Comme

## Lets Reform The Military Reformers

Pentagon Critics Can't Tell LA Laser From a Latrine Fan

... By Fred Reed ....

Any: ANY AND GRAVE things are wrong with the American military, about which nothing will be done; these defects could easily lose us a big war. A major reason why we will do nothing to remedy them is that a few evangelical critics of the military, by focusing on defects which do not exist, have distracted attention from defects that do exist. Not to mince words, much of what prominent adversaries of the military write is absolute, verifiable nonsense—yet Washington takes it seriously. This is an inadequate approach to the management of a heavily armed world.

A few examples of the work of these people, who invariably call themselves Military Reformers:

Dina Rasor, archenemy of the M1 tank, head of the Project on Military Procurement, and so frequently on talk-shows as to seem part of their furniture, has over



大大の人の一年の一大学の一大学のことのできる

the years released all sorts of information purporting to show the manifold shortcomings of the M1. Rather less attention has been paid to the manifold shortcomings of Rasor, the unconscious assumption in much of Washington being that anything derogatory to the military must be true.

In 1985 she published a book, a risk which few Reformers should take. In the book ("The Pentagon"

Underground!), she tells of going with a congressional delegation to Fort Hood, Texas, in 1981 to see the M1. She tells of getting into the driver's seat, low in the front of the hulf, and discovering—lof The Army had designed the tank for midgets! There wasn't enough room for people of normal size. For example, her head bumped against the turret. Why, she gasped, one of our boys might be knocked out.

Ever vigilant, Rasor ferreted out another manifestation of the tanks excessive tininess. She is only 5'6" tall, she writes, yet "I later had a crew member close the hatch while I was in the driver's seat. In order to fit,



Was Castro

New Evidence Shows

By Seymour M. Hersin.

Emorale "walls. Offic EDITORIALS/COLUMNISTS HI



# Ut of Control in 1962? ets Weren't Calling All the Shots in the Cuban Missile Crisis

which became known only when the United States face-to-air missile in the crisis, and senior White broke a Soviet code in 1964, is that it shows the House officials did not consider the possibility that Cubans were more independent of Moscow in the so it had been a Cuban decision to shoot down the


possible. In particular, it suggests that Soviet Pre- The U2 shootdown was a factor in President

the crisis, was shaped by its assumption that of the Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in return for Khrushchev had direct control of all surface-to-air a private American commitment to remove Jupiter missile batteries in Cuba and had ordered the shootdown—perhaps to deliberately escalate the as well as a public pledge not to invade Cuba. crisis: It; was the first known use of a Soviet sur-

mier Nikita S. Khrushchev may not have had comkennedy's decision to send his brother Robert to
plete control of the SAM battery that shot down see Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on the
the U2 If so, the Cuban missile crisis 25 years ago evening of Oct. 27, according to Robert Kennedy's
was even more, dangerous than the public has realized with both superpowers making important fried a tough ultimatum. The Soviets should begin
strategic misjudgments.

The Kennedy administration easses ment of the United States would strike Khrushelm event strategic misjudgments. dismantling the missiles within 48 hours or the The Kennedy administration's assessment of the United States would strike. Khrushchev caved in U2 shootdown, one of the most emotional issues of wo overnight and agreed to an immediate withdrawal missiles within five months from Turkey and Italy,

Soo CRISIS, II2, Col. 1



ciga blames for his the Norlega is bitter. He recalls the day his

im, for reasons that it elected civilian government.... The [U.S.].

de Assistant Secre- : mentor and predecessor, Gen. Omar Tor-Abrams, Sen. Jesse krijos, asked him to go to Cuba to gain the Ambassador to Pan-Ambassador t civilian figurehead ed that "when the Americans need some-Why is Noriega de-Lithing, they picture it very nicely and say

ral [who ruled] Gua you're a hero, but when they don't need you ags?"

United States is, in He says he has done other favors for the te Noriega's regime, United States. He claims that when the name should not be American invasion force took off for Grehould be run by an See PANAMA, 112, Col. 1

### MARY MCGRORY

ANY Washingtonians woke up last Tuesday to the sound up last tuesda, co Abrams, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, was on National Public Radio sounding a . theme that has been peddled by the administration ever since it began its hapless contra venture five years' age. What we are facing is nothing less than the establishment of a "Soviet base in this hemisphere." It was as if the Arias peace plan had pever seen the light of day.

