma

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

I WAS THE FO AND PF, OPERATING INTO MSP. THE FLT OPERATED NORMALLY UNTIL THE INITIAL ARR PHASE INTO MSP. ARR TFC INTO MSP WAS BEING IMPACTED BY A SIGNIFICANT WX SYS WHICH DROPPED THE ARPT ARR RATE TO LESS THAN 5 ACFT PER HR. OUR FLT WAS ORIGINALLY CLRED VIA THE TWOLF 1 ARR. DUE TO SEVERE WX ALONG THAT ARR RTE, ZMP INSTRUCTED US TO FLY DIRECT TO KASPR INTXN AND JOIN THE KASPR 3 ARR TO MSP. WE WERE THEN ISSUED HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS AT KASPR TO HOLD AS PUBLISHED, LEGS AT OUR DISCRETION, AND AN EFC OF XA50Z. WE DID NOT HAVE A SUFFICIENT FUEL QUANTITY FOR A HOLD OF THIS DURATION. ZMP ALSO ADVISED THAT WX NEAR KASPR MIGHT PRECLUDE HOLDING BUT HE WANTED US TO TAKE A LOOK AND SEE IF WE COULD DO IT AND ADVISE. THE CAPT STARTED SENDING ACARS MESSAGES TO THE DISPATCHER IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHERE WE SHOULD DIVERT TO. AS WE APCHED KASPR, THERE WAS CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY ALONG BOTH SIDES OF THE AIRWAY AND A L-HAND HOLD WOULD BE BETTER THAN A R-HAND. RADAR DEPICTED 2 LEVEL 1 CELLS APPROX 10 MI E OF KASPR. I DETERMINED THAT IF WE COULD NOT GET L TURNS, A R-HAND HOLD MIGHT WORK. DUE TO FREQ CONGESTION WE COULD NOT CONTACT ZMP PRIOR TO ENTERING THE HOLD. I HAD PREVIOUSLY SLOWED TO TURBULENT AIR PENETRATION SPD PRIOR TO HOLD ENTRY. UPON ROLLING OUT ON THE OUTBOUND LEG, A TSTM ILLUMINATED ITS PRESENCE IMMEDIATELY IN FRONT OF THE ACFT. I STARTED A 1/2 STANDARD RATE TURN BACK TOWARD KASPR. THE NEXT 45-60 SECONDS WERE VERY EXCITING WITH MODERATE TO SEVERE TURB. THE CAPT ASKED ME IF I WANTED TO CLB. I REPLIED THAT IF WE COULD GET CLRNC, IT MIGHT GET US OUT FASTER. IN EITHER CASE, WE WOULD EXIT THE CELL TO THE W SHORTLY. UPON EXITING THE CELL, I DISCOVERED THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS IN VERT SPD MODE AND THAT WE HAD CLBED 900 FT AND WERE STILL CLBING. I ABRUPTLY PUSHED THE NOSE OVER AND STARTED BACK TO FL320. ABOUT THAT TIME, ZMP CALLED AND SAID TO IMMEDIATELY DSND AND MAINTAIN FL320 AND TO TURN R TO HDG 090 DEGS. THERE WAS TFC AT 2 O'CLOCK POS AND 4 MI CONVERGING AT FL330. I GOT DOWN TO FL320 IN ABOUT 30 SECONDS, AND CALLED CTR AND TOLD HIM THAT I WAS SORRY FOR THE ALTDEV, BUT I HAD JUST EXITED THE TSTM THAT A 090 DEG HDG WAS GOING TO PUT ME RIGHT BACK IN. HE SAID THAT ANY NE HDG WOULD WORK AND TO ADVISE WHEN I GOT ON THE 090 DEG HDG. ONCE WE WERE ON THE 090 DEG HDG, I CALLED CTR AND ADVISED OF OUR STATUS. THE CTRLR THEN STARTED VECTORING US TO RST VOR. AS THE FLT PROGRESSED, IT BECAME CLR THAT 2 THINGS WERE NOT GOING TO HAPPEN. WE WERE NOT GOING TO GET TO MSP

ANY TIME SOON, AND THE WX OVER RST WAS BEGINNING TO DETERIORATE RAPIDLY. COMPOUNDING OUR PREDICAMENT WAS THE FACT THAT THE PREVIOUS ELECTRICAL ENCOUNTER WAS BEGINNING TO MANIFEST ITSELF IN SYS FAILURES. FIRST THE CAPT'S ADC FAILED. UPON ME NOTICING THIS FAILURE, I TALKED THE CAPT INTO DIVERTING INTO ROCHESTER. DURING THE DSCNT, THE CAPT'S AHARS FAILED AND WAS SOON FOLLOWED BY A RUDDER OVER-BOOST. ALL FAILURES WERE HANDLED THROUGH COMPANY ESTABLISHED PROCS. THE FLT LANDED NORMALLY AND WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CAPT THE NEXT DAY, I LEARNED THAT HE HAD NEVER BEEN IN A WX SYS LIKE THAT AND HAD NO IDEA HOW TO HANDLE IT. HE ALSO ADMITTED TO SELECTING THE VERT SPD MODE AND NOT TELLING ME THAT HE DID IT. AT THE TIME HE SELECTED VERT SPD MODE, THE ACFT WAS CLBING, SO THE SELECTION OF THE MODE AT THAT TIME ASSURED THAT THE AUTOPLT CONTINUED A CLB. HE FURTHER SAID THAT HE WAS TRYING TO DIAL IN A DSCNT BUT TURB THREW HIS HAND INTO THE OVERHEAD AND HURT HIM. I WILL BE HAVING A DISCUSSION WITH MY AIRLINE'S PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS FOLKS IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO DISCUSS THIS PLT'S CRM SKILLS AS THE ALTDEV WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED IF HE HAD JUST TOLD ME HE DID IT.

Synopsis

WEATHER, TURBULENCE, LIGHTNING AND FUEL ISSUES COMBINE TO PROVIDE AN E145 FLT CREW A LITTLE MORE THAN THEY CAN HANDLE.

ACN: 798479

Time / Day

Date : 200808
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : HNL.Airport
State Reference : HI
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 10000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : HCF.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 798479

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 798893

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Speed Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Other
Consequence.Other : Emotional Trauma

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING MY DSCNT INTO HNL, I TOOK OVER THE CTLS FROM MY FO. I HAVE BRIEFED MY FO THAT I WANT SOP'S AND PROFILES. 250 KTS BELOW 10000 FT. DURING OUR DSCNT INTO HNL, I NOTICED THAT WE WERE AT 280 KTS AND 8000 FT. I TOLD THE FO THAT WE NEED TO BE AT 250 KTS. THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED. HE MADE NO CORRECTION. I TOOK OVER THE CTLS AND SAID I GOT IT. WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. HE DID NOT RESPOND WHEN I TOLD HIM TO CORRECT THE AIRSPD. HE JUST DID NOT DO ANYTHING. THE FO WAS COMPLAINING ABOUT PAY ISSUES, HOW BAD IT WAS TO FLY WITH ANOTHER CAPT, AND JUST COMPLAINING ABOUT EVERYTHING IN GENERAL. HIS MIND WAS NOT SET ON FLYING THE ACFT. I TOOK OVER THE FLYING DUTIES AND TOOK OVER THE CTL OF THE ACFT. I HAD THE FO RELEASED FROM FLT DUTIES AND HAD HIM REPLACED. I AM REQUESTING THAT HE BE CORRECTED AND GIVEN ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND GET CRM EDUCATION AND MAYBE A MEDICAL EVALUATION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 798893: WHILE ON DSCNT INTO HNL, AS PF, I DID NOT SLOW THE ACFT FROM 280 KIAS TO 250 KIAS AS I PASSED THROUGH 10000 FT MSL. I WAS FLYING THE ACFT USING A MANUALLY SELECTED SPD INSTEAD OF THE FMS SPD SELECTION. WE WERE CRUISING AT 13000 FT AND WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH INTO HNL. I SELECTED A LOWER ALT ON FCP (3000 FT FOR THE SHORELINE). AT APPROX 7500 FT, THE CAPT POINTED OUT MY SPD WAS STILL 280 KIAS AND DIRECTED ME TO SLOW THE PLANE. I SPD SELECTED 250 KIAS. THE CAPT THEN DIRECTED ME TO SLOW MORE QUICKLY SO I DECREASED OUR RATE OF DSCNT TO 500 FPM USING THE VERT SPD WHEEL. I ASSUME THE CAPT DECIDED THE PLANE WAS NOT SLOWING IN A TIMELY ENOUGH MANNER AS HE THEN ANNOUNCED THAT HE HAD THE ACFT, CLICKED OFF THE AUTOPLT, AND LEVELED THE ACFT UNTIL THE SPD DECREASED BELOW 250 KIAS. THE CAPT THEN CONTINUED THE DSCNT AND APCH, MAINTAINING CTL OF THE ACFT FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. THERE WAS NEVER ANY CALL FROM HCF APCH CONCERNING OUR SPD. THE CAPT POINTED OUT MY ERROR. ALTHOUGH HE REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT WITH ME AFTER THE FLT, I BELIEVE HCF APCH VECTORING OTHER ACFT TO MAINTAIN SPACING TO THE RWY MADE HIM AWARE OF OUR SPD. MY BELIEF IS REINFORCED BY HCF APCH ISSUING US VECTORS FOR SPACING RIGHT AS THE CAPT TOOK CTL. THE ACFT WAS SLOWED BELOW 250 KIAS AND THE FLT CONTINUED NORMALLY. WHILE IN CRUISE, THE FMS SPD WAS 275 KIAS. THE CAPT DIRECTED ME TO CRUISE AT 280 KIAS PER COMPANY POLICY. I SPD SELECTED 280 KIAS. DURING THE DSCNT, I FORGOT THAT I HAD A MANUALLY SELECTED SPD SET INSTEAD OF USING THE FMS SPD. THE ACFT DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY SLOW TO 245 KIAS BY 10000 FT AS WOULD HAVE BEEN THE CASE IF I HAD BEEN IN FMS SPD. THE MAJORITY OF THE TIME, I CRUISE AND DSND IN FMS SPD AND I FELL VICTIM TO A HABIT PATTERN WHICH RESULTED IN A LAPSE OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. I HAD EVERY INTENTION OF SLOWING TO 250 KTS AS WE DSND BELOW 10000 FT AS THE CAPT HAD INCLUDED THIS AS PART OF HIS PREFLT BRIEFING PRIOR TO OUR FIRST FLT EARLIER THAT AFTERNOON. AFTER THE CAPT DIRECTED ME TO SLOW THE ACFT, I DID NOT SLOW AS AGGRESSIVELY AS HE WISHED. AT THE TIME HE POINTED OUT MY HIGH AIRSPD, I BELIEVED WE WERE GREATER THAN 12 NM OFFSHORE AND, THEREFORE, I DID NOT BELIEVE WE WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE FARs. FURTHER, HCF APCH HAD NOT DIRECTED A SPD REDUCTION AND HAD NOT YET GIVEN US

ANY VECTORS FOR SPACING. TAKING ALL THESE FACTORS INTO CONSIDERATION, I FELT I WAS SLOWING AT A SUFFICIENT RATE. I HAVE SINCE TALKED TO OTHER CAPTS, CONDUCTED SOME RESEARCH INTO THE MATTER AND NOW REALIZE THAT THIS IS A VERY GRAY AREA WITH CONFLICTING OPINIONS BOTH AMONG PLTS AND BTWN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE FAA. AS SUCH, I PERSONALLY WILL NOW BE TREATING 250 KIAS BELOW 10000 FT MSL WHEN OUTSIDE 12 NM FROM SHORE AS IF IT IS UNDOUBTEDLY AN FAR LIMITATION.

Synopsis

CAPTAIN AND FO INBOUND TO HNL SUFFER BREAKDOWN IN CRM DUE TO FO FAILURE TO SLOW TO 250K BELOW 10K MSL. CAPTAIN TAKES OVER PF DUTIES AND HAS FO REMOVED FROM SUBSEQUENT FLT SEGMENTS.

ACN: 796790

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SLK.Airport
State Reference : NY
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZBW.ARTCC
Make Model Name : Citation Excel
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company.Other
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 132
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6200
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1055

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company.Other
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

WE WERE PART 135 TO SLK. WX AT SLK: CLR BUT 4 SM VISIBILITY WITH HZ. 20 MI OUT, WE DECIDED TO DO ILS. PF WANTED TO GO DIRECT TO FAF AND PICK UP ILS OR VISUAL FROM THERE. I SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT NOT SEE THE ARPT FROM THERE DUE TO 4 SM VISIBILITY AND SUGGESTED TO GO VIA SLK VOR AND PICK UP ARPT VISUALLY OVERHEAD OR JUST FLY THE FULL ILS. CAPT/PF AGREED, SO I RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING CLRNC, 'CLRED FOR THE ILS MAINTAIN 7000 FT UNTIL SLK VOR.' AT 15 NM FROM SLK, PF ACTED NERVOUS AND SAID 'I DON'T SEE THE ARPT! CANCEL IFR, I WANT TO GO VISUAL.' HE STARTED TO DSDN IMMEDIATELY AND I TOLD HIM TO WAIT AND STAY AT 7000 FT UNTIL I GOT THE CLRNC FOR A VISUAL. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE THE ARPT AT 12.8 MI AND DUE TO 4 SM VISIBILITY AT THE ARPT. I CALLED ATC TO REQUEST THE VISUAL, BUT ATC WAS WORKING 3 FREQS AND DID NOT RESPOND. IN THE MEANTIME, PF (WAS ALSO PIC) AND 8 YRS SENIOR AT THE COMPANY AND MY AGE. HE WAS ALSO AN EX-MIL PLT. HIS CRM SKILLS WERE WEAK THE PREVIOUS FEW DAYS. HE FINALLY GOT ON THE RADIO (AFTER MY SECOND CALL TO ATC) AND INSISTED THAT ATC WOULD ANSWER. HE ALSO NEVER LEVELED OFF AND DISREGARDED MY INPUT TO DO SO. ATC RESPONDED TO HIM IN AN IRRITABLE WAY THAT HE WAS WORKING 3 FREQS AND CLRED HIM FOR THE VISUAL. THE REASON I DID NOT GRAB THE FLT CTLS FROM THIS PIC/PF: 1) I BELIEVE IT WOULD HAVE BECOME A 'FIGHT' OVER THE FLT CTLS, AND I DID NOT WANT TO PUT OUR PAX THROUGH THAT. THEY WERE VERY NERVOUS FLYERS AND I BELIEVE IT COULD BECOME DANGEROUS. 2) I COULD SEE THE TERRAIN BELOW US CLEARLY AND WE HAD SUFFICIENT CLRNC. 3) I KNEW THE AREA FROM PREVIOUS TRIP AND KNEW THE TERRAIN WOULD GET LOWER TO THE ARPT. I BELIEVE I MADE THE CORRECT DECISION DOING IT THIS WAY, HOWEVER, WE WERE AT 6300 FT WHEN WE GOT THE VISUAL APCH CLRNC.

Synopsis

CE560 FLT CREW DEVIATES FROM CLRED ALTITUDE WHEN CAPT AND FO CONFLICT OVER ARRIVAL PREFERENCES.

ACN: 796690

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500

Environment

Light : Dusk

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZ.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-300
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope : XXL
Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Precision
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : N/S

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 154
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1420
ASRS Report : 796690

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 174
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 7000
ASRS Report : 796818

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : Entry
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Penetrated Airspace
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

ARRIVED ZZZ VIA STAR ARR. FLEW DOWNWIND FROM VOR AFTER BEING TOLD TO EXPECT ILS XXL SIDESTEP RWY XXR. ON DOWNWIND AND APPROX 2 MI PAST ABEAM THE NUMBERS, ATC ADVISED US OF TFC WE WOULD BE FOLLOWING ON FINAL FOR RWY XXR. I SPOTTED THE TFC. THE CAPT (PF) SAW THAT TFC ALSO AND WE CALLED IT IN SIGHT. PF BEGAN CONFIGURING AND EXTENDED THE DOWNWIND UNTIL ATC ASKED US TO TURN BASE. WE TURNED BASE AND PF ASKED ME IF I COULD SEE THE ARPT. I STATED I COULD NOT. HE THEN SAID HE COULD SEE THE ARPT. AT NO TIME DURING THE REST OF THE FLT DID HE SAY IF HE COULD ALSO SEE THE TFC WE WERE FOLLOWING. WE WERE CLRED TO FOLLOW THE ACFT IN SIGHT FOR THE VISUAL RWY XXR. WHILE CONFIGURING THE AIRPLANE FOR LNDG AND STILL ON BASE LEG, APCH CALLED OVER THE RADIO TO WARN US THAT WE HAD FLOWN THROUGH FINAL AND TO IMMEDIATELY TURN TOWARD THE ARPT. THE CTLR ASKED US IF WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. THE CAPT TOLD ME AGAIN HE DID AS WE IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED N TO INTERCEPT FINAL FOR RWY XXR. WE RPTED ZZZ IN SIGHT TO ATC. I THEN ADVISED THE CAPT THAT I COULD STILL NOT SEE RWY XXR. VISIBILITY WAS POOR WITH THE SUN LOW IN THE SKY (OR SETTING). ON APPROX A 6 MI FINAL I COULD SEE ALL 4 RWYS AND VERIFY THAT WE WERE ON FINAL FOR RWY XXR. WE LANDED NORMALLY. AFTER PARKING, WE WERE ADVISED OVER THE PHONE THAT WE HAD COME TOO CLOSE TO AN ACFT ON FINAL FOR THE S COMPLEX AT ZZZ. THE CRM BTWN THE CAPT AND I DURING THE ENTIRE TRIP WAS EXCELLENT. WE HAD FLOWN AN FAA COCKPIT OBSERVER ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE TRIP AND HE COMMENTED ON HOW WELL WE WORKED TOGETHER. THIS INCIDENT TOOK PLACE ON THE LAST DAY OF THE TRIP. IT HAPPENED IN A VERY, VERY SHORT AMOUNT OF TIME AND DURING A TASK-INTENSIVE PHASE. I STATED CLRLY TO THE CAPT THAT I COULD NOT IDENT RWY 24R VISUALLY FOR MOST OF THE APCH. HIS TONE AND ATTITUDE WERE VERY CONFIDENT AS HE CONTINUED TO STATE THAT 'IT'S OK, I HAVE THE ARPT IN SIGHT.' IT APPEARS THAT HE MISIDENTED RWYS XX FOR RWYS YY AND FLEW THROUGH BOTH RWY XXL AND XXR FINAL APCHS. ATC PROMPTLY ADVISED US OF THE ERROR. AS WE TURNED BASE LEG FROM FINAL, I WAS VERY TASK SATURATED. I WAS LOOKING FOR THE ARPT, MONITORING AIRSPD FOR CONFIGN AND TALKING TO ATC. ALTHOUGH WE HAD THE ILS FOR RWY XXL SET UP, AND IT MAY BE EASY TO ASK WHY I DID NOT NOTICE THAT WE HAD FLOWN THROUGH THAT COURSE USING THE CDI, THE TRUTH IS THAT I WAS VERY BUSY. MY PRIMARY FOCUS WAS LOOKING OUTSIDE THE ACFT TO FIND THE ARPT VISUALLY BECAUSE THAT IS THE APCH WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR. ATIS WAS RPTING 8 MI AND SCATTERED CLOUDS OVER THE ARPT. THE SUN AT XA00 PM IS AT A VERY BAD ANGLE FOR SEEING ARPT WHEN THE MARINE LAYER IS OVER THE ARPT. BUT THIS COMES AS A SURPRISE WHEN THE ARPT IS VERY EASY TO SEE ON DOWNWIND ABEAM MIDFIELD AT 7000 FT. IT IS VERY COMMON DURING EVERYDAY OPS TO RPT THE FIELD IN SIGHT AND ACCEPT A VISUAL CLRNC WITH ONLY 1 PLT ABLE TO SEE THE RWY. CAPTS DO IT

ALL THE TIME ON DOWNWIND FOR LAS RWY 25L, FOR EXAMPLE. IN THIS INSTANCE, I COULD HAVE MORE AGGRESSIVELY STATED THAT I DID NOT SEE THE RWY SINCE I WAS VERY CONCERNED WITH HELPING THE PF INTERCEPT THE CORRECT FINAL, BUT ONCE AGAIN TIME AND TASK MGMNT WERE AN ISSUE. MY OPINION, THERE IS NOTHING I HAVE SEEN AT ACR FLT OPS THAT CAUSES ME MORE CONCERN THAN CAPTS THAT TAKE OVER DECISION MAKING IN THE COCKPIT ENTIRELY BY THEMSELVES. IN THIS SPECIFIC CASE AT ZZZ, THE PF/CAPT THOUGHT HE SAW THE CORRECT RWY, BUT SEEMED TO FEEL NO OBLIGATION TO SEEK OUT MY OPINION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT WE WERE INTERCEPTING THE CORRECT FINAL. THIS IS WHAT VISUAL APCHS COMBINED WITH POOR WX AND A VERY SHORT PERIOD (BASE LEG AT ZZZ) WILL DO TO A CAPT (OR ANY PF) WHO IS OTHERWISE OUTSTANDING AT CRM. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 796818: IN THE BASE TURN I REALIZED THAT THE ARPT WAS NOT IN SIGHT, BUT IT APPEARED THAT I COULD FOLLOW THE PRECEDING TFC TO THE ARPT. ABOUT THE TIME WE SHOULD HAVE STARTED OUR TURN TO FINAL, I ASKED FOR FLAPS 15 DEG SETTING OFF GEAR HORN. I VISUALLY WENT INSIDE TO TROUBLESHOOT THE GEAR THINKING THAT IT HAD BEEN LOWERED DURING THE DOWNWIND TO BASE TURN. WHEN I WENT OUTSIDE AGAIN I WAS UNABLE TO SEE THE PRECEDING ACFT BUT LOCATED THE RWYS. UNFORTUNATELY WHAT I SAW WAS RWY XYL AND XYR. THE ACFT HDG WAS 90 DEGS OFF RWY COURSE WHEN I NOTICED THE XXL LOC START TO SWING. I IMMEDIATELY TURNED R TO CORRECT MY MISTAKE. IN THE TURN I SAW THE APCH LIGHTS AND PAPI'S WHICH WERE JUST STARTING TO COME INTO VIEW FROM UNDER THE MARINE LAYER AS WE DSNDED ONTO PROFILE. WE MADE A VISUAL APCH TO RWY XYR. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) IT APPEARED VISUAL APCH WOULD BE NO PROB FROM ABEAM THE ARPT. 2) THIN MARINE LAYER THAT PREVENTED US FROM SEEING THE RWYS FROM ABOVE PROFILE. 3) SEVERAL ATC COMS COINCIDED WITH CALLOUTS AND COCKPIT COMS. I BELIEVE THIS LED TO THE GEAR NOT BEING LOWERED. A SECOND CALL CAME WHILE TRYING TO RESOLVE THE GEAR HORN. 4) NON-STANDARD APCHS TO ILS XXR. TUNNEL VISION SET IN AS I BECAME TASK SATURATED. ALTHOUGH I AM VERY FAMILIAR WITH ZZZ AND ITS SURROUNDINGS, I DIDN'T PICK UP ON CLUES THAT SHOULD HAVE HELPED ME LOCATE THE CORRECT RWY. THE APPROPRIATE COURSE OF ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN A GAR.

Synopsis

A B737 CREW REPORTS A CRM ERROR WHEN THE FO REPORTED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE THE RWY IN SIGHT FOR A VISUAL. THE CAPT REPORTED HE SAW THE RWY BUT HE HAD THE WRONG RWY. A LOSS OF SEPARATION RESULTED.

ACN: 795090

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : JFK.Airport
State Reference : NY
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 17500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : KINGSTON

Aircraft : 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Personal
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout : Takeoff

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 19150
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4650
ASRS Report : 795090

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 230
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 1600
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1000
ASRS Report : 794738

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE FLYING THE KINGSTON 8 ARR INTO JFK, WE EXPERIENCED AN NMAC OVER LGA. WE EXECUTED THE TCAS RA AND AVOIDED THE INTRUDER ACFT. BACKGROUND: AFTER AN INITIAL CLRNC TO CROSS THE LENDY INTXN AT FL190, WE WERE CLRED TO DSND TO 13000 FT AND DEPART LGA HDG 150 DEGS. AS WE APCHED LGA FROM THE NW, WE NOTICED A TCAS TARGET ON AN INTERCEPT COURSE FROM OUR 2 O'CLOCK POS. THAT TARGET WAS BELOW US, BUT WAS CLBING AS WE DSNDDED. THE TCAS SOUNDED A TA, THEN QUICKLY CONVERTED TO AN RA, COMMANDING US TO CLB. I QUICKLY DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND ARRESTED OUR DSCNT AND SMOOTHLY TRANSITIONED TO CLB IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RA. THE FO HAD BEEN VISUALLY SEARCHING FOR THE TARGET WITH NO LUCK UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT -- WHEN HE SAW A SINGLE ENG GA ACFT PASS BELOW OUR R WINGTIP AT APPROX 500 FT HORIZ AND 300 FT VERT SEPARATION. I NEVER SAW THE TARGET (POSSIBLY A CIRRUS?). THE ATC CTLR CALLED POP-UP 'VFR' TFC JUST AS WE WERE EXECUTING THE RA. THE FO RESPONDED 'WE'RE ALREADY CLBING WITH AN RA.' THE CTLR REPLIED 'HE'S STILL CLBING TOO.' THE INCIDENT WAS OVER IN SECONDS AND WE RESUMED OUR DSCNT WITH AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG AT JFK. IN DEPLANING, NO PAX MADE ANY COMMENT AND THE FLT ATTENDANT SAID SHE BELIEVES THAT NO ONE NOTICED AN ABNORMALITY. MY FO WAS VERY DILIGENT IN HIS TFC SCANNING, BUT THE TARGET ACFT WAS JUST TOO SMALL, FLYING HEAD ON, AND WAS MASKED BELOW IN THE PATTERNS OF THE CITY. OUR CRM AND TCAS RESPONSE TRAINING HELPED CONTRIBUTE TO A RAPID, APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO THE THREAT.

Synopsis

AN ACR ACFT DSNDING INTO JFK RESPONDED TO A TCAS RA. THE FLT HAD A NMAC WITH VFR TFC AT 17500 FT THAT ATC CALLED AS LATE TFC.

