

ASRS Database Report Set

Commuter and Corporate Flight Crew Fatigue Reports

Report Set Description.....	A sampling of reports referencing Commuter and Corporate flight crew fatigue issues and duty periods.
Update Number.....	14.0
Date of Update	November 4, 2008
Number of Records in Report Set.....	50
Number of New Records in Report Set	7
Type of Records in Report Set.....	For each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

TH: 262-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the reporting of a specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de- identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.



Linda J. Connell, Director
Aviation Safety Reporting System

CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

One thing that can be known from ASRS statistics is that they represent the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 1999 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 1999. Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS lies in the **report narratives**. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. The values of these narrative reports lie in their qualitative nature. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

Report Synopses

ACN: 793969 (1 of 50)

Synopsis

A FATIGUED FALCON 10 CAPT CLBED TO 2000 FT BEFORE THE 4.5 DME ON THE TEB 5 EVEN AFTER THE FO WARNED HIM OF HIS ALT.

ACN: 779863 (2 of 50)

Synopsis

SMALL JET FLT CREW REPORTS LANDING WITHOUT CLEARANCE AFTER VERY LONG DUTY DAY.

ACN: 779358 (3 of 50)

Synopsis

BOI APCH CTLR DESCRIBED NEAR LOSS OF SEPARATION EVENT DURING VIS APCH PROCS WHEN POSSIBLE INCORRECT CLRNC READBACK WAS MISSED.

ACN: 779187 (4 of 50)

Synopsis

PRM1 CLIMBS TO FL270 UNPRESSURIZED ACCOUNT BLEED AIR NOT TURNED ON. HYPOXIA FOR ALL ABOARD IS ABATED WHEN FO REALIZES THE SITUATION AND INITIATES AN EMERGENCY DESCENT.

ACN: 773670 (5 of 50)

Synopsis

FATIGUED CORPORATE JET FLT CREW FAILS TO COMPLY WITH 1500 FT MSL RESTR ON TEB SID FROM TEB.

ACN: 772899 (6 of 50)

Synopsis

AN ADVANCED COCKPIT CORPORATE JET FO INADVERTENTLY SHUT DOWN BOTH ENGS IN FLT BY SELECTING THE FUEL LEVERS CLOSED INSTEAD OF TURNING OFF IGNITION.

ACN: 768148 (7 of 50)

Synopsis

DURING THE TEB 5 PREFLT THE FO SET 2000 FT VS 1500 FT IN THE ALT ALERT. AFTER LEVELING AT 2000 FT ATC CAUTIONED THE CREW BUT ALLOWED THEM TO STAY.

ACN: 766736 (8 of 50)

Synopsis

A FALCON 20 CAPT RPTS A TRACK DEV ON THE TEB 5 DEP.

ACN: 764388 (9 of 50)

Synopsis

A C650 PILOT DEPARTED ON THE TEB 5 AND AFTER MISREADING DME CLBED TO 2000 FT 3 MILES EARLY.

ACN: 762643 (10 of 50)

Synopsis

A CORPORATE JET CAPT FAILED TO OBSERVE THE 1500 FT ALT RESTR ON THE TEB 5 PROC.

ACN: 753763 (11 of 50)

Synopsis

C208 RECEIVES SLIGHT DAMAGE TO TAIL WHEN PERFORMING A REJECTED TKOF TO AVOID AN ACFT DEPARTING AN INTERSECTING RWY.

ACN: 753418 (12 of 50)

Synopsis

CE550 FLT CREW DESCENDS BELOW ASSIGNED ALTITUDE WHILE BOTH PILOTS ARE SCANNING OUTSIDE LOOKING FOR THE FIELD. FATIGUE IS CITED AS A FACTOR.

ACN: 749847 (13 of 50)

Synopsis

A FLIGHT INTO SKRG DEVIATED FROM THE CHARTED APPROACH PROCEDURE, CROSSING RNG AT 10000 FT VICE 12000 FT.

ACN: 748135 (14 of 50)

Synopsis

BELL 430 INSTRUCTOR RPTS ROTOR DAMAGE AFTER SIMULATED ENG OUT LNDG WHEN CYCLIC IS RELEASED WITH AUTOPLT ENGAGED.

ACN: 746959 (15 of 50)

Synopsis

PLT FALLS ASLEEP AT CTLS AFTER LONG DUTY NIGHT AND OVERFLIES DEST BEFORE WAKING UP.

ACN: 742938 (16 of 50)

Synopsis

C182 PLT INTENTIONALLY LANDED LONG, BUT TOUCHED DOWN WITH INSUFFICIENT RWY REMAINING AND STRUCK RWY THRESHOLD LIGHT.

ACN: 741063 (17 of 50)

Synopsis

A FAIRCHILD SA227 METRO ACFT HAD ONE 'RETURN' TO FIELD DUE TO CAPT HSI NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY AND ONE COMPLETED FLIGHT WITH ALL NAV #2 INDICATIONS LOST.

ACN: 740530 (18 of 50)

Synopsis

A G IV PILOT REPORTS FATIGUE LEADING TO AN UNSTABILIZED APCH TO LFMN.

ACN: 740461 (19 of 50)

Synopsis

CL60 FAILS TO COMPLY WITH ALT RESTRICTIONS ON THE TEB SID FROM TEB.

ACN: 740166 (20 of 50)

Synopsis

FALCON FLT CREW ENCOUNTERED TCAS RA DURING DESCENT AFTER SETTING INCORRECT ALT IN ALT ALERT WINDOW.

ACN: 738205 (21 of 50)

Synopsis

A FALCON 20'S AILERON CTL LEVERS IN THE ACFT'S FUSELAGE BECAME FROZEN WITH MELTED GALLEY ICE APPARENTLY UNABLE TO DRAIN FROM A FROZEN DRAIN MAST.

ACN: 731820 (22 of 50)

Synopsis

B727 CREW CUTS CORNER DURING TURN ONTO TAXIWAY E FROM TXWY B AND GETS STUCK IN THE WET GRASS.

ACN: 731531 (23 of 50)

Synopsis

PILATUS PC12 PLT LINES UP WITH RWY EDGE LIGHTS AND DAMAGES ACFT DURING TKOF ROLL.

ACN: 728781 (24 of 50)

Synopsis

AN A320 FLT CREW DEVIATED FROM CHARTED TRACK DURING APCH TO RWY 12 AT BZN WHEN THEY FOLLOWED FMS GUIDANCE THAT TOOK THEM BEYOND THE 10 MI LIMIT DURING PROC TURN MANEUVER.

ACN: 726038 (25 of 50)

Synopsis

LATE RWY ASSIGNMENT ON STAR TO LAX RESULTS IN COCKPIT DISTRACTION AND MISSED CROSSING ALT.

ACN: 726022 (26 of 50)

Synopsis

BE40 FLT CREW HAS RWY INCURSION UPON MISREADING OF EFB ARPT DIAGRAM.

ACN: 726000 (27 of 50)

Synopsis

HSV TRACON CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 8000 WHEN ENTERING ADJACENT CENTER'S AIRSPACE DURING SKILLS CHECK.

ACN: 724269 (28 of 50)

Synopsis

FOLLOWING A HASTY PREFLT A C402 DEPARTED ONLY TO HAVE THE CARGO DOOR OPEN AFTER TKOF REQUIRING A CLOSE IN RETURN TO LAND.

ACN: 723793 (29 of 50)

Synopsis

FLT CREW ON THE ONT.POM 7 CLBED ABOVE 7000 FT PRIOR TO THE POM 7000 FT RESTR.

ACN: 721633 (30 of 50)

Synopsis

BE40 CREW BECOMES DISORIENTED ON VISUAL APCH TO SBA AND DSNDS BELOW MSA.

ACN: 720771 (31 of 50)

Synopsis

A G200 DEPARTING ON THE TEB5 EXCEEDED THE INITIAL 1500 FT LEVELOFF ALT BY 250 FT THEN DSNDED BACK TO 1500 FT.

ACN: 719224 (32 of 50)

Synopsis

A CE560XL DEVIATED FROM ASSIGNED TRACK BECAUSE OF IMPROPERLY PROGRAMMED FMC, AND CLBED THROUGH ASSIGNED ALT BECAUSE OF CREW ERROR.

ACN: 719003 (33 of 50)

Synopsis

CITATION CE680 SOVEREIGN FLT CREW HAS AN ALTDEV DEPART MDW.

ACN: 718678 (34 of 50)

Synopsis

A C560XL DEPARTING TEB ON THE TEB DEP CLBED BEFORE CHARTED POINT TO 2000 FT.

ACN: 718049 (35 of 50)

Synopsis

LATE AMENDMENT OF CLRED ALT RESULTS IN LOSS OF SEPARATION BTWN C560 CLRED TO FL370 AND XING TFC AT FL360.

ACN: 717721 (36 of 50)

Synopsis

ZMA CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 20700 FT WHEN LEADING DEP ACFT SLOWED AND WAS OVERTAKEN BY A SUCCEEDING DEP ACFT.

ACN: 716043 (37 of 50)

Synopsis

FLT CREW OF CL60 EXPERIENCE ALTDEV ON SID FROM EGGW.

ACN: 715542 (38 of 50)

Synopsis

A CE560 FLT CREW MISSED SETTING 29.92 CLBING THROUGH FL180. WHEN THEY LEVELED AT CRUISE ALT, ATC ADVISED THEY WERE 400 FT LOW.

ACN: 715134 (39 of 50)

Synopsis

LEAR 45 CREW RPTS PROBS WITH RWY HOLD SHORT MARKINGS AT LAS RWY 1L/7L JUNCTION.

ACN: 714672 (40 of 50)

Synopsis

A FALCON 20 ON WYLYY DEP FROM BOS DEVIATE FROM THE CHARTED TRACK.

ACN: 713679 (41 of 50)

Synopsis

LEAR 60 CREW GOES OFF COURSE ON THE BOACH DEP DEPARTING LAS.

ACN: 713552 (42 of 50)

Synopsis

A HAWKER HS125 DEPARTING TEB ON THE TEB DEP FAILED TO LEVEL OFF AT THE CHARTED 1500 FT RESTR, CLBING TO 1800 FT, AT LEAST PARTLY BECAUSE OF A TCAS TA.

ACN: 713390 (43 of 50)

Synopsis

A LR35 CAPT RPTS DECLARING AN EMER AND DIVERTING TO A NEARBY ARPT FOLLOWING A LOW OIL PRESSURE WARNING. FATIGUE PLAYED A PART.

ACN: 713094 (44 of 50)

Synopsis

BE1900 CREW LANDS LONG AND PROP STRIKES A LIGHT AT THE END OF RWY.

ACN: 712627 (45 of 50)

Synopsis

FLT CREW TAXIES ONTO WRONG RWY AT HNL AFTER LONG PACIFIC FLT.

ACN: 710292 (46 of 50)

Synopsis

BE40 FLIES MUSTANG VICE RENO SID AS CLRED FROM RNO. CITE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH ELECTRONIC FLT BAG.

ACN: 703471 (47 of 50)

Synopsis

MD11 FLT CREW HAS AN ENRTE ALTDEV.

ACN: 703037 *(48 of 50)*

Synopsis

FALCON 50EX FLT CREW HAS AN ALTDEV RESULTING IN LOSS OF SEPARATION DURING DEP FROM IPT.

ACN: 701751 *(49 of 50)*

Synopsis

KINGAIR 90 FLT CREW HAS A RWY EXCURSION AT HLG.

ACN: 699031 *(50 of 50)*

Synopsis

C210 PLT APCHS WRONG RWY AT MSY.

Report Narratives

ACN: 793969

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter
Make Model Name : Falcon 10C
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Climbout : Takeoff
Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB 5

Aircraft : 2

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8900
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 300
ASRS Report : 793969

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 83
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5986
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 119
ASRS Report : 793968

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DEPARTING RWY 24 TEB, SID CALLS FOR RWY HEADING TO 1500 FT MSL THEN R TURN TO 280 DEGS UNTIL 4.5 DME TEB, THEN CLB TO 2000 FT MSL. I PROCEEDED TO CLB TO 2000 FT MSL AFTER THE TURN TO 280 DEGS. ATC QUESTIONED THE ALTITUDE, SAYS IT IS A CONFUSING DEP. NO OTHER CONVERSATION. NO OTHER ACFT IN THE AREA. I READ BACK THE CLRNC TO MY SIC BEFORE DEP CORRECTLY. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHY HE DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING TO CORRECT ME, HE SAID HE TRIED TO. I NEVER HEARD ANYTHING FROM HIM. PURE CASE OF CRM GONE TO HECK. DEP PLATE WAS ON HIS YOKE. FROM NOW ON, PROC WILL BE TO HAVE IT ON THE PF'S YOKE FOR QUICK GLANCES. WE USE 1 SET OF PLATES IN THE COCKPIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM RPTR ACN 793968: UPON REACHING 1500 FT THE CAPT INITIATED THE TURN TO 280 DEGS, BUT CONTINUED TO CLB. I REMINDED HIM 'MAINTAIN 1500 FT TO 4.5 DME.' HIS RESPONSE WAS 'GIVE ME 2000 FT (IN THE ALTITUDE ALERTER).' I AGAIN VOICED MY CONCERN, THEN ATC ASKED OUR ALTITUDE. THE CAPT SEEMED SURPRISED TO DISCOVER THAT ANYTHING WAS WRONG, AND ATTEMPTED TO RATIONALIZE THE SITUATION. THE SITUATION WAS RESOLVED WITH A CURT EXPLANATION FROM ATC OF OUR RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THEY VECTORED US ON COURSE AND UP TO 10000 FT. THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT PER OUR TCAS. CIRCUMSTANCES: WE HAD AN EARLY XA15 START (XA45 DEP) AND DID NOT DEPART TEB UNTIL XL55. WE DUTIED OUT AT XN55, 20 MIN. SHORT OF OUR 14 HR. MAX. DURING THE WAIT AT TEB THE CAPT EXPRESSED THE DESIRE TO 'TAKE A NAP', BUT SAID THAT HE HAD TOO MUCH PAPERWORK TO CATCH UP ON AND THEREFORE WAS PROBABLY TIRED. I SPENT 3 TO 4 HOURS IN THE SNOOZE ROOM AND WAS REASONABLY REFRESHED.

Synopsis

A FATIGUED FALCON 10 CAPT CLBED TO 2000 FT BEFORE THE 4.5 DME ON THE TEB 5 EVEN AFTER THE FO WARNED HIM OF HIS ALT.

ACN: 779863

Time / Day

Date : 200803
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZ.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter
Make Model Name : Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Landing : Roll

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 75
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 300
ASRS Report : 779863

Events

Anomaly.Incursion : Landing Without Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE EVENT OCCURRED AT THE CONCLUSION OF A MAX LENGTH DUTY DAY, ON THE FINAL LEG FLYING TO ZZZ. THE CAPT BEGAN HAND FLYING SOMEWHERE

BTWN 10000 FT AND 6000 FT DURING THE DSCNT IN ORDER TO GET SOME HANDS-ON TIME, AS THERE WERE NO PAX ABOARD. AFTER BEING VECTORED TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE, WE WERE TOLD BY APCH TO 'MAINTAIN 2000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED, CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 12R AT ZZZ.' THAT STATEMENT BY THE CTLR PROMPTED ME TO INPUT THE TWR FREQ INTO THE STANDBY POS OF THE #1 RADIO WHICH WE WERE USING AT THAT TIME, FULLY EXPECTING TO BE HANDED OFF TO THE TWR CTLR MOMENTARILY. I STATED TO MY PARTNER THAT I HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH BOTH THE RWY AND THE VASI. WE ROLLED BRISKLY TO THE L IN ORDER TO INTERCEPT THE LOC AND WE OVERSHOT THE ROLLOUT HDG BY ABOUT 20 DEGS BECAUSE THE CAPT WAS POINTING THE ACFT TOWARD WHERE HE BELIEVED THE RWY TO BE LOCATED. HE THEN STATED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE A VISUAL ON THE RWY AND THAT IT WAS NOT IN THE LOCATION TOWARD WHICH HE WAS LOOKING AND BELIEVED IT TO BE LOCATED. I STATED THAT THE RWY WAS AT 1 O'CLOCK POS, THE XWIND WAS (QUICKLY) BLOWING US OFF COURSE TO THE L OF COURSE (WITH A DOWNWIND HDG), AND THAT HE SHOULD TURN R TO INTERCEPT. IMMEDIATELY ROLLING BACK TO THE R, WE INTERCEPTED SHORTLY THEREAFTER. I COMPLETED THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST AND THEN MADE CALLOUTS. WE LANDED, I DEPLOYED THE LIFT DUMP, SAID 'MY YOKE,' CALLED OUT 10 KT INCREMENTS OF SPD UNTIL 60 KTS FOR THRUST REVERSER STOW, AND WE EASILY EXITED A HIGH SPD TXWY. AS WE CROSSED THE HOLD LINE OUTBOUND FROM THE RWY, I REACHED TOWARD THE RADIO TO SWITCH TO THE GND FREQ. IMMEDIATELY, I REALIZED AND STATED THAT 'WE DIDN'T CALL THE TWR!' AT THE SAME TIME MY PARTNER WAS STATING 'THE TAXI LIGHT IS NOT ON, WE DIDN'T GET A CLRNC TO LAND!' (WE DO NOT TURN ON THE TAXI LIGHT ON DURING AN APCH UNTIL WE HAVE RECEIVED A CLRNC TO LAND, AND THEN THE POS OF THAT SWITCH BECOMES FOR US A CONFIRMATION THAT WE HAVE IN FACT RECEIVED THAT CLRNC.) (THE CURRENT ATIS HAD STATED THAT GND AND TWR WERE COMBINED ON THE TWR FREQ.) UPON CONTACTING TWR, THE GENTLEMAN ASKED 'ARE YOU READY TO TAXI?' I REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE AND GAVE OUR DEST FBO. 'TXWY C ALL THE WAY TO THE MAIN RAMP' WAS HIS REPLY. AS WE TAXIED, I MADE A FEEBLE ATTEMPT TO LOOK MORE INNOCENT BY XMITTING 'TWR, HOW DO YOU READ THIS RADIO?' HE SAID '5 BY 5, HOW ME?' TO WHICH I REPLIED 'PERFECT.' WHAT A SURPRISE -- LWOC HAS NEVER HAPPENED TO EITHER ONE OF US PRIOR TO THIS POINT! A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THIS LWOC WAS THE FACT THAT WE WERE NOT HANDED OFF BY THE APCH CTLR TO THE TWR CTLR. BUT THAT HAS HAPPENED TO BOTH OF US BEFORE AND WE HAVE ALWAYS CAUGHT THE ERROR AND CORRECTED IT BEFORE LNDG. THE CAPT AND MYSELF WORK VERY WELL TOGETHER AS A TEAM. WE HAD EVEN DECIDED TO TAKE SOME TIME DURING OUR LAST STOP TO GO GET A REAL SIT-DOWN DINNER BEFORE HEADING OUT ONCE MORE. WE AGREED THAT THE DELAY IN GETTING HOME WAS ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE WE HAD GONE QUITE A WHILE WITHOUT EATING, WE WERE TIRED AND A DINNER BREAK WOULD HELP TO REFRESH US BEFORE STARTING OUT AGAIN. WE ALSO DID NOT WANT TO GET HOME LATE AND BE STARVING, COMPOUNDED BY SLEEP DEPRIVATION AND A MESSED UP SLEEP SCHEDULE THE FOLLOWING DAY CAUSED BY EATING TOO LATE AT NIGHT. BOTH THE CAPT AND MYSELF TAKE PRIDE IN OUR WORK AND WE STRIVE TO BE THE BEST THAT WE CAN BE, REALIZING THAT NEITHER ONE OF US IS PERFECT. WE CATCH EACH OTHER'S MISTAKES AND WATCH EACH OTHER'S BACKS, BUT BOTH OF US WERE TOTALLY CAUGHT OFF GUARD AND TOTALLY SURPRISED WITH THIS EVENT EVEN WITH PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT REMAINING THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE TIME LINE. BEING TO THE L OF THE LOC FOR A SHORT PERIOD ON THE APCH AND THE CAPT NOT SEEING A RWY WHERE HE THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE WERE ALSO DISTRS, BUT NOTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY OR

ANYTHING THAT WE HAVE NOT OVERCOME PREVIOUSLY. THE ONLY THING THAT WE COULD FIGURE OUT WAS THAT WE MUST HAVE BEEN MORE TIRED THAN WE THOUGHT OURSELVES TO BE. I DID NOT REALIZE HOW FATIGUED I WAS UNTIL I WAS DRIVING HOME AND ALL OF THE CARS GOING THE SAME WAY ON THE FREEWAY WERE PASSING ME. I BELIEVE THAT FATIGUE IS AN INSIDIOUS FORM OF DEBILITATION BECAUSE WE ARE NOT ABLE TO SEE HOW MUCH OR EVEN IN WHAT WAY IT IS ACTUALLY AFFECTING US. I AM SO VERY HUMBLLED BY THIS EVENT AND IT HAS MADE ME MORE ADAMANT ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF DUTY AND REST PERIODS AND BEING PROACTIVE ABOUT TAKING CARE OF MYSELF AND MY PARTNER BOTH BEFORE AND DURING A FLT.

Synopsis

SMALL JET FLT CREW REPORTS LANDING WITHOUT CLEARANCE AFTER VERY LONG DUTY DAY.

