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Re: hal - denials

From: Stephen Smalley <sds_at_tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Mon, 04 Apr 2005 08:55:42 -0400


On Sat, 2005-04-02 at 18:14 -0500, Ivan Gyurdiev wrote:
> Ok, here is what hald required to stop complaining.
> Which ones should be dontaudit? I take it you won't like
> allowing hald to write to /selinux, and read /dev/mem.

Writing to /selinux/context to check the validity of a context is ok, and necessary for checking the context it is going to use for the mount option. Note that each node under /selinux has its own finer-grained permission check in the security class to allow distinctions to be made among the operations separate from the inode-based permission check. See the can_getsecurity() macro for an example of allowing the ability to get any kind of security decision from selinuxfs (as distinct from being able to set things like the enforcing status, booleans, or loading policy, which have their own macros).

>
> re: dmidecode -
> dmidecode decodes the DMI data present in x86 and IA64 BIOS's.
>
> Can't that be made to run in its own domain?

Likely should be.

-- 
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
National Security Agency


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Received on Mon 4 Apr 2005 - 09:05:50 EDT
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
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