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| | | | USN |
| (b)(3)-P.L. | 86-36 | | |

(b)(1) (b)(3)-50 USC 403 (b)(3)-18 USC 798 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

The History of Applesauce

| 50 USC 403 | -Which was the | nickname for our | (b)(3) OGA |
|--------------------------|--|---|---------------|
| 50 USC 403 P.L. 86-36 | earliest experiment | in civilian operation | |
| | of an intercept statio | - | /\ / \ \ . |
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| | | | //\-\ |
| | te post-war era (1945–48), the U.S. | | |
| | lligence organization shrank from its | | Captain |
| | f great strength to a mere cadre. It had | Mason thought this was worth pursuing and dis | |
| been decided, of c | ourse, that a principal post-war target | begin the necessary planning. (My principal | |
| | | time was Intercept and D/F Control Officer fo | or the Naval |
| - | No. of the second secon | Security Group; this project was additional.) | ./ |
| | | We estimated that we would need to establis | sn abou |
| <u> </u> | and the second of the second o | intercept positions, to cover both | 1:1 .1. |
| | us parts of the world. Our collection In the Pacific we had | and that we could account highly skilled people. We re | |
| capability was | HII the Pacific we had | with about highly skilled people. We re recruiting that many skilled operators w | |
| SHIZH WING HI | | formidable task. | ould be a |
| | | toringable task. | |
| \ \ \ | | /// | all planning |
| | | was to be done by the Navy. | an planning |
| | | At that time, NSG had within its reserve con | mponents an |
| | | organization known as the Reserve Listen | |
| | | (RLS). This consisted of civilians who had ser | |
| our mainstay in the | e area, was | operators during World War II and who had | |
| 1 / | | reserve components throughout the U.S. | |
| | . \ | performed their Navy drills by copying foreig | |
| The | station was a great distance from its | their homes two hours a week with Navy radio | equipment. |
| orincipal target are | | The intercepted material was mailed to NSS for | |
| Ì | -but there was very little | and certain feedback information was retur | |
| perational activity | on the part of the | operators. The RLS was not a smashing succes | |
| | | keep alive the interest of former operators and | d gave us a |
| | ryone complained about this problem | minor return on our investment. | 1 |
| | rying desperately to find a solution. | The RLS was a natural choice as a recruiting | |
| | of the problems presented to Captain | One day LCDR I. E. Willis, who was in ch | |
| | hen he returned to duty with the Naval | NSG/Reserve program, said he needed a proje use in correspondence. Several were suggeste | |
| with newly establish | 1947. Captain Mason began discussions | amused Mr. Willis, who remarked that "that | |
| | 1. It appeared that we might be able to | like a lot of applesauce to me." And we had | |
| Concettor | The supposition that we might be able to | name. | our project |
| | \ L | In 1949 the Armed Forces Security Agency (| (AFSA) was |
| After a year's n | egotiation. | formed, and the Navy and Army opera | |
| | / | consolidated. The Production organization wa | |
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| Arlington Hall Station, with Captain Mason as the Chief. He reaffirmed the requirement for the station and directed that I step up the effort to establish it. | The formation of AFSA assisted Project Applesauce in some ways because it gave a wider base for planning. John McIntire, who had experience in facilities planning with ASA, designed the station, as well as the training facility at Arlington Hall Station that was a near replica of the actual station. In addition to the RLS operators we hoped to hire, we combed the ASA Reserve records for experienced men who might be available. We also checked AFSA personnel files. |
|--|--|
| There was one difficulty in the operation of intercept stations at that time that we particularly wanted to remedy. The operators were ordinarily cleared only as high as Confidential, which prevented them from knowing about the results of T/A or C/A efforts; thus they received no feedback information and operated in a vacuum. We insisted that all of the Project Applesauce crew receive the same Top Secret clearance, and, though we had to fight this one all the way to the top in CIA, we finally won—a victory that, I am sure, ultimately contributed to | We then embarked on a unique recruiting effort for cryptologic specialists by mailing a letter to approximately 300 men scattered throughout the U.S., asking if they would be interested in civilian employment with a Government Agency (unspecified) at an overseas location (unspecified) at an unspecified salary, doing work similar to that in which they had been engaged during the recent war. Ind I applied the signature. We were highly gratified to receive a large |
| the success of the station. (b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 8 | number of replies. 6-36 |
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The entire communications complex, with the wing which housed USF 61 in the lower right. (U. S. Navy photograph)

