THE DEVELOPING FOOD SECURITY CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

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THE DEVELOPING FOOD SECURITY CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

THURSDAY, JUNE 13, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:30 a.m., in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order.

Thanks for joining us today at this meeting of the Committee on International Relations. The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the developing food security crisis in the countries of southern Africa, and also to hear from the Administration and the United Nations regarding their respective plans and strategies for assisting those facing hunger in the months ahead.

Specifically, I would like the Committee to hear from our distinguished witnesses: The current field situation and the food security outlook for southern Africa; the level of preparedness of international donors, the United Nations, and the non-governmental community in assisting the people and governments of the region to cope with the developing food insecurity crisis; the intentions and willingness of other donors besides the U.S. to assist the people of southern Africa in this time of crisis; and the state of preparedness and planning on the part of the United States Government, given increased food insecurity in the region.

I would also be interested to hear from our witnesses regarding what specific governmental policies or other human-caused factors are responsible for this current crisis, especially in the case of Zimbabwe and Malawi.

According to the United Nations, up to 6 million people in southern Africa will need emergency food assistance during 2002. Last week, the World Food Programme, the WFP, revised upward its estimate of the number affected by this crisis to a new figure of 12.8 million people. Under Mr. Morris' leadership, WFP has recently been alerting the international community to the developing crisis. Donors have already begun to assist those in need—the United States has announced food donations worth $52 million and totaling 93,000 tons. But the region may need more than a million tons in emergency aid to make it through the year.

Food shortages are caused by several factors, both natural and human-caused. Self-destructive economic and agricultural policies have resulted in reduced plantings and production in Zimbabwe, adverse weather in Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia has led to re-

duced cereal harvests, and is also to blame for other food shortages in the region. Meteorologists are also warning that the El Nino climatic phenomenon could adversely affect the 2002–2003 harvest. And the effects of this crisis will be terribly destructive. Prolonged food shortages in southern Africa will cause an already weakened population to succumb to a variety of illnesses and disease, particularly those living with HIV/AIDS.

As I am sure we will hear from our witnesses today, several years ago Zimbabwe was the breadbasket of sub-Saharan Africa. It produced more than enough food for its needs and exported high quality maize to its neighbors. But, today, a self-inflicted food crisis grips that country. The illegitimate Mugabe regime is squarely to blame. Rarely has promise and production so quickly turned to stagnation and uncertainty. Government-sponsored instability, self-destructive economic policies and the land invasion and confiscation campaign of the Mugabe regime are the chief causes of food shortages, not only for Zimbabwe, but for the region as well. Zimbabwe's declining economy and continued political uncertainty have led to inflation, higher unemployment, and a rise in prices of staple foods. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO, Zimbabwe's 2001 maize crop was estimated at 1.5 million tons, 28 percent less than in 2000 and well-below average in general. A recent WFP/FAO report indicates that the decrease in production was mainly due to

> "a reduction of 54 percent in the area planted on the large-scale commercial farms, as a result of disruption by land acquisition activities."

I look forward to hearing from our three witnesses today—Administrator Natsios, Mr. Morris and Mr. Wilkinson—on the challenges ahead.

I now turn to the distinguished Ranking Member of the Committee, Mr. Lantos.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Hyde follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Thank you for joining me at today's meeting of the Committee on International Relations.

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- the current field situation and the food security outlook for southern Africa;
- the level of preparedness of international donors, the United Nations, and the non-governmental community in assisting the people and governments of the region to cope with the developing food security crisis;
- the intentions and willingness of other donors, besides the United States, to assist the people of southern Africa in this time of crisis; and
- the state of preparedness and planning on the part of the United States Government given increased food insecurity in the region.

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Food shortages are caused by several factors, both natural and human-caused. In addition to self-destructive economic and agricultural policies that have resulted in reduced plantings and production in Zimbabwe, adverse weather in Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia has led to reduced cereal harvests and is also to blame for other food shortages in the region. Meteorologists are also warning that the El Nino climatic phenomenon could adversely affect the 2002–2003 harvest. And the effects of this crisis will be terribly destructive. Prolonged food shortages in southern Africa will cause an already weakened population to succumb to a variety of illnesses and disease, particularly those living with HIV/AIDS.

As I'm sure we will hear from our witnesses today, several years ago, Zimbabwe was the breadbasket of sub-Saharan Africa. It produced more than enough food for its needs and exported high quality maize to its neighbors. But, today, a self-inflicted food crisis grips that country. The illegitimate Mugabe regime is squarely to blame. Rarely has promise and production so quickly turned to stagnation and uncertainty. Government-sponsored instability, self-destructive economic policies, and the land invasion and confiscation campaign of the Mugabe regime are the chief causes of food shortages, not only for Zimbabwe, but for the region as well. Zimbabwe's declining economy and continued political uncertainty have led to inflation, higher unemployment, and a rise in prices of staple foods. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Zimbabwe's 2001 maize crop was estimated at 1.5 million tons, 28 percent less than in 2000 and well-below average in general. A recent WFP/FAO report indicates that the decrease in production was mainly due to "a reduction of 54 percent in the area planted on the large-scale commercial farms, as a result of disruption by land acquisition activities."

