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RE: dynamic context transitions

From: Chad Hanson <chanson_at_TrustedCS.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Nov 2004 09:11:00 -0500

>
> On Sun, 2004-10-31 at 17:47, Frank Mayer wrote:
> > > The MLS model is another reason for this functionality. We have
> > > chosen to create MLS policy overrides using a new SELinux MLS
> > > capability class.
> >
> > I have not thought greatly about this choice, but I wonder
> if it was wise to
> > make the MLS mechanism dependent on the capability
> mechanism. Orthogonal
> > mechanisms would seem smarter.
>
> Point of clarification: These MLS capabilities only exist as TE
> abstractions, not as part of the Linux capabilities logic,
> IIUC. Using
> TE to control MLS privileges is desirable.
>

This is correct. We believe the the existing capabilities logic shouldn't be extended and thus added a new TE class for MLS override logic. These "MLS capabilities" only affect MLS policy decisions. In our desired implementation, SELinux would abritrate all capability decisions and obsolete the capability module.

> > Ah and here we have the beginning of the slippery slope.
> This might be easy in
> > terms of lines of code, but the conceptual complexity of
> what you describe above
> > scares me. I still wonder why we have to change TE to
> support a MLS convention.
> > I'd much rather you did not make these mechanisms dependent
> on each other.
>
> TE was originally developed to fill in the gaps of MLS, including
> privilege management for trusted subjects. Using TE to control MLS
> privileges is a good thing. Whether or not privilege bracketing is a
> good thing is more open to debate, although it is clearly
> entrenched in
> applications today, and not just MLS applications; the prior requests
> for such a feature have been to support traditional Unix applications
> that presently use seteuid/setfsuid.
>

IMHO the combination of MLS and TE is next step in increasing the security of solutions. Existing MLS applications and systems have weaknesses. Using TE to model a complex MLS scenario is not a good idea. The combination of the two technologies create the strongest foundation.

-Chad



Chad Hanson
Senior Secure Systems Engineer

Trusted Computer Solutions
121 W Goose Alley
Urbana, IL 61801

www.TrustedCS.com

V: 217.384.0028 ext.12
F: 217.384.0288

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Received on Mon 1 Nov 2004 - 09:10:43 EST
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
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