TO: Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair

Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and

Procedure

FROM: W. Eugene Davis, Chair

Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure

SUBJECT: Report of the Advisory Committee on Criminal

Rules

DATE: May 10, 2001

I. Introduction

The Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure met on April 25-26 in Washington, D.C. and acted on the proposed restyling of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and on proposed substantive amendments to some of those rules. The Minutes of that meeting are included at Appendix E.

II. Action Items—Summary and Recommendations.

This report contains two action items:

- Approval and forwarding to the Judicial Conference of restyled Criminal Rules 1 through 60 (Appendix A); and
- Approval and forwarding to the Judicial Conference of substantive amendments to eight rules—Rules 5, 5.1, 10, 12.2, 26, 30, 35, and 43 (Appendix B).

III. ACTION ITEM—Approval and Forwarding to Judicial Conference of Restyled Criminal Rules 1-60 (Appendix A)

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B. Publication of Style and Substantive Packages for Public Comment

In June 2000, the Standing Committee authorized publication for public comment of two packages of amendments. The purpose of presenting the proposed amendments in two separate pamphlets was to highlight for the public that in addition to the "style" changes in Rules 1 to 60, a number of significant (perhaps controversial) amendments were also being proposed.

1. The "Style" Package

The first package (Appendix A)—referred to as the "style" package, included Rules 1 to 60. For those rules where the Committee was proposing significant substantive changes (Rules 5, 5.1, 10, 12.2, 26, 30, 35, 41, and 43), the language containing those

changes was deleted from the "style" package. A "Reporter's Note" explained to the public that additional substantive changes for that particular rule were being published simultaneously in a separate package.

2. The "Substantive" Package

The second package (Appendix B)—referred to as the "substantive" package, consisted of Rules 5, 5.1, 10, 12.2, 26, 30, 32, 35, 41, and 43, which all provide for significant changes in practice. This version of the package included not only the restyled version of the rule but also the language that would effect the change in practice. The Committee Notes reflect those changes and again, a "Reporter's Note" explained that another version of each of these rules (which included only style changes) was being published simultaneously in a separate package.

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IV. ACTION ITEM—Approval and Forwarding to Judicial Conference of Amendments to Rules 5, 5.1, 10, 12.2, 12.4, 26, 30, 35, and 43 in the Substantive Package (Appendix B)

A. The Substantive Package of Amendments—An Overview

In June 2000, the Standing Committee approved publication of a separate package of amendments, known as the "substantive" package. That package originally consisted of Rules 5, 5.1, 10, 12.2, 26, 30, 32, 35, 41, and 43, which all provide for significant changes in practice. This version of the package includes not only the restyled version of the rule but also the language that would effect the change in practice. The Committee Notes reflect those changes and a

"Reporter's Note" explained to the public that another version of each of these rules (which includes only style changes) was being published simultaneously in a separate package.

The Advisory Committee received approximately 80 written comments, and heard the testimony of five witnesses, on the proposed substantive amendments. Most of the comments focused on the proposed amendments to Rules 5, 10, and 26, which would provide for video teleconferencing of initial appearances and arraignments and for video transmission of trial testimony. Those comments and testimony are summarized by rule at Appendix C.

B. Presentation of Substantive Package to Judicial Conference

As noted, above, the Advisory Committee published two separate packages of amendments: the "style" package and the "substantive" package. Throughout the post-publication review of the public comments and revisions, and for purposes of discussion by the Standing Committee, the Advisory Committee has maintained the two distinct packages.

The "style" package of amendments to Rules 1-60 is designed to stand on its own and could be presented to the Judicial Conference and Supreme Court in that format. The proposed amendments in the separate, "substantive" package include not only the style changes to those particular rules, but more importantly, the significant substantive amendments that may generate some controversy. Following the public comment, the Committee made a number of changes to proposed Rules 5 and 10 and withdrew two amendments that seemed particularly controversial—the amendments to Rule 32 and 41. The Committee does not believe that the substantive amendments as presently written will draw significant controversy.

The Standing Committee must decide whether to submit the style and substantive packages separately to the Judicial Conference. Whatever the Standing Committee decides to do in this respect, the Advisory Committee assumes that the rules that the Judicial Conference approves will be blended together for submission to the Supreme Court.

C. Rule-by-Rule Summary of Post-Publication Changes to the Substantive" Package

1. Rule 5. Initial Appearance: Video Teleconferencing

The substantive change to Rule 5 is in new Rule 5(d), which permits video teleconferencing for an appearance under this rule—if the defendant consents. This change reflects the growing practice among state courts to use video teleconferencing to conduct initial proceedings. A similar amendment was proposed to Rule 10 concerning arraignments. In amending Rules 5, 10, and 43 (which generally requires the defendant's presence at all proceedings), the Committee was very much aware of the argument that permitting a defendant to appear by video teleconferencing might be considered an erosion of an important element of the judicial process.

As originally presented to the Standing Committee in January 2000, the proposed rule included a provision to use video teleconferencing for initial appearances—if the defendant consents. Upon further reflection, the Advisory Committee recommended, and the Standing Committee adopted, a proposal to publish not only that provision but also an alternate provision that would permit the court to conduct such procedures, even without the defendant's consent. Thus, the published version offered two alternatives.

After further discussion, the Advisory Committee recommends, by a vote of 7 to 4, that the Standing Committee approve the version that requires the defendant's consent.

The public comment (which included responses from district judges and magistrate judges) on the proposed amendments was mixed. For example, on behalf of the Committee on Defender Services, its chair objected to the use of video teleconferencing without the defendant's consent and expressed reservations about its use under any circumstances. The Committee nonetheless believes that in appropriate circumstances the court and the defendant should have the option of using video teleconferencing, as long as the defendant consents to that procedure. The question of when it would be appropriate for a defendant to consent is not spelled out in the rule. That is left to the defendant and the court in each case. Nor does the rule specify any particular technical requirements for the video conferencing system to be used.

The Committee Note to Rule 5 has been expanded to include additional discussion on the factors that a court may wish to consider in deciding whether to use video teleconferencing for initial appearances.

Recommendation: The Advisory Committee recommends that the substantive amendment to Rule 5 be approved and forwarded to the Judicial Conference with the recommendation that if it is approved, the "substantive" version be substituted for the "style" version.

2. Rule 5.1. Preliminary Hearing: Authority of Magistrate Judge to Grant Continuance

Rule 5.1(c) contains a substantive change that creates a conflict between the rule and a federal statute—18 U.S.C. § 3060(c). The proposed amendment is being offered at the recommendation of the Judicial Conference at its Spring 1998 meeting.

In 1997, the Advisory Committee considered a proposed amendment to Rule 5(c), which would permit a magistrate judge to continue a preliminary hearing even if, the defendant objects. The Committee decided to recommend to the Standing Committee that it first propose legislative changes to § 3060(c). The Standing Committee, however, believed it more appropriate for the Advisory Committee to propose a change to Rule 5(c) through the Rules Enabling Act and remanded the issue to the Advisory Committee. At its October 1997 meeting, the Committee considered the issue and decided not to pursue the issue any further, and reported that position to the Standing Committee at its January 1998 meeting.

The matter was ultimately presented to the Judicial Conference during its Spring 1998 meeting. In its summary of actions, the Conference remanded the issue to the Advisory Committee with:

instructions to the Rules Committee to propose an amendment to Criminal Rule 5.1(c) consistent with the amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3060 which has been proposed by the Magistrate Judges Committee.

Revised Rule 5.1 includes language that expands the authority of a magistrate judge to grant a continuance for a preliminary hearing conducted under the rule. Currently, if the defendant does not

consent, then the government must present the matter to a district judge. As noted above, the proposed amendment conflicts with 18 U.S.C. § 3060, which tracks the original language of the rule and permits only a district judge to grant a continuance when the defendant objects. The Committee believes that this restriction is an anomaly. The Committee also believes that the change will promote judicial economy and that it is entirely appropriate to seek this change to the rule through the Rules Enabling Act procedures. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Under those procedures, approval by Congress of this rule change would supersede the parallel provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 3060. The Committee understands that if the amendment is approved, the appropriate Congressional staff will be advised and an amendment of the existing law pursued.

No post-publication changes were made to Rule 5.1, other than minor stylistic changes.

Recommendation: The Advisory Committee recommends that the substantive amendment to Rule 5.1 be approved and forwarded to the Judicial Conference with the recommendation that if it is approved, the "substantive" version be substituted for the "style" version.

3. Rule 10. Arraignment

The proposed amendments to Rule 10 create two exceptions to the requirement that the defendant be personally present in court for an arraignment. First, revised Rule 10(b) permits the court to hold an arraignment in the defendant's absence when the defendant has waived the right to be present in writing and the court consents to that waiver. Second, revised Rule 10(c) permits the court to hold

arraignments by video teleconferencing—with the defendant's consent. A conforming amendment will also be made to Rule 43.

a. Waiver of Appearance at Arraignment: Rule 10(b)

Although the Committee considered the traditional objections to permitting a defendant to waive a personal appearance, the Committee nonetheless believed that in appropriate circumstances the court, and the defendant, should have the option of conducting the arraignment in the defendant's absence—a procedure used in some state courts. Under Rule 10(b), the defendant must give his or her consent in writing and it must be signed by both the defendant and the defendant's attorney. Finally, the amendment requires that the waiver specifically state that the defendant has received a copy of the charging instrument.

The amendment does not permit waiver of an appearance when the defendant is charged with a felony information. In that instance, the defendant is required by Rule 7(b) to be present in court to waive the indictment. Nor does the amendment permit a waiver of appearance when the defendant is standing mute, or entering a conditional plea, a nolo contendere plea, or a guilty plea. In each of those instances the Committee believed that it was more appropriate for the defendant to appear personally.

The amendment does not permit the defendant to waive the arraignment itself, which may be a triggering mechanism for time limits in other rules.

The Committee voted unanimously to recommend approval of Rule 10(b).

b. Video Teleconferencing for Arraignments: Rule 10(c).

Rule 10(c) addresses the second substantive change in the rule. That rule would permit the court to conduct arraignments through video teleconferencing. Although the practice is now used in state courts and in some federal courts, Rules 10 and 43 have generally prevented federal courts from using that method for arraignments in criminal cases over the defendant's objection. See, e.g., Valenzuela-Gonzales v. United States, 915 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1990) (Rules 10 and 43 require personal appearance; thus, pilot program for video teleconferencing not permitted). A similar amendment was proposed by the Committee in 1993 and published for public comment but was later withdrawn from consideration in order to consider the results of several planned pilot programs. Upon further consideration, the Committee believed that the benefits of using video teleconferencing outweighed the costs of doing so. This amendment also parallels a proposed change Rule 5(d) that would permit initial appearances to be conducted by video teleconferencing.

When this rule was published for public comment, an alternative version was also provided. The alternative version of Rule 10(c) would have permitted the court to use teleconferencing without the defendant's consent.

In deciding to adopt the amendment, the Committee was persuaded in part by the fact that some districts deal with a very high volume of arraignments of defendants who are in custody and because of the distances involved, must be transported long distances. That procedure can also present security risks to law enforcement and court personnel.

Unlike the waiver for any appearance whatsoever at an arraignment, noted above, this particular provision would not require that the waiver for video teleconferencing be in writing. Nor does it require that the defendant waive that appearance in person, in open court.

The Committee voted 8 to 3 to recommend this amendment to Rule 10. As with Rule 5, above, the Committee Note has been expanded to address issues that the court may wish to consider in using video teleconferencing.

Recommendation: The Advisory Committee recommends that the substantive amendments to Rule 10 be approved and forwarded to the Judicial Conference with the recommendation that if they are approved, the "substantive" version be substituted for the "style" version.