ACN: 779358

Time / Day

Date : 200803
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : BOI.Airport
State Reference : ID
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 6000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : BOI.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Citation II S2/Bravo
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Aircraft : 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : BOI.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Premier 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Person : 1

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach
Qualification.Controller : Radar
Experience.Controller.Radar : 21
ASRS Report : 779358

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 18000
Miss Distance.Vertical : 1000

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Narrative

CITATION JET EBOUND ON VECTORS FOR VISUAL APCH 28R AT BOI WAS LEVEL AT 6000 FT. C550 WAS DSNDDED TO 5000 FT AND THEN CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH. C550 DID NOT START DSCNT RIGHT AWAY AND CONTINUED EBOUND. PREMIER JET ALSO EBOUND ON VECTORS FOR VISUAL APCH 28L LEVEL AT 8000 FT. AFTER VISUAL APCH GIVEN TO C550, PRM1 DSNDDED TO 7000 FT. TFC ISSUED TO C550 AT 1230 FT AND 2 MI. PRM1 CONSIDERABLY FASTER AT THIS POINT. I OBSERVED PRM1 DSNDING THROUGH 6800 FT AND ISSUED 6500 FT (NEEDED FOR MVA TO THE E) AND RESTATED LAST ASSIGNED ALT AS 7000 FT. HE REPLIED THAT LAST ASSIGNED ALT WAS 6000 FT. AT THIS POINT, PRM1 HAD PULLED AHEAD TO THE E TO HAVE 3+ MI, AND C550 HAD STARTED HIS DSCNT AND BASE TURN. IT WAS CLOSER THAN I WANTED IT TO BE. I AM UNSURE WHETHER I ISSUED 6000 FT TO THE PRM1 OR HE HAD THE WRONG ALT. I AM HOPEFUL THAT I DID NOT ISSUE 6000 FT, AS THAT POSSIBLY WOULD HAVE BEEN AN MVA CONFLICT IF THE PRM1 HAD STAYED ON E VECTORS. LESSON LEARNED: STAY MORE VIGILANT ON READBACK/HEARBACK ITEMS, AND MORE CLOSELY MONITOR TFC. POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTORS TO MY PERFORMANCE THAT DAY: I WAS WORKING AN AFTERNOON OVERTIME SHIFT ON THE DAY AFTER A MID SHIFT, AND WAS NOT COMPLETELY RESTED, SO FATIGUE WAS PART OF IT. OUR FACILITY IS VERY SHORT STAFFED DUE TO IRRESPONSIBLE FAA NEGLECT IN PLANNING, AND 6-DAY WKS WITH MANDATORY OVERTIME ARE THE NORM. THIS IS THE SECOND YR WE ARE WORKING THE 6-DAY WKS, AND PEOPLE ARE GETTING TIRED AND BURNED OUT, AND I WORRY ABOUT PERFORMANCE ISSUES IN THE FUTURE.

Synopsis

BOI APCH CTLR DESCRIBED NEAR LOSS OF SEPARATION EVENT DURING VIS APCH PROCS WHEN POSSIBLE INCORRECT CLRNC READBACK WAS MISSED.

ACN: 779187

Time / Day

Date : 200803
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 27000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : King Air C90 E90
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Pressurization System

Component : 2

Aircraft Component : Indicating and Warning - Air Conditioning and Press.

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 120
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 24575
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 15
ASRS Report : 779187

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 110
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 16100

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1135
ASRS Report : 778901

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

PART OF THE 'TAXI' CHKLIST WAS MISSED DUE TO THE CAPT TRYING TO HELP ME WITH A RTE CHANGE IN THE FMS. THERE WERE SEVERAL INTERRUPTIONS DURING THE TAXIING TO THE ACTIVE RWY. THE FLT WAS PLANNED AT A CRUISING ALT OF FL270. THE MISSED ITEM ON THE CHKLIST WAS THE BLEED AIR SWITCH NOT PLACED IN THE 'BOTH' OR 'ON' POS, HENCE UNPRESSURIZED. CABIN ALT CLBED TO A POINT THAT HYPOXIA BEGAN TO SET IN. I WAS THE PNF AND SITTING IN THE R SEAT SINCE I HAD NOT BEEN TO TRAINING ON THE ACFT. SOMEWHERE DURING THE FLT AT FL270, I KEPT HEARING CTR CALLING AND ASKING IF WE COULD MAKE OUR XING RESTR THAT I HAD ACKNOWLEDGED. AT THIS POINT (DUE TO HYPOXIA) I WAS UNABLE TO REACH THE YOKE MIKE BUTTON TO RESPOND. SOMEHOW I REALIZED THAT WE WERE NOT DSNDRG TO OUR ASSIGNED ALT AND MY FLYING PARTNER AND ALL PAX WERE NOT RESPONSIVE. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND DEPLOYED THE SPD BRAKES AND STARTED AN EMER DSCNT. AT ABOUT FL180, I GOT THE CAPT ON OXYGEN AND CONTINUED DSCNT TO BELOW 10000 FT. I MADE A SAFE LNDG AT ZZZ. 1) CREW DISTR WAS THE PRIMARY FACTOR CAUSING THIS EVENT, 2) THERE WAS NO CABIN 'ALT HIGH' MASTER CAUTION, AND 3) THE CABIN OXYGEN MASK DID NOT PRESENT (DROP). 4) THE USE OF ELECTRONIC CHKLIST SHOULD BE USED SINCE AN ITEM WOULD NOT BE MISSED AS IT WAS USING A PAPER CHKLIST. 5) THE CAPT HAD FLOWN SEVERAL TRIPS THE 3 PREVIOUS DAYS -- ALL STARTING VERY EARLY AND ENDING VERY LATE AT NIGHT. FATIGUE WAS A HUGE FACTOR. THERE IS NO STATUS LIGHT ON THE ANNUNCIATOR PANEL INDICATING THAT THE BLEED AIR SWITCH IS IN THE 'OFF' POS AS THERE IS ON ALL PRESSURIZED ACFT THAT I HAVE FLOWN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 778901: DURING PREFLT CHKS, ATTN WAS DIVERTED FROM QUICK TURN CHKLIST TO ASSIST NEW CREW MEMBER IN PROGRAMMING RTE CHANGE INTO FMS. THIS TOOK 3-4 MINS TO ACCOMPLISH. RETURNING TO CHKLIST, BLEED AIR SWITCH WAS MISSED AND NOT TURNED ON. AFTER TKOF AND CLB TO ASSIGNED ALT OF FL270, CABIN ALT CLBED TO THE POINT THAT HYPOXIA BEGAN TO SET IN. NEW CREW MEMBER RECOGNIZED THE PROB AND STARTED DSCNT WHILE CALLING FOR CREW TO GO ON OXYGEN. 1) CREW DISTR AND BREAKING THE FLOW OF PREFLT CHKLIST WAS PRIMARY CAUSE OF THIS EVENT. 2) CABIN 'ALT HIGH' WARNING LIGHT FAILED TO ILLUMINATE WHEN CABIN ALT PASSED 10000 FT. 3) CABIN OXYGEN MASKS FAILED TO DROP AFTER CABIN ALT CLBED ABOVE 10000 FT EVEN THOUGH THE SYS WAS ARMED AND SUFFICIENT OXYGEN PRESSURE WAS PRESENT. 4) USE OF ELECTRONIC

CHKLIST WILL HELP PREVENT THIS IN THE FUTURE. THIS FEATURE DOES NOT FORGET WHERE IT LEFT OFF. 5) SUGGEST THAT A STATUS LIGHT INDICATING THAT THE BLEED AIR SWITCH IS IN THE OFF POS BE ADDED TO THE ANNUNCIATOR PANEL. MOST PRESSURIZED ACFT HAVE THIS FEATURE. 6) NO INJURIES OCCURRED DURING THIS EVENT. 7) THIS WAS THE THIRD LEG OF THE DAY AND IS WHY QUICK TURN CHKLIST WAS USED.

Synopsis

PRM1 CLIMBS TO FL270 UNPRESSURIZED ACCOUNT BLEED AIR NOT TURNED ON. HYPOXIA FOR ALL ABOARD IS ABATED WHEN FO REALIZES THE SITUATION AND INITIATES AN EMERGENCY DESCENT.

ACN: 773670

Time / Day

Date : 200802
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout : Takeoff
Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8010
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 200
ASRS Report : 773670

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

INSTRUCTIONS: TEB 5 DEP OFF RWY 24 -- CLB RWY HDG TO 1500 FT -- TURN R TO 280 DEGS MAINTAINING 1500 FT -- AT 4.5 DME TEB VOR CLB TO 2000 FT. DEVIATION: AT TURN TO 280 DEGS CREW CLBED TO 2000 FT PRIOR TO 4.5 TEB DME FIX. MISREAD INSTRUCTIONS. CREW HAS DONE TEB 5 DEP ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS BEFORE THIS EVENT WITH NO DEVS. POSSIBLE FACTORS: CREW TRAVELED 2 HRS BY VEHICLE TO ZZZ. CREW FLEW COMMERCIALY DEADHEAD FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1 DUE TO MAINT ON ANOTHER ACFT THAT NIGHT. CREW ARRIVED AT HOTEL LATE. CREW WAS UP 5 HRS LATER THAT MORNING FOR A DEP TO TEB IN 2 HRS. PLANNED DEP TIME FROM TEB WAS IN 12 HRS. CREW WAS CALLED 5 HRS EARLY AT HOTEL DURING SLEEP FOR AN IMMEDIATE DEP. CREW FELT RUSHED AND SLEEP DEPRIVED DUE TO LAST MINUTE SCHEDULE CHANGE. SUGGESTION: SUGGEST KEEPING TFC AT 1500 FT TILL CLBING ON COURSE -- 500 FT DOES NOT SEEM IMPORTANT AND ADDS TO POSSIBLE CONFUSION ON SID. SID SHOULD READ RWY HDG TO 1500 FT THEN R TURN TO 280 EXPECT FURTHER CLRNC ON COURSE 10 MINS AFTER DEP.

Synopsis

FATIGUED CORPORATE JET FLT CREW FAILS TO COMPLY WITH 1500 FT MSL RESTR ON TEB SID FROM TEB.

ACN: 772899

Time / Day

Date : 200802

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Weather Elements : Snow
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZ.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Gulfstream IV
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude
Route In Use.Departure : Other Published IFR Departure

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Ignition Switching

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 32
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14448
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2338
ASRS Report : 772899

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Regained Aircraft Control
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DEPARTED WITH CONTINUOUS ENG IGNITION SELECTED ON BECAUSE THE RWY WAS CONTAMINATED WITH SNOW. APPROXIMATING AN ASSIGNED ALT OF 3000 FT, THE PF CALLED FOR THE AFTER TKOF/CLB CHKLIST. PNF IN THE R SEAT READ AND ACCOMPLISHED THE CHKLIST ITEMS UP TO THE 'IGNITION' ITEM. PNF INADVERTENTLY TURNED OFF THE FUEL CTL SWITCHES INSTEAD OF THE IGNITION SWITCHES. THERE WAS A FEW SECONDS WHERE THE ENGS CONTINUED TO RUN WHILE THE PNF CONTINUED THE CHKLIST, THEN THE L ENG FLAMED OUT FOLLOWED BY THE R ENG FLAMING OUT. WHEN BOTH PLTS REALIZED THAT THE ENGS QUIT, WE CONFIRMED THE FUEL CTL SWITCH POS. PF CALLED FOR ENG FAILURE CHKLIST AT THE SAME TIME THE PNF PLACED THE FUEL CTL SWITCHES FOR BOTH ENGS BACK TO RUN. PF HELD ALT BTWN 2600 FT MSL TO 3000 FT MSL DURING THE EVENT FOLLOWING AN ASSIGNED RADAR VECTOR HDG OF 270 DEGS, NOTIFIED ATC THAT WE HAD A DUAL ENG FLAMEOUT AND DECLARED AN EMER AND MAY NEED TO RETURN TO LAND. PNF WENT TO THE ENGS TAB IN THE ACFT QRH AND RAN THE INADVERTENT ENG SHUTDOWN CHKLIST. AFTER ABOUT 90 SECONDS AND JUST BEFORE THE PNF ATTEMPTED TO START THE APU AND RUN THE STARTER ASSIST AIR START PROC CHKLIST, BOTH ENGS RESTARTED. ONCE THE ENGS WERE UP TO SPD THE ACFT GENERATORS PROVIDED US FULL FLT DISPLAYS AND WE WERE ABLE TO RESTORE THE ACFT BACK UP TO A COMPLETELY AIRWORTHY CONFIG. THE PNF TERMINATED THE EMER WITH ATC AND REQUESTED TO CONTINUE THE FLT TO SCHEDULED DEST. AS THE PNF IN THE R SEAT, I AM THANKFUL FOR THE TRAINING I AND MY FELLOW PLT RECEIVED. THIS WAS A TIME CRITICAL EMER. I THINK MY QUICK REACTION IN GETTING THE FUEL CTLS BACK TO RUN AND HIS FLYING ABILITIES SAVED THE DAY AS WE WERE LOSING VALUABLE AIRSPD. WHEN I LOOKED AT THE PEDESTAL WHERE THE IGNITION PUSH BUTTON SWITCHES WERE ILLUMINATED ON, AND PLACED THE 2 FUEL CTLS SWITCHES OFF, OBVIOUSLY, I LOST MY CONCENTRATION DURING THAT ACTION. POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: I HAD BEEN AWAKE FOR ABOUT 10.5 HRS AND ON DUTY FOR 9.1 HRS WHEN THIS EVENT HAPPENED. I DIDN'T SLEEP VERY WELL THE NIGHT BEFORE, BECAUSE OF CONCERNS ABOUT THE WX FORECAST BOTH AT HOME BASE AND DEP ARPT. WE WERE ADVISED THAT THE PAX MIGHT BE LATE AS MUCH AS 1 HR. I NEEDED TO HAVE AND DID HAVE THE ACFT DEICED BEFORE TKOF. WE WERE ADVISED BY ATC THAT WE MIGHT BE DELAYED FOR TKOF DUE TO ARR HOLDS AT OUR DEST. ONCE WE WERE AIRBORNE I HAD A SENSE OF RELIEF UP UNTIL THE EVENT OCCURRED. IN PAST YRS I HAVE FLOWN ACFT WHICH HAVE ENG IGNITER SWITCHES SIMILAR TO THE FUEL CTL SWITCHES ON THE G-550. ALSO THE IGNITION SWITCHES WHICH ARE ILLUMINATED CAPSULE SWITCHES ARE IN CLOSE PROX TO THE FUEL CTL SWITCHES. I HAVE NEVER OCCUPIED THE R SEAT AND USED THE CONTINUOUS IGNITION SYS ON THIS ACFT. I HAVE VERY SELDOM USED THE SYS, AND WHEN WE USED IT I WAS THE PF IN THE L SEAT. I DON'T FEEL THAT I WAS IN A HURRY GOING THROUGH THE AFTER TKOF/CLB CHKLIST, WHICH IS A COMPANY DESIGNED CARD TYPE. OUR PROCS ARE THE PNF READS OUT LOUD AND DOES THIS CHKLIST. CORRECTIVE ACTION: I HAVE SUGGESTED TO OUR COMPANY OPS, WHEN USING THE CONTINUOUS IGNITION SYS FOR WHATEVER REASON AND ESPECIALLY DURING THE BEFORE TKOF BRIEFING TO INCLUDE A SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON TURNING OFF THE CONTINUOUS IGNITION SYS WITH THE

PF GUARDING THE FUEL CTL SWITCHES AS THE PNF COORDS WITH THE OTHER PLT AND THEN SELECTS THE IGNITION SWITCHES OFF. MAKE THE AFTER TKOF/CLB CHKLIST A CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE CHKLIST. THIS IS A POOR DESIGN BY GULFSTREAM. THE IGNITION SYS SWITCHES NEED TO BE MOVED ELSEWHERE OR THE FUEL CTL SWITCHES SHOULD HAVE A GUARD PROTECTIVE DEVICE INSTALLED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE IGNITER SWITCHES ON THIS ACFT ARE PUSH BUTTON TYPE SELECTORS AND ARE ILLUMINATED WHILE THE SWITCHES ARE ENGAGED. WHEN THE SWITCH IS DISENGAGED THE LIGHT TURNS OFF. THE FUEL CONTROL SWITCH IS A SMALL LEVER THAT IS DETENTED WHEN PLACED IN EITHER THE 'ON' OR 'OFF' POSITIONS. THE IGNITER BUTTON AND THE FUEL CONTROL LEVER ARE LOCATED ONE ABOVE THE OTHER ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT AFT CENTER PEDESTAL FACE. THE REPORTER DOES NOT KNOW WHAT CAUSED HIM TO SELECT THE FUEL CONTROL SWITCHES TO OFF INSTEAD OF MERELY PUSHING THE IGNITION SELECTOR BUTTONS TO OFF. THIS PILOT'S COMPANY IS RELOCATING ALL ITS ACFT'S IGNITION SWITCHES FROM THE AFT PEDESTAL TO THE OVERHEAD PANEL IN ORDER TO PREVENT THIS FROM OCCURRING AGAIN.

Synopsis

AN ADVANCED COCKPIT CORPORATE JET FO INADVERTENTLY SHUT DOWN BOTH ENGS IN FLT BY SELECTING THE FUEL LEVERS CLOSED INSTEAD OF TURNING OFF IGNITION.

ACN: 768148

Time / Day

Date : 200712
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Challenger CL604
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000
ASRS Report : 768148

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 16000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 6500
ASRS Report : 768149

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ACFT CLRED FOR TAKEOFF RWY 24 TEB WITH TEB 5 DEP. TEB 5 CALLED FOR R TURN 280 DEGS MAINTAIN 1500 FT UNTIL PASSING 4.5 DME TEB THEN CLB AND MAINTAIN 2000 FT. ACFT DEPARTED AND PROMPTLY CLBED TO 2000 FT. ATC TOLD US DON'T BOTHER TO DSND BACK TO 1500 FT AS AIRLINER DSNDING INTO NEWARK WAS MANEUVERING TO AVOID US. ATC ASSUMED WE MISREAD DEP PROC SO I DID NOT CORRECT HIM REGARDING HIS ASSUMPTION. PROBLEM: COPLT SET ALT SOURCE SELECTOR TO 2000 FT NOT 1500 FT. COPLT SCREWED UP THE ALT SELECTOR SETTING. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: HEAD COLD, MINIMUM REST PRIOR TO FLT. I'VE DONE THIS DEP FOR CLOSE TO SEVEN YEARS AND WAS JUST HAVING A BAD DAY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 768149: WHILE CLBING OUT OF TEB I FAILED TO NOTICE MY ALT PRESELECT WAS INCORRECTLY SET FOR 2000 FT, NOT 1500 FT AS PRESCRIBED ON THE TEB 5 DEP. JUST AS I REACHED 2000 FT I NOTICED THE ERROR AT THE SAME TIME DEP CTL ADVISED ME OF THE ERROR. I WAS TOLD BY DEP CTL TO REVIEW THE TEB 5 SID AND BE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS.

Synopsis

DURING THE TEB 5 PREFLT THE FO SET 2000 FT VS 1500 FT IN THE ALT ALERT. AFTER LEVELING AT 2000 FT ATC CAUTIONED THE CREW BUT ALLOWED THEM TO STAY.

ACN: 766736

Time / Day

Date : 200712
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Falcon 20FJF/20C/20D/20E/20F
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 40
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1600
ASRS Report : 766736

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DIDN'T FOLLOW THE RWY 24 SID TEB 5 DEP CORRECTLY. WE BRIEFED THE DEP ON THE SIC'S, EFB. THE EFB DID NOT SHOW THE ENTIRE DEP ON ZOOM MODE. WE ONLY HAD HALF THE DEP PROC. THE DEP WAS TO 'CLB RWY FIX TO 1500 FT THE R TO 280 DEG HDG, AT 4.5 DME FROM TEB CLB TO 2000 FT.' WE CLBED RWY HDG TO 1500 FT THEN DID NOT TURN AT 280 DEG HDG AND STAYED ON RWY HDG TILL 4.5 DME. THEN BEFORE WE REACHED THE 435 DME ATC CLRED US TO A 310 HDG AND CLB TO 6000 FT. NO OTHER DEVS WERE NECESSARY. 1) PROBLEM AROSE FROM TRUSTING THE SIC TO READ THE DEP CORRECTLY. 2) BOTH PLTS SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THEIR OWN EFB'S OUT AND SEPARATELY LOOK AT THE DEP. 3) SIC NOT PAYING ATTENTION TO DETAIL. 4) FATIGUE OR DISTRACTED INDIVIDUALS.

Synopsis

A FALCON 20 CAPT RPTS A TRACK DEV ON THE TEB 5 DEP.

ACN: 764388

Time / Day

Date : 200712

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport

State Reference : NJ

Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 1500

Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation : Corporate

Make Model Name : Citation III, VI, VII

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial

Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC

Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 70

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5000

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 600

ASRS Report : 764388

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airport

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING THE TEB 5 DEP I LEVELED AT THE INITIAL ALT OF 1500 FT, MADE THE TURN THEN MISREAD THE DME AND CLBED TO 2000 FT APPROX 3 MILES EARLY. LACK OF SLEEP THE NIGHT BEFORE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A FACTOR, BUT I WOULD NOT SWEAR TO THAT.

Synopsis

A C650 PILOT DEPARTED ON THE TEB 5 AND AFTER MISREADING DME CLBED TO 2000 FT 3 MILES EARLY.

ACN: 762643

Time / Day

Date : 200711
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 1500
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 1800

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements : Windshear
Light : Dusk

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter
Make Model Name : HS 125 Series
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 280
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 18000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 40
ASRS Report : 762643

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON DEP WE WERE CLRED FOR THE TEB 5 DEP. THE DEP FOR RWY 19 IS ON ONE SIDE OF THE PAGE AND THE DEP FOR RWY 24 IS ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE SAME PAGE. THE FMS WAS SET FOR THE PROPER DEP. THE PF EXCEEDED THE 1500 FT RESTR AS DEPICTED ON THE TEB 5 DEP FOR RWY 24. THE CONFUSION WAS THAT THE TEB 5 BEING PRINTED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE PAGE MADE IT EASY TO CONFUSE THE VARIOUS RWYS' DEP SPECIFICS. THIS COUPLED WITH A 2.5 HR DELAY IN THE AIRPLANE FOR TFC CONGESTION CAUSED US TO BE TIRED AND INATTENTIVE. THE DEP SPECIFICS ARE ALSO PRINTED ON A LARGE PAGE REQUIRING 3 FOLDS TO MAKE IT FIT THE BINDER FORMAT, SO WHEN LOOKING AT ONE DEP SOME OF THE OTHER CAN SHOW.

Synopsis

A CORPORATE JET CAPT FAILED TO OBSERVE THE 1500 FT ALT RESTR ON THE TEB 5 PROC.

