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The fact of White House cognizance of, and interest in, SIGINT was quite apparent by the time of the 2nd GTK incident in Sept. During that incident a highly significant SPOT Intelligence item was issued by the sup det which did not include CIA in its list of address. As a result the WH SIT Room did not receive the item as CIA(DCI) is charged with the responsibility for servicing the WH on all SIGINT product. This incident led to an examination of the problem by the Pres's Foreign Intell Advisory Board which concluded that remedial action was required and directed NSA to take those actions needed to assure the receipt in Washington by all interested recipients of all SIGINT reports as well as the timely receipt by NSA of the technical info required for NSA to provide an evaluation of the development being reported on.

The NSA study provided to the board showed the NSA involvement in the Sept DS patrol from the initial states - the nature of which has already been discussed. After notification from NSG of the September patrol planning NSA had commenced planning and by 13 September completed two-phase preparations for the DS patrol... The first dealing with the patrol under routine circumstances - providing relevant SIGINT tasking instructions and necessary procedures for continued technical support of the period when the patrol would be in progress. the second phase regarding

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the patrol as a potential target for hostile NVN of [] actions, to cover which contingency, instructions were issued which specified the intercept, forwarding, and reporting procedures to be implemented in the event of an incident.

In answer to the PFIAB inquiry NSA could point out that within 30 minutes of receipt of the COMNAVFORJAP CRITIC showing the MORTON had taken under radar targets under fire, it had implemented these special instructions at land-based collection sites which had responsibility for the NVN problem and for certain areas of []. These instructions had included additional collection emphasis, special reporting procedures (both with regard to the frequency of reports and to the dissemination of reports and to the dissemination of reports to a wider audience). and equally important, special input to NSA of the Technical basis for these reports.

Regarding the PFIAB's particular concern for the non-forwarding of full encode text to CIA and the WH, it was pointed out that though this did happen, it had applied only to those messages which were intercepted by the MADDIX SIGINT Det and that NSA had compensated for the non-forwarding by placing collection emphasis at shore-based facilities i.e., targets covered by the Det were also monitored by shore-based facilities, which also accomplished relevant technical input. It was emphasized to PFIAB that the foregoing procedure had been followed in the interest of keeping the operational requirements of the detachment at a minimum consistent with its limited resources and communications capability.

PFIAB was assured that the NSA was aware that the above procedures, while adequate during previous patrols, had not been satisfactory during the patrols in question... the inadequacy having been occasioned by the non-routine development which had occurred during this particular patrol, and by the unusual communication difficulties (atmospherics) experienced by the shore-based SIGINT facilities. Although the required technical data had been collected and forwarded to NSA, the delays encountered were acknowledged by NSA to have been unacceptable and as so remedial action was taken on 21 October 1964. From that time on, all special dets were required to forward significant technical data in the same manner as

shore based facilities. In addition, SIGINT reports issued by special detachments would be forwarded to an appropriate shore-based facility for direct dissemination to all interested members of the intelligence community, including Washington area consumers.

PFIAB was also informed of NSA actions already planned for the general improvement of the overall SEA SIGINT production problems, i.e., actions were underway to relocate the remainder of the DRV NAVAL collections, processing, and reporting effort from San Miguel, R. P. to Phu Bai, SVN -- a move calculated to result in a concentration of analytic talents in an area of maximum hearability and further enhance the field capability to produce accurate and timely translations and other SIGINT product. In terminating the report to PFIAB NSA did not fail to point out that relevant to the comms difficulties experienced by certain shore-based SIGINT units in September - the DOD communications improvements including the installation of hard wire systems expected to be operational in January 1965, should improve all comms services from and to SEA



Currently available COMINT indicates that throughout the patrol DRVN

entities were keenly aware and accurately informed of the presence of the DS
vessels. Fearing a south vietnamese incursion and expecting U.S. attack if
provoked, the DRVN was geared to repulse the intruders. Toward this end naval
authorities continually admonished subordinate units to effect an high level of
defensive preparedness, to institute alert condition one, to camouflage their
locations and above all to avoid spurious provocation. That any DRVN entity
was directed otherwise if not reflected.

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At 170045Z the presence of american ships in the GTK area was initially
reflected when northern fleet HVS, Port Mallat, reported the U.S 7th fleet's
intentions were to move into the area close to the shore for the purpose of
provoking the DRV. Subsequently, the radar station at Deio Ngang reported presence
of DDs. All stations were directed to effect alert condition one and acknowledge
mobilization orders. At 170422Z Port Mallat informed the T146 that the enemy intended
to provoke and possibly attack from both the sea and air especially on 17 and 18
September. DRV vessels were ordered to camouflage and prepare for a possible attack
but to await further order. at 0830Z an unidentified southern fleet activity reported
sub unit 6 had acknowledged the orders which possibly "postponed" the battle.
Inasmuch as there were no other offensive intentions indicated in DRVN comms on
this date the significance of the above order in ink. DRV shipping comms

indicate ~~prohibit~~ that subsequently all units were ordered to be alert and in particular to reinforce the border in order to defend against enemy acty. "be prepared to fight" Sub unit 7 was ordered to proceed and remain at Xuan Young approximately 30 miles west NW of point delts, the scheduled DS vessel entry point for 19 September. Port Wallut then reported the 07430Z posit of the DS.