ACN: 794108

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 3000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZ.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Traffic Pattern

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 201
ASRS Report : 794108

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 168
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 13700
ASRS Report : 793806

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : Flap Pos
Indicators And Lights
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency
Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Schedule Pressure
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Fault Isolation
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Repair
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON THE DOWNWIND LEG WE WERE ASKED TO SLOW DOWN TO 170 KTS FOR TFC. OUR CONFIG WAS FLAPS 10 DEGS, LNDG GEAR UP. ATC ASKED TO KEEP OUR SPD UP DURING THE APCH. ON FINAL APCH THE CAPT ASKED FOR LNDG GEAR DOWN, FLAPS 15 DEGS, AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER FLAPS 30 DEGS 'BEFORE LNDG CHKLST' WHICH I SELECTED. WE BOTH NOTICED IMMEDIATELY THAT FLAPS WERE STILL STUCK AT FLAPS 10 DEGS WITH THE 'LEADING EDGE FLAPS TRANSIT' LIGHT ILLUMINATED. WE QUICKLY DECIDED TO INITIATE A GAR IN ORDER TO ANALYZE THE PROB. ATC WAS NOTIFIED, WE RECEIVED VECTORS, NO EMER WAS DECLARED AT THAT POINT. WE BRIEFLY TALKED TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO INFORM THEM, WHO TALKED TO THE PAX. WE DISCUSSED WHICH CHKLST WAS APPLICABLE. DECIDED THAT IT WAS THE 'FLAPS, TRAILING EDGE: SYMMETRICAL NON-NORMAL/NO FLAPS' CHKLST. AFTER SOME TROUBLESHOOTING, WE DETERMINED THAT THE FLAPS WERE INDEED STUCK IN 10 DEG POS. WE ALSO CHKD ACFT SYS AND CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND ANALYZED THE ENTIRE SCENARIO WITH LESS THAN 5000 LBS LEFT FOR FUEL AND NO OPC (OPC WAS MEL'ED AND DID NOT WORK). AT THAT POINT WE REQUESTED CALCULATION FROM DISPATCH FOR FLAPS 10 DEGS WITH A LNDG WT OF 109.0 LBS. WITH NO INITIAL RESPONSE, I CONTACTED OPS TO GET A PATCH THROUGH TO DISPATCH. IT TOOK SEVERAL ATTEMPTS, THEN THEY STARTED WORKING ON THE PATCH. DISPATCH CAME BACK AT A LATER POINT ASKING ABOUT THE FLAPS 10 DEGS, BUT NO NUMBERS. TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE. CAPT REQUESTED VECTORS BACK TO THE ARPT IN ORDER TO AVOID A LOW FUEL SITUATION. WE RECEIVED SOME VECTORS WHICH WOULD NOT TAKE US TOWARD THE FIELD AT WHICH POINT WE DEVIATED FROM THE INSTRUCTIONS SLIGHTLY AND IMMEDIATELY CALLED ATC TO INFORM THEM ABOUT OUR TIME CONSTRAINTS AND THAT WE NEEDED A MORE DIRECT VECTOR. WE BRIEFED THE CHKLST, WHICH CALLED FOR THE ALTERNATE FLAP EXTENSION. DURING FINAL WE PERFORMED THE ALTERNATE FLAP EXTENSION PROC WITH NO RESULTS. IN CONSIDERATION OF FUEL LOAD WHICH WAS CLOSE TO 4000 LBS, OUR AIRSPD AT FLAPS 10 DEGS, WHICH WAS BTWN 160-165 KTS, WE DECLARED AN EMER AT THAT TIME AND REQUESTED RWY XXR FOR LNDG AS WE WERE GAINING ON THE TFC AHEAD ON RWY XXL AND WE PREFERRED THE LONGER RWY. ALL APPLICABLE CHKLSTS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. THE DISPATCH PATCH CAME THROUGH ON SHORT FINAL AT WHICH POINT WE CONCENTRATED ON THE LNDG. WE TOUCHED DOWN BTWN 155-160 KTS ON MAX BRAKING. WHEN WE TAXIED ONTO THE TXWY, WE CALLED OFF THE EMER VEHICLES. AS WE TAXIED TOWARD THE GATE, I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO HAVE MAINT CHK THE BRAKE TEMPS BEFORE

ACTUALLY PARKING AT THE GATE, BUT THE CAPT OPTED TO DRIVE IN TO THE GATE. HE NOTIFIED THE PEOPLE ON THE GND ABOUT POTENTIALLY HOT BRAKES AND I CALLED MAINT OUT TO CHK THE BRAKE TEMPS AT THAT POINT, WHICH ENDED UP AT 495 DEGS C AND REQUIRED 55 MINS OF COOLING. MAINT WAS GOING TO RELEASE THE ACFT AFTER A SHORT CYCLING OF THE FLAP-CHK WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO DUPLICATE THE PROB. NEITHER THE CAPT NOR I THOUGHT THAT WAS GOOD ENOUGH. WE ASKED FOR A SUPVR WHO TOOK THE AIRPLANE OTS. BETTER EDUCATION ON THIS SYS WITH REGARDS TO THE SKEW SENSORS ON THE -700. THE MAINT SUPVR TOLD US THAT THERE HAVE BEEN PROBS IN THE PAST WITH THAT SYS, BUT NEITHER THE CAPT NOR I HAVE EVER HEARD ABOUT THIS. WE SHOULD TRY TO NOT ACT SO FAST TO PUT AN AIRPLANE BACK ON THE LINE AFTER AN EMER WAS DECLARED! DISPATCH DID NOT REPLY FOR 13 MINS (ACARS) AND WHEN THEY DID, THEY QUESTIONED OUR REQUEST INSTEAD OF HELPING US. OPS TOOK 3 OF OUR CALLS BEFORE THERE WAS A REPLY, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS APPARENT THAT WE HAD A PROB. COM BTWN ME AND THE CAPT COULD HAVE BEEN BETTER. I FELT I HAD NO INPUT ON THE DECISIONS ALL THE WAY TO THE BRAKE PROB. I AM AWARE OF MY POS AS AN FO AND NOT MAKING THE FINAL CALL, BUT I DID NOT FEEL VERY USEFUL AT ALL, WHICH IN MY MIND WAS FUELED FROM A '1-WAY COM.' EVEN THE DEBRIEF WAS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. I BELIEVE THAT BRAKE TEMPS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHKD BEFORE PROCEEDING TO JETWAY. I AM NOT SURE IF A LOGBOOK ENTRY FOR THE HOT BRAKES WAS MADE, BUT IT SHOULD HAVE! SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 793806: AS AIRSPD SLOWED THROUGH 160 KTS, I CALLED FOR FLAPS 30 DEGS. AT THAT MOMENT, WE FELT A MOMENTARY ACTIVATION OF THE STICK SHAKER. NOTE 1 OF THE PROC SAYS TO ACTIVATE THE ALTERNATE FLAP EXTENSION SYS MOMENTARILY TO ENSURE THE TRAILING EDGE FLAPS WILL OPERATE WITH THE ALTERNATE SYS. I CHOSE TO HOLD THE CHKLIST AT THIS POINT BECAUSE I DID NOT WANT ANY MORE FLAPS OUT UNTIL WE WERE ON FINAL AND LNDG ASSURED DUE TO A RAPIDLY DETERIORATING FUEL STATE. THERE WAS A BRIEF DISCUSSION BTWN THE FO AND ME ABOUT WHETHER WE SHOULD APPROACH THE GATE OR NOT DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF HOT BRAKES. I FELT THAT AT OUR LNDG WT/TOUCHDOWN SPD AND THE BRAKING FORCES I USED TO STOP THE ACFT, THE BRAKES MIGHT HAVE EXCEEDED MAX QUICK TURN LIMITS BUT I DID NOT FEEL THEY POSED A THREAT. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE FO DID NOT AGREE WITH MY DECISION TO CONTINUE TO THE GATE. I DID STOP THE ACFT AND WE DISCUSSED THIS POINT, BUT NOT REACHING AN AGREEMENT, I ELECTED TO CONTINUE TO THE GATE. I HAVE GREAT RESPECT FOR THIS FO AND RESPECT HER OPINION -- WE SIMPLY DID NOT AGREE ON THIS POINT. MAINT: WHEN MAINT CAME IN THE COCKPIT, HE PUT THE FLAP HANDLE UP AND OF COURSE THE FLAPS WORKED JUST FINE. HE WAS READY TO SIGN OFF THE ACFT AND PUT IT BACK INTO SVC AFTER BRAKE COOLING. IT TOOK A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF DISCUSSION TO GET A MAINT SUPVR INVOLVED AND CONVINCED THAT WE HAD MORE THAN AN OUT-OF-SEQUENCE FLAP EVENT.

Synopsis

B737-700 SUFFERS FLAPS STUCK AT 10 DEGREES ON FINAL APCH. LOW FUEL STATE, DEFERRED SYSTEMS, LACK OF TIMELY SUPPORT FROM DISPATCH AND POOR FLT CREW CRM CONTRIBUTE TO AN IMPERFECT BUT SAFE RESOLUTION.

ACN: 793969

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter
Make Model Name : Falcon 10C
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Climbout : Takeoff
Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB 5

Aircraft : 2

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8900
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 300
ASRS Report : 793969

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 83
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5986
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 119
ASRS Report : 793968

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DEPARTING RWY 24 TEB, SID CALLS FOR RWY HEADING TO 1500 FT MSL THEN R TURN TO 280 DEGS UNTIL 4.5 DME TEB, THEN CLB TO 2000 FT MSL. I PROCEEDED TO CLB TO 2000 FT MSL AFTER THE TURN TO 280 DEGS. ATC QUESTIONED THE ALTITUDE, SAYS IT IS A CONFUSING DEP. NO OTHER CONVERSATION. NO OTHER ACFT IN THE AREA. I READ BACK THE CLRNC TO MY SIC BEFORE DEP CORRECTLY. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHY HE DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING TO CORRECT ME, HE SAID HE TRIED TO. I NEVER HEARD ANYTHING FROM HIM. PURE CASE OF CRM GONE TO HECK. DEP PLATE WAS ON HIS YOKE. FROM NOW ON, PROC WILL BE TO HAVE IT ON THE PF'S YOKE FOR QUICK GLANCES. WE USE 1 SET OF PLATES IN THE COCKPIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM RPTR ACN 793968: UPON REACHING 1500 FT THE CAPT INITIATED THE TURN TO 280 DEGS, BUT CONTINUED TO CLB. I REMINDED HIM 'MAINTAIN 1500 FT TO 4.5 DME.' HIS RESPONSE WAS 'GIVE ME 2000 FT (IN THE ALTITUDE ALERTER).' I AGAIN VOICED MY CONCERN, THEN ATC ASKED OUR ALTITUDE. THE CAPT SEEMED SURPRISED TO DISCOVER THAT ANYTHING WAS WRONG, AND ATTEMPTED TO RATIONALIZE THE SITUATION. THE SITUATION WAS RESOLVED WITH A CURT EXPLANATION FROM ATC OF OUR RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THEY VECTORED US ON COURSE AND UP TO 10000 FT. THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT PER OUR TCAS. CIRCUMSTANCES: WE HAD AN EARLY XA15 START (XA45 DEP) AND DID NOT DEPART TEB UNTIL XL55. WE DUTIED OUT AT XN55, 20 MIN. SHORT OF OUR 14 HR. MAX. DURING THE WAIT AT TEB THE CAPT EXPRESSED THE DESIRE TO 'TAKE A NAP', BUT SAID THAT HE HAD TOO MUCH PAPERWORK TO CATCH UP ON AND THEREFORE WAS PROBABLY TIRED. I SPENT 3 TO 4 HOURS IN THE SNOOZE ROOM AND WAS REASONABLY REFRESHED.

Synopsis

A FATIGUED FALCON 10 CAPT CLBED TO 2000 FT BEFORE THE 4.5 DME ON THE TEB 5 EVEN AFTER THE FO WARNED HIM OF HIS ALT.

ACN: 793841

Time / Day

Date : 200806

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ATL.Airport

State Reference : GA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 18000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC

Weather Elements : Rain

Weather Elements : Thunderstorm

Weather Elements : Turbulence

Weather Elements : Windshear

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZTL.ARTCC

Operator.General Aviation : Corporate

Make Model Name : Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : N/S

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 50

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5500

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 100

ASRS Report : 793841

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC

Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 50

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5000

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 400

ASRS Report : 793859

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

UPON ARRIVING INTO ATL AND BEING TRANSFERRED TO ATL CENTER, A FLIGHT PLAN REROUTE WAS ISSUED BY ATC. THE REROUTE CHANGED THE TRANSITION AND ARRIVING STAR. WE WERE CLEARED TO DSND TO ONE EIGHT THOUSAND FROM AN ALTITUDE OF FL240. AS THE DSCNT WAS IN PROGRESS THE STAR WAS CHANGED AGAIN BY ATC. WHILE STILL DSNDING A THIRD STAR WAS ISSUED BY ATC, AT THIS POINT THREE DIFFERENT STARS HAD BEEN ISSUED WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD BY ATC. DIFFICULTIES AROSE WHILE TRYING TO REPROGRAM THE FLT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. THE CONDITIONS WERE TURBULENT AND LIGHTNING WAS IN THE AREA. THE CAPT OFFERED ASSISTANCE TO INPUT THE LATEST STAR INTO THE FMS. DURING THAT TIME THE ACFT DSNDDED BELOW THE ALTITUDE ASSIGNED BY THE CTRL. POSSIBLE CAUSE WAS AUTOPLT DISCONNECT AND ATTENTION DIVERTED FROM NOT OBSERVING THE AUTOPLT AND THE ACFT. THE CTRL ASKED WHAT ALTITUDE WAS ASSIGNED AND I RESPONDED ONE EIGHT THOUSAND. AT THAT TIME SHE RESPONDED CLB AND MAINTAIN ONE NINE THOUSAND; IMMEDIATELY A CLB BEGAN. WHILE CLBING UP TO ONE NINE THOUSAND SHE CHANGED THE STAR AGAIN, TO ONE THAT WAS PREVIOUSLY ISSUED. AT THIS POINT I ASKED FOR A VECTOR AND STATED THAT WE NEEDED TIME TO SET UP THE STAR WITH AN APCH AT PDK. A VECTOR WAS GIVEN AS WELL AS A CTRL HANDOFF, AND THE FLT WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT. I BELIEVE THE CTRL WAS TRYING TO ISSUE A STAR THAT WOULD KEEP US AWAY FROM THUNDERSTORMS. IN MY OPINION THE CHANGES WERE TOO RAPID, AS A RESULT, COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SUFFERED. THE PREVIOUS EVENTS LED TO AN OVERBEARING WORKLOAD ON THE CREW. ALTITUDE DEV WAS THE END RESULT. CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN BY CREW HAS BEEN TO DISCUSS THE EVENT, AGREE TO WORK AS A TEAM WITH SPECIFIC DUTIES FOR EACH CREW MEMBER AND REVIEW CRM PROCS AS BY FLT SAFETY GUIDELINES.

Synopsis

A CORP ACFT CREW RECEIVED FOUR STAR CHANGES ON AN ATL ARR IN HEAVY WX. AN ALT DEV RESULTED. THE CREW BECAME TASK SATURATED AND THE FLT CREW REQUESTED VECTORS.

ACN: 793598

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 13000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 251
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 700
ASRS Report : 793598

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar
Qualification.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Speed Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE ENRTE ON THE ARR INTO ZZZ, WE HAD A MESSAGE ON ACARS TO CONTACT ZZZ. THE FO CONTACTED ZZZ OPS AND WAS INFORMED OF AN ACFT SWAP WITH THAT ACFT ALONG WITH SEVERAL GATE CHANGES. THERE WAS CONFUSION ON THE OPS FREQ WHICH CAUSED A LONGER THAN NORMAL TIME FRAME FOR THIS OCCURRENCE. WHEN I RETURNED TO ATC COM I INFORMED THE CAPT OF WHAT WAS GOING ON AND THAT I WAS BACK WITH HIM. AT THIS POINT ATC QUESTIONED US IF WE WERE GOING TO MAKE THE FIX AT 9000 FT. HAVING JUST COME BACK TO THE SCENE, I ASKED THE CAPT IF WE COULD, IN WHICH HE SAID, 'YES.' I RELAYED THAT TO ATC. AT THIS POINT I NOTICED WE HAD SPD BRAKES EXTENDED AT THE FASTEST RATE OF DSCNT THE ACFT WOULD BE ABLE TO PERFORM. ATC THEN ASKED AGAIN IF WE WERE GOING TO MAKE THE XING. THE CAPT TOLD ME TO TELL THEM YES AND THAT IT SHOULDN'T BE A PROB. MY QUICK TAKE ON THE SCENARIO WAS THAT WE WOULDN'T, BUT UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CAPT HAD MUCH MORE EXPERIENCE WITH THE ACFT AND TRUSTED HIS CALCULATION OVER MINE. AT THAT POINT ATC CHANGED OUR FREQ TO APCH AND THERE WAS A FREQ BLOCK WHEN I WAS TRYING TO RELAY TO THE CTR CTLR. I FINALLY JUST CHANGED FREQS ON MY OWN AND CHKED IN WITH APCH. AT THIS POINT I NOTICED OUR MISS BY APPROX 1500 FT AND WERE 320 KTS GOING THROUGH 10000 FT FOR THE LEVELOFF AT 9000 FT. APCH INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN 250 KTS AND A MIN LATER GAVE US A RADAR VECTOR. THE CAPT QUERIED ATC ABOUT THE EVENT AND ATC RESPONDED THAT WE WERE HIGH ON THE XING AND APPEARED TO BE FAST. NO OTHER ACFT SEEMED CONFLICTED WITH OUR EVENT. THE ENTIRE EVENT HAPPENED EXTREMELY QUICK WITH LITTLE TIME FOR CREW MEMBER INTERACTION COUPLED WITH THE COM CHANGES AND FREQ CHANGE. ANOTHER THREAT WAS CRM BREAKDOWN BTWN US, COUPLED WITH AN ARTIFICIAL PRESSURE TO MAKE THE XING RESTR CAUSING 'TUNNEL VISION' AND LOWERING OUR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. BETTER CRM AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ESPECIALLY WITH 1 PLT DOING OTHER DUTIES NEEDED TO OCCUR. I, AS THE FO SHOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP MORE ON MY CALCULATION FOR DSCNT INSTEAD OF TRUSTING MY CAPT'S COMPLETELY.

Synopsis

ATC QUERIED A CREW ABOUT A CROSSING RESTRICTION COMPLIANCE WHICH THE CAPT AFFIRMED THEY WOULD MAKE. THEY MISSED THE RESTRICTION AND WERE VECTORED.

ACN: 791878

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.General Aviation : Personal
Make Model Name : Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Other : Personal
Function.Observation : Passenger
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Private
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 7
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 1202.6
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1202.6
ASRS Report : 791879

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Incursion : Runway
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ACFT CLRED FROM RAMP TO TAXI TO RWY XX AT TXWY D. AS THE PLT OPERATING THE RADIO, I MISTAKENLY COPIED RWY XY AT TXWY D, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THE TAXI CLRNC. I'M NOT SURE WHETHER I READ BACK RWY XX OR RWY XY. PF HAS APPROX 200 HRS TOTAL TIME, PLT OPERATING THE RADIO HAS APPROX 1200 HRS AND OUTRANKS THE PF. ACFT WAS TAXIED TO RWY XY, XING ACTIVE RWY XX IN THE PROCESS. CTLR NOTIFIED ACFT THAT IT HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TAXI TO RWY XX AT TXWY D, AND HAD CROSSED THE ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT PERMISSION. FORTUNATELY, NO TFC WAS ON OR APCHING THE RWY. THE PROB AROSE WITH THE MISUNDERSTOOD TAXI CLRNC, AND WAS COMPOUNDED BY THE PF NOT QUESTIONING THE CLRNC (ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED HE THOUGHT HE HEARD RWY XX) AND THE FAILURE OF THE CTLR TO HALT OUR INCORRECT TAXI PATH UNTIL AFTER WE HAD CROSSED THE ACTIVE RWY. WE ESPOUSE CRM, AND STRESS FLT SAFETY. NEVERTHELESS, THE PF DID NOT FEEL COMFORTABLE QUESTIONING THE TAXI CLRNC. RE-EMPHASIS ON CRM PROCS, AND THE DUTY TO CLARIFY UNCLR OR UNCERTAIN OR INCORRECT DIRECTIONS NEED TO BE STRESSED PRIOR TO EACH FLT.

Synopsis

A SMALL AIRCRAFT TAXIED ACROSS AN ACTIVE RUNWAY WITHOUT CLEARANCE.

ACN: 791642

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Position And Hold

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 75
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 11000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 5000
ASRS Report : 791642

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHEN A SINGLE ENG TAXI WAS COMMANDED BY THE CAPT, I BROUGHT UP THE 5 MIN WARM-UP. ON J, WHEN WE STARTED THE ENG, I MENTIONED THE 5 MIN WARM-UP AGAIN. PER SOP, I STARTED TIMING FOR THE 5 MINS AFTER THE ENG STABILIZED VERBALIZING WHAT I DID. IT WAS NO SURPRISE TO ME THAT WE ARRIVED AT RWY 9R WITH JUST ABOUT 3 MINS LEFT ON THE WARM-UP. WHEN TWR CLRED US INTO POS AND HOLD, I ACCEPTED THE CLRNC AND INFORMED THEM THAT A FEW MINS WERE NEEDED (I CANNOT REMEMBER THE EXACT TIME I GAVE THEM) BEFORE WE COULD TAKE OFF. AT FIRST, TWR CLRED US STRAIGHT AHEAD BUT THEN RESCINDED AND SAID POS AND HOLD. ALL THE WHILE THE CAPT WAS YELLING 'POS AND HOLD' REPEATEDLY. AFTER WE ENTERED THE RWY, TWR CLRLY CHANGED HIS MIND AND TOLD US TO EXIT THE RWY STRAIGHT

AHEAD. I REPEATED HIS CLRNC. THE CAPT WHILE STILL YELLING POS AND HOLD, DISREGARD THE CTLR AND TURNED INTO POS. THEN THE TWR CLRED US TO TAXI STRAIGHT AHEAD AND MAKE A R TURN OFF RWY 9R. THE CAPT AGAIN YELLED POS AND HOLD TO ME. I LOOKED AT THE CAPT AND SAID 'COMPLY WITH ATC INSTRUCTIONS AND EXIT THE RWY' PROFESSIONALLY, CALMLY BUT WAS FIRM AS MY HAND WAS GOING TO THE TILLER TO TAKE THE ACFT TO COMPLY. FORTUNATELY, THIS WAS NOT NEEDED AND THE CAPT EXITED THE RWY. CRM: I CANNOT CONCEIVE HOW I COULD HAVE DONE ANYTHING ELSE TO PREPARE THE CAPT FOR THE WAIT. HE DECIDED TO DO A SINGLE ENG TAXI TO RWY 9R FULL WELL KNOWING WE HAD A WARM-UP. IN HINDSIGHT, MAYBE I SHOULD HAVE REQUESTED HE RETURN TO THE GATE OR TAKE SOME TIME TO CALM DOWN. I NOW WONDER WHERE HIS THOUGHTS WERE DURING THE TKOF. I SHOULD ALSO NOTE WE LANDED 15 MINS EARLY AFTER FLYING A LOW COST INDEX. TIME WAS NEVER A FACTOR.

Synopsis

A320 FO REPORTS DISAGREEMENT WITH CAPT OVER COMPLIANCE WITH COMPANY REQUIRED ENGINE WARM-UP BEFORE TKOF.

ACN: 790028

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : AEX.Airport
State Reference : LA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : AEX.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Challenger CL600
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4000
ASRS Report : 790028

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Incursion : Runway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING THE DEP BRIEFING PRIOR TO PUSHBACK, I HAD INADVERTENTLY IDENTIFIED RWY 14 AS THE DEP RWY. I'D OPERATED INTO AND OUT OF AEX MANY TIMES OVER THE LAST 10 YRS AND UNDERSTOOD RWY 14/32 TO BE THE PRIMARY RWY UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS. MY FO IMMEDIATELY REMINDED ME THAT RWY 14 WAS UNAVAILABLE AND THE RWY 18 WAS BEING USED FOR DEPS. I CHANGED THE DEP RWY IN THE FMS TO RWY 18, AND COMPLETED THE BRIEFING AND ALL CHKLISTS. AS THE PUSHBACK BEGAN, WE WERE MOMENTARILY DISTURBED BY A PROB WITH THE TUG THAT WAS SOON CORRECTED. AFTER PUSHBACK WAS COMPLETE, MY FO CALLED FOR A TAXI CLRNC, AND WE WERE CLERED TO TAXI TO RWY 18. THE PUSHBACK LEFT US FACING NE, TOWARD THE TERMINAL BUILDING. UPON RECEIVING THE TAXI CLRNC, I MADE A L TURN AND JOINED TXWY A. BY NOW, MY PRIOR CONDITIONING (THINKING OF RWY 14/32 AS THE 'PRIMARY RWY') REASSERTED ITSELF AND I BEGAN TAXIING TO RWY 14. INSTEAD OF TURNING R ONTO TXWY B TO APCH RWY 18, I CONTINUED ON TXWY A TO APCH RWY 14. AS FAR AS I WAS CONCERNED, NOTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY WAS HAPPENING. I WAS MAINTAINING A CONSERVATIVE TAXI SPD SINCE TXWY A HAD A SLIGHT ZIGZAG CHARACTER TO IT ON THAT PART OF THE ARPT. AS WE APCHED RWY 18 AT TXWY A MY FO (WHO LATER CONFESSED SHE WAS BY THIS TIME THOROUGHLY SATISFIED THAT I WAS COMPETENT, CONFIDENT, AND SEASONED PIC) BEGAN TO SENSE THAT SOMETHING WAS WRONG. UPON RECOGNIZING THAT I INTENDED TO ENTER RWY 18/36 ON TXWY A, SHE ASKED 'WHAT ARE YOU DOING?' SHE DID NOT TAKE POSITIVE ACTION TO STOP THE ACFT BECAUSE ON SOME GUT LEVEL, SHE BELIEVED THAT I DID, IN FACT, KNOW WHAT I WAS DOING. AT THE SAME MOMENT MY FO SPOKE, THE GND CTLR TOLD US TO TURN R ONTO RWY 18 AND CONTACT THE TWR ON 127.35 MHZ. ALL THIS HAPPENED AS THE ACFT WAS ENTERING THE RWY AND APCHING THE RWY CTRLINE. THE TWR FURTHER INSTRUCTED US TO BACK-TAXI ON RWY 18, MAKE A 180 DEG TURN AT THE END, AND ADVISE WHEN READY TO TAKE OFF. IT WAS ONLY WHEN THE GND CTLR TOLD US TO TURN R ONTO RWY 18 THAT I REALIZED WHAT I HAD DONE. THE REMAINDER OF THE DEP WAS NORMAL, AND THERE WAS NO FURTHER MENTION OF THE EVENT BY ATC. I RECENTLY COMPLETED FAA-MANDATORY RWY INCURSION AWARENESS TRAINING VIA MY COMPANY'S TRAINING DEPT -- AS DID ALL PLTS AT MY COMPANY. I, FOR ONE, TOOK THE TRAINING VERY SERIOUSLY, AND SPENT SOME TIME CONSIDERING VARIOUS WAYS TO MAKE MYSELF 'INCURSION-PROOF.' TO ME, THE MOST IMPORTANT LESSON TO COME OUT OF THE TRAINING WAS THAT AN INCURSION CAN HAPPEN TO ANYONE, REGARDLESS OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE. NEVERTHELESS, I ALLOWED MY ROUTINE EXPERIENCE WITH THIS 'SLOW, SMALL-TOWN' ARPT TO MAKE ME COMPLACENT. I STRIPPED AWAY ALL OF THE PROCEDURAL 'FAIL-SAFES' I NORMALLY USE TO PROTECT MYSELF AND MY PAX, AND LEFT MYSELF COMPLETELY DEPENDENT ON MY FO TO KEEP ME OUT OF TROUBLE. FROM A CRM PERSPECTIVE, HER DECISION TO NOT TAKE ACTION TO STOP THE ACFT, WHILE REGRETTABLE, IS COMPLETELY UNDERSTANDABLE. AFTER ALL, I'M THE VETERAN WITH HUNDREDS OF HRS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THIS FIELD, AND SHE'S THE 14-MONTH FO. WHY SHOULDN'T SHE BELIEVE THAT I KNOW EXACTLY WHAT I'M DOING? I HAVE RE-COMMITTED MYSELF TO ELEVATING MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, AS WELL AS THAT OF MY CREW, DURING ALL PHASES OF FLT, BUT PARTICULARLY DURING TAXI. I'M STILL KICKING MYSELF FOR MAKING THE MISTAKE THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO HAPPEN TO 'OTHER PEOPLE,' NOT TO ME.

Synopsis

CRJ FLT CREW EXPERIENCES A RUNWAY INCURSION AT AEX.

ACN: 789540

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : PIT.Airport
State Reference : PA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : PIT.Tower
Operator.General Aviation : Instructional
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Ground : Takeoff Roll

Person : 1

Affiliation.Other : Instructional
Function.Instruction : Trainee
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Private
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 20
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 680
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 250
ASRS Report : 789540

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Incursion : Runway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS UNDERGOING A RECURRENT EVAL WITH 2 FLT INSTRUCTORS IN 2 ACFT. I HAD NOT FLOWN EITHER OF THESE PARTICULAR PLANES BEFORE. THE R SEAT

INSTRUCTOR WAS SIMULTANEOUSLY BEING EVALUED FOR HIS SKILLS BY THE BACK SEAT INSTRUCTOR. THE PLAN WAS TO FLY THE C172 TO ANOTHER ARPT, THEN SWITCH TO A C182 FOR TYPE SPECIFIC WORK, THE RETURN TO OUR FIELD IN THE C172. DURING THE PREFLT, THE CHRONOMETER WAS FOUND INOP WITH NO PLACARD. I COULDN'T FIND A PLACARD AND THE CHIEF INSPECTOR SAID 'LET'S JUST GO.' REALLY AN FAR VIOLATION. JUST AFTER ROTATION ON TKOF, I NOTICED THE ENG RPM EXCEEDED THE REDLINE BY 250 RPM. I COMMENTED THAT THE ENG RPM WAS ABNORMALLY ABOVE REDLINE AND WAS GOING TO GO BACK. THE CHIEF INSTRUCTOR SAID THEY HAD JUST CHANGED THE TACH AND IT HAD THE WRONG MARKINGS AND MAINT HAD FORGOTTEN TO PLACARD THE ACFT. I SHOULD HAVE TERMINATED THE FLT DUE TO 2 VIOLATIONS OF FAR'S AND GND'D THE PLANE, BUT FELT PRESSURED BECAUSE MY COMPANY REQUIRED RECURRENT HAD EXPIRED AND I WOULD HAVE BEEN GND'D UNTIL EVERYTHING COULD BE PLANNED AGAIN, IT HAD TAKEN 3 MONTHS THE FIRST TIME. WE SWITCHED ACFT TO THE C182 AND IN DOING THE WT AND BAL FOUND THAT SECTION WAS MISSING FROM THE ACFT MANUAL AND THERE WERE NO OTHER COPIES IN THE PLANE OR AVAILABLE. I HAD THE CORRECT WT AND BAL FIGURED OUT FROM HOME, BUT AN INCOMPLETE MANUAL IS ANOTHER FAR VIOLATION. I THEN FOUND THE ELT BATTERY WAS EXPIRED. WE WERE ABLE TO OPERATE UNDER AN FAR EXCEPTION FOR TRAINING WITH 50 NM, BUT I THINK IT, THOUGH LEGAL, WAS A POOR DECISION. LATER I CROSSED A HOLD LINE AT AN UNCTLED ARPT WITHOUT ANNOUNCING INTENTIONS. THERE WAS NO TFC AND NO CONFLICT BUT IT SHOWED A REAL CRM ISSUE WHEN NONE OF 3 PEOPLE QUESTIONED WHETHER WE WERE GOING TO STOP. NONE OF THE 4 PROBS, EXCEPT PERHAPS THE RWY INCURSION, WERE AN IMMINENT SAFETY ISSUE, BUT THEY ARE DEFINITELY THE KIND OF CHOICES YOU SEE HIGHLIGHTED IN NTSB RPTS. IT ALSO SHOWED THE CPR SAFETY ISSUE WHEN 3 CREW MEMBERS, ALL HIGHLY QUALIFIED AND WITH MANY YRS WITH THE COMPANY, ALL ACCEPTED DECISION WHICH DIRECTLY VIOLATED FAR'S. I WILL NEVER MAKE THOSE CHOICES AGAIN NOR LET ANYONE PERSUADE ME TO MAKE THEM.