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| | It appeared that we could probably hire an adequate | |
| | number of people; however, they were scattered all over | |
| | the U.S. and personal interviews were required. We | |
| | therefore planned to have our interviewing team, consisting | |
| | of Major Thorsten Erickson, USA, an AFSA employee, of CIA, visit principal cities in each | |
| | section of the country. | |
| / | Major Erickson, in musti, and traveled about | |
| | 10,000 miles in three weeks; they interviewed a large | |
| | number of applicants and hired most of them. During the | |
| / | interviews, the candidates were not told for whom they | |
| | would be working, other than the U.S. Government; they | |
| | were not told where they were going, except that it would | |
| - January | be in the area; and they were not told exactly what they would be doing. The team carried a large | $\sqrt{}$ |
| (b)(1) | amount of cash and paid some men on the spot for travel | $\setminus \setminus$ |
| (b)(3) | and other expenses. | $\langle \cdot \rangle $ |
| OGA | Major Erickson was quite pleased with the men he had | $\setminus igwedge \setminus$ |
| CIA | been able to hire and said he believed they would make a | |
| | good crew with a minimum of training. Most of the hiring | $_{\sim}$ $_{\sim}$ |
| | was done at the GS 5-7 level with an occasional GS-9 as a supervisor. | $\setminus \setminus \setminus \setminus$ |
| | | |
| Ì | We also had to find a suitable person to be the civilian in charge and the deputy. This proved to be a monumental | |
| | undertaking requiring approximately six months. I had | |
| | several possible candidates; however, for personal reasons, | |
| | most of them declined, and one was rejected for security | The operations room taken about 3 |
| | reasons. Fortunately we had an ace in the hole in the form | The operations room taken about 3 years after the station was established. The facil- |
| \ | of USN (Retired) and Chief Radioman USN (Retired), highly experienced | ity originally had positions, most of which are |
| \ | individuals who very reluctantly agreed to come out of | shown here. (b) (1) |
| 1 | Florida retirement and head the project at salaries of | (Photo classified CONFIDENTIAL) (b) (3) -50 USC 403 |
| . // | \$10,000 per year—a lot of money in those days. | (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 |
| (b)(3)-P-L | In the meantime, had been working | |
| 86-36 | frantically to finish installation of the training facility in A | and updating of their knowledge. Those hired to man the |
| 1 | Building, AHS. | communications circuits worked in the Arlington Hall |
| | Finally, all of our new employees were brought to Arlington Hall to be briefed. | Station Communications Center. The men regained their code-copying speed and learned as much as we knew about |
| | Fitzpatrick explained to them, for the first time, exactly | the They were also briefed on |
| | where they were going and what they would be doing. | personnel matters, living conditions and all of |
| | When was mentioned, I watched their | the other things they needed to know about their new job. |
| | faces and concluded that most of them had a general idea | There was an absolute minimum of complaining, sickness, |
| • | of where they were going; however, it was obvious a few of | and absenteeism; we had a gung-ho crew. |
| | them did not. One man told me he had been sure he was going to At the end of the briefing, we asked if | In the fall of 1950, the men completed training and |
| | anyone wanted to back out: we were cheered to see not a | |
| • | single hand. | Post-Log |
| 13g + | For the next two months the men worked in the training | The intercept station was a success from the |
| .f | facility: those hired as supervisors established watch lists, | beginning. The men proved to be highly motivated |
| | and the men copied targets that could be heard in | operators, and hearability was excellent. For the |
| Ŋ. | Washington. They also visited the Navy's | first time, we were able to keep up with the |
| 1 | section at Arlington Hall Station for on-the-job training | problem. |

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| After a few years, it became difficult to hire replacements and to place the skilled men in jobs once they returned from AFSA, NSA, and CIA hired many of the returnees, but it was eventually decided that it would be better to man the station with military operators. | This later became USM-49 under ASA. When could not these sites also have been used for Comint a that time? As far as were concerned, I doubt in they would have ever known the difference—or cared in they did know. |
|---|---|
| Accordingly the Navy | they did know. |
| took over in June 1957, with the facility redesignated | (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 |
| USN-16. Thus ended the first U.S. civilian operator | |
| In retrospect, I wonder why we had so much trouble finding a suitable site for this station. For example, in 1948-49, the U.S. Navy (not NSG) established an Elint site This site was later turned over to NSG and became USN-18. At this same period, the U.S. Army (not ASA) began operating an ELINT site | USN, is currently serving as Executive Officer of the National Cryptologic School. As a career cryptologic officer, he has served in Sigint activities in many parts of the world, and as Commanding Officer of five of them. He has had several tours in NSA in jobs involving virtually every cryptologic discipline. He has also contributed to the NSA Technical Journal. |
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