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RE: dynamic context transitions - a seteuid parallel

From: Frank Mayer <mayerf_at_tresys.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2004 07:58:31 -0500


> The alternatives are to overprivilege the application which is not
> acceptable or to rewrite all of the applications before they can be
> used on this new platform. The latter is goal which can and should be
> achieved or time. Applications can streamlined and reorganized to fit
> into the modular framework and of cooperating applications. This is a
> considerable effort and major roadblock to utilizing SELinux and
> therefore Linux for these types of applications.

I think the case is not stated accurately. What you want is to fundamentally change a key property of the most important security property of type enforcement (process type tranquility) in order to allow software the *discretion* to turn on and off some of its privileges, arbitrarily. I certainly have no problem with software's ability to decide not to use its privileges, but I an quite concerned that achieving this small victory cause significant damage to the core mandatory security assurance.

> The other main roadblocks are already being addressed with Linux
> getting CAPP EAL3 and soon to be EAL4 certifications. Add LSPP and
> RBAC and you have Linux system suitable to address secure information
> sharing needs.

No, privilege bracketing is not (or should not be) a concerned at EAL4 and below. I try my best to forget the CC :-) but I'm quite sure of this. Maybe if you're talking about EAL5 (the B2 like requirement), but again that's just an evaluation strategy, not necessarily "good." I know for a fact that the EAL4 evaluation strategy for a certain non-Unix OS never concerned itself with such an issue.

If the Linux guys are wrapped around privileges within a single process for an EAL4 evaluation, seek better advice! This is simply the wrong issue to be focusing the evaluators on.

Frank

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Received on Tue 2 Nov 2004 - 07:58:40 EST
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
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