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Re: sys_admin cap breakup

From: Stephen Smalley <sds_at_epoch.ncsc.mil>
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2004 11:42:24 -0400


On Mon, 2004-04-12 at 08:58, Colin Walters wrote:
> On Sun, 2004-04-11 at 22:34, Joshua Brindle wrote:
>
> > So this is a question for the guys that are doing kernel work and
> > possibly interacting with linus and friends. How plausible would it be
> > to suggest breaking up caps that give lots of access in the next major
> > version, 2.7 or 2.8? do you think they'd go for it?
>
> Maybe a better solution is to simply stop using capabilities entirely,
> and make the necessary changes to the policy.

Yes, although this still requires adding a LSM hook to abstract the new security check and defining new classes and permissions as appropriate for SELinux. SELinux should eventually replace capabilities entirely and provide complete privilege management using RBAC/TE.

-- 
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
National Security Agency


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Received on Mon 12 Apr 2004 - 11:42:37 EDT
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
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