ACN: 753763

Time / Day

Date : 200709

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LBB.Airport

State Reference : TX

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : LBB.Tower

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Taxi

Make Model Name : Caravan 1 208A

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135

Flight Phase.Ground : Takeoff Roll

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Taxi

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC

Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Qualification.Pilot : Commercial

Qualification.Pilot : Instrument

Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 156

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7000

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 320

ASRS Report : 753763

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Critical

Anomaly.Ground Encounters.Other

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Rejected Takeoff

Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Airport

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS PIC OF A C208 CARAVAN. I REQUESTED IFR CLRNC TO ROW AND THEN TAXI INSTRUCTION. I WAS GIVEN TAXI TO RWY 17R INTXN S. UPON ARR AT INTXN I ANNOUNCED MY ACFT READY FOR DEP. I WAS CLRED FOR TKOF. I PROCEEDED TO CROSS THE RWY HOLD SHORT LINE. THERE WAS THEN COM FROM LBB TWR AND ANOTHER ACFT. IT APPEARED THAT ANOTHER ACFT HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND. I MOVED MY THROTTLE TO BETA RANGE AND APPLIED HARD BRAKING. MY ACFT CAME TO A HALT ON THE RWY EDGE LINE JUST AS A PIPER PASSED THROUGH THE INTXN. I HAD BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF IN ERROR PROBABLY BECAUSE OF CTRLR FATIGUE OR RUSH. I BELIEVE AN ACCIDENT WAS ONLY NARROWLY AVOIDED BECAUSE OF COMMERCIAL PRESSURE AND I BELIEVE BECAUSE OF COMMERCIAL PRESSURE I MAY HAVE FAILED TO DOUBLE-CHK THE CTRLR ACTION BY A CHK UP LOOK OF THE FINAL APCH. BECAUSE I CONTINUED TO APPLY REVERSE PWR WITH BRAKING BY INSTINCT THIS CAUSED MY ACFT TO DROP ON ITS TAIL AND BE DAMAGED REQUIRING MAINT INSPECTION.

Synopsis

C208 RECEIVES SLIGHT DAMAGE TO TAIL WHEN PERFORMING A REJECTED TKOF TO AVOID AN ACFT DEPARTING AN INTERSECTING RWY.

ACN: 753418

Time / Day

Date : 200709
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 5500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements.Other
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Citation II S2/Bravo
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other.NDB
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 99
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9474
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 6796
ASRS Report : 753418

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 108
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2872

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 748
ASRS Report : 753599

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3Mode C
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE CREW HAD STARTED THEIR DUTY DAY AT XA00 LCL AND COMPLETED THE DAY WITH 12 HRS ON DUTY AND FLEW 8.7 HRS. ON THE LAST OF 4 LEGS THE FMS LOCKED UP AND WAS UNUSABLE FOR THE DURATION. AFTER COMPLETING THE FLT USING VOR TO VOR NAV, WE PASSED ZZZ VOR AND WERE TRYING TO GET TO THE FIELD USING AN NDB JUST N OF ZZZ. THE INDICATION FROM THE NDB WAS NOT MATCHING UP WITH VISUAL NAVAIDS (CITIES AND HWYS) SO WE PROCEEDED IN THE DIRECTION OF THE FIELD. AT THAT TIME WE WERE BOTH LOOKING OUTSIDE THE ACFT TO NAV TO THE ARPT AND ATC NOTIFIED US WE WERE 500 FT BELOW OUR ASSIGNED ALT. THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AND DID NOT CAPTURE THE ALT. WE DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND CLBED TO 6000 FT. I BELIEVE BOTH PLTS FOCUSING THEIR ATTN OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT AND NOT MONITORING THE INSTS LED TO THE PROB. ADDITIONAL FACTORS WERE FATIGUE AND THE FACT THAT IT WAS THE LAST LEG OF THE DAY AND WERE IN THE LCL AREA.

Synopsis

CE550 FLT CREW DESCENDS BELOW ASSIGNED ALTITUDE WHILE BOTH PILOTS ARE SCANNING OUTSIDE LOOKING FOR THE FIELD. FATIGUE IS CITED AS A FACTOR.

ACN: 749847

Time / Day

Date : 200708
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SKRG.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 10000

Environment

Flight Conditions : Mixed
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SKRG.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Taxi
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope : 36
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Precision

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000
ASRS Report : 749847

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : Foreign
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

ATC Facility.Procedure Or Policy : SKRG.TRACON
Chart.Airport : SKRG.Airport
Chart.Approach : SKRG ILS36

Narrative

DEPARTED SKCL (CALI, COLUMBIA). WE WERE ROUTED PALMA3 DEP UJC W3 TO SKRG (MEDELLIN COLUMBIA). THE FELIX3 ARR FIT THIS ROUTING BEST AND WE KEPT THE PLATE AVAILABLE. SKRG ARR (121.1) CLRED US DIRECT THE RNG (RIO NEGRO) VOR AND TO CROSS AT 10000 FT. HE THEN ALSO CLRED US FOR THE ILS APCH. DURING DSCNT IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT HIGH TERRAIN WOULD POSSIBLY EXIST IN BETWEEN OUR PRESENT POS AND RNG. OUR COURSE WAS APPROX THAT OF THE FELIX3 ARR (THIS WAS THE MOST RESTRICTIVE ARR). I UTILIZED THAT ARR TO KEEP CLR OF TERRAIN AS A DIRECT UNIMPEDED DSCNT WOULD HAVE US POSSIBLY FLYING INTO TERRAIN. WE ARRIVED AT RNG AT 10000 FT MOSTLY IN VMC CONDITIONS. WE PERFORMED THE CHARTED PROC ON THE ILS-Y RWY 36 APCH PLATE. DURING OUR TURN WE NOTED THAT TERRAIN WAS A LITTLE CLOSER THAN WOULD BE EXPECTED. QUICKLY REVIEWING THE PLATE WE FOUND THAT WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT 12000 FT OUTBOUND ON THE PROC TURN. WE CLBED BACK UP TO 12000 FT AND CONTINUED WITH THE APCH AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. UPON LNDG WE WERE CHASTISED BY TWR THAT WE DID NOT COMPLETE THE APCH PROC PROPERLY -- AND THEY REFERRED US TO THE MATROLA ARR. THIS ARR IS CLOSE AND SIMILAR TO THE FELIX3 WITH THE FELIX3 BEING MORE RESTRICTIVE. IN BOTH THESE CASES THE APCH ENDS AT 10000 FT. BOTH OF THESE ARRS COME IN FROM THE S FOR RWY 36. THE PROB, POINT OF CONFUSION AND DILEMMA IS THAT A DARK LINED OVAL PROC TURN IS SHOWN ON THE APCH PLATE. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THIS PROC TURN WOULD NOT BE USED WITH A NBOUND STRAIGHT IN APCH FOR RWY 36. THERE WAS AN UNRESOLVED CONVERSATION WITH TWR PERSONNEL REGARDING THIS ENTIRE ISSUE. I INFORMED THEM THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO CROSS RNG VOR AT 10000 FT. IT WAS UNCLR IF THIS MEANT WHEN PROC TURN INBOUND OR WHEN INITIALLY REACHING RNG VOR. FACTORING IN THAT THE 2 APPLICABLE ARR END AT RNG VOR AT 10000 FT THIS WOULD IMPLY THAT NO PROC TURN IS REQUIRED FOR A STRAIGHT-IN APCH FOR RWY. THIS IS A VERY DUBIOUS SITUATION WITH VERY DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES. THE ILS-Y RWY 36 COMMERCIAL APCH PLATE SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO SHOW 'NO PT' FOR STRAIGHT IN NBOUND APCHS. THIS SHOULD ALLEVIATE ANY DOUBT AS TO HOW THE APCH SHOULD BE FLOWN. BEING THAT WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO RNG VOR THIS REMOVES US FROM THE PROTECTION THAT EITHER OF THE ARRS WOULD HAVE AFFORDED US IN SPITE THAT THE DIRECT FROM PRESENT POS WAS VERY CLOSE TO THE ARR. WE UTILIZED EXTREME CAUTION AT ALL TIMES. UNTIL FURTHER CLARIFICATION BECOMES AVAILABLE SUBSEQUENT APCHS WILL BE PERFORMED XING RNG VOR INITIALLY AT 12000 FT AND FLYING THE PROC TURN. SOME OF THE FACTORS INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT ARE THAT WE WERE FATIGUED AFTER MAKING AN INITIAL ARR AND MISSED APCH AT SKRG. WE DIVERTED TO SKCL AND HAD TO WAIT A PROTRACTED AMOUNT OF TIME FOR THE WX TO LIFT AND TO ADDRESS A MYRIAD OF LOGISTICAL ISSUES. WE DO NOT HAVE A FORMAL TRAINING PROGRAM FOR OUR COMPANY'S OPS INTO SOUTH

AMERICA. THIS WAS MY FIRST TIME OPERATING IN COLUMBIA. THERE ARE ALSO THE EVER PRESENT COM DIFFICULTIES. WE SHOULD HAVE REFUSED THE DIRECT TO RNG CLRNC AND INSISTED ON STAYING ON THE ARR THOUGH WE STILL WOULD HAVE HAD TO DEAL WITH THE QUANDARY OF THE PROC TURN. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THERE WAS SOME GUIDE AVAILABLE THAT WOULD HELP IN DECIPHERING THE APCH PLATE PROCS/NOMENCLATURE AND DIFFERENCES FROM UNITED STATES DOMESTIC CHARTING PROCS FOR OPS IN/OUT OF SOUTH AMERICA AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD FOR THAT MATTER. I WILL BE CONSULTING THE CHART COMPANY IN AN EFFORT TO FIND MORE INFO.

Synopsis

A FLIGHT INTO SKRG DEVIATED FROM THE CHARTED APPROACH PROCEDURE, CROSSING RNG AT 10000 FT VICE 12000 FT.

ACN: 748135

Time / Day

Date : 200708

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

State Reference : NC

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Dusk

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Taxi

Make Model Name : Jet Ranger Undifferentiated or Other Model

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135

Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Taxi

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Instruction : Instructor

Function.Oversight : PIC

Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Qualification.Pilot : CFI

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 80

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8566

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 475

ASRS Report : 748135

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Taxi

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Function.Instruction : Trainee

Events

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS TRAINING A PLT (CAPT) FOR A 2 PLT EMS HELI OP ON THE BELL 430. WE HAD JUST COMPLETED A SIMULATED SINGLE ENG LNDG AND HAD MOVED OFF

THE RWY TO THE GRASS JUST OFF A TXWY. THE CAPT TRAINEE WAS ON THE CTLS AND HE DID NOT CALL FOR THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST, NOR DID I AS THE TRAINING CAPT REMIND HIM TO DO SO. WHILE REPOSITIONING TO THE GRASS I GLANCED AT THE AUTOMATED FLT CTL SYS MODE SELECT PANEL TO SEE IF THE AUTOMATED FLT CTL SYS WAS IN STABILITY AUGMENTATION OR AUTOPLT. I SAW THE GREEN STABILITY AUGMENTATION LIGHT ON. WHILE I FUNCTIONED AS THE SIC THE CAPT DIRECTED ME TO SET UP THE RADIOS FOR OUR DEP AND NEXT ARR. WHILE DOING SO, HE (STILL IN COMMAND OF THE FLT CTLS) WAS VERIFYING WHAT I HAD DONE. HE MUST HAVE LET GO OF THE CTLS. NEXT THING I KNEW I HEARD LOUD POUNDING AND GRABBED FOR THE FLT CTLS. I FOUND THE CYCLIC CTL TO BE NEARLY FULL FORWARD. I SUSPECTED THE ROTOR SYS HAD COME IN CONTACT WITH THE UPPER WIRE CUTTER ASSEMBLY. UPON SHUTDOWN AND INSPECTION I CONFIRMED THIS. AS IS ALWAYS THE CASE, SEVERAL THINGS LED TO THIS INCIDENT: 1) WHEN I LOOKED AT THE AUTOMATED FLT CTL SYS MODE PANEL AND SAW THE GREEN STABILITY AUGMENTATION LIGHT ON, I ASSUMED THE PLT HAD TURNED THE AUTOPLT OFF AND ENGAGED STABILITY AUGMENTATION. HE HAD NOT. HE WAS HOLDING THE CYCLIC FORCE TRIM BUTTON DOWN. THIS CAUSES THE AUTOMATED FLT CTL SYS TO REVERT TO STABILITY AUGMENTATION FROM AUTOPLT ONLY WHILE THE BUTTON IS BEING HELD DOWN. 2) THE AUTOPLT, STILL BEING ENGAGED DROVE THE CYCLIC FORWARD IN AN ATTEMPT TO FOLLOW THE LAST ASSIGNED DUTY, A DSCNT. 3) I DIDN'T FOLLOW UP ON THE 'CAPT' TO ENSURE HE CALLED FOR THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST. 4) EVEN THOUGH WE HAD BRIEFED A 3-WAY FLT CTL EXCHANGE, THE CAPT LET GO OF THE CTLS WITHOUT TELLING ME. IN THE DARK COCKPIT, I DIDN'T NOTICE THIS. 5) THE HOSPITAL BASED EMS PROGRAM ACFT WAS OTS, SO I WAS UNDER (SELF-IMPOSED) PRESSURE TO TRAIN SEVERAL REPLACEMENTS TO GET THE PROGRAM BACK IN SVC QUICKLY. 6) UNDER THIS SELF-IMPOSED PRESSURE, I HAD BEEN WORKING 6 DAYS WITH EACH DAY BEING MORE THAN 11 HRS, AND IN SOME CASES, 14 HR DUTY DAYS WHILE CONDUCTING GND AND FLT TRAINING. BTWN THE 2 DAYS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT AND THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT, I HAD FLOWN 18.3 HRS. 7) TEMPS HAD BEEN MID 80'S TO MID 90'S WITH HIGH HUMIDITY. 8) THE NIGHT BEFORE THE INCIDENT, I HAD DEVELOPED A SORE THROAT AND SOUR STOMACH RESULTING IN A FITFUL NIGHT'S SLEEP. THERE ARE ENOUGH LINKS IN THIS CHAIN TO BUILD 2 MISHAPS MUCH LESS THE ONE THAT HAPPENED.

Synopsis

BELL 430 INSTRUCTOR RPTS ROTOR DAMAGE AFTER SIMULATED ENG OUT LNDG WHEN CYCLIC IS RELEASED WITH AUTOPLT ENGAGED.

ACN: 746959

Time / Day

Date : 200707
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 6000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZ.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Taxi
Make Model Name : Small Transport
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 1680
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 150
ASRS Report : 746959

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

AT THE END OF A 12 HR DUTY DAY ON THE LAST LEG OF THE FLT, I FELL ASLEEP WHILE ENRTE FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ. I STARTED DUTY AT XA30 LCL FROM ZZZ AND FLEW THROUGH THE NIGHT. TOTAL FLT TIME IS JUST OVER 6 HRS FOR THE NIGHT. ON THE LAST LEG AROUND XL30 LCL TIME NEAR ZZZ, I APPARENTLY FELL ASLEEP. I DO NOT REMEMBER FEELING SLEEPY OR THE NEED TO TRY TO DO ACTIVITY TO STAY ALERT. I HAD THE AUTOPLT ON AND WAS CRUISING AT 6000 FT MSL. WHEN I WOKE UP, I WAS APPROX 15 MI PAST THE ZZZ ARPT. I TURNED THE ACFT AROUND AND MADE CONTACT WITH ATC. I WAS THEN VECTORED FROM THE S FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 10. UPON LNDG I WAS GIVEN A PHONE NUMBER TO CONTACT APCH WITH. AFTER SHUTTING DOWN THE ENG AND UNLOADING THE CARGO, I PROCEEDED TO CALL APCH ON THE PHONE. I SPOKE WITH A CTLR AND EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT I HAD FALLEN ASLEEP WITH THE AUTOPLT ON AND OVERFLEW THE ARPT. HE THEN REQUESTED MY PHONE NUMBER IN CASE THERE WAS A NEED TO CONTACT ME SO I PROVIDED HIM WITH IT. HE THEN TOLD ME THAT BECAUSE I HAD NOT LEFT ZZZ AIRSPACE, HE DID NOT BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE AN ISSUE. THAT WAS ESSENTIALLY THE ENTIRE CONVERSATION THAT WE HAD. I BELIEVE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS OCCURRENCE ARE THAT I AM A RESERVE PLT WITH A CHANGING SCHEDULE. I HAD BEEN ON A DAY SCHEDULE 2 DAYS PRIOR TO THIS FLT AND SWITCHED TO THE NIGHT SCHEDULE 2 NIGHTS BEFORE. FATIGUE WAS PROBABLY A FACTOR IN THAT I WORK LONG HRS AND GET 5-7 HRS OF SLEEP A NIGHT. CONTRIBUTING TO MY FATIGUE IS THAT I HAD FLOWN THE PREVIOUS 6 DAYS CONSECUTIVELY. ALSO, MY FATHER IS HAVING SURGERY ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT AND MY WIFE IS 9 MONTHS PREGNANT WITH OUR FIRST CHILD.

Synopsis

PLT FALLS ASLEEP AT CTLS AFTER LONG DUTY NIGHT AND OVERFLIES DEST BEFORE WAKING UP.

ACN: 742938

Time / Day

Date : 200706
Day : Sun
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Dawn

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Landing : Roll

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 35
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 800
ASRS Report : 742938

Events

Anomaly.Excursion : Runway
Anomaly.Ground Encounters.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Insufficient Time

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS PIC OF A C182. TWR CLRED ME TO LAND ON RWY 5R (A 7500 FT RWY). THE TWR ALSO SUGGESTED A LONG LNDG TO REDUCE TAXI TIME, WHICH I ACCEPTED. I CONTINUED MY APCH TO RWY 5R, ADDED 10 DEG FLAPS, CAME DOWN INTO GND EFFECT AND MAINTAINED 5 FT (APPROX) ABOVE THE RWY. I CONTINUED DOWN THE RWY UNTIL WHAT I THOUGHT WAS AN APPROPRIATE POS TO PULL PWR TO IDLE AND TOUCHDOWN. AFTER TOUCHING DOWN, I APPLIED

THE BRAKES AND IN CONTINUING MY SCAN OUTSIDE AFTER THE NOSE TOUCHED THE RWY, REALIZED THE RWY END THRESHOLD LIGHTS WERE CLOSER THAN EXPECTED. I APPLIED HEAVIER BRAKING BUT WAS CAREFUL NOT TO LOCK THE BRAKES. I KNEW I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STOP BEFORE THE LIGHTS, SO I MAINTAINED ACFT CTL AND GUIDED THE ACFT NOSE BTWN 2 OF THE LIGHTS SO AS TO MINIMIZE ACFT DAMAGE, IE, PROP IMPACT AND SUBSEQUENT ENG TEARDOWN COSTS. AS I TRAVELED THROUGH THE LIGHTS I FELT THE ACFT HIT A LIGHT. THE ACFT CAME TO A STOP 10-15 FT BEYOND THE LIGHTS. I SHUT DOWN THE ACFT, MADE A QUICK INSPECTION AND FOUND I COULD TAXI SAFELY TO THE RAMP. WE GOT CLRNC FROM THE TWR TO TAXI TO THE RAMP WHERE WE WERE MET BY ARPT OPS. THEY INSPECTED THE ACFT AND FOUND NO DAMAGE TO THE ACFT. THE ONLY THING WE COULD FIGURE IS THAT THE L MAIN TIRE OR ONE OF THE TIRES MADE A DIRECT HIT ON THE LIGHT. NONE OF THE DEBRIS FROM THE IMPACT HIT THE ACFT. THE PROB AROSE BECAUSE I ACCEPTED A CLRNC TO LAND LONG AND I BELIEVE I MISJUDGED MY TOUCHDOWN POINT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS MAY HAVE BEEN FATIGUE, FOR I JUST COMPLETED A 2 HR FLT AT 1000 FT AGL DOING A LAKE PATROL FLT AND IT WAS HOT OUTSIDE. ALSO, I BELIEVE NOW THAT FLYING LOW OVER THE RWY LIKE I DID IS NOT ALWAYS A GOOD IDEA SINCE YOU MAY NOT HAVE A GOOD VIEW OF THE RWY END. I DO NOT PLAN ON LNDG LONG AGAIN. I WAS VERY FORTUNATE TO NOT HAVE CAUSED ANY ACFT DAMAGE AND THE BEST PART IS THAT THE FAA SAYS THERE WILL NOT BE ANY ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST ME, AT LEAST THAT IS WHY I AM SUBMITTING THIS NASA FORM. MY CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR THE FUTURE IS TO GET SOME DUAL INSTRUCTION AND I ALSO PLAN ON GIVING A PLT SAFETY SEMINAR FOR THE ORGANIZATION I AM WITH. THE OTHER ITEM I WOULD LIKE TO ADD IS THAT IS THAT AT NO TIME WAS THE SAFETY OF MY CREW AT RISK. I MAINTAINED POSITIVE CTL OF THE ACFT AT ALL TIMES DURING THE SIT. I WILL NOT LET THIS INCIDENT OCCUR AGAIN.

Synopsis

C182 PLT INTENTIONALLY LANDED LONG, BUT TOUCHED DOWN WITH INSUFFICIENT RWY REMAINING AND STRUCK RWY THRESHOLD LIGHT.

