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SELinux Mailing ListRe: Now that SELinux supports booleans should we replace tunableswith booleans?
From: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan_at_tresys.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 2004 11:57:53 -0400
> On Thu, 2004-08-05 at 08:30, Stephen Smalley wrote: Just changing the booleans isn't enough - you would also need to evaluate all of the expressions and set rules to active/inactive. If you were planning to take the same approach as the user management tool that you just did, this should be trivial. The other option is that the reading code could be changed to evaluate all of the expressions after loading a policy so that changes to the booleans would become active, but that would obviously require kernel changes. For the reload case, the only other idea that I can think of is to have security_load_policy copy the current boolean states to the newly loaded policy for booleans that are shared between the policies. I'm not certain this is a good idea - and you probably want to have a way to disable the behavior - but the advantage is that it allows booleans to be persistent while a machine is running without requiring them to be persistent across reboots. It seems to me that persistance across reboots is actually a separate case and I am concerned about administrator confusion about when a change to a boolean is temporary and when it is persistent. I agree, however, that it is important to have some safe mechanisms for making the boolean states stay during reload and reboots. Karl
> -- -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.Received on Fri 6 Aug 2004 - 12:03:08 EDT |
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Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009 |