In Zambia, FAO estimates that the 2001 maize harvest decreased by 24 percent from the 2000 harvest, due to excessive rain and localized floods in many areas combined with prolonged dry weather in the south. In southern Zambia, severe drought has caused total crop failure, even devastating the usually drought-resistant sorghum. Many Zambians are experiencing their second year of crop failure and have little or no food stocks on which to rely. The situation has been further exacerbated by developments in Zimbabwe causing an increased regional demand for maize, which has pushed the price of Zambia's staple food beyond the reach of large numbers of people.

The United States has traditionally played an essential and central role in alleviating hunger in Africa. In 2000, large-scale famine was averted in Ethiopia and Eritrea due to outstanding donor support provided by the United States and the strong leadership of then-executive Director of the World Food Programme, Catherine Bertini. In 1998, the United States led the way in reducing the effects of the Bahr el-Ghazal famine that was exacerbated by the Government of Sudan and its limitations on access by humanitarian workers. No doubt, 2002 is becoming another year of food crisis, and the United States will do its part to alleviate shortages caused by natural phenomenons of floods or droughts. It is my hope, however, that the Committee will understand when the failed policies of governments—or worse, malfeasance and corruption—are responsible for such widespread suffering.

I look forward to hearing from our two witnesses today—Administrator Andrew Natsios and Executive Director James Morris—on the challenges ahead. Mr. Natsios is a frequent guest at this Committee, but this is Mr. Morris' first time as a witness for this Committee since taking the helm of the United Nations World Food Programme in April.

I now turn to the distinguished Ranking Member of the Committee, Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and at the outset I want to thank Dr. Pearl Alice Marsh seated behind me who is the specialist on Africa on the democratic side for her outstanding work in preparing this hearing.

Thank you, Pearl Alice.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for convening today's hearing on a matter of extreme urgency. As the world focuses its attention on

the Middle East and South Asia, a devastating humanitarian crisis rages in southern Africa. Nearly 13 million men, women and children will go hungry as the worst food crisis in 10 years ravages the region; and millions of people are doomed to die of starvation unless the international community takes immediate and forceful action.

We cannot wait, Mr. Chairman, until a CNN moment to take action, when television images of mass graves brimming with corpses expose our policy failures and rouse our human conscience. We must mobilize the resources of the developed world and work with our regional partners and nongovernmental organizations to begin feeding the almost 13 million Africans at risk before it is too late.

Mr. Chairman, while a 2-year drought and floods are major factors, the current food crisis afflicting southern Africa is largely a man-made phenomenon. Misguided policies, short-sighted politics and chronic poverty are contributing factors in this crisis, and the catastrophic HIV/AIDS pandemic has only compounded this emergency.

Most people in the region live on less than $1 per day and nearly 15 percent of all children die before the age of 5. The unsustainable debt of some of the world's poorest countries has been exacerbated by harsh economic liberalization policies, deteriorating terms of trade, endemic corruption and chronically weak economic performance.

To take but one example, Zimbabwe's President Mugabe triggered his nation's food shortage by perverting legitimate land reform issues for short-term political gain and the ruthless consolidation of personal power. During the last food emergency, Zimbabwe provided needed food to the region. Today, the country's commercial farming sector is in total disarray and grain production has plummeted to unprecedented lows. Instead of being the region's breadbasket, Zimbabwe is becoming the region's basket case.

Across the continent in Angola, a nation blessed with much fertile cropland, civilians are starving to death after a protracted civil war that served no other purpose than to feed the political egotism of Jonas Savimbi, the late UNITA rebel leader, and to justify the rigidly centralized government of the ruling MPLA regime, which itself is fraught with corruption.

Superimposed over this crisis is the HIV/AIDS epidemic which has decimated women and men who otherwise would be able-bodied farmers. In some countries, the average life span is below 40 years and falling. Under these conditions, agricultural development simply cannot take root.

Mr. Chairman, the long-term solution for southern Africa's food security lies in sound and sustainable development policies and programs that include biodiversity, land reform, the end of corruption and the effective use of natural resources. The promotion of fair agricultural trade within the region and, specifically, with developed countries will also boost national economies and help ensure governments that they meet the basic needs of all their citizens.

The defeat of the HIV/AIDS pandemic is integral to a international food security effort.

The United States, in my judgment, Mr. Chairman, can and must play a leading role in this campaign to end the food crisis in southern Africa. Today's hearing offers an important opportunity to understand the problem. Let us seize this moment to define solutions and then move ahead with effective action.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Royce, Chairman of the Africa Subcommittee.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for calling this very important hearing.

As you have noted, the situation in several southern African countries is very grim. Famine is looming, and I think the United States and other countries must act. But in considering the country's impact, Zimbabwe should be placed in a category alone.

This Committee has spent considerable time attempting to promote democracy and the rule of law in what should be a prosperous Zimbabwe. I won't go into the details of the growing oppression that Robert Mugabe's illegitimate government is bringing to bear against brave Zimbabweans daring to exercise their right to vote; I won't go into what happened this week. But let me just say that Chairman Hyde and Ranking Member Lantos explained well the situation there, and I will say that Mugabe's regime, having stolen an election in March, is barring no means to maintain its power and its perquisites.

Now, my fear is that in a few months we will be seeing television footage of starving Zimbabweans, as we have seen in the past elsewhere in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa; and it is important that the American people and people throughout the world understand the true nature of the problem in Zimbabwe.

We need to be clear. This isn't primarily a problem of drought, as the Mugabe regime would have the world believe. Not unlike in North Korea, we are confronting in Zimbabwe a regime that is willingly starving its political opposition.