ACN: 741063

Time / Day

Date : 200706

Day : Fri

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Taxi

Make Model Name : SA-227 AC Metro III

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135

Flight Phase.Ground : Maintenance

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : AHRS/ND

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Taxi

Function.Maintenance : Lead Technician

Qualification.Technician : Airframe

Qualification.Technician : FCC

Qualification.Technician : Inspection Authority

Qualification.Technician : Powerplant

Qualification.Technician : Repairman

Experience.Maintenance.Avionics : 18

Experience.Maintenance.Lead Technician : 10

Experience.Maintenance.Technician : 20

ASRS Report : 741063

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : HSI And Nav

#2 Inop

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Resolatory Action.Other

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Fault Isolation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Inspection

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Installation
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Logbook Entry
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements
Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Testing

Assessments

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

ACFT X HAD THE #2 HSI BACKLIGHTING ON MEL. I HAD WORKED THE ACFT IN JUNE TROUBLESHOOTING A VOR SPLIT OF 5 DEGS BTWN THE #1 AND #2 SYS. DURING THAT EVENT I HAD REMOVED THE RADIOS FROM THE RACK TO RECORD THE SERIAL NUMBER AND PART NUMBER DATA FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES. THE RADIOS WERE KX165'S NAV/COM'S WITH A FRONT MOUNTED HEX SCREW THAT IS USED TO SECURE THE RADIO IN THE RACK. I HAD CLEANED THE CONNECTORS AND INSTALLED THE RADIOS BACK IN THE RACK. I STOPPED BACK AT THE HANGAR ON MY WAY HOME FROM MY OTHER JOB ON THE MORNING 3 DAYS LATER TO WORK ANOTHER ACFT. I HAD WORKED MY NORMAL SHIFT AT ANOTHER AVIATION COMPANY (13 HRS) AND STOPPED ON MY WAY HOME TO SEE WHAT THE STATUS OF THE FLEET WAS. I CLOCKED IN BEFORE XA00. ACFT X HAD LAUNCHED EARLIER IN THE DAY AND I INITIALLY WORKED ON ANOTHER TYPE OF ACFT IN THE FLEET WITH A DIFFERENT NAV PROB. I LEFT AFTER 2 HRS (XC00) TO GO HOME AND SLEEP. ON MY WAY HOME I GOT A CALL THAT ACFT X HAD RETURNED AND THE CAPT'S HSI WAS NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. I WAS TOO TIRED TO RETURN TO THE HANGAR SO I SAID I WOULD RETURN AT XT30 TO TROUBLESHOOT THE SYS. I GOT HOME AT XE00 AFTER HAVING TO RUN SEVERAL OTHER SMALL ERRANDS. I WOKE BACK UP AT XI00 AND RETURNED TO THE HANGAR. I TESTED THE SYS AND FOUND THAT THE CAPT'S HSI WAS DEFECTIVE AND NEEDED REPLACED DUE TO AN INTERNAL FAILURE. WE HAD THE PART IN STOCK TO FIX THE BACKLIGHTING ON THE OTHER SIDE SO I SIMPLY INSTALLED THAT PART TO FIX THE CAPT'S SIDE. I HAD TO RESEARCH THROUGH SEVERAL INSTALLATION MANUALS TO FIND OUT EXACTLY WHICH NUMBERS WERE EFFECTIVE FOR THIS ACFT. ACFT X USES A 5 VOLT LIGHT SYS THAT IS DIFFERENT THAN THE OTHER METROS THAT WE HAVE HERE. THE OTHER METROS USE THE 28 VOLT LIGHTING IN THE INST AND USE A DIFFERENT DASH NUMBER DISPLAY. I QUICKLY CHKED THE SYS OUT WITH OUR TEST EQUIP AND ESTABLISHED THAT THE HSI WAS OPERATIONAL ON THE PLT'S SIDE. I HAD SWAPPED THE POS OF THE RADIOS SOME TIME DURING THIS VISIT TO MAKE SURE THAT THE DATA WAS GOOD FROM BOTH OF THEM TO BOTH SIDES. I CHKED VOR/LOC/GS OP AND ALL THE PLT'S SIDE INSTS WERE RESPONDING. DURING THESE CHKS I HAD TO STOP SEVERAL TIMES TO LOOK UP INFO FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES AND TO SEE HOW LONG I HAD DUE TO THE ACFT WAS NEEDED TO BE BACK IN SVC ASAP AND HAD ANOTHER SQUAWK IN WORK. I WAS NOT USING A WRITTEN WORK IN PROGRESS CHKLIST, JUST THE COMPANY CHKLIST PROVIDED FOR THE RAMP CHK (AVIONICS RAMP CHKLIST). I SIGNED THE ACFT BACK INTO SVC AND QUICKLY HAD TO LEAVE IN ORDER TO GET TO MY OTHER JOB. I LEFT THE HANGAR AFTER XK30 AND THE ACFT WAS BEING RUN TO CHK OUT ANOTHER PROB UNRELATED TO THE NAV SYS. THE ACFT WAS ASSIGNED A FLT ON THE NEXT DAY AND THE PLT RPTED INFLT THAT ALL THE NAV #2 INDICATIONS WERE LOST ON HIS INST PANEL. HE COMPLETED THE FLT AND MADE A LOGBOOK ENTRY. A LCL REPAIR SHOP WAS CALLED OUT TO EVALUATE THE ACFT. THE #2 RADIO WAS FOUND TO BE LOOSE OR IMPROPERLY SECURED IN THE RACK. THE CONTRACT MAINT COMPANY

VERIFIED THE PROB AND CORRECTLY INSTALLED THE RADIO AND OP WAS RETURNED TO NORMAL. I WAS TIRED FROM WORKING SPLIT SHIFTS AND HAD NOT PLANNED ON WORKING THE ACFT ON THE DAY THAT IT RETURNED. I HAD NOT TAKEN THE TIME TO RESEARCH AND DOCUMENT THE SPECIFIC STATUS OF THIS ACFT AND WAS USING TRIBAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE OTHER FLEET ACFT TO GUIDE MY TROUBLESHOOTING. I FAILED TO PERFORM AN AFTER MAINT SECURITY CHK OF ALL THE COMPONENTS I HAD WORKED WITH DURING THAT VISIT AND THE PREVIOUS VISIT. I FAILED TO VERIFY THE SECURITY OF THE RADIO IN THE RACK BECAUSE I WAS DISTR AT SEVERAL KEY POINTS DURING MY CHKS BY RELATED AND UNRELATED TASKS AND REQUESTS. I ALSO WAS NOT USING A MEMORY AID OR WRITTEN CHKLIST TO MAKE SURE I DIDN'T SKIP ANY TASKS. I ALSO DID NOT ATTACH A STREAMER AS A VISUAL REMINDER THAT THE RADIO WAS LOOSE.

Synopsis

A FAIRCHILD SA227 METRO ACFT HAD ONE 'RETURN' TO FIELD DUE TO CAPT HSI NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY AND ONE COMPLETED FLIGHT WITH ALL NAV #2 INDICATIONS LOST.

ACN: 740530

Time / Day

Date : 200705
Day : Thu
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LFMN.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 500
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 3000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : LFMN.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter
Make Model Name : Gulfstream IV
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 125
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15600
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4200
ASRS Report : 740530

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Unstabilized Approach
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VOR/DME CGS RIVIERA CIRCLE-TO-LAND APCH FOR RWY 4L AT LFMN. WE BRIEFED THE APCH WELL AND FLEW THE APCH WELL -- THAT IS, UNTIL THE D5.0 CGS FIX AT WHICH POINT WE WERE TO EITHER FLY VISUALLY TO THE RWY OR EXECUTE A MISSED APCH. AT THE 35.0 FIX WE TOOK OVER VISUALLY AND HEADED TO THE ARPT. VISIBILITY WAS, I BELIEVE, 6 MI (10K) WITH NO CEILING. I WAS THE PF AND STARTED A DSCNT FROM 3000 FT AND BEGAN A TURN TO THE ARPT. THE PNF IN THE R SEAT WAS IN A BETTER POS TO SEE THE RWYS AND BECAUSE OF MY POS (L SEAT, IN A TURN, DSNDING) I HAD TROUBLE KEEPING MY EYE ON THE RWY. I BEGAN TO LINE UP ON RWY 4R INSTEAD OF RWY 4L AND BEGAN A DSCNT FOR RWY 4R. THE PNF POINTED OUT RWY 4L FOR ME. I WAS LOW FOR RWY 4L AND ROLLED OUT OF THE TURN, THEN OVERSHOT RWY 4L AND HAD TO TURN TO THE R TO GET BACK ON THE CTRLINE FOR RWY 4L. STILL LOW, I ADDED PWR TO GET BACK ON THE PROPER GLIDE PATH AND SPD FOR THE RWY. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED ON ABOUT A 2 MI FINAL. WE LANDED SAFELY AND ATC (LCL) DID NOT MENTION EITHER MY ALT OR COURSE EXCURSIONS ON THE VISUAL PORTION OF THE APCH. THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT. I WAS DISAPPOINTED IN THE APCH BECAUSE WE HAD BRIEFED IT SO WELL. THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS INVOLVED: 1) VISIBILITY WAS NOT GREAT AND WHEN WE REACHED THE D5.0 WE HAD THE ARPT AND RWYS IN SIGHT BUT IT WASN'T VERY SHARP. I BEGAN TURNING TOWARDS THE WRONG RWY UNTIL CORRECTED BY THE PNF. 2) AN ACFT WAS TAKING OFF FROM RWY 4R. I MISTAKENLY THOUGHT THAT WAS THE ACFT WE WERE FOLLOWING FOR LNDG ON RWY 4L AND THAT HE WAS ON THE LNDG ROLL. 3) WHILE WE BRIEFED THE APCH WELL, OUR BRIEFING STOPPED AT THE D5.0 FIX. NO TALK AMONG US ABOUT WHAT WE SHOULD DO AFTER REACHING THAT POINT. I DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ASK THE PNF TO POINT TO THE ARPT OR THE RWY. VISIBILITY WAS SUCH THAT SEEING THE ARPT WAS NOT GOING TO BE A PROB. I WAS INSIDE FLYING THE PRESCRIBED APCH AND I DISREGARDED WHAT WAS OUTSIDE UNTIL THE FINAL MOMENT AND THEN HAD TROUBLE PUTTING MY EYE ON THE ARPT. THE PNF WHO SAW THE ARPT AND RWY DID NOT OFFER ANY EARLY CORRECTIONS FOR THE FINAL APCH COURSE AND NOW I WAS BUSY LOOKING OUTSIDE AND DISREGARDED THE CTRLINE EXTENSION I BUILD IN THE FMS FOR RWY 4. 4) FATIGUE. WE HAD DEPARTED ZZZ1 (US) 2 DAYS BEFORE AT AROUND XA15 LNDG AT LFMN IN THE AFTERNOON OF THE NEXT DAY. BEFORE OUR DEP WE LEARNED THAT WE WOULD BE PICKING UP SOME OTHER PAX IMMEDIATELY UPON ARR TO FLY FROM LFMN TO ZZZZ2. SLEEP BEFORE OUR ZZZ1 (US) DEP WAS SPORADIC DURING THE DAY. THE EXTRA LEG WOULD STILL PUT US WELL WITHIN FLT AND DUTY TIME LIMITS BUT I KNEW THE NEXT WOULD BE A LONG DAY. THAT DAY WE WERE TO DEPART ZZZZ2 FOR LFMN WITH PAX. WE WOULD BE OFF DUTY FOR ABOUT 21 HRS. SLEEP WOULDN'T COME FOR ME THAT NIGHT, BUT I WAS NOT CONCERNED -- WE WOULD NOT HAVE TO LEAVE THE HOTEL FOR THE ARPT UNTIL THE AFTERNOON FOR OUR FLT TO LFMN. I FELL ASLEEP ABOUT XF30 ON THAT DAY. PRETTY GOOD, BECAUSE THAT WOULD GIVE ME A FULL NIGHT'S SLEEP. THE PHONE RANG TWO HOURS LATER. IT WAS OUR DISPATCH SAYING THAT THE DEP TIME WAS NOW XQ00. THE PAX WANTED XQ30 BUT THE ONLY SLOT AVAILABLE WAS XQ00. I CALLED THE ARPT TO CHANGE OUR HOTEL PICK-UP TIME AND THEN CALLED OUR HANDLER TO CHANGE OUR DEP AND LFMN ARR TIMES. I FELL ASLEEP AGAIN AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER. DISPATCH CALLED AGAIN SAYING THE

PAX WANTED TO LEAVE AT XS30, THE ORIGINAL TIME. I AGAIN MADE ALL THE PHONE CALLS TO GET THINGS CHANGED BACK TO THE WAY THEY WERE. DISPATCH, I BELIEVE, CONFUSED TIME ZONES, GMT AND LCL TIME, AND INDEED HAD NO IDEA WHAT TIME IT WAS IN ZZZZ2 AND FOR SOME REASON THOUGHT THAT THE PAX WANTED TO LEAVE AT XQ30 INSTEAD OF XS30. I COULD NOT GET BACK TO SLEEP AND THE PNF DIDN'T SLEEP WELL EITHER. WE WERE BOTH EXHAUSTED BY THE TIME WE ARRIVED AT THE ARPT FOR DEP. THE ONE THING WE, AS A CREW, COULD HAVE DONE MUCH BETTER WOULD BE TO COMPLETE THE APCH BRIEFING ALL THE WAY TO THE CIRCLING RWY. IT WAS A CIRCLING APCH WITH A 90 DEG TURN TO THE R. AFTER REACHING THE D5.0 FIX, CRM SEEMED TO HAVE BROKEN DOWN AND BOTH PLTS, LOOKING BACK, SEEMED TO BE LISTLESS AND NOT INVOLVED.

Synopsis

A G IV PILOT REPORTS FATIGUE LEADING TO AN UNSTABILIZED APCH TO LFMN.

ACN: 740461

Time / Day

Date : 200706
Day : Fri
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 1500
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter
Make Model Name : Challenger CL601
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB5

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 17600
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 520
ASRS Report : 740461

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

TEB5 DEP. I READ (MEMORIZED) THE DEP PROC AT LEAST 4 TIMES. CLBED ON RWY HDG TO 1500 FT. TURNED 280 DEGS AND CONTINUED TO 2000 FT BEFORE 4.5 NM. COMPLETELY BLEW THE DEP. NO TFC CONFLICT. FATIGUE AND HOUR OF THE DAY LIKELY CAUSE OF MY ERROR.

Synopsis

CL60 FAILS TO COMPLY WITH ALT RESTRICTIONS ON THE TEB SID FROM TEB.

ACN: 740166

Time / Day

Date : 200705
Day : Sat
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : PVD.VORTAC
State Reference : RI
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 9500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZBW.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Taxi
Make Model Name : Falcon 2000
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Navigation In Use.Other.VORTAC
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : INNDY

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 74
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2150
ASRS Report : 740166

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 60

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8310
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2390
ASRS Report : 740165

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Critical
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : TCAS
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 6000
Miss Distance.Vertical : 500

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

PROCEEDING INBOUND ON THE ARR IN VMC. APPROX 40 MI E OF PVD I MENTIONED TO THE FO (WHO WAS FLYING FROM THE L SEAT) 'CTR NEEDS TO GET US DOWN TO 11000 FT, IF WE ARE TO MAKE PVD AT 11000 FT.' THE CTRLR WAS BUSY, SO I DIDN'T INTERRUPT. FINALLY THE CTRLR ASKED US IF HE HAD 'GIVEN US 11000 FT AT PVD.' I REPLIED 'NEGATIVE THIS IS THE FIRST MENTION OF THAT.' THE ZBW CTRLR APOLOGIZED FOR THE LATE DSCNT AND CLRED US TO CROSS 5 MI E OF PVD AT 11000 FT INSTEAD OF 11000 FT. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE I SET 11000 FT IN THE ALT ALERT DEVICE, AND WE BOTH SAID '11000 SEEN.' HOWEVER, AFTER PASSING 10000 FT WE BOTH SAW 6000 SET IN THE ALERTER. I DON'T KNOW HOW 6000 WAS SET, NOR DO I RECALL SETTING SUCH A NUMBER IN THE ALERTER. THE ONLY 'SIX' IN OUR CLRNC WAS 'ALTIMETER OF 30.06.' THE ONLY POSSIBILITY THAT I CAN THINK OF, IS THAT SOMEHOW, IN THE HASTE TO ACCOMMODATE THE LATE DSCNT NOTICE, POSSIBLY I TRANSPOSED THE 30.06 INTO THE 6 IN THE ALT ALERTER. DURING THE DSCNT IT WAS NECESSARY TO ATTAIN 4000 FPM IN ORDER TO MEET THE NOW IMPOSED RESTR. AIRBRAKE ONE POS WAS USED. I MENTIONED TO THE FO THAT 'IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO SLOW TO 250 KIAS BY PVD SINCE THAT RESTR WAS NOT ISSUED.' SHORTLY BEFORE THAT I SAW THE 6000 FT IN THE ALT ALERT DEVICE. PASSING THROUGH 10000 FT WE GOT AN 'RA' WITH THE TFC IN SIGHT, WHEN THE CTRLR QUERIED OUR ALT, THEN CLRED US TO 9000 FT WE THEN CONTINUED TO BOSTON LOGAN UNEVENTFULLY. I ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL ACTIONS. IN RETROSPECT, I BELIEVE THAT I ERRED IN JUDGEMENT, MOST LIKELY DUE TO FATIGUE. THE FOLLOWING APPLIES: I WAS ABLE TO SLEEP ONLY ABOUT 4-4.5 HRS LAST NIGHT. NORMALLY I SLEEP ABOUT 8 HRS PER NIGHT. ON THIS NIGHT WE HAD THE MINIMUM LEGAL REST. I IMMEDIATELY WENT TO MY HOTEL ROOM TO GET SLEEP. UPON ARRIVING AT MY ROOM I DISCOVERED THAT THE ROOM'S OUTSIDE DOOR CONNECTING TO A COMMON OUTDOOR DECK WOULD NOT LOCK OR CLOSE. SINCE ANYONE HAD ACCESS TO THE AREA, I FELT UNSAFE TRYING TO SLEEP WITH THE PEDESTRIAN TFC NEARBY

WITH THE WIND BLOWING THE DOOR OPEN. THEREFORE, I ASKED FOR ANOTHER ROOM, WHICH TOOK ABOUT 45 MINS TO ARRANGE. UNFORTUNATELY THE ONLY REPLACEMENT ROOM WAS NEAR AN ELEVATOR ON THE THIRD FLOOR. THIS ELEVATOR WAS IN USE FREQUENTLY THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT WITH NOISY TOURISTS, PASSING IN AND ABOUT, WHO REPEATEDLY WOKE ME UP. THE NEXT DAY, I DID NOT REALIZE MY FATIGUE STATE. IN THE FUTURE, I SHOULD DECLINE THE TRIP SHOULD SUCH A LACK OF SLEEP OCCUR.

Synopsis

FALCON FLT CREW ENCOUNTERED TCAS RA DURING DESCENT AFTER SETTING INCORRECT ALT IN ALT ALERT WINDOW.

ACN: 738205

Time / Day

Date : 200705
Day : Wed
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 5000

Environment

Flight Conditions : Mixed
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Falcon 20FJF/20C/20D/20E/20F
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Arrival : On Vectors

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Waste Water Disposal System

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 50
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7600
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000
ASRS Report : 738205

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Narrative

ON A TRANS OCEANIC FLT OUR AILERON CONTROLS FROZE UP. DURING CRUISE THE AILERON TRIM ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT KEPT COMING ON. TOWARDS THE END OF THE CROSSING AND DURING THE DSCNT AUTOPILOT TRACKING BECAME UNRELIABLE WITHOUT AILERON TRIM ASSISTANCE. IT WAS DURING VECTORS TO APCH THAT A LEFT HAND TURN EXCEEDED 30 DEGS BANK WHEREUPON I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPILOT AND REALIZED THAT WE HAD FROZEN AILERONS. THE BANK ANGLE AT THE TIME OF DISCONNECT WAS ABOUT 45 DEGS AND REQUIRED WINGS LEVEL RECOVERY WITH RUDDER. BOTH PILOTS WORKING TOGETHER COULD NOT ACHIEVE ANY AILERON AUTHORITY. AN EMER WAS DECLARED AT THIS POINT. ALL REMAINING TURNS WERE ACCOMPLISHED USING RUDDER ONLY INCLUDING ILS INTERCEPT AND LNDG. NO DAMAGE TO ACFT, PAX, OR CREW. CAUSE SEEMS TO BE A QUANTITY OF WATER ACCUMULATING DURING THE FLT AND FREEZING IN THE BELLY, EVENTUALLY BUILDING UP TO THE POINT OF BINDING THE AILERON CONTROL SYSTEM. I BELIEVE THAT THE SHORT DURATION OF THE TWO STOPS WERE NOT LONG OR WARM ENOUGH TO ALLOW THAWING OF THE ACCUMULATED ICE INSIDE THE ACFT, WHICH KEPT BUILDING UP AS WE FLEW. THE ACTUAL SOURCE OF THE WATER IS STILL BEING INVESTIGATED. ALSO APPARENTLY WE HAD A FAILURE OF THE AUTOMATIC DRAIN ON THE BELLY. DURING THE DESCENT WE THOUGHT THE AUTOPILOT SERVO OR AILERON TRIM TO BE THE PROBLEM, POSSIBLY FREEZING OR STICKING, AS WE COULD ASSIST WITH TRIM INPUTS TO HELP WITH TRACKING. I DID DISCONNECT ONCE AT ALTITUDE AND THE AILERON CONTROLS FELT STIFF BUT FREE. THINKING IT WAS STILL AN ICING VALVE OR STICKY ACTUATOR I TURNED ON THE BLEED AIR WING HEAT FOR THE DESCENT HOPING TO HELP THAW WHATEVER THE PROBLEM WAS. IT MADE NO NOTICEABLE IMPROVEMENT. THIS OCCURRENCE WAS AT THE END OF A LONG DAY FOR THE CREW. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT AN ICE BLOCK WAS FOUND ON AN AILERON CTL ARM COMMON TO BOTH THE HYDRAULICALLY BOOSTED AND MANUAL REVERSION CTL OF THE AILERONS. THE ACFT HAD MADE TWO PREVIOUS STOPS DURING THE LONG INTERNATIONAL FLT AND AT EACH STOP ICE IN THE 2 REFRESHMENT COOLING DRAWERS WAS REPLENISHED. BECAUSE THE UNDER FUSELAGE DRAIN MAST USUALLY ALLOWS THAWED LIQUID TO DRAIN FROM THE REFRESHMENT DRAWER AREA, THERE WAS NOTHING UNUSUAL NOTED AT EITHER STOP. HOWEVER, IT IS NOW SUSPECTED THAT THE DRAIN MAST HAD BECOME CLOGGED WITH FROZEN MATERIAL. DURING THE FINAL FLT ENOUGH FLUID HAD ACCUMULATED AROUND THE AILERON CTL ROD BECAUSE OF THE ACFT'S NORMAL 5 DEG NOSE UP FLT ATTITUDE, THAT UPON FREEZING AND BEING UNABLE TO DRAIN IN THE FROZEN DRAIN MAST, THE ICE LOCKED THE AILERONS.

Synopsis

A FALCON 20'S AILERON CTL LEVERS IN THE ACFT'S FUSELAGE BECAME FROZEN WITH MELTED GALLEY ICE APPARENTLY UNABLE TO DRAIN FROM A FROZEN DRAIN MAST.