Abrams has been absent from Capitol Hill since the Iran-contra hearings, when he admitted to lying to Congress about his part in getting big bucks to the contras. Sen. Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) refused to have him as a witness and House committees have followed suit.

But if he is out of the loop on the current peace initiative being pushed by House Speaker Jim Wright, Abrams is plainly in sync with his ultimate boss, President Reagan. The president's speech to the Organization of American States, which National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci had told Wright would be conciliatory, was the utterance of a man who chokes on the thought of leaving the Sandinistás in power.

Puzzled Hill people think that Carlucci was possibly speaking in See McGRORY, HE, Col. 4.

Mary McGrory is a Washington Post columnist. .

almost impossible driving position."

I had the same problem until I adjusted the seat. At 5'11' I, fit comfortably into the tank. Not only didn't Rasor know about the adjustable seat, she apparently wasn't interested: The book was published in 1985, and the trip made in 1981, allowing ample time: to make a telephone call. Her whole book is full of such tales. Thus do we influence policy in Washington.

Ignorance of such august dimensions is customary among Reformers. When I first became a military col-See REFORMERS, 114, Col. 1

Fred Reed writes: "Soldiering," a nationally syndicated column on mililary affairs, and is a Washington editor.

, in October 1962, a key Soviet surface-to-. missile base on the island was attacked, ; parently by Cuban troops, with at least 18 Sov casualties, according to newly available decod

communications intercepts.

Less than 12 hours later, on the morning of O 27, 1962, an American U2 spyplane crashed m the base. President Kennedy and his advisors, w did not know of the firefight at the Cuban ba assumed the Soviets had shot down the U2 will missile from that base.

The significance of the military skirmish in Cul

Seymour Hersh is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author of "The Target Is Destroya

By Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black

Service of the service of the service of N 1942, the United States found itself not only lighting a war on the popula-abroad, but trying to unify the populanot only fighting a war on two fronts tion at home behind the war effort. One group—black Americans—presented a particular problem. Blacks still suffered under the burden of Jim Crow laws which kept them segregated in large sections of the country, especially the South as well as the armed forces; they were effectively denied the right to vote in the South, and in the North they were confined to menial jobs and to living in squalid ghettoes.

Polls taken by the government showed

that blacks despised the Germans, not sur-


Claylon Koppes is chairman of the history department of Oberlin College. Gregory Black is chairman of the communications studies department of the University of . Missouri, Kansas City. This article is adapted from "Hollywood Goes to War. How Politics, Profils & Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies."

prising because of the Nazis' racial policies. At the same time, however, blacks showed a more ambivalent attitude toward the Jananese, who some tended to identify with as fellow people of color.

With racial tensions increasing, the government was anxious that nothing aggravate black hostility and undermine the war effort. Films were the most popular form of entertainment and the government, through its Office of War Information, had high hopes of getting Hollywood to portray blacks in a more favorable light than the film industry had ever done before.

There was clearly room for improvement. As Dalton Trumbo said, the movies made, "tarts of the Nogro's daughters, crap shooters of his sons, obsequious Uncle Toms of his fathers, superstitious and grotesque crones of his mothers, strutting peacocks of his successful men, psaint-singing mountebanks of his priests, and Barnum and Bailey side-shows of his religion." .

· · · OWI's Bureau of Motion Pictures regretfully concurred. In an analysis of the depic-See HOLLYWOOD, 114, Cel. 1



## trying to overth

By Lally Weymouth

country in an effort to get rid of him. 1

Noriega is sitting in the back of his helicopter, called "the Super Puma," with a drink in his hand and a pretty female soldier at his side. He's a short man with a pockmarked complexion, derided by his enemies as "pineapple face."

"We are going to make a list of those the U.S. betrayed," says the Panamanian general. "The shah of Iran, Gen. Alvarez of ANAMA CITY—Gen. Manuel Anto- . Honduras—they kidnapped Alvarez and nio Noriega, who has ruled Panama now he's a teacher in a small military since 1983, is complaining that the school." He adds Ferdinand Marcos to the Americans have set about destablizing his list and says that he—Noriega—is the next

" "You can erase me," Noriega says. "But there are another two guys behind me. Ten years ago, I wasn't here.

