Research
.
Skip Search Box

SELinux Mailing List

Re: named SELinux policy

From: Ivan Gyurdiev <ivg2_at_cornell.edu>
Date: Mon, 06 Mar 2006 13:12:24 -0500

> File context that differs from parent directory is especially hard to
> maintain and can give the impression that SELinux is difficult. We
> can not predict which tools a user will use to maintain the named.conf
> file so leaving it etc_t is better in my opinion. If you want to
> prevent secret data then you should not store a file in /etc with
> default context (etc_t, etc_runtime_t). (You probably should not
> store the file there in the first place.)
I see this as one of the fundamental problems of SELinux to solve before it becomes mainstream...

Should automatic type transitions be treated as a hack, placed there until the app starts using setfscreatecon? Should they instead be treated as the way to do things, with applications being modified to better organize their files into folders, and the folders pre-created as appropriate.

Automated transitions have already proved difficult when mixing files of different types in the same folder, and also with shared libraries creating files.

It seems like the app has much more knowledge about the file than the kernel's (src_context, target_class) pair. However, should we be incorporating selinux contexts into applications [ as is already done in consolehelper ]? How reliable are those context? The rwx of chmod() are pretty much set in stone. Policy changes all the time. Is it better to keep selinux logic out of applications instead?

--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with
the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Received on Mon 6 Mar 2006 - 13:12:33 EST
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
bottom

National Security Agency / Central Security Service