It is difficult for good-hearted Americans to comprehend that a government would use food as a lethal weapon. It is imperative that our government and, hopefully, others comprehend this tragic reality in order to save lives. Our food relief efforts are facing a determined enemy in the Mugabe regime, which ominously still shelters the former Ethiopian dictator Mengistu who, frankly, developed this into a fine art in terms of using starvation as a political weapon. He is a houseguest there. He engineered the Ethiopian famines of the 1980s.

If we are to be successful, we need to be as determined as the Machiavellian Mugabe regime officials who seek to manipulate our goodwill to what can be described only as evil ends—feeding their supporters, starving their enemies. Otherwise, Zimbabweans will die in large numbers, and we will have unwittingly bolstered this vile regime.

Winning this battle is a tall task. I appreciate that AID Administrator Natsios has had tough words for Mugabe. He bluntly made the point that this is Mugabe's famine, and I know that the Administrator has had considerable experience in this area and has faced similar perverse circumstances in Sudan.

So today I am looking forward to hearing the Administration's disaster relief plan for a civil society.

And again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing.

Chairman HYDE. The Ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee on Africa, Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief, but let me commend you for holding this very important meeting at this critical time. As has been indicated very clearly, southern Africa is certainly facing a food security crisis that requires, certainly, immediate attention and immediate assistance.

Each new assessment shows that the famine is worsening, with some 8 million people, 5 million of whom are children, needing emergency food assistance. By the end of this year, the figure will rise to in excess of 13 million people of the six worst affected countries in the region—Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi. Malawi is certainly the hardest hit, with hundreds of people dying every day.

We know that there are a number of problems that are creating the situation. We have to look at overall assistance, because food is simply the tip of the iceberg of the overall problem of development in Africa: the whole question of the continent being marginalized by not having adequate investment to keep its potential afloat.

And so, although we are specifically dealing today with the food problem, at other times we deal with the HIV/AIDS problem and at another time we talk about the erosion problem. I think that we have to start taking a look at Africa and what can we do in a coordinated, worldwide effort to provide what is needed to let this continent have the opportunity to progress in this new millennium.

And so I hope that this is just a beginning. As we look toward the request of the world that all developed countries should have 0.7 as a goal for assistance, our current assistance is less than 0.1 percent of our GDP. And unless we are willing to step up to the plate and get in line with what is being requested by world leaders, we will continually see these droughts cyclically coming, and it will be health one day, food another day, erosion another day, lack of civil strife the next day.

And so, with that, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your holding this very important hearing. I look forward to listening to the witnesses.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. The Chairman Emeritus, Mr. Gilman, of New York.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for taking the time and effort to bring this serious issue to our Nation and to the world.

Southern Africa is facing an unprecedented famine. The reports are arriving with greater frequency and are chilling. As many as 20 million people in the region of southern Africa are suffering from hunger and food insecurity. Nearly 6 million people in southern Africa are in desperate need of food.

Officials of the Government of Malawi have said that thousands are at risk of dying of hunger-related diseases if food doesn't reach them in time. Reports of babies dying in their mother's arms as they await aid have become all too commonplace. Already, in Ma-

lawi, by many estimates, more than a hundred people a day are dying from hunger and are weakened by hunger of easily preventable diseases. Zimbabwe and Zambia are also seriously impacted.

Although the flooding that destroyed much of last year's harvest and the dry weather are the primary causes of the food crisis, politics has also played an important role. The fact that Malawi's grain reserve was recently sold off without any clear explanation raises some very serious questions as to the ability and the willingness of the regional governments to act decisively on this issue and to come to the aid of their own people.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the witnesses for taking the time to be with us today to share their knowledge and experience. Hopefully, this hearing will provide an insight into what actions the Administration and the Congress can take to help alleviate the suffering of those suffering from hunger in southern Africa.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. Hilliard of Alabama.

Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, let me congratulate you, first of all, for having this hearing at this particular time.

I am very anxious to hear from the Administration, but I want to be sure, Mr. Chairman, that we do not try to surrogate hungry kids and families based on the politics of the government of the country. I think that if we are going to have a humanitarian effort to solve the hunger crisis, then we should not deal with the politics of the situation, but the urgency and the need and the humanitarian effort necessary to resolve it.

And with that said, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I ask that my full statement be made part of the record in the interest of time.

Just in response to the previous speaker, just to say that to leave out the political equation here when we have a man-made famine, when we have a man by the name of Mugabe who is committing wholesale crimes against humanity—killing, raping, letting his so-called war veterans run rampant over either white farms or going after, as he is doing now, thousands of people who are in opposition, who are black Africans—is an outrage. We need to speak out, as Mr. Natsios and others have done so forcibly, against this man-made famine and these ongoing crimes that are being committed as we deal with delivering humanitarian aid to those who are at risk of starvation and death.

To leave that out—I mean, there is a cause. It is not because it is not raining, although certainly droughts contribute. But just as Mr. Royce pointed out so well, the Mengistu famines were man-made. He used food as a weapon, and food is being used as a weapon again today. And we need to step up to the plate and be honest about that, especially with regard to the Mugabe regime.

Despite our country's misgivings, and I have misgivings about the International Criminal Court, there is a Hague meeting in a few weeks. If ever there was a case to be brought against someone

for crimes against his own people, it is that individual. There needs to be reform there, and then we will see people eating.

As was pointed out by Mr. Hyde so well, and Mr. Lantos and others, Zimbabwe used to be a breadbasket. It used to produce food that could then be exported, high-quality food, so that people could be nourished. That changed because of a corrupt and a bloodthirsty regime.

