

#### NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

FORT GEORGE & MEADE MARYLAND 20755-5000 Serial: N5P/017/98

01 April 1998

Dated: 24 February 1998

DECL ON: X1,X3.X5,X6:X7,X8

Mr. T. Jeremy Gunn Executive Director Assassination Records Review Board 600 E Street, N.W. Washington. DC 20530

against Cuba EXEMPT

Dear Mr. Gunn:

(U) In response to your letter of November 28:1997, we tasked appropriate elements of the NSA Operations and the NSA Archives elements to search for information responsive to your questions. In addition, a member of my staff reviewed our United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and USIB SIGINT Subcommittee record holdings. The following represents the composite response of these elements.

buring the period 1963-1964? Including

CO) Question #1: What were NSA targeting priorities and capabilities

records of the U.S. Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Board, what records does NSA possess on tasking and results from these

	A target communications between
	the meeting Messrs. Hatch and
	Security Agency had a facility EXEMPT
EXEMPT in 1963 target	
operations did not meet with great	<u> </u>
EXEMPT	a former NSA employee.
might have more specific knowled	ge of such an operation and that you
could contact him.	ge of sport are operation and that you
Codid Contact min.	* <u>*</u>
- CC- ANSIED. A	the SICINIT Subcommistee of the IISIR
francisco 1000 maridas a mara fab	the SIGINT Subcommittee of the USIB
from August 19%3 provides a recap of th	le USIB SIGNAL Subcommittee's Priority
National Intelligence Objectives. Include	
[requirements] to obtain information on	
[requirements] to obtain information on	1) Soviet and Cuban military
[requirements] to obtain information on	1) Soviet and Cuban military
[requirements] to obtain information on	1) Soviet and Cuban military
[requirements] to obtain information on	1) Soviet and Cuban military  EXEMPT
frequirements to obtain information on  EXEMPT 2) Soviet and Cuban	1) Soviet and Cuban military  EXEMPT
frequirements to obtain information on  EXEMPT 2) Soviet and Cuban	1) Soviet and Cuban military  EXEMPT
frequirements to obtain information on  EXEMPT 2) Soviet and Cuban	1) Soviet and Cuban military  EXEMPT

## TOP SECRET UMBRA

	<u>.</u>	•		-	
	(TSC) An NSA COMINT	Technical Repo	ort (A5/A6 (	COMINT TECH	INICAL
REP	ORT #1-66- A Survey of S	oviet Communi	cations in C	Cuba) regardin	g SIGINT
resu	ilts of the targeting of Cuba	a was reviewed	by Dr. Hall.	This appears	to be the
mos	t comprehensive record of	our capabilitie	<u>s against C</u>	uba for the 19	63-1964
	frame. Numerous Cuban		EMPT	during the	e early
	Os, <u>including some Cuban</u>	military		ommunication	_
thro	<b>▽</b> 1		NSA had	an excellent o	apability
to m	eet the SIGINT challenges	of the 1960's.	We had fiel	ld sites in posi	tion to
сору	the signals of interest in	Cuba. and thos	se communi	ication exchan	iges
	EXEMPT		-		_
		<del></del>			
	<del>(150)</del> Product reports b	ased on the tar	geting of	EXEMPT	
comi	munications were reviewed	d by two memb	ers of my st	aff. Some of t	hese
	rts were the result of targe				
E.	XEMPT However, no reco	ords responsive	to the Johr	ı F. Kennedy	
Assa	ssination Records Act of 1				v passed
	le ARRB. There were no re				
	might have been related to				
	ctions of U.S. political and				
12 sl	hin boxes [4 linear feet] of	EXEMPT	record		-
	· '				
	(S) in early December 19	997 the ARRB	staff was pr	ovided with th	e name
and:	phone number of the U.S.				
	COM) historian wh <u>o has ir</u>				
	) collection site in EXEMP			4 timeframe.	
	OM historian is EXEMPT			on 703-706-26	
	XEMPT .dvised us of into				
that	was written by EXEMPT			that member	
	met in December 1997 wi				
	Vational SIGINT Committee				
	committee), who provided				
	ities regarding the	EXEMPT		ons in the earl	
					., <u> </u>
(U)	Question #2. What, if any,	additional NSA o	apabilities w	ere added to tai	raet
(-)	communications sources w				
	1964? What information d				
	sources within Cuba by CIA				
	issue? NSA stated that it m				
	related material. Of what do				
	these records?		Choice may	M .	CALLINIC