Synopsis

PVT PLT UNDERGOING RECURRENT EVAL BROKE NUMEROUS FAR'S AND HAD A RWY INCURSION, CITING SCHEDULING PRESSURE AS THE MAIN REASON FOR ACCEPTING AND MAKING POOR DECISIONS.

ACN: 789160

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : CZUL.Airport
State Reference : PQ
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 38000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : CZUL.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : MD-11
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level
Route In Use.Enroute.Airway : J551.Airway

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 120
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6200
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2600
ASRS Report : 789160

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : Foreign
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Consequence.FAA : Assigned Or Threatened Penalties

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

IN CRUISE FLT, UNDER RADAR CONTACT, MONTREAL CTR CLRED MD11 DIRECT WAYPOINT (MT) THEN FPR. PF (FO) SELECTED THE 'DIRECT-TO' TILE ON MCDU AND THE 'LSK 1L' NEXT TO (MT). HE VISUALLY CONFIRMED NAV IN ROLL FMA AND (MT) AS ACTIVE WAYPOINT ON NAV DISPLAY. APPROX 30 SECONDS LATER, AFTER SELECTING THE 'PROGRESS' TILE ON THE MCDU, THE PF NOTICED (MT) WAS THE 'FROM' WAYPOINT ON THE MCDU, BUT THE NAV DISPLAY STILL DISPLAYED (MT) AS THE ACTIVE WAYPOINT. HE RE-ACCOMPLISHED THE 'DIRECT-TO' BY TYPING (MT) INTO THE 'DIRECT-TO' BLOCK AND RECEIVED THE CORRECT INDICATIONS ON BOTH THE NAV DISPLAY AND THE MCDU. PF AND PLT MONITORING DISCUSSED THE ANOMALY, CONFIRMING WHAT THEY HAD SEEN AND THAT ALL INDICATIONS APPEARED CORRECT NOW. APPROX 30 MINS LATER, WITH PLT MONITORING (NOW THE CAPT) AND PF (NOW THE RELIEF PLT), ACFT SEQUENCED (MT) AND INITIATED A SLIGHT L TURN TO JOIN J551 TO YVO PER FPR. PLT MONITORING NOTICED ACFT START THE L TURN AND CONFIRMED NAV IN ROLL FMA AND YVO AS ACTIVE WAYPOINT ON THE NAV DISPLAY. APPROX 15 MINS LATER, MONTREAL ASKED WHERE WE WERE GOING. PLT MONITORING NOTED/CONFIRMED NAV IN ROLL FMA AND YVO AS ACTIVE WAYPOINT ON NAV DISPLAY. HOWEVER, WE HAD NO MAGENTA LINE FROM ACFT SYMBOL TO YVO WHICH WAS LOCATED AT 10 O'CLOCK POS AND 90 NM ON THE NAV DISPLAY. MONTREAL TOLD US WE WERE OFF COURSE THEN CLRED US TO A FIX DOWN TRACK. THEY ALSO STATED THEY WOULD RPT THE INCIDENT. AFTER OUR CREW DEBRIEF, 2 LESSONS LEARNED ARE APPARENT: 1) ALTHOUGH WE WERE IN RADAR CONTACT, GREATER DILIGENCE AFTER SEQUENCING (MT) WOULD PROBABLY HAVE ENABLED THE CREW TO DETECT THE ANOMALY AND PREVENT THE NAV ERROR. WE DID CONFIRM NAV AND THE CORRECT ACTIVE WAYPOINT ON THE NAV DISPLAY BUT FAILED TO CATCH THE SUBSEQUENT FMS AUTO SEQUENCE TO A DOWN TRACK WAYPOINT. 2) WHILE THE PF/PLT MONITORING OBSERVED GOOD CRM IN THEIR STATUS BRIEF TO THE PLT RETURNING FROM A REST CYCLE, THEY OVERLOOKED BRIEFING THE PREVIOUS FMS ANOMALY. HAD THEY BRIEFED THIS PROB WE MIGHT HAVE CAUGHT THE SUBSEQUENT ANOMALY AND PREVENTED THE NAV DEV. ALSO OF NOTE, BUT POSSIBLY UNRELATED, THE ACFT EXPERIENCED A LIGHTNING STRIKE ON THE LEG PRIOR TO OURS.

Synopsis

MD11 FLT CREW EXPERIENCES NAV DEVIATION FOLLOWING FMS ANOMALY.

ACN: 788812

Time / Day

Date : 200805
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Intersection : COHOP
State Reference : NY
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 1450
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 1600

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer Only : 22
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Non Precision

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 788812

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING DSCNT INTO LGA AREA, RECEIVED ATIS INDICATING LDA-A RWY 22 APCH IN USE. SINCE LDA-A APCH NOT IN FMS AS AN APCH AVAILABLE TO BE SELECTED, FIXES ON APCH HAD TO BE MANUALLY BUILT IN FMS TO USE BEST

AVAILABLE ACFT AUTOMATION. THIS TOOK TIME FOR INSTRUCTION FROM CAPT TO FO (CAPT FLYING), AND CAUSED SOME RUSHING TO ACCOMPLISH IN-RANGE CHKLISTS AND ARR PROCS IN TIMELY MANNER. NEW YORK APCH RADIO TFC WAS ALSO VERY BUSY. FLT WAS CLRED FROM HAARP ON RKA2 ARR DIRECT TO CASLE ON LDA-A APCH, AND CLRED FOR LDA-A APCH. WX WAS VMC, AND ARPT WAS IN SIGHT BEFORE CASLE FIX. SINCE MANUALLY BUILT APCHS CAN'T USE LNAV/VNAV PROCS, CAPT SELECTED VOR/LOC AND VERT SPD FOR DSCNT AT CASLE. CAPT INADVERTENTLY SELECTED 1000 FT (CIRCLING MINIMA) IN ALT SELECTOR VERSUS 1600 FT FOR COHOP STEPDOWN FIX. LOC WAS CAPTURED AT CASLE, AND ACFT WAS S-ING DOWN FINAL DUE TO LOC COURSE DEVIATING BACK-AND-FORTH (PROBABLY DUE TO XING ACFT ON GND, LGA TKOFS WERE BEING CONDUCTED ON RWY 13). CAPT SELECTED LNAV FOR STEADY COURSE CTL. APPROX 1 MI BEFORE COHOP, CAPT RECOGNIZED ALTDEV AT APPROX 1450 FT, DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT, CORRECTED BACK TO 1600 FT AT COHOP, AND CONTINUED APCH TO LAND AT LGA RWY 22. DIGITAL ATIS CAPABILITY WOULD HAVE HELPED. WITH DIGITAL ATIS, DEST STATION WX AND ACTIVE APCHS CAN BE STUDIED AND ANALYZED ENRTE RATHER THAN IN DSCNT PHASE, ALLOWING FOR MORE TIME TO DISCUSS AND PLAN ALL ASPECTS OF THE APCH TO BE FLOWN. WHEN VOICE ATIS MUST BE RECEIVED BY ONE OF THE PLTS DURING DSCNT INTO BUSY ARPT AREAS, THERE IS MUCH MORE POTENTIAL FOR ERROR IN MANY ASPECTS OF THE DSCNT AND APCH.

Synopsis

B737-700 FLT CREW DESCENDS BELOW CROSSING RESTRICTION ON LDA-A IN VMC TO LGA. CITE WORKLOAD, CRM ISSUES AND LACK OF PROCEDURE IN FMS DATABASE AS CONTRIBUTORS.

ACN: 788592

Time / Day

Date : 200805
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TVL.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 10000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : RNO.TRACON
Make Model Name : Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer Only : 18
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Arrival : On Vectors

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 50
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 30
ASRS Report : 788592

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE DSNDING FOR TVL WE REQUESTED VECTORS HOPING TO GET THE VISUAL APCH. WE THEN DECIDED SINCE WE WERE BOTH UNFAMILIAR WITH THE AREA WE SHOULD ASK FOR THE LDA/DME-1 RWY 18. WE THEN RECEIVED A VECTOR AND LOWER ALT FOR THE LDA/DME-1 RWY 18 APCH AT TVL. WE WERE ASKED BY CTR IF WE WERE GOING TO BE ABLE TO MAKE THE APCH FROM THERE. WE DECIDED THEY MUST THINK WE ARE TOO HIGH TO MAKE THE DSCNT. WE RESPONDED INDICATING WE WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE IT. WE WERE HANDED OFF TO RENO APCH. WE WERE VMC AND THE CAPT STATED, THIS IS THE LAKE (BY THE ARPT). I BELIEVED I COULD SEE THE RWY AND STATED WHERE I THOUGHT IT WAS. THE CAPT STATED THE ARPT WOULD NOT BE IN THE POS INDICATED. WE LOOKED AT THE APCH PLATE AND AGREED IT WAS NOT THE ARPT I WAS SEEING. THE CAPT THEN INITIATED A DSCNT OVER THE LAKE. I POINTED OUT WE HAD NOT INTERCEPTED THE LDA AND WERE NOT RECEIVING ANY DME. I STATED WE SHOULD NOT DSND UNTIL WE ARE ON THE LDA AND HAD REACHED A STEP DOWN POINT. THE CAPT INDICATED WE WERE VISUAL SO IT DID NOT MATTER. RENO APCH CALLED US AND TOLD US TO CHK ALT AND GAVE US AN ALTIMETER SETTING. RENO APCH THEN CALLED US AND STATED AN ALT ALERT, STATED THE MINIMUM ALT, AND WHAT ALT THEY WERE SHOWING US AT. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY CLBED TO THE MINIMUM ALT. WE THEN REALIZED THE LAKE WE WERE DSNDING OVER WAS NOT THE LAKE BY THE ARPT WE WERE LNDG AT. WE HAD BEEN DSNDING OVER A SMALLER LAKE TO THE NE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: NOT ADHERING TO SOP. LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. LACK OF CRM. FATIGUE.

Synopsis

CITATION FO REPORTS DESCENDING BELOW MSA WHILE VISUALLY SEARCHING FOR TVL ARPT.

ACN: 788268

Time / Day

Date : 200805
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 35000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Beechjet 400
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Vacating Altitude
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : ZZZ

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Turbine Engine

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 30000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4000
ASRS Report : 788268

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 70
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 11500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4000
ASRS Report : 789496

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Other
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

FLYING ON TOP OF WX WITH ENG DEICE SYS ACTIVATED. AS WE BEGAN DSCNT TO FL240, THE R ENG SPOOLED DOWN. WHILE COMPLETING THE FLT CHKLST, THE ENG OIL PRESSURE LIGHT ILLUMINATED. THE ENG SHUT DOWN, RESTART CHKLST WAS COMPLETED, AND THE ENG RELIT SUCCESSFULLY. NO OTHER PROBS WERE ENCOUNTERED, AND A NORMAL LNDG WAS MADE AT ZZZ. MECHS WERE SUMMONED TO INVESTIGATE THE ENG. FUEL SAMPLES WERE NORMAL WITH NO WATER PRESENT, AND THE ANTI-ICING ADDITIVE WAS NORMAL. AFTER COMPLETING THE PWR CHKS, THE ACFT MANUFACTURER WAS NOTIFIED. WE ARE STILL INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE, AND AT THIS TIME, WE BELIEVE THE PROB LIES WITHIN THE P3 LINE. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS SITUATION HAS OCCURRED WITH OTHER ACFT IN THE PAST, AND A SVC BULLETIN IS BEING ISSUED TO HEAT THE P3 LINE WITH ENG BLEED AIR. WE WILL CERTAINLY COMPLY WITH THIS BULLETIN IN A TIMELY MANNER IN HOPES THAT THIS OCCURRENCE WILL NOT RECUR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 789496: WE WERE DSNDRG ON THE ARR OUT OF FL350 WITH THE ENG ANTI-ICE ON, WHEN THE PIC INSTRUCTED ME TO TURN ON THE WING HEAT. SHORTLY AFTER TURNING ON THE WING HEAT, THE R ENG ROLLED BACK. THE PIC INSTRUCTED ME TO ADVISE ATC THAT OUR R ENG HAD ROLLED BACK AND GET THE CHKLST OUT FOR ENG FAILURE, AND WHILE I WAS LOOKING UP THE ENG FAILURE PROCS THE PIC STATED THE ENG FAILED AND HE SELECTED FUEL CUTOFF POS FOR THE R ENG. AT THAT TIME HE INSTRUCTED ME TO FIND THE ENG AIR-START PROCS. I INITIATED THE RESTART AND THE ENG RESTARTED AND RAN NORMAL AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER ABNORMALITIES. AFTER ADVISING THE MAINT DEPT AND THEIR RESEARCH THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS P3 BLEED LINE FREEZING AND CAUSING THE ENG TO GO TO IDLE POS. I THINK HAD THE PIC WAITED JUST A LITTLE BIT THAT THE CTL OF THE ENG WOULD HAVE RETURNED TO NORMAL. I ALSO THINK THAT CRM WAS NOT USED EFFECTIVELY BECAUSE HE DECIDED TO SHUT DOWN THE ENG SO RAPIDLY AND NOT EVEN CONFER WITH ME, WHILE I WAS BUSY WITH THE CHKLST THAT JUST THAT AMOUNT OF TIME MIGHT HAVE BEEN ENOUGH TO REGAIN CTL OF THE ENG.

Synopsis

BEECHJET 400 FLT CREW REPORTS ENGINE ROLL BACK DURING DESCENT. ENGINE IS SHUT DOWN AND RESTARTED WITH NO FURTHER PROBLEMS.

ACN: 788259

Time / Day

Date : 200805
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : OMAE.ARTCC
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : OMAE.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 38
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 18587
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 6230
ASRS Report : 788259

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : Foreign
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I CHOSE FOR MY FO TO FLY THIS LEG AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN TO ZZZZ. HE LOADED THE FLT PLAN INTO THE CDU USING THE COMPANY GENERATED FLT PLAN (RAV DCT SHJ DCT AVAMI R401 ANVIX...). I CHKED HIS INPUT USING THE COMPANY GENERATED FLT PLAN, BUT FAILED TO CHK THE ICAO FLT PLAN THAT WAS GIVEN TO US AT OPS (RAV DCT SHJ DCT ANVIX...). FAILING TO MAKE THIS CHK WAS A HUGE ERROR AS THE COURSE SHJ DCT AVAMI IS APPROX 30 DEGS L OF THE COURSE SHJ DCT ANVIX. OUR CLRNC WAS 'R TURN DIRECT TO SHJ THEN AS FILED, CLB TO 4000, SQUAWK.' WITH TWR FREQ IN THE L VHF RADIO, AS NORMAL THE TKOF WAS MADE WITH INSTRUCTIONS FROM TWR TO SWITCH TO DUBAI DEP WHEN PASSING 2000 FT. WHEN PASSING 2000 FT THE FREQ CHANGE WAS MADE USING THE L VHF, AND DUBAI DEP ACKNOWLEDGED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO MAINTAIN 4000 FT. APCHING 4000 FT AND THE SHJ VORTAC I REQUESTED THE RELIEF PLT CONTACT OPS ON THE R VHF RADIO TO GIVE AN OFF RPT. ON THIS PARTICULAR ACFT ONE CAN CHANGE THE L/C/R VHF FREQS AND L/AM/R HF FREQS ON THE L/C/R VHF AND HF RADIOS USING EITHER THE L/C/R RADIO SELECTOR PANELS. IN CHANGING THE FREQ ON THE R VHF RADIO, I FAILED TO NOTICE THE L VHF RADIO WAS SELECTED ON THE R RADIO SELECTOR PANEL. IN SO DOING I CHANGED THE L VHF RADIO TO OPS AND LOST COMS WITH DUBAI DEP. AT SHJ THE ACFT TURNED L DIRECT TO AVAMI AS I THOUGHT WAS CORRECT ACCORDING TO THE COMPANY GENERATED FLT PLAN (BUT ACTUALLY INCORRECT ACCORDING TO THE FILED/ICAO FLT PLAN). AFTER A TIME PERIOD AND APCHING AVAMI, I THOUGHT TO ASK DUBAI DEP FOR CLRNC DIRECT TO ANVIX. THIS WAS WHEN I REALIZED I HAD MADE ERRORS IN CHANGING THE RADIO FREQS. I IMMEDIATELY REGAINED CONTACT WITH DUBAI DEP, AND DUBAI IMMEDIATELY ASKED IF I WAS HAVING RADIO PROBS. I EXPLAINED WE HAD INADVERTENTLY SWITCHED RADIO FREQS. DUBAI DEP ASKED WHERE I WAS GOING AND I REPLIED DIRECT TO AVAMI AS FILED. DUBAI DEP THEN TOLD ME I SHOULD BE GOING DIRECT TO ANVIX. DUBAI DEP'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE COMPLETED. SHORTLY THEREAFTER A FREQ CHANGE WAS MADE, AND THE ENSUING CTRLR INFORMED ME THAT A RPT ON MY ERRORS WAS TO BE SUBMITTED. I DID HAVE OTHER ACFT SHOW UP ON TCAS, BUT NO WARNING OR ADVISORY WAS GENERATED. I DO NOT HONESTLY KNOW IF A CONFLICT ENSUED, AND DUBAI DEP DID NOT INFORM ME OF ANY. SOLUTIONS TO PREVENT THESE TYPE OF ERRORS: I MUST BE MORE DILIGENT IN COMPARING THE COMPANY FLT PLAN AND THE ATC/ICAO GENERATED FLT PLAN. HAVING USED A COMPANY GENERATED FLT PLAN, APPROVED BY THE FAA AND US ATC, THE PREVIOUS 18 YRS CREATES AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE A COMPANY FLT PLAN IS RELIED ON. IF OTHER PEOPLE, COMPANIES, OR AGENCIES ARE AWARE OF THE DIFFERENCES BTWN COMPANY/SUBMITTED FLT PLANS AND ACTUAL FLT PLAN, THESE DIFFERENCES SHOULD BE HIGHLIGHTED IN BRIEFINGS OR CLRNCs. HOWEVER, THIS IN NO WAY REDUCES THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CAPT TO BE FULLY AWARE OF HIS CLRNC. THE ENTIRE CREW MUST BE MORE DILIGENT AS WELL. WHEN 2 FLT PLANS EXIST, ONLY USE THE ATC GENERATED FLT PLAN. NO OTHER RADIOS NEED TO BE USED FOR OTHER COM BELOW 10000 FT UNLESS AN EMER IS IN PROGRESS. MY ERROR FOR REQUESTING THE RELIEF PLT TO MAKE THE OFF RPT. MY ABOVE RPT IS WRITTEN IN THE FIRST PERSON AND IS NOT DONE SO TO INDICATE I WAS DOING EVERYTHING. ON THE CONTRARY, THE CREW WAS GOOD AND PERFORMING WELL. MY RESPONSIBILITY IS TO ENSURE BETTER CRM. REGARDING THE RADIOS, AGAIN DUE DILIGENCE IS PARAMOUNT WHEN CHANGING RADIO FREQS, ENSURING THAT ALL RADIO SELECTIONS ARE IN THE CORRECT POS AND VERIFYING THAT THE CORRECT FREQ IS IN PLACE AFTER THE

CHANGE IS MADE. OVERCONFIDENCE PLAYED A LARGE PART IN THE MISTAKES. ALTHOUGH I HAD NOT FLOWN FROM THE UAE, I HAD FLOWN NUMEROUS TRIPS FROM EUROPE TO INDIA AND WAS FAMILIAR WITH PROCS OVERFLYING THIS AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST. A MORE THOROUGH DISCIPLINE IS REQUIRED WHEN FLYING FROM ANY UNFAMILIAR DEP POINT.

Synopsis

B757 CAPT REPORTS TRACK DEV AND LOST COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTING ZZZZ.

ACN: 785954

Time / Day

Date : 200805
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 700

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation : Personal
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout : Takeoff

Person : 1

Affiliation.Other : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Private
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 83
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 277
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 274
ASRS Report : 785954

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : VFR In IMC
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

IN THE MORNING, I CHKED THE WX AROUND THE COASTAL AREAS FOR A XCOUNTRY WHICH I CANCELED BECAUSE THE METARS AND TAFS SHOWED CEILINGS AROUND 3700 FT AND THE VISIBILITY TO BE 4 SM. I HAD TO DO THAT FLT VFR. I DECIDED TO COME BACK IFR. WE TRIED FILING A FLT PLAN ON THE GND WITH ZZZ1 RADIO BUT COULD NOT GET THEM AND OUR PLAN WAS TO TAKE OFF VFR AND MAINTAIN VFR TILL WE GOT AN IFR CLRNC. WE GOT INTO CLOUDS BEFORE WE EXPECTED AT 700 FT. WE LEVELED OFF FOR SOME TIME AND THE PAX BEHIND SAID SHE COULD LOOK AT THE GND AND I TURNED TO SEE AND TRY TO FIND THE ARPT. BUT I COULD NOT FIND IT, AND THE LAND WAS NOT VISIBLE CLEARLY. MY COPLT WAS ALSO IFR RATED AND HE SAID WE CLB AGAIN BECAUSE WE WERE ALREADY FLYING IN CLOUDS. WE WERE IN A BANK OF 30 DEGS WITHOUT REALIZING FOR ABOUT A FEW SECONDS 3 TIMES. BUT WE CORRECTED. MY COPLT THOUGHT WE WERE IN AN UNUSUAL ATTITUDE BUT OUR AIRSPD WAS MAINTAINED AND WE DIDN'T HAVE ANY CHANGES IN ALT. WE CLBED AND HE WAS TRYING TO TALK TO ZZZ1 RADIO AND FILE A FLT PLAN AND WAS TURNING THE ACFT UNINTENTIONALLY. I TRIED HELPING HIM WITH IT BUT THEY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND US. BUT I WAS READY TO TALK TO ZZZ1 CTR FOR POP-UP IFR AND WE SWITCHED TO THEM AND I MADE THE FIRST CALL THAT WE REQUESTED IFR CLRNC. IN BTWN, THERE WAS CONFUSION AS TO WHO HAD THE CTLS, AND I SAID 'YOU HAVE THE CTLS' ONCE -- AND HE TOOK OVER FOR A WHILE. THEY GAVE US A SQUAWK CODE AND SAID TO MAINTAIN VFR. MY COPLT SAID WE CANNOT MAINTAIN VFR AND AGAIN SHE TOLD US TO MAINTAIN VFR AND HE TOLD HER THAT IT'S EMER REQUEST IFR FLT FOLLOWING IMMEDIATELY. SHE GAVE US IFR CLRNC AND SAID WE WERE RADAR CONTACT 20 MI W OF ABC VOR. BY THIS TIME WE WERE 3200 FT. AFTER THAT, MY COPLT THOUGHT THAT THE VORS WERE NOT WORKING PROPERLY, BUT I THOUGHT THEY WERE. BUT THEN WE REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS AND CAME ON RADAR VECTORS AND CAME BACK TO VMC, BUT WE DID NOT CANCEL IFR AND CAME BACK TO DO THE ILS AT ZZZ2. THE VOR'S WERE WORKING FINE AND WE HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT AT ALL TIMES. WE HAD DIFFERENT OPINIONS AND THERE WERE DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT SOME DECISIONS LIKE THE VOR FUNCTIONING. AFTERWARDS, I MENTIONED THAT I WAS WORRIED ABOUT MY LICENSE. OUR FAULTS WERE THAT WE DID NOT FILE AND TOOK CLRNC BEFORE TKOF, WE THOUGHT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN VFR TILL WE GOT OUR CLRNC. AFTER THAT, OUR CORRECTIVE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO TURN BACK, THERE WAS AN ACFT TAKING OFF BEHIND US AND I WAS TRYING TO FIND THE ARPT BUT COULD NOT SEE IT. THERE WAS A LACK OF CRM AND THERE WAS CONFUSION ABOUT WHO HAD THE CTLS FOR A WHILE. ALSO IN THE CONFUSION WE DID NOT REALIZE THAT WE WERE NOT NAVING TO ANYTHING.

Synopsis

INEXPERIENCED PLTS OF C172 CLB INTO IMC WHILE ATTEMPTING TO GET AN IFR CLRNC.

ACN: 785307

Time / Day

Date : 200805
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LAS.Airport
State Reference : NV
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : LAS.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 267
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 267
ASRS Report : 785307

Person : 2

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 155
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000
ASRS Report : 785595

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE TAXIING OUT FOR AN INTXN TKOF AT RWY 7L AT INTXN A8 IN LAS. THERE WERE A FEW ACFT HOLDING SHORT WAITING TO TAKE OFF AND AS WE APCHED INTXN A6, THE TWR ASKED IF WE COULD ACCEPT A TKOF FROM THAT INTXN. I REMEMBERED A STOPPING MARGIN OF OVER 4500 FT WITH A REDUCED PWR TKOF FROM INTXN A8. AFTER LOOKING AT THE ARPT DIAGRAM, I ESTIMATED THE RWY AVAILABLE WOULD BE ABOUT 9000 FT FROM INTXN A6. IN MY MIND I JUSTIFIED ACCEPTING THE CLRNC BECAUSE OF THE LARGE REDUCTION TKOF FROM INTXN A8, LACK OF TERRAIN E OF THE FIELD, THE GOOD FIELD CONDITIONS, AND MY ESTIMATED 9000 FT OF RWY AVAILABLE FROM INTXN A6. AS I TOLD THE FO TO ACCEPT THE CLRNC, HE ASKED IF WE HAD THE NUMBERS. I INCORRECTLY ASSUMED THAT SINCE WE TAKE OFF MANY PLACES WITH LESS RWY AVAILABLE AND THERE IS NO TERRAIN, THE COMPUTER WOULD HAVE THE DATA. I COMMITTED A CRM BLUNDER AND DISREGARDED HIS CONCERN ABOUT DATA AND TOOK OFF WITHOUT UPDATING TKOF DATA FROM THE NEW INTXN. HAD I STOPPED THE ACFT AND CHKED THE DATA PER THE FOM, I WOULD HAVE REALIZED THE COMPANY DOES NOT ALLOW A TKOF FROM THAT INTXN. AS MY MIND RACED ON DEP, I REALIZED MY MISTAKE. MY FO DID ASK THE RIGHT QUESTIONS AND I TOTALLY SCREWED UP BY NOT ADEQUATELY ACKNOWLEDGING HIS CONCERNS. THIS IS PROBABLY WHAT I'M BEATING MYSELF UP MOST ABOUT. I DISREGARDED THE BACKUP WHO IS THERE TO MONITOR ME AND BE THE SAFETY NET. I AM AWARE OF THE REQUIREMENT TO HAVE DATA FOR EACH TKOF AND SHOULD HAVE STOPPED THE ACFT, TOLD ATC WE NEEDED TO RUN NUMBERS WITHOUT THE FO ASKING THE QUESTION. I HAD ANOTHER CHANCE TO DO THE RIGHT THING AFTER THE FO RAISED HIS CONCERN. IT WOULD HAVE TAKEN 1 MIN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 785595: IN RETROSPECT, THE CAPT AND I AGREED THAT IT WAS A DUMB MISTAKE THAT WAS EASILY AVOIDED. THE CAPT 'ASSUMED' THAT WE HAD DATA FROM THAT INTXN AND I THOUGHT THE CAPT 'KNEW.'

Synopsis

B737 FLT CREW DEPARTS RWY 7L AT A6 IN LAS WITHOUT ASSOCIATED DATA.