Through probably fishing craft visual sightings passed to shipping net control Hai pong at 180247Z, the DS patrol vessels were id'd as the 946 and 950. At 180630Z the DRVN had located the ships 15 miles east of Hon Matt Island. The T130 reported that precusions were being made probably against JVN raiders. The DRV reportedly feared that SVN vessel would attack the DRV coast using the DS pat as a decoy. Subsequently Port Wallut 1008Z admonished all stas to do their best in avoiding provocations and to disperse during the anticipated enemy air attacks. An unid sta later reported insufficient foliage for camouflag while another unit on 20 Sept reported they were anchored and well camouflaged.

Thru the present, it has not been possible to isolate in COMINT any reflection of an attack by NVN forces on the DS or of the DS attack on any NVN vesses; However, at 1719/18 Port Wallu reported to all stas that personnel on the Gianh river had heard the sounds of the explosions. Ben thay indicated that the enemy was creating an incident similar to the one on the night of 4 Aug in order to strike us and all stations were directed to examine existing a/d plans and to

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camouflage correctly. Shortly thereafter, Port Wallut notified the T231 that the enemy was planning to attack and that the targets would consist of NVN military, economic and political installation. All naval units were ordered to disperse, Ha Long bay was to be reinforced, timely warning and reporting was to be emphasized, and vessels were to seek haven in concealed anchorages.

On 19 September stations in the southern fleet were cationed to fire only after the enemy had opened fire and to continue under alert condition one. Northern and southern fleet elements were again reminded of the events of 4 and 5 August and informed that the American STATE DEPARTMENT had announced that an American ship was attacked in the GFK the night of 13 September. Port Wallut added that the NVN had been falsely accused of launching torp attacks. Then they directed sub unit 2 IP 258 and T259 at 19 2159Z to remain in alert condition one and during the day to assist in air defense; at night they were to strike the raiders. The "raiders" may be referring to either the presence of American capital ship, the feared incursions of south Vietnamese boats, or both.

Late of 19 September, DRVN units were informed that the 7th fleet had retired to an area south of the DMZ. At 192120Z Port Wallut informed the T191 and the T193 that effective 0500G 20 S they were to assume alert condition 3 vice 2 to also assume an a/d posture during the day and again to strike the enemy at night. This alert posture continued through 20 S with DRVN units

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being admonished to maintain a defense posture, to avoid provocations and to concentrate on defending the shoreline.

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TRACKING

NVN naval tracking entities were noted at a moderately increased state of readiness during the period 1719 s with 327 msgs noted 98 of which reflected the DS miss. Altho 2 msgs from Haiphong gave orders to "report continuously" on the enemy destroyers, tracking was oth sporadic and erratic when compared to acty noted during the aug patrol. Cannot identify any NVN naval acty reflected on tracking net as having of been rouse into action because of the presence of the DS patl. Comparison of the patrol's posit log with avail tracking indicates that also discrepancies up to 10 NM were observed in some reports. overall. The S tracking appears to be somewhat more accurate than the Aug patrol.

During the period of the attack: at 1256 followed to 1433. Shortly thereafter, reflex of "enemy a/c" were noted in tracking from Dao Ngang . The a/c , which were reproted variously as one, 2 and 5 units, were observed from 10 miles nw of ...Another ENEMY possible a/c was reported as being at 1520Z. Its acty was prob a reflex of the carrier based a/c involved in droppin g flares and illuminating the attack area for wasearch ofor debris.

19 s only 7 tracking reflex N) 0 OTHER NOTED.

September - a total of 41 hours 26 min of intercept consisting exclusively
of northern and southern fleet VHN MM traffic was collected between 11 2015

and 210001. VH air and ground and all target entities were nil heard throughout the patrol.

VHN produced 46 readable or partially readable encoded operational msgs and 23 tracking msgs.

tracking appeared highly accurate based on prelim comparisons with DS nav log.

1st msg 170245Z port wallut to T 120

one msg vinh son to ben thut to sub unit 6 received order to postpone the

battle . This intercept was subj of msg which suggested Have not yet received orders to fight as a possible interpretation.

946 adn 950 id'd when ships passing two antenna-rigged fishing craft. first closely encountered vesselx of patrol.

Haiponhg to so-1 sub chaster T231... follow precisely the intention to expect war which was pblicized. anschoe discreetly.

NSA25X3