4. Rule 12.2. Notice of Insanity Defense; Mental Examination

Rule 12.2, which addresses the notice requirements for presenting an insanity defense or evidence of mental condition on the merits, contains several significant amendments.

First, Rule 12.2(c) clarifies that a court may order a mental examination for a defendant who has indicated an intention to raise a defense of mental condition bearing on the issue of guilt. Second, under Rule 12.2(b), the defendant is required to give notice of an intent to present expert evidence of the defendant's mental condition during a capital sentencing proceeding. Third, Rule 12.2(c) addresses the ability of the trial court to order a mental examination for a defendant who has given notice of an intent to present evidence of

mental condition during capital sentencing proceedings and sets out when the results of that examination may be disclosed. Fourth, the amendment addresses the timing of disclosure of the results and reports of the defendant's expert examination. Finally, the amendment extends the sanctions for failure to comply with the rule's requirements to the punishment phase of a capital case. Rule 12.2(d).

The Committee made several post-publication changes to Rule 12.2. First, it deleted the words "upon motion of the government" from Rule 12.2 (c)(1) to reflect that examinations may also be requested by either the defendant or the government. Second, Rule 12.2(c)(4)(A) has been modified to clarify that a defendant's statements are admissible only after the defendant has introduced evidence requiring the notice in Rule 12.2(a) or (b)(1). Finally, Rule 12.2(c)(4)(B) has been amended to clarify that introduction of expert testimony in a capital sentencing proceeding requiring notice under Rule 12.2(b)(2) will trigger use of a defendant's statements.

The Committee voted unanimously to recommend approval of the substantive amendments to Rule 12.2.

Recommendation: The Advisory Committee recommends that the substantive amendments to Rule 12.2 be approved and forwarded to the Judicial Conference with the recommendation that if they are approved, the "substantive" version be substituted for the "style" version.

5. Rule 12.4. Disclosure Statement (New Rule)

The Committee made several post-publication changes to new Rule 12.4. First, regarding Rule 12.4(a)(2), the Committee recognized the potential difficulty in requiring the prosecution to

learn all of the disclosable information about an organizational defendant early in the proceedings. Thus, the Committee added the words, "to the extent it can be obtained through due diligence" at the end of that section. Second, the language in Rule 12.4(b)(1) was intended to track similar language in the Civil Rules counterpart to this rule but that approach creates problems in applying the requirements to a criminal proceeding. Thus, the Committee modified Rule 12.4(b)(1) to indicate that the disclosure requirements are triggered with the defendant's initial appearance. Finally, the Committee has recommended deleting the reference in Rule 12.4(a)(1)(B), which delegates authority to the Judicial Conference to prescribe additional disclosure requirements that may preempt local rules governing disclosure.

Recommendation: The Advisory Committee recommends that Rule 12.4 be approved and forwarded to the Judicial Conference with the recommendation that it be approved.

6. Rule 26. Taking Testimony: Video Transmission of Testimony

The proposed amendment to Rule 26(b) would permit the court to use remote transmission of live testimony. Current Rule 26 indicates that normally only testimony given in open court will be considered, unless otherwise provided by the rules, an Act of Congress, or any other rule adopted by the Supreme Court. For example, Rule 15 recognizes that depositions, in conjunction with Federal Rule of Evidence 804, may be used to preserve and present testimony if there are exceptional circumstances in the case and it is in the interest of justice to do so. The revision to Rule 26(b) extends the logic underlying that exception to contemporaneous video

testimony of an unavailable witness. The amendment generally parallels a similar provision in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43.

As a result of public comments, the Committee modified the rule in several respects. First, the rule was changed to make it clear that the Committee envisions two-way video transmission. Second, the term "compelling circumstances" was changed to "exceptional circumstances" to reflect the standard for taking depositions in Rule 15 and the standard applied by courts that have addressed the Confrontation Clause issue. Finally, the Committee Note has been expanded.

Although a number of public comments raised concerns about whether the amendment would violate a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause, the Committee believes that the rule is constitutional and that permitting use of video transmission of testimony only in those instances when certain requirements are met, is appropriate. *See United States v. Gigante*, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999) (use of remote transmission of unavailable witness' testimony did not violate confrontation clause).

The amendment recognizes that there is a need for the trial court to impose appropriate safeguards and procedures to insure the accuracy and quality of the transmission, the ability of the jurors to hear and view the testimony, and the ability of the judge, counsel, and the witness to hear and understand each other during questioning. Deciding what safeguards are appropriate is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. That topic is discussed in an expanded Committee Note.

The Committee voted unanimously to recommend approval of the amendment to Rule 26.

Recommendation: The Advisory Committee recommends that the substantive amendment to Rule 26 be approved and forwarded to the Judicial Conference with the recommendation that if it is approved, the "substantive" version be substituted for the "style" version.

7. Rule 30. Jury Instructions

The amendment to Rule 30 would permit the court to request the parties to submit their requested instructions before trial. The current rule indicates that a court may request those instructions after the trial has started. Several public comments raised concerns that permitting the court to require the defense to disclose its theory of the case prior to trial might be problematic. The Committee concluded, however, that the court should have the option of requesting pretrial submission of requested instructions and has included a comment in the Note to the effect that the amendment is not intended to change the practice of submitting supplemental requests after trial has started.

The Committee has also addressed the issue of waiver of objections to the instructions by adding a sentence at the end of Rule 30(d). The Committee decided not to address more explicitly the issue of whether a party must renew an objection after the instructions are given.

The Committee voted 9 to 2 to recommend approval of the amendment to Rule 30.

Recommendation: The Advisory Committee recommends that the substantive amendment to Rule 30 be approved and forwarded to the Judicial Conference with the recommendation that if it is approved, the "substantive" version be substituted for the "style" version.

8. Rule 35. Correcting or Reducing Sentence

Rule 35 contains several changes. First, as noted, *supra*, the published version of Rule 35 used the term "sentencing" to describe the triggering element for the two "time" requirements in the rule. While the rule was out for public comment, and at the suggestion of the Standing Committee, the Advisory Committee discussed the issue of further defining or clarifying the term "sentencing." The Committee's initial decision was to use the term "oral announcement of the sentence." That is the view of the majority of the courts that have addressed the issue. Upon further reflection, however, the Committee decided to add a new provision (now Rule 35(a)) and define sentencing as the entry of the judgment. Even though that may result in the change in practice in some circuits, it is more consistent with describing the triggering event, for example, of an approval of a sentence.**

^{**} At the request of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure agreed at its June 7-8, 2001, meeting, to withdraw the proposal defining "sentencing" as the entry of the judgment. The Committee also agreed with the advisory committee's recommendation to publish the withdrawn proposal for public comment.

Rule 35(c) (published as Rule 35(b)) includes a substantive change that had been under consideration apart from the restyling project. Rule 35(c) includes new language to the effect that the government may file a late motion to reduce a sentence if it demonstrates that the defendant had presented information, the usefulness of which could not reasonably be known until more than one year following sentencing. The current rule, however, did not address the issue and the courts were split on the issue. *Compare United States v. Morales*, 52 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1995) (permitting filing and granting of motion) with United States v. Orozco, 160 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1998) (denying relief and citing cases). Although the court in *Orozco* felt constrained to deny relief under Rule, the court urged an amendment of the rule to:

address the apparent unforeseen situation presented in this case where a convicted defendant provides information to the government prior to the expiration of the jurisdictional, one-year period from sentence imposition, but that information does not become useful to the government until more than one year after sentence imposition. *Id.* at 1316, n.13.

The amendment to Rule 35(c) is intended to address the instances identified by the court in *Orozco*. The proposed amendment would not eliminate the one-year requirement as a generally operative element.

Following additional consideration of the rule, the Committee has recommended, post-publication, a slight expansion in Rule 35(c) that would permit the government to file a motion for sentence reduction when the defendant is not aware of the helpful nature of the

information until after one year, but provides it to the government promptly upon learning of its usefulness.

The Committee voted unanimously to recommend the approval of the proposed amendments to Rule 35.

Recommendation: The Advisory Committee recommends that the substantive amendments to Rule 35 be approved and forwarded to the Judicial Conference with the recommendation that if they are approved, the "substantive" version be substituted for the "style" version.

9. Rule 43. Defendant's Presence

The amendments to Rule 43 are conforming changes, that hinge on approval of Rules 5 and 10 concerning video teleconferencing, and Rule 10 that permits the defendant to waive appearance at an arraignment. The Committee made no post-publication changes to Rule 43.

Recommendation: The Advisory Committee recommends that the substantive amendment to Rule 43 be approved and forwarded to the Judicial Conference with the recommendation that if it is approved, the "substantive" version be substituted for the "style" version.

VI. INFORMATION ITEM—Withdrawal of Substantive Amendment to Rule 32 and Deferral of Substantive Amendment to Rule 41

A. Rule 32. Sentencing: Ruling on Material Matters.

The Standing Committee approved publication of an amendment to Rule 32 that would have required the sentencing judge to resolve objections to "material" matters in the presentencing report—even if those matters would not directly affect the actual sentence. The rationale for that proposed change rested on the understanding that the presentence report is used by the Bureau of Prisons in making important post-sentencing decisions regarding such issues as the ability of the defendant to receive drug treatment. Upon further consideration, and after considering comments from the Bureau of Prisons, the Committee decided to withdraw the recommendation. Nonetheless, the Committee decided to include information in the Committee Note that would draw attention to the potential problems associated with incorrect information in the presentence report.

B. Rule 41. Search and Seizure: Covert Searches

The Standing Committee approved publication of an amendment to Rule 41 that would have addressed the procedures for issuing a warrant for covert entries. After considering the public comments on the rule, and further discussion, the Committee has decided to defer further action on that amendment. The Committee envisions continued discussions of the amendment and contemporaneous consideration of amendments to Rule 41 that would address the topic of issuing what are often referred to as "tracking device" warrants.

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PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE*

Rule 5. Initial Appearance Before the Magistrate Judge

(a) In General. Except as otherwise provided in this rule,
an officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon
a complaint or any person making an arrest without a
warrant shall take the arrested person without
unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal
magistrate judge or, if a federal magistrate judge is not
reasonably available, before a state or local judicial
officer authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3041. If a person
arrested without a warrant is brought before a magistrate
judge, a complaint, satisfying the probable cause
requirements of Rule 4(a), shall be promptly filed. When
a person, arrested with or without a warrant or given a
summons, appears initially before the magistrate judge,
the magistrate judge shall proceed in accordance with the

^{*} New matter is underlined; matter to be omitted is lined through.

applicable subdivisions of this rule. An officer making
an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint
charging solely a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1073 need not
comply with this rule if the person arrested is transferred
without unnecessary delay to the custody of appropriate
state or local authorities in the district of arrest and an
attorney for the government moves promptly, in the
district in which the warrant was issued, to dismiss the
complaint.

