

MR. ROTH: I am Nickolas Roth. I'm with the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. I have a number of comments about the DOE EISs, regarding security issues.

First, that the TADs do not shield workers or the public from radiation; require overpacks for reactor storage, transport, and Yucca storage, in order to provide radiation protection. I'd like to know what are the DOE's procedures for insuring that correct overpacks -- that correct overpacks will be available when fuel is transferred into TADs. Will each reactor's safety analysis report be need to be amended to cover these operations?

TADs are also not protected in any way from terrorist attack. DOE must provide a full analysis of all impacts on public health and safety arising from terrorist attack or accident at the reactor sites, in transit, and at Yucca Mountain.

Additionally, since at least ten percent of the waste will not be packaged in the TADs at reactors, the spent fuel is -- the spent fuel pool is presumably once again part of the design of the surface facilities at the Yucca Mountain site. DOE must provide an analysis of all impacts on public health and environmental from a terrorist attack on the spent fuel at Yucca Mountain. What are the Security in Action measures planned for the fuel pool?

What mitigation measure will be put in place to prevent a zirconium cladding fire that could release large amounts of radioactivity into the environment from the pool, in case of accident or attack? Will the pool be placed under a containment structure or precautions against the drop of a heavy load such -- such as a fully loaded waste cask into the pool, which could cause water to drain from the pool and consequent fire?

What are the risks are accidental -- of accidental or intentional military airplane into the pool from nearby Nellis Testing Range -- or Nellis Training Range?

MS. DESELL: Is that it? Thank you.