ACN: 731820

Time / Day

Date : 200703
Day : Thu
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Weather Elements : Rain
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter
Make Model Name : B727-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 102
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6406
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 800
ASRS Report : 731820

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Excursion : Taxiway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolutive Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE CAPT OF THE PLANE TAXIED THE ACFT THROUGH A 90 DEG TURN AND CUT THE CORNER TOO SHORT PUTTING THE R MAIN WHEEL IN THE GRASS. THE WHEEL STUCK IN THE WET GRASS AND WE WERE UNABLE TO TAXI ANY FURTHER. WE LANDED AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO TURN OFF AT THE END OF RWY. WE TURNED R AT THE END OF RWY AS INSTRUCTED. THE CTLR GAVE US INSTRUCTIONS TO TAXI ON TXWY B AND TURN R ON TXWY E TO FBO. THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US THAT THE TXWY WAS 50 FT WIDE. WHEN WE GOT CLOSE TO TXWY E, THE FE AND MYSELF (THE FO) ADVISED THE CAPT NOT TO PROCEED. HOWEVER THE CAPT CONTINUED THE TAXI CUTTING TOO SHORT. AFTER FURTHER REVIEW OF THE ARPT DIAGRAM. I NOTICED THAT THE TXWY E IS NOT STRESSED FOR OUR WT AND WE SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED THOSE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. ALSO, OUR DISPATCHERS SHOULD NOT HAVE HAD US HANDLED BY THAT FBO BECAUSE OF THE TXWYS THAT YOU HAVE TO TRAVEL TO GET THERE. IN CONCLUSION, XA00 IN THE MORNING, RAIN, TIRED, BAD TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, AND CAPT ERROR.

Synopsis

B727 CREW CUTS CORNER DURING TURN ONTO TAXIWAY E FROM TXWY B AND GETS STUCK IN THE WET GRASS.

ACN: 731531

Time / Day

Date : 200703
Day : Sun
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Pilatus Undifferentiated
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Ground : Takeoff Roll

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 65
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6904
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2340
ASRS Report : 731531

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Excursion : Runway
Anomaly.Ground Encounters.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE DEPARTING AT NIGHT I ROLLED DIRECTLY ONTO THE RWY FROM INTXN AFTER TKOF CLRNC FROM TWR. AS I MADE MY TURN ONTO THE RWY I ALIGNED THE ACFT WITH WHAT I BELIEVED WAS THE RWY CTRLINE LIGHTING SYS. I APPLIED TKOF PWR AND UTILIZED AN INSIDE/OUTSIDE SCAN IN ORDER TO CHK MY GAUGES FOR ENG PERFORMANCE/LIMITS AND TO MONITOR MY TKOF OUTSIDE THE ACFT. PRIOR TO LIFT-OFF I HEARD/FELT 2 SMALL THUMPS. I WAS CONCERNED BUT NOT ALARMED AND CONTINUED MY TKOF DUE TO THE FACT THAT I WAS CLOSE TO ROTATION SPD AND THAT THERE WERE NO OTHER INDICATIONS OF A PROB. ONCE AIRBORNE I ASKED ATC FOR A DOWNWIND TURN IN ORDER TO RETURN TO THE FIELD FOR LNDG. I WAS CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH. THE APCH, LNDG, ROLLOUT, TAXI, AND SHUTDOWN WERE ALL NORMAL. POSTFLT INSPECTION REVEALED DAMAGE TO THE L MAIN LNDG GEAR DOOR AND THE L FLAP. I CALLED THE TWR FROM OUR OFFICE AND ADVISED THEM OF THE INCIDENT AND REQUESTED A RWY CHK BY OPS. AN OPS REPRESENTATIVE CAME TO MY HANGAR AND RPTD 3 RWY LIGHTS DAMAGED. THIS CONFIRMED MY SUSPICION THAT I HAD NOT PROPERLY ALIGNED MYSELF WITH THE RWY CTRLINE BUT RATHER THE L SIDE EDGE. I LEARNED FROM TWR THAT THE RWY CTRLINE LIGHTS WERE NOT ILLUMINATED. THE INTXN OF RWYS XX AND YY PLUS THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD ON RWY XX LEADS TO A CONFUSING SITUATION AS ONE TAKES THE RWY FOR TKOF AT NIGHT (AND DAY!). I BELIEVE I FOLLOWED THE TXWY STRIPE LEADING TO RWY YY AND THEN ALIGNED THE TKOF TRACK WITH THE L EDGE LIGHTS BELIEVING THAT I WAS ON THE RWY XX CTRLINE. THERE IS SIGNIFICANT RWY MATERIAL L OF THE EDGE LIGHTS. IT APPEARED TO BE A NORMAL TKOF. I RECOMMEND THAT THE CTRLINE LIGHTS ALWAYS BE UTILIZED AT NIGHT FOR ALL OPS IN ORDER TO AVOID THE SITUATION I WAS INVOLVED IN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE HAS OPERATED FROM THE ARPT FOR OVER 8 YRS WITH THE SAME COMPANY AND IS FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT. HE STATED THAT IT WAS LATE NIGHT/EARLY MORNING AND FATIGUE MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR IN THE INCIDENT. HE FELT THAT HE HAD A FALSE SENSE OF POSITIONAL AWARENESS WHEN HE TOOK THE RWY AND THE LEAD IN LINE HE FOLLOWED WAS FOR RWY YY VICE RWY XX WHICH CAUSED HIM TO LINE UP ON THE EDGE LIGHTS FOR RWY XX. WITHOUT THE CTRLINE LIGHTING BEING ILLUMINATED HE LOST POSITIONAL AWARENESS. HE NOTED THAT THE ARPT AUTH HAD INDICATED THAT ONE OTHER ACFT HAD A SIMILAR EVENT SEVERAL YRS AGO. WHEN QUESTIONED, THE RPTR INDICATED THAT HE FELT IT WAS HIS MISTAKE AND THAT SAFETY OF FLT WAS NOT AN ISSUE.

Synopsis

PILATUS PC12 PLT LINES UP WITH RWY EDGE LIGHTS AND DAMAGES ACFT DURING TKOF ROLL.

ACN: 728781

Time / Day

Date : 200702
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : BZN.Airport
State Reference : MT
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7300

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Weather Elements : Fog
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZLC.ARTCC
Controlling Facilities.Tower : BZN.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope : 12
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Precision

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 13000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1300
ASRS Report : 728781

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DEPARTED MSP-BZN ON FLT XXA, BZN WX SHOWED GOOD VMC WITH CALM WIND AND FORECASTED FOR VMC. IT HAD BEEN 2+ YRS SINCE I HAD LAST FLOWN INTO BZN SO WE THOROUGHLY REVIEWED THE BZN COMMERCIAL CHART INFO ENRTE ON THE PREVIOUS LEG AND HAD QUERIED DISPATCH REGARDING SNOWFALL AND WIND CONDITIONS DUE TO LNDG RESTRS. ENRTE TO BZN WE AGAIN REVIEWED BZN COMMERCIAL CHART PAGES, DISCUSSED HOW WE WOULD EXECUTE THE FULL APCH USING MANAGED NAV AND REGULARLY UPDATED BZN, GTF, AND SEA (LISTED ALTERNATES) WX WHICH ALL INDICATED VMC. I LOADED THE ILS RWY 12 VIA BZN INTO THE FMS FLT PLAN, AND WE ARMED OUR TERR ON NAV DISPLAY (EGPWS) SWITCHES. ON DSCNT I ATTEMPTED TO COPY THE BZN ATIS BUT WAS UNABLE AS THE LISTED ATIS FREQ WAS ERRONEOUS. SO WE RECEIVED THE LATEST 'SA' RPT WHICH STILL SHOWED VMC. APPROX 40 NM OUT ZLC ADVISED US THAT BZN WAS SUDDENLY 1/4 MI VISIBILITY WITH FZFG AND ASKED OUR INTENTIONS. WE RECEIVED HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS AT MANNI AND CONSULTED WITH DISPATCH. WE COLLECTIVELY AGREED TO DIVERT TO GTF IF NEEDED AND CALCULATED BINGO FUEL. AFTER ABOUT 1.5 TURNS IN HOLDING SLC ADVISED US THAT THE BZN VISIBILITY WAS 1/2 MI AND ASKED IF WE WANTED APCH CLRNC FOR THE ILS RWY 12. WE ACCEPTED THE APCH CLRNC AND WERE HANDED OFF TO BZN TWR WHO REQUESTED THAT WE RPT MANNI INBOUND. ONCE ESTABLISHED WE DSNDED TO THE 'PT' ALT. WE WONDERED WHY THE OUTBOUND SEGMENT SEEMED LONGER THAN EXPECTED BUT DECIDED TO CONTINUE ON THE FMS COURSE WITH CAUTION (NAV DISPLAY SHOWED A 30 KT HEADWIND ON THE OUTBOUND LEG). AS WE STARTED OUR 'PT' OUTBOUND BZN TWR INSTRUCTED US TO CONTACT ZLC WHO IMMEDIATELY TOLD US TO CLB TO 11000 FT DUE TO A LOW ALT WARNING AND TO PROCEED DIRECT TO BZN VOR, WE HAD FLOWN BEYOND 10 NM FROM MANNI BY FOLLOWING THE FMS APCH PATH. WE COMPLIED WITH THE CLB AND ROUTING. APCHING THE VOR THE BZN ARPT WAS NOW VMC, AND WE COULD EASILY SEE THE RWY. SLC ISSUED US CLRNC FOR THE VISUAL APCH WHICH WAS COMPLETED TO A LNDG AFTER WHICH WE CONTACTED SLC BY PHONE. CAUSE: LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS BY THIS CREW WITH REGARD TO OUR DISTANCE FROM MANNI. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR OUR FMS TO BUILD AN ELONGATED APCH COURSE. I ASSUMED THAT FMS APCHS WERE BUILT WITH 'HARD' (GEOGRAPHICALLY DEFINED) POINTS IN SPACE AND NOT SUBJECT TO KNOWN HOLDING PATTERN ANOMALIES. 2) FATIGUE DUE TO A SCHEDULED 12 HR DUTY DAY BECOMING ALMOST 13 HRS. 3) LONG TIME LAPSE SINCE LAST EXECUTING A FULL APCH. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) MONITOR DISTANCE FROM 'ANCHOR' FIXES USING THE PROG PAGE, THE NAV DISPLAY ON THE NAV DISPLAY, AND TIMING. 2) EMPHASIZE THE DISTANCE RESTR ON THE APCH BRIEFING. 3) AGGRESSIVELY AND IMMEDIATELY INVESTIGATE ANY GUT FEELINGS THAT SOMETHING IS AMISS.

Synopsis

AN A320 FLT CREW DEVIATED FROM CHARTED TRACK DURING APCH TO RWY 12 AT BZN WHEN THEY FOLLOWED FMS GUIDANCE THAT TOOK THEM BEYOND THE 10 MI LIMIT DURING PROC TURN MANEUVER.

ACN: 726038

Time / Day

Date : 200701
Day : Tue
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : PDZ.VORTAC
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 17000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SCT.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Citation V
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : CIVET

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6550
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1000
ASRS Report : 726038

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I LEARNED A VERY GOOD LESSON REGARDING STARS SERVING MULTIPLE RWYS WITH A DIFFERENT SEGMENT FOR EACH RWY. IN THIS CASE IT WAS EITHER THE CIVET OR MITTS ARR INTO LAX -- I REALLY CAN'T RECALL. I HAD NEVER DONE EITHER ONE AND NEVER ANY SIMILAR ONE EITHER. SINCE THE TWO ARRS ARE SO SIMILAR, THE LESSON LEARNED CAN APPLY TO BOTH. I WAS PF IN THE LEFT SEAT ON A MORNING FLT. THERE WERE CLOUDS AROUND BUT WE WERE VFR. 20 OR 25 MILES ON HEC TRANSITION BEFORE CIVET (ON BOTH STARS) I ASKED THE PNF TO GET OUR RWY ASSIGNMENT FROM CTR AS I HAD NOT PROGRAMMED ONE IN THE FMS YET AND WE WERE UNDEFINED AFTER CIVET. LOTS OF RADIO CHATTER AND BEFORE WE COULD CALL WE WERE HANDED OFF TO SOCAL APCH. UPON CHKING IN WE WERE GIVEN RWY 25R BUT NOW I ONLY HAD 5 MILES TO REPROGRAM THE FMS SO IT WOULD MAKE THE PROPER TURNS. I HAD TO ENTER A RWY BUT WHEN I DID THE STAR DISAPPEARED SO I HAD TO ENTER THAT AND A TRANSITION AND THEN RESEQUENCE THE FLT PLAN SO WE WERE ON THE CORRECT LEG. I DID THIS IN BARELY ENOUGH TIME SO THAT WE MADE OUR TURN AT THE NEXT FIX (EITHER CIVET OR RUSTT) LOSING ONLY ABOUT 1/4 DEFLECTION ON THE HSI NEEDLE. JUST THEN THE PNF SAID WE WERE SUPPOSED TO CROSS THE FIX AT (15000 FT?) AND WE WERE AT 12000 FT. I WAS FEELING DUMB AND BEFORE I COULD SAY ANYTHING, THE CTRLR GAVE US A DSCNT TO 10000 FT AND A HDG OF 260 DEGS TO INTERCEPT ILS RWY 25R. I WAS GLAD TO HEAR THAT! THE REST OF THE FLT WENT WELL, THOUGH I WAS EMBARRASSED. I WAS TIRED (LITTLE SLEEP) AND SHOULD HAVE HAD THE PNF DO THE FMS PROGRAMMING SO I COULD KEEP SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. I SHOULD HAVE ALSO READ THE NOTE TO SET UP FOR RWY 25L UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED EVEN THOUGH RWY 25L WAS CLOSED, THIS WOULD HAVE SAVED US OR GIVEN ENOUGH TIME TO GET THINGS RIGHT. I COULD HAVE HAD THE PNF DETERMINE OUR RWY EARLIER, TOO. AND I COULD HAVE READ THE ARR MORE CAREFULLY ON SEGMENTS FROM CIVET TO LAX SO I'D KNOW WHAT TO EXPECT BUT I WAS GOING TO DO THAT AFTER RWY ASSIGNMENT. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL SET UP A SEGMENT OF MOST LIKELY RWY OR AS INSTRUCTED ON STAR. I WILL READ STAR MORE CAREFULLY AND WILL GET RWY ASSIGNMENT EARLIER.

Synopsis

LATE RWY ASSIGNMENT ON STAR TO LAX RESULTS IN COCKPIT DISTRACTION AND MISSED CROSSING ALT.

ACN: 726022

Time / Day

Date : 200607
Day : Tue
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ROC.Airport
State Reference : NY
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Dusk

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ROC.Tower
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Beechjet 400
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Aero Charts

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5100
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1100
ASRS Report : 726022

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Incursion : Runway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHEN TAXI CLEARANCE WAS CALLED FOR, ATC ASKED WHICH RWY WE WOULD PREFER TO USE, RWY 22 OR RWY 28. I RESPONDED RWY 28 MISTAKENLY AFTER MISREADING THE AIRPORT DIAGRAM CHART. TAXI CLEARANCE WAS GIVEN TO RWY 28. TAXI WAS INITIATED WITH MY MISTAKEN THINKING WE WERE ACTUALLY CLEARED FOR RWY 22. TAXI PROCEEDED WITHOUT INCIDENT INCLUDING CROSSING RWY 28. THE SITUATION WAS REVEALED WHEN WE CALLED FOR TAKEOFF CLEARANCE AT RWY 22. THE TOWER ASKED US OUR LOCATION AND WE ANSWERED AT RWY 22. THE TOWER CONTROLLER SOUNDED CONFUSED AND THEN ADVISED US THAT TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE ACTUALLY FOR RWY 28. I IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED MY ERROR AND ADVISED THE TOWER OF THIS. NO INCIDENT WAS NOTED BY ATC AND WE PROCEEDED WITH OUR FLIGHT. I BELIEVE THIS INCIDENT WAS CLEARLY BASED ON MY MISREADING THE AIRPORT CHART. MY COMPANY USES EFB'S EXCLUSIVELY FOR OUR APPROACH AND AIRPORT DIAGRAMS. THESE HAVE PROVEN TO BE DIFFICULT TO READ UNDER CERTAIN LIGHTING CONDITIONS. WE ALSO HAD A PASSENGER ONBOARD THAT WAS LATE. THIS WAS CAUSING US TO EXTEND AN ALREADY LONG DUTY DAY. WE HAD BEEN ON DUTY FOR 10.5 HOURS AT THIS POINT. I THINK THAT THE COMBINATION OF RUSHING, AND POOR VISIBILITY OF THE AIRPORT DIAGRAM CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ERROR. FATIGUE MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR ALTHOUGH WE DID HAVE 13 HOURS OF REST PRIOR TO THIS DUTY DAY.

Synopsis

BE40 FLT CREW HAS RWY INCURSION UPON MISREADING OF EFB ARPT DIAGRAM.

ACN: 726000

Time / Day

Date : 200701
Day : Sun
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : RQZ.VORTAC
State Reference : AL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 8000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : HSV.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Citation II S2/Bravo
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude
Route In Use.Departure : On Vectors

Aircraft : 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : HSV.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Gulfstream V
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Cruise : Enroute Altitude Change

Person : 1

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach
Function.Controller : Radar
Qualification.Controller : Developmental
Experience.Controller.Radar : 17.40
ASRS Report : 726000

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Critical
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation
Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : Conflict Alert
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Consequence.FAA : Investigated
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 6000
Miss Distance.Vertical : 200

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS HAVING A SKILL CHK BY MY SUPVR. I WAS WORKING ALL RADAR POS COMBINED (W RADAR, E RADAR, AND E/W ASSOCIATE POS). THE ONLY OTHER PERSON IN THE ROOM WAS ANOTHER SUPVR SITTING BEHIND THE SUPVR'S DESK. I HAD A COORD NIGHTMARE. I HAD TO COORDINATE WITH BIRMINGHAM APCH AND ZTL ALONG WITH WORKING OTHER AIRPLANES. I WAS WORKING A C550 THAT TURNED SEBOUND INTO ZTL'S AIRSPACE AND GOT TOO CLOSE WITH ANOTHER ACFT AT 8000 FT. IF THERE HAD BEEN ANOTHER PERSON DOING THE COORDINATING THEN THE INCIDENT MAY NOT HAVE HAPPENED. THE FACILITY IS SHORT STAFFED, THE CTLRS ARE TIRED, THERE IS LITTLE TO NO LEAVE AVAILABLE AND MGMNT ENJOYS SHOVING FAA POLICY DOWN OUR THROATS.

Synopsis

HSV TRACON CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 8000 WHEN ENTERING ADJACENT CENTER'S AIRSPACE DURING SKILLS CHECK.

ACN: 724269

Time / Day

Date : 200601
Day : Wed
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Weather Elements : Ice
Weather Elements : Snow
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Taxi
Make Model Name : Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Cargo Door

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 170
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2400
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 230
ASRS Report : 724269

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

I WAS AWOKEN FROM A SOUND SLEEP BY DISPATCH AND TOLD THAT I NEEDED TO REPOSITION ASAP TO ZZZ1 FROM ZZZ2 AS WX APPEARED TO BE GOING DOWN AT ZZZ1. GND ICING CONDITIONS WERE PRESENT AT ZZZ2 IN THE FORM OF SNOW (STICKING TO THE ACFT) AND FREEZING FOG. IT TOOK OVER AN HR TO PREPARE THE ACFT FOR FLT WHICH ADDED TO THE URGENCY TO GET OFF THE GND. I HAD TO GET INTO THE NOSE BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT TO ACCESS A BRUSH THAT'S USED IN THE DEICING PROCESS. I DIDN'T DO A WALKAROUND BEFORE STARTING THE ENGS FOR TAXI AND TKOF, WHICH RESULTED IN NOT CATCHING THE NOSE BAGGAGE DOOR STILL UNLATCHED. JUST AFTER TKOF, THE BAGGAGE DOOR CAME OPEN AND I REQUESTED FROM TWR TO COME AROUND AND LAND. I WAS ASKED IF I COULD DO SO IN VFR CONDITIONS TO WHICH I REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. (AT THE TIME, I TOOK THIS TO MEAN 'COULD I LAND VISUALLY?' WITHOUT LOSING SIGHT OF THE RWY.) I WAS CLRED TO MAKE L CLOSED TFC AND DID SO WITHOUT INCIDENT. I SUPPOSE I COULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER IF I'D BEEN DENIED TO MAKE CLOSED TFC DUE TO THE LOW VISIBILITY, BUT THE SITUATION WAS UNDER CTL AND I WAS BUSY ENOUGH KEEPING TRACK OF THE ARPT AND MY AIRSPD, ETC. IT WAS MY BEST JUDGEMENT TO NOT FLY OFF INTO THE CLOUDS AND MAKE AN APCH WITH THE BAGGAGE DOOR OPEN FOR FEAR OF WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN DURING THE FLT WITH THE DOOR OPEN AT THE HIGHER SPDS THAT MIGHT BE OBTAINED DURING MANEUVERING AND THE APCH, NOT TO MENTION THE DURATION OF THE FLT WITH THE DOOR OPEN. BEING IN A HURRY IN ANY AVIATION SITUATION CAN LEAD TO DANGEROUS PERFORMANCE AND CRITICAL ITEMS BEING OVERLOOKED AS WAS THE CASE HERE. A WALK AROUND THE PLANE WOULD HAVE CORRECTED THIS SITUATION. I WAS LUCKY IN THAT THE WX WAS NOT WORSE THAN IT WAS AND THAT THE C402 IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED IN FLT AT RELATIVELY LOW AIRSPDS WITH THE NOSE COMPARTMENT BAGGAGE DOOR OPEN. ON ANOTHER DAY, IN A DIFFERENT PLANE, THINGS MIGHT NOT HAVE TURNED OUT SO WELL.

Synopsis

FOLLOWING A HASTY PREFLT A C402 DEPARTED ONLY TO HAVE THE CARGO DOOR OPEN AFTER TKOF REQUIRING A CLOSE IN RETURN TO LAND.