So to leave out the political equation would do an ill service to the people who are being malaffected.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I commend you on having this hearing. And indeed this hearing today is very timely, but the timeliness of the debate is not whether or not a famine is happening in southern Africa and not for us to debate whether or not the international donor community has or has not responded to the warnings and the crises which was eminent.

No, the hearing today is timely because here we are in the 21st century, living in a world that has become increasingly interconnected, interdependent, and possessing technologies we could only have dreamed about a few years ago. Yet, we also live in a world where hundreds of thousands of African people can and do die from hunger. While I know we still have hunger here in America, which is the richest nation in the world, what explains the seemingly common conditions which can lead to the occurrence of famines in Africa which affect 10 to 50 percent of an entire society?

Mr. Chairman, if we explore this issue from the point of departure that Article 11 of the United Nations International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states, that it is the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, then how should we think about this issue if we truly want to help and deal with it? Do African peoples have the right to be free from hunger, to live with the dignity of knowing that the ability of a man or woman to eat or to feed their child should not be conditioned upon the willingness of someone else to feed them?

Mr. Chairman, contrary to those who would attempt to simplify the causes of famine in Africa to something which is natural to Africa, that chronic hunger is the norm in Africa and are all simply the products of bad policy and corruption by African governments. We must be honest when we talk about why people are dying right now in southern Africa. The widespread of loss of life from famines are caused by a myriad of complex variables, both causal and relative.

As with all famines, the causes fall into two categories: Trigger factors—livelihood, shocks and responses to failures; and, underlying causes—factors that make communities in a society vulnerable to livelihood shocks in the first place.

Given these facts, I am appalled that some would pursue a political agenda by blaming an individual for causing a famine in a region. Not only does this kind of thinking prevent us from learning lessons to address the root causes of famines, but it truly devalues the people that have paid with their lives. I am convinced that in order to fully address the issue of famine, then we cannot limit our discussions to one of what has or has not been the reaction to a

crisis. Nor can we limit the discussion to issues of corruption of individuals.

Mr. Chairman, I should hope, you know, as in all nations in the world, we are part of an era of globalization, and contrary to some myths, Africa is not being left out of globalization. Globalization reaches the remote villages and affects the smallest farmers. Yet it seems that globalization is not helping small producers and African women, which form the backbone of African agriculture for the provisions of food.

Some could say—and I hope we don't—that there is enough blame to go around for everyone. But even here, the most powerful economy in the world, the second largest agricultural subsidizer in the world—we would be negligent if we did not take some responsibility for the fact that our domestic policy actions, particularly in agriculture, impact the lives of millions of hard-working, small farmers around the world. And we all, America included, could be the cause and could also be both part of the problem and the solution, so that we can deal with the root problem of hunger in southern Africa.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady from Virginia, Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have any opening statement.

Chairman HYDE. The Chair thanks Mrs. Davis.

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I want also to thank you and our Ranking Member for holding today's hearing.

This food security crisis, this famine in southern Africa has become a matter of life and death for millions of Africans. Over the past several months news reports from across the globe have illustrated the devastating impact of the food security crisis in southern Africa.

The food crisis can be attributed to a variety of circumstances, including years of poor harvest and droughts and also of neglect. The United States and the international community cannot stand back and watch as millions of people endure famine and may die of starvation, and are dying of starvation. But I would like to be clear today and hope that we can ensure that our debate does not unravel into a debate about the need to ensure political stability in southern Africa before a serious and meaningful response can be asserted.

As the wealthiest and most powerful country in the world, I believe we must respond immediately, and we should hear from our panel what our specific actions should be.

We all know that there are many factors which are contributing to the famine in South Africa—in southern Africa. The food crisis is most severe in Malawi, where hundreds of people have died in recent months, and officials in the region have indicated that 70 percent of Malawi's 10 million people are at risk of starvation. In Mozambique, years of drought, which have been followed by severe flooding, have compounded this problem. Food shortages in that country may have—or have had disastrous impact and are now leading to starvation for many, many people.

The crisis also acts upon the people of Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.

As we consider the United States' response to the food crisis in southern Africa, I believe this discussion must also include issues of development and land reform for the entire region and the impact of United States policy on trade with African countries. Specifically, we must ensure that those African countries which are forced to make decisions to alleviate hunger are not adversely affected or are precluded from engaging in trade opportunities with the United States and the international community.

Finally, we must also remember that the famine is compounded now by the HIV/AIDS crisis, TB and the malaria pandemics. These horrific diseases alone require a multitiered strategy.

And so, in the strongest sense, I urge that we look at our overall U.S. commitment to Africa—to development, to food assistance, to education, to enhancing our health care and HIV/AIDS efforts—because otherwise this famine is only going to exacerbate the AIDS crisis and millions more will die as a result.

So I just want to once again thank our Chairman and our Ranking Member for conducting these hearings, and just say, finally, that I believe it is the moral responsibility of the United States and the international community to come to the aid of the continent of Africa and come to its assistance immediately.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentlelady.

We have a special guest who is a Member of the Judiciary Committee, but whose interest in this subject is deep. She has asked to make a statement and participate in the questioning if she desires. And so, without objection, the Chair recognizes Ms. Maxine Waters of California.

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to commend you and Congressman Tom Lantos for organizing this important hearing on the desperate food crisis in southern Africa.