Noriega is no angel. He's a military strongman and he's been been accused of corruption, brutality and consorting with foreign affairs for The Washington Post. Doint. The United States described and consorting with point. The United States does seem to be

aren't entirely ch . The American present dilemmi tary of State B

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
Asked whethe fact, trying to de Abrams says thi run by a genera

nilitary control of the oint, although .... no side at the time." ion in the television ation about the fireications intercepts. In scores of books and : missile crisis have he extent of Khrush-

emplacements that had fired on the two lowflying American reconnaissance planes on the morning of the 27th.

In Ellsberg's view, Khrushchev understood what Kennedy did not-that he, and perhaps even Fidel Castro, could not stop the firing of the antiaircraft batteries.

"Bobby had no reason to believe that the threat on reconnaissance [to Dobrynin] had



independent corrobothe firefight at Danes, lis crisis-communicaidertaken for W. Walt epartment counselor, ss to America's most jell as to members of also had been deeply... į Cuban air strikes. twed by Ellsberg in ag with Dobrynin on . after the U2 shootp came after the re- ... iller in which he de- ; missiles be pulled out,

are that his remarks july classified internal Deberg of his ultimaly set for early Tues, "war."

pent, as part of a set-

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AM sites in Cuba, and ... any special significance," Elisberg recalled. ly suggested that the .. "He didn't think it was that important. He had been ordered behind no reason to believe that Khrushchev was goissident military men ing to be so reckless as to shoot anything else down. It didn't occur to him that he was talkrecent' weeks that a ing to the wrong nation—and that Khrushchev did not control the Cubans."

> hat fact also didn't occur to Ellsberguntil he was informed on April 14, 1964, about a month after his meeting with Kennedy, of the new intelligence finding.

"Once I learned about the firefight at Los Angeles,". Ellsberg recalled, "I said, Jesus isis in 1962, working ... Christ.' Khrushchev didn't have control and that's why he backed off right away"-within :12 hours instead of taking the next 48 hours Kennedy, who told of and attempting to improve his bargaining positon. Khrushchev knew that the United States would send more reconnaissance flights at first light the next morning and he also knew, Ellsberg theorized, that he could not guarantee that the Cubans manning the antiaircraft guns—and perhaps the SAM site at Los Angeles-would not shoot down another aircraft and precipitate an immediate American response.

Castro, in an interview with journalist Tad ultimatum would not Szulc published last year, acknowledged that intil Kennedy's mem- on Oct. 27 he had given his antiaircraft forces en Days," was pub- ... blanket authority to shoot at low-flying Amerre, the Soviets were ican reconnaissance planes. Only "the inexpetes would attack the rience of our artillerymen," he said, led them by Tuesday morning, seto miss that day. "I am absolutely certain that isome evidence with- if the low-level flights had been resumed [on (the sites were being "Oct. 28], we would have shot down one, two, a already had learned . For three of the planes," Castro said. "I don't ic a full-scale invasion . know whether this would have started nuclear 1

The risks were greater than anyone in idence emerged sug- ... Washington realized.

ultimatum may have ... Other Cuban missile crisis scholars, most Rusk, who was sec---notably Ambassador Raymond L. Garthoff,

mander of Soviet forces in Cuba. Thank quoteu the officer, according to Stevenson, as explaining that all of the antiaircraft weaponry and SAM sites on Cuba are "manned by Cubans. It was a Cuban colonel that shot down our plane."

Statsenko's statement to Thant suggested, as Ellsberg understood, that the Cubans weremanning the SAM sites as of Oct. 30, three days after the only known firing of a SA2 SAM missile had taken place. Since it was highly improbable that the Soviets would turn over control of the SAM sites to the Cubans after the U2 had been shot down and after Khurshchev had agreed to no longer attack 'American reconnaissance aircraft, Statsenko's commtent. seemed to mean that the Soviets had permitted the Cubans to operate the SAM sites at least since the 27th, even if a Soviet officer was on the scene and nominally in charge. :

The second telephone message to Rusk discovered by Eilsberg came from George Ball, the undersecretary of state, who reported Nov. 1 on a conversation he had with Thant's military adviser, Indian Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye. Rikhye described a conversation with Fidel Castro in which the Cuban premier was quoted, as relayed by Ball, as saying that "Castro talked as though he had all the antiaircraft and he did boast that it was the Cubans who had shot down Maj. Anderson. Rikhye himself is not at all persuaded," Ball told Rusk on the telephone, "that this was just only boastfulness on his [Castro's] part,"

Rusk and other members of the ExComm thus had been provided with evidence within' days of the shootdown from both the Cubans and the Soviets in Cuba that the U2 probably had not been attacked on orders from Khrushchev. But the senior officials could not see the

significance of the information because everyone in the government assumed that the spyplane had been shot down by a Soviet SA2 missile in the control of the Soviet forces on the ground-and thus by Khrushchev.