ACN: 784963

Time / Day

Date : 200805
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-800
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude
Flight Phase.Climbout : Takeoff
Flight Phase.Cruise : Enroute Altitude Change
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi
Flight Phase.Landing : Roll
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 225
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 700
ASRS Report : 784963

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE PROB WITH THIS FLT ORIGINATED ON THE TURN FROM SMF BACK TO ZZZ.
THE CAPT WENT TO GET THE PAPERWORK AND I DID THE WALKAROUND AND
STARTED THE PREFLT PROGRAMMING. THE GATE AGENT HAD COME DOWN TO

ASK IF HE COULD LOAD EARLY FOR AN EARLY DEP. THE CAPT SAID THAT SHOULD NOT BE A PROB, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT WAS A RED-EYE AND IT WOULD BE GOOD TO GET BACK EARLY. AT NO TIME DID OPS, THE GATE AGENT, GND CREW, OR ANYONE ELSE TELL US THAT OUR AIRPLANE WAS NOT THE ONE RETURNING TO ZZZ. SOMEONE EITHER IN DISPATCH OR MAINT SHOULD HAVE INFORMED THE STATION AND THE CREW OF THE LAST SECOND PLANE SWAP. I COULD NOT GET THE ACARS TO INITIALIZE. ONCE THE CAPT RETURNED, I INFORMED HIM OF THE PROB. HE LOOKED AT THE INITIALIZATION WHICH SHOWED THE PLANE GOING FROM SMF TO ZZZ, HOWEVER, THE WRONG EMPLOYEE NUMBERS WERE LISTED. THE CAPT MANUALLY ENTERED OUR EMPLOYEE NUMBERS INTO THE FMS. HE INDICATED THAT IT WAS OK AND WE WOULD JUST HAVE TO UPDATE IT MANUALLY. IN ADDITION, I LOOKED AT MY PAIRING PRINTOUT AND IT SHOWED THE SAME ACFT RETURNING TO ZZZ. EVIDENTLY COMPLACENCY CREPT INTO THE COCKPIT OR I WOULD HAVE INSISTED ON VERIFYING OUR TAIL NUMBER FROM THE RELEASE. DUE TO MY INEXPERIENCE WITH THE ACARS (FIRST TIME THIS HAS HAPPENED) I FEEL LIKE THIS PROB SHOULD NEVER HAVE HAPPENED, AND IN THE FUTURE IT WILL NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. OUR PDC ALSO DID NOT SHOW UP AND AT THIS POINT I THOUGHT SOMETHING WAS WRONG. THE CAPT TOLD ME TO OBTAIN THE CLRNC, WHICH I DID, AND WE VERIFIED THE ROUTING. THE NEXT CHAIN OF EVENTS WAS THE WTS WOULD NOT LOAD. AT THIS POINT WE WERE READY TO PUSH AND THE CAPT ASKED IF I WAS OK WITH GETTING THE NUMBERS ON THE TAXI OUT AND ENTERING THEM WHEN WE WERE IN A STERILE ZONE BEFORE TKOF. I SAID I WAS OK WITH THAT DECISION. IN HINDSIGHT AND BECAUSE OF MY LACK OF KNOWLEDGE WITH THE ACARS PROGRAMMING, I SHOULD HAVE ASKED TO VERIFY ALL OF THE FLT PARAMETERS. THE CAPT HELD ONTO ALL OF THE PAPERWORK EXCEPT FOR THE FLT PLAN. I SHOULD HAVE INSISTED TO VERIFY THE RELEASE TO ENSURE THE CORRECT TAIL NUMBER. FURTHERMORE, DUE TO THE LATE HR AND MY TIME AWAKE, MY COGNITIVE ABILITIES WERE PROBABLY SUFFERING FROM FATIGUE. ONCE WE WERE HOLDING SHORT OF THE RWY WITH THE PARKING BRAKE SET, THE CAPT ASKED ME TO CALL DISPATCH AND GET THE NUMBERS FOR TKOF. I DID CALL DISPATCH FROM MY CELL PHONE AND ASKED FOR THE NUMBERS. I HAD A HARD TIME UNDERSTANDING THE DISPATCHER AND I BELIEVE HER TO ME. I DON'T THINK SHE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE COULDN'T GET THE WTS TO PRINT AND THERE WAS A BIGGER PROB. SHE RATTLED OFF THE NUMBERS AGAIN AND I RELAYED THEM TO THE CAPT. THE CAPT SET THE NUMBERS FOR TKOF AND WE DEPARTED UNEVENTFULLY. AGAIN, IN HINDSIGHT, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PROACTIVE IN ASKING FOR THE RELEASE TO VERIFY, OR TOLD THE CAPT THAT WE SHOULD START OVER BECAUSE THE CHAIN OF EVENTS WERE PILING UP. HOWEVER, AT NO TIME DID I FEEL THE SAFETY OF THE FLT WAS IN JEOPARDY BECAUSE WE SECURED THE NUMBERS AND SET THE FMS ACCORDINGLY. I ALSO FEEL THAT DUE TO MY HRS AWAKE AND THE LATE NATURE OF THE FLT CONTRIBUTED TO THE MENTAL ERRORS THAT WERE MADE. IN FUTURE RED-EYE OR NORMAL FLTS, I NEED TO TAKE BETTER ACTION IN CRM RESPONSIBILITIES TO FACILITATE EXECUTION OF THE THREAT AND ERROR MGMNT MODEL. ONCE WE LANDED IN ZZZ AND HAD CONFUSION AS TO WHICH GATE WE WERE ASSIGNED, OPS TOLD US THAT THERE WAS SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR ACFT AND THEY WOULD GET IT STRAIGHTENED OUT. AT THIS POINT THE CAPT SAID THE OPS WOULD TAKE CARE OF THE PROB AND I HEADED FOR HOME.

Synopsis

B737-800 FLT CREW OPERATED A REVENUE FLT WITH THE WRONG ACFT.

ACN: 784629

Time / Day

Date : 200804
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LAS.Airport
State Reference : NV
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 8000
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 8500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : LAS.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 85
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8900
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 10
ASRS Report : 784629

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolutive Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE ISSUED A DEP CLRNC THRU PDC AT LAS FOR A FLT TO ZZZ. THE CAPT (WHO WAS MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE ACFT FMS THAN I), SENT FOR THE CLRNC THRU THE FMS, AND I COPIED IT ON A T.O.L.D. CARD. THE CLRNC RECEIVED SHOWED THE SAME ROUTING THAT WAS FILED EXCEPT THERE WAS A CHANGE ISSUED THAT I WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH FOR THE DEP SID THAT WAS TO BE USED. THIS WAS MY FIRST USE OF PDC ON THE COLLINS FMS, AND WAS UNFAMILIAR WHERE CHANGES WERE PLACED IN THE TEXT. CONSEQUENTLY, I WROTE DOWN WHAT I THOUGHT WAS THE SID FILED ON THE FLT PLAN, AND NOT THE CLRNC ISSUED THRU ATC. THE CAPT AND I BRIEFED THE DEP PER COMPANY PROCS, BUT OFF THE T.O.L.D. CARD, NOT THE PDC RECEIVED AND STORED ON THE FMS. ON CLBOUT, ATC ASKED WHY WE WERE TURNING L AND NOT R AS DEPICTED ON THE SID. WE ADVISED HIM OF THE SID WE WERE COMPLYING WITH AND WAS PROMPTLY TOLD WE WERE NOT ON THE SID CLRED FOR. WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY GIVEN A HDG TO FOLLOW AND TO MAINTAIN 8000 FT. WE WERE ALREADY CLBING THRU THAT ALTITUDE, AND HAD TO LEVEL OFF AND DSND BACK TO IT. WE WERE ADVISED BY THE CTLR THAT OUR ASSIGNED ALTITUDE WAS 8000 FT AND HE WAS SHOWING 8500 FT. WE TOLD HIM WE WERE IN THE PROCESS OF STOPPING THE CLB AND WOULD DSND BACK DOWN TO LEVEL AT 8000 FT. ONCE LEVEL, WE WERE TOLD TO PROCEED TO XYZ FIX, AND CONTINUE ON THE APPROPRIATE SID. THERE WERE NO CONFLICTS ON TCAS, NOR WITH ANY OTHER ARRIVING OR DEPARTING ACFT AS WE WERE TURNING L WHEN MOST OTHER ACFT WERE TURNING R (THE RWY IN USE FOR DEPS WAS RWY 25R, AND ARRIVALS WERE ON RWY 25L AND RWY 19). AFTER A FEW MINUTES, THE CTLR INQUIRED WHETHER WE HAD THE PDC STORED ON THE FMS, AND IF WE COULD BRING IT UP TO CONFIRM WHAT WE WERE GIVEN, BECAUSE THEY WERE HAVING PROBLEMS WITH THEIR PDC SYSTEM BECAUSE OTHER ACFT WERE DOING THE SAME THING AS US. THE CAPT REVIEWED THE CLRNC ON THE FMS AND SAW THE CHANGE ISSUED BY ATC, BUT NOT RECORDED BY ME. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE COLLINS FMS WILL ALWAYS SHOW THE RTE FILED BY US, REGARDLESS OF THE CHANGES MADE BY ATC. THERE WAS A SEPARATE AREA IN THE TEXT (THAT I WAS NOT AWARE OF) THAT SHOWED ANY CHANGES IN THE ORIGINAL FLT PLAN. HE APOLOGIZED TO THE CTLR AS THE MISTAKE WAS OURS, AND WE WERE TOLD NOT TO WORRY, BUT MAKE SURE WE WERE MORE CAREFUL ABOUT THAT IN THE FUTURE. WE WERE ALSO GIVEN A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL TO TALK FURTHER ABOUT THE PROBLEM, WHICH THE CAPT DID RIGHT AWAY. THE SUPERVISING CTLR JUST WANTED TO CONFIRM WHAT WAS DISCUSSED, BECAUSE EVIDENTLY ONE OF OUR OTHER COMPANY ACFT DID THE EXACT SAME THING EARLIER IN THE DAY. THE CAPT SAID HE WOULD MAKE SURE EVERYBODY WAS FULLY AWARE OF HOW TO INTERPRET THE INFORMATION GIVEN ON THIS PARTICULAR FMS. SHE ADVISED THAT HIS RECOMMENDATION WOULD SUFFICE, AND THAT NO ENFORCEMENT ACTION WOULD TAKE PLACE. HE THANKED HER AND AGAIN APOLOGIZED FOR ANY CONFUSION ON OUR PART. MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT FULL CRM NEEDS TO TAKE PLACE ON ITEMS AS IMPORTANT AS THE CLRNC ISSUED BY ATC THRU THE PDC SYSTEM. I SHOULD HAVE ASKED THE CAPT WHAT

THE CODED ITEM MEANT IN THE CLRNC ISSUED. WE ALSO SHOULD HAVE REVIEWED THE PDC CLRNC ON THE FMS, NOT MY INTERPRETATION OF IT THAT I HAD WRITTEN DOWN. I WILL SEE TO IT THAT THIS IS CLR COMPANY WIDE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT BECAUSE HE WAS NEW TO THIS ACFT (10 HRS) AND THE PDC PRESENTATION ON THE FMS CDU, HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THAT THE TEXT BETWEEN THE HYPHENS WAS THE NEW CLRED ROUTING. HE SAW THE FILED ROUTING ALSO WITH THE OTHER TEXT AND THEREFORE INCORRECTLY ASSUMED THEY WERE FLYING THE ORIGINAL ROUTING. THE REASON ATC WANTED TO TALK WITH THE CREW WAS BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF PDC ERRORS BEING MADE, SOME OF WHICH WERE CAUSED BY ERRONEOUS PDC INFORMATION. IN THIS CASE PLT ERROR WAS INVOLVED AND THE CREW READILY ADMITTED WHAT HAD CAUSED THEM TO BEGIN FOLLOWING AN INCORRECT SID.

Synopsis

A G150 PLT MISREAD A PDC FORMATTED WITH A CHANGE AND PRESENTED ON AN FMC CDU WITH NO PRINTED COPY. ACFT TURNED INCORRECTLY AFTER TKOF BECAUSE THE ORIGINAL ROUTING WAS IN THE FMC.

ACN: 782091

Time / Day

Date : 200804
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DEN.Airport
State Reference : CO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : D01.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope : 34R
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 160
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 600
ASRS Report : 782091

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Observation : Company Check Pilot

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THIRD LEG OF THE TRIP. THERE HAD BEEN SOME CRM ISSUES ON THE PRECEDING LEG. THIS WAS A LINE CHK ON THE CAPT AND I WAS THE PF. ZDV SWITCHED OUR ARR STAR TWICE AND RWY ASSIGNMENTS MULTIPLE TIMES. EFFECTIVELY, I PERFORMED 3 OR 4 BRIEFS FOR OUR APCH. BY THE TIME WE WERE ISSUED OUR FINAL RWY ASSIGNMENT WE WERE BELOW 15000 FT AND I

DID NOT BRIEF A FULL ILS BECAUSE THE WX CONDITIONS IN DENVER LED ME TO BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A VISUAL APCH. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH AND INSIDE BENGL I ASKED FOR 7000 FT TO BE SET IN THE ALT WINDOW. THE NOTE, WHICH I READ, CORRESPONDED TO LOC GS ONLY APCH, SO I THOUGHT I WAS OK TO DSND BELOW THE 8000 FT. BUT THE NOTE I READ DID NOT CORRESPOND TO THE ACTUAL SITUATION. THE COMPANY CHK AIRPERSON POINTED THIS OUT ON OUR DEBRIEF.

Synopsis

A320 FO ASKS FOR 7000 VICE 8000 PASSING BENGL ON THE ILS 34R APCH AT DEN.

ACN: 775593

Time / Day

Date : 200802
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : FLL.Airport
State Reference : FL
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : FLL.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-400
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Takeoff Roll

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 20000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 15000
ASRS Report : 775593

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE #2 FOR DEPARTURE ON RWY 27R AT FLL. WE JUST RECEIVED OUR WT AND BAL. WE PROCEEDED TO APCH END OF RWY 27R. AS WE APPROACHED, THE CONTROLLER ASKED US, 'DID YOU GET BROWARD COUNTY PERMISSION TO

OPERATE FROM FULL LENGTH?' WELL, THIS COMMENT TOOK US COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE AND CLOUDED MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. HE THEN TURNED US OVER TO GROUND CONTROLLER AND SHE STARTED TO GIVE US CONTACT INFORMATION FOR THE BROWARD COUNTY. WELL, AT THIS POINT THE FO AND I ARE FAR INTO THE 'YELLOW.' WE HAVE NEVER EXPERIENCED RECEIVING WT AND BAL FOR A PORTION OF THE RUNWAY THAT WAS RESTRICTED. APPARENTLY, DEPARTURES ARE ONLY PERMITTED FROM TXWY B5. WE FELT THAT PERHAPS, THE WT AND BAL WAS, IN FACT, BASED ON DEPARTURE FROM TXWY B5. WE FELT PRESSURED AND DECIDED THAT DEPARTURE FROM TXWY B5 WAS ACCEPTABLE (7700 FT REMAINING). WE DEPARTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. HOWEVER, ONCE AIRBORNE, WE TOOK A CLOSER LOOK AT THE WT AND BAL AND DETERMINED WE WERE OVERWT FOR A TXWY B5 INTERSECTION DEPARTURE. CALLED DISPATCH ON THE PHONE UPON OUR ARRIVAL IN ZZZ. I BRIEFED THE DISPATCHER ON THE EVENT AND ADMITTED WE TOOK OFF FROM INTERSECTION TXWY B5 IN AN OVERWEIGHT CONDITION. DEPARTURE SHOULD HAVE BEEN FROM FULL LENGTH. HE ADVISED ME THE NEXT FLIGHT FROM FLL EXPERIENCED THE SAME ISSUE BUT TOOK A DELAY TO GET PERMISSION, FROM BROWARD COUNTY, FOR A FULL LENGTH DEPARTURE. HE ALSO ADVISED ME A NOTAM WAS ISSUED ON THE PREVIOUS DAY THAT ONLY THE TOWER NEEDED TO BE ADVISED FOR A FULL LENGTH DEPARTURE. THIS NOTAM WAS NOT PRESENT IN OUR PAPERWORK. CRM, ERROR MANAGEMENT. IF WE HAD TAKEN MORE TIME, AND IGNORED OUR EXTERNAL PRESSURES, WE WOULD HAVE DEPARTED FROM FULL LENGTH. THIS WAS A 'TEXT BOOK' ERROR MANAGEMENT EVENT. I'M STILL KICKING MYSELF FOR RUSHING AND SUCCUMBING TO EXTERNAL PRESSURES (ATC, MULTIPLE AIRCRAFT WAITING FOR TAKEOFF). IN OUR DEFENSE, WE HAD MULTIPLE EVENTS, UNFAMILIAR TO US, TAKE PLACE IN A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. 1) WT AND BAL DATA FOR A RESTRICTED RUNWAY. 2) AN ATC TRANSMISSION THAT I FEEL WAS MORE A 'STATEMENT' (HEY KNUCKLEHEAD, WHERE ARE YOU GOING) THAN THAT OF A CLEARANCE.

Synopsis

B737-400 FLT CREW, UNAWARE OF NOTAM CONCERNING PARTIAL RWY AVAILABLE, DEPARTED FROM INTERSECTION IN OVERWEIGHT CONDITION.

ACN: 768385

Time / Day

Date : 200712
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : HOU.Airport
State Reference : TX
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1700

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : HOU.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 170/175 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 45
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 45
ASRS Report : 768385

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Intended or Assigned Course
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Original Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

HOUSTON APCH CTL CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 4 IN HOU AS WE WERE ON DOWNWIND. WE WERE HANDED OFF TO HOU TWR AND WERE CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 4. WE TURNED BASE LEG ABOUT 6 MI AND SAW ELLINGTON ARPT WHICH ALSO HAS A RWY 4. AT 1700 FT MSL WE REALIZED WE WERE LOOKING AT ELLINGTON AND COMPARED WHAT WE SAW VISUALLY TO THE MFD AND THE EXTENDED COURSE FROM HOU RWY 4, AND ALSO THE LOC COURSE, AND REALIZED IT WASN'T LINING UP CORRECTLY. AT APPROX 1600 FT MSL THE TWR INSTRUCTED US TO TURN TO A HDG OF 270 DEGS AND CLB TO 2000 FT AND THAT THE FIELD WOULD BE AT OUR 2 O'CLOCK POS. WE WERE ASKED TO RPT THE FIELD IN SIGHT. WE COMPLIED WITH THE INSTRUCTION, OBTAINED VISUAL ON THE FIELD, WERE CLRED TO LAND AND LANDED ON RWY 4 AT HOU, WITHOUT INCIDENT. THANKS TO GOOD CRM, BACKING UP THE APCH WITH THE LOC, AND LOADING THE APCH IN THE FMS FOR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, AN INCIDENT WAS AVOIDED. WE THINK A POSSIBLE SAFETY RISK EXISTS AND CREWS SHOULD BE EXTREMELY VIGILANT, ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT, WHEN COMMENCING VISUAL APCHS AT HOU TO RWY 4, BECAUSE ELLINGTON ARPT IS APPROX 4 MI FROM HOU WITH THE SAME RWY CONFIGN.

Synopsis

EMB170 WAS CLEARED FOR A VISUAL APCH, BUT INITIATED APCH INTO NEARBY ARPT WITH SIMILAR RWY CONFIGURATION. THE ERROR WAS DISCOVERED, AND AN APCH WAS CONDUCTED TO THE DEST ARPT.

ACN: 764199

Time / Day

Date : 200710

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter
Make Model Name : Learjet 55
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Landing : Roll

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Fuel System

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 50
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3001
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 196
ASRS Report : 764199

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE DEP, ENRTE AND DSCNT SEGMENTS OF THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ATC HOLDING US AT ALT LONGER THAN NORMAL WHICH REQUIRED A STEEP DSCNT TO THE TERMINAL AREA. DURING THE INITIAL APCH TO THE ARPT I PERFORMED THE APCH CHKLIST WHICH INCLUDES A FUEL CHK AND I NOTED THAT THERE WAS 500 LBS OF FUEL PER WING TANK AND THAT

THERE WAS APPROX 1400 LBS IN THE FUSELAGE TANK. THE GRAVITY FLOW LINE WAS NOT OPEN AND I CALLED THIS TO THE ATTN OF THE CAPT AND AT THAT TIME I OBSERVED THE CAPT MOVE THE GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH TO THE FORWARD POS (XFER) AND I VISUALLY CONFIRMED THAT THE VALVE OPENED (DISAGREEMENT LIGHT) AND NOTED THAT THE CHKLIST ITEM WAS COMPLETE AND PROCEEDED TO COMPLETE THE REMAINDER OF THE APCH CHKLIST. WE WERE CLRED BY ATC TO CONDUCT A VISUAL APCH WITH A SPD RESTR OF 170 KIAS AND HANDED OFF TO THE CTL TWR. WE WERE CLRED TO LAND AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO LAND AND EXIT MIDFIELD AT TXWY X. WE CONFIRMED THE CLRNC AND PROCEEDED TO LAND. AFTER LNDG THE CAPT APPLIED SPOILERS, MAX BRAKING AND THRUST REVERSERS BUT THAT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO STOP IN TIME TO MAKE A SAFE TURNOFF ON TXWY X. THE TWR IMMEDIATELY ISSUED AN INSTRUCTION TO MAKE A 180 DEG TURN AND EXPEDITE EXITING THE RWY AT TXWY X. AS WE WERE PROCEEDING TO ENTER A L TURN THE TWR CTLR INFORMED US THAT HE OBSERVED SMOKE COMING FROM THE R ENG. I LOOKED OUT MY R WINDOW AND OBSERVED WHITE SMOKE MOVING FORWARD ON THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT AS WE WERE PREPARING TO EXECUTE A L 180 DEG TURN. WE HAD NO INDICATION OF AN ENG FIRE ON THE FLT DECK. AS WE PROCEEDED INTO THE L 180 DEG TURN ON THE RWY THE CAPT ANNOUNCED THAT 'WE JUST LOST BOTH ENGS...' I LOOKED AT THE ENG GAUGES AND NOTED THE TURBINES WERE INDEED SPOOLING DOWN. THE TWR CTLR REPEATED HIS INSTRUCTION TO EXPEDITE OUR EXIT AND I INFORMED THE TWR THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO COMPLY. HE ASKED US TO CONFIRM UNABLE AND I CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE UNABLE. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO COMMUNICATE OUR STATUS AND THE TWR CTLR ASKED US IF WE NEEDED ASSISTANCE AND WE REPLIED THAT WE HAD NO INDICATION OF FIRE AND THAT WE WERE GOING TO TRY AND RESTART ONE OF THE ENGS SO AS TO EXIT ASAP. AT THAT TIME THE CAPT WAS ATTEMPTING TO RESTART THE R ENG. I MONITORED THE START AND CONFIRMED STAGNATION AND THE START WAS ABORTED. WE DISCUSSED WAITING BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO RESTART THE L ENG. THE ATTEMPT TO RESTART THE L ENG WAS ABORTED AS WELL. I INFORMED THE TWR THAT WE WOULD NEED A TOW OFF OF THE RWY. THE TWR TOLD US THAT HELP WAS ON THE WAY. THE TUG ARRIVED AND WE WERE OFF OF THE RWY IN 5-10 MINS. POSTFLT: AT THE TIME THE PAX WERE BEING ACCOMMODATED I WAS APCHED BY A LEAR MECH AND WE DISCUSSED WHAT COULD CAUSE BOTH ENGS TO FLAME OUT AT THE SAME TIME DURING A LNDG ROLL. I EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD USED MAX BRAKING AND THRUST REVERSE AND THAT WE HAD APPROX 250 LBS IN EACH MAIN FUEL TANK. I ASKED HIM IF IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE FUEL TO UNPORT UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS AND BRIEFLY DISCUSSED SCAVENGE PUMPS INSTALLED IN THE WING TANKS OF THE LEAR AND HOW THEY SHOULD PREVENT THAT. SOON THEREAFTER THE MECH ENTERED THE ACFT AND EXAMINED THE THRUST LEVERS. HE SAID IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE THRUST LEVERS TO MOVE PAST THE IDLE DETENT AND INTO CUTOFF IF THEY WERE NOT RIGGED PROPERLY. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE COMPANY IT WAS DETERMINED THAT POOR CRM AND FUEL MGMNT HAD LED TO A LOWER THAN NORMAL FUEL CONDITION WITH A RESULTING UNPORTING OF WING TANK FUEL UNDER HVY DECELERATION AND THAT WAS THE CAUSE OF THE ENG FLAMEOUTS. THE FACT THAT WE ACCEPTED A LAND SHORT INSTRUCTION FROM THE TWR THAT REQUIRED A MAX DECELERATION EFFORT WAS DISCUSSED AT LENGTH. ANALYSIS: IN THE AFTERMATH OF THIS INCIDENT I COULD NOT HELP FEEL THAT I WAS NOT GETTING A STRAIGHT ANSWER TO THE OBVIOUS QUESTION. HOW COULD BOTH ENGS FLAME OUT AT THE SAME TIME? ACCORDING TO THE CAPT THERE WAS 250 LBS OF FUEL IN EACH WING TANK AND EVEN WITH HARD DECELERATION AND SCAVENGE PUMPS SHOULD HAVE

TRIGGERED AND KICKED IN AT A LOW FUEL WARNING CONDITION. ACCORDING TO THE MECHS THAT EXAMINED THE ACFT THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE INSPECTION. IT WAS NOT UNTIL I WAS ON A SUBSEQUENT ROAD TRIP WITH ANOTHER CAPT THAT I STARTED TO GAIN INSIGHT INTO WHAT PROBABLY HAPPENED. HE SAID THAT OF THE 3 SWITCHES ON THE FUEL CTL PANEL THAT ARE USED TO MOVE FUEL TO AND FROM THE AFT FUSELAGE TANK THAT ONLY 1 HAS A DUAL FUNCTION. THIS WOULD BE THE FUSELAGE FUEL XFER/FILL AND IT HAS 3 POS. 1) CTR (CLOSED) -- VALVE XFER LINE IS CLOSED. 2) FORWARD (XFER) -- SEND FUEL FORWARD FROM THE FUSELAGE TANK TO THE WING TANKS. 3) REAR POS (FILL) -- XFER FUEL FROM THE WINGS TO THE FUSELAGE TANK. THE FUSELAGE XFER SWITCH IS RIGHT NEXT TO THE GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH AND TO TURN OFF THE GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH YOU HAVE TO MOVE IT TO THE REARWARD POS. IF SOMEONE WERE TO INADVERTENTLY MOVE THE SWITCH NEXT TO THE GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH TO THE REAR POS WITHOUT CONFIRMING THAT IT WAS INDEED THE GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH THEY WOULD BE IN EFFECT MOVING FUEL FROM THE MAIN TANKS AND TO THE REAR FUSELAGE TANK. THIS MIGHT EXPLAIN WHAT HAPPENED TO FUEL THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN LEFT IN THE WING TANKS AS A RESULT OF NOT BEING BURNED BY THE ENGS. CONCLUSION: OUR ULTIMATE CONCLUSION WAS THAT ONE OF US HAD INADVERTENTLY MOVED THE FUSELAGE FUEL XFER SWITCH TO THE REAR POS THINKING THAT IT WAS THE FUEL GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT IS WELL KNOWN AMONG LEARJET DRIVERS THAT THIS WAS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN INHERENT IN THE DESIGN OF AND DUAL FUNCTION BUILT INTO THIS SWITCH. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IT MATTERS NOT WHO DID WHAT BUT WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED AND HOW CAN THIS BE PREVENTED IN THE FUTURE OP OF THE LEARJET. RECOMMENDATION: THE FUEL CTL PANEL IN THE LEARJET ONLY HAS 1 SWITCH THAT PROVIDES AN ANNUNCIATION ON THE CAP (CENTRAL ANNUNCIATOR PANEL) WHEN IT IS OPENED. THAT SWITCH CTLS THE CROSS FLOW VALVE. WHEN THE CROSS FLOW VALVE IS OPENED IT TURNS ON A GREEN LIGHT ON THE CAP (CENTRAL ANNUNCIATOR PANEL). I RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ITEMS BE ROLLED INTO 1 MANDATORY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE FOR THE LEARJET MODEL 35/55. 1) MODIFY THE LEAR TO INDICATE ON THE CAP WHEN THE FUSELAGE TANK XFER LINE VALVE IS IN THE FILL POS. THE LIGHT SHOULD BE AMBER. 2) THE SAME AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE SHOULD REQUIRE THE VALVE TO CLOSE WHEN ANY ENG IS IN OP AND THE FUEL LEVEL IN ANY 1 WING TANK FALLS BELOW A CERTAIN LEVEL (FUEL LOW THRESHOLD QUANTITY?) 3) THE AMBER FUEL LOW WARNING LIGHT ON THE CAP SHOULD TRIGGER THE MWS (MAIN WARNING SYS) TO ALERT BOTH PLTS OF A LOW FUEL CONDITION AND IT SHOULD BE RED, NOT AMBER. (THE LEAR 35 HAS A RED CAP LIGHT DURING A LOW FUEL CONDITION AND FOR SOME REASON THE LEAR 55 DOES NOT.) CURRENTLY ON THE LEAR 55 THE AMBER LOW FUEL WARNING LIGHT IS LOCATED ON THE UPPER L POS OF THE CAP AND IS CLOSER TO THE CAPT'S SCAN THAN THAT OF THE PLT IN THE R SEAT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER BELIEVES THAT FUEL WAS BEING TRANSFERRED FROM THE WINGS TO THE FUSELAGE DURING THE LAST FEW MINUTES OF THE APPROACH AND MAY HAVE LED TO FUEL EXHAUSTION DURING THE QUICK STOP. THESE TWO SWITCHES LOOK ALIKE AND WORK IN THE SAME WAY, MAKING THEM EASY TO MIX UP.

Synopsis

LEAR FO REPORTS DUAL ENGINE FLAME OUT AFTER MAX EFFORT STOP. FUEL STARVATION IS SUSPECTED.

