Re: Proposed policy feature: $1_domain attribute

On Tue, 2005-03-01 at 09:53 -0500, Ivan Gyurdiev wrote:
> >can_ptrace? You could easily end up allowing unintended permissions
> >directly to the user domain that were previously limited to a specific
> >program.
>
> Can you elaborate? I thought can_ptrace was needed for the proper
> operation of the strace command.

If the program domain has enhanced permissions for its function beyond what the user domain is directly allowed, and you allow the user domain to ptrace the program domain, then you allow it to completely control the program and thus indirectly gain those permissions. No different than ptracing setuid root programs.

-- 
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
National Security Agency


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