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Re: dynamic context transitions

From: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan_at_tresys.com>
Date: Mon, 01 Nov 2004 16:44:02 -0500


On Mon, 2004-11-01 at 11:56 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Fri, 2004-10-29 at 15:10, Darrel Goeddel wrote:
> > Since the ability to perform dynamic transitions is controlled by
> > separate permission from exec-based transitions (process setcurrent),
> > policy writers have the ability to not use the new feature. The chain
> > of allowable dynamic transitions is also controlled on a context-pair
> > basis. This allows a "dynamic transition group" to be treated as an
> > equivalence class for policy analysis.
>
> Question for people writing policy analysis tools (some cc'd): What
> impact do you see such a change having on the ability to analyze
> policies? How difficult would it be to have your tools collapse the
> domains in one of these "dynamic transition groups" into a single
> equivalence class for information flow analysis?
>

It is certainly possible for apol to collapse domains for information flow analysis. I would say that it is non-trivial but certainly doable. This capability might even be useful in general so that a group of domains can be considered as a single security domain. Collapsing the domains means that the analysis results can't be used to make assurance arguments about the application, of course, which seems to counter one of the major arguments for doing this.

Karl

-- 
Karl MacMillan
Tresys Technology
kmacmillan@tresys.com
http://www.tresys.com


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Received on Mon 1 Nov 2004 - 16:45:14 EST
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
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