ACN: 762945

Time / Day

Date : 200711
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SEA.Airport
State Reference : WA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 1200

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : S46.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Aircraft : 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : S46.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 197
ASRS Report : 762945

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 490
ASRS Report : 762960

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Critical
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Precautionary Avoidance Action

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Airport

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

LNDG SEATTLE RWYS 34C AND 34R. VISUAL APCHS IN USE. I WAS PF. WE PLANNED RWY 34C BUT WAS CLRED VISUAL APCH TO RWY 34R. ON VISUAL APCH FOR RWY 34R WE HEARD ANOTHER CARRIER CLRED TO, 'FOLLOW IN BEHIND COMPANY, CLRED VISUAL 34C, COMPANY IS GOING TO 34R.' APPROX 1200 FT AGL WE RECEIVED A TA FOLLOWED BY AN RA TO CLB. WHEN I FIRST GOT THE TA, I IMMEDIATELY SWITCHED MY MAP MODE TO THE 5 MI SCALE TO LOCATE TARGET. IT SHOWED A TARGET RIGHT ABOVE US 200-300 FT. THE FIRST RA CAME RIGHT AFTER SWITCHING MY MAP MODE TO 5 MI SCALE. THE RA WAS A 'CLB RA.' THIS DID NOT MAKE SENSE TO CLB BECAUSE THE TARGET LOOKED TO BE 200-300 FT ABOVE ME ON THE MAP DISPLAY. WE LOOKED VISUALLY FOR THE TARGET BUT HAD NO SUCH LUCK LOCATING. I HESITANTLY PULLED UP A BIT AND RECEIVED A 'DSCNT RA' FOLLOWED BY A 'MONITOR VERT SPD.' THEN I RECEIVED ANOTHER 'CLB RA.' STILL NO VISUAL ON TARGET. I HAD TO ASSUME THAT THE TARGET WAS RIGHT ABOVE US SO I RESUMED THE APCH. APPROX 800-900 FT AGL WE RECEIVED A FINAL TA FOLLOWED BY A 'CLR OF CONFLICT.' STILL LOOKING FOR THE ACFT VISUALLY, I BANKED SLIGHTLY R TO LIFT THE L WING UP TO LOOK FOR THE TARGET AND SAW ANOTHER CARRIER RUNNING PARALLEL WITH US 100-200 FT ABOVE US, BUT SEEMED TO BE 600-800 FT HORIZONTALLY ON APCH TO RWY 34C. I SAID TO THE FO, 'HEY, LOOK AT THAT' SHOWING HIM HOW CLOSE THE OTHER CARRIER SEEMED TO BE. THE OTHER CARRIER WAS SUPPOSED TO FOLLOW IN BEHIND US AND LAND RWY 34C. I DON'T KNOW IF THE OTHER CARRIER OVERSHOT THE CTRLINE ON RWY 34C OR NOT, BUT I BELIEVE THAT HE DEFINITELY GOT TOO CLOSE TO US. I BELIEVE THAT ATC SHOULD HAVE ASSURED THAT HE STAYED STAGGERED WITH US ON THE APCH SINCE THE RWYS ARE SO CLOSE HORIZONTALLY. I UNDERSTAND THAT IN 'LNDG CONFIG' WE ARE BY PROC SUPPOSED TO 'GAR' IF WE RECEIVE AN RA, I COULD NOT BRING MYSELF TO GO AROUND BECAUSE THE TARGET SEEMED TO BE RIGHT ABOVE US AND WE HAD NO VISUAL WITH THE TARGET. WHEN WE GOT THE 'DSCNT RA' THIS RECONFIRMED TO US THAT THE TARGET WAS ABOVE US AND THAT A 'GAR' WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE SAFEST RESPONSE. WE LANDED WITHOUT ANY FURTHER INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 762960: I HAVE ALWAYS FOLLOWED AN RA IMMEDIATELY WITHOUT QUESTION, BUT THIS SCENARIO WAS 'SENDING UP RED FLAGS' TO BOTH OF US. FROM WHAT WE SAW ON THE TCAS DISPLAY, IT APPEARED THAT THE OTHER CARRIER COULD BE RIGHT ABOVE US, PERHAPS LINING UP ON THE WRONG RWY OR DRIFTING FROM THE RWY 34C EXTENDED CTRLINE. ONCE WE VISUALLY IDENTED THE OTHER CARRIER, I REALIZED THAT THE LIMITED SCALE AND RESOLUTION OF THE MAP MAY HAVE ONLY MADE IT APPEAR TO BE DIRECTLY OVERHEAD OF US. IN HINDSIGHT, WE PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE EXECUTED A GAR. THE SCALE AND RESOLUTION OF THE TCAS DISPLAY MAY MAKE AN ACFT'S POS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE, AND WE HAVE TO ASSUME THAT THE TCAS KNOWS THE RELATIVE POS MORE ACCURATELY

THAN WE DO. AT THE TIME THOUGH, WE WERE TRULY CONCERNED ABOUT CLBING INTO THE OTHER ACFT. WE WERE TRYING TO INSTANTLY ASSESS THE SITUATION AND USE OUR COLLECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND JUDGEMENT TO MAKE THE BEST DECISION THAT WE COULD. I FEEL THAT THE CAPT AND I COMMUNICATED WELL AND USED GOOD CRM. I BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD MAKE A GREAT TRAINING SCENARIO IN THE SIMULATOR OR IN THE CLASSROOM.

Synopsis

AN ACR CREW APCHING SEA REPORTS A CLB RA ON FINAL WHILE THE TCAS DISPLAY INDICATED THE TFC WAS NEARLY DIRECTLY ABOVE THEM. THE FLT CONTINUED TO LNDG.

ACN: 758526

Time / Day

Date : 200710
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : MDW.Airport
State Reference : IL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : C90.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope : 31C
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 758526

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 758509

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON APCH TO MDW, WE WERE CLRED TO 'MAINTAIN 4000 FT UNTIL GLEAM, CLRED FOR THE ILS 31C CIRCLE 22L.' I CONTINUED IN NAV MODE AND INITIATED A PROFILE DSCNT TO 2300 FT, WHICH WAS THE ALT AT WHICH I WAS GOING TO CIRCLE, RATHER THAN ARMING APCH -- LAND, FROM WHICH I WOULD HAVE TO MANUALLY STOP THE DSCNT WHILE ON THE GS. THE ACFT BEGAN TO DSND, AND THE CAPT NOTED THAT, OVER GLEAM, WE WERE APPROX 3600 FT. WE RE-INTERCEPTED THE CORRECT PROFILE OVER RUNTS AND COMPLETED THE APCH. ATC NEVER MENTIONED THE DEV. THE MDW ATIS IS EXTREMELY WEAK, SO WE WERE UNABLE TO OBTAIN THE APCH IN USE UNTIL ONLY AROUND 75 MI FROM THE FIELD. THE APCH IN USE WAS ADVERTISED AS 'VISUAL 22L,' EVEN THOUGH FROM PAST EXPERIENCE, IN THIS CONFIGN WE COULD HAVE EXPECTED ILS RWY 31C CIRCLE RWY 22L. I BRIEFED THE RNAV RWY 22L AS A BACKUP FOR THE VISUAL. ONCE ON FREQ WITH CHICAGO APCH, WE WERE TOLD TO PROCEED DIRECT GLEAM AND TO EXPECT THE ILS RWY 31L CIRCLE RWY 22L. THE CAPT QUICKLY ENTERED DIRECT GLEAM IN THE FMS, AND THEN STRUNG THE APCH. WE THEN XFERRED CTLS AND I QUICKLY BRIEFED THE APCH. WHILE STRINGING THE APCH, WE DID NOT ENTER ANY TRANSITION BECAUSE WE WERE DIRECTLY INTERCEPTING FINAL. IN THIS SCENARIO, GLEAM DOES NOT SHOW UP ON THE APCH. WE THEREFORE MANUALLY REMOVED THE DISCONTINUITY BTWN GLEAM (WHERE WE WERE PROCEEDING) AND RUNTS. THIS SHOWED THE CORRECT WAYPOINTS FOR THE APCH, BUT THE MINIMUM ALT AT GLEAM (4000 FT) WAS NOT ENTERED. I DIDN'T NOTICE THAT THIS ALT WASN'T STRUNG. I DIDN'T LISTEN FULLY TO THE APCH CLRNC BECAUSE OF TASK SATURATION. WHEN I DIDN'T HEAR THE APCH CLRNC, I DIDN'T ASK TO REVIEW IT WITH THE CAPT. HE DIDN'T NOTICE THE PROFILE DSCNT TOOK US BELOW 4000 FT UNTIL WE WERE 400 FT LOW. BOTH OF OUR MISTAKES, AND LACK OF COM LED TO THIS DEV. WE BOTH KNEW THE ARPT, AND THAT THE APCH WE HEARD ON THE ATIS WAS ATYPICAL FOR THE CONDITIONS. WE SHOULD HAVE PREPARED FOR WHAT WE REALLY EXPECTED. WHEN BUILDING AN APCH FROM SCRATCH, EXTRA CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN TO MAKE SURE IT AGREES WITH WHAT IS ON THE PLATE. FINALLY, RUSHING AN APCH BRIEFING, ESPECIALLY WHEN EXECUTING AN UNUSUAL APCH LIKE THIS, SHOULD ALWAYS RAISE A RED FLAG.

Synopsis

UNEXPECTED LATE CHANGE FROM ATIS ADVERTISED VISUAL APCH RWY 22 TO AN ILS RWY 31C, CIRCLE TO LAND RWY 22 RESULTS IN BREAKDOWN IN CRM, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND, ULTIMATELY, BUSTING AN ALT RESTRICTION ON THE ARRIVAL.

ACN: 756622

Time / Day

Date : 200701
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 38000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Dawn

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : AC Generation

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 6000
ASRS Report : 756622

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EICAS
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

FLT WAS DISPATCHED WITH APU INOP. AT TOP OF DSCNT, L GENERATOR FAILED. RAN CHKLIST, GENERATOR RESET FAILED. LANDED AT CLOSEST SUITABLE ARPT, ZZZ, SINCE STOPPING DISTANCE WAS NOT AFFECTED BY SINGLE GENERATOR OP. OF NOTE WAS THE HONEYWELL FMS 'ALTERNATE' ARPT FEATURE. THIS SHOWED TIME TO 3 ARPTS AS IDENTICAL FROM OUR POS. DUE TO DISTANCE REQUIRED TO DSND, ZZZ WAS CHOSEN. FAMILIARITY AND LNDG FLOW MADE THIS THE LOGICAL CHOICE. LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. CREW COORD WAS EXCELLENT DUE TO WELL THOUGHT OUT BOEING QRH PROCS, ACR TRAINING, CRM AND GOOD HELP FROM ATC. ONLY NEGATIVE WAS MULTIPLE REQUESTS FOR FUEL AND SOULS ONBOARD FROM SUBSEQUENT ATC SECTORS/FACILITIES.

Synopsis

B757 FLT CREW REPORTS GENERATOR FAILURE AT TOP OF DESCENT AFTER BEING DISPATCHED WITH APU INOPERATIVE. FLT CREW LANDS AT NEAREST SUITABLE WHICH IS NOT THEIR FILED DESTINATION.

ACN: 754680

Time / Day

Date : 200709

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : BKF.Airport

State Reference : CO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 10000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : D01.TRACON

Operator.Other : Military

Make Model Name : Hornet (F-18)

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial

Aircraft : 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : D01.TRACON

Operator.Other : Military

Make Model Name : Hornet (F-18)

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial

Person : 1

Affiliation.Government : Military

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial

Qualification.Pilot : Instrument

Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Qualification.Pilot : Private

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 50

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 1100

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 800

ASRS Report : 754680

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : Military

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA

Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE LEAD PLT OF A 3 SHIP OF FA-18'S INCORRECTLY CONFIGURED THE ACFT FOR IFR FLT BY HAVING THE RADAR ALTIMETER RPTING AGL ALT TO THE HEADS UP DISPLAY (HUD). THEREFORE, THE LEAD PLT WAS SEEING AGL ALT VICE MSL ALT ON HIS PRIMARY INST REF. THE FA-18 AUTOMATICALLY SWITCHES TO MSL ALT AT APPROX 5000 FT AGL. TWR CLRED THE FLT FOR TKOF AT BUCKLEY BY SAYING FLY RWY HDG TO 8 THOUSAND. ON TKOF, THE #2 WINGMAN HAD ORIGINALLY SWITCHED TO THE INCORRECT DEP FREQ, BUT THEN SWITCHED TO THE CORRECT DEP FREQ IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF WHEN HE XCHKED THE FREQ ON HIS APCH PLATE AFTER NOT HEARING ANY RADIO CHATTER OR HIS FLT LEAD CHK IN WITH DEP. AS THE FLT PASSED THROUGH 8000 FT MSL (2300 FT AGL) THE PLT OF THE #2 ACFT WAS CONFUSED, UNSURE IF DEP HAD CLRED THE FLT HIGHER BEFORE HE HAD SWITCHED TO THE CORRECT DEP FREQ. ON THE AUX RADIO HE ASKED, I THOUGHT WE WERE CLRED TO 8 THOUSAND? THE DEP CTLR SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD THE FLT TO DSND IMMEDIATELY. THE LEAD PLT THEN ASKED DEP, SAY AGAIN ALT FOR FLT X AS THEY BEGAN A DSCNT. AT THIS POINT, THE DISPLAYED ALT IN THE FLT LEAD PLT'S HUD SWITCHED FROM RPTING AGL ALT TO RPTING BAROMETRIC ALT AND DISPLAYED APPROX 10000 FT MSL. THE LEAD PLT SWITCHED THE SETTING TO BAROMETRIC ALTIMETER TO THE HUD, AND LEVELED OFF AT 8000 FT MSL. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: LEAD PLT FAILURE TO CORRECTLY CONFIGURE THE ACFT FOR IFR FLT IS THE OVERRIDING FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT. POOR CRM. THE FLT LEAD FAILED TO RESOLVE UNCERTAINTIES BTWN THE ASSIGNED ALTS. EACH FLT MEMBER, THE BUCKLEY CLRNC DELIVERY AGENCY, THE BUCKLEY TWR CTLR, AND THE DEP CTLR ALL WERE PLAYERS IN THIS INCIDENT. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: LEAD PLT WILL BRIEF ALL SQUADRON PLTS ON THIS INCIDENT EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF ADHERING TO IFR PROCS. EFFECTIVE CRM WILL BE THOROUGHLY REVIEWED AT THE ORGANIZATION'S NEXT PLT TRAINING MEETING.

Synopsis

FLIGHT LEAD FOR A FLIGHT OF THREE FA-18'S DEPARTED USING AGL AS PRIMARY ALT SOURCE FOR INSTRUMENT REFERENCE. AS A RESULT, THE FLIGHT OVERSHOT THE INITIAL ALT CLRNC ON DEP FROM A HIGH ALT ARPT.

ACN: 754397

Time / Day

Date : 200709
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ABQ.Airport
State Reference : NM
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 10000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ABQ.TRACON
Operator.Other : Government
Make Model Name : Citation II S2/Bravo
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout : Vacating Altitude
Route In Use.Departure : On Vectors

Person : 1

Affiliation.Government.Other
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 60
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3400
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1000
ASRS Report : 754397

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE HIGHER RANKING PF FAILED TO MAINTAIN AN ATC REQUIRED ALT. I WAS THE PNF OR COPLT. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AND ASSIGNED A SOUTHERLY HDG AND TO CLB AND MAINTAIN 10000 FT. THE TKOF WAS UNEVENTFUL. AT 9000 FT WE GOT AN AUDIBLE WARNING OF 1000 FT TO LEVEL OFF. I HAD MY HEAD DOWN RUNNING CHKLISTS. I LOOKED UP AND WE WERE STILL IN A RAPID CLB. I NOTIFIED THE PF '200 FT TO LEVEL OFF.' HE ACKNOWLEDGED. HE HAD BEEN HAND FLYING THE ACFT AND DECIDED TO QUICKLY ARM THE AUTOPLT IN AN ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE THE 10000 FT ALT. HE APPEARED FLUSTERED. ATC THEN ASKED IF WE WERE MAINTAINING 10000 FT. I REPLIED 'WE ARE TRYING TO...SORRY.' ALBUQUERQUE DEP ACKNOWLEDGED. THEY THEN TOLD AN AIRLINER OF OUR POS AHEAD OF THEM AT 10000 FT. THEY WERE AT 11000 FT. I KNEW THERE MIGHT BE A TFC CONFLICT AND LOOKED AT THE TCAS DISPLAY TO LOCATE NEARBY TFC. I THEN LOOKED OUTSIDE THE ACFT TO GET A VISUAL ON ANY TFC IN THE VICINITY. I THEN LOOKED BACK AT THE ALTIMETER AND THE PF HAD LEVELED AT 10650 FT, BUT HAD NOT STARTED A DSCNT TO MY SURPRISE. I TOLD HIM 'WE NEED TO GET THE PLANE DOWN TO 10000 FT NOW!' HE AGAIN ACKNOWLEDGED AND PROCEEDED TO USE THE AUTOPLT TO DSND AT A RATE OF 600 FPM. I WAS ABOUT TO RECOMMEND A FASTER DSCNT RATE WHEN ATC CLRED US TO A HIGHER ALT. THE ATC INSTRUCTIONS WERE CLR. WE HAD NO CONFUSION ON THAT END. I THINK THE PF'S LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN THE ACFT CAUSED HIM TO ACT SLOWLY TO THE PROB AT HAND. I THINK HE ALSO SLOWED DOWN UNDER PRESSURE. HIS THINKING THE AUTOPLT WOULD SAVE HIM WAS NOT CORRECT IF THE INPUTS ARE NOT ACCURATE. OUR DEPT ALSO HAS A LACK OF GOOD CRM. I HAVE ASKED FOR TRAINING IN THIS AREA FOR ALL PLTS, BUT HAVE BEEN DENIED. THE 'MGT' PLTS COME FROM A SINGLE PLT BACKGND AND DO NOT LIKE THE CREW ENVIRONMENT AND TRY TO FLY IN A MANNER THAT EXCLUDES CREW INVOLVEMENT. I ALSO THINK THERE WAS A LACK OF FOCUS ON HIS PART. I SHOULD HAVE REACTED QUICKER AND TAKEN THE CTLS TO BRING THE ACFT TO THE ASSIGNED ALT. I HESITATED BECAUSE HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROB AND CLAIMED HE WAS CORRECTING. I PUT MY ATTN TO OTHER POTENTIAL PROBS THAT COULD ARISE BECAUSE OF THE ERROR AND EXPECTED HIM TO COMPLETE HIS TASK UNASSISTED. I SHOULD NOT HAVE LET HIS RANK AND FEAR OF WORKPLACE RETALIATION KEEP ME FROM ACTING QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY TO CORRECT THE SITUATION AND TAKE CTL AS NEEDED. TO PREVENT FUTURE OCCURRENCES, THE FLT DEPT NEEDS TRAINING IN CRM AND ALSO NEEDS FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP POS. IT IS A POOR INSTITUTIONAL MIND-SET THAT LEADS TO PROBS. THERE IS LITTLE TO NO ACCOUNTABILITY FOR POOR PLT PERFORMANCE AND NO CHAIN THAT ONE CAN FILE COMPLAINTS OR ADDRESS PROBS WITHOUT FEAR OF REPRISAL. ANY MENTION OF SAFETY RELATED ISSUES ON OUR DEPT LEADS TO HARSH WORKING CONDITIONS AND POSSIBLE SLANDER.

Synopsis

CE550 FO RPTS THE INABILITY OF THE CAPT TO LEVEL OFF AT ASSIGNED ALT DUE TO LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN ACFT TYPE.

ACN: 750993

Time / Day

Date : 200708
Day : Mon
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : ZZZ.BCSTN
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 33000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation : Personal
Make Model Name : Learjet 24
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : AC Generation

Person : 1

Affiliation.Other : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 45
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8520
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3480
ASRS Report : 750993

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Overcame Equipment Problem
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

FLT ORIGINATED IN ZZZ ON AN IFR CLRNC AND FLT PLAN TO ZZZ2. ACFT WAS CLRED BY CTR TO FL330. ACFT WAS FLOWN BY USAGE OF ITS AUTOPLT AND THE CAPT HAD LEVELLED OFF AT TARGET ALT AND ENGAGED THE ALT HOLD WHEN THE L/H GENERATOR DROPPED OFF-LINE. IMMEDIATE RESET PROC OF THE FAILED GENERATOR TRIPPED THE R/H GENERATOR OFF-LINE AS WELL AND THE CREW NOTICED THE ELECTRONIC DISPLAYS OF BOTH DIGITAL ALTIMETERS FLICKERING WITH THE #1 ALTIMETER INDICATING A RAPID DESCENT AND THE #2 ALTIMETER SHOWING A RAPID CLB. CAPT ADDRESSED THE ELECTRICAL POWER LOSS AND THE SIC WAS INVESTIGATING THE CB PANELS AND SWITCHES FOR THE ADC ON HIS SIDE. MOMENTS LATER THE CAPT ADVISED THE SIC TO WATCH THE ACFT AND STOP THE TROUBLESHOOTING ON HIS SIDE. THE 3RD STBY ALTIMETER ALSO HAD WANDERED AND FLUCTUATED BETWEEN GOING UP AND DOWN DURING THE PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED SEQUENCE. WHILE THE CAPT SUCCESSFULLY RESTORED ELECTRICAL POWER AND GOT BOTH GENERATORS BACK ON LINE, THE SIC NOTICED AND RPTED THAT THE AUTOPLT HAD TRIPPED OFF-LINE (POTENTIALLY AS A RESULT OF THE ELECTRIC SPIKES IN THE SYSTEM FROM RESET ATTEMPTS OF THE GENERATORS). CROSS CHECKS OF BOTH VSI'S CONFIRMED A CLB AND THE PLANE SEEMED TO HAVE DEPARTED FROM THE LEVEL ALT DURING THE TROUBLESHOOTING AND SYSTEM RECOVERY PROC. THE CAPT ARRESTED THE CLB AND STARTED A SHALLOW DSCNT WITH REFERENCE TO THE STBY ALTIMETER THAT HAD STARTED TO STABILIZE AND SHOWED A FEW HUNDRED FEET ABOVE THE ASSIGNED FL330. AT OR ABOUT THAT TIME ATC CALLED AND ASKED FOR ALTITUDE VERIFICATION. WITH POWER RESTORED, BOTH DIGITAL ALTIMETERS ALSO WENT BACK TO NORMAL INDICATION AND SHOWED THE SAME VALUES. CAPT LEVELLED OFF AT FL330, RE-ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND ALT HOLD AND VERIFIED THAT BOTH GENERATORS WERE PUTTING OUT THE REQUIRED ELECTRICAL POWER. BOTH DIGITAL ALTIMETERS AND THE STBY ALTIMETERS SEEMED TO BE IN AGREEMENT AND STABLE. A FEW MINS LATER THE SIC RECEIVED A CALL FROM ATC AND A PHONE NUMBER TO CONTACT AFTER LNDG. SUBSEQUENT PHONE CONVERSATION WITH ATC AFTER LNDG REVEALED THAT THE PLANE HAD CLBED ABOVE THE ASSIGNED ALT BY SEVERAL HUNDRED FEET DURING THE TIME WHERE THE CREW WAS BUSY WITH TROUBLESHOOTING AND SYSTEM RESTORATION EFFORTS. REASONS FOR THE DEVIATION AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: ELECTRICAL FAILURE OF BOTH GENERATORS IN SHORT SUCCESSION AND A POTENTIAL ELECTRICAL SPIKE IN THE SYSTEM THAT TRIPPED THE AUTOPLT AND CAUSED THE ELECTRONIC ALTIMETRY SYSTEM AND THE ADC'S TO BECOME TEMPORARILY UNRELIABLE. CREW WAS DISTRACTED FOR A MOMENT AND FOCUSED TOO MUCH ON SYSTEMS RECOVERY AND DID NOT IMMEDIATELY NOTICE THE TRIPPED AUTOPLT AND THE DISENGAGED ALT HOLD BUTTON. BOTH CREW MEMBERS CHKED AND TROUBLESHOT THEIR RESPECTIVE SIDES OF THE COCKPIT AND CB BANKS (LOWER SIDE PANELS/HEAD DOWN) WITHOUT NOTICING THE PLANE'S DEPARTURE FROM THE ASSIGNED ALT QUICKLY ENOUGH. BOTH PLTS SUB-CONSCIOUSLY ASSUMED THE PLANE ON ALT HOLD AND STABLE WHICH WAS A MISTAKE SINCE IT DOES NOT TAKE LONG FOR A LEAR JET TO CLIMB A FEW HUNDRED FEET. LESSONS LEARNED FROM INCIDENT: STRICT ADHERENCE TO CRM PROCS WILL AVOID SIMILAR SITUATIONS. WITH ONE PLT FLYING AND MONITORING ATTITUDE, ASSIGNED ALTITUDE AND HEADING AND THE OTHER PLT ENGAGING IN TROUBLESHOOTING WILL PREVENT ANY DEVIATION FROM HAPPENING. HISTORY HAS SHOWN OVER AND OVER AGAIN THAT NOTHING

IS HELPED IF BOTH PLTS TRY TO CURE A PROBLEM AND NOBODY WATCHES THE PLANE. BOTH CREW MEMBERS REGRET THIS INCIDENT AND WILL WORK ON PROPER CRM TO AVOID ANY SUCH FUTURE SITUATION. MECHANICAL FINDINGS: MECHANICS FOUND THE FIELD/COIL WIRES OF BOTH GENERATORS AS HAVING INTERMITTENT CONTACT. THE ACFT HAD UNDERGONE AN LH ENGINE SWAP AND SEVERAL COMPONENTS OF THE OTHER ENGINE WERE REMOVED, TESTED AND REINSTALLED PRIOR TO THE FLT. A TEST RUN AND FLIGHT HAD SHOWN NO PROBLEMS BUT SOME WIRES WERE CHAFING ON THE SUBSEQUENT FLT. THE FAULTY WIRES WERE IDENTIFIED AND REPAIRED AND THE PROBS HAVE BEEN CORRECTED.

Synopsis

BOTH GENERATORS OF LR 24 TRIPPED OFF LINE CAUSING THE IAS, THE AFDS, AND ALT HOLD TO FAIL. AN ALT DEVIATION RESULTED AS THE ACFT CLBED UNNOTICED BY CREW DURING TROUBLESHOOTING.

ACN: 748106

Time / Day

Date : 200707
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 27500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A330
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Door Warning System

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 242
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 19050
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 416
ASRS Report : 748106

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 747667

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : ECAM
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

CLBING THROUGH FL270, ECAM MESSAGE 'REAR CARGO DOOR.' ACFT LEVELED OFF AT FL275. COMPLIED WITH ECAM (WE THOUGHT). ECAM SHOULD HAVE SAID 'IF ABN CAB V/S MAX FL-100 MEA.' STATUS PAGE SAID, 'MAX FL-100/MEA.' WE SAW THE STATUS PAGE, BUT DID NOT SEE THE 'IF ABN CAB V/S' INFO. WE DID APPEAR TO HAVE NORMAL CABIN PRESSURE, HOWEVER FO HAD PULLED OUT OXYGEN MASK. HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A PRESSURE BUMP, BUT DID NOT PUT ON MASK. CONSIDERING 3+ HR FLT OVERWATER, WE DECIDED TO RETURN TO ZZZ. ESTIMATED LNDG WT OF 430000 LBS, MAX LNDG WT 412200 LBS. REFEED OVERWT LNDG CHKLIST. CHKLIST NOTE 'PERFORM AN OVERWT LNDG WHEN A CONDITION CAUSES IT TO BE SAFER TO LAND OVERWT THAN THE CONTINUE FLT UNTIL AT OR BELOW MAX CERTIFICATED LNDG WT.' PLANNED LNDG ZZZ, RWY 10506 FT, QRH INDICATED 5940 FT REQUIRED. BY SATCOM, I DISCUSSED ALTERNATIVES WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL. WE ALL AGREED TO LAND OVERWT AND NOT HOLD FOR 1 1/2-2 HRS TO BURN DOWN TO MAX LNDG WT. RETURNED TO ZZZ. AFTER BRAKES COOLED, RETURNED TO GATE. MAX BRAKE TEMP 580 DEGS. OUR PLT HANDBOOK HAS A CHAPTER WHICH IS A DETAILED VERSION OF THE ECAM FOR NON-NORMAL PROCS. IT IS 210 PAGES LONG AND STATES, 'AFTER PERFORMING THE ECAM ACTIONS AND REVIEWING ECAM STATUS, REFER TO THE PLT'S HANDBOOK PROC FOR SUPPLEMENTAL INFO IF TIME PERMITS.' ON THIS PAGE FOR THE CARGO DOOR OPEN, A NOTE SAYS, 'INFLT -- NO CREW ACTION REQUIRED AS LONG AS CABIN PRESSURE IS NORMAL.' THIS IS NOT ANNOTATED ON ECAM. WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLY WITH ECAM STATUS PAGE, DSNding TO FL100, BEFORE EVER GETTING TO THIS CHAPTER. CHIEF PLT REQUESTED A MEETING WITH THE FLT CREW TO DISCUSS FLT, WITH UNION REPRESENTATIVES THE NEXT DAY. HE DID NOT AGREE WITH OUR RETURN TO ZZZ AND OUR DECISION TO LAND OVERWT. WE WERE GIVEN TRAINING IN ECAM USAGE AT THIS TIME BY A CHK AIRMAN. MY CONCERNS ARE: 1) DOES IT MAKE ANY SENSE TO CONTINUE A FLT WITH AN UNKNOWN CARGO DOOR PROB ON AN ETOPS FLT JUST BECAUSE AIRBUS SAYS IT'S OK, ESPECIALLY WHEN YOU ARE ONLY 25 MINS INTO THE FLT? 2) CRM IS STRESSED EXTENSIVELY IN OUR TRAINING AND THAT INCLUDES WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL. ALL 3 AGREED ON THE OVERWT LNDG. THEN WE WERE ALL BEING SECOND GUESSED BY THE CHIEF PLT. NOTE: AS MEETING CONCLUDED, CHIEF PLT WAS NOTIFIED THE SAME ACFT, SAME FLT NUMBER, WITH THE SAME CARGO DOOR INDICATION, HAD JUST LANDED IN ZZZ AND MADE AN OVERWT LNDG. MAINT COMPLIED WITH CARGO DOOR MEL, WHICH INHIBITS THE DOOR WARNING. SAME ACFT DEPARTED ONCE MORE, SAME FLT NUMBER. EVEN THOUGH THE DOOR WARNING HAD PRESUMABLY BEEN DISABLED, THE WARNING CAME ON ONCE AGAIN! ACFT ONCE AGAIN RETURNED TO ZZZ WITH AN OVERWT LNDG.

