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SELinux Mailing ListRE: dynamic context transitions
From: Chad Hanson <chanson_at_TrustedCS.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 2004 13:00:50 -0500
Karl MacMillan wrote:
I would agree these models are not same. Privilege bracketing can be used for two distinct purposes. The first purpose is to always run with the mininum amount of permission to complete an operation. This model has no gain in security assurance than program always running with all of the permissions. It can only help audit the internal functionality of the program. The second purpose can permanently remove permissions from a process. This provides a mechanism this is more strict than the previous domain, and cannot revert back to the old domain. This is similiar to the exec model without the environment cleansing and controlled interfaces. I believe it could help strengthen the exec model, by disallowing usage of helpers which are no longer needed inside an application. The exec model also leads itself to easier analysis as a source audit is not needed to help determine the abilities of an application. -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.Received on Wed 3 Nov 2004 - 13:01:13 EST |
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Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009 |