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Re: Added is_context_configurable function

From: Colin Walters <walters_at_redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2005 22:52:32 -0500


On Wed, 2005-01-12 at 17:09 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Wed, 2005-01-12 at 10:48, Colin Walters wrote:
> > Actually, thinking about this a bit: probably not. On my system I have
> > several times changed the SELinux user identity component of file
> > contexts from the default system_u to e.g. foo_u. The reason is that
> > the constraints prevent a user from relabeling a file unless the SELinux
> > user matches. So a list of alternate types would not be sufficient in
> > this case.
> <snip>
> > It seems the SELinux uid, for one. Also perhaps whether or not the
> > pathname is part of the standard filesystem. There seems to me to be a
> > difference between a very well known file such as /etc/shadow being
> > mislabeled according to file_contexts versus an unknown path such
> > as /apps/web/blah.
>
> Ok, so I take this to mean that I should await a new patchset from Dan
> that supports this more general way of specifying customizable contexts
> based on a combination of type, user identity, and file location. Yes?

This is a complex issue, given we've been going back and forth on this for months now, with several proposed patches. The last time this came up in October, you posted a good message:

http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=selinux&m=109872521815476&w=2

You say:

> The file_contexts configuration and setfiles were only intended to
> initialize the system, as previously noted. After installation, one
> should only do a make relabel upon a major policy upgrade, and even in
> that case, it would be better to selectively relabel based on the
> differences between the policies.

And I couldn't agree more. If we can get to the point where we never (and I really mean never!) tell users to run "fixfiles relabel", I think a lot of these problems would essentially just go away. I brainstormed a bit in another message in this thread about how we can avoid it for policy upgrades, which I believe is the major cause. I'll follow up to that in a bit.

Let's assume for now that we've successfully gotten rid of fixfiles (at least from the user's perspective; it may exist as an implementation detail). At that point, what problems remain? The problem of usercustomizable  types like httpd_sys_script_ro_t in well-known areas such as /var/www being reset to httpd_sys_content_t goes away, because there is nothing to reset them. The problem of user-defined locations such as /web/mysite1 with type httpd_sys_content_t being reset to default_t goes away as well. Are there any other problems?

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Received on Wed 12 Jan 2005 - 22:52:49 EST
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
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