- (b) Misdemeanors and Other Petty Offenses. If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor or other petty offense triable by a United States magistrate judge under 18 U.S.C. § 3401, the magistrate judge shall proceed in accordance with Rule 58.
- (c) Offenses Not Triable by the United States Magistrate

 Judge. If the charge against the defendant is not triable

 by the United States magistrate judge, the defendant shall

22 FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

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not be called upon to plead. The magistrate judge shall inform the defendant of the complaint against the defendant and of any affidavit filed therewith, of the defendant's right to retain counsel or to request the assignment of counsel if the defendant is unable to obtain counsel, and of the general circumstances under which the defendant may secure pretrial release. The magistrate judge shall inform the defendant that the defendant is not required to make a statement and that any statement made by the defendant may be used against the defendant. The magistrate judge shall also inform the defendant of the right to a preliminary examination. The magistrate judge shall allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall detain or conditionally release the defendant as provided by statute or in these rules. A defendant is entitled to a preliminary examination, unless waived, when charged 50

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with any offense, other than a petty offense, which is to be tried by a judge of the district court. If the defendant waives preliminary examination, the magistrate judge shall forthwith hold the defendant to answer in the district court. If the defendant does not waive the preliminary examination, the magistrate judge shall schedule a preliminary examination. Such examination shall be held within a reasonable time but in any event not later than 10 days following the initial appearance if the defendant is in custody and no later than 20 days if the defendant is not in custody, provided, however, that the preliminary examination shall not be held if the defendant is indicted or if an information against the defendant is filed in district court before the date set for the preliminary examination. With the consent of the defendant and upon a showing of good cause, taking into account the public interest in the prompt disposition of

24	FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDUR	E

67	criminal cases, time limits specified in this subdivision
68	may be extended one or more times by a federal
69	magistrate judge. In the absence of such consent by the
70	defendant, time limits may be extended by a judge of the
71	United States only upon a showing that extraordinary
72	circumstances exist and that delay is indispensable to the
73	interests of justice.

Rule 5. Initial Appearance

(a) In General.

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(1) Appearance Upon an Arrest.

77 (A) A person making an arrest within the United

78 States must take the defendant without

79 unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge, or

80 before a state or local judicial officer as

81 Rule 5(c) provides, unless a statute provides

82 otherwise.

	FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 25
83	(B) A person making an arrest outside the United
84	States must take the defendant without
85	unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge
86	unless a statute provides otherwise.
87	(2) Exceptions.
88	(A) An officer making an arrest under a warrant
89	issued upon a complaint charging solely a
90	violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1073 need not comply
91	with this rule if:
92	(i) the person arrested is transferred without
93	unnecessary delay to the custody of
94	appropriate state or local authorities in the
95	district of arrest; and
96	(ii) an attorney for the government moves
97	promptly, in the district where the warrant
98	was issued, to dismiss the complaint.

26	FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
99	(B) If a defendant is arrested for violating
100	probation or supervised release, Rule 32.1
101	applies.
102	(C) If a defendant is arrested for failing to appear in
103	another district, Rule 40 applies.
104	(3) Appearance Upon a Summons. When a defendant
105	appears in response to a summons under Rule 4, a
106	magistrate judge must proceed under Rule 5(d) or
107	(e), as applicable.
108	(b) Arrest Without a Warrant. If a defendant is arrested
109	without a warrant, a complaint meeting Rule 4(a)'s
110	requirement of probable cause must be promptly filed in
111	the district where the offense was allegedly committed.
112	(c) Place of Initial Appearance; Transfer to Another
113	District.
114	(1) Arrest in the District Where the Offense Was
115	Allegedly Committed. If the defendant is arrested in

F	EDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 27
116	the district where the offense was allegedly
117	committed:
118	(A) the initial appearance must be in that district;
119	<u>and</u>
120	(B) if a magistrate judge is not reasonably available,
121	the initial appearance may be before a state or
122	local judicial officer.
123	(2) Arrest in a District Other Than Where the Offense
124	Was Allegedly Committed. If the defendant was
125	arrested in a district other than where the offense
126	was allegedly committed, the initial appearance must
127	be:
128	(A) in the district of arrest; or
129	(B) in an adjacent district if:
130	(i) the appearance can occur more promptly
131	there; or

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132	(ii) the offense was allegedly committed there		
133	and the initial appearance will occur on the		
134	day of arrest.		
135	(3) Procedures in a District Other Than Where the		
136	Offense Was Allegedly Committed. If the initial		
137	appearance occurs in a district other than where the		
138	offense was allegedly committed, the following		
139	procedures apply:		
140	(A) the magistrate judge must inform the defendant		
141	about the provisions of Rule 20;		
142	(B) if the defendant was arrested without a warrant,		
143	the district court where the offense was		
144	allegedly committed must first issue a warrant		
145	before the magistrate judge transfers the		

defendant to that district;

offense was allegedly committed.

30 FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 164 (d) Procedure in a Felony Case. 165 (1) Advice. If the defendant is charged with a felony, 166 the judge must inform the defendant of the 167 following: 168 (A) the complaint against the defendant, and any 169 affidavit filed with it; 170 (B) the defendant's right to retain counsel or to 171 request that counsel be appointed if the 172 defendant cannot obtain counsel; (C) the circumstances, if any, under which the 173 174 defendant may secure pretrial release; 175 (D) any right to a preliminary hearing; and

against the defendant.

(E) the defendant's right not to make a statement,

and that any statement made may be used

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179	(2) Consulting with Counsel. Th	ne judge must allow the
180	defendant reasonable oppor	tunity to consult with
181	counsel.	
182	(3) Detention or Release. The	judge must detain or
183	release the defendant as prov	ided by statute or these
184	rules.	
185	(4) Plea. A defendant may be asl	ked to plead only under
186	<u>Rule 10.</u>	
187	(e) Procedure in a Misdemeanor C	ase. If the defendant is
188	charged with a misdemeanor only	, the judge must inform
189	the defendant in accordance with	Rule 58(b)(2).
190	f) Video Teleconferencing. Video	teleconferencing may
191	be used to conduct an appearance	e under this rule if the
192	defendant consents.	

COMMITTEE NOTE

The language of Rule 5 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood

and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic, except as noted below.

Rule 5 has been completely revised to more clearly set out the procedures for initial appearances and to recognize that such appearances may be required at various stages of a criminal proceeding, for example, where a defendant has been arrested for violating the terms of probation.

Rule 5(a), which governs initial appearances by an arrested defendant before a magistrate judge, includes several changes. The first is a clarifying change; revised Rule 5(a)(1) provides that a person making the arrest must bring the defendant "without unnecessary delay" before a magistrate judge, instead of the current reference to "nearest available" magistrate judge. This language parallels changes in Rule 4 and reflects the view that time is of the essence. The Committee intends no change in practice. In using the term, the Committee recognizes that on occasion there may be necessary delay in presenting the defendant, for example, due to weather conditions or other natural causes. A second change is non-stylistic, and reflects the stated preference (as in other provisions throughout the rules) that the defendant be brought before a federal judicial officer. Only if a magistrate judge is not available should the defendant be taken before a state or local officer.

The third sentence in current Rule 5(a), which states that a magistrate judge must proceed in accordance with the rule where a defendant is arrested without a warrant or given a summons, has been deleted because it is unnecessary.

Rule 5(a)(1)(B) codifies the caselaw reflecting that the right to an initial appearance applies not only when a person is arrested within the United States but also when an arrest occurs outside the United

States. See, e.g., United States v. Purvis, 768 F.2d 1237 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In these circumstances, the Committee believes — and the rule so provides — that the initial appearance should be before a federal magistrate judge rather than a state or local judicial officer. Rule 5(a) (1)(B) has also been amended by adding the words, "unless a federal statute provides otherwise," to reflect recent enactment of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat. 2488) that permits certain persons overseas to appear before a magistrate judge by telephonic communication.

Rule 5(a)(2)(A) consists of language currently located in Rule 5 that addresses the procedure to be followed where a defendant has been arrested under a warrant issued on a complaint charging solely a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (unlawful flight to avoid prosecution). Rule 5(a)(2)(B) and 5(a)(2)(C) are new provisions. They are intended to make it clear that when a defendant is arrested for violating probation or supervised release, or for failing to appear in another district, Rules 32.1 or 40 apply. No change in practice is intended.

Rule 5(a)(3) is new and fills a perceived gap in the rules. It recognizes that a defendant may be subjected to an initial appearance under this rule if a summons was issued under Rule 4, instead of an arrest warrant. If the defendant is appearing pursuant to a summons in a felony case, Rule 5(d) applies, and if the defendant is appearing in a misdemeanor case, Rule 5(e) applies.

Rule 5(b) carries forward the requirement in former Rule 5(a) that if the defendant is arrested without a warrant, a complaint must be promptly filed.

Rule 5(c) is a new provision and sets out where an initial appearance is to take place. If the defendant is arrested in the district where the offense was allegedly committed, under Rule 5(c)(1) the defendant must be taken to a magistrate judge in that district. If no magistrate judge is reasonably available, a state or local judicial officer may conduct the initial appearance. On the other hand, if the defendant is arrested in a district other than the district where the offense was allegedly committed, Rule 5(c)(2) governs. In those instances, the defendant must be taken to a magistrate judge within the district of arrest, unless the appearance can take place more promptly in an adjacent district. The Committee recognized that in some cases, the nearest magistrate judge may actually be across a district's lines. The remainder of Rule 5(c)(2) includes material formerly located in Rule 40.

Rule 5(d), derived from current Rule 5(c), has been retitled to more clearly reflect the subject of that subdivision and the procedure to be used if the defendant is charged with a felony. Rule 5(d)(4) has been added to make clear that a defendant may only be called upon to enter a plea under the provisions of Rule 10. That language is intended to reflect and reaffirm current practice.

The remaining portions of current Rule 5(c) have been moved to Rule 5.1, which deals with preliminary hearings in felony cases.

The major substantive change is in new Rule 5(e), which permits video teleconferencing for an appearance under this rule if the defendant consents. This change reflects the growing practice among state courts to use video teleconferencing to conduct initial proceedings. A similar amendment has been made to Rule 10 concerning arraignments.

In amending Rules 5, 10, and 43 (which generally requires the defendant's presence at all proceedings), the Committee carefully considered the argument that permitting a defendant to appear by video teleconferencing might be considered an erosion of an important element of the judicial process. Much can be lost when video teleconferencing occurs. First, the setting itself may not promote the public's confidence in the integrity and solemnity of a federal criminal proceeding; that is the view of some who have witnessed the use of such proceedings in some state jurisdictions. While it is difficult to quantify the intangible benefits and impact of requiring a defendant to be brought before a federal judicial officer in a federal courtroom, the Committee realizes that something is lost when a defendant is not required to make a personal appearance. A related consideration is that the defendant may be located in a room that bears no resemblance whatsoever to a judicial forum and the equipment may be inadequate for high-quality transmissions. Second, using video teleconferencing can interfere with counsel's ability to meet personally with his or her client at what, at least in that jurisdiction, might be an important appearance before a magistrate judge. Third, the defendant may miss an opportunity to meet with family or friends, and others who might be able to assist the defendant, especially in any attempts to obtain bail. Finally, the magistrate judge may miss an opportunity to accurately assess the physical, emotional, and mental condition of a defendant—a factor that may weigh on pretrial decisions, such as release from detention.

On the other hand, the Committee considered that in some jurisdictions, the court systems face a high volume of criminal proceedings. In other jurisdictions, counsel may not be appointed until after the initial appearance and thus there is no real problem with a defendant being able to consult with counsel before or during that proceeding. The Committee was also persuaded to adopt the amendment because in some jurisdictions delays may occur in travel

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time from one location to another—in some cases requiring either the magistrate judge or the participants to travel long distances. In those instances, it is not unusual for a defense counsel to recognize the benefit of conducting a video teleconferenced proceeding, which will eliminate lengthy and sometimes expensive travel or permit the initial appearance to be conducted much sooner. Finally, the Committee was aware that in some jurisdictions, courtrooms now contain high quality technology for conducting such procedures, and that some courts are already using video teleconferencing—with the consent of the parties.

The Committee believed that, on balance and in appropriate circumstances, the court and the defendant should have the option of using video teleconferencing, as long as the defendant consents to that procedure. The question of when it would be appropriate for a defendant to consent is not spelled out in the rule. That is left to the defendant and the court in each case. Although the rule does not specify any particular technical requirements regarding the system to be used, if the equipment or technology is deficient, the public may lose confidence in the integrity and dignity of the proceedings.

