On Sat, 2004-10-30 at 05:06, Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton wrote:
> the bit that i don't like is the possibility of a process giving itself
> an uncontrolled amount of access rights.
>
> what guarantees can you offer that a process can only escalate to a
> specific alternative set of access rights?
>
> e.g. is your proposal a bit like the file_contexts "alternate"
> keyword idea, where the policy contains a different context that
> the process can flip to?

If you look at the patch, it includes an oldcontext-to-newcontext dyntransition permission check for these dynamic context transitions, so you can control the set of domains which can be reached via dynamic transitions from any given domain.

-- 
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
National Security Agency


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