I appreciate the attention and concern that is developing around this humanitarian crisis, and I am particularly thankful to you for allowing me to participate here today. I don't know if members of the audience understand that it is a prerogative of the Chair to decide whether or not to allow Members who are not on the Committee to participate. So I am very grateful for your generosity.

I am here, and I decided to forgo a markup that is going on right now in Judiciary, Mr. Chairman and Members, because I am very frightened and I am feeling somewhat desperate.

I am very frightened and I feel somewhat desperate because I have lived long enough to have witnessed several catastrophes on the continent of Africa, even while I was a Member of Congress, and I did not move to do anything about it. I did not lend my voice. I did not fight and struggle at the time that there was a famine going on; and, of course, at a time when we saw genocide in another part of Africa, Rwanda.

So I vowed that I would never be silent again, that I would do everything that I could to try and save lives, give assistance and help with the development of the entire continent.

Over the last several years, I have been working to address the needs of sub-Saharan African countries for debt relief, and assistance responding to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In 1999, I worked with my colleagues on the Banking Committee to pass H.R. 1095, the Debt Relief for Poverty Reduction Act.

On July 13 of the following year, I offered a floor amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 to increase funding for debt relief by $156 million. The passage of my amendment ensured full funding of the debt relief program.

I also worked with my colleagues on the Banking Committee to pass H.R. 3519, which led to the establishment of the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

However, I am now more than concerned that the current food crisis will undermine the progress that we have made in addressing the needs of impoverished people in several African countries.

Southern Africa is now facing its worst food crisis in nearly 60 years. Almost 13 million people in southern Africa are in danger of starvation. In Zambia, people are turning to desperate measures, such as eating potentially poisonous wild foods, stealing crops, and prostitution even, in order to obtain enough food for their families to eat.

The crisis also affects the people of Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.

The effects of the food crisis have been exacerbated by the HIV/AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa. The AIDS pandemic has created many orphaned children and left many African families with fewer productive family members to produce food or generate income with which to purchase food. Furthermore, high rates of HIV infection have caused large numbers of Africans to have increased vulnerability to the effects of malnutrition and related diseases such as cholera and malaria.

The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization and the World Food Programme (WFP) estimate that nearly 4 million metric tons of food will be needed to—will need to be imported into the region over the next 12 months to meet the minimum food consumption requirements of these six countries. At least 1.2 million metric tons are needed immediately.

It is my understanding that the United States Government has provided almost $52.7 million in emergency humanitarian assistance to the six aforementioned southern African countries in response to this crisis. Most of that assistance, I am told, has been in the form of donations of commodity foods. However, as of June 7, 2002, the WFP had only received a total of 73,950 metric tons of commodities from the United States and 119,785 metric tons from all donors combined. Clearly, more needs to be done; and I believe that the United States must be a leader and must be very aggressive in confronting this food crisis. We must not allow babies, children and families to die from starvation.

I am circulating a letter to the conferees on H.R. 4775, the Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2002, asking them to provide an emergency supplemental appropriation of $200 million to respond to the food crisis in southern Africa. An emergency appropriation, I believe, is essential to enable the United States Government to provide desperately needed assistance to millions of starving people.

Of course, I am looking forward to hearing the testimony of Andrew Natsios, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, on the progress of U.S. relief efforts; and I am especially interested in his assessment of the need for addi-

tional assistance. Together, I think we can ensure that the United States Government and the international community have sufficient resources to address this unprecedented humanitarian crisis.

Mr. Chairman and Members, I did not intend to say much about Zimbabwe, but I noticed that it seems to be the focus of attention here as you address this crisis——

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. [presiding.] If the gentlelady could keep it very brief because your time has expired.

Ms. WATERS. I am hopeful that we will not allow babies and children to die, because we are concerned, disagree with—and oppose even—the policies of Mugabe and Zimbabwe. I am hopeful that the supplemental appropriations, where we have funding for Afghanistan and other areas even though we disagree with some of the policies in some of the countries that are being funded—that we will do the same for Zimbabwe despite the fact we have got work to do there.

I thank the Chairman for his generosity, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. I thank the gentlelady for raising that issue, because I do think a strawman is being established here, suggesting that somehow we are going to wait until the political situation has been remedied before this food aid and other kinds of aid goes—nothing could be further from the truth.

The Bush Administration, Mr. Natsios as Administrator of AID, working in tandem with the NGOs—everyone is working to make sure that the suffering people have their needs met, notwithstanding what is one of the primary reasons for their suffering, and that is Mr. Mugabe in Zimbabwe. So I think that strawman should be laid to rest.

No one is saying we should wait "until," but if we want to remedy the problem, we have got to realize that there are tangible policies, cruel policies that are exacerbating, in many cases creating, the very problems that are trying to be ameliorated by AID and others—World Food Programme and other very, very good humanitarian organizations.

I would like to welcome our very distinguished panel and begin with Andrew Natsios, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. Mr. Natsios's distinguished career includes service as Director of USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance from 1989 to 1991.

Later, during the Administration of George Bush, Mr. Natsios served as the Assistant Administrator of USAID, responsible for food and humanitarian assistance.

Before assuming his current position, Mr. Natsios was Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority and Secretary for Administration and Finance for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. He also served as Vice President of World Vision.

We are honored to have you here today, Mr. Natsios, and I say this to all three of our distinguished panelists: I know normally we impose a 5-minute rule, but this testimony is so important, I would encourage you to take whatever time you deem necessary to present your testimony.