ACN: 723793

Time / Day

Date : 200701

Day : Wed

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : POM.VORTAC

State Reference : CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 8000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SCT.TRACON

Operator.General Aviation : Corporate

Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude

Route In Use.Departure.SID : POMONA7

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC

Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 125

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10000

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3000

ASRS Report : 723793

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA

Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

MY ACFT X WAS CLRED FOR AN IFR TKOF FROM ONT, DEPARTING ON THE POMONA 7 DEP. THE DEP CALLS FOR A LEVELOFF AT 7000 FT AT THE POM VOR AND THEN A REQUIREMENT TO BE AT OR ABOVE 14000 FT AT BUCCK INTXN 10 MI FURTHER ON THE SID. MY ORIGINAL CLRNC WAS THE SID, MAINTAIN 14000 FT. I WROTE DOWN 14000 FT AND WAS THINKING OF THAT ALT WHEN I SET THE LEVELOFF ALT IN MY EFIS. I CONTINUED THROUGH THE 7000 FT RESTR, FORGETTING ABOUT THE 7000 FT SID REQUIREMENT. DEP CALLED AND ASKED ME ABOUT MY ALT. I TOLD HIM OF MY MISTAKE AND HE GAVE ME A NEW HDG. IT WAS AN EARLY MORNING DEP AT THE BEGINNING OF MY DAY AND EVEN THOUGH CREW REST WAS NOT A FACTOR AND I SHOULD HAVE HAD SUFFICIENT REST, I'M SURE THAT MY TIRED MIND WAS NOT THINKING ABOUT THE ISSUE PROPERLY. IN THE FUTURE, I REALIZE THAT I NEED TO AGAIN REVIEW THE SID AND MY EFIS SETTINGS PRIOR TO TKOF, AND MAKE SURE THAT I COMPLY WITH ALL SID ALTS. REGARDLESS OF MY CLRNC ON THE GND, I MUST MAKE SURE THAT MY EFIS SETUP COMPLIES WITH THE SID.

Synopsis

FLT CREW ON THE ONT.POM 7 CLBED ABOVE 7000 FT PRIOR TO THE POM 7000 FT RESTR.

ACN: 721633

Time / Day

Date : 200612
Day : Mon
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : GVO.VORTAC
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SBA.TRACON
Make Model Name : Beechjet 400
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6980
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1900
ASRS Report : 721633

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : MSAW
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolutive Action.Controller : Issued Alert
Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Resolutory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude
Resolutory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Original Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING DSCNT INTO SBA FROM THE N, WE WERE CLRED TO HABUT XC, WHICH IS 11.7 NM E OF THE ARPT. OUR FLT PATH TOOK US OVER IZA. WE MISTAKENLY IDENT THE BCN AT IZA AS SBA, AND WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH. AT ABOUT 3500 FT CTLR QUERIED US AND INFORMED US HIS MVA WAS 7000 FT. I BEGAN AN IMMEDIATE CLB, AND WITHIN 15 SECONDS ACQUIRED THE APCH LIGHTS FOR RWY 7 AT SBA. THE MAIN CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THIS BREAKDOWN IN JUDGEMENT WAS FATIGUE. OTHERS WERE DISTR FROM TRYING TO DOCUMENT AN INTERMITTENT PROB CAUSING VARIOUS TAWS RELATED ANNUNCIATORS TO COME ON THEN OFF, MY FAILURE TO MAINTAIN SPATIAL AWARENESS (IE, WE WERE FLYING TOWARD A POINT 11.7 NM E OF SBA NOT TOWARD THE ARPT, A WEAK SIC WHO ALSO DID NOT REGISTER THE MISTAKE, AND TENDED NOT TO 'SPEAK UP' WHEN SOMETHING DID NOT SEEM RIGHT. PRIMARILY THOUGH THIS WAS CAUSED BY FATIGUE LEADING TO MY POOR JUDGEMENT.

Synopsis

BE40 CREW BECOMES DISORIENTED ON VISUAL APCH TO SBA AND DSNDS BELOW MSA.

ACN: 720771

Time / Day

Date : 200612
Day : Thu
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Gulfstream 200 [G200] (IAI 1126 Galaxy)
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB5

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 70
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 26000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 500
ASRS Report : 720771

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 40
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6990
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 800
ASRS Report : 720770

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Chart.SID : TEB5

Narrative

WE WERE SCHEDULED FOR A XJ00 LOCAL DEP OUT OF TEB AFTER BEING UP SINCE XA00. THE PAX FINALLY ARRIVED AT XJ45 JUST IN TIME TO HIT 'RUSH HOUR' TRYING TO DEP TEB FOR ZZZ1. WHEN WE CALLED FOR ENG START WE WERE TOLD WE WOULD BE PLACED IN THE 'QUEUE.' AFTER 30 PLUS MINS OUR STARTUP CLRNC CAME THROUGH. AS WE TAXIED TO THE ACTIVE RWY (RWY 24) WE WERE ADVISED A 'STOP' WAS PLACED ON WESTBOUND DEPS. THIS RESULTED IN ANOTHER DELAY. AT XL00 LOCAL WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF ON THE TEB5 DEP, WHICH CALLS FOR A CLB TO 800 FT THEN A RIGHT TURN HDG 280 DEGS TO MAINTAIN 1500 FT. THIS IS WHAT THE CAPT BRIEFED PRIOR TO DEP. ALL WENT AS BRIEFED, HOWEVER, THE CAPT OVERSHOT 1500 FT. I SAID 1500 FT, 1500 FT SEVERAL TIMES AND HE CORRECTED FROM 1750 FT BACK DOWN TO 1500 FT. ZNY CAME ON AT THE SAME TIME AND SAID, 'ACR X, YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO BE LEVEL AT 1500 FT.' WE TOLD HIM WE HAD CORRECTED AND WERE, IN FACT, LEVEL AT 1500 FT. THAT WAS THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION WITH HIM AND WE WERE HANDED OFF TO THE NEXT CTLR. I BELIEVE THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED FOR 3 REASONS: 1) WE WERE WORN DOWN BY THE ROLLING DELAYS. 2) WE HAD BEEN UP ALL DAY PRIOR TO THE FLT, AND 3) THE CAPT HAD NOT FLOWN THIS ACFT AS PIC IN MORE THAN 2 MONTHS AND WAS SLOW TO PULL THE POWER BACK FOR LEVELOFF AT 1500 FT WHICH RESULTED IN THE OVERSHOOT. AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR WAS THE WT OF THE ACFT. WE GENERALLY LEAVE TEB WITH A FUEL LOAD OF FUEL FOR THE TRIP TO THE WEST COAST (WINDS PERMITTING). THIS FLT HAD A VERY LIGHT FUEL LOAD SINCE WE WERE STOPPING IN ZZZ, A ONE HOUR FLT.

Synopsis

A G200 DEPARTING ON THE TEB5 EXCEEDED THE INITIAL 1500 FT LEVELOFF ALT BY 250 FT THEN DSNDED BACK TO 1500 FT.

ACN: 719224

Time / Day

Date : 200612
Day : Fri
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : TNP.VORTAC
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 21000
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 22000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZLA.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Citation Excel
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Navigation In Use.Other.VORTAC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude
Route In Use.Departure.SID : KEPEC

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 300
ASRS Report : 719224

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 110
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8200
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 400
ASRS Report : 719889

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Intended or Assigned Course

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DEPARTED TRM VFR WITH XPONDER CODE ISSUED BY PALM SPRINGS APCH. FMS ORIGINALLY SET UP WITH FILED RTE 'DAG, KEPEC 1 LAS.' ONCE AIRBORNE ATC ISSUED 'DIRECT TNP THEN KEPEC 1 TO LAS.' MY FO ASSURED ME FMS WAS SET UP PROPERLY. UPON ARR AT TNP VOR ACFT MADE THE TURN TOWARDS DAG VOR. SHORTLY THEREAFTER ATC ASKED WHAT WAS OUR FILED RTE. FO READ BACK CLRNC TO ATC. SHE ASKED US TO TURN N AND THAT WE WERE OFF COURSE. I THEN REVIEWED THE FMS AND NOTICED IT WAS NOT PROPERLY PROGRAMMED. AS I WAS MAKING CHANGES TO THE FMS ATC CLRED US TO FL210. I DID NOT HEAR THE ALT CLRNC FROM ATC. ACCORDING TO MY FO, ATC ASSIGNED FL220, THEN CORRECTED HERSELF AND ASSIGNED FL210. MY FO HAD SET FL220, BUT DID NOT RESET ALT ALERTER TO FL210. ATC QUERIED US AS TO OUR ALT. THE FO SAID FL220. SHE STATED FL210 WAS ASSIGNED. WE DSNDED TO FL210. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. FATIGUE MAY HAVE PLAYED A PART. POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO PREVENT ANOTHER OCCURRENCE. 1) PUSH ATC FOR A FULL CLRNC PRIOR TO DEP. 2) PERSONALLY REVIEW ALL FMS INPUTS TO FMS BY FO. 3) FO SHOULD HAVE READ BACK ASSIGNED ALT FOR MY VERIFICATION.

Synopsis

A CE560XL DEVIATED FROM ASSIGNED TRACK BECAUSE OF IMPROPERLY PROGRAMMED FMC, AND CLBED THROUGH ASSIGNED ALT BECAUSE OF CREW ERROR.

ACN: 719003

Time / Day

Date : 200611
Day : Wed
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : C90.TRACON
State Reference : IL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : C90.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Sovereign
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : MDW4

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8200
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 200
ASRS Report : 719003

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 90
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 130
ASRS Report : 719004

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DEPARTING MDW ON MIDWAY 4 DEP, CREW PUT 4000 FT IN ALT WINDOW WHEN CLRNC HAD BEEN TO 3000 FT. WE CLBED TO 4000 FT AND WERE THEN INFORMED WE SHOULD BE AT 3000 FT BUT TO STAY AT 4000 FT. WE HAD AN XA30 SHOW THIS MORNING AND IT WAS MY 4TH BEFORE XC00 IN A ROW. I BELIEVE THE LOOP ERROR IN THE COCKPIT WAS CAUSED BY FATIGUE.

Synopsis

CITATION CE680 SOVEREIGN FLT CREW HAS AN ALTDEV DEPART MDW.

ACN: 718678

Time / Day

Date : 200612
Day : Fri
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Weather Elements : Rain
Weather Elements : Turbulence
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Citation Excel
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : Pilotage
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB 5

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 110
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10900
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 775
ASRS Report : 718678

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 125
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 300
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 750
ASRS Report : 718672

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON CLIMB OUT FROM TEB FLYING THE TEB 5 DEP THE FINAL CLIMB FROM 1500 FT MSL TO 2000 FT MSL WAS INITIATED EARLY. THE FMS WAS BEING UTILIZED AND THE AUTOPILOT WAS ENGAGED AT 400 FT. THE AIRCRAFT PROCEEDED ON THE DEP AS PUBLISHED TO 1500 FT MSL AND BEGAN THE RIGHT TURN TO A 280 DEG HEADING AS CALLED FOR BUT SHOULD HAVE LEVELED OFF AT 1500 FT TO THE 4.5 DME OF TEB BEFORE CLIMBING TO 2000 FT. INSTEAD OF HAVING SET THE INITIAL ALTITUDE OF 1500 FT AND THE RESETTING TO 2000 FT AT THE 4.5 NM FIX THE ALTITUDE PRESET WAS MISTAKENLY SET TO 2000 FT AT TAKEOFF THEREFORE THE AIRCRAFT CONTINUE THE CLIMB TO 2000 FT PRIOR TO THE 4.5 NM FIX. THE PNF DID NOT DETECT TO ERROR EITHER AND NO CALL OUT WAS MADE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WAS A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE CREW PRIOR TO TAKEOFF ABOUT PAX HANDLING CREATING A DISTRACTION FROM A PROPER TAKEOFF BRIEF. THE AIRCRAFT WAS FOURTH IN LINE BUT WAS GIVEN A CLRNC TO THE RWY FOLLOWED QUICKLY BY TAKEOFF CLRNC. IT WAS UNEXPECTED TO RECEIVE THE CLRNC SO QUICKLY AND THIS HELPED CREATE A HURRY UP SITUATION AND VOIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACCOMPLISH A FINAL REVIEW OF THE TAKEOFF PROC. IN ADDITION, FATIGUE WAS ALSO A FACTOR AS THE DAY BEFORE WAS A 13 HRS DUTY DAY PRECEDED BY A 12.5 HOUR DAY. FURTHERMORE, MUCH ATTENTION BY BOTH CREW MEMBERS IS BEING PAID TO THE AIRCRAFT BEING RELOCATED TO A NEW AIRPORT AND THE TASKS REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH IT. THE AIRCRAFT HAS FLOWN 400 HOURS YEAR-TO-DATE WHICH IS A VERY BUSY SCHEDULE FOR JUST TWO PILOTS.

Synopsis

A C560XL DEPARTING TEB ON THE TEB DEP CLBED BEFORE CHARTED POINT TO 2000 FT.

ACN: 718049

Time / Day

Date : 200611
Day : Tue
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : TAY.VORTAC
State Reference : FL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 35300

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Dusk

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZJX.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Citation Excel
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude

Aircraft : 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZJX.ARTCC
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 700
ASRS Report : 718049

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 90
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 250
ASRS Report : 718050

Person : 3

Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 4

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Critical
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : TCAS
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 4
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Precautionary Avoidance Action

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE CLRED TO FL370. UPON PASSING FL352, CTR SAID 'AMEND ALT, MAINTAIN FL350.' PF ARRESTED THE CLB AND BEGAN A DSCNT TO FL350 WHEN THE TCAS GAVE A TA CALL. TFC WAS AT 1:30 O'CLOCK POS, AND 2 MI. I ACQUIRED SAID TARGET VISUALLY AND READ BACK 'DSNDING TO FL350.' CTL REPLIED 'VERIFY YOU'RE LEVEL AT 350?' AND I EXPLAINED WE WERE TRYING, BUT HE HAD ORIGINALLY CLRED US TO 370 AND ONLY CHANGED IT TO 350 ONCE WE WERE AT FL352. HE REPLIED 'ROGER.' ABOUT 2 MINS LATER HE ASKED, 'ARE YOU IN THE TURN?' I RE-VERIFIED EVERYTHING AGAIN, FLT LEVEL, HDG, ETC. THE CTLR WAS NOTICEABLY CONFUSED, MISSED RADIO CALLS, GAVE US A BAD ALT. SOMETHING DID NOT SEEM RIGHT WITH THE CTLR. SOME OF HIS REPLIES, SOUNDED SLURRED LIKE HE MAY HAVE BEEN OVERLY TIRED OR SOMETHING.

Synopsis

LATE AMENDMENT OF CLRED ALT RESULTS IN LOSS OF SEPARATION BTWN C560 CLRED TO FL370 AND XING TFC AT FL360.

ACN: 717721

Time / Day

Date : 200611
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Intersection : EONNS
State Reference : FL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 20700

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZMA.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Learjet 35
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude

Aircraft : 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZMA.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B767-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude

Person : 1

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar
Qualification.Controller : Radar
Experience.Controller.Radar : 24
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 15.75
ASRS Report : 717721

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation
Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : Conflict Alert
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Consequence.FAA : Investigated

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING A VERY BUSY PERIOD OF HVY TFC, I WAS WORKING RADAR SECTORS 41/42 COMBINED FOR MORE THAN 2 HRS ON POS, WHICH INCLUDED METERING FOR FLL (N RWY) AND MULTIPLE ARRS FOR BOTH MIA AND FLL AND SATELLITE ARPTS. THE MAJORITY OF THE COMPLEX TFC WAS IN SECTOR 42 AND I DID NOT ASK FOR THE SECTOR TO BE SPLIT BECAUSE IT WAS ALREADY TOO BUSY TO DECOMBINE. THE ERROR OCCURRED IN SECTOR 41. MIAMI WAS OPERATING ON A W OP, WHICH ADDS TO THE COMPLEXITY AT BOTH JUNUR/FLIPR AND DEKAL. I WAS WORKING APPROX 16 ACFT AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. BOTH THE LJ35 AND THE B762 DEPARTED MIA ON THE EONNS TRANSITION AND CAME TO ME CLBING TO 16000 FT AT 6-7 MI APART AT COMPARABLE SPDS. I ISSUED CLB CLRNC TO BOTH ACFT TO FL230 AND OBSERVED DURING THEIR CLBS THAT THEY MAINTAINED THEIR SEPARATION AND WERE BOTH INDICATING AT 370-380 KTS GS. I WAS SATISFIED THEY WOULD REMAIN SEPARATED, AND THEN FOCUSED MY ATTN ON THE TFC IN SECTOR 42. AT THE TIME CONFLICT ALERT ACTIVATED, THE LJ35'S GS DROPPED TO 330 KTS, AND SEPARATION WAS LOST AT AROUND FL207. I IMMEDIATELY ISSUED A VECTOR TO THE B762 (HE WAS THE FOLLOWING ACFT) TO A HDG OF 090 DEGS AND STOPPED HIM AT FL220. DURING THE REPLAY ON THE FALCON SYS AT THE ZMA WATCH DESK, I SAW THE GND SPD OF THE LJ35 DECREASE BY ALMOST 50 KTS, AND CONFLICT ALERT DID NOT ACTIVATE UNTIL SEPARATION WAS ALREADY LOST. I FEEL THAT THE SECTOR WAS TOO BUSY TO REMAIN COMBINED, ALTHOUGH I DID NOT ASK FOR SECTOR 42 TO BE SPLIT BECAUSE IT WAS ALREADY TOO BUSY, I DID NOT ANTICIPATE THE RAPID DETERIORATION OF SEPARATION ON THE SUBJECT ACFT. AT NO TIME DURING MY MORE THAN 2 HRS ON POS DURING THIS HVY TFC DID THE SUPVR COME OVER TO ASSESS THE SITUATION, NOR EVALUATE THE TSD FOR POSSIBLE SECTOR DECOMBINATION. AT CTR IT IS TYPICAL FOR US TO BE VERY BUSY DURING THE HOLIDAY TFC PERIODS, AND AS USUAL, WE WERE SHORT STAFFED AND MOST CTRLRS ROUTINELY GO OVER 2 HRS ON POS. THIS CAN CAUSE FATIGUE VERY QUICKLY, AND THAT WAS THE SITUATION IN MY CASE. HAD THE SECTORS BEEN SPLIT IN A TIMELY MANNER, I WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FOCUS MY ATTN TO ALL AREAS OF MY SECTOR, AND I WOULD HAVE MOST LIKELY NOTICED THE DEVELOPING SITUATION IN TIME TO ENSURE SEPARATION.

Synopsis

ZMA CTRLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 20700 FT WHEN LEADING DEP ACFT SLOWED AND WAS OVERTAKEN BY A SUCCEEDING DEP ACFT.

ACN: 716043

Time / Day

Date : 200611
Day : Wed
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Navaid : BPK.VORTAC
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : EGLL.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Challenger CL604
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Route In Use.Departure.SID : DETLING

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Component : 2

Aircraft Component : Altimeter

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 210
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8750
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 975
ASRS Report : 716043

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : Foreign
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Speed Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DEPARTED EGGW. SID ASSIGNED WAS THE DETLING 4C. AS THE MONITORING PLT AND THE ONE WHO SET UP THE DEP I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE TURNS AND ALT RESTRS THAT WERE PUBLISHED. I DID SET THE ALT SELECTOR KNOB TO THE HIGHEST ALT ON THE SID, KNOWING THAT THERE WERE LOWER 'HARD' ALTS THAT NEEDED TO BE ADHERED TO. THE CAPT HAD REVIEWED THE DEP AND WAS FALSELY COMFORTABLE SINCE HE HAD BEEN IN AND OUT OF THE ARPT MANY TIMES. COMPANY OPS HAS THE CAPT OUT OF THE COCKPIT 30 MINS PRIOR GREETING AND MEETING PAX AND BASICALLY LEAVES THEM OUT OF THE LOOP FOR SETTING UP THE ENTIRE FLT, INCLUDING THE CLRNC (WITH EXCEPTION OF EUROPE). I FEEL THAT THIS IS A VERY LARGE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WITH THE ALT EXCURSION, SINCE HE WASN'T FAMILIAR WITH IT ENOUGH TO DISREGARD THE FLT DIRECTOR BARS AND JUST FLY THE DEP. DURING TAXI OUT THE 'FLT INSTS/NAV' WAS BRIEFED, BUT WHAT HE MISSED IN HIS SCAN WAS THE NEEDLE ON HIS HSI THAT WAS MISSING. THERE WAS NOTHING THERE, NO WHITE NEEDLE FOR THE FMS, NOR GREEN FOR VOR, OR YELLOW FOR X-SIDE REF, NOTHING. TO ADD TO CONFUSION, HIS RADAR WAS PAINTING A HORRIBLE BRIGHT RED AND YELLOW PICTURE FROM THE ACFT POS OUT OVER 50% OF THE SCREEN. THE DISTANCE SELECTED WAS NOT USEABLE FOR DEP, I THINK, 25 NM, WHICH MADE IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO READ THE INFO ON THE SCREEN. THE CAPT IS ALSO THE DIRECTOR OF AVIATION WHO HAS TENS OF THOUSANDS OF HRS AND WAS GIVING ME THE EUROPE CHK OUT. HE FREQUENTLY UNDER-UTILIZES THE RESOURCES IN THE FMS, AND HAS HIS SCREENS SET OUT OF RANGE FOR ARRS AND DEPS, AS WELL AS LOOKS THROUGH A LOT OF NONSENSE WITH THE RADAR. THE RED AND YELLOW HE WAS PAINTING THIS NIGHT, ALL GND CLUTTER. NO NEED FOR RADAR. AFTER TKOF WHEN HE WENT TO ARM THE NAV MODE OF THE FMS AND FLY THE BARS, IT DIDN'T FOLLOW ANYTHING. IT STAYED ON HDG MODE. HE BEGAN TO PANIC AS HE CLBED RAPIDLY THROUGH 3000 FT. I SAID HE NEEDED TO STOP AT 4000 FT UNTIL PASSING BPK VOR. AT THIS POINT, THE FLYING HAS DETERIORATED, WITH BANK ANGLES OF 45 DEGS AT ONE POINT, AIRSPD FLUCTUATIONS IN EXCESS OF 40 KTS. I COULD SEE IT ALL SO CLR ON MY SIDE, AND YET HE COULDN'T PROCESS OR SEE THROUGH THE 'JUNK' TO INTERPRET ANYTHING. AS WE LEVELED AT 5000 FT, CONFUSED AND EXTREMELY FRUSTRATED (AN ICE LIGHT CHIMED AS WELL), ATC STARTED GIVING US HDG AND RECLRED US TO 4000 FT. I DID EXACERBATE THE PROB BY GOING TO FLT LEVEL TOO EARLY ON THE CLB. THE APPROPRIATE TRANSITION LEVEL WAS 6000 FT, AND I HIT THE 29.92 AROUND 4500 FT. AFTER MUCH CONFUSION AND TENSION IN THE COCKPIT, WE LEVELED AT THE REQUESTED ALT ASSIGNED BY ATC. THE CTLING SECTOR DID ASK US WHY WE HAD CONTINUED TO CLB WHEN IT WAS DEPICTED 4000 FT FOR SEVERAL MI AND THEN A CLB TO 5000 FT,

AND TO VERIFY WE HAD THE SID. WE DIDN'T EXPLAIN NOR MAKE ANY FURTHER COMMENT REGARDING THE DEP. I LEARNED A LOT! VIGILANCE, VIGILANCE! EVEN AFTER MANY TIME ZONE CHANGES, LENGTHY DUTY DAYS AND JUST BEING TIRED, YOU MUST RISE TO THE OCCASION AND DO IT RIGHT EVERY TIME! I WON'T LET A PF DEPART WITH INFO THAT IS USELESS OR DISTRACTING. IT MUST BE PERTINENT AND HELPFUL OTHERWISE IT'S NO GOOD AND CAN ACTUALLY MAKE THINGS MUCH WORSE. I WILL ALSO BE SURE THAT HE OR SHE IS VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE DEP AND CAN RECITE THE CRITICAL AREAS THAT THEY SHOULD REMEMBER IN THE EVENT THE FMS NAV BARS DON'T WORK.

