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Re: Latest Ref Policy Diffs

From: Christopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito_at_tresys.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2005 11:41:38 -0500


On Mon, 2005-12-12 at 09:54 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Thu, 2005-12-08 at 16:14 -0500, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> Nit: It is more difficult to search through reference policy for
> occurrences of execmem et al due to the inlining of
> general_domain_access() everywhere (which happens to include it in an
> exclusion list of permissions to not allow to self:process). It will
> also be harder to add further excluded permissions to that list in the
> future due to such inlining. Rationale for such inlining in the
> reference policy?

The rationale is the same for all of the example policy macros, save obvious ones like domain_auto_trans(), can_exec(), object class set, and permission set macros. We wanted to expand all of the macros so that we could see all the rules for each domain. After all the modules have been ported over, we can more easily see the common policy patterns. Then we can reevaluate the old macros and decide what to do with them. We do intend to add support macros and templates to cover common policy patterns, but we just haven't gotten to this part yet, since we're still porting modules over from the example policy.

> > gfs support is added
>
> I don't think gfs supports security xattrs yet, so I don't think you
> want it to use fs_use_xattr as its labeling mechanism.

Ok, I can reverse this change.

-- 
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
(410) 290-1411 x150


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Received on Mon 12 Dec 2005 - 11:47:30 EST
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
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