We will also welcome Mr. James Morris, the new Executive Director of the U.N. World Food Programme. Mr. Morris' career began in Indianapolis, Indiana, where he served as Chief of Staff to Mayor Richard Lugar. In 1973, Mr. Morris became Director of the charity, the Lilly Endowment, Inc., where he served in various capacities before taking over as President.

Prior to joining the World Food Programme, Mr. Morris was Chairman and CEO of IWC Resources Corporation and Indianapolis Water Company. He also served as Treasurer and Chairman of the Audit and Ethics Committee of the U.S. Olympic Committee.

Currently, Mr. Morris is Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Indiana University and a member of the Board of Governors of the American Red Cross. And, Mr. Morris, we welcome you to the Committee as well.

Finally, we will hear from Mr. Bruce Wilkinson, Senior Vice President of World Vision in the United States, the largest privately funded Christian relief and development organization in the world. In his current role as Senior Vice President for International Programs, Mr. Wilkinson is responsible for allocating $400 million per year from private donors, U.S. Government grants and corporate gifts in kind. Mr. Wilkinson also oversees the World Vision's Office of Public Policy and Advocacy.

Mr. Wilkinson has 15 years of work experience in West Africa in relief and development efforts and has spent most of his career abroad in both Africa and Europe. Most recently, he has served 7 years as World Vision's Regional Director for West Africa, based in Senegal, where he oversaw relief and development efforts in that country. Prior to joining World Vision, Mr. Wilkinson also served with the Peace Corps.

And like our other distinguished panelists, welcome.

Mr. Natsios, if you could begin.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ANDREW NATSIOS, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. NATSIOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would first like to submit written testimony for the record that is much longer than what I am presenting here now.

Mr. Chairman, I was responsible for running the humanitarian relief effort in the southern Africa drought of 1991 and 1992 in the first Bush Administration. It was the worst drought in Africa in the 20th century; 24 million people were at risk, twice the number as in this famine, and we required 3 million tons of relief food—once again, twice what we require in this famine.

No one ever talks about the southern Africa famine of 1991 to 1992, because we caught the famine at the incipient stage, before there was a large-scale loss of life, and succeeded in preventing a food emergency from mutating into a famine. We intend to do exactly the same thing we did 10 years ago in this drought. I want to make that commitment to you today.

That is an instruction from President Bush and from Colin Powell. We are not going to let this turn into a famine.

I have watched them up close. They are horrific events comparable only to a genocide in the horror they engender. I have

watched the mass burial of bodies during the North Korean famine. I was in China on the border with North Korea, and I actually watched the bodies being put in mass graves during that famine that killed 2.5 million people.

I want to emphasize that the President has given us instructions not to politicize food aid anywhere in the world, and I want to just indicate the evidence of that: We announced last Friday with no fanfare another 100,000 tons of food for a very severe food and nutritional problem that is ongoing in North Korea. There are lots of issues around that, and we announced additional food aid.

North Korea is not our best friend. We are certainly not doing that for the North Korean Government. We are doing that to avoid serious nutritional problems in that country and across the world.

We have led the relief effort in Afghanistan; 75 percent of the food that went into Afghanistan last fall and this spring came from the United States through the World Food Programme (WFP).

Once again, in this drought, Mr. Chairman, 75 percent of the food that has been pledged to WFP as of this date comes from the United States Government, from the USAID and the United States Department of Agriculture.

Now, let me talk a little bit about what evidence we have that there is a food emergency, other than news headlines, which you always have to be careful of because half the time the media are late telling us that there is a problem. Other times, they exaggerate it. Other times, they understate it. We need to get reports based on technical assessments on the ground.

We began sending teams out to confirm the reports from the USAID missions last December. Some African countries were facing an incipient food emergency. We began sending teams out in April and May of this year with WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. We put people from USAID on all of those teams in all of the countries in the region to get an on-the-ground assessment of how severe the crisis was.

We now have evidence; there are 8 of 14 prefamine indicators present in Zimbabwe and 6 of 14 prefamine indicators present in Malawi. Those are the two most severely affected countries right now.

Are there food insecurities in other countries? Yes. But Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland and, at this point, Zambia are not facing famine. They are facing a food emergency, but not a famine. The other two are further along in the food emergency, because the level of nutritional stress is more severe.

Prefamine indicators are evidence that people are running out of their coping mechanisms to deal with food stress, and we look for those in any famine or prefamine condition to determine whether or not we are facing a food crisis, because if you see hungry children on TV or starving children, you see mass graves. It is too late to intervene, because it takes between 2 and 3 months to order food in Washington, then purchase the food in the Midwest grain markets, and ship it. It takes a month to get the food to Africa, offload it, and then move it sometimes through rough terrain in remote areas.

So the time to act is before, not after we begin seeing these prefamine indicators accelerating.

So we are not at a famine yet. We are at what we call a "prefamine stage." There is a food emergency taking place, and if we do not act, we will see by late this fall a famine on our hands and widespread deaths.

Now, let me talk about what the United States Government has done since last fall. Last December, we began our first ordering of food. To date, we have ordered, purchased and shipped 136,000 tons of food from the Midwest grain markets that is in various stages of processing.

By July, next month, or a month from now, 100,000 tons of that food will have arrived. It began arriving in April. Tonnage arrived this month—in May; it is arriving in June as we speak. It is being off-loaded at four ports on the coast of West Africa, and another 200,000 tons of food has been committed as of May from the Emerson Trust.