Synopsis

FLT CREW OF CL60 EXPERIENCE ALTDEV ON SID FROM EGGW.

ACN: 715542

Time / Day

Date : 200611
Day : Wed
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DDC.Airport
State Reference : KS
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 30000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZKC.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Citation V
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 120
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 17000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1800
ASRS Report : 715542

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 50
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1000
ASRS Report : 715543

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Undershoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE IN CRUISE FLT AT FL300 WE WERE ASKED TO VERIFY LEVEL AT FL300. AS I CHKED BOTH ALTIMETERS THE PNF RESPONDED THAT WE WERE LEVEL AT FL300. INSTANTLY IT CAUGHT MY ATTN THAT WE FORGOT TO SET OUR ALTIMETERS TO 29.92 AT TRANSITION ALT FL180. I IMMEDIATELY TOOK ACTION TO SET MY ALTIMETER TO STANDARD AND CLBED THE 400 FT TO FL300. THE PNF PROCEEDED TO SET HIS ALTIMETER AND CALLED ZKC BACK TO RELAY WHAT WE HAD DONE AND THAT WE WERE CORRECTING. SHE RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NOT A PROB. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO US MISSING OUR ALTIMETER SETTING WERE: 1) WE WERE IN THE 10TH HR OF A LONG DAY OF FLYING. FATIGUE WAS PLAYING A FACTOR. 2) ALSO LACK OF FINISHING THE CLB CHKLIST WHICH PROMPTS US TO SET ALTIMETERS AT FL180. AFTER THE PNF AND I DISCUSSED WHAT WE DID WRONG AND THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO IT, WE CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT NO MATTER HOW LONG THE DAY HAD BEEN, WE NEED TO BE DILIGENT IN USING THE CHKLIST WHICH WOULD HAVE KEPT US FROM MAKING THIS MISTAKE.

Synopsis

A CE560 FLT CREW MISSED SETTING 29.92 CLBING THROUGH FL180. WHEN THEY LEVELED AT CRUISE ALT, ATC ADVISED THEY WERE 400 FT LOW.

ACN: 715134

Time / Day

Date : 200610
Day : Wed
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LAS.Airport
State Reference : NV
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : LAS.Tower
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Learjet 45
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 80
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5640
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1160
ASRS Report : 715134

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Technician : Airframe
Qualification.Technician : Powerplant
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 65
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 16000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1200
ASRS Report : 715135

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Ground

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Less Severe
Anomaly.Incursion : Runway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolutive Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : FAA
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Airport.Markings : LAS.Airport
Chart.Airport : LAS.Airport

Narrative

WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI FROM FBO TO RWY 1L VIA TXWY H AND TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 7L. THE NIGHT WAS VERY DARK BUT CLR. AS WE APCHED TXWY B, I COMMENTED TO THE COPLT THAT I COULD NOT SEE A HOLD LINE AND WOULD STOP OPPOSITE THE TXWY B SIGN. THIS WAS AN AREA WHERE THE THRESHOLDS OF RWY 7L AND 1L CAME TOGETHER. THE COPLT CONTACTED THE TWR WHO THEN CLRED US TO CROSS RWY 7L AND TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1L. THIS AREA OF THE ARPT WAS ALSO VERY DARK AND THE TXWY LINES WERE FADED AND DIFFICULT TO SEE. I TAXIED ON THE GREEN LIGHTED TXWY CTRLINE THAT I THOUGHT LED TO RWY 1L. THE COPLT, WHO HAD THE TAXI CHART IN HAND, WAS HELPING ME WITH DIRECTIONS AND SEEMED OK WITH THIS ACTION. AS I MADE THE LEFT TURN ALONG THE CTRLINE, I REALIZED THAT I TURNED ONTO RWY 7L. I IMMEDIATELY TURNED BACK TO THE RIGHT TO GET OFF THE RWY AND TO WHAT I THOUGHT TO BE THE TXWY TOWARD RWY 1L. I HEARD THE TWR ISSUE A GO AROUND TO AN ACFT ON FINAL FOR RWY 1L AND I IMMEDIATELY STOPPED AND TOLD THE COPLT TO TELL THE TWR WE WERE NOT SURE WHERE WE WERE AND TO ASK FOR DIRECTIONS. I NEVER DID SEE A HOLD SHORT LINE FOR ANY RWY. APPARENTLY, WE ENDED UP BETWEEN RWY 1L EDGE LINE AND THE HOLD SHORT LINE WHEN I MADE THE RIGHT TURN AWAY FROM RWY 7L BACK TO RWY 1L. WE WERE BOTH CONFUSED AT THIS POINT AS TO HOW WE GOT TO WHERE WE WERE AND WHERE TO GO NEXT. TWR THEN TOLD US TO FLASH OUR TAXI LIGHTS. HE THEN ISSUED CLRNC TO TAXI STRAIGHT AHEAD TO RWY 1R AND PUT US IN POSITION AND HOLD ON RWY 1R. WE NOW HAD OUR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS BACK AND EVERYTHING PROCEEDED NORMALLY FROM HERE ON. I ALWAYS CARRY AND REVIEW GOV TAXI CHART FOR EACH ARPT I FLY INTO. I DOWNLOAD THESE FROM THE WEB PRIOR TO EACH FLT SO THAT I HAVE AN UP-TO-DATE CHART. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS VERY LITTLE DETAIL ON THE CHART FOR THE LAS TAXI AREA FOR RWY 7L AND RWY 1L. AFTER THIS INCIDENT, I ALSO REVIEWED THE LAS CHART THAT COMMERCIAL CHART COMPANY PROVIDES. WHILE IT ALSO SHOWS LITTLE DETAIL OF THE TAXI AREA FOR RWY 7L AND RWY 1L, IT DOES, HOWEVER, IDENTIFY THIS AREA AS A RWY INCURSION 'HOT SPOT.' THE GOV CHART DOES NOT HAVE THIS FEATURE. SUPPLEMENTAL

INFO FROM ACN 715135: IT WAS DAY 4 OF A VERY LONG DUTY DAY. IT WAS NIGHT, BUT WX WAS NOT A FACTOR. NEITHER PLT HAD EVER FLOWN TO LAS BEFORE. AS PNF, I WAS RUNNING THE RADIOS. UPON THE CALL TO GND CTL WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 1L, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 7L. AS WE DEPARTED THE FBO RAMP, THE CAPT COMMENTED THAT THE TXWY CTRLINE WAS FADED. WE PROCEEDED S ON TXWY H AND HELD JUST BEYOND TXWY B. AFTER A FEW MINUTES OF HOLDING, I CALLED GND TO ADVISE, 'HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 7L.' THE CTRLR TOLD US TO SWITCH TO TWR. AFTER CALLING TWR, HE INSTRUCTED US TO, 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 7L.' THIS WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY ME. WE DID NOT MOVE AT THAT POINT. A VERY SHORT TIME LATER (APPROX 20 SECONDS), HE CALLED US AND TOLD US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1L. THIS WAS ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED. AS WE STARTED TO MOVE, I GLANCED DOWN AT THE TAXI CHART. WHEN I LOOKED BACK OUT, I WAS MOMENTARILY DISORIENTED BUT THE CAPT AND I SIMULTANEOUSLY REALIZED WE WERE LINED UP WITH RWY 7L. I SUGGESTED A HARD RIGHT TURN TO GET BACK OVER TO RWY 1L. AT ABOUT THIS TIME THE CTRLR ORDERED AN AIR CARRIER TO GO AROUND. THE CAPT DID MAKE A HARD RIGHT TURN TO MANEUVER BACK OVER TO RWY 1L. HE TAXIED SLOWLY LOOKING FOR THE HOLD SHORT LINE. NEITHER OF US EVER SAW ANY HOLD SHORT MARKINGS FOR EITHER RWY. AS WE APPROACHED THE RWY EDGE LINE FOR RWY 1L, I ADVISED THE CAPT TO STOP. TWR CALLED US BEFORE WE COULD CALL HIM AND HE INSTRUCTED US TO EXPEDITE ACROSS RWY 1L AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1R. WE COMPLIED, AND AFTER A PERIOD OF TIME WE WERE CLRED TO DEPART RWY 1R. CONCLUSIONS: IF I HAD TO DO IT ALL OVER AGAIN, I WOULD REQUEST A RWY 1L AT TXWY B DEPARTURE AND NOT DEAL WITH THE POORLY MARKED CORNER OF THE AIRFIELD. CREW FATIGUE WAS PROBABLY A FACTOR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 715134 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE INTXN IS EXTREMELY CONFUSING AND THEY NEVER DID SEE THE HOLD LINE.

Synopsis

LEAR 45 CREW RPTS PROBS WITH RWY HOLD SHORT MARKINGS AT LAS RWY 1L/7L JUNCTION.

ACN: 714672

Time / Day

Date : 200610
Day : Thu
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : BOS.Airport
State Reference : MA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 1000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : A90.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Falcon 20FJF/20C/20D/20E/20F
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : WYLYY.5

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 80
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 700
ASRS Report : 714672

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON A DEADHEAD LEG BACK TO BASE WITH THE FO IN THE L SEAT, WE FLEW RWY HDG OFF OF RWY 27 ON THE WYLYY 5 RNAV DEP THAT CALLS FOR A L TURN SWBOUND TOWARDS THE FIRST FIX. THE END OF A LONG DAY, A SEAT SWAP, AND NIGHTTIME CONDITIONS WITH THE CAPT RUNNING AFTER TKOF CHKLISTS, RESULTED IN BEING QUERIED BY BOS DEP CTL OF OUR HDG. UPON REALIZING WE NEGLECTED TO FOLLOW THE SID, WE NOTIFIED THE CTRLR OF OUR 270 DEG HDG AND WERE GIVEN ALTERNATE VECTORS AND COMPLIED. OUR PART 135 OP ARE NOT APPROVED FOR RNAV SIDS AND STARS. OUR FIRST MISTAKE WAS ACCEPTING THE SID, EVEN AS A 91 REPOS. OUR NON COMPLIANCE WOULD HAVE BEEN ALLEVIATED HAD BOTH PLTS BEEN ATTENTIVE TO THE IMPROPER FLT PATH AS WELL AS THE SELECTION OF THE FMS AS GUIDANCE BY THE PF. A MORE IN DEPTH BRIEFING OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN RNAV DEP AND STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH COMPANY SOP'S WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE.

Synopsis

A FALCON 20 ON WYLYY DEP FROM BOS DEVIATE FROM THE CHARTED TRACK.

ACN: 713679

Time / Day

Date : 200610
Day : Fri
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LAS.Airport
State Reference : NV
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 10000
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 19000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : L30.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Learjet 60
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude
Route In Use.Departure.SID : BOACH2

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 162
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 162
ASRS Report : 713679

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE TOOK OFF FROM LAS ON RWY 19R AT XA43Z. THE FO WAS THE PF AND THE CLRNC WAS TO FLY THE BOACH TWO RNAV DEP. THE FO WAS HAND FLYING THE ACFT ON THE RNAV DEP USING THE FLT DIRECTOR. AS THIS WAS A POS LEG WITHOUT PAX HE WAS CLBING AT A RAPID RATE OF APPROX 4000-6000 FPM. AFTER I COMPLETED THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST I NOTICED THAT WE APPEARED TO BE SLIGHTLY OFF COURSE. I MENTIONED THIS TO THE FO AND HE BEGAN TO CORRECT TOWARD THE PROPER COURSE. WE WERE BOTH PUZZLED AS TO THE REASON FOR THE COURSE DEV BECAUSE THE RNAV DEP WAS CORRECTLY DISPLAYED ON BOTH OUR PFD'S. BEFORE WE WERE ABLE TO CONTINUE ANALYZING THE CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND OUR DEV THE DEP CTLR CALLED AND SAID THAT WE WERE NOT ON THE RNAV DEP. I STATED THAT WE HAD GONE OFF THE COURSE BUT THAT WE WERE CORRECTING TO GET BACK ON IT. THE CTLR THEN GAVE US DIRECTIONS TO FLY OUR PRESENT HDG TO INTERCEPT AND TRACK INBOUND ON THE 213 DEG RADIAL TO HEC. WE WERE THEN IMMEDIATELY PASSED ON TO ANOTHER FREQ. DUE TO THE NEW CLRNC AND ITS ASSOCIATED WORKLOAD ALONG WITH THE RAPID HDGF WE WERE UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE EXACT REASON FOR OUR DEV. I BELIEVE THIS ALL OCCURRED BTWN THE ROPPR-RODDD FIXES ON THE DEP. I ESTIMATE WE STRAYED OFF COURSE 2-4 NM. POSSIBLE CAUSES/CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR MALFUNCTION -- LATER IN THE FLT WHILE ON DSCNT WITH THE AUTOPLT FLYING WE INEXPLICABLY BEGAN TO CLB. AS WE WERE ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AUTOPLT PROB EARLIER WE WERE BOTH CLOSELY MONITORING OUR FLT PATH AND THE FO IMMEDIATELY BEGAN HAND FLYING THE ACFT. AFTER DSCNT WAS AGAIN STABILIZED THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED AND NO OTHER PROBS WERE NOTED. 2) LEAR 60 FLT DIRECTOR OP -- BECAUSE OUR LR60 NORMALLY OPERATES WITH A 'SPLIT' FMS AND FLT DIRECTOR IT IS DIFFICULT TO QUICKLY DETERMINE WHAT COURSE THE OTHER PLT'S FLT DIRECTOR IS FOLLOWING. EACH PLT HAS AN INDIVIDUAL FLT CTL PANEL WHERE THEY MAY CHOOSE DIFFERENT FLT DIRECTOR INPUTS. ALTHOUGH SOP IS TO HAVE BOTH FLT DIRECTORS MATCH, DURING A HIGH WORKLOAD PERIOD THIS IS NOT ALWAYS POSSIBLE. 3) AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR SELECTED TO HDG NOT NAV MODE -- THE FO MAY HAVE INADVERTENTLY SELECTED HDG ON THE FCP WHILE I WAS COMPLETING THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST AND COMMUNICATING ON THE RADIO. THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT FOR ME TO SEE IMMEDIATELY SINCE MY FLT DIRECTOR WAS IN NAV MODE. WHEN WE REALIZED THAT WE HAD DEVIATED FROM COURSE THE AUTOPLT WAS IMMEDIATELY DISCONNECTED AND THE FO BEGAN PUSHING VARIOUS BUTTONS ON THE FCP IN AN EFFORT TO RESELECT THE RNAV DEP. I WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHAT THE EXACT AUTOPLT/FLT DIRECTOR CONFIGN WAS ON HIS SIDE AT THE TIME OF OUR DEV. 4) FATIGUE -- BOTH THE FO AND I HAD BEEN ON MINIMUM REST THE PREVIOUS NIGHT. WE ALSO ENCOUNTERED NUMEROUS PROBS BEFORE BEGINNING OUR SEQUENCE OF TRIPS IN THE MORNING (GND TRANSPORTATION FAILED TO SHOW, 2 BROKEN

GPU'S, DIFFICULTY STARTING ACFT). OUR TRIP FROM LAS WAS THE 3RD AND FINAL LEG OF THE DAY. I BELIEVE ALL THESE FACTORS MAY HAVE COMPOUNDED OUR FATIGUE AND DIMINISHED OUR CONCENTRATION AND LED TO A STATE OF COMPLACENCY LATER IN THE DAY. WE CLRLY DID NOT MONITOR THE ACFT FLT PATH AS CLOSELY AS WE SHOULD HAVE.

Synopsis

LEAR 60 CREW GOES OFF COURSE ON THE BOACH DEP DEPARTING LAS.

ACN: 713552

Time / Day

Date : 200610
Day : Fri
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : TEB.Airport
State Reference : NJ
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 1500
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 1800

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : BAe 125 Series 800
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : TEB

Aircraft : 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 120
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15800
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 5500
ASRS Report : 713552

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 45
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7100

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1200
ASRS Report : 713550

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Person : 4

Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : TCAS
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude
Miss Distance.Vertical : 1000

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE DEPARTING TEB AT THE START OF RUSH HOUR ON RWY 24 ASSIGNED THE TEB 5 DEP. THE TEXTUAL DESCRIPTION SAYS TO FLY RWY HEADING UNTIL REACHING 1500 FT THEN FLY HEADING 280. MAINTAIN 1500 FT UNTIL 4.5 DME FROM TEB THEN CLB TO 2000 FT. WE HAD AMPLE TIME TO DISCUSS THE DEP SINCE WE WERE ABOUT NUMBER 7 FOR DEP AND ELECTED TO SET 2000 FT IN THE ALT ALERTER. TKOF WAS NORMAL WITH A NOISE ABATEMENT CLB EXECUTED. JUST AFTER GEAR AND FLAPS WERE RETRACTED, CLBING THROUGH ABOUT 1000 FT, WE GOT A TFC ALERT FROM THE TCAS. BOTH CREWMEMBERS LOOKED OUTSIDE FOR THE TFC. I MADE THE HEADING CHANGE TO 280 DEGS, BUT DID NOT LEVEL AT 1500 FT DUE TO THE TFC DISTRACTION. I NOTICED MY ERROR AT 1800 FT AND PUSHED OVER TO DESCEND JUST AS DEP CTL CALLED TO TELL US TO WATCH OUR ALT. WE LEVELED AT 1500 FT AND RESUMED THE DEP AS REQUESTED. I WAS GIVEN A TELEPHONE NUMBER TO CALL UPON ARR AT DEST. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) HIGH TFC, HIGH WORKLOAD ENVIRONMENT. THIS DEP REQUIRES A NOISE ABATEMENT CLB WITH A TURN AND LEVEL OFF AT 1500 FT MSL. 2) PART TIME FO WHOM I FLY WITH ON A SPORADIC BASIS. 3) WE HAD EXPERIENCED A RESOLUTION ADVISORY (RA) FROM THE TCAS ON THE ARR 3 HOURS EARLIER AND HAD TAKEN EVASIVE ACTION TO AVOID A COLLISION WITH AN ACFT ATC WAS NOT TALKING TO. WE WERE 'SPRING LOADED' TO TCAS ALERTS FROM THE CLOSE CALL A FEW HOURS EARLIER. BOTH OF US SHOULD NOT HAVE LOOKED OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT AT THE SAME TIME DURING THIS HIGH WORKLOAD PHASE OF FLT. THE INITIAL ALT OF 1500 FT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET IN THE ALT ALERTER INSTEAD OF 2000 FT. BOTH CREW MEMBERS

SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE DILIGENT IN ALT MONITORING. WE WERE NOT FATIGUED FROM A LONG DAY, BUT HAD BEEN IN A HIGH STRESS, HIGH WORKLOAD ENVIRONMENT ALL DAY HAVING COME FROM THE WASHINGTON, DC, AREA TO THE NEW YORK AREA.

Synopsis

A HAWKER HS125 DEPARTING TEB ON THE TEB DEP FAILED TO LEVEL OFF AT THE CHARTED 1500 FT RESTR, CLBING TO 1800 FT, AT LEAST PARTLY BECAUSE OF A TCAS TA.