The amendment does not require a court to adopt or use video teleconferencing. In deciding whether to use such procedures, a court may wish to consider establishing clearly articulated standards and procedures. For example, the court would normally want to insure that the location used for televising the video teleconferencing is conducive to the solemnity of a federal criminal proceeding. That might require additional coordination, for example, with the detention facility to insure that the room, furniture, and furnishings reflect the dignity associated with a federal courtroom. Provision should also be made to insure that the judge, or a surrogate, is in a position to carefully assess the defendant's condition. And the court should also consider establishing procedures for insuring that counsel and the

defendant (and even the defendant's immediate family) are provided an ample opportunity to confer in private.

REPORTER'S NOTES

In publishing the "style" changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Committee decided to publish separately any rule that includes what it considered at least one major substantive change. The purpose for this separate publication was to highlight for the bench and the bar any proposed amendments that the Committee believes will result in significant changes in current practice. Rule 5 was one of those rules. In revising Rule 5, the Committee decided to also propose a substantive change that would permit video teleconferencing of initial appearances. Another version of Rule 5, which does not include proposed Rule 5(f) is included in what has been referred to as the "style" package.

Rule 5.1. Preliminary Examination

1

2 (a) Probable Cause Finding. If from the evidence it
3 appears that there is probable cause to believe that an
4 offense has been committed and that the defendant
5 committed it, the federal magistrate judge shall forthwith
6 hold the defendant to answer in district court. The
7 finding of probable cause may be based upon hearsay

8	evidence in whole or in part. The defendant may cross-
9	examine adverse witnesses and may introduce evidence.
10	Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired
11	by unlawful means are not properly made at the
12	preliminary examination. Motions to suppress must be
13	made to the trial court as provided in Rule 12.

- (b) Discharge of Defendant. If from the evidence it appears that there is no probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the federal magistrate judge shall dismiss the complaint and discharge the defendant. The discharge of the defendant shall not preclude the government from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
- (c) Records. After concluding the proceeding the federal magistrate judge shall transmit forthwith to the clerk of the district court all papers in the proceeding. The

24	magistrate judge shall promptly make or cause to be
25	made a record or summary of such proceeding.
26	(1) On timely application to a federal magistrate judge,
27	the attorney for a defendant in a criminal case may
28	be given the opportunity to have the recording of the
29	hearing on preliminary examination made available
30	to that attorney in connection with any further
31	hearing or preparation for trial. The court may, by
32	local rule, appoint the place for and define the
33	conditions under which such opportunity may be
34	afforded counsel.
35	(2) On application of a defendant addressed to the court
36	or any judge thereof, an order may issue that the
37	federal magistrate judge make available a copy of
38	the transcript, or of a portion thereof, to defense
39	counsel. Such order shall provide for prepayment of
40	costs of such transcript by the defendant unless the

defendant makes a sufficient affidavit that the 41 42 defendant is unable to pay or to give security 43 therefor, in which case the expense shall be paid by 44 the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts from available appropriated 45 46 funds. Counsel for the government may move also 47 that a copy of the transcript, in whole or in part, be 48 made available to it, for good cause shown, and an 49 order may be entered granting such motion in whole 50 or in part, on appropriate terms, except that the government need not prepay costs nor furnish 51 52 security therefor.

(d) Production of Statements.

53

54 (1) In General. Rule 26.2(a)-(d) and (f) applies at any
55 hearing under this rule, unless the court, for good
56 cause shown, rules otherwise in a particular case.

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57	(2) Sanctions for Failure to Produce Statement. If a
58	party elects not to comply with an order under
59	Rule 26.2(a) to deliver a statement to the moving
60	party, the court may not consider the testimony of a
61	witness whose statement is withheld.
62	Rule 5.1. Preliminary Hearing
63	(a) In General. If a defendant is charged with an offense
64	other than a petty offense, a magistrate judge must
65	conduct a preliminary hearing unless:
66	(1) the defendant waives the hearing;
67	(2) the defendant is indicted;
68	(3) the government files an information under Rule 7(b)
69	charging the defendant with a felony:
70	(4) the government files an information charging the
71	defendant with a misdemeanor; or
72	(5) the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor and

consents to trial before a magistrate judge.

(b) Selecting a District. A defendant arrested in a district
75 other than where the offense was allegedly committed
76 may elect to have the preliminary hearing conducted in
77 the district where the prosecution is pending.

- c) Scheduling. The magistrate judge must hold the preliminary hearing within a reasonable time, but no later than 10 days after the initial appearance if the defendant is in custody and no later than 20 days if not in custody.
- (d) Extending the Time. With the defendant's consent and upon a showing of good cause taking into account the public interest in the prompt disposition of criminal cases a magistrate judge may extend the time limits in Rule 5.1(c) one or more times. If the defendant does not consent, the magistrate judge may extend the time limits only on a showing that extraordinary circumstances exist and justice requires the delay.

- 90 (e) Hearing and Finding. At the preliminary hearing, the 91 defendant may cross-examine adverse witnesses and may 92 introduce evidence but may not object to evidence on the 93 ground that it was unlawfully acquired. If the magistrate 94 judge finds probable cause to believe an offense has been 95 committed and the defendant committed it, the 96 magistrate judge must promptly require the defendant to 97 appear for further proceedings.
- 98 **(f)** Discharging the Defendant. If the magistrate judge
 99 finds no probable cause to believe an offense has been
 100 committed or the defendant committed it, the magistrate
 101 judge must dismiss the complaint and discharge the
 102 defendant. A discharge does not preclude the
 103 government from later prosecuting the defendant for the
 104 same offense.
 - (g) Recording the Proceedings. The preliminary hearing
 must be recorded by a court reporter or by a suitable

105

107	recording device. A recording of the proceeding may be
108	made available to any party upon request. A copy of the
109	recording and a transcript may be provided to any party
110	upon request and upon any payment required by
111	applicable Judicial Conference regulations.
112	(h) Producing a Statement.
113	(1) In General. Rule 26.2(a)-(d) and (f) applies at any
114	hearing under this rule, unless the magistrate judge
115	for good cause rules otherwise in a particular case.
116	(2) Sanctions for Not Producing a Statement. If a party
117	disobeys a Rule 26.2 order to deliver a statement to
118	the moving party, the magistrate judge must not
119	consider the testimony of a witness whose statement
120	is withheld.

COMMITTEE NOTE

The language of Rule 5.1 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout

the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic, except as noted below.

First, the title of the rule has been changed. Although the underlying statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3060, uses the phrase *preliminary examination*, the Committee believes that the phrase *preliminary hearing* is more accurate. What happens at this proceeding is more than just an examination; it includes an evidentiary hearing, argument, and a judicial ruling. Further, the phrase *preliminary hearing* predominates in actual usage.

Rule 5.1(a) is composed of the first sentence of the second paragraph of current Rule 5(c). Rule 5.1(b) addresses the ability of a defendant to elect where a preliminary hearing will be held. That provision is taken from current Rule 40(a).

Rule 5.1(c) and (d) include material currently located in Rule 5(c): scheduling and extending the time limits for the hearing. The Committee is aware that in most districts, magistrate judges perform these functions. That point is also reflected in the definition of "court" in Rule 1(b), which in turn recognizes that magistrate judges may be authorized to act.

Rule 5.1(d) contains a significant change in practice. The revised rule includes language that expands the authority of a United States magistrate judge to grant a continuance for a preliminary hearing conducted under the rule. Currently, the rule authorizes a magistrate judge to grant a continuance only in those cases in which the defendant has consented to the continuance. If the defendant does not consent, then the government must present the matter to a district judge, usually on the same day. The proposed amendment conflicts with 18 U.S.C. § 3060, which tracks the original language of the rule and permits only district judges to grant continuances when the

defendant objects. The Committee believes that this restriction is an anomaly and that it can lead to needless consumption of judicial and other resources. Magistrate judges are routinely required to make probable cause determinations and other difficult decisions regarding the defendant's liberty interests, reflecting that the magistrate judge's role has developed toward a higher level of responsibility for preindictment matters. The Committee believes that the change in the rule will provide greater judicial economy and that it is entirely appropriate to seek this change to the rule through the Rules Enabling Act procedures. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Under those procedures, approval by Congress of this rule change would supersede the parallel provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 3060.

Rule 5.1(e), addressing the issue of probable cause, contains the language currently located in Rule 5.1(a), with the exception of the sentence, "The finding of probable cause may be based upon hearsay evidence in whole or in part." That language was included in the original promulgation of the rule in 1972. Similar language was added to Rule 4 in 1974. In the Committee Note on the 1974 amendment, the Advisory Committee explained that the language was included to make it clear that a finding of probable cause may be based upon hearsay, noting that there had been some uncertainty in the federal system about the propriety of relying upon hearsay at the preliminary hearing. See Advisory Committee Note to Rule 5.1 (citing cases and commentary). Federal law is now clear on that proposition. Thus, the Committee believed that the reference to hearsay was no longer necessary. Further, the Committee believed that the matter was best addressed in Rule 1101(d)(3), Federal Rules of Evidence. That rule explicitly states that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to "preliminary examinations in criminal cases, ... issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses, and search warrants." The Advisory Committee Note accompanying that rule recognizes that: "The nature of the proceedings makes

application of the formal rules of evidence inappropriate and impracticable." The Committee did not intend to make any substantive changes in practice by deleting the reference to hearsay evidence.

Rule 5.1(f), which deals with the discharge of a defendant, consists of former Rule 5.1(b).

Rule 5.1(g) is a revised version of the material in current Rule 5.1(c). Instead of including detailed information in the rule itself concerning records of preliminary hearings, the Committee opted simply to direct the reader to the applicable Judicial Conference regulations governing records. The Committee did not intend to make any substantive changes in the way in which those records are currently made available.

Finally, although the rule speaks in terms of initial appearances being conducted before a magistrate judge, Rule 1(c) makes clear that a district judge may perform any function in these rules that a magistrate judge may perform.

REPORTER'S NOTES

In publishing the "style" changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Committee decided to publish separately any rule that includes what it considered at least one major substantive change. The purpose for this separate publication is to highlight for the bench and the bar any proposed amendments that the Committee believes will result in significant changes in current practice. Rule 5.1 was one of those rules. In revising Rule 5.1, the Committee decided to also propose a substantive change that would permit a

United States magistrate judge to grant a continuance for a preliminary hearing conducted under the rule where the defendant has not consented to such a continuance. Another version of Rule 5.1 that does not include that proposed change is presented in what has been referred to as the "style" package.

Rule 10. Arraignment

- Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall
 consist of reading the indictment or information to the
 defendant or stating to the defendant the substance of the
 charge and calling on the defendant to plead thereto. The
 defendant shall be given a copy of the indictment or
 information before being called upon to plead.
- 8 Rule 10. Arraignment
- 9 (a) In General. An arraignment must be conducted in open
- 10 <u>court and must consist of:</u>
- 11 (1) ensuring that the defendant has a copy of the
- indictment or information;

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13	(2) reading the indictment or information to t	<u>he</u>
14	defendant or stating to the defendant the substan	<u>ce</u>
15	of the charge; and then	
16	(3) asking the defendant to plead to the indictment	<u>or</u>
17	information.	
18	(b) Waiving Appearance. A defendant need not be prese	<u>ent</u>
19	for the arraignment if:	
20	(1) the defendant has been charged by indictment	<u>or</u>
21	misdemeanor information;	
22	(2) the defendant, in a written waiver signed by both t	<u>he</u>
23	defendant and defense counsel, has waive	<u>ed</u>
24	appearance and has affirmed that the defenda	<u>ınt</u>
25	received a copy of the indictment or information as	<u>nd</u>
26	that the plea is not guilty; and	
27	(3) the court accepts the waiver.	
28	(c) Video Teleconferencing. Video teleconferencing m	<u>ay</u>
29	be used to arraign a defendant if the defendant consen	ts.