And I want to thank this Committee, and I want to thank the Congress—I wasn't in office when it happened; it happened in the 1990s—for the creation of the Emerson Trust, named after Bill Emerson from Missouri, a good friend of mine, because that trust has allowed us the flexibility we need to order the food up front.

So that decision was taken in May to take 275,000 tons of wheat that is earmarked, and then we are going to convert that, switch it, or transfer it into corn—that is the principal staple people eat in southern Africa—and into vegetable oil, and beans for protein. We need beans for protein and the fats from the vegetable oil; and the caloric intake is really from the corn.

If you do not have a balanced diet, you can have people survive, but have serious nutritional disorders like protein deficiencies and other deficiencies that you can see in a famine where the diet is not balanced. Of course, oil is more expensive than corn and beans are more expensive than corn, and that is why we have to balance what we call the "food basket" for people receiving assistance.

So the total U.S. commitment to date is about 335,000 tons of food toward this emergency.

That is not the end of our commitments; that is what has been done to date. We have a meeting twice a week, on Tuesday and Thursday, an interagency meeting, organizing and planning the response to this relief effort; and decisions are taken on a rolling basis, week by week, depending on the reports from the WFP and the NGOs as to what other donors are doing.

We cannot do all of this alone. I just have to say, we need the help of the Canadians, who are a huge food producer, the Japanese who contribute a lot of money toward food emergencies around the world, and particularly our European donors, allies and friends on this issue. So we will be the principal donor, as we are now. We will continue to be out in front, but we cannot do this alone.

Let me just say that we have been working also through the USAID missions. There are USAID missions of course in Zimbabwe, in Zambia, in Malawi, and in Mozambique that are working with the NGO community and the WFP to coordinate the planning for this.

It is not simply a function in these emergencies of ordering the food. The port facilities, WFP informs us, are probably all right to handle the intake of the 1.2 million tons of corn we need to bring

into the region. However, the logistics systems have deteriorated in the last 10 years. Some of the storage facilities in some countries, some roads and some train systems in some countries, are not in the same condition they were in 10 years ago, when we had the major drought of 1991–1992.

So Jim Morris and I have been talking. He and I were in Rome together at the World Food Summit, and we have discussed a logistics system. The big problem we are going to have is in-country, at what we call the tertiary and secondary distribution once the food gets to the capital cities. Then it is going to become a problem just in terms of volume, because this drought and food emergency is so severe.

Let me mention now the risks that we are facing in terms of the conditions on the ground. In no famine is relief food ever the whole answer to everything. The total need in the region for food is 3 million tons of food; 2 million tons of that has to come through commercial means. Half the population of Zimbabwe, the most severely affected, is at risk right now, but half the population are either middle class or upper class, and they have enough money to purchase food if only there were enough food in the markets at a reasonable price.

One of the things that happens in famines—it is a phenomenon of 90 percent of famines—is, people's incomes collapse as there is a dramatic rise in food prices, and we are seeing a 300 to 400 percent rise in food prices, particularly right now in Malawi and Zimbabwe, which is a great alarm to me, because when you see those rises, it means an increasing number of middle-class people with money cannot buy food because the price is too high.

So one of the strategies beyond food assistance that Jim and I have talked about is a commercial strategy to strengthen the commercial markets, to get more commercial food in at a normal price so that middle-class people who have resources can buy food. We should not be using money to buy food for the middle class when they have money if only the prices were at a reasonable level. So that is a major market-oriented intervention that we will consider.

We did this in Somalia 10 years ago. We did it in Afghanistan, and now we do realize that this cannot just be humanitarian assistance.

We have two reports in Zimbabwe of politicized feeding, which is to say—one report is from the Danish Physicians for Human Rights; another report is from WFP—that people have been chosen for feeding based on political loyalties. In one case we had eyewitness accounts of children being taken out of feeding lines in a school for supplemental feeding, whose parents were supporters of the democratic opposition to President Mugabe in the last presidential election. That is unacceptable.

President Bush has said we will not politicize aid by our standards, but we are not going to let other people politicize aid that we give them. Food will be distributed by our standards and by WFP and NGO standards, an accepted standard, neutrally based on need. We need to make very clear markers now that in no country is it acceptable that food be distributed based on political loyalties.

One Catholic organization suspended food in one area of Zimbabwe because, once again, they were being prohibited from

feeding opposition committee members—opposition movement members.

The food system of Zimbabwe is the most fragile, essentially for two reasons. One is, the government has decided that food must be, in order to be imported commercially into the country, purchased by the state grain board rather than privately on the private markets; and because the grain board is using a differential price that is not competitive, they are unable to bring the volume of food in for the commercial markets. So in a number of areas of the country, the commercial food markets have completely collapsed.

There is no food even for upper-class people to buy in those markets. Food has disappeared. That is a very dangerous sign, and we have urged the Zimbabwean Government to reverse its policy on this, because it will affect our ability to deal with the volume of the famine that is facing us.

The third problem we face is the shutdown of the commercial farms, and I am not going to go through here—since it is in my testimony—the consequence of that, but let me just tell you why that is important. The commercial farms, before the confiscation of this land by the Mugabe government, provided about 40 to 50 percent of the corn or maize requirements of the country; and generally, Zimbabwe was an exporter of maize prior to this change of policy.

