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Re: MCS and unconfined_t

From: Russell Coker <russell_at_coker.com.au>
Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2006 01:55:16 +1100


On Thursday 30 March 2006 03:29, "Christopher J. PeBenito" <cpebenito@tresys.com> wrote:
> > Hmmm...I had thought that Russell had introduced a mlsconstraint on
> > process transition and dyntransition permissions in policy/mcs, see the
> > earlier discussion on list in Feb. But it appears to be missing from
> > the current policy, which does mean that an unconfined process can
> > easily escape its restrictions via runcon or newrole -l. Seems to be
> > missing in FC5 too.
>
> My issue with that patch was that it had types hardcoded into the
> constraints, violating encapsulation. In the interim other parts of the
> patch were fixed and resubmitted, but this piece got lost along the way.
> I've committed it, using an attribute and an interface.

http://people.redhat.com/rcoker/pol/

At the above URL I've put some packages for rawhide that fix this issue and a few other things.

Among the changes is the change to file contexts to separate /usr(/.*)? into /usr -d and /usr/.* etc. This causes a relabel of most of the system on package install (so I'm not planning to put it in FC5), but gives a small performance increase on setfiles/restorecon etc once it's in place.

-- 
http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/   My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages
http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/  Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/postal/    Postal SMTP/POP benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/  My home page

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Received on Fri 31 Mar 2006 - 10:16:04 EST
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
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