COMMITTEE NOTE

The language of Rule 10 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only, except as noted below.

Read together, Rules 10 and 43 require the defendant to be physically present in court for the arraignment. See, e.g., Valenzuela-Gonzales v. United States, 915 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1990) (Rules 10 and 43 are broader in protection than the Constitution). The amendments to Rule 10 create two exceptions to that requirement. The first provides that the court may hold an arraignment in the defendant's absence when the defendant has waived the right to be present in writing and the court consents to that waiver. The second permits the court to hold arraignments by video teleconferencing when the defendant is at a different location. A conforming amendment has also been made to Rule 43.

In amending Rule 10 and Rule 43, the Committee was concerned that permitting a defendant to be absent from the arraignment could be viewed as an erosion of an important element of the judicial process. First, it may be important for a defendant to see and experience first-hand the formal impact of the reading of the charge. Second, it may be necessary for the court to personally see and speak with the defendant at the arraignment, especially when there is a real question whether the defendant actually understands the gravity of the proceedings. And third, there may be difficulties in providing the defendant with effective and confidential assistance of counsel if counsel, but not the defendant, appears at the arraignment.

The Committee nonetheless believed that in appropriate circumstances the court, and the defendant, should have the option of conducting the arraignment in the defendant's absence. The question of when it would be appropriate for a defendant to waive an appearance is not spelled out in the rule. That is left to the defendant and the court in each case.

A critical element to the amendment is that no matter how convenient or cost effective a defendant's absence might be, the defendant's right to be present in court stands unless he or she waives that right in writing. Under the amendment, both the defendant and the defendant's attorney must sign the waiver. Further, the amendment requires that the waiver specifically state that the defendant has received a copy of the charging instrument.

If the trial court has reason to believe that in a particular case the defendant should not be permitted to waive the right, the court may reject the waiver and require that the defendant actually appear in court. That might be particularly appropriate when the court wishes to discuss substantive or procedural matters in conjunction with the arraignment and the court believes that the defendant's presence is important in resolving those matters. It might also be appropriate to reject a requested waiver where an attorney for the government presents reasons for requiring the defendant to appear personally.

The amendment does not permit waiver of an appearance when the defendant is charged with a felony information. In that instance, the defendant is required by Rule 7(b) to be present in court to waive the indictment. Nor does the amendment permit a waiver of appearance when the defendant is standing mute (*see* Rule 11(a)(4)), or entering a conditional plea (*see* Rule 11(a)(2)), a nolo contendere plea (*see* Rule 11(a)(3)), or a guilty plea (*see* Rule 11(a)(1)). In each

of those instances the Committee believed that it was more appropriate for the defendant to appear personally before the court.

It is important to note that the amendment does not permit the defendant to waive the arraignment itself, which may be a triggering mechanism for other rules.

Rule 10(c) addresses the second substantive change in the rule. That provision permits the court to conduct arraignments through video teleconferencing, if the defendant waives the right to be arraigned in court. Although the practice is now used in state courts and in some federal courts, Rules 10 and 43 have generally prevented federal courts from using that method for arraignments in criminal cases. See, e.g., Valenzuela-Gonzales v. United States, supra (Rules 10 and 43 mandate physical presence of defendant at arraignment and that arraignment take place in open court). A similar amendment was proposed by the Committee in 1993 and published for public comment. The amendment was later withdrawn from consideration in order to consider the results of several planned pilot programs. Upon further consideration, the Committee believed that the benefits of using video teleconferencing outweighed the costs of doing so. This amendment also parallels an amendment in Rule 5(f) that would permit initial appearances to be conducted by video teleconferencing.

In amending Rules 5, 10, and 43 (which generally requires the defendant's presence at all proceedings), the Committee carefully considered the argument that permitting a defendant to appear by video teleconferencing might be considered an erosion of an important element of the judicial process. Much can be lost when video teleconferencing occurs. First, the setting itself may not promote the public's confidence in the integrity and solemnity of a federal criminal proceeding; that is the view of some who have witnessed the use of such proceedings in some state jurisdictions.

While it is difficult to quantify the intangible benefits and impact of requiring a defendant to be brought before a federal judicial officer in a federal courtroom, the Committee realizes that something is lost when a defendant is not required to make a personal appearance. A related consideration is that the defendant may be located in a room that bears no resemblance whatsoever to a judicial forum and the equipment may be inadequate for high-quality transmissions. Second, using video teleconferencing can interfere with counsel's ability to meet personally with his or her client at what, at least in that jurisdiction, might be an important appearance before a magistrate judge. Third, the defendant may miss an opportunity to meet with family or friends, and others who might be able to assist the defendant, especially in any attempts to obtain bail. Finally, the magistrate judge may miss an opportunity to accurately assess the physical, emotional, and mental condition of a defendant—a factor that may weigh on pretrial decisions, such as release from detention.

On the other hand, the Committee considered that in some jurisdictions, the courts face a high volume of criminal proceedings. The Committee was also persuaded to adopt the amendment because in some jurisdictions delays may occur in travel time from one location to another—in some cases requiring either the magistrate judge or the participants to travel long distances. In those instances, it is not unusual for a defense counsel to recognize the benefit of conducting a video teleconferenced proceeding, which will eliminate lengthy and sometimes expensive travel or permit the arraignment to be conducted much sooner. Finally, the Committee was aware that in some jurisdictions, courtrooms now contain high quality technology for conducting such procedures, and that some courts are already using video teleconferencing—with the consent of the parties.

The Committee believed that, on balance and in appropriate circumstances, the court and the defendant should have the option of

using video teleconferencing for arraignments, as long as the defendant consents to that procedure. The question of when it would be appropriate for a defendant to consent is not spelled out in the rule. That is left to the defendant and the court in each case. Although the rule does not specify any particular technical requirements regarding the system to be used, if the equipment or technology is deficient, the public may lose confidence in the integrity and dignity of the proceedings.

The amendment does not require a court to adopt or use video teleconferencing. In deciding whether to use such procedures, a court may wish to consider establishing clearly articulated standards and procedures. For example, the court would normally want to insure that the location used for televising the video teleconferencing is conducive to the solemnity of a federal criminal proceeding. That might require additional coordination, for example, with the detention facility to insure that the room, furniture, and furnishings reflect the dignity associated with a federal courtroom. Provision should also be made to insure that the judge, or a surrogate, is in a position to carefully assess the condition of the defendant. And the court should also consider establishing procedures for insuring that counsel and the defendant (and even the defendant's immediate family) are provided an ample opportunity to confer in private.

Although the rule requires the defendant to waive a personal appearance for an arraignment, the rule does not require that the waiver for video teleconferencing be in writing. Nor does it require that the defendant waive that appearance in person, in open court. It would normally be sufficient for the defendant to waive an appearance while participating through a video teleconference.

The amendment leaves to the courts the decision first, whether to permit video arraignments, and second, the procedures to be used.

The Committee was satisfied that the technology has progressed to the point that video teleconferencing can address the concerns raised in the past about the ability of the court and the defendant to see each other and for the defendant and counsel to be in contact with each other, either at the same location or by a secure remote connection.

REPORTER'S NOTES

In publishing the "style" changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Committee decided to publish separately any rule that includes what it considered at least one major substantive change. The purpose for this separate publication was to highlight for the bench and the bar any proposed amendments that the Committee believes will result in significant changes in current practice. Rule 10 was one of those rules. This proposed revision of Rule 10 includes an amendment that would permit the defendant to waive any appearance at an arraignment and a second amendment that would permit use of video teleconferencing for arraignments. Another version of Rule 10, which does not include these significant amendments is presented in what has been referred to as the "style" package.

- 1 Rule 12.2. Notice of Insanity Defense or Expert
- 2 Testimony of Defendant's Mental Condition
- 3 (a) Defense of Insanity. If a defendant intends to rely upon
- 4 the defense of insanity at the time of the alleged offense,
- 5 the defendant shall, within the time provided for the

may direct, notify the attorney for the government in writing of such intention and file a copy of such notice with the clerk. If there is a failure to comply with the requirements of this subdivision, insanity may not be raised as a defense. The court may for cause shown allow late filing of the notice or grant additional time to the parties to prepare for trial or make such other order as may be appropriate.

(b) Expert Testimony of Defendant's Mental Condition.

If a defendant intends to introduce expert testimony relating to a mental disease or defect or any other mental condition of the defendant bearing upon the issue of guilt, the defendant shall, within the time provided for the filing of pretrial motions or at such later time as the court may direct, notify the attorney for the government in writing of such intention and file a copy of such notice

23	with the clerk. The court may for cause shown allow late
24	filing of the notice or grant additional time to the parties
25	to prepare for trial or make such other order as may be
26	appropriate.

case the court may, upon motion of the attorney for the government, order the defendant to submit to an examination pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4241 or 4242. No statement made by the defendant in the course of any examination provided for by this rule, whether the examination be with or without the consent of the defendant, no testimony by the expert based upon such statement, and no other fruits of the statement shall be admitted in evidence against the defendant in any criminal proceeding except on an issue respecting mental condition on which the defendant has introduced testimony.

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40	(d) Failure to Comply. If there is a failure to give notice
41	when required by subdivision (b) of this rule or to submit
42	to an examination when ordered under subdivision (c) of
43	this rule, the court may exclude the testimony of any
44	expert witness offered by the defendant on the issue of
45	the defendant's guilt.
46	(e) Inadmissibility of Withdrawn Intention. Evidence of
47	an intention as to which notice was given under
48	subdivision (a) or (b), later withdrawn, is not, in any civil
49	or criminal proceeding, admissible against the person
50	who gave notice of the intention.
51	Rule 12.2. Notice of an Insanity Defense; Mental
52	Examination
53	(a) Notice of an Insanity Defense. A defendant who intends
54	to assert a defense of insanity at the time of the alleged
55	offense must so notify an attorney for the government in
56	writing within the time provided for filing a pretrial

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73	notice late, grant the parties additional trial-preparation
74	time, or make other appropriate orders.
75	(c) Mental Examination.
76	(1) Authority to Order an Examination; Procedures.
77	(A) The court may order the defendant to submit to
78	a competency examination under 18 U.S.C.
79	<u>§ 4241.</u>
80	(B) If the defendant provides notice under
81	Rule 12.2(a), the court must, upon the
82	government's motion, order the defendant to be
83	examined under 18 U.S.C. § 4242. If the
84	defendant provides notice under Rule 12.2(b)
85	the court may, upon the government's motion,
86	order the defendant to be examined under
87	procedures ordered by the court.
88	(2) Disclosing Results and Reports of Capital
89	Sentencing Examination. The results and reports

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90	of any examination conducted solely under Rule
91	12.2 (c)(1) after notice under Rule 12.2(b)(2) must
92	be sealed and must not be disclosed to any attorney
93	for the government or the defendant unless the
94	defendant is found guilty of one or more capital
95	crimes and the defendant confirms an intent to offer
96	during sentencing proceedings expert evidence on
97	mental condition.
98	(3) Disclosing Results and Reports of the Defendant's
99	Expert Examination. After disclosure under
100	Rule 12.2(c)(2) of the results and reports of the
101	government's examination, the defendant must
102	disclose to the government the results and reports of
103	any examination on mental condition conducted by
104	the defendant's expert about which the defendant
105	intends to introduce expert evidence.

