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Re: Proposed policy feature: $1_domain attribute

From: Ivan Gyurdiev <ivg2_at_cornell.edu>
Date: Tue, 01 Mar 2005 12:29:47 -0500


On Tue, 2005-03-01 at 12:14 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>On Tue, 2005-03-01 at 12:16 -0500, Ivan Gyurdiev wrote:
>> > And allowing the caller to kill the program at any
>> >arbitrary point is potentially dangerous, e.g. leading to file
>> >corruption or holding of a lock indefinitely.
>>
>> As opposed to not being able to kill misbehaving programs?
>> Shouldn't that be the user's decision? I've been wondering
>> why under strict SElinux I always have so much trouble killing
>> my broken scripts...
>
>Depends on whether the program operates with more or less permissions
>than the user. Again, think about the parallel for setuid programs.
>Some domain-changing programs should be killable by the user; others
>should not.

Well, in that case, how about an attribute to marks all of the programs that have less permissions than the user. You said Tresys has done inheritance work that can verify this stuff automatically.

How about a: $1_constrained attribute.

Then we can do:
can_ps($1, $1_constrained)
can_ptrace($1, $1_constrained)
allow $1 $1_constrained:process signal;
>

-- 
Ivan Gyurdiev <ivg2@cornell.edu>
Cornell University


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Received on Tue 1 Mar 2005 - 12:29:30 EST
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
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