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Re: Question on networking accesses

From: Casey Schaufler <casey_at_schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Mon, 21 May 2007 09:07:21 -0700 (PDT)

  • Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> wrote:

> On Monday, May 21 2007 9:48:52 am Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > I have what I hope is a fairly straitforward question on the SELinux
> > networking model. Let's pretend that I have a process A that sends a
> > UDP packet P to a second process B. From the viewpoint of access control
> > is this:
> >
> > - process A writing to process B
> > - process B reading from process A
> > - process A creating packet P, and process B reading packet P
> >
> > some combination of the above, or something else entirely?
>
> >From 10,000 feet up in the air that sounds roughly about right. Although if
>
> you are talking about labeled networking it can be a bit more involved,
> especially if you are using labeled IPsec.
>
> Can you be a bit more specific?

How about if I throw out an example. The evaluation team loved this one back in '92.

I have a tic-tac-toe server that does little but maintain a tic-tac-toe board. It allows two connections, one for the "X" player and one for the "O" player. Player X invokes the tictacclient program, which sends a UDP packet to tictacserver. The client may be local or remote. What access control decisions are made, where, and using what information?

The decision may be different if it's seen as a write from tictacclient to tictacserver than if it's seen as a read from tictacclient by tictacserver. The decision may have another outcome entirely if the packet is treated as a named object that is created by tictacclient.

So, what should the creator of this tic-tac-toe system expect on an selinux system? Will the access decision be based on a write from the client, a read by the server, the attribues associated with a packet object, or something else entirely?

Historical MLS systems treated the access as a write by the client to the server (well, the server's socket) but the MLS rules typically limited the communications to matching labels. SELinux is much more likely to encounter a situation where the client might be able to write to the server but the server might not be allowed to read the client (or the other way around). It may matter if it is a read or a write.

Casey Schaufler
casey@schaufler-ca.com

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Received on Mon 21 May 2007 - 12:07:29 EDT
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
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