Castro himself has since provided varying accounts of who was in control, telling a Washington Post reporter during an interview in 1985, for example, that Soviet troops had been manning the SA2 missiles when the U2 was shot down. "I did not have the honor of shoot! ing down the spy plane," Castro said,

The strong assumption of Soviet control inside Cuba made it inevitable that the information provided by Thant and his military adviser also would be overlooked throughout the intelligence community, although senior American intelligence officials, in interviews in recent weeks, acknowledged that the United States government had no hard information as of Nov. 1, 1962, as to how Maj. Anderson's

aircraft had been destroyed.

George Ball, in a telephone interview from his office in Princeton, N.J., confirmed that he had held a conversation with Rikhye. Told of i. the intelligence suggesting that Khrushchev had not controlled the U2 shootdown, Ball said he had not been told of the 1964 intercepts but i acknowledged that he "was not surprised." Throughout the crisis, he said, the ExComm was constantly making assumptions about Soviet behavior: "We were making guesses and we were just plain wrong-and we were tapping what we thought was the best possible intelligence."

In the Soviet Union,

Word, of the U2 shootdown came into in the morning on Oct. 27, just moments after the White House learned that Klirushchev had toughened his demands for a settlement of the crisis; by insisting in a letter to Kennedy that any withdrawal of Soviet missiles in Cuba be publicly linked to the withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey. In a note received by the White House the evening before, Khrushchev had offered to withdraw the missiles from Cuba without any such link-age.

The ExComm transcript shows that Pres'ident Kennedy expressed concern that the
'U2 shootdown might be "an escalation" on
the part of Khrushchev, according to those
who have read the transcript. There also
were reports that Cuban-run antiaircraft batferies had opened fire on two low-flying
American reconnaissance aircraft, without
causing serious damage, and there were
guestions in the ExComm, according to the
minutes, about the extent of Khrushchev's
control over the antiaircraft units.

The slain U2 pilot, as many in the Ex-Comm knew, was Air Force Maj. Rudolph Anderson Jr., whose flight two weeks before had been the first to bring back photographic evidence of the Soviet missile installations.

he first challenge to American assumptions about the U2 shootdown came about 18 months later, in early 1964, when analysts at the National Security Agency Succeeded in breaking a Soviet code. The Soviet code system, known to some in the American intelligence community as "Silver," had been in widespread usage by Soviet forces stationed in Cuba in 1962.

As the NSA analysts began decoding some of the many messages sent during the crisis, they learned that there had been a major firefight on the night of Oct. 26 at Los Angeles, a SAM site near a naval base at Banes, on Cuba's northeastern coast—which was the site of the next morning's U2 crash.

was overheard saying that there had been an attack at the adjacent SAM base. He subsequently reported that he was advancing with troops and that three soldiers were killed and 15 others were wounded. The commander, identified by the NSA as an officer named Mal'tsev, also issued a call for surgeons. Seven physicians were sent to the scene that night.

Other NSA intercepts showed that Mal'tsev, whose "advance" was apparently a counterattack against Cuban troops seeking to storm the SAM base, was ordered to make a full report in person the next morning, Oct. 27, to Col. Gen. of Aviation Victor Davidkov, apparently the senior Soviet commander at the time in Cuba.

The intercepts, which made clear that Soviet soldiers had been "shot and wounded," did not specifically name the attacking forces as Cuban, although NSA analysts quickly reached the obvious conclusion that the fighting was between Soviets and Cubans. The intercepts suggested that the attack had ended by the morning of Oct. 27, but the NSA analysts were unable to preciude the possibility that the SAM

and, it could have been Russlans lighting Rules slans. However, an American professor said in an interview last week that during a research trip to Cuba several years ago, he had been told that that the Cubans indeed had taken byer a Soviet military base by force during the Cuban missile crisis.

None of this information was available to the ExComm on the morning of Oct. 27. Nonethe-

was available to the of Oct. 27. Nonether


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less, the intelligence official said, he found it disturbing that the senior members of the Ex-Comm acted without full knowledge in assuming that Khrushchev was responsible for the shootdown: "I don't think you'll ever know who pulled the trigger."

telligence, with its implication that policy-makers had made a serious miscal-culation during the missile crisis 18 months earlier, was kept under tight wraps inside the National Security Agency. Conversations in recent weeks with former members of the ExComm, including McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's national security adviser, indicated that none of the key Kennedy administration actors in the missile crisis had been briefed on the new material in 1964.

