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SELinux Mailing ListRe: dynamic context transitions - a seteuid parallel
From: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan_at_tresys.com>
Date: Mon, 01 Nov 2004 20:12:07 -0500
>Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton wrote: It is not clear to me how the application is not overprivileged already if it is allowed to freely change between a privileged and unprivileged domain. The application must be fully trusted with the maximum access that it is granted. A misbehaving application will simply not drop access (obviously). Additionally, it seems that from an analysis stand point, these domains must be treated as equivalent and so it is not clear how the argument can be made that this increases assurance. Karl
>The latter is goal which can and should be achieved or
>The other main roadblocks are already being addressed with Linux getting -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.Received on Mon 1 Nov 2004 - 20:12:45 EST |
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Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009 |