106	(4) Inadmissibility of a Defendant's Statements. No
107	statement made by a defendant in the course of any
108	examination conducted under this rule (whether
109	conducted with or without the defendant's consent),
110	no testimony by the expert based on the statement,
111	and no other fruits of the statement may be admitted
112	into evidence against the defendant in any criminal
113	proceeding except on an issue regarding mental
114	condition on which the defendant:
115	(A) has introduced evidence of incompetency or
116	evidence requiring notice under Rule 12.2(a) or
117	(b)(1), or
118	(B) has introduced expert evidence in a capital
119	sentencing proceeding requiring notice under
120	Rule 12.2(b)(2).
121	(d) Failure to Comply. If the defendant fails to give notice
122	under Rule 12.2(b) or does not submit to an examination

123		when ordered under Rule 12.2(c), the court may exclude
124		any expert evidence from the defendant on the issue of
125		the defendant's mental disease, mental defect, or any
126		other mental condition bearing on the defendant's guilt
127		or the issue of punishment in a capital case.
128	<u>(e)</u>	Inadmissibility of Withdrawn Intention. Evidence of
129		an intention as to which notice was given under
130		Rule 12.2(a) or (b), later withdrawn, is not, in any civil or
131		criminal proceeding, admissible against the person who
132		

COMMITTEE NOTE

The language of Rule 12.2 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only, except as noted below.

The substantive changes to Rule 12.2 are designed to address five issues. First, the amendment clarifies that a court may order a mental examination for a defendant who has indicated an intention to raise a defense of mental condition bearing on the issue of guilt. Second, the defendant is required to give notice of an intent to present expert

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evidence of the defendant's mental condition during a capital sentencing proceeding. Third, the amendment addresses the ability of the trial court to order a mental examination for a defendant who has given notice of an intent to present evidence of mental condition during capital sentencing proceedings and when the results of that examination may be disclosed. Fourth, the amendment addresses the timing of disclosure of the results and reports of the defendant's expert examination. Finally, the amendment extends the sanctions for failure to comply with the rule's requirements to the punishment phase of a capital case.

Under current Rule 12.2(b), a defendant who intends to offer expert testimony on the issue of his or her mental condition on the question of guilt must provide a pretrial notice of that intent. The amendment extends that notice requirement to a defendant who intends to offer expert evidence, testimonial or otherwise, on his or her mental condition during a capital sentencing proceeding. As several courts have recognized, the better practice is to require pretrial notice of that intent so that any mental examinations can be conducted without unnecessarily delaying capital sentencing proceedings. *See*, *e.g.*, *United States v. Beckford*, 962 F. Supp. 748, 754-64 (E.D. Va. 1997); *United States v. Haworth*, 942 F. Supp. 1406, 1409 (D.N.M. 1996). The amendment adopts that view.

Revised Rule 12.2(c)(1) addresses and clarifies the authority of the court to order mental examinations for a defendant — to determine competency of a defendant to stand trial under 18 U.S.C. § 4241; to determine the defendant's sanity at the time of the alleged offense under 18 U.S.C. § 4242; or in those cases where the defendant intends to present expert testimony on his or her mental condition. Rule 12.2(c)(1)(A) reflects the traditional authority of the court to order competency examinations. With regard to examinations to determine insanity at the time of the offense, current

Rule 12.2(c) implies that the trial court *may* grant a government motion for a mental examination of a defendant who has indicated under Rule 12.2(a) an intent to raise the defense of insanity. But the corresponding statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4242, *requires* the court to order an examination if the defendant has provided notice of an intent to raise that defense and the government moves for the examination. Revised Rule 12.2(c)(1)(B) now conforms the rule to § 4242. Any examination conducted on the issue of the insanity defense would thus be conducted in accordance with the procedures set out in that statutory provision.

Revised Rule 12.2(c)(1)(B) also addresses those cases where the defendant is not relying on an insanity defense, but intends to offer expert testimony on the issue of mental condition. authority of a trial court to order a mental examination of a defendant who has registered an intent to raise the insanity defense seems clear, the authority under the rule to order an examination of a defendant who intends only to present expert testimony on his or her mental condition on the issue of guilt is not as clear. Some courts have concluded that a court may order such an examination. See, e.g., United States v. Stackpole, 811 F.2d 689, 697 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Buchbinder, 796 F.2d 910, 915 (1st Cir. 1986); and United States v. Halbert, 712 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1983). In United States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286 (6th Cir. 1996), however, the court in a detailed analysis of the issue concluded that the district court lacked the authority under the rule to order a mental examination of a defendant who had provided notice of an intent to offer evidence on a defense of diminished capacity. The court noted first that the defendant could not be ordered to undergo commitment and examination under 18 U.S.C. § 4242, because that provision relates to situations when the defendant intends to rely on the defense of insanity. The court also rejected the argument that the examination could be ordered under Rule 12.2(c) because this was, in the words of the rule, an

"appropriate case." The court concluded, however, that the trial court had the inherent authority to order such an examination.

The amendment clarifies that the authority of a court to order a mental examination under Rule 12.2(c)(1)(B) extends to those cases when the defendant has provided notice, under Rule 12.2(b), of an intent to present expert testimony on the defendant's mental condition, either on the merits or at capital sentencing. *See*, *e.g.*, *United States v. Hall*, 152 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 1998), *cert. denied*, 119 S. Ct. 1767 (1999).

The amendment to Rule 12.2(c)(1) is not intended to affect any statutory or inherent authority a court may have to order other mental examinations.

The amendment leaves to the court the determination of what procedures should be used for a court-ordered examination on the defendant's mental condition (apart from insanity). As currently provided in the rule, if the examination is being ordered in connection with the defendant's stated intent to present an insanity defense, the procedures are dictated by 18 U.S.C. § 4242. On the other hand, if the examination is being ordered in conjunction with a stated intent to present expert testimony on the defendant's mental condition (not amounting to a defense of insanity) either at the guilt or sentencing phases, no specific statutory counterpart is available. Accordingly, the court is given the discretion to specify the procedures to be used. In so doing, the court may certainly be informed by other provisions, which address hearings on a defendant's mental condition. *See*, *e.g.*, 18 U.S.C. § 4241, et seq.

Additional changes address the question when the results of an examination ordered under Rule 12.2(b)(2) may, or must, be disclosed. The Supreme Court has recognized that use of a

defendant's statements during a court-ordered examination may compromise the defendant's right against self-incrimination. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (defendant's privilege against self-incrimination violated when he was not advised of right to remain silent during court-ordered examination and prosecution introduced statements during capital sentencing hearing). subsequent cases have indicated that the defendant waives the privilege if the defendant introduces expert testimony on his or her mental condition. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680, 683-84 (1989); Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 421-24 (1987); Presnell v. Zant, 959 F.2d 1524, 1533 (11th Cir. 1992); Williams v. Lynaugh, 809 F.2d 1063, 1068 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Madrid, 673 F.2d 1114, 1119-21 (10th Cir. 1982). That view is reflected in Rule 12.2(c), which indicates that the statements of the defendant may be used against the defendant only after the defendant has introduced testimony on his or her mental condition. What the current rule does not address is if, and to what extent, the prosecution may see the results of the examination, which may include the defendant's statements, when evidence of the defendant's mental condition is being presented solely at a capital sentencing proceeding.

The proposed change in Rule 12.2(c)(2) adopts the procedure used by some courts to seal or otherwise insulate the results of the examination until it is clear that the defendant will introduce expert evidence about his or her mental condition at a capital sentencing hearing; i.e., after a verdict of guilty on one or more capital crimes, and a reaffirmation by the defendant of an intent to introduce expert mental-condition evidence in the sentencing phase. See, e.g., United States v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 748 (E.D. Va. 1997). Most courts that have addressed the issue have recognized that if the government obtains early access to the accused's statements, it will be required to show that it has not made any derivative use of that evidence. Doing so can consume time and resources. See, e.g., United States v. Hall,

supra, 152 F.3d at 398 (noting that sealing of record, although not constitutionally required, "likely advances interests of judicial economy by avoiding litigation over [derivative use issue]").

Except as provided in Rule 12.2(c)(3), the rule does not address the time for disclosing results and reports of any expert examination conducted by the defendant. New Rule 12.2(c)(3) provides that upon disclosure under subdivision (c)(2) of the results and reports of the government's examination, disclosure of the results and reports of the defendant's expert examination is mandatory, if the defendant intends to introduce expert evidence relating to the examination.

Rule 12.2(c), as previously written, restricted admissibility of the defendant's statements during the course of an examination conducted under the rule to an issue respecting mental condition on which the defendant "has introduced testimony" — expert or otherwise. As amended, Rule 12.2(c)(4) provides that the admissibility of such evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding is triggered only by the defendant's introduction of expert evidence. The Committee believed that, in this context, it was appropriate to limit the government's ability to use the results of its expert mental examination to instances in which the defendant has first introduced expert evidence on the issue.

Rule 12.2(d) has been amended to extend sanctions for failure to comply with the rule to the penalty phase of a capital case. The selection of an appropriate remedy for the failure of a defendant to provide notice or submit to an examination under subdivisions (b) and (c) is entrusted to the discretion of the court. While subdivision (d) recognizes that the court may exclude the evidence of the defendant's own expert in such a situation, the court should also consider "the effectiveness of less severe sanctions, the impact of preclusion on the evidence at trial and the outcome of the case, the

extent of prosecutorial surprise or prejudice, and whether the violation was willful." *Taylor v. Illinois*, 484 U.S. 400, 414 n.19 (1988) (citing *Fendler v. Goldsmith*, 728 F.2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1983)).

REPORTER'S NOTES

In publishing the "style" changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Committee decided to publish separately any rule that includes what it considered at least one major substantive change. The purpose for this separate publication was to highlight for the bench and the bar any proposed amendments that the Committee believes will result in significant changes in current practice. Rule 12.2 was one of those rules. As outlined in the Committee Note, this proposed revision of Rule 12.2 includes five substantive amendments. Another version of Rule 12.2, which does not include these significant amendments, appears in what has been referred to as the "style" package.

Rule 12.4. Disclosure Statement

1 (a) Who Must File.

2 (1) Nongovernmental Corporate Party. Any
3 nongovernmental corporate party to a proceeding in
4 a district court must file a statement that identifies
5 any parent corporation and any publicly held

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6	corporation that owns 10% or more of its stock or
7	states that there is no such corporation.
8	(2) Organizational Victim. If an organization is a
9	victim of the alleged criminal activity, the
10	government must file a statement identifying the
11	victim. If the organizational victim is a corporation,
12	the statement must also disclose the information
13	required by Rule 12.4(a)(1) to the extent it can be
14	obtained through due diligence.
15	(b) Time for Filing; Supplemental Filing. A party must:
16	(1) file the Rule 12.4(a) statement upon the defendant's
17	initial appearance; and
18	(2) promptly file a supplemental statement upon any
19	change in the information that the statement
20	<u>requires.</u>

COMMITTEE NOTE

Rule 12.4 is a new rule modeled after Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and parallels similar provisions being proposed in new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1. The purpose of the rule is to assist judges in determining whether they must recuse themselves because of a "financial interest in the subject matter in controversy." Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C(1)(c)(1972). It does not, however, deal with other circumstances that might lead to disqualification for other reasons.

Under Rule 12.4(a)(1), any nongovernmental corporate party must file a statement that indicates whether it has any parent corporation that owns 10% or more of its stock or indicates that there is no such corporation. Although the term "nongovernmental corporate party" will almost always involve organizational defendants, it might also cover any third party that asserts an interest in property to be forfeited under new Rule 32.2.

Rule 12.4(a)(2) requires an attorney for the government to file a statement that lists any organizational victims of the alleged criminal activity; the purpose of this disclosure is to alert the court to the fact that a possible ground for disqualification might exist. Further, if the organizational victim is a corporation, the statement must include the same information required of any nongovernmental corporate party. The rule requires an attorney for the government to use due diligence in obtaining that information from a corporate organizational victim, recognizing that the timing requirements of Rule 12.4(b) might make it difficult to obtain the necessary information by the time the initial appearance is conducted.