### OP SECRET UMBRA

the period November 1962 through 1964 were recently reviewed. No SIGINT Objectives were included in the SIGINT Subcommittee's objectives regarding or the 1962-1964 timeframe. The August 1963 SIGINT Subcommittee record recaps SIGINT Objectives and the 5 and 18 November 1963 and the 10 January 1964 records indicate that requirements to target Soviet forces in Cuba and EXEMPT were already receiving priority SIGINT coverage. The 2 December 1963 record appears to show a change in priorities because it presents "pertinent examples of actions underway or planned": 1) increase in intercept and more timely consolidated reporting on Cuban military problems.
2) intercept and analysis of communications related to exempt activityseeking
information on Cuban EXEMPT in particular., 3) A new attack on the problem
•
intercept of Cuban communications is planned, and 5) Increased efforts to
mitercept of Cubair commitmingations is plantified, and of increased enorts to
develop information on the technical characteristics of the internal military
develop information on the technical characteristics of the internal military exempt communications exempt countries.  #5-6007 NSA collectors, based on their personal recollections, were alerted to put greater emphasis on Soviet exempt and Cuban military targets to
develop information on the technical characteristics of the internal military exemple communications exempt countries.  The economy of their personal recollections, were alerted to put greater emphasis on Soviet exempt and Cuban military targets to look for signs of increased readiness in their force posture. Analysts at NSA
develop information on the technical characteristics of the internal military exemple communications exemple countries.  ##\$-\$CCO; NSA collectors, based on their personal recollections, were alerted to put greater emphasis on Soviet exemple and Cuban military targets to look for signs of increased readiness in their force posture. Analysts at NSA were also looking for signs of exemple reactions to, and foreign intelligence
develop information on the technical characteristics of the internal military exemple communications exemple countries.  ##\$-ECO NSA collectors, based on their personal recollections, were alerted to put greater emphasis on Soviet exemple and Cuban military targets to look for signs of increased readiness in their force posture. Analysts at NSA were also looking for signs of exemple reactions to, and foreign intelligence reporting on, the assassination. Any voice and cipher traffic was thoroughly
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· (S-CCO) A review of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) records held by NSA shows CIA and NSA top-level Agency cooperation/coordination on intelligence targeting via the USIB. However, according to recollections of individuals working at NSA in the mid 1960s, liaison between CIA and NSA for the 1962-1964 timeframe was limited and no record of CIA/NSA cooperation/ coordination at the working levels of the agencies was located. We searched for records of CIA targeting of Cuban communications, but no records were located. However, the USIB records make repeated reference to Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) Biweekly Report on High-Level Coverage of Cuba with the caveat that the information was distributed through restricted channels. Because we do not have copies of the COMOR reports, we are unable to determine if the tasking of these missions was limited to PHOTINT, or if SIGINT was also performed from the overhead vehicles. COMOR was the predecessor of the SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee (SORS). The SORS committee is a subcommittee of the current U.S. SIGINT Committee. The Chairman of the SORS is Mr. EXEMPT (phone number: 202-496-9828).

## OP SECRET LIMBRA TO

Regarding the "six to twelve boxes" discussed during our meeting with Dr. Hall and members of the ARRB Staff in November 1997, these boxes referred to are records regarding  mentioned in response to Question #1, a recent review of these records did not result in locating any records not already identified as responsive to the JFK Assassination Records Act. The ARRB staff is welcome to examine these
records as well as any other of the records mentioned in this letter. The records pertaining to Cuba and EXEMPT for this timeframe held by NSA have been researched and those believed to be responsive to the John F. Kennedy Records Act of 1992 have been provided to the ARRB.
(S-CC) Question #3. What canabilities and targeting priorities did NSA have against Cuba outside of EXEMPT and Cuba itself during the time period 1960-1964? What records of this targeting and any results might still exist?
-(TSC)-ANSWER: For the timeframe 1960-1964 NSA targeted and was
EXEMPT
reports based on the intercept of communications, for this period. Those reports deemed responsive to the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Act of 1992 have been forwarded to the ARRB.
Question #4. What policy recommendations from the time period 1960-64 might still exist which reflect NSA policy making or tasking on Cuban military communications outside of Cuba?
(U) ANSWER: As stated previously, the USIB SIGINT Subcommittee records show the objectives (requirements for targeting) and are available for review by ARRB members or staffers.
(S-CCC) Question #5. Are there any COMINT Board recommendations or tasking on the targeting of EXEMPT communications during the period 1963-1964? Does NSA have any other independent knowledge of these targets?
(S-CCO) ANSWER: No recommendation specific to was located, however, the USIB SIGINT subcommittee record of 2 December 1963 presents as one of the "pertinent examples of actions underway or planned:"  "Increased efforts to develop information on the technical characteristics of the internal military exempt countries".

# FOP SECRET UMBRA

(TS-CCO) Question #6. Including all records of the COMINT Board, what records does NSA have that refer to the targeting of any Soviet EXEMPT hat were in place during the period 1963-1964? What were NSA capabilities and targeting priorities against Soviet targets in EXEMPT rom 1963-1964?
TS-ECOL ANSWER: No records referring to NSA targeting of Soviet  EXEMPT were located. Our interest in EXEMPT and our capability against any targets in EXEMPT was very limited.
(2-000) Question #7. Did NSA produce a Technical SIGINT Report (TSR) on capabilities in 1963?
(S-CCO) ANSWER: A search for any Technical SIGINT Reports or similar documents was performed in January 1998 but no records documenting NSA's capabilities against EXEMPT target for the period 1960-1964 were located.
(S-CCO) The ARRB staff was provided with the name and phone number of an INSCOM historian Phone Nr. 703-706-2630), who has information regarding an Army Security Agency collection site in EXEMPT during the 1963-1964 timeframe. In addition ARRB staff members met with Frederick Berghoff, the former Chairman of the National SIGINT Committee, to obtain some "recollections" from Mr. Berghoff regarding NSA's interest and capabilities regarding EXEMPT in 1963.
(U) If you have any questions or need additional clarification regarding the information provided, please contact either Lee Schroyer or Claudia Collins of my staff on (301)688-6798.
Sincerely,

GOANN H. GRUBE
Deputy Director of Policy