Synopsis

A330 ECAM INDICATED 'REAR CARGO DOOR' WARNING DURING CLIMBOUT. FLT CREW RETURNED TO DEP ARPT AND LANDED OVERWEIGHT.

ACN: 745610

Time / Day

Date : 200705

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : IAD.Airport
State Reference : VA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Climbout : Takeoff

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Pax Seat

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant : On Duty
Qualification.Flight Attendant : Currently Qualified
ASRS Report : 745610

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Attendant : On Duty
Qualification.Flight Attendant : Currently Qualified
ASRS Report : 745611

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : Seat Row
Separated From Track
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted
Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

JUST AFTER TKOF FROM IAD A CALL LIGHT WENT OFF IN ROW 9ABC (THE ROW IN FRONT OF THE EXIT). THE PLANE WAS STILL CLBING SO FLT ATTENDANT MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO RING THE CALL LIGHT AGAIN IF THERE WAS AN EMER. THE CALL LIGHT RANG AGAIN. FLT ATTENDANT WENT TO INVESTIGATE. THE PAX IN SEAT 9C, MR X, NOTICED THAT THIS ROW OF SEATS WAS DETACHED FROM THE FLOOR MOUNTING. HE EXPLAINED THAT DURING TKOF THIS HAD CAUSED THE SEATS TO TILT BACKWARDS AND PULL UP FROM THE FRAMEWORK. THE GENTLEMAN WAS NOTICEABLY CONCERNED AND UNEASY ABOUT THE OBVIOUS HAZARD. FLT ATTENDANT NOTIFIED THE CAPT OF THE PROB. THE CAPT SAID HE WOULD CALL MAINT CTL AND ADVISE US FURTHER. WHEN NO WORD WAS RECEIVED FROM THE CAPT AFTER ABOUT 15 MINS, FLT ATTENDANT REQUESTED PERMISSION TO ENTER THE COCKPIT TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION. THE CAPT'S FIRST SUGGESTION WAS TO RELOCATE EMPLOYEES TO THAT ROW IF THE PAX WERE UNCOMFORTABLE SITTING THERE. WHEN FLT ATTENDANT REPLIED THAT THERE WERE NO EMPLOYEES ON BOARD, THE CAPT THEN RECOMMENDED THAT WE FIND MOTHERS TRAVELING WITH SMALL CHILDREN AND REQUIRE THAT THEY HOLD THEIR CHILDREN ON THEIR LAPS IN ORDER TO FREE UP SEATS AND SUBSEQUENTLY MOVE THE PEOPLE SEATED IN ROW 9ABC. IN THE MEANTIME, HE WOULD CONTACT DISPATCH TO OBTAIN CLRNC FOR THE 2 FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS TO MOVE FROM FIRST CLASS TO THE COCKPIT. HE SAID HE WOULD GET BACK TO US WITH MORE INFO. FLT ATTENDANT LEFT THE COCKPIT AND RELAYED THIS TO THE INVOLVED PAX AND MYSELF. THE GENTLEMAN SEATED IN 9C DIDN'T AGREE THAT THIS WOULD RECTIFY THE PROB. HE WAS ANXIOUS ABOUT THE PRECARIOUS CONDITION OF THE SEATS. THERE WERE ONLY 2 CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 2 ON BOARD AND THEY WERE ALREADY SITTING ON LAPS. IN ADDITION, WE FELT THAT TO MAKE THAT REQUEST THAT OF ANYONE WHO HAD PURCHASED A SEAT FOR THEIR CHILD ON A FULL 5 HR FLT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE AS WELL AS AN INADEQUATE SOLUTION. AT THIS POINT ALMOST 50 MINS INTO THE FLT AND AGAIN NO WORD FROM THE CAPT, I CALLED AND REQUESTED ENTRY TO THE COCKPIT. PRIOR TO THIS, I EXAMINED ROW 9ABC CLOSELY TO EVALUATE THE PRECISE NATURE OF THE PROB THEN CONFERRED WITH ALL THE FLT ATTENDANTS. WE EACH AGREED THAT THE SITUATION WARRANTED FURTHER EMPHASIS ON THE UNSAFE CONDITION BE CONVEYED TO THE CAPT. UPON ENTERING THE COCKPIT, I EXPLAINED IN DETAIL THAT THE ENTIRE ROW WAS INSECURE AND THAT 9C IN PARTICULAR WAS NEARLY DETACHED FROM THE MOUNTING STRUCTURE. THE CAPT WAS UNRESPONSIVE (AS WAS THE FO). I ADVOCATED ON BEHALF OF THE OTHER FLT ATTENDANTS THAT WE COLLECTIVELY DEEMED IT A SIGNIFICANT SAFETY ISSUE AND THAT WE WERE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE POTENTIAL HAZARD THIS POSED TO THE SAFETY OF THE FLT. WE CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS MORE SERIOUS THAN JUST THE REPOSE OF 3 PAX. THE CAPT INSINUATED THAT HE WAS IRRITATED AND SAID NOTHING DESPITE THE ATTEMPT I MADE AT USING MY LEARNED CRM SKILLS. HE TURNED AWAY FROM ME AND SIMPLY ADVISED ME THAT HE HAD OBTAINED CLRNC FOR THE FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS TO SIT IN THE COCKPIT SO 2 OF THE PAX COULD MOVE TO THOSE FIRST CLASS SEATS. I POINTED OUT THAT ASIDE FROM THE NEGLECTING THE PURPOSE OF THE FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS

WITHOUT THE WT (AT LEAST 450 LBS -- THE MINIMUM COMBINED WT OF THE 3 MEN) ON THE CHAIRS I BELIEVED IT WOULD BE EVEN MORE INSECURE. THE CAPT OVERTLY DISPLAYED AN INTENTIONAL DISREGARD FOR SAFETY. HE NEVER ASKED ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SEATS. CLRLY HIS ONLY INTEREST WAS HOW WE COULD CONTINUE WITHOUT ANY INTERRUPTION. HE EXHIBITED MERE ANNOYANCE BY THE PROB. I REQUESTED THAT HE MAKE A BRIEF ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX EXPLAINING THE REASON WE HAD BEEN WALKING BACK AND FORTH TO ROW 9 AND INTO THE COCKPIT. I THOUGHT IT SUITABLE SINCE THERE WAS OBVIOUSLY A DISTURBANCE OF SOME SORT AND BY NOW WE WERE ALMOST 1 HR INTO OUR FLT AND HAD YET TO BEGIN THE SVC IN ECONOMY CLASS. HIS RESPONSE WAS 'WHY DON'T YOU DO IT?'

Synopsis

AN AIRBUS A320 ACFT SEAT ROW 9-ABC WITH PASSENGERS, SEPARATED FROM TRACK MOUNT AFTER TKOF. CAPTAIN WOULD NOT RETURN TO FIELD. FLT FULL. FIVE HOUR FLT CONTINUED TO DESTINATION.

ACN: 745449

Time / Day

Date : 200707
Day : Sat
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SJC.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : SJC.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 110
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6200
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 900
ASRS Report : 745449

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Ground
Qualification.Controller : Radar
ASRS Report : 744538

Events

Anomaly.Excursion : Taxiway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Consequence.FAA : Assigned Or Threatened Penalties

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Airport.Markings : SJC.Airport
Airport.Signage : SJC.Airport

Narrative

I HAD COMPLETED THE 'COCKPIT INSPECTION' ITEMS ON OUR CHKLIST AND OBTAINED ATIS AND OUR CLRNC FROM SJC CLRNC DELIVERY AND ENTERED IN THE CLRNC DATA IN OUR FLT MGMNT SYSTEM. AFTER BRIEFING OUR PAX, MY FO JOINED ME IN THE COCKPIT AND OCCUPIED THE R SEAT. I PROVIDED HIM WITH ATIS AND THE CLRNC INFO. WE THEN WENT THROUGH OUR 'BEFORE STARTING' CHKLIST ITEMS, STARTED THE ENGINES AND THEN COMPLETED OUR 'BEFORE TAXIING' CHKLIST ITEMS. AT THAT POINT, MY FO CALLED SJC GND CTL AND INFORMED THEM WE HAD ATIS AND THAT WE WERE READY TO TAXI FROM THE FBO. THE GND CTLR CLRED US TO TAXI TO RWY 30L AND DIRECTED US TO OBTAIN NEW ATIS AND ADVISE HIM WHEN WE HAD IT. THE FO STATED THAT WE SHOULD TURN L OFF THE RAMP TO TAXI TO RWY 30L AND I CONCURRED. I THEN THROTTLED UP OUR ENGINES TO BEGIN TAXIING AND THE FBO MARSHALER VIGOROUSLY DIRECTED US TO TURN TO OUR R TO EXIT THEIR RAMP. THE FO COMMENTED THAT HE HAD HOPED THE MARSHALER WOULD DIRECT US TO TURN TO OUR L, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN A MORE DIRECT TAXI TO RWY 30L. AS WE STARTED TO TAXI THE FO SWITCHED TO THE ATIS FREQ TO OBTAIN THE NEW ATIS. UNFORTUNATELY, HE DID NOT HAVE GND CTL FREQ PROGRAMMED INTO OUR OTHER RADIO AND NEITHER OF US WAS MONITORING GND CTL. AT THE TIME, I WAS NOT AWARE THAT NEITHER OF US WERE MONITORING GND CTL AND THIS WAS NOT COMMUNICATED BETWEEN US, WHICH WAS A FLAW IN OUR CRM PROC. WHILE WE WERE TAXIING, MY FO WAS OBTAINING NEW ATIS AND I WAS GOING THROUGH THE 'TAXIING' CHKLIST ITEMS. WHEN WE CAME TO THE ENTRANCE TO WHAT I THOUGHT TO BE TXWY V (BUT IN FACT IT WAS THE ENTRANCE TO RWY 11/29), I ASKED THE FO (WHO HAD THE ARPT DIAGRAM) IF THIS WAS WHERE WE TURNED R (TO TAXI TO RWY 30L) AND HE RESPONDED 'YES.' AS WE TAXIED UP TO THE ENTRANCE TO WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS TXWY V (NEITHER OF US NOTICED ANY RUNWAY SIGNS OR DISTINCT MARKINGS), I LOOKED L AND VISUALLY CLRED THE INTXN AND AIRSPACE ABOVE IT AND STATED 'CLR L' AND THE FO LOOKED TO THE R AND VISUALLY CLRED THE INTXN AND AIRSPACE ABOVE IT AND STATED 'CLR R.' AFTER CONFIRMING THAT THERE WERE NO POTENTIAL CONFLICTS TO THE L AND R, WE ENTERED THE INTXN AND TURNED R ONTO WHAT WE THOUGH WAS TXWY V (HEADING SE), BUT UNFORTUNATELY, WE HAD MISTAKENLY ENTERED ONTO RWY 11/29. AT THAT TIME THE FO SWITCHED FROM THE ATIS FREQ BACK TO GND CTL FREQ TO ADVISE HIM WE HAD THE NEW ATIS, AND THE CTLR IMMEDIATELY ADVISED THAT WE HAD TURNED ONTO RWY 29 AND HAD COMMITTED A 'PLT DEV.' AS I RECALL THE FO IMMEDIATELY APOLOGIZED TO THE GND CTLR AND ASKED FOR INSTRUCTIONS, TO WHICH THE CTLR ADVISED US TO CONTINUE TAXIING (SE) DOWN RWY 11/29 AND EXIT AT THE END AND THEN CONTINUE OUR TAXI TO RWY 30L. WE TAXIED TO RWY 30L AND UPON ARRIVING AND SWITCHING TO THE TWR FREQ, WE WERE ADVISED TO CALL THE SJC TWR MGR UPON OUR ARRIVAL. WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR TKOF FROM RWY 30L AND FLEW FROM SJC TO ZZZ WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVING AT ZZZ WE CALLED THE

SAN JOSE TWR MGR (WHILE IN MY PRESENCE, BUT I COULD ONLY HEAR MY FO'S SIDE THE CONVERSATION). THE TWR MGR ADVISED OF THE DEV RPT. THE FO TOLD ME THAT DURING HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE TWR MGR, HE WAS TOLD THAT THERE HAD BEEN 5 TO 6 SIMILAR 'PLT DEVS' ON THIS RWY IN RECENT MONTHS AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN PROBS WITH THE FBO MARSHALERS AND RAMP PERSONNEL IN OTHER INCIDENTS, AS WELL. I SPOKE WITH A SAN JOSE FSDO OPS INSPECTOR WHO CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN MANY SIMILAR INCIDENTS IN THE LAST YEAR ON RWY 29 FROM ACFT DEPARTING THE FBO. THIS WAS ONLY THE SECOND TIME THAT EITHER OF US HAS FLOWN INTO OR OUT OF SJC AND WE WERE NOT VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT. FINALLY, THE TWR MGR ADVISED THAT 1) THERE WAS NO CONFLICTING TFC DURING THE 'PLT DEV,' 2) WE DID NOT PLACE ANY OTHER ACFT IN DANGER, 3) NO INBOUND ACFT WAS REQUIRED TO EXECUTE A 'GAR,' AND 4) THE INCIDENT DID NOT COST ANYONE ANY MONEY. IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE FAA TO LOOK AT WHAT MAY BE POSSIBLE SHORTCOMINGS IN THE ARPT INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE RAMP AREA NEAR THE FBO AND THE ADJACENT TXWY AREA. BETTER SIGNAGE AND MARKINGS COULD REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW 'PLT DEVS.' FURTHERMORE, THE COMMERCIAL ARPT DIAGRAM IS NOT VERY CLR IN DEPICTING THIS AREA OF THE ARPT, THE FBO RAMP AND HOW IT INTEGRATES WITH TXWY V. ALSO, PROVIDING PLTS WHO ARE DEPARTING FROM THE FBO RAMP A HANDOUT BRINGING ATTENTION TO THIS PROB AND BETTER TRAINING OF MARSHALERS WITH EMPHASIS ON WHICH DIRECTION THEY DIRECT ACFT TO TURN OUT OF THE RAMP COULD REDUCE CONFUSION AND INCREASE SAFETY WHEN TAXIING AWAY FROM THE FBO. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 744538: C560 REQUESTED TAXI CLRNC FROM FBO FOR IFR DEP AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO TAXI TO RWY 30L, WHICH ACFT ACKNOWLEDGED. CTLR NOTICED ACFT TURN WRONG DIRECTION ON TXWY V, WHICH IS ADJACENT TO FBO. CTLR ATTEMPTED BUT WAS UNABLE TO RAISE PLT ON FREQUENCY AFTER INITIAL CONTACT. CTLR THEN NOTICED ACFT TURN TOWARDS RWY 29 AT TXWY G, STILL UNABLE TO RAISE PLT ON FREQUENCY. CTLR OBSERVED ACFT TURN ONTO RWY 29, AND ALERTED THE TOWER CTLR. EVENTUALLY ABLE TO RAISE PLT WHO STATED HE WAS GETTING THE CURRENT ATIS. THE INTXN OF RWY 29 TXWY G IS CLRLY MARKED WITH SIGNS AND GROUND MARKINGS IN RED DENOTING A RWY. THERE ARE NO RWY GUARD LIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS RWY AS IT IS PRIMARILY USED FOR LIGHT GA ACFT. SJC HAS HAD SEVERAL PLT DEVS OF A SIMILAR NATURE IN THE SAME EXACT MANNER, WHEREAS CORPORATE TYPE ACFT TURN THE WRONG WAY OUT OF THE FBO AND TURN ONTO RWY 29 AT TXWY G. IT SEEMS INEXPLICABLE TO TRY TO UNDERSTAND HOW TO PREVENT THIS TYPE OF ERROR, EXCEPT TO SAY IT PROBABLY HAS TO DO WITH SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ON BEHALF OF THE FLT CREWS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT IN RETROSPECT THE VIGOROUS MARSHALER TAXI SIGNALS WERE INTENDED TO KEEP THE ACFT TURNING R ONTO TXWY V. THE RAMP WAS NOT WELL MARKED IN THE AREA THE ACFT WAS EXITING AND SO THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A TXWY (V) AND RWY WAS NOT CLEAR. THE AREA THE ACFT WAS EXITING APPEARED TO BE RAMP AND BECAUSE A MORE NARROW TXWY (F) WAS IMMEDIATELY IN FRONT OF THEM LEADING ONTO WHAT APPEARED TO BE A LONG WIDE TXWY (IN FACT RWY 11/29) THAT PATH APPEARED THE MORE OBVIOUS TAXI DIRECTION. COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM WAS THE FACT THAT THE FO WAS GETTING ATIS LEAVING THE CAPT SOLO DURING THE INITIAL CRITICAL TAXI EVOLUTION. THE RPTR SUGGESTS MORE SIGNAGE TO IDENTIFY THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE FBO RAMP AND THE TXWY AND ADDITIONALLY UPRIGHT SIGNS FOR RWY 11/29 AT TXWY F. THE RPTR DOES NOT REMEMBER SEEING ANY SIGNS.

Synopsis

A PLT RPTS TAXIING ONTO SJC RWY 11/29 AT TXWY F AFTER LEAVING THE FBO RAMP IMMEDIATELY SE OF THE SJC TWR.

ACN: 745235

Time / Day

Date : 200707
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : UGN.Airport
State Reference : IL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4600

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Operator.General Aviation : Personal
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 2 Eng, Retractable Gear
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : GPS
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial

Person : 1

Affiliation.Other : Personal
Function.Instruction : Instructor
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 205
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3863
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 35
ASRS Report : 745235

Events

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : Entry
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Penetrated Airspace

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DEPARTED XA30 FROM UGN (CLASS D CTLED) IN DA42 TWINSTAR WITH STUDENT WHO IS A CERTIFICATED ATP/MEL, SEL CFI AND CFII. I WAS PROVIDING MEI DUAL INSTRUCTION AND PREPARING STUDENT FOR MEI P61 FLT TEST. STUDENT WAS QUALIFIED AND CURRENT TO ACT AS PIC IN DA42. I ASKED STUDENT PRIOR

TO ENTERING ACFT IF HE HAD CURRENT TERMINAL AREA CHARTS FOR CHICAGO AREA AND IF HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH CLASS B AIRSPACE SHELVES SINCE THE UGN ARPT WAS LOCATED UNDERNEATH THE ORD CLASS B. STUDENT HAD A CURRENT CHART AND WAS FAMILIAR WITH SURROUNDING AREA AND AIRSPACE. FURTHERMORE, STUDENT INDICATED HE WAS PROVIDING SEL DUAL INSTRUCTION DAILY FROM THE UGN ARPT. DURING PRE TKOF BRIEFING, STUDENT INDICATED HE WAS ACTING PIC AND CONTINUED THROUGH TRADITIONAL MEL PRE TKOF BRIEFING. STUDENT HELD SHORT OF RWY 23 AND REQUESTED NE DEP, CLRNC WAS GRANTED AND WE DEPARTED VFR FROM RWY 23. STUDENT BEGAN L TURNOUT TO GENERAL EASTERLY DIRECTION. SHORTLY AFTER, I WAS DISTR WITH OTHER DUTIES INCLUDING REACHING BEHIND SEAT TO PROCURE EMER CHKLISTS FOR MULTI-ENG/SINGLE-ENG TRAINING AND FAILURE, IFR CHARTS AND APCH PLATES. DA42 IS EQUIPPED WITH GARMIN G1000 AND AFTER REFINING PFD, I NOTICED STUDENT WAS IN AN AGGRESSIVE CLB AT VY. AT THAT TIME I ALSO NOTICED ACFT WAS IN A SE HDG AND PASSING THROUGH 4000 FT MSL. SINCE THE STUDENT WAS FLYING A SE HDG INSTEAD OF FULLY COMPLETING THE L TURN TO THE NE AS ORIGINALLY REQUESTED, WE WERE NOW INADVERTENTLY INSIDE THE ORD CLASS B OUTER RING AS DEPICTED ON THE G1000 MFD. WE WERE LOCATED APPROX 9 DME FROM THE OBK VOR ON THE 050 DEG RADIAL. AFTER REFINING THE CHART AND CONFIRMING THE OUTER RING WAS FROM 3600-10000 FT MSL, I TOOK CTL OF ACFT, LEVELED AT 4500 FT MSL, AND INITIATED AN IMMEDIATE DSNDRG L TURN TO A HDG OF 360 DEGS TAKING US DIRECTLY OUT OF THE AIRSPACE. APPROX 3 MI LATER, THE ACFT WAS CLR OF THE CLASS B AIRSPACE. DURING THAT TIME THERE WAS NO TFC VISUALLY IN THE AREA OR ON THE ACFT'S TIS. THE ACFT'S MODE S XPONDER WAS ACTIVELY SQUAWKING AND SET TO 'ALT.' IN REFLECTION OF THE INCIDENT, IT WAS CLR THE STUDENT MAY HAVE BEEN A HIGHLY CERTIFICATED PLT AND INSTRUCTOR THAT FLEW IN THAT AREA DAILY. HOWEVER, HE WAS OUT OF HIS ELEMENT IN A MORE COMPLEX MULTI-ENG ACFT AND WAS ACTING AS A STUDENT INSTEAD OF HIS TRADITIONAL INSTRUCTOR ROLE. I TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION HIS EXPERIENCE AND NEGLECTED TO CLOSELY MONITOR HIS ACTIVITIES AS I WOULD WITH A PRIMARY STUDENT. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL NOT MAKE ASSUMPTIONS BASED ON CERTIFICATION LEVELS AND EXPERIENCE, BUT CLOSELY MONITOR ACTIVITIES OF ANY STUDENT. I COULD HAVE ALSO BEEN BETTER PREPARED PRIOR TO TAKEOFF AND HAD ALL OF THE NECESSARY CHARTS AND CHKLISTS SITUATED ACCORDINGLY SO I WAS NOT DISTR DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. TO PREVENT THIS SIT IN THE FUTURE, I INTEND TO UTILIZE MORE EFFECTIVE CRM AND PREFLT PLANNING PRACTICES. I ALSO MONITORED GUARD 121.5 WHILE OPERATING INADVERTENTLY IN THE CLASS B DURING THESE 2-3 MINS AND WHILE OUTSIDE THE AIRSPACE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. IN RETROSPECT, IT MAY HAVE BEEN MORE APPROPRIATE TO CONTACT ORD APCH AND ADVISE THEM OF THE INADVERTENT INCURSION AND REQUEST A SQUAWK CODE AND CLRNC WHILE EXITING THE AIRSPACE.

Synopsis

DA42 INADVERTENTLY PENETRATED CLASS B AIRSPACE DURING INSTRUCTIONAL FLT.

ACN: 744781

Time / Day

Date : 200707
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : ZZZZ.BCSTN
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZZ.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Qualification.Pilot : Private
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 300
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3100
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1021
ASRS Report : 744781

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Speed Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON ROTATION, WE GOT 2 CAUTION MESSAGES THAT DISTR ME (WINDSHEAR FAIL AND GPWS FAIL). AS WE CLBED OUT, WE FORGOT TO BRING UP THE GEAR. WITH THE GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED, THE THRUST RATING CANNOT BE CHANGED FROM TKOF TO CLB UNTIL 1700 PRESSURE ALT. THIS WAS FURTHER DISTRACTING. WHEN WE FINALLY DID BRING UP THE GEAR, WE WERE STILL AT 200 KTS (THE MAX GEAR RETRACTION SPD). THE GEAR HESITATED FOR SEVERAL SECONDS, AND WE GOT A MASTER WARNING LNDG GEAR DISAGREE. THE ACFT WAS BUFFETING LIGHTLY FOR ABOUT 30 SECONDS WHILE THE GEAR WAS HANGING DOWN MID-TRANSIT, THEN THE GEAR FINISHED ITS CYCLE AND WE FELT 3 DISTINCT BUMPS AS THE GEAR LOCKED UP. BY THIS POINT, MY ATTN SPAN WAS SATURATED. I DECIDED TO BREAK THE CHAIN OF EVENTS BY DECLARING AN EMER FOR PRIORITY HANDLING BACK INTO THE ARPT. FURTHERMORE, I WANTED THE EMER VEHICLES STANDING BY IN CASE THE GEAR COLLAPSED. WE RAN THE APPLICABLE EMER CHKLIST (WHICH CALLED FOR A RETURN TO FIELD), RAN THE IN-RANGE AND APCH CHKLIST, AND LANDED WITHOUT EVENT. WE STOPPED THE ACFT ON THE RWY, SET THE BRAKE AND CONTACTED MAINT CTL TO MAKE SURE WE WERE OK TO TAXI INTO THE GATE WITHOUT DANGER OF COLLAPSING THE GEAR. MAINT SAID IT WAS ALRIGHT IF WE TAXIED, WHICH WE DID WITHOUT FURTHER EVENT. I HAVE LEARNED IMMENSELY FROM THIS EVENT. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL TRY TO BRING OTHERS INTO THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS, SPECIFICALLY DISPATCH AND MAINT (VIA SELCAL FREQ). I THINK IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO HAVE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. AT THE TIME, MY THINKING WAS THAT WE ALREADY HAD PROBS WITH THE AHRS (THE REASON WE WERE A FERRY FLT TO BEGIN WITH), AND WERE TRAVELING INTO KNOWN IFR CONDITIONS. I FELT THAT HAVING A POTENTIAL GEAR PROB WAS TOO MUCH TO DEAL WITH, GIVEN THE OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES. FURTHER, WE HAD BEEN SITTING IN THE HEAT AND HUMIDITY FOR SEVERAL HRS AT THE ARPT, AND WERE NOT AS SHARP AS WE COULD HAVE BEEN FOR THIS FERRY FLT. TOO MANY DISTRS HAD BROUGHT ME AWAY FROM SOP AND 'THE NORMAL GROOVE.' I THINK IT WAS A GOOD DECISION TO NIP THIS POTENTIAL LANDSLIDE OF BAD CIRCUMSTANCES TO A CLOSE. AGAIN, AT THIS TIME I FELT THAT MY DECISION WAS A BIT OF A SNAP DECISION. I MADE THE EMER CALL FAIRLY QUICKLY, AND WITHOUT BRINGING THE FO INTO THE DECISION. THOUGH THE FO AGREED WITH MY DECISION, IT WAS POOR CRM ON MY PART TO ACT HASTILY AND UNILATERALLY. I THINK WE SHOULD HAVE WORKED THE PROB A LITTLE BIT MORE, AND RUN THE CHKLIST. HOWEVER, IT IS TOUGH TO KEEP THINGS SORTED OUT WHEN YOU ARE SATURATED. I WAS ALREADY SATURATED BY DISTRS FROM THE 2 CAUTION MESSAGES ON ROTATION, AND HAVING FORGOTTEN THE THRUST SETTING LOGIC I WAS DISTR BY NOT BEING ABLE TO SET CLB THRUST UNTIL 1700 PRESSURE ALT. ANOTHER ISSUE HERE IS A DEMO OF WHY DETAILED SYS KNOWLEDGE IS SO IMPORTANT. HAD I REMEMBERED THAT SOME IECA MESSAGES ARE NOT INHIBITED DURING TKOF, OR THAT THE THRUST RATINGS HAD LOGIC, I WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO SATURATED WHEN THE GEAR HAD THE PROBS.

Synopsis

AN EMB145 PILOT REPORTS THAT FOLLOWING AN EICAS DISTRACTION DURING TKOF THE LNDG GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT BECAUSE OF EXCESSIVE SPD. AN EMER WAS DECLARED WITH A RETURN TO LNDG.