The report of the firefight at Banes apparently did not surface again until 1979, when William B. Bader, an assistant deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, initiated an exhaustive study of Soviet forces in Cuba. The Carter administration was then in the embarrassing position of having called public attention to the so-called Soviet "brigade" in Cuba only to learn that it had been in place since the resolution of the missile crisis, which hinged in part on a pledge by the Kennedy administration not to invade the island.

Bader, in a recent interview, recalled asking the intelligence community in 1979 for all of its files on Soviet forces in Cuba. The documents included a bonus: the electronic intelligence about the battle at Banes. "What I saw was a summary talking about a firefight inside Cuba," he said. "It did have date and time groups but the significance of it didn't occur to me at the time." His focus then was to unravel the 1962 and 1970 agreements that permitted the Soviets to keep troops inside Cuba: "I saw that material in context of the brigade issue."

chev's control over the S the few doubters invarial downing of the U2 had Khrushchev's back by d inside the Soviet Union.

Ellsberg, informed in reporter had obtained a ration for his account of told more of the story. I tions study, which was un Rostow, then the State E gave him enormous accelosely held secrets as with ExComm. Ellsberg involved in the missile of with a group planning the

Among those interviewerly 1964 was Robert his extraordinary meeting extraordinary meeting also ceipt of Khrushchey's is manded that the Jupiter with an official announce tlement.

Kennedy, obviously as were meant only for a higovernment study, told turn to Dobrynin. That become publicly known oir of the crisis, "Third lished in 1969. In esset told that the iUnited St. missile sites inside Cuba Oct. 30, unless there wa in the next 48 hours that dismantled. Soviet official that American planning I was underway, with D-I day morning.

(Six weeks ago, now e gesting that Kennedy's been partly a bluff. Dea

PANAMA, From III

pada, Vice President George Bush called and asked him to tell Castro to stay away. (Bush denies this through a spokesman.) g "Bush is my friend," says Noriega. "I hope

'Me becomes president.'

A

'n blaming the Americans for all his problems, Noriega has downplayed the wide-L spread and genuine opposition to his regime. But it cannot be denied that the United . States is playing an active role in underminng him. For example, one senior State Degarlment official wondered out loud recently: JWhy is it so hard to get rid of Noriega and Pinochet, when it was so easy with Haiti and Marcos?"

Ndriega clearly feels that he's being corpered by the Americans. Last month, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution cutting off failitary and economic aid within 45 days unless the military (meaning Noriega and his forces) ceased to dominate the politics of ganama. Meanwhile, Panama's economy is drumbling. As a result of the political instability, capital is being withdrawn and credit

jsn't available. 🗀

The situation appeared to be reaching a gtalemate in the past month, and moderates were hopeful that a compromise could be arranged. But instead of showing the hopedfor signs of moderation; Noriega lashed out this week. He had Delvalle make a hardline speech warning that the government would crack down on future opposition demonstrations. And after the speech, the police went. out and picked up eight U.S. servicemen,

who were held overnight along with many Panamanian opposition members.

"This is only a sample of what could happen," says an anxious former U.S. official. "Noriega is bad, but he keeps the lid on. Don't corner him. He will fight and he holds the trump. We've got a catastrophe in Nicaragua. Do we need another one in Panama of our own making?"

oriega made his name as the head of the Panamanian military intelligence service. In this capacity, he established close intelligence links with the Israelis. (Elis right hand man is reputedly a former Mossad agent named Mike Herari, and one U.S. official told me that Israel wants to see Noriega stay in power because of the information he provides.) Noriega also developed a long-term relationship with the Cubans.

A Machiavellian character, Noriega managed to play left against right and stay on top in Panama. If he gave communists key positions in his government and made Panama a rest-and-recreation site for some of the world's leading terrorists, he also managed to make it safe for the thousands of U.S. soldiers that are stationed there.

Four months ago everything changed, when Col. Roberto Diaz Herrera broke the code of silence that the Panamanian defense forces had always maintained about Noriega. and themselves. Herrera alleged publicly what had long been rumored: that Noriega had ordered the murder of his political opponent, Hugo Spadafora, back in 1985, that he had participated in a plot to assassinate. I that by attacking the Torrijos and that the election of 1984 had making its eagerm

been rigged. Nor charges are "total sick man.'

