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SELinux Mailing ListRe: [redhat-lspp] Re: MLS enforcing PTYs, sshd, and newrole
From: Stephen Smalley <sds_at_tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Wed, 25 Oct 2006 15:24:50 -0400
Sorry, no (at least based on that description - didn't receive the patch itself). get_ordered_context_list() et al are still interfaces based on SELinux user identity. What you need to do is to validate the user-supplied level against the range returned by getseuserbyname(), and the particular check needs to see whether the level is within the user's authorized range. Which gets into policy specifics, which is why I suggested using a permission check via avc_has_perm or security_compute_av, and letting policy define a mlsconstrain on it. -- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.Received on Wed 25 Oct 2006 - 15:24:20 EDT |
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Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009 |