ACN: 713390

Time / Day

Date : 200610
Day : Mon
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 34000

Environment

Flight Conditions : Mixed
Weather Elements : Ice
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter
Make Model Name : Learjet 35
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Powerplant Lubrication System

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 110
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6285
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4600
ASRS Report : 713390

Person : 2

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 4

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : Low Oil Pressure Light
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Landed In Emergency Condition
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

ON OCT/XA/06, I WAS PIC OF A LEARJET 35 ON A ROUTINE FAR 135 CHARTER. THIS FLT ORIGINATED AND WAS SUPPOSED TO END IN ZZZ1, WITH A LAYOVER IN ZZZ2. ALTHOUGH WE LEFT ZZZ1 AT XA00L AND ZZZ2 AT XP45L ON THE SAME DAY, BOTH THE SIC AND I COMPLETED THE NECESSARY 10 HRS REST PERIOD IN A HOTEL BTWN FLTS. THE PROB OUR FLT INCURRED DID NOT HAPPEN UNTIL REACHING FL340 WHILE CLBING ENRTE BACK TO ZZZ1 (ABOUT XQ15L). UPON CLBING THROUGH FL340, I NOTICED A LOW OIL PRESSURE LIGHT FOR THE L ENG. I THEN LOOKED OVER TO THE ASSOCIATED ENG GAUGES AND ALL THREE LOOKED NORMAL. NO INCREASE IN ITT, N1, OR N2. I THEN LOOKED OVER TO THE L ENG OIL PRESSURE GAUGE AND SAW IT SLOWLY DECREASING. LOOKING TOWARDS THE SIC, I ASKED HIM TO PULL OUT THE CHKLIST FOR THE LOW OIL PRESSURE LIGHT, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY PULLING THE L ENG THROTTLE TO IDLE. AT THE TIME, WE WERE FLYING IN HIGH LEVEL ICING CONDITIONS WITH NACELLE, WING, AND STABILIZER ANTI-ICING DEVICES ON. I THEN ASKED ATC TO LEVEL AT FL350, BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT FL360 WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE. AFTER COMPLETING THE SHORT CHKLIST, THE SIC HANDED ME THE CHKLIST AS I WANTED TO CONFIRM ITS COMPLETION. BY THIS TIME, OUR ACFT WAS STABLE AND LEVEL AT FL360. I SHUT DOWN THE L ENG AS THE CHKLIST CALLED FOR, TRYING TO PREVENT ANY ACFT DAMAGE THAT COULD HAVE FOLLOWED. I THEN ASKED ATC TO DSND AND INFORMED HIM OF THE SITUATION. I DID DECLARE AN EMER AND I SOON AFTER ASKED ATC IF HE COULD SUGGEST AN ARPT NEARBY WITH A RELATIVELY LONG RWY AND GOOD WX. HE CAME BACK WITH ZZZ. I SAID FINE AND ATC GAVE US CLRNC TO FLY DIRECTLY TO ZZZ. DURING OUR DSCNT TO ZZZ, WE COMPLETED SEVERAL MORE CHKLISTS, INCLUDING ABNORMAL SINGLE-ENG LNDG. AS PIC, I ALSO DECIDED THAT ZZZ WAS NOT THE BEST PLACE FOR US TO DIVERT. 1) IT WAS AN AIR FORCE BASE. 2) ATC INFORMED US THAT THE CEILINGS WERE 1500 FT OVCST. 3) I WAS UNSURE THE LOCATION COULD ACCOMMODATE ANY MAINT FOR THE ACFT. AND 4) OUR PAX WOULD NOT HAVE AN IDEAL WAY TO CONTINUE THEIR TRIP HOME FROM ZZZ, I CHOSE TO DIVERT TO ZZZ3, HAVING PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE OF ITS CHARACTERISTICS AND DEEMING IT A SAFE PLACE TO LAND. WE COMPLETED OUR APCH AND LNDG INTO ZZZ3, WITHOUT ANY PROBS, EXCEPT FOR OUR INABILITY TO TURN ON THE RWY LIGHTS USING THE PLT CTLED LIGHTING. IT TOOK OVER 10 'CLICKS' TO ACTIVATE THE LIGHTS. HAVING SPENT THE BETTER HALF OF THE DAY TRYING TO REST FOR OUR LATE TRIP BACK TO ZZZ1, I FOUND THAT BOTH OUR EARLY AND LATE HRS DURING THE TRIP WAS STILL A FACTOR IN MY DECISION MAKING ABILITIES. MY PERFORMANCE IN SHUTTING DOWN THE

ENG COULD HAVE BEEN EXPEDITED. OUR DECISION TO LAND AT AN ARPT WITHOUT AN OPEN TWR COULD BE QUESTIONED. I CAN ONLY SAY THAT I DEALT WITH THE SITUATION AS CALMLY AS POSSIBLE, TAKING FULL USE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE AREA AND TRYING TO PREVENT A POSSIBLE ACCIDENT. I DID NOT KNOW FOR SURE WHAT OTHER PROBS COULD HAVE OCCURRED IN RELATION TO THE LOW OIL PRESSURE IN THE L ENG. LACK OF OIL WAS AN OBVIOUS REASON, BUT COULD IT HAVE BEEN SOMETHING ELSE. COULD OUR PREFLT HAVE MISSED SOMETHING? THIS WAS MY REASONING FOR NOT LOOKING LONGER FOR A MORE SUITABLE ARPT. I CAN SAY THIS EXPERIENCE CHANGED THE WAY I LOOK AT AVIATION, SINCE IT WAS MY FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH A POTENTIALLY FATAL SITUATION. ALL MY TRAINING, WHETHER IT BE IN AN ACTUAL ACFT OR A SIMULATOR, DID PREPARE ME FOR THIS SITUATION. HOWEVER, ONE'S PHYSICAL CONDITION ALWAYS HAVE A TREMENDOUS EFFECT.

Synopsis

A LR35 CAPT RPTS DECLARING AN EMER AND DIVERTING TO A NEARBY ARPT FOLLOWING A LOW OIL PRESSURE WARNING. FATIGUE PLAYED A PART.

ACN: 713094

Time / Day

Date : 200610
Day : Fri
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Taxi
Make Model Name : Beech 1900
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Landing : Roll

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 195
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6075
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 275
ASRS Report : 713094

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Excursion : Runway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted
Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WITH THE ARPT IN SIGHT WE CANCELED IFR AND THE CAPT CHOSE A STRAIGHT-IN LNDG. WINDS WERE RPTED AT 180 DEGS 5 KTS SCATTERED, CLR CONDITIONS. SLIGHTLY HIGH ON A 2 MI FINAL WE WERE VREF +15 KTS AND CROSSED OVER THE NUMBERS AT VREF +10 KTS. VREF SPDS WERE CALLED OUT THROUGHOUT THE APCH. WE EXCESSIVELY FLOATED OVER THE RWY AT WHICH TIME I CALLED OUT THAT WE WERE TOO LONG. THE CAPT SAID I KNOW AND PROCEEDED TO LAND THE AIRPLANE. HE APPLIED REVERSE IMMEDIATELY AND AS I SAW THE END OF THE RWY APCHING I GOT ON THE BRAKES AS WELL WITH MAX BRAKING. WE CAME TO A STOP AT THE VERY END OF RWY AND TOOK OUT A LIGHT AT THE END OF RWY. AFTER TAXIING IN TO THE TERMINAL AND OPENING THE DOOR WE REALIZED WE HAD A PROP STRIKE BELIEVED TO BE FROM THE LIGHT. PAX WERE ALL FINE, NO COMPLAINTS AND PROBABLY DID NOT REALIZE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION. I BELIEVE THIS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY BEING ON VREF OVER THE NUMBERS AND GETTING IT DOWN OVER THE RWY PWR IDLE AND TOUCHING DOWN. LOOKING BACK, I COULD HAVE BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE THROUGHOUT THE APCH. THE CAPT HAD 1200+ HRS IN TYPE. WE HAD FLOWN 2 DAYS TOGETHER WITHOUT A PROB. POOR JUDGEMENT AND A BAD DECISION TO LAND THE AIRPLANE BY THE CAPT MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED SOMEWHAT BY FATIGUE. THIS WAS OUR 5TH LEG APCHING A 10 HR DUTY DAY. IT WAS JUST AFTER XA00 AND FELT LATER. PERCEPTIONS, JUDGEMENTS, AND DECISION I BELIEVE CAN ALL BE AFFECTED AT NIGHT (OR ANY TIME) AFTER A LONG DAY.

Synopsis

BE1900 CREW LANDS LONG AND PROP STRIKES A LIGHT AT THE END OF RWY.

ACN: 712627

Time / Day

Date : 200609
Day : Mon
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : HNL.Airport
State Reference : HI
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : HNL.Tower
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 178.6
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 12500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 520
ASRS Report : 712627

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Combined Local

Events

Anomaly.Incursion : Runway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolutive Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolutive Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE TRIP ON WHICH THE PROB AROSE WAS A CPR TRIP TO HNL. PRIOR TO LNDG IN HNL, WE RECEIVED THE CURRENT ATIS AND DID A COMPLETE BRIEF ON THE TYPE OF APCH, LNDG RWY AND THE LOCATION OF THE FBO. THE FO WAS A NEW HIRE BUT WITH APPROX 7000 HRS AND 5000 HRS JET EXPERIENCE. AND EXPERIENCE AT THIS ARPT. I HAD BRIEFED THAT WE WOULD LAND RWY 4R AND THAT IT WOULD BE A L TURN OFF THE RWY FOR THE FBO. THE FO DID NOT DISAGREE NOR DID HE ADD ANYTHING TO THE BRIEFING. THE PROPER EXIT WOULD HAVE BEEN TO THE R (S) AND NOT THE L. ALL APCH PLATES WERE READY ON OUR ELECTRONIC FLT BAGS. AFTER LNDG RWY 4R I EXITED TO THE L (N) AS BRIEFED. THE ATC CTLR THEN INFORMED US WE SHOULD HAVE TURNED R AND GAVE US A LENGTHY TAXI CLRNC TO THE FBO ALL THE WAY TO DEST. MY FO REPLIED, 'ROGER' AND DID NOT GIVE A COMPLETE READBACK OF THE TAXI CLRNC. I QUERIED IF HE GAVE A READBACK AND HE SAID NO. THE CTLR WAS WORKING BOTH GND AND TWR FREQS AND SEEMED TOO BUSY FOR FURTHER QUESTIONS OR A PROGRESSIVE AS I WOULD HAVE LIKED AS WE WERE TIRED AT THE TIME ALSO. I BEGAN TO TAXI AS WHAT I BELIEVED WAS THE CORRECT DIRECTION ALTHOUGH THAT AREA WAS POORLY MARKED AND DIMLY LIT. THE CTLR INFORMED US WE HAD TAXIED ON THE WRONG RWY AND I THEN INSISTED ON A PROGRESSIVE AS IT WAS OBVIOUS WE WERE DISORIENTED. ONCE REACHING THE FBO AREA I APOLOGIZED FOR THE CONFUSION AND NOTHING FURTHER WAS INDICATED FROM THE CTLR AS THERE HAVING BEEN A PROB. TO MY KNOWLEDGE THERE WAS NO EVASIVE ACTION OR INCONVENIENCE TO ANY OTHER ACFT. IN REVIEW OF THE CHAIN OF EVENTS MY EVALUATION IS SUCH THAT FIRSTLY I SHOULD HAVE INSISTED THAT MY FO GIVE A COMPLETE READBACK OF THE CLRNC. I SHOULD NOT HAVE BEGUN TO TAXI UNTIL WE POSITIVELY WERE ORIENTED ON THE CHART AND UNDERSTOOD THE DIRECTIONS. THE CTLR ALSO SOUNDED DISPLEASED AND DID NOT LEND HIMSELF TO FURTHER INQUIRIES. THE CTLR WORKING 2 FREQS AT THE TIME MAY HAVE ADDED TO HIS ABILITY TO DISCERN THAT WE WERE NOT SURE OF OUR LOCATION NOR DID HE INSIST ON A FULL READBACK. THE DUTY DAY WAS AT LEAST 12 HRS PRIOR TO THE SITUATION OCCURRING WITH THE CREW BEING AWAKE AN ADDITIONAL 4-5 HRS PRIOR TO THIS. FATIGUE DEFINITELY WAS A FACTOR. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE HNL FLT I EVALUATED THE SITUATION AND IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENTED SOME NEW PROCS AND REINFORCED OTHERS THAT I HAVE UTILIZED MOST OF MY FLYING CAREER. THESE PROCS I BELIEVE WILL ELIMINATE ANOTHER SITUATION LIKE THIS OCCURRING AGAIN IN OUR DEPT. I ALSO FELT THERE WAS A PROB WITH MY FO'S PROCS AND REVIEWED EVERYTHING WITH HIM AGAIN. FIRSTLY, ALL TAXI CLRNCs WILL BE FULLY READ BACK AND COPIED DOWN. (THIS IS A PROC I HAVE ADHERED TO IN THE PAST). SECONDLY, I HAVE REITERATED THAT NO CHKLISTS WILL BE COMMENCED UNTIL A) THE ACFT IS CLR OF THE RWY, B) TAXI CLRNCs ARE COPIED, READ BACK AND UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH PLTS, C) THE PF IS ORIENTED AND COMFORTABLE WITH THE TAXI CLRNC. THIRDLY, SHOULD THERE BE ANY CONFUSION OR QUESTION AS TO THE TAXI CLRNC THE ACFT WILL STOP UNTIL IT IS RECTIFIED. I ALSO FEEL THAT THERE ARE SOME PROBS WITH THE ELECTRONIC FLT BGS IN THAT THEY ARE DIFFICULT TO SWITCH PAGES AS WELL AS MAGNIFICATION FOR THE AREA

THAT YOU ARE WORKING. WE ARE NOW PRINTING THE CHARTS WHENEVER POSSIBLE AND FEEL PAPER IS STILL MUCH MORE MANAGEABLE AND EFFICIENT.

Synopsis

FLT CREW TAXIES ONTO WRONG RWY AT HNL AFTER LONG PACIFIC FLT.

ACN: 710292

Time / Day

Date : 200609
Day : Thu
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : RNO.Airport
State Reference : NV

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : RNO.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Taxi
Make Model Name : Beechjet 400
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : mustang

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Component : 2

Aircraft Component : Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 75
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 11000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000
ASRS Report : 710292

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Departure

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

VERY SIMPLY, THE FO RECEIVED A DEP CLRNC FOR THE RENO 3 DEP AND LOADED THE MUSTANG 6 DEP IN THE FMS. DURING THE TAXI CHK I ASKED HIM TO BRIEF THE DEP. I BELIEVE HE STATED THAT WE HAD THE RENO 3, BUT HE READ THE DEP FROM THE MUSTANG DEP. I'VE ASKED MYSELF HOW THIS COULD HAPPEN AND HOW I MISSED IT. THE THINGS THAT I FEEL CONTRIBUTED TO US FLYING THE WRONG DEP WERE: 1) WE WERE ON DAY 7 OF A BUSY 8 DAY TOUR. WE WERE ALSO ON THE 5TH LEG OF A VERY BUSY DAY WITH SHORT TURNS. OUR DAY HAD STARTED EARLY AND COMBINED WITH OUR CUMULATIVE FATIGUE, WE WERE VERY TIRED. 2) THE ELECTRONIC CHARTS WE USE ARE A CONTINUING SOURCE OF FRUSTRATION TO ME. WE NOW HAVE A MOUNTING BRACKET ON THE COPLT'S SIDE, WHICH PUTS THE UNIT DIRECTLY IN THE SUN. THE PLT IN THE R SEAT HAS TROUBLE READING IT AND THE PLT IN THE L CAN'T SEE IT AT ALL. HAD I HAD A CHART THAT I COULD SEE, I MAY HAVE CAUGHT THIS MISTAKE.

Synopsis

BE40 FLIES MUSTANG VICE RENO SID AS CLRED FROM RNO. CITE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH ELECTRONIC FLT BAG.

ACN: 703471

Time / Day

Date : 200607
Day : Fri
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : LTAA.ARTCC
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 40000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : LTAA.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Charter
Make Model Name : MD-11
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1500
ASRS Report : 703471

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Charter
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON CLBOUT FROM OKBK WE RECEIVED MULTIPLE HDG AND ALT CHANGES AND DID NOT ACCOMPLISH RESETTING THE ALTIMETER AT TRANSITION ALT. THIS WAS ALSO AT APPROX XA00 AND 10+ HRS INTO OUR DUTY DAY. WE PROCEEDED THROUGH IRAQ AIRSPACE AND WHEN XING INTO EURO RVSM ANKARA SAW THE ALTDEV OF 400 FT. WE IMMEDIATE RESET TO 1013 MILLIBARS AND DSND TO OUR CORRECT LEVEL. 3 PLTS WATCHED THIS HAPPEN AND NONE NOTICED IT. I HAVE TO BELIEVE FATIGUE WAS A LARGE CONTRIBUTOR. I ALSO MISSED THE ITEM ON THE ENRTE CLB CHKLIST. PERHAPS WE SHOULD BE DOING THE CHKLIST AT TA RATHER THAN FL180.

Synopsis

MD11 FLT CREW HAS AN ENRTE ALTDEV.

ACN: 703037

Time / Day

Date : 200607
Day : Tue
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : IPT.Airport
State Reference : PA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 6000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Weather Elements : Turbulence
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZNY.ARTCC
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate
Make Model Name : Falcon 50
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Cruise : Enroute Altitude Change
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Aircraft : 2

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZNY.ARTCC
Make Model Name : PA-28 Cherokee/Archer II/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 45
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15200
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3500
ASRS Report : 703037

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Corporate
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 5000
ASRS Report : 703156

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Person : 4

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : Conflict Alert
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

LOSS OF ACFT SEPARATION OCCURRED DUE TO CONVECTIVE TURB CAUSING MOMENTARY ALTDEV OF 150-200 FT FROM THE ASSIGNED ALT OF 6000 FT MSL. OTHER ACFT WAS AT AN ASSIGNED ALT OF 7000 FT MSL. THE PF WAS HAND FLYING THE ACFT, THE AUTOPLT WAS NOT ENGAGED. THE ALT CAPTURE FUNCTION OF THE ALT PRESELECT FEATURE WAS NOT FUNCTIONING CORRECTLY. IT WAS NOTICED ON THE PREVIOUS LEG, AND WAS INTERMITTENTLY INOP. CREW CORRECTED TO 6000 FT IMMEDIATELY, AND THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. CREW WAS NOTIFIED ON THE LOSS OF SEPARATION AFTER LNDG AT FRG ARPT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 703156: WE DID OBSERVE A SLIGHT DEV ABOVE 6000 FT AS OUR ALT SELECT DID NOT CAPTURE AT EXACTLY 6000 FT. I DO REMEMBER MAKING THE OBSERVATION TO MY FO THAT THE ALT HOLD DID NOT ENGAGE AT 6000 FT. THIS HAPPENED AT THE END OF A 13 HR DUTY DAY IN CUMULUS CLOUDS IN AN AREA OF CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY.

Synopsis

FALCON 50EX FLT CREW HAS AN ALTDEV RESULTING IN LOSS OF SEPARATION DURING DEP FROM IPT.

ACN: 701751

Time / Day

Date : 200606
Day : Sat
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : HLG.Airport
State Reference : WV
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : Marginal
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : PIT.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Taxi
Make Model Name : King Air C90 E90
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Landing : Roll

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Main Gear Tire

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 94
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10360
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 582
ASRS Report : 701751

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 40
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 1600
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 720
ASRS Report : 701973

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Excursion : Runway
Anomaly.Other Anomaly
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Unstabilized Approach
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Insufficient Time

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE EXITED THE RWY AT HLF WITH A BLOWN TIRE. THERE WAS NO OTHER DAMAGE (NEITHER ACFT, PERSONAL NOR PROPERTY). THE EVENT WAS A RESULT OF FATIGUE AND A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY. THE COPLT, A 4 YR VETERAN, WAS FLYING. HE PERFORMED NORMALLY PRIOR TO THE EVENT. THE WX WAS IFR WITH A 500 FT CEILING, CALM WINDS AND 2 1/2 MI VISIBILITY ON THE ILS TO RWY 3 AT HLG. WE WERE VECTORED ONTO FINAL ABOUT 2 MI OUTSIDE OF THE MARKER. HE HAD APCH FLAPS AND 150 KTS. HE LOWERED THE GEAR JUST BEFORE CAPTURING THE GS. FROM THAT POINT ON THE ESSENTIALLY SHUT DOWN. HE INITIALLY FAILED TO CAPTURE THE GS. RECOGNIZING THAT VIA MY PROMPTING THAT THE GS WAS BELOW US HE STARTED A 1000 FPM DSCNT TO RE-INTERCEPT. HE DID NOT REDUCE THE PWR AS REQUIRED BY THE ACCELERATED RATE OF DSCNT. IRONICALLY I SAID 'YOU'VE GOT TO SLOW DOWN, WE DON'T WANT TO GO OFF THE END OF THE RWY.' HE RESPONDED, 'I WOULD NEVER DO THAT TO YOU.' I AGAIN INFORMED HIM THAT WE WERE FAST, AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED. WE BROKE OUT AT 500 FT WITH THE GEAR DOWN AND APCH FLAPS BUT WITH 140 KTS STILL. I AGAIN TOLD HIM WE WERE FAST AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED. AT 200 FT WE WERE STILL TOO FAST FOR FULL FLAPS (130 KT LIMIT) SO I TOLD HIM TO 'JUST PULL THEM TO IDLE.' AGAIN HE ACKNOWLEDGED BUT THERE WAS LITTLE PHYSICAL MOVEMENT. WE TOUCHED DOWN AT 2000 FT WITH 3000 FT REMAINING AT APPROX 120 KTS WITH APCH FLAPS. I HAD A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY FROM THE KING AIR'S NORMAL STOPPING PERFORMANCE COUPLED WITH THE FO'S NORMAL PERFORMANCE. THE PROB WAS THAT HE HAD PHYSICALLY SHUT DOWN AND DID NOT GO INTO REVERSE EVEN THOUGH HIS HAND WAS IN POS TO DO SO. AT 2000 FT REMAINING AND 100 KTS, HE APPLIED TOE BRAKING WITH LITTLE EFFECT. I WAS RELUCTANT TO ABORT THE LNDG AT THIS POINT BECAUSE THE BRAKES WERE BECOMING EFFECTIVE AND WE WERE CLOSING IN ON LESS THAN 1500 FT REMAINING. I HELPED APPLY MAX BRAKING AT 1000 FT REMAINING FAVORING THE L RUDDER TO ENSURE WE WOULD MISS THE LIGHTS AT THE END. THIS ACTION LOCKED THE L TIRE AND CAUSED IT TO FAIL. WE WENT OFF INTO THE GRASS WHICH WAS VERY WET AND SLIPPERY DUE TO CONDENSATION AND INTERMITTENT GND FOG. THE ACFT SKIDDED TO A STOP WITH NO DAMAGE.

Synopsis

KINGAIR 90 FLT CREW HAS A RWY EXCURSION AT HLG.

ACN: 699031

Time / Day

Date : 200606
Day : Fri
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : MSY.Airport
State Reference : LA
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 1000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Weather Elements.Other
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : MSY.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Taxi
Make Model Name : Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C, 210D
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 135
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Taxi
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 300
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 1550
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 300
ASRS Report : 699031

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerB : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE ON THE 12TH HR OF A 14 HR DUTY DAY, PART 135 SINGLE PLT IFR, WAS ON A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 1 AT MSY. WHEN SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ, ASKED TO SWITCH TO RWY 28. CLRED THE VISUAL AND CLRED TO LAND. WHILE CONFIGURING THE ACFT TO LAND, INSTEAD OF JOINING A LEFT DOWNWIND TO RWY 28, JOINED A R BASE TO RWY 10. FATIGUE PLAYED A BIG PART IN LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. QUERIED BY ATC AS TO WHICH RWY WAS GOING TO, TOLD THE RWY 10 WHEN REALIZED THAT IS WHERE I WAS DSNDING TO. ATC THEN CLRED ME TO LAND RWY 10. AT NO POINT DID I CROSS THE EXTENDED RWY CTRLINE UNTIL I WAS CLRED TO LAND. I THINK THAT A 14 HR DUTY DAY IS THE MAJOR FACTOR OF THE SIT. MORE REST FOR PART 135 WOULD SOLVE THE PROB.

Synopsis

C210 PLT APCHS WRONG RWY AT MSY.