But in respons crowds took to the waving white han Noriega's ouster a Businessmen who I politics joined with the so-called "Civil ganized and sustai in Panama since ! rule 19 years ago.

Sitting at the he ble in his plush off nian military facilit riega explains how created the prese responsible, he cha

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Helms did inder long before it becar one of his senior s me. And the scunt very active in pre resolution, which a imous vote.

s for why At in Panama, "Elliott defin to save himself fro was referring to ! contra alfair. Norie told by many Ame tion on Panama is himself with the Co

The State Depa

. CRISIS, From III

That Saturday, Oct. 27, was described by :Harvard professor Graham T. Allison in his classic 1971 study, "Essence of Decision," as -"the blackest and most frustrating day of the ', crisis." New details will emerge soon when a 25th-anniversary conference at Harvard Unieversity releases a previously classified transcript of the Oct. 27 meetings of President Kennedy's missile-crisis management group known as the Executive Committee, or "Ex-"Comm."

"The ExComm transcript will show that Kennedy was more willing than many of his ladvisers to compromise over withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey than previbusly thought. Kennedy wondered on Oct. 27 show he could justify risking a nuclear war over the details of withdrawing missiles from Turkey that his own advisers considered obsolete. The minutes also show that ExComm members, in their discussions that day, all assumed that Khrushchev had authorized the U2 shootdown as a show of force designed to buttress his bargaining strategy-or had --- แรงสะบไหญาใหญาแก้นหม่เปลดหายเลยสาย เลย คนั้น

site at Los Angeles may not have been fully under Soviet control when the U2 was shot down.

Other evidence supported the analysts' assumption. By early 1964, according to a former official who was at the top of an intelligence agency at the time, there was clear evidence that the Cuban military—and thus Fidel . Castro—had been in direct control of the many antiaircraft batteries scattered throughout the island at the height of the crisis. The, official recalled that his agency eventually concluded that the SA2 SAM sites had been "manned by a mixed crew of Cubans and Russians" as of Oct. 27. Furthermore, he said, there was no available evidence linking Khrushchev to an order to shoot down Maj. Anderson's U2.

"We'll never know whether it was shot down by Cubans or Russians," the official added. "I doubt even if Castro knows."

Cuban accounts of the crisis are contradictory, and it remains unclear why Cubans would have attacked the Los Angeles SAM site. An American who recently visited Havana said that a senior Cuban official had told him that he had no knowledge of such a firefight in Oc-

Bader, who is n think tank called S ized much later the intelligence report. question," he said. especially of an exol in the system? W community at the ! Why didn't they app den of it?"

One government: the strategic signifi-1964 was Daniel E from the Rand Con sified study for the crisis communicatio sile crisis. Ellsberg). en years later as the top-secret Pentagor; close his special kno until April 1986, w. WGBH, the Bostor. for a documentary ( to be aired in 1989;

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to !Herrera's, charges, streets of Panama City, erchiefs and calling for I the end of military rule. d never been involved in. teachers and lawyers in ... n Crusade," the first ortd opposition movement

imposition of military a high i at a joint U.S.-Panamacalled Fort Amador, Not believes the Americans I crisis. The man most es is Sen. Helms. . . .

opposed the transfer of a," says Noriega, "and . is political life to fighting

W. Carrie start opposing Noriega" I fashionable to do so, as flera readily affirmed to is staff has indeed been sed by an almost unan-

ms is promoting change :. priega had this to say: ly lias his own strategy !his jown problems." He ams' role in the Iran-Iclaims that he has been ans that Abrams' posimeans of ingratiating ress.

ment may have hoped impopular Noriega and for democratization as

iga says that all these clear in regard to Panama as it is in Nicara. gua, the administration would attract liberal ' support for the contras.

. But there is another reason for the American enthusiasm to get rid of Noriega. Looking toward the year 2000, when the United States would turn over the canal to Panama, American officials want to plan for a stable government, friendly to U.S. interests. Back in 1977 when President Carter signed the Panama Canal treaty, U.S. strategic planners had not counted on a Sandinista presence in Nicaragua. As instability has increased in the region during the last few years, the State-Department and the NSC staff have concluded that anything would be better in Panama than Noriega. The Pentagon and CIA aren't so enthusiastic about the campaign against the Panamanian leader, partly because they aren't sure what would come next.