ACN: 744494

Time / Day

Date : 200706

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ORD.Airport
State Reference : IL
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ORD.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 215
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3200
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2800
ASRS Report : 744494

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Non Adherence.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

CAPT REQUESTS AND DIRECTS FO TO CONDUCT AN EXTERNAL VISUAL CHK OF FLAP SETTINGS DURING TAXI-OUT PHASE OF FLT OPS ON ACTIVE TXWY AT ORD ARPT. I, THE FO, CHALLENGE THE DECISION AND MAKE MULTIPLE ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE PIC TO USE DIFFERENT RWY OR CONTACT GND CTL TO LET THEM KNOW OF OUR INTENTIONS WITH NO POSITIVE RESULT. INITIALLY, I, THE FO, CHALLENGE THE DECISION TO EXIT ACFT ON AN ACTIVE TXWY WITH ENGS RUNNING AT IDLE, BUT CAPT CITES FOR HIS JUDGEMENT CALL THE COMPANY FLT

MANUAL WHICH STATES, 'TKOF FLAPS MUST BE SET PRIOR TO DEP AND AN EXTERNAL VISUAL CHK MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED TO DETECT TO ANY TWISTING, SKEWING, OR ABNORMAL DEFORMATION OF THE FLAPS. USE THE INFO PROVIDED IN THE NORMAL/ABNORMAL OUTBOARD FLAP CONFIN AND OUTBOARD FLAPS GO/NO-GO CRITERIA FIGURES LOCATED IN THIS SECTION. IF ANY ADDITIONAL CHANGE IS NECESSARY, PRIOR TO TKOF, ACCOMPLISH THE VISUAL CHK SPECIFIED BY THE PRECEDING FIGURES...' THIS INTERP OF A COMPANY FLT MANUAL PUTS A FO IN A PRECARIOUS POS. FO'S WANT TO FOLLOW DIRECTIONS OF PIC AND PROVIDE AN IDEAL CRM ENVIRONMENT AS THEY WORK AS A 'TEAM,' HOWEVER, AT THE SAME TIME COMMON SENSE IS ABSENT IN THIS KIND OF DECISION MAKING. THIS KIND OF COMPANY FLT MANUAL INTERP IS A SAFETY HAZARD AND SECURITY RISK. THANKFULLY, NO INCIDENTS OR ACCIDENTS RESULTED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER STATED THAT THE CAPT CITED THE COMPANY FLT MANUAL WHICH STATES THAT A VISUAL CHECK OF TKOF FLAPS IS REQUIRED IF A CHANGE IN FLAP POSITION IS MADE. THE CHECK IS NORMALLY ACCOMPLISHED DURING PREFLIGHT WITH TKOF FLAPS PRESET, BUT IF A RWY CHANGE NECESSITATES ANOTHER FLAP SETTING, THIS APPARENTLY MANDATES AN 'EXTERNAL VISUAL CHECK.' APPARENTLY SOME CAPTS FOR THIS CARRIER INTERPRET THIS TO MEAN THAT THE FO MUST EXIT THE ACFT FOR THIS CHECK.

Synopsis

CRJ200 FO WAS ORDERED TO EXIT ACFT ON TAXIWAY TO VISUALLY CHECK FLAPS AFTER AN ALTERNATE FLAP SETTING WAS MADE.

ACN: 743714

Time / Day

Date : 200706
Day : Thu
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : BTV.Airport
State Reference : VT
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1800

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : BTV.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Traffic Pattern

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 120
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1000
ASRS Report : 743714

Events

Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : GPWS
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Precautionary Avoidance Action

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

BRIEFED NORMAL VISUAL APCH INTO BTV. 1900 FT TFC PATTERN ALT AND A 5 MI
BASE TO FINAL LEG. GOT CLRED THE VISUAL RWY 33. WHILE EXECUTING THE

VISUAL APCH TO RWY 33 I TURNED A 6 MI FINAL AT OUR BRIEFED TFC PATTERN ALT. WHILE ON THE L BASE TO FINAL I REALIZED I WAS GOING TO BE HIGH WHEN ROLLING OUT ON FINAL, SO I STARTED A NORMAL DSCNT FOR LNDG WITH THE GEAR DOWN AND 160 KTS. DURING SHALLOW DSCNT TO LNDG RECEIVED A 'TERRAIN, TERRAIN-PULL UP' CAUTION MESSAGE AT APPROX 1800 FT. I EXECUTED THE TERRAIN AVOIDANCE MANEUVER AND CONTINUED TO AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. FACTORS: ALTHOUGH I DID NOT FEEL TIRED, IT HAD BEEN A LONG DAY. DAY 3 OF 5. NIGHT VISUAL CUES INFLUENCED MY DESIRE TO 'TURN AND DSND TOWARDS RWY.' DSCNT INITIATED KNOWING I WOULD BE HIGH ON FINAL. CRM, COM, AND WX WERE ALL VERY GOOD. I JUST DID NOT STICK TO THE PLAN OF TURNING 5 MI FINAL OR LESS. FIRST TIME IN BTV, NEXT TIME I WILL ONLY ACCEPT AN ILS OR SETUP MORE VISUAL CUES TO MAKE SURE A 5 MI FINAL IS ACHIEVED.

Synopsis

CL65 FLT CREW EXECUTES TERRAIN AVOIDANCE MANEUVER AFTER RECEIVING EGPWS TERRAIN WARNING ON NIGHT VISUAL TO RWY 33 AT BTV.

ACN: 743035

Time / Day

Date : 200706
Day : Wed
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 31000

Environment

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Engine Driven Pump

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
ASRS Report : 743035

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING CLB AFTER DEP FROM ZZZZ, FLT ATTENDANT #4 CALLED THE FLT DECK TO ADVISE THAT THE R ENG APPEARED TO BE WOBBLING OR MOVING AROUND MORE THAN IT SHOULD. THE CAPT SENT THE RELIEF OFFICER TO INVESTIGATE AND THE RELIEF OFFICER RPTED BACK WITH EXCESSIVE LATERAL MOVEMENT OF THE R ENG, L ENG WAS SOLID -- NOT MOVING AT ALL. WX WAS SMOOTH DURING CLB. MOMENTS LATER, WE LEVELED OFF AND THE CAPT WENT TO TAKE A LOOK. PWR SETTING WAS CONSIDERABLY LESS AND HE OBSERVED A SMALL AMOUNT OF ENG MOVEMENT. THE RELIEF OFFICER WAS ADAMANT THAT SOMETHING WAS WRONG WITH THE ENG OR THE PYLON MOUNTING. THE RELIEF OFFICER AND I

WERE VERY CONCERNED THAT CONTINUING ON TO ZZZ WOULD CREATE A POSSIBLE UNSAFE SITUATION. THE RELIEF OFFICER AND MYSELF ADVISED THE CAPT CONTINUALLY THAT WE FELT A DIVERSION WAS NECESSARY AS WE ARE NOT MECHS AND NOT QUALIFIED TO DETERMINE THE RELIABILITY OF THE ENG AS WE WERE ABOUT TO ENTER THE ETOPS PORTION OF OUR FLT. THE CAPT LISTENED AND THANKED US FOR OUR INPUT AND ADVISED WE WOULD CONTINUE TO DEST. DISPATCH AND MAINT WERE NOTIFIED. THROUGH ACARS (VIA DISPATCH), TECHNICIAN GAVE US A POSSIBLE CAUSE AND MAINT RECOMMENDED NOT TO USE REVERSE THRUST UPON LNDG, SO AS NOT TO STRESS THE ENG MOUNTINGS FURTHER. DURING CRUISE, THE ENG MOVEMENT WAS MINIMAL TO NON-EXISTENT. DURING DSCNT INTO ZZZ, R ENG WOBBLE STARTED AGAIN AND CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE DSCNT UNTIL LNDG. A MAINT DISCREPANCY WAS WRITTEN UP IN THE LOGBOOK UPON ARR. HAVING PREVIOUSLY BEEN A CAPT, I UNDERSTAND THE PROVISIONS OF FLT MANUAL PART I, REF THE CAPT'S ULTIMATE AUTH, ALONG WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FO TO CONTINUALLY ADVISE THE CAPT OF ANY SITUATION DETRIMENTAL TO THE SAFETY OF THE FLT. THE RELIEF OFFICER AND I FULLY COMPLIED WITH OUR RESPONSIBILITY IN PART I. THE PURPOSE OF THIS RPT IS NOT TO QUESTION CAPT'S AUTH IN ANY FASHION. ALTHOUGH I AM CONCERNED THAT DUE TO THE RECENT ECONOMIC DOWNTURN WITHIN OUR COMPANY OR OTHER UNKNOWN REASONS, THE MOST CONSERVATIVE COURSE OF ACTION IS NOT ALWAYS BEING TAKEN. FOR QUITE A WHILE WE HAVE BEEN TAUGHT THERE IS NO MISSION. I THINK AS A FLT DEPT, WE NEED TO RE-EMPHASIZE THIS. HAD THE LATERAL MOVEMENT CAUSED AN ENG FAILURE OR MORE SIGNIFICANTLY THE SEPARATION OF THE ENG FROM THE ACFT, THE OUTCOME WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY DIFFERENT. I DO NOT BELIEVE WE TOOK THE SAFEST, MOST CONSERVATIVE ACTION, AND I WAS IN COMPLETE DISAGREEMENT WITH THE DECISION TO CONTINUE TO ZZZ THE ENTIRE FLT, AS WAS THE RELIEF OFFICER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER STATED THAT THE HIGH PRESSURE FUEL PUMP ON THE ENG ACCESSORY DRIVE PAD WAS OUT OF BALANCE. WHEN AN OUT OF BALANCE CONDITION BECOMES SEVERE THE ENG CAN MOVE ON THE PYLON IN WAYS IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO DO. IN HIS OPINION A DIVERSION WOULD HAVE BEEN JUSTIFIED. THIS MAINTENANCE EVENT BECAME A CRM ISSUE AND HE WOULD HAVE DEALT WITH IT DIFFERENTLY.

Synopsis

A B767-300 FO REPORTS AN APPARENTLY LOOSE ENG MOUNT ALLOWING EXCESSIVE LATERAL ENG MOVEMENT. THE CAPT WOULD NOT DIVERT TO INSPECT ACFT.

ACN: 740530

Time / Day

Date : 200705
Day : Thu
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LFMN.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 500
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 3000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : LFMN.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter
Make Model Name : Gulfstream IV
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 125
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15600
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4200
ASRS Report : 740530

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Unstabilized Approach
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VOR/DME CGS RIVIERA CIRCLE-TO-LAND APCH FOR RWY 4L AT LFMN. WE BRIEFED THE APCH WELL AND FLEW THE APCH WELL -- THAT IS, UNTIL THE D5.0 CGS FIX AT WHICH POINT WE WERE TO EITHER FLY VISUALLY TO THE RWY OR EXECUTE A MISSED APCH. AT THE 35.0 FIX WE TOOK OVER VISUALLY AND HEADED TO THE ARPT. VISIBILITY WAS, I BELIEVE, 6 MI (10K) WITH NO CEILING. I WAS THE PF AND STARTED A DSCNT FROM 3000 FT AND BEGAN A TURN TO THE ARPT. THE PNF IN THE R SEAT WAS IN A BETTER POS TO SEE THE RWYS AND BECAUSE OF MY POS (L SEAT, IN A TURN, DSNDING) I HAD TROUBLE KEEPING MY EYE ON THE RWY. I BEGAN TO LINE UP ON RWY 4R INSTEAD OF RWY 4L AND BEGAN A DSCNT FOR RWY 4R. THE PNF POINTED OUT RWY 4L FOR ME. I WAS LOW FOR RWY 4L AND ROLLED OUT OF THE TURN, THEN OVERSHOT RWY 4L AND HAD TO TURN TO THE R TO GET BACK ON THE CTRLINE FOR RWY 4L. STILL LOW, I ADDED PWR TO GET BACK ON THE PROPER GLIDE PATH AND SPD FOR THE RWY. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED ON ABOUT A 2 MI FINAL. WE LANDED SAFELY AND ATC (LCL) DID NOT MENTION EITHER MY ALT OR COURSE EXCURSIONS ON THE VISUAL PORTION OF THE APCH. THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT. I WAS DISAPPOINTED IN THE APCH BECAUSE WE HAD BRIEFED IT SO WELL. THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS INVOLVED: 1) VISIBILITY WAS NOT GREAT AND WHEN WE REACHED THE D5.0 WE HAD THE ARPT AND RWYS IN SIGHT BUT IT WASN'T VERY SHARP. I BEGAN TURNING TOWARDS THE WRONG RWY UNTIL CORRECTED BY THE PNF. 2) AN ACFT WAS TAKING OFF FROM RWY 4R. I MISTAKENLY THOUGHT THAT WAS THE ACFT WE WERE FOLLOWING FOR LNDG ON RWY 4L AND THAT HE WAS ON THE LNDG ROLL. 3) WHILE WE BRIEFED THE APCH WELL, OUR BRIEFING STOPPED AT THE D5.0 FIX. NO TALK AMONG US ABOUT WHAT WE SHOULD DO AFTER REACHING THAT POINT. I DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ASK THE PNF TO POINT TO THE ARPT OR THE RWY. VISIBILITY WAS SUCH THAT SEEING THE ARPT WAS NOT GOING TO BE A PROB. I WAS INSIDE FLYING THE PRESCRIBED APCH AND I DISREGARDED WHAT WAS OUTSIDE UNTIL THE FINAL MOMENT AND THEN HAD TROUBLE PUTTING MY EYE ON THE ARPT. THE PNF WHO SAW THE ARPT AND RWY DID NOT OFFER ANY EARLY CORRECTIONS FOR THE FINAL APCH COURSE AND NOW I WAS BUSY LOOKING OUTSIDE AND DISREGARDED THE CTRLINE EXTENSION I BUILD IN THE FMS FOR RWY 4. 4) FATIGUE. WE HAD DEPARTED ZZZ1 (US) 2 DAYS BEFORE AT AROUND XA15 LNDG AT LFMN IN THE AFTERNOON OF THE NEXT DAY. BEFORE OUR DEP WE LEARNED THAT WE WOULD BE PICKING UP SOME OTHER PAX IMMEDIATELY UPON ARR TO FLY FROM LFMN TO ZZZZ2. SLEEP BEFORE OUR ZZZ1 (US) DEP WAS SPORADIC DURING THE DAY. THE EXTRA LEG WOULD STILL PUT US WELL WITHIN FLT AND DUTY TIME LIMITS BUT I KNEW THE NEXT WOULD BE A LONG DAY. THAT DAY WE WERE TO DEPART ZZZZ2 FOR LFMN WITH PAX. WE WOULD BE OFF DUTY FOR ABOUT 21 HRS. SLEEP WOULDN'T COME FOR ME THAT NIGHT, BUT I WAS NOT CONCERNED -- WE WOULD NOT HAVE TO LEAVE THE HOTEL FOR THE ARPT UNTIL THE AFTERNOON FOR OUR FLT TO LFMN. I FELL ASLEEP ABOUT XF30 ON THAT DAY. PRETTY GOOD, BECAUSE THAT WOULD GIVE ME A FULL NIGHT'S SLEEP. THE PHONE RANG TWO HOURS LATER. IT WAS OUR DISPATCH SAYING THAT THE DEP TIME WAS NOW XQ00. THE PAX WANTED XQ30 BUT THE ONLY SLOT AVAILABLE WAS XQ00. I CALLED THE ARPT TO CHANGE OUR HOTEL PICK-UP TIME AND THEN CALLED OUR HANDLER TO CHANGE OUR DEP AND LFMN ARR TIMES. I FELL ASLEEP AGAIN AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER. DISPATCH CALLED AGAIN SAYING THE

PAX WANTED TO LEAVE AT XS30, THE ORIGINAL TIME. I AGAIN MADE ALL THE PHONE CALLS TO GET THINGS CHANGED BACK TO THE WAY THEY WERE. DISPATCH, I BELIEVE, CONFUSED TIME ZONES, GMT AND LCL TIME, AND INDEED HAD NO IDEA WHAT TIME IT WAS IN ZZZZ2 AND FOR SOME REASON THOUGHT THAT THE PAX WANTED TO LEAVE AT XQ30 INSTEAD OF XS30. I COULD NOT GET BACK TO SLEEP AND THE PNF DIDN'T SLEEP WELL EITHER. WE WERE BOTH EXHAUSTED BY THE TIME WE ARRIVED AT THE ARPT FOR DEP. THE ONE THING WE, AS A CREW, COULD HAVE DONE MUCH BETTER WOULD BE TO COMPLETE THE APCH BRIEFING ALL THE WAY TO THE CIRCLING RWY. IT WAS A CIRCLING APCH WITH A 90 DEG TURN TO THE R. AFTER REACHING THE D5.0 FIX, CRM SEEMED TO HAVE BROKEN DOWN AND BOTH PLTS, LOOKING BACK, SEEMED TO BE LISTLESS AND NOT INVOLVED.

Synopsis

A G IV PILOT REPORTS FATIGUE LEADING TO AN UNSTABILIZED APCH TO LFMN.

ACN: 737582

Time / Day

Date : 200704
Day : Mon
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Citationjet, C525/C526
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Aircraft : 2

Operator.General Aviation : Instructional
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 30
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 40
ASRS Report : 737582

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Ground Encounters.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE GOT OFF OF THE END OF THE RWY, AND ASKED ATC (GND CTL) FOR PROGRESSIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE FBO. THEY SAID TO MAKE A R TURN ON TXWY B THEN WE WILL SEE THE FBO HANGARS. WE PROCEED TO MAKE THE R TURN AS TOLD, THEN WE BOTH SAW HANGARS ON THE L, AS DESCRIBED BY THE TWR. AFTER WE TURNED, WE BOTH DISCUSSED HOW IT DID NOT LOOK RIGHT. I CALLED THE TWR ONCE AGAIN TO CONFIRM THAT WE WERE IN THE RIGHT AREA. THE TWR THEN STATED THAT HE COULD NO LONGER SEE US. THE CAPT STOPPED BRIEFLY AT THIS TIME OR SLOWED DOWN TO AN ALMOST STOP, WHEN HE SAID, 'I THINK THERE'S THE FOLLOW ME VEHICLE,' AND I AGREED. THE CAPT THEN JUST TURNED R TOWARDS THE VEHICLE, DOWN A VERY TIGHT ROW OF SMALLER PROP ACFT. I WAS VERY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THIS DECISION, BUT IT WAS NEVER DISCUSSED AT THAT TIME THAT HE WAS JUST GOING TO TURN R TOWARDS THE TRUCK. THE CAPT SLOWED DOWN, KNOWING THAT THIS WAS A REALLY TIGHT PLACE TO BE. WE SHOULD HAVE JUST STOPPED THERE. HE REQUESTED FOR ME TO WATCH MY WING AND HE WOULD WATCH HIS, AND I AGREED TO. AS WE GOT CLOSER TO THE AIRPLANE THAT WE STRUCK, I STARTED TO SAY THAT WE WERE REALLY, REALLY, REALLY CLOSE, AND BEFORE I COULD SAY ANYTHING, IT SEEMED THAT WE PICKED UP A LITTLE SPD AND IT WAS TOO LATE. I COULDN'T GET OUT ANOTHER WORD BEFORE WE STRUCK THE NOSECONE OF A C172 WITH OUR R WINGTIP. AFTER THAT, THE CAPT JUST CONTINUED DOWN THE ROW, FOLLOWING THE TRUCK TO THE FBO. WHAT I SHOULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENT AND LEARNED FROM THIS: EVEN AS SIC, I NEED TO BE MORE DECLARATIVE WHEN I AM NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE DECISION AND IF NEED BE, DO WHAT I NEED TO. AS THE CAPT MADE THE TURN DOWN THE ROW, I SHOULD HAVE STATED AT THAT TIME, THAT I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE, AND THAT I COULDN'T BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WING. LET'S STOP RIGHT HERE. MORE CRM SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE. IF YOUR GUT TELLS YOU IT'S WRONG, IT IS TOO CLOSE, THEN IT IS. DON'T TAKE CHANCES!

Synopsis

DURING TAXI IN TO THE FBO A CE525 FLT CREW HAS THE RIGHT WING TIP CONTACT THE PROPELLER SPINNER OF A C172 PARKED ALONG THE TXWY.

ACN: 736051

Time / Day

Date : 200704
Day : Sun
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Bound Lower : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZ.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Ground : Takeoff Roll
Route In Use.Departure.SID : zzz

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Oil Pressure Indication

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 11000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3800
ASRS Report : 736051

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Maintenance : Technician

Person : 4

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : oil pressure ind.
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed As Precaution
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

OUR FLT PUSHED BACK FROM THE GATE A FEW MINS LATE DUE TO LATE ARRIVING BAGS. I WAS PF, AND MY FO WAS PLT MONITORING. BOTH ENGS STARTED NORMALLY AND PROVIDED NORMAL N1, N2, OIL QUANTITY, AND OIL PRESSURE INDICATIONS AFTER ENG START AND THROUGHOUT OUR TAXI. WE INITIATED OUR TKOF AT XA41Z, AND DURING THE TKOF ROLL AT APPROX 100 KTS, WE OBSERVED AMBER 'XX'S' SPONTANEOUSLY APPEAR ON BOTH ENGS' OIL INDICATORS ON THE ENG ECAM PAGE THAT IS DISPLAYED DURING TKOF. IN 9 YRS OF AIRLINE FLYING, WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN TRAINED TO BE 'GO-ORIENTED' DURING EACH TKOF, AND TO ABORT FOR ONLY THE MOST SERIOUS ACFT SYS FAILURES. SINCE WE HAD NORMAL N1, N2, ENG OIL QUANTITY, AIRSPD, AND NO ABNORMAL VIBRATIONS OR ANY LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CTL, I ELECTED NOT TO ABORT THE TKOF. I DID NOT WANT TO OVERREACT AND CREATE THE DANGEROUS POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN UNWARRANTED ABORTED TKOF. IN THAT MOMENT, I ALSO REMEMBER FROM MY LAST SIMULATOR CHK RIDE THAT THE MOST DECISIVE INDICATOR OF ENG DAMAGE OR MALFUNCTION IN OUR HIGH BYPASS CFM56 ENGS IS OIL QUANTITY, NOT OIL PRESSURE. BECAUSE ALL OUR OTHER ENG INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL, MY DECISION WAS TO CONTINUE A NORMAL TKOF, STABILIZE OUR ACFT CONFIGN AND GET CLR OF NEARBY TFC BEFORE ASSESSING THE SITUATION IN ANY FURTHER DEPTH. WE RECEIVED NO ECAM WARNINGS AT ANY TIME DURING OUR TKOF (OR AFTER CLBING ABOVE THE TKOF INHIBIT PHASE ALT), NOR DURING ANY OTHER PORTION OF OUR FLT UNTIL LATER DURING OUR ROLLOUT PHASE UPON LNDG. WE BEGAN OUR INITIAL CLB, RETRACTED LNDG GEAR AND FLAPS, AND QUICKLY BUT METHODICALLY PERFORMED OUR AFTER TKOF CHKLISTS, WHILE CONTINUOUSLY MONITORING OUR ENG PAGE FOR ANY FURTHER ABNORMAL SYMPTOMS. WE WERE PREPARED AT THE FIRST SIGN OF ANY ADDITIONAL ABNORMALITY TO DECLARE AN EMER AND LAND IMMEDIATELY, BUT WE WERE CONFIDENT THAT WE WERE OBSERVING ONLY AN ABSENCE OF INDICATIONS, NOT A GENUINE OIL PRESSURE LOSS. THE REASON WE BELIEVED THIS IS BECAUSE IN THE AIRBUS, WE SEE THESE TYPES OF INDICATION FAILURES ALL THE TIME, WHERE 'XX'S' APPEAR TO TELL US THAT A SENSOR HAS FAILED. ALL ENG INDICATIONS CONTINUED TO BE NORMAL THROUGHOUT OUR INITIAL CLB, AND AS WE WERE VECTORED BY ATC, WE BECAME CLR ENOUGH OF NEARBY TFC TO ASSESS OUR SITUATION IN GREATER DEPTH. I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND RADIO COMS, AND ASKED MY FO TO

REVIEW ALL OUR ACFT ECAM SYS PAGES (WHICH WERE ALL NORMAL, EXCEPT FOR THE AMBER 'XX'S' DISPLAYED ON THE ENG OIL PRESSURE PORTION OF OUR ENG PAGE), AND I ALSO ASKED HIM TO CHK THE WHOLE COCKPIT FOR ANY POPPED CIRCUIT BREAKERS, AND TO CONSULT OUR VOLUME 2 FOR ANY ABNORMAL PROCS RELATED TO 'LOSS OF OIL PRESSURE INDICATIONS.' WE FOUND NO POPPED CIRCUIT BREAKERS, AND WE FOUND NO EMER CHKLISTS OR DIRECTLY PERTINENT GUIDANCE IN OUR VOLUME 2 MANUAL RELATING TO A LOSS OF ENG OIL PRESSURE INDICATIONS. THE ONLY PROC SLIGHTLY SIMILAR TO OUR CONDITION WAS IN THE ECAM ANNUNCIATED ABNORMALS SECTION FOR ENG 1(2) OIL LOW PRESSURE. THIS SECTION ADVISES SHUTTING DOWN THE AFFECTED ENG(S) IF OIL PRESSURE IS BELOW 13 PSI AND ACCOMPANIED WITH AN ENG OIL LOW PRESSURE WARNING. SINCE WE HAD SEEN NO ECAM WARNINGS, NONE OF THESE PROCS SEEMED APPLICABLE. THERE SIMPLY WAS NO EMER OR ABNORMAL CHKLIST PROC FOR OUR CURRENT ACFT CONDITION, EITHER IN THE ECAM EMERS, NON-ECAM EMERS, OR ABNORMALS SECTION OF OUR MANUALS, SO WE HAD TO RELY ON OUR JUDGEMENT OF THE ACFT'S STATE AND THE ADVICE OF OUR AIRLINE'S MAINT CTL EXPERT. I HAD MY FO CONTACT MAINT CTL TO DETERMINE ANY ADDITIONAL MEASURES WE MIGHT TAKE TO FURTHER UNDERSTAND OUR SITUATION. MAINT CTL INSTRUCTED US TO CHK FOR POPPED CIRCUIT BREAKERS, WHICH WE THEN DID AN ADDITIONAL TIME. AGAIN, WE FOUND NO CIRCUIT BREAKERS POPPED ANYWHERE IN THE COCKPIT. WE MAINTAINED A FLT PATH AND ALT THAT PERMITTED US TO HAVE BOTH ZZZ, AND ZZZ2 AVAILABLE IF ANY FURTHER ENG ISSUES DEVELOPED. I TALKED DIRECTLY WITH MAINT CTL ON THE RADIO AND TOLD THEM WE NEEDED A DECISION FROM THEM ON WHETHER TO RETURN TO ZZZ, FOR FURTHER ACFT INSPECTION OR MAINT. MAINT CTL REQUESTED WE RETURN TO ZZZ. WE HAD ACTUALLY ALREADY DECIDED TO RETURN, BUT I WANTED TO ENSURE THAT OUR MAINT CTL DEPT PARTICIPATED IN THIS DECISION. I RELAYED THIS MESSAGE TO MY FO, TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AS PF AGAIN, AND ASKED MY FO TO TELL ATC WE NEEDED TO RETURN FOR A PRECAUTIONARY LNDG BUT THAT WE WERE NOT DECLARING AN EMER AT THIS TIME. IN RETROSPECT, I NOW THINK IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO HAVE DECLARED THE EMER AS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE WAY OF HANDLING THE UNKNOWN FACTORS IN THIS SITUATION. I BRIEFED OUR FLT ATTENDANTS AND THEN OUR PAX THAT WE WERE RETURNING TO ZZZ AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE BECAUSE OF A LOSS OF ANCILLARY ENG INDICATIONS, AND EMPHASIZED THAT WE WERE EXPERIENCING TOTALLY NORMAL ENG AND OTHER ACFT SYS INDICATIONS AND WERE CONFIDENT OF A SAFE AND UNEVENTFUL ARR. AS WE WERE HANDED OFF TO APCH CTL, THEY ASKED US AGAIN WHETHER WE WERE DECLARING AN EMER, AND WE STATED AGAIN, 'NOT AT THIS TIME,' BUT AFTER HEARING THE NATURE OF OUR ABNORMAL INDICATIONS APCH CTL INSISTED ON DECLARING IT AS AN EMER, AND ADVISED US THAT ARPT CRASH FIRE AND RESCUE TRUCKS AND EQUIP WOULD BE STANDING BY FOR OUR LNDG. OUR ILS APCH AND LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL, EXCEPT FOR THE FACT THAT DURING THE LNDG ROLLOUT WE EXPERIENCED SIMULTANEOUS L/R THRUST REVERSER FAULT ON BOTH ENGS. WE SUSPECTED THAT THIS WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE LACK OF OIL PRESSURE INDICATIONS FROM BOTH ENGS. MAINT CTL LATER CONFIRMED THIS WHEN WE DISCUSSED THIS WITH THEM AT THE GATE. AS A LEARNING POINT, WE FELT LATER THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL TO HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY OUR AIRLINE'S MAINT CTL DEPT TO EXPECT OUR THRUST REVERSERS TO NOT FUNCTION, ESPECIALLY IF WE HAD BEEN RETURNING OUT OF NECESSITY TO AN ARPT WITH SHORT RWYS. WE RETURNED TO THE GATE AT XB15Z, COMPLETED ALL OUR NORMAL PARKING CHKLISTS, COMPLETED THE AIR TURN BACK ENTRY

INTO THE ACFT LOGBOOK, ALONG WITH PERTINENT FLT TIMES. WE INFORMED MECHS MEETING THE ACFT EXACTLY WHAT WE OBSERVED AND INFORMED THEM THAT OUR LNDG WT OF 110000 LBS DID NOT REQUIRE AN OVERWT LNDG LOGBOOK ENTRY OR INSPECTION. (SIDE NOTE: OUR MAINT CTL MECHS THAT MET THE AIRPLANE UPON OUR ARR AT THE GATE STATED THEY FOUND 2 CIRCUIT BREAKERS RELATED TO OIL PRESSURE POPPED, BUT I AM ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN THEY WERE NOT POPPED AT EACH OF THE 3 TIMES WHEN WE EXAMINED OUR CIRCUIT BREAKERS THAT DAY: ONCE DURING OUR FIRST FLT OF THE DAY PREFLT INSPECTION, ONCE IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF AS WE ATTEMPTED TO DIAGNOSE OUR ACFT'S CONDITION OURSELVES, AND ONCE AGAIN WHEN WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CHK THEM BY OUR MAINT CTL EXPERTS DURING FLT. WE CAN ONLY SURMISE THAT SOME EVENT -- POSSIBLY THE ACFT HYD SYS THRUST REVERSER SHUTOFF VALVE, RECEIVING NO INPUTS FROM THE ENG OIL PRESSURE SENSORS -- CAUSED AN AMPERAGE THAT POPPED THESE CIRCUIT BREAKERS WHEN WE TRIED TO USE OUR THRUST REVERSERS ON LNDG.) MAINT CTL MECHS RAN SEVERAL DIAGNOSTIC TESTS AND ENG RUN-UPS, AND AFTER APPROX 30 MINS THEY SIGNED OFF OUR ACFT LOGBOOK AND WE WERE ABLE TO BEGIN OUR FLT AGAIN. THIS EVENT WAS MANAGED WITH CALM AND EFFICIENCY. WE STRIVED TO MAINTAIN A METHODOICAL PROB SOLVING APCH TO OUR SITUATION, IN A MANNER THAT AT ALL TIMES MAINTAINED FAR'S AND COMPANY POLICIES, AND FOCUSED CRM, STANDARD OPERATING PROCS, COMMON SENSE, AND GOOD JUDGEMENT TOWARDS THE SAFEST POSSIBLE OUTCOME. WE WERE CONSCIOUSLY TRYING TO NOT OVERREACT TO THE SITUATION (SUCH AS ABORTING THE TKOF OR IMPULSIVELY DECLARING AN EMER AND DIVING FOR ANY AVAILABLE RWY, THEREBY ENDANGERING OTHER ACFT IN A VERY CONGESTED ARPT TERMINAL AREA), AND TO METHODOCALLY RESPOND TO THE CONDITIONS WE SAW AT THAT TIME, AND MAKE DECISIONS THAT WOULD LEAD TO THE SAFEST POSSIBLE OUTCOME. BUT THIS EXPERIENCE DID TEACH ME AN IMPORTANT LESSON. IN THE FUTURE, WHERE ENG INSTS ARE CONCERNED IT IS PROBABLY WISER TO DECLARE AN EMER AND RETURN FOR LNDG IMMEDIATELY, EVEN IF THE ANOMALY SEEMS INNOCUOUS AND THE ACFT APPEARS TO BE PERFORMING NORMALLY.

