On Thu, Oct 02, 2003 at 03:42:30PM -0700, Fleischman, Eric wrote:
> I hope to be able to configure SELinux so that it would have policies that correspond to the traditional DoD Separation of Duties with Least Privilege practice of establishing different roles/functions for Network Administrators than for Security Officers. Specifically, I'd like the Security Officer to be solely able to establish/modify accounts and passwords, establish group memberships, establish user role memberships, etc. However, the Security Officer must not be able to perform any other traditional sysadm_r:sysadm_t functions. Similarly, I want the sysadm_r:sysadm_t to no longer be able to perform the functionalities that have now become within the sole auspices of the Security Officer. Is this possible to do? If so, how can I do this?

This should be possible, in theory. In a practical implementation, there are possibly a lot of holes that might be used to elevate priviledges.

The most obvious example is, of course, that if the security officer can modify the policy, he can grant himself additional rights.

What you certainly can do is create a sysadm_r that is limited in the respect you wish, i.e. can not add/edit users or modify the policy.

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