Re: [PATCH] SELinux protection for exploiting null dereference using mmap

On Thu, 2007-05-31 at 07:55 -0700, Ulrich Drepper wrote:
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> Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > Or it could be a sysctl value if you wanted it to generalize beyond
> > selinux.
>
> That's likely the right answer. But then you need to protect changing
> the value. How does SELinux deal with that?

The policy can label sysctls based on their name (since there we can generate a reliable stable name from kernel data that isn't subject to userspace manipulation or aliasing, unlike typical pathnames), and then control access based on the TE type.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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