Although the disclosures required by Rule 12.4 may seem limited, they are calculated to reach the majority of circumstances that

are likely to call for disqualification on the basis of information that a judge may not know or recollect. Framing a rule that calls for more detailed disclosure is problematic and will inevitably require more information than is necessary for purposes of automatic recusal. Unnecessary disclosure of volumes of information may create the risk that a judge will overlook the one bit of information that might require disqualification, and may also create the risk that courts will experience unnecessary disqualifications rather than attempt to unravel a potentially difficult question.

The same concerns about overbreadth are potentially present in any local rules that might address this topic. Rule 12.4 does not address the promulgation of any local rules that might address the same issue, or supplement the requirements of the rule.

The rule does not cover disclosure of all financial information that could be relevant to a judge's decision whether to recuse himself or herself from a case. The Committee believes that with the various disclosure practices in the federal courts and with the development of technology, more comprehensive disclosure may be desirable and feasible.

Rule 12.4(b)(1) indicates that the time for filing the disclosure statement is at the point when the defendant enters an initial appearance under Rule 5. Although there may be other instances where an earlier appearance of a party in a civil proceeding would raise concerns about whether the presiding judicial officer should be notified of a possible grounds for recusal, the Committee believed that in criminal cases, the most likely time for that to occur is at the initial appearance and that it was important to set a uniform triggering event for disclosures under this rule.

Finally, Rule 12.4(b)(2) requires the parties to file supplemental statements with the court if there are any changes in the information required in the statement.

1	Rule 26. Taking of Testimony
2	In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken
3	orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by an Act of
4	Congress or by these rules, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or
5	other rules adopted by the Supreme Court.
6	Rule 26. Taking Testimony
7	(a) In General. In every trial the testimony of witnesses
8	must be taken in open court, unless otherwise provided
9	by a statute or by rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072
10	<u>2077.</u>
11	(b) Transmitting Testimony from a Different Location
12	In the interest of justice, the court may authorize
13	contemporaneous, two-way video presentation in oper
14	court of testimony from a witness who is at a differen
15	location if:

16 (1) the requesting party establishes exceptional

17 circumstances for such transmission;

18 (2) appropriate safeguards for the transmission are used;

19 and

20 (3) the witness is unavailable within the meaning of

21 Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4)-(5).

COMMITTEE NOTE

The language of Rule 26 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only, except as noted below.

Rule 26(a) is amended, by deleting the word "orally," to accommodate witnesses who are not able to present oral testimony in open court and may need, for example, a sign language interpreter. The change conforms the rule, in that respect, to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43.

A substantive change has been made to Rule 26(b). That amendment permits a court to receive the video transmission of an absent witness if certain conditions are met. As currently written, Rule 26 indicates that normally only testimony given in open court will be considered, unless otherwise provided by these rules, an Act of Congress, or any other rule adopted by the Supreme Court. An example of a rule that provides otherwise is Rule 15. That Rule

recognizes that depositions may be used to preserve testimony if there are exceptional circumstances in the case and it is in the interest of justice to do so. If the person is "unavailable" under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a), then the deposition may be used at trial as substantive evidence. The amendment to Rule 26(b) extends the logic underlying that exception to contemporaneous video testimony of an unavailable witness. The amendment generally parallels a similar provision in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43.

The Committee believed that permitting use of video transmission of testimony only in those instances when deposition testimony could be used is a prudent and measured step. A party against whom a deposition may be introduced at trial will normally have no basis for objecting if contemporaneous testimony is used instead. Indeed, the use of such transmitted testimony is in most regards superior to other means of presenting testimony in the courtroom. The participants in the courtroom can see for themselves the demeanor of the witness and hear any pauses in the testimony, matters that are not normally available in non-video deposition testimony. Although deposition testimony is normally taken with all counsel and parties present with the witness, there may be exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 947-48 (2d Cir. 1988) (conviction affirmed where deposition testimony, taken overseas, was used although defendant and her counsel were not permitted in same room with witness, witness's lawyer answered some questions, lawyers were not permitted to question witness directly, and portions of proceedings were not transcribed verbatim).

The revised rule envisions several safeguards to address possible concerns about the Confrontation Clause rights of a defendant. First, under the rule, the court is authorized to use "contemporaneous twoway" video transmission of testimony. Thus, this rule envisions procedures and techniques very different from those used in

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (transmission of one-way closed circuit television of child's testimony). Two-way transmission ensures that the witness and the persons present in the courtroom will be able to see and hear each other. Second, the court must first find that there are "exceptional circumstances" for using video transmissions, a standard used in *United States v. Gigante*, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (1999). While it is difficult to catalog examples of circumstances considered to be "exceptional," the inability of the defendant and the defense counsel to be at the witness's location would normally be an exceptional circumstance. Third, arguably the exceptional circumstances test, when combined with the requirement in Rule 26(b)(3) that the witness be unavailable, is at least as stringent as the standard set out in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). In that case the Court indicated that a defendant's confrontation rights "may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important government public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." Craig, 497 U.S. at 850. In Gigante, the court noted that because the video system in Craig was a one-way closed circuit transmission, the use of a two-way transmission made it unnecessary to apply the *Craig* standard.

The Committee recognized that there is a need for the trial court to impose appropriate safeguards and procedures to insure the accuracy and quality of the transmission, the ability of the jurors to hear and view the testimony, and the ability of the judge, counsel, and the witness to hear and understand each other during questioning. See, e.g., United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999).

Deciding what safeguards are appropriate is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. The Committee envisions that in establishing those safeguards the court will be sensitive to a number

of key issues. First, it is important that the procedure maintain the dignity and decorum normally associated with a federal judicial proceeding. That would normally include ensuring that the witness's testimony is transmitted from a location where there are no, or minimal, background distractions, such as persons leaving or entering the room. Second, it is important to insure the quality and integrity of the two-way transmission itself. That will usually mean employment of technologies and equipment that are proven and reliable. Third, the court may wish to use a surrogate, such as an assigned marshal or special master, as used in Gigante, supra, to appear at the witness's location to ensure that the witness is not being influenced from an off-camera source and that the equipment is working properly at the witness's end of the transmission. Fourth, the court should ensure that the court, counsel, and jurors can clearly see and hear the witness during the transmission. And it is equally important that the witness can clearly see and hear counsel, the court, and the defendant. Fifth, the court should ensure that the record reflects the persons who are present at the witness's location. Sixth, the court may wish to require that representatives of the parties be present at the witness's location. Seventh, the court may inquire of counsel, on the record, whether additional safeguards might be employed. Eighth, the court should probably preserve any recording of the testimony, should a question arise about the quality of the transmission. Finally, the court may consider issuing a pretrial order setting out the appropriate safeguards employed under the rule. See *United States v. Gigante*, 971 F. Supp. 755, 759-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (court order setting out safeguards and procedures).

The Committee believed that including the requirement of "unavailability" as that term is defined in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4) and (5) will insure that the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights are not infringed. In deciding whether to permit contemporaneous transmission of the testimony of a government

witness, the Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) is instructive. In that case, the prosecution presented the testimony of a child sexual assault victim from another room by one-way closed circuit television. The Court outlined four elements that underlie Confrontation Clause issues: (1) physical presence; (2) the oath; (3) cross-examination; and (4) the opportunity for the trierof-fact to observe the witness's demeanor. Id. at 847. The Court rejected the notion that a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights could be protected only if all four elements were present. The trial court had explicitly concluded that the procedure was necessary to protect the child witness, i.e., the witness was psychologically unavailable to testify in open court. The Supreme Court noted that any harm to the defendant resulting from the transmitted testimony was minimal because the defendant received most of the protections contemplated by the Confrontation Clause, i.e., the witness was under oath, counsel could cross-examine the absent witness, and the jury could observe the demeanor of the witness. See also United States v. Gigante, supra (use of remote transmission of unavailable witness's testimony did not violate confrontation clause); Harrell v. Butterworth, F.3d (11th Cir. 2001) (remote transmission of unavailable witnesses' testimony in state criminal trial did not violate confrontation clause).

Although the amendment is not limited to instances such as those encountered in *Craig*, it is limited to situations when the witness is unavailable for any of the reasons set out in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4) and (5). Whether under particular circumstances a proposed transmission will satisfy some, or all, of the four protective factors identified by the Supreme Court in *Craig* is a decision left to the trial court.

The amendment provides an alternative to the use of depositions, which are permitted under Rule 15. The choice between these two alternatives for presenting the testimony of an otherwise unavailable witness will be influenced by the individual circumstances of each case, the available technology, and the extent to which each alternative serves the values protected by the Confrontation Clause. *See Maryland v. Craig, supra.*

REPORTER'S NOTES

In publishing the "style" changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Committee decided to publish separately any rule that includes what it considered at least one major substantive change. The purpose for this separate publication was to highlight for the bench and the bar any proposed amendments that the Committee believes will result in significant changes in current practice. Rule 26 was one of those rules. This proposed revision of Rule 26 includes an amendment that would authorize a court to receive testimony from a remote location. Another version of Rule 26, which does not include this significant amendment, is presented in what has been referred to as the "style" package.

Rule 30. Instructions

1

- 2 At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during
- 3 the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may file
- 4 written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as
- 5 set forth in the requests. At the same time copies of such
- 6 requests shall be furnished to all parties. The court shall

inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury. The court may instruct the jury before or after the arguments are completed or at both times.

No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection.

Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury and, on request of any party, out of the presence of the jury.

Rule 30. Jury Instructions

(a) In General. Any party may request in writing that the court instruct the jury on the law as specified in the request. The request must be made at the close of the evidence or at any earlier time that the court reasonably sets. When the request is made, the requesting party must furnish a copy to every other party.

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(b) Ruling on a Request. The court must inform the pa	<u>arties</u>

25 before closing arguments how it intends to rule on the

26 requested instructions.

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(c) Time for Giving Instructions. The court may instruct the jury before or after the arguments are completed, or at both times.

30 (d) Objections to Instructions. A party who objects to any 31 portion of the instructions or to a failure to give a 32 requested instruction must inform the court of the 33 specific objection and the grounds for the objection 34 before the jury retires to deliberate. An opportunity must 35 be given to object out of the jury's hearing and, on request, out of the jury's presence. Failure to object in 36 37 accordance with this rule precludes appellate review, 38 except as permitted under Rule 52(b).

COMMITTEE NOTE

The language of Rule 30 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only, except as noted below.

Rule 30(a) reflects a change in the timing of requests for instructions. As currently written, the trial court may not direct the parties to file such requests before trial without violating Rules 30 and 57. While the amendment falls short of requiring all requests to be made before trial in all cases, the amendment permits a court to do so in a particular case or as a matter of local practice under local rules promulgated under Rule 57. The rule does not preclude the practice of permitting the parties to supplement their requested instructions during the trial.

Rule 30(d) clarifies what, if anything, counsel must do to preserve a claim of error regarding an instruction or failure to instruct. The rule retains the requirement of a contemporaneous and specific objection (before the jury retires to deliberate). As the Supreme Court recognized in *Jones v. United States*, 527 U.S. 373 (1999), read literally, current Rule 30 could be construed to bar any appellate review absent a timely objection when in fact a court may conduct a limited review under a plain error standard. The amendment does not address the issue of whether objections to the instructions must be renewed after the instructions are given, in order to preserve a claim of error. No change in practice is intended by the amendment.

REPORTER'S NOTES

In publishing the "style" changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Committee decided to publish separately any rule that includes what it considered at least one major substantive change. The purpose for this separate publication was to highlight for the bench and the bar any proposed amendments that the Committee believes will result in significant changes in current practice. Rule 30 was one of those rules. This proposed revision of Rule 30 includes an amendment that would authorize a court to require the parties to file requests for instructions before trial. Another version of Rule 30, which does not include this substantive amendment, is presented in what has been referred to as the "style" package.