Synopsis

A320 ENG #1 AND #2 OIL PRESSURE INDICATION FAILURE DURING TKOF ROLL AND ELECTS TO CONTINUE. AFTER TROUBLESHOOTING WITHOUT SUCCESS CREW RETURNS TO DEP ARPT.

ACN: 736028

Time / Day

Date : 200704
Day : Sun
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : RIC.Airport
State Reference : VA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : PCT.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Canadair/Bombardier Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual
Route In Use.Arrival : On Vectors

Aircraft : 2

Make Model Name : Ultralight
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Aircraft : 3

Make Model Name : Ultralight
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4000
ASRS Report : 736028

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2000

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1000
ASRS Report : 736028

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 200
Miss Distance.Vertical : 200

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 20 AT RIC. ATC GAVE US A HDG OF 270 DEGS AT 3000 FT. APPROX 10 MI NE OF THE ARPT THE FO SPOTTED AN ULTRALIGHT AT OUR ALT R OF OUR COURSE. A COUPLE OF SECONDS LATER I SPOTTED ANOTHER ULTRALIGHT AT OUR ALT ON OUR COURSE. I TURNED OFF THE AUTOPLT, TURNED R AND BEGAN A DSCNT. WE MISSED THE ULTRALIGHT BY APPROX 200 FT HORIZONTALLY AND 200 FT VERTICALLY. WE TOLD APCH WHAT WE DID AND WHY. I'M NOT SURE IF THE ULTRALIGHTS WERE IN THE CLASS C AIRSPACE OR NOT. ATC HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THEM. IF ACTION WAS NOT TAKEN THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A COLLISION. IT WAS HARD TO SEE TFC BECAUSE WE WERE LOOKING DIRECTLY INTO THE SUN. GOOD VISUAL SCANNING AND CRM HELPED US TO AVOID A CONFLICT. WE HAD ALSO ONLY BEEN ON DUTY FOR APPROX 6 HRS AFTER A GOOD NIGHT'S REST, WHICH I THINK HELPED THE QUICK REACTION TIME.

Synopsis

FLT CREW REPORTS NMAC WITH ULTRALIGHT ACFT 10 NM NE OF RIC AT 3000 FEET.

ACN: 734002

Time / Day

Date : 200704
Day : Fri
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements : Windshear
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Takeoff

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 148
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8015
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 925
ASRS Report : 734002

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 130
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2780
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 220
ASRS Report : 734393

Events

Anomaly.Excursion : Runway
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Rejected Takeoff
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 3 APPROX XA50. FO WAS AT THE CTLS. CURRENT METAR (NEARLY 1 HR OLD) AS FOLLOWS: DATE AND TIME 050/06KT 10 SM SCT110 19/M06 A3000. LIGHT WIND WAS CONFIRMED BY OBSERVATION OF WINDSOCK AND FLAGS. REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE CHARTS SHOWED COMFORTABLE MARGINS FOR ACCELERATION/STOP AND ACCELERATION/GO. BROKEN CLOUDS AND VIRGA WERE NOTED TO THE S, SCATTERED TO BROKEN CLOUDS WERE OBSERVED TO THE N. RWY WAS DRY AND CLEAN. ROTATION SPD WAS INCREASED BY 6 KTS OVER THAT REQUIRED FOR OUR TKOF WT TO ASSURE CLEAN UNSTICK. MAX PWR WAS SET BEFORE BRAKE RELEASE. ACCELERATION WAS NORMAL UNTIL AFTER 80 KT STATUS CHK AND CALLOUT. MOMENTARY HESITATION OF IAS INCREASE WAS NOTED AT APPROX 87 KTS, FOLLOWED BY RESUMPTION OF NORMAL ACCELERATION. NORMAL ROTATION TO TOGA V-BAR PITCH ATTITUDE RESULTED IN LIFT-OFF, BUT THE ACFT IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO SETTLE. IAS WAS DECREASING RAPIDLY IN SPITE OF SUBJECTIVE FEEL OF NORMAL ACCELERATION. SUBJECTIVELY, GND SPD WAS INCREASING RAPIDLY. MAIN WHEELS CONTACTED THE RWY 2-3 SECONDS AFTER LIFT-OFF. FO CORRECTED FOR A SLIGHT WEATHERVANE YAW ON LIFT-OFF AND MAINTAINED TKOF PITCH ATTITUDE. WHEN THE MAINS TOUCHED DOWN, I TOOK THE CTLS AND APPLIED FULL REVERSE AND MODERATE BRAKING (TO AVOID WHEEL LOCKUP). APPROX 2500 FT OF RWY REMAINED. IAS WAS LESS THAN 100 KTS, GND SPD (SUBJECTIVELY) WAS AT LEAST 120 KTS. UPON REACHING THE END OF THE PAVEMENT, I STEERED 10 DEG L TO AVOID THE LOC ANTENNA BERM, CONTINUED FULL REVERSE, AND APPLIED MAX BRAKING ON SANDY SOIL. FO ASSISTED WITH BRAKING AND EXECUTED THE EMER SHUTDOWN PROC BEFORE THE ACFT CAME TO REST. THE ACFT STOPPED APPROX 500-600 FT PAST THE END OF THE RWY. AFTER ASSURING THAT EMER EGRESS WAS NOT REQUIRED, I EXITED THE ACFT AND FOUND ALL LNDG GEAR INTACT AND NO VISIBLE DAMAGE. BOTH MAINS DEFLATED WITHIN A FEW MINS WHEN THE FUSE PLUGS ACTIVATED FROM THE HEAT GENERATED BY THE MAX BRAKING EFFORT. I NOTED A STRONG, STEADY WIND, ESTIMATED TO BE IN EXCESS OF 20 KTS, COMING FROM THE DIRECTION OF THE RWY. THE NEW METAR AT XA54 SHOWS 340 DEGS 12 KTS GUSTING 23 KTS. RWY WAS CHANGED TO RWY 21 WHILE WE WERE WAITING FOR SVC VEHICLES TO ARRIVE. THIS EVENT IS THE RESULT OF A STRONG NEGATIVE WINDSHEAR AT ROTATION. MY DECISION TO ABORT WAS PROMPTED BY A FLASHBACK TO A SIMULATOR SCENARIO (CE560) A FEW YRS AGO. IF I HAD TO DO IT AGAIN, I WOULD DISCONTINUE THE TKOF AT THE POINT WHERE THE IAS HESITATED MOMENTARILY. OUR TRAINING DISCOURAGES ABORTING AFTER 80 KTS EXCEPT FOR FIRE, ENG FAILURE OR DIRECTIONAL CTL. THE FO AND I WERE PRIMED TO CONTINUE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ABNORMAL INDICATION PRIOR TO

80 KTS. IN THIS SITUATION, I DO NOT BELIEVE THE ACFT COULD HAVE REMAINED AIRBORNE AND CLBED TO AVOID A CFIT OUTCOME. CRM AND THE FO'S PERFORMANCE WERE EXCELLENT. NO INJURIES WERE SUSTAINED BY ANYONE, AND THE ACFT WAS RETURNED TO SVC AFTER REPLACEMENT OF BOTH MAIN WHEELS AND A THOROUGH BRAKE INSPECTION.

Synopsis

CREW ELECTS TO REJECT THE TAKEOFF AFTER ROTATING DUE TO WINDSHEAR ENCOUNTER THAT CAUSES ACFT TO SETTLE BACK ON THE RWY.

ACN: 732207

Time / Day

Date : 200703
Day : Thu
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : HPN.Airport
State Reference : NY
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : HPN.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 60
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9800
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 300
ASRS Report : 732207

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Excursion : Taxiway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Insufficient Time

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

CREW WAS REPOSITIONING ACFT FROM A REMOTE PARKING LOCATION TO THE TERMINAL AREA. DUE TO A BREAKDOWN IN CRM THE CAPT (ME) ALLOWED THE

STANDARD PROCS, IE, CHKLIST COMPLETION (BEFORE START CHKLIST) TO BE BYPASSED. WHILE BEGINNING TAXI PHASE TO REPOSITION ACFT I ATTEMPTED TO STEER ACFT WITH TILLER AND NOSEWHEEL STEERING WAS NOT RESPONSIVE. I APPLIED BRAKES AND CALLED FOR FO TO DO SO AS WELL. JUST AS THE ACFT ROLLED OFF OF TXWY ONTO SOFT GRASSY AREA I NOTICED THAT THE HYD PUMPS WERE NOT IN THE REQUIRED POS OF 'AUTO/ON.' CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE CREW FATIGUE (EARLY SHOW TIME, LAST DAY OF 4-DAY TRIP), CRM BREAKDOWN (IE, CAPT ALLOWED EXTERNAL ATC RADIO CALLS TO INTERFERE WITH COCKPIT DUTIES), TRYING TO RUSH TO MOVE ACFT TO BOARD PAX AT THE TERMINAL TO MAKE AN UPDATED 'ETDC' WINDOW. NOTE: ONLY FLT CREW PLUS 1 FLT ATTENDANT ON BOARD. NO PAX. NO INJURIES, NO DAMAGE TO ACFT WHATSOEVER.

Synopsis

CL65 CREW DOES NOT USE BEFORE START CHECKLIST AND ATTEMPTS TO TAXI WITH THE HYDRAULIC PUMPS OFF. STEERING AND BRAKES ARE INOPERATIVE AND THE ACFT GOES OFF THE TAXIWAY.

ACN: 730780

Time / Day

Date : 200703
Day : Wed
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 35000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Make Model Name : B737-800
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Pressurization Outflow Valve

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 186
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6906
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 6906
ASRS Report : 730780

Person : 2

Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : Cabin Altitude
Indicator/Warning Horn
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency
Resolatory Action.Other
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

PREFLT IN ZZZ. WX VERY COLD AND CLR. OUTSIDE AIR TEMP 7 DEGS F. DURING WALKAROUND, I NOTED PRESSURIZATION OUTFLOW VALVE CLOSED PER COLD WX PROCS. IT WAS THE FIRST TIME I RECALL SEEING THAT CONDITION ON MY WALKAROUND. CAPT DID COCKPIT PREFLT, SETTING PRESSURIZATION SELECTOR TO AUTO AFTER I RETURNED FROM WALKAROUND. SHORTLY BEFORE PUSHBACK A WATER LINE IN AFT GALLEY SPLIT, GUSHING WATER IN AFT GALLEY AREA. MAINT SECURED LEAK AND DEFERRED THE FIX. WATER TO AFT GALLEY WAS SHUT OFF. CLEANERS CLEANED UP WATER IN AFT GALLEY AREA. FLT ATTENDANTS INDICATED WE HAD OVER 1 INCH OF WATER IN THE REAR OF THE ACFT. WE DEPARTED THE GATE 2 MINS LATE. I WAS THE PF. CLB WAS NORMAL. AT LEVELOFF, FL350, CAPT NOTICED CABIN RATE OF CHANGE FLUXING +/-800-1000 FT, CABIN ALT AT 8000 FT. THE CABIN OUTFLOW VALVE WAS APPROX AT THE FIRST TIC MARK ABOVE FULL CLOSED. ALL SWITCHES WERE CHKED AND INDICATIONS APPEARED NORMAL. CAPT DIRECTED ME TO SWITCH CABIN CONTROLLER TO ALTERNATE CABIN, RATE OF CHANGE CONTINUED TO FLUX AND BEGAN TO SHOW A VERY SLOW CLB. NEXT, HE DIRECTED ME TO SWITCH CONTROLLER TO MANUAL, ATTEMPTED TO GAIN CTL OF CABIN ALT AT 9000 FT OUTFLOW VALVE WOULD NOT INDICATE FULL CLOSED. OUTFLOW VALVE WOULD STOP APPROX AT THE SAME SPOT AS IN AUTO AND ALTERNATE MODE. THE CABIN CONTINUED TO A SLOW CLB. I TOLD THE CAPT TO GET CLRNC TO 10000 FT AND I DONNED MY OXYGEN MASK. LET HIM WORK IMPENDING EMER. THAT PRETTY MUCH COVERED THE AUTO FAIL/UNSCHEDULED PRESSURIZATION CHKLIST. CAPT REQUESTED FL290, AND I STARTED DOWN WITH THE PWR UP, HOPING TO KEEP CABIN PRESSURE BELOW 10000 FT AND WONDERING WHY WE WERE DSNDRG TO ONLY FL290. CAPT WAS STILL ON RADIO DISCUSSING RADAR COVERAGE AND FREQS IN CASE ATC CONTACT WAS LOST. AT APPROX FL300 CABIN ALT WARNING HORN WENT OFF. CAPT DONNED HIS MASK, EXTINGUISHED THE HORN, GOT CLRNC TO 10000 FT, A TURN TO ZZZ, AND BEGAN WORKING CHKLISTS WHILE STILL COORDINATING FREQS AND RADAR CONTACT WITH ATC, AS WE WERE OVER THE WATER AND ABOUT TO EXIT ATC COVERAGE. RADIOS WERE NEVER RELINQUISHED TO ME. DURING THE TURN I SWITCHED OFF THE AUTOPLT. CAPT DIRECTED THE AUTOPLT BE ENGAGED AND THEN HE SELECTED LEVEL CHANGE DSCNT (PWR AT IDLE) ON THE MCP, APPARENTLY, ABANDONING THE PWR ON DSCNT. SHORTLY AFTER LEVEL CHANGED WAS ENGAGED, THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED. I NOTED PAX OXYGEN LIGHT ILLUMINATED INDICATING WE HAD FAILED TO KEEP THE CABIN ALT BELOW 14000 FT AND THE LEVEL CHANGE DSCNT HAD APPARENTLY ACCELERATED OUR DEPRESSURIZATION WITH THE PWR BACK. PASSING THROUGH APPROX FL180, I NOTED THE SPD BRAKE WAS NOT DEPLOYED INDICATING WE HAD NEVER REALLY ACCOMPLISHED THE EMER DSCNT CHKLIST. NOR DO I RECALL THE COMPLETION OF THE CABIN ALT WARNING HORN OR RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION CHKLIST. ALTHOUGH THE CAPT INDICATED HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED THE CHKLISTS. AT 10000 FT, I NOTED THE PRESSURIZATION CONTROLLER IN AUTO AND OUTFLOW VALVE FULL OPEN. I SWITCHED THE CONTROLLER TO MANUAL AND CLOSED OUTFLOW VALVE TO MAINTAIN 7000 FT (APPROX FIRST TIC). I DID NOT ATTEMPT TO SEE IF OUTFLOW VALVE WOULD FULLY CLOSE. DSNDRG OUT OF 10000 FT THE CAPT POSITIONED THE CONTROLLER BACK TO AUTO. THE CAPT CHKED WITH THE BACK TO ENSURE EVERYONE WAS OK AND HAD EVERYONE REMOVE THEIR MASKS AT 10000 FT. THE FLT ATTENDANTS INDICATED SOME OF THE MASKS DID NOT WORK AND I HAD A

DISCUSSION ABOUT IT WITH THEM. LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. MAINT RPTED SEEING SOME ICE AROUND THE OUTFLOW VALVE AT THE GATE AND SUGGESTED THAT POSSIBLY WATER FROM THE EARLIER LEAK HAD FLOWED BACK DOWN AND FROZE DURING CLBOUT NOT ALLOWING FULL CLOSURE OF THE OUTFLOW VALVE AT ALT. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: PF SHOULD DO ATC COM, FREEING UP PNF TO FOCUS ON CHKLISTS. IF AUTOPLT IS WORKING FINE, DO NOT SHUT IT OFF -- IT FREES ONE UP ENOUGH TO STAY IN THE LOOP BETTER. ALT WARNING HORN IS TOO LOUD AND DISTRACTING, THEY SHOULD BE CHANGED TO A VOICE TELLING YOU TO DON OXYGEN MASK (LIKE MANY OTHER WARNINGS), IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH IT GOING OFF. IN HINDSIGHT IT APPEARS FULL COMPLETION OF THE CHKLIST MAY HAVE TAKEN BACK SEAT TO ACT/CABIN COM, IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING ENVIRONMENT WITH COM HAMPERED BY THE FULL FACE OXYGEN MASKS. ALSO THE TRANSITION FROM A PWR ON DSCNT TO AN EMER DSCNT WAS NOT REAL CLR CUT, ALTHOUGH IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ONCE THE CABIN REACHED 14000 FT. HAD WE FOCUSED MORE ON THE 3 EMER CHKLISTS, WE WOULD HAVE ENSURED ALL ITEMS WERE COMPLETED. HOWEVER, THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME I DO NOT BELIEVE WOULD HAVE BEEN ANY DIFFERENT.

Synopsis

B737-800 FLT CREW EXPERIENCES PRESSURIZATION FAILURE LIKELY RELATED TO WATER SPILL IN AFT CABIN OVER PRESSURIZATION OUTFLOW VALVES DURING PREFLT IN VERY COLD CONDITIONS. CRM AND SOP ISSUES ARE MAGNIFIED DURING PERFORMANCE OF CHECKLISTS AND EMERGENCY DESCENT.

ACN: 729594

Time / Day

Date : 200703
Day : Sat
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Intersection : CEJAY
State Reference : AZ
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 23000
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 25000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZLA.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Challenger CL601
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : TYSSN

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 95
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6700
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000
ASRS Report : 729594

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS CAPT OF THE FLT, BUT I WAS IN THE R SEAT FOR THIS LEG ACTING AS THE PNF. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE TYSSN 1 RNAV ARR INTO LAS. I ASSUMED THAT WE WOULD FLY THE ARR UTILIZING THE VNAV PORTION OF THE FMS. I INITIALLY ENTERED 8000 FT IN THE ALT SELECTOR, BEING THAT WAS THE LOWEST ALT ON THE ARR. HOWEVER, I DID NOT CONFIRM THIS WITH THE PF, HE ELECTED TO USE THE VERTICAL SPEED (VS) MODE OF THE AUTOPILOT. THE ARR WOULD HAVE US CROSS THE CEJAY INTXN AT FL190. AS WE APCHED CEJAY APPROX 10-15 MILES E, AND AT AN ALT OF BETWEEN FL250-FL230, I LOOKED AT THE ALT SELECT WINDOW, WHICH READ 8000 FT, AND AT THE DISTANCE TO CEJAY, WHICH WAS BETWEEN 10-15 MILES AWAY, AND CONVINCED THE PF THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO MAKE OUR CROSSING RESTR. THIS WAS INCORRECT. BEFORE THIS TOOK PLACE, THE CTLR HAD RE-CLRED US TO CROSS THE KADDY INTXN AT 12000 FT. AS WE DSNDED THROUGH 12000 FT AND EVENTUALLY THROUGH 11000 FT, THE CTLR SAID THAT HE SHOWED US THROUGH 11000 FT. I ADMITTED OUR ERROR, AND WE BEGAN OUR CLIMB BACK TO 12000 FT. THERE WAS NO TCAS ALERT OR RA. WE CONTINUED TO LAS WITH ANY FURTHER INCIDENT. SOME CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) THE PF IS AT THE MOMENT, A CONTRACT PLT THAT WE (OUR COMPANY) USES ON A REGULAR BASIS. HE WILL BE HIRED TO FULL TIME STATUS AT A LATER DATE. THEREFORE, THERE WAS A CONTRACT PILOT FLYING THE AIRPLANE, AND A COMPANY PILOT IN THE R SEAT AS THE PNF WHO HAS MORE TIME AND EXPERIENCE IN THE AIRPLANE. 2) AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT, OUR COMPANY RECENTLY PURCHASED ELECTRONIC FLT BAGS (EFB'S) TO USE ON BOARD THE ACFT. BOTH PLTS HAVE AN EFB TO THEIR DISPOSAL. THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION IN THE COCKPIT DURING THE ARR BECAUSE WE WERE GIVEN A DIFFERENT ARR THAN WAS PLANNED. DURING THIS CONFUSION, THE PF HAD TROUBLE LOCATING THE TYSSN 1 ARR ON HIS EFB, AND HAD ASKED FOR THE PAPER COPY VERSION, WHICH HAD NOT BEEN PULLED FOR THAT TRIP. 3) THE DAY BEFORE OUR TRIP, ONE OF MY CLOSEST FRIENDS OF 20 YEARS WAS KILLED IN HIS HELI. SOME FIXES IMPLEMENTED: 1) WE ARE NOW PRINTING PAPER COPIES OF ARPT CHARTS FOR BOTH PLTS IN ADDITION TO USING THE EFB'S. 2) WE NOW ARE BRIEFING WHICH TYPE OF DESCENT WILL BE USED FOR ARRIVALS AND DEPS. VNAV OR VS. WE ARE A PROFESSIONAL FLT CREW USING CRM AT ITS FULLEST. THIS WAS AN INADVERTENT DEVIATION AND WAS NOT INTENTIONAL.

Synopsis

A CL60 CREW USING AN ELECTRONIC FLT BAG WAS CONFUSED ABOUT AN LAS RNAV CROSSING ALT. A LOW TIME FO AND NEW EFB CONTRIBUTING TO THE HIGH WORKLOAD.

ACN: 728727

Time / Day

Date : 200702
Day : Thu
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 14000

Environment

Flight Conditions : Mixed
Weather Elements : Ice
Weather Elements : Turbulence
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter
Make Model Name : IAI1124/1124A/Westwind
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 75
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 450
ASRS Report : 728727

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Turbulence
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Intended or Assigned Course
Consequence.Other : Physical Injury

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

UPON LEVELING OFF THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT MAINTAINING THE 14000 FT AS SELECTED. AT 14100 FT I RESELECTED 14000 FT AND IT CORRECTED BACK DOWN. WITHIN SECONDS WE WERE AT 14400 FT WHEN I SAID TO THE CAPT 'WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE AUTOPLT, HOW COME IT WON'T HOLD ALT?' THE CAPT THEN DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND PITCHED DOWN TO CORRECT FOR THE UNCOMMANDED CLB. THE RIDE THEN WENT FROM SMOOTH TO VIOLENT. I PULLED BOTH THROTTLES TO IDLE AS SOON AS I WAS ABLE. IT WAS SO ROUGH THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO CTL YOUR ARMS AND LEGS AT TIMES. BOTH OF US HIT OUR HEADS ON THE BREAKER PANEL ABOVE, WHICH RUNG OUR BELL SO TO SPEAK. INITIALLY I HEARD A HISSING SOUND AND THOUGHT DECOMPRESSION AND MASK. THEN NO MASK WE ARE ONLY 14000 FT. THE HISSING WAS A BURST BEVERAGE CONTAINER OR MY MASK OUT OF ITS HOLSTER AND PURGING, I DON'T KNOW FOR SURE. THE CAPT HAD A SEVERE CUT ON HIS HEAD AND WAS BLEEDING. HE CONTINUED TO FLY AND CLAIMED TO BE OK. THE AIRFRAME WAS COVERED WITH ICE AND A GENERATOR WAS OFFLINE. WE RPTED OUR STATUS WITH CTR AND I BELIEVE THEY DECLARED US AN EMER ACFT. AS PNF I ACTIVATED THE ACFT'S ICE PROTECTION WHICH WORKED WELL. WE BEGAN LOAD REDUCTION. I RAN THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST FOR THE GENERATOR OFF AND IT WAS RESTORED. THE REMAINING FLT WAS UNREMARKABLE. I REVIEWED THE FLT LOG AND IT INDICATED A MAX ALT LOSS OF 2000 FT. THIS IS MY BIGGEST CONCERN. MAINTAINING WINGS LEVEL WAS A FULL TIME JOB DURING THIS EVENT WITH SEVERE TURB AND I COMMEND MY CAPT. I THINK GOOD CRM PROBABLY SAVED OUR LIVES. DURING THIS EVENT I FOUND MYSELF DOING ONLY THE THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN 'OVER-LEARNED.' IN THE FUTURE I WILL PIPE UP AND ASK FOR DEVS AROUND ALL CLOUDS WHEN POSSIBLE AND IF ANYONE IS EVER INJURED INFLT I WILL SUGGEST THE USE OF OXYGEN. WE MAY NEED ALL THE HELP WE CAN GET.

Synopsis

WW24 CREW ENCOUNTERS SEVERE TURB AND ICING AT 14000 FT.

ACN: 727937

Time / Day

Date : 200701
Day : Mon
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Beech 1900
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 790
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 500
ASRS Report : 727937

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 220
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3750
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1030
ASRS Report : 728476

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING PREFLT PREPARATIONS THE CAPT ADVISED ME THAT THE FLT HAD AN ALTERNATE DUE TO WX AND REQUIRED EXTRA FUEL. WE HAD A FULL LOAD OF 19 PAX AND 20 CHECKED BAGS. I KNEW WE WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE SOME BAGS BEHIND AND WERE LEAVING LATE DUE TO RAMP CONGESTION. DURING ACFT BOARDING AND LOADING I WAS HELPING A MOTHER AND INFANT BOARD. I NOTICED THAT THE CAPT WAS COM WITH THE RAMP AGENT UP IN THE COCKPIT ABOUT HOW MANY BAGS WE WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE BEHIND. AFTER I HELPED THE PAX GET SEATED I WALK TO THE REAR OF THE ACFT TO CLOSE THE CARGO DOOR. I NOTICED THAT THERE WERE 2 CHKD BAGS ON THE FLOOR OUTSIDE OF THE ACFT WITH 18 CHKD BAGS IN THE FORWARD CARGO COMPARTMENT. I DID MY FINAL CHKS IN BACK WITH THE PAX AND THEN CLOSED THE CABIN DOOR. DURING OUR CLB AFTER TAKEOFF THE CAPT CALLED DISPATCH TO ADVISE THEM THE NUMBER OF BAGS LEFT AT ZZZ AND THE TIMES, SINCE THE CAPT WAS UNABLE TO REACH OPS. THE CAPT LOOKED AT ME AND SAID I FELT REALLY BAD ABOUT LEAVING ALL OF THOSE BAGS. I SAID THERE WERE 2 BAGS LEFT BEHIND. HE ASKED IF I WAS SURE AND SAID THERE SHOULD HAVE ONLY BEEN 1 BAG AND 4 GATE CHKD BAGS ON THE PLANE. I SAID THERE WERE A LOT MORE BAGS THAN THAT. WE FIGURED THAT WE HAD 18 CHKD BAGS PLUS THE 4 GATE CHKD BAGS. THE CAPT TOLD ME WE WERE APPROX 500 LBS ABOVE MAX RAMP AS WELL AS MAX TAKEOFF WEIGHT. HE CALLED DISPATCH TO ADVISE THEM THAT THERE WAS A MISCOM AND THERE COULD BE A LOT LESS BAGS AT ZZZ. WE CONTINUED TO DEST WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE CAPT VERIFIED THE LNDG WT AND LNDG SPEEDS AND ALSO VERIFIED THAT NO OTHER LIMITATIONS WERE EXCEEDED. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THAT BETTER CRM COULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS. OUR PRIORITY WAS TO GET THE FLT OUT ON TIME.

Synopsis

BEECH 1900D FLT CREW OPERATED ABOVE MTGW.