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Re: Patch to make can_network stronger and remove nscd tunable.

From: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh_at_redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 03 Nov 2004 11:23:38 -0500


Russell Coker wrote:

>On Wednesday 03 November 2004 02:56, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> wrote:
>
>
>>Updated with Russell's "daemon" change and other fixes.
>>
>>How does this look?
>>
>>
>
>+can_network($1_login_t)
>+allow $1_login_t self:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } connect;
>
>local_login_t does not need network access unless you use NIS or similar.
>can_ypbind() may be appropriate, but no other rules for network access for
>$1_login_t.
>
>Your patch is allowing many domains access to { tcp_socket udp_socket }
>connect which have no need for network connections other than ypbind. It's
>probably best to just add this to can_ypbind and not add it to ANY daemon
>policy except for daemons which obviously need it. Otherwise this change
>will make the policy weaker overall by explicitely adding permissions where
>they are not needed. If we don't have the time to do this properly right now
>then we should leave can_network as it is until we have more time to work on
>it.
>
>
>

Not true. pam_kerberos, pam_ldap require network access. login already has can_ypbind, which
used to be turned on by default. Now there is a boolean to turn it off. and it is off by default, because it
gives too many privs. The problem is that these other protocols are also allowed/required. So this policy
is actually tighter since the allow_ypbind is now off.

>Probably the best thing to do is to merge a patch that doesn't allow such
>access to any daemon apart from the most obvious cases (EG allowing a mail
>server to make TCP connections). Things will work for the binary policy in
>Fedora as NIS support is enabled. Then we can spend the next couple of
>months testing out all the daemons and submitting patches for exactly the
>connection access that is required.
>
>
>+mount_domain(sysadm, mount, `, fs_domain, nscd_client_domain')
>
>What does mount do that requires nscd access?
>
>
>

NFS Mounts probably.

>Why does user_ssh_t require kill capability?
>
>Does dhcpc_t require TCP connection access when there is no NIS?
>
>
>

Not sure.

>Does innd_t require UDP connection access when there is no NIS?
>
>
>
>

Probably not.

>sys_tty_config capability is another thing that should go into
>daemon_base_domain(), but as a dontaudit.
>
>
>

Ok.

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Received on Wed 3 Nov 2004 - 11:23:59 EST
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
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