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Re: [patch 0/2] policy capability support

From: Joshua Brindle <method_at_manicmethod.com>
Date: Wed, 05 Dec 2007 15:35:56 -0500


Stephen Smalley wrote:

> On Wed, 2007-12-05 at 15:16 -0500, Joshua Brindle wrote:
>   
>> Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>     

>>> On Wed, 2007-12-05 at 14:30 -0500, Todd Miller wrote:
>>>
>>>> Paul Moore wrote: >>>> >>>>> The discussion for this appears to have gone quiet (at least I >>>>> haven't seen anything else on this list). Where do things currently >>>>> stand? >>>>> >>>> At this point I'd be OK with requiring equivalence and throwing an error >>>> otherwise. I do think that this will result in usability issues that we >>>> will have to address once people start using the caps. However, with >>>> only >>>> a single cap defined so far it is not really possible to know how these >>>> will end up being used. >>>>

>>> We could try to come up with a solution at least for allowing clean
>>> upgrades from F8 (w/o any caps) to F9 (likely w/ peer cap defined)
>>> without requiring manual user intervention for dealing with local
>>> modules.
>>>

>>>
>> This was my exact objection to using an intersection or equivalence. IMO >> it is incompatible to require all modules to be the same and to also >> require upgrades to work without manual intervention. >> >> Do you still think unioning is wrong? >> > > Yes, I'm still against (automatic, default) unioning of the capabilities > by the linker - that is clearly not a safe default. semodule could > possibly override that behavior based on an option though, at which > point the %post scriptlet in the policy rpm could use that option if we > wanted to force it w/o user intervention. > >

And when a user installs a new module via audit2allow they have to know to select --ignore-stuff-the-modules-say-and-do-something-else-anyway? I don't like this idea either.

>>> There are however plenty of other ways in which a policy upgrade can
>>> break at present.

>>>

>>>
> >
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Received on Wed 5 Dec 2007 - 15:36:08 EST
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
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