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RE: Proposed policy feature: $1_domain attribute

From: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan_at_tresys.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2005 10:03:07 -0500

> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
> [mailto:owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov] On Behalf Of Ivan Gyurdiev
> Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2005 5:07 PM
> To: Stephen Smalley
> Cc: Thomas Bleher; selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
> Subject: Re: Proposed policy feature: $1_domain attribute
>
> On Tue, 2005-03-01 at 13:07 -0500, Ivan Gyurdiev wrote:
> >On Tue, 2005-03-01 at 12:31 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> >>On Tue, 2005-03-01 at 12:29 -0500, Ivan Gyurdiev wrote:
> >>> Well, in that case, how about an attribute to marks all of the
> >>> programs that have less permissions than the user. You
> said Tresys
> >>> has done inheritance work that can verify this stuff
> automatically.
> >>
> >>Not sure that their notion of inheritance will apply here, as it is:
> >>1) name-based, i.e. type A.B.C is bounded by the
> permissions allowed
> >>to type A.B and type A.B is bounded by the permissions
> allowed to type
> >>A,
> >>2) strict, i.e. type A.B.C cannot any permissions to type D unless
> >>type A has those permissions, whereas program domains have
> often some
> >>additional permissions even if we consider them to be less
> privileged
> >>for their own private objects,
> >>3) likely to cut across domains differently than you
> envision, as it
> >>is intended to allow delegation of management of portions of the
> >>policy, e.g. the entire apache policy, without being able to alter
> >>properties of the base policy (as bounded by the overall
> "apache" type).
>
> It would be an interesting exercise to try to represent
> SElinux as a graph, and use standard graph algorithms to
> determine domain interactions... but in the meantime I'll
> just do this the normal way - looking at the policy rules by hand :)
>

My information flow work for Setools does just that - represents the policy as a set of nodes with edges representing information flow. You can search the list for some discussions of this with Mitre and, of course, look at the libapol source.

Karl

---
Karl MacMillan
Tresys Technology
http://www.tresys.com
(410) 290-1411 ext 134 


> --
> Ivan Gyurdiev <ivg2@cornell.edu>
> Cornell University
>
>
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Received on Mon 7 Mar 2005 - 10:07:57 EST
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
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