The best solution to the present crisis is probably negotiations between Noriega and the opposition. Noriega claims he is willing to negotiate with anyone without preconditions, but members of the Crusade say they will not 'negotiate with him until he announces a reoting the latest Senate is tirement date-which he will not do.

Noriega struck a conciliatory tone in the interview, saying, about the opposition: "We have to gain their trust that they can have a fair chance in competing for the government." As for the next election, which is scheduled for 1989, he said he would agree to having computers count the votes and to representation of the opposition on the elec-

toral tribunal—which is not now the case.

But many Panamanians would regard an election with Norlega still at the helm as a waste of time. After all, many believe he fixed the returns of the last election and then later kicked out the appointed winner, Nicky Barletta. Asked whether he would be willing.

to sten down before the election, he was even sive, claiming that this would lead to the destruction of the armed forces and ensuing anarchy. In reply to a question, he said he would run for president.

Noriega has other problems. According to news accounts, two federal investigations in Florida are looking into possible drug violations by Noriega, an allegation he denies. And he's angered conservatives in the United States by flirting with Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega. Asked why he was dealing with Ortega if he was worried about the left, Noriega: replied that he had to talk with everyone and then asked: "Why does Reagan embrace Gorbachev?"

So what should the United States do about Noriega? It could actively encourage negotiations between the two sides—and not just stand by and wait for a disaster to occur. It could, for example, send a special U.S. emissary to cut a deal with Noriega to get him out by 1989. These steps have been discussed but not yet implemented.

The danger for the United States of a continuing stalemate is that as the situation gets worse, Noriega will play his only card-and unleash the Cuban-backed leftist elements he has kept under control until now. 1

State Department officials, although concerned by the radicalization of Nicaragua and Cory Acquino's problems in the Philippines, argue that Panama will be different, that it does not have an active insurgency like the Philippines and that it will not face a threat from the left because it has such a strong. middle class. But as they move to destabilize Noriega's regime, how can American officials. be sure they aren't providing an opening for the left? In any event, if the United States decides to oust Noriega, it should do so quickly and decisively—by finding a viable alternative and backing him all the way.

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retary of state at the time, disclosed that Kennedy had told him to contact United Nations - Secretary General U Thant and have him propose a compromise if the tough talk didn't work and Khrushchev didn't back down.)

• Elisberg recalled that he asked Kennedy: "So they had 48 hours to decide and if no disimantling is under way, then we'll hit the missile sites and follow up with an invasion.' Bobby interjected, 'Unless they hit another reconnaissance plane and in that case, we will hit all the SAM sites immediately and probably the missile sites as well.". More reconnaissance flights were scheduled for the next morning. Kennedy was specific, Ellsberg said, in recalling that he had told Dobrynin he had 48 hours to act.

In act.
In! Thirteen Days," Kennedy described his tough conversation with Dobrynin this way: The shooting down of the U2 was "a most serious turn of events," he quoted himself as telling the Soviet ambassador. "Because of the deception of the Soviet Union, our photographic reconnaissance planes would have to continue to fly over Cuba, and if the Cubans or Soviets shot at these planes, then we would have to shoot back. This would inevitably lead to further incidents and to escalation of the conflict, the implications of which were very grave indeed." Kennedy was assuming that Khrushchev had control not only over the SAM sites in Cuba but also over the many an-

confirmed in recent interviews that the private record shows that Robert Kennedy did warn Dobyrnin about reconnaisance flights in their Oct. 27 meeting. Garthoff, who wrote many key memoranda during the crisis as a young State Department officer, reports new details about the extent of Soviet-Cuban estrangement in his new book on the missile crisis, which will be published later this month. After Khrushchev's backdown, he writes, "Cuban troops took up positions around the four Soviet missile bases on Oct. 28 and remained there for three days . . . . This fact was not immediately known."

s his research continued, Ellsberg said, he found further evidence of Khrush-chev's lack of control, ignored at the time, in Rusk's as-yet-unpublished telephone records. Elisberg was provided with full access to all of the secretary of state's telephone logs and memoranda and uncovered two extraordinary telephone calls in which Thant reported on his visit to Cuba in late October, just after Khrushchev had agreed to dismantle the nuclear missiles.

. The first telephone message, dated Oct. 31. was from Adlai Stevenson, the American ambassador to the United Nations, who relayed Thant's account of a meeting on Oct. 30 in Havana with the Soviet ambassador and a young brigadier general, identified as Igor