Rule 35. Correction or Reduction of Sentence

1

2	(a) Correction of a Sentence on Remand. The court shall
3	correct a sentence that is determined on appeal under 18
4	U.S.C. 3742 to have been imposed in violation of law, to
5	have been imposed as a result of an incorrect application
5	of the sentencing guidelines, or to be unreasonable, upon
7	remand of the case to the court-
8	(1) for imposition of a sentence in accord with the
9	findings of the court of appeals; or

10	(2) for further sentencing proceedings if, after such
11	proceedings, the court determines that the original
12	sentence was incorrect.

the Government so moves within one year after the sentence is imposed, the court may reduce a sentence to reflect a defendant's subsequent substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person, in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission under 28 U.S.C. § 994. The court may consider a government motion to reduce a sentence made one year or more after the sentence is imposed if the defendant's substantial assistance involves information or evidence not known by the defendant until one year or more after sentence is imposed. In evaluating whether substantial assistance has been rendered, the court may consider the defendant's

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27	pre-sentence assistance. In applying this subdivision, the
28	court may reduce the sentence to a level below that
29	established by statute as a minimum sentence.
30	(c) Correction of Sentence by Sentencing Court. The
31	court, acting within 7 days after the imposition of
32	sentence, may correct a sentence that was imposed as a
33	result of arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.
34	Rule 35. Correcting or Reducing a Sentence
35	(a) Correcting Clear Error. Within 7 days after
36	sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted
37	from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.
38	(b) Reducing a Sentence for Substantial Assistance.
39	(1) In General. Upon the government's motion made
40	within one year of sentencing, the court may reduce
41	a sentence if:

42	(A) the defendant, after sentencing, provided
43	substantial assistance in investigating or
44	prosecuting another person; and
45	(B) reducing the sentence accords with the
46	Sentencing Commission's guidelines and policy
47	statements.
48 <u>(2)</u>	Later Motion. Upon the government's motion made
49	more than one year after sentencing, the court may
50	reduce a sentence if the defendant's substantial
51	assistance involved:
52	(A) information not known to the defendant until
53	one year or more after sentencing;
54	(B) information provided by the defendant to the
55	government within one year of sentencing, but
56	which did not become useful to the government
57	until more than one year after sentencing; or

58	(C) information the usefulness of which could not
59	reasonably have been anticipated by the
60	defendant until more than one year after
61	sentencing and which was promptly provided to
62	the government after its usefulness was
63	reasonably apparent to the defendant.
64	(3) Evaluating Substantial Assistance. In evaluating
65	whether the defendant has provided substantial
66	assistance, the court may consider the defendant's
67	presentence assistance.
68	(4) Below Statutory Minimum. When acting under
69	Rule 35(b), the court may reduce the sentence to a
70	level below the minimum sentence established by
71	statute.

COMMITTEE NOTE

The language of Rule 35 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules.

These changes are intended to be stylistic only, except as noted below.

The Committee deleted current Rule 35(a) (Correction on Remand). Congress added that rule, which currently addresses the issue of the district court's actions following a remand on the issue of sentencing, in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-473. The rule cross-references 18 U.S.C. § 3742, also enacted in 1984, which provides detailed guidance on the various options available to the appellate courts in addressing sentencing errors. In reviewing both provisions, the Committee concluded that Rule 35(a) was no longer needed. First, the statute clearly covers the subject matter and second, it is not necessary to address an issue that would be very clear to a district court following a decision by a court of appeals.

Former Rule 35(c), which addressed the authority of the court to correct certain errors in the sentence, is now located in Rule 35(a). In the current version of Rule 35(c), the sentencing court is authorized to correct errors in the sentence if the correction is made within seven days of the imposition of the sentence. The revised rule uses the term "sentencing." No change in practice is intended by using that term.

A substantive change has been made in revised Rule 35(b). Under current Rule 35(b), if the government believes that a sentenced defendant has provided substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person, it may move the court to reduce the original sentence; ordinarily, the motion must be filed within one year of sentencing. In 1991, the rule was amended to permit the government to file such motions after more than one year had elapsed if the government could show that the defendant's substantial assistance involved "information or evidence not known by the defendant" until more than one year had elapsed. The current rule,

however, did not address the question whether a motion to reduce a sentence could be filed and granted in those instances when the defendant's substantial assistance involved information provided by the defendant within one year of sentence but that did not become useful to the government until more than one year after sentencing (e.g., when the government starts an investigation to which the information is pertinent). The courts were split on the issue. Compare United States v. Morales, 52 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1995) (permitting filing and granting of motion) with United States v. Orozco, 160 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1998) (denying relief and citing cases). Although the court in Orozco felt constrained to deny relief under Rule 35(b), the court urged an amendment of the rule to:

address the apparent unforeseen situation presented in this case where a convicted defendant provides information to the government prior to the expiration of the jurisdictional, one-year period from sentence imposition, but that information does not become useful to the government until more than one year after sentence imposition. *Id.* at 1316, n. 13.

Nor does the existing rule appear to allow a substantial assistance motion under equally deserving circumstances where a defendant, who fails to provide information within one year of sentencing because its usefulness could not reasonably have been anticipated, later provides the information to the government promptly upon its usefulness becoming apparent.

Revised Rule 35(b) is intended to address both of those situations. First, Rule 35(b)(2)(B) makes clear that a sentence reduction motion is permitted in those instances identified by the court in *Orozco*. Second, Rule 35(b)(2)(C) recognizes that a post-sentence motion is also appropriate in those instances where the

defendant did not provide any information within one year of sentencing, because its usefulness was not reasonably apparent to the defendant during that period. But the rule requires that once the defendant realizes the importance of the information the defendant promptly provide the information to the government. What constitutes "prompt" notification will depend on the circumstances of the case.

The rule's one-year restriction generally serves the important interests of finality and of creating an incentive for defendants to provide promptly what useful information they might have. Thus, the proposed amendment would not eliminate the one-year requirement as a generally operative element. But where the usefulness of the information is not reasonably apparent until a year or more after sentencing, no sound purpose is served by the current rule's removal of any incentive to provide that information to the government one year or more after the sentence (or if previously provided, for the government to seek to reward the defendant) when its relevance and substantiality become evident.

By using the term "involves" in Rule 35(b)(2) in describing the sort of information that may result in substantial assistance, the Committee recognizes that a court does not lose jurisdiction to consider a Rule 35(b)(2) motion simply because other information, not covered by any of the three provisions in Rule 35(b)(2), is presented in the motion.

REPORTER'S NOTES

In publishing the "style" changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Committee decided to publish separately any

rule that includes what it considered at least one major substantive change. The purpose for this separate publication is to highlight for the bench and the bar any proposed amendments that the Committee believes will result in significant changes in current practice. Rule 35 was one of those rules. This proposed revision of Rule 35 includes an amendment that would authorize a court to hear a motion to reduce a sentence, more than one year after sentence was imposed, when the defendant's substantial assistance involved information known to the defendant within one year after sentencing, but no motion was filed because the significance or usefulness of the information was not apparent until after the one-year period had elapsed. Another version of Rule 35, which does not include this amendment, is presented in what has been referred to as the "style" package.

Rule 43. Presence of the Defendant

1

- 2 (a) Presence Required. The defendant shall be present at
 3 the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of
 4 the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the
 5 return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence,
 6 except as otherwise provided by this rule.
- 7 **(b)** Continued Presence Not Required. The further
 8 progress of the trial to and including the return of the
 9 verdict, and the imposition of sentence, will not be
 10 prevented and the defendant will be considered to have

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11	waived the right to be present whenever a defendant,
12	initially present at trial, or having pleaded guilty or nolo
13	contendere,
14	(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced
15	(whether or not the defendant has been informed by
16	the court of the obligation to remain during the trial),
17	(2) in a noncapital case, is voluntarily absent at the
18	imposition of sentence, or
19	(3) after being warned by the court that disruptive
20	conduct will cause the removal of the defendant
21	from the courtroom, persists in conduct which is
22	such as to justify exclusion from the courtroom.
23	(c) Presence Not Required. A defendant need not be
24	present:
25	(1) when represented by counsel and the defendant is an
26	organization, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 18;

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27	(2) when the offense is punishable by fine or by
28	imprisonment for not more than one year or both,
29	and the court, with the written consent of the
30	defendant, permits arraignment, plea, trial, and
31	imposition of sentence in the defendant's absence;
32	(3) when the proceeding involves only a conference or
33	hearing upon a question of law; or
34	(4) when the proceeding involves a reduction or
35	correction of sentence under Rule 35(b) or (c) or 18
36	U.S.C. § 3582(c).
37	Rule 43. Defendant's Presence
38	(a) When Required. Unless this rule, Rule 5, or Rule 10
39	provides otherwise, the defendant must be present at:
40	(1) the initial appearance, the initial arraignment, and
41	the plea;
42	(2) every trial stage, including jury impanelment and the
43	return of the verdict; and

94	FEDER	AL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
44	<u>(3)</u>	sentencing.
45	(b) Wh	en Not Required. A defendant need not be present
46	und	er any of the following circumstances:
47	<u>(1)</u>	Organizational Defendant. The defendant is an
48		organization represented by counsel who is present.
49	<u>(2)</u>	Misdemeanor Offense. The offense is punishable by
50		fine or by imprisonment for not more than one year,
51		or both, and with the defendant's written consent,
52		the court permits arraignment, plea, trial, and
53		sentencing to occur in the defendant's absence.
54	<u>(3)</u>	Conference or Hearing on a Legal Question. The
55		proceeding involves only a conference or hearing on
56		a question of law.
57	<u>(4)</u>	Sentence Correction. The proceeding involves the
58		correction or reduction of sentence under Rule 35 or
59		18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).

60	(c) Waiving Continued Presence.
61	(1) In General. A defendant who was initially present
62	at trial, or who had pleaded guilty or nolo
63	contendere, waives the right to be present under the
64	following circumstances:
65	(A) when the defendant is voluntarily absent after
66	the trial has begun, regardless of whether the
67	court informed the defendant of an obligation to
68	remain during trial;
69	(B) in a noncapital case, when the defendant is
70	voluntarily absent during sentencing; or
71	(C) when the court warns the defendant that it will
72	remove the defendant from the courtroom for
73	disruptive behavior, but the defendant persists
74	in conduct that justifies removal from the
75	courtroom.

76 (2) Waiver's Effect. If the defendant waives the right to
77 be present, the trial may proceed to completion,
78 including the verdict's return and sentencing, during
79 the defendant's absence.

COMMITTEE NOTE

The language of Rule 43 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only, except as noted below.

The first substantive change is reflected in Rule 43(a), which recognizes several exceptions to the requirement that a defendant must be present in court for all proceedings. In addition to referring to exceptions that might exist in Rule 43 itself, the amendment recognizes that a defendant need not be present when the court has permitted video teleconferencing procedures under Rules 5 and 10 or when the defendant has waived the right to be present for the arraignment under Rule 10. Second, by inserting the word "initial" before "arraignment," revised Rule 43(a)(1) reflects the view that a defendant need not be present for subsequent arraignments based upon a superseding indictment.

The Rule has been reorganized to make it easier to read and apply; revised Rule 43(b) is former Rule 43(c).

REPORTER'S NOTES

In publishing the "style" changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Committee decided to publish separately any rule that includes what it considered at least one major substantive change. The purpose for this separate publication is to highlight for the bench and the bar any proposed amendments that the Committee believes will result in significant changes in current practice. Rule 43 was one of those rules. This version of Rule 43 recognizes substantive amendments to Rules 5 and 10, which in turn permit video teleconferencing of proceedings, where the defendant would not be personally present in the courtroom. Another version of Rule 43, which includes only style changes is presented in what has been referred to as the "style" package.