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Re: [PATCH] SELinux protection for exploiting null dereference using mmap

From: Stephen Smalley <sds_at_tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Thu, 31 May 2007 10:45:51 -0400


On Thu, 2007-05-31 at 09:45 -0400, James Morris wrote:
> On Thu, 31 May 2007, Eric Paris wrote:
>
> > suggestions for a better name from anyone?
>
> system? kernel?

In retrospect, we likely should have moved all of the execmem/stack/heap checks into a separate memory class and we could have put this one there as well. There is a 'system' class already, so it isn't better than using 'process' aside from having more free bits; using a new class will ensure that no existing policy implicitly allows this check via an allow a b:c *; rule.

> > It doesn't address the question of 'is 1 page enough' Anyone with a
> > good suggestion of how much is enough? Or a reasonable idea on how to
> > make something like this configureable if we can't agree on a single
> > number?
>
> For SELinux, have a default and allow the value to be set via a selinuxfs
> node.

Or it could be a sysctl value if you wanted it to generalize beyond selinux.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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Received on Thu 31 May 2007 - 10:45:54 EDT
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
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