The problem with it is this: There is a drought. It is affecting production. But the commercial farms are irrigated, and the dams are full of water. There is more than enough water in the dams for irrigated agriculture, but the farmers are not growing food either because their farms have been taken over and no one is farming them, or they are not planting because the government has a policy of only paying $40 per ton when the world price for corn is $200.

So you can see there is a huge disincentive for anybody to plant when they are, in fact, going to be losing huge amounts of money since they won't be able to make even a portion of their costs. We need to urge the government to reverse its policies in terms of pricing, because it will affect the production of food in the country from the commercial farms that are irrigated, that can use the dams that are full of water resources right now. And the sooner that is done, the better off we are all going to be, and the better off the people will be in the country.

The political crisis in the country is also distracting policymakers in neighboring countries, because it is acting upon food markets in other countries. That is the thing that is disturbing us a little bit on this, the turmoil in Zimbabwe that is taking place, over the last year in particular.

And the problems in the election—and I think it was probably one of the most abusive elections in the Third World that we have seen in recent memory—are affecting the ability of regional governments to deal with this emergency in a cooperative and corroborative way. We have never had a famine in recorded history in a democratic government, and we do not want one now. We do not want a famine in these countries, given the progress that countries like Mozambique have made.

Mozambique has made more progress. They have a 12 percent growth rate in their economy. They are one of the stellar per-

formers in the developing world. Their food emergency is not as severe. In fact, they will be selling food from northern Mozambique to Malawi and Zimbabwe—that is going on right now—because they actually have food surpluses in northern Mozambique. If you look up there, you will see where the major circle is of red, right to the right of that, in Mozambique, there was no drought, there was a large surplus produced, and that will be shipped in commercially if we can get the pricing system right.

Let me just finish by saying we are commited to stopping this horrendous event from occurring. I think we have caught it in time. We started working last December, and we will continue to redouble our efforts to ensure that this drought does not turn into a famine.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you for your tremendous testimony and the extraordinary work you and the agency do.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Natsios follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ANDREW NATSIOS, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to come here today and address the complex food security crisis that is developing in southern Africa.

INTRODUCTION

Southern Africa is currently facing a complex food security crisis due to adverse climate conditions, mismanagement of grain reserves, and questionable government policies, primarily in Zimbabwe.

Just as in the drought of 1991–92, the size of the problem is likely to overwhelm the coping capacities of the most affected countries within the region and become a regional emergency. I was responsible for managing the U.S. Government's humanitarian response to the southern African drought of 1991–92, a drought we successfully prevented from becoming a famine.

United States missions in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho have all assessed the problem to varying degrees. The food security situation is increasingly alarming, especially due to emerging concerns about regional cereal availability, the ability of regional governments to close any cereal gap and the affordability of food to the majority.

USAID has been closely monitoring the situation in southern Africa over the past year and, during that period, has taken a number of actions that could, I believe, position the international community to PREVENT a famine, not RESPOND to one. However, the outstanding issues I will outline for you today still must be addressed if we are to succeed in that effort.

Today, Zimbabwe is already on the verge of a serious food crisis, with as many as 6.0 million people at risk. The potential for large-scale humanitarian crises also exists in Malawi and Zambia. Poor and vulnerable households in Mozambique, Swaziland, and Lesotho will also require humanitarian assistance. The governments of several countries in Southern Africa have already declared national disasters due to the food security crisis, namely Malawi (February 27), Lesotho (April 22), Zimbabwe (April 30), and Zambia (May 29).

According to the recent United Nations assessment, over the next nine months, nearly 3.2 million tons of food will need to be imported—commercially and through humanitarian assistance—to meet the minimum food needs of the sub-region's population. The World Food Program (WFP) estimates that over 1.2 million metric tons of corn will need to be provided by the international donor community in emergency food aid to meet the requirements of some 12.8 million of the region's most vulnerable people between now and March 2003.

PRE-FAMINE INDICATORS

As a result of political actions taken by the Government, the people of Zimbabwe are witnessing a total collapse of their food system. This has been greatly exacerbated by flooding in 2000 and 2001 and by drought this year. These two factors—political and climatic—created conditions where food is simply not available in mar-

kets, and where attempts to control food prices and to prohibit the commercial importation and movement of grain have resulted in highly inflated prices. Further complicating matters is the loss of employment and income earning opportunities, combined with the many costs borne by HIV/AIDS-affected households and orphans. Thus, the price of the maize is now beyond the reach of even many middle-class Zimbabweans and has forced them to cope in desperate ways, including the sale of productive assets. Now, more than ever before, children are vulnerable to prostitution (and therefore potentially contracting HIV/AIDS) simply in order to eat. It is clear that unless the Government of Zimbabwe enables the commercial and international donor community to respond appropriately, the slide towards famine will continue rapidly.

The threat of famine in Malawi is also very real, although the Famine Early Warning System's analysis of pre-famine indicators suggests that the threat is less than in Zimbabwe. Prolonged exposure to natural disasters, flooding in recent years, and reduced rainfall this past year, have combined with poverty, extremely small family farms, and HIV/AIDS to lead prices well beyond the reach of the majority of the population.

And while serious chronic and acute food security indicators for Zambia, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Swaziland also exist, the threat of famine in these countries is far less serious at the present time.

HOW DID THIS CRISIS DEVELOP?

The regional food security crisis southern Africa is currently facing developed as a result of a series of episodic shocks. Floods at the end of last year and the unusually dry conditions that extended across much of the region during the past growing season have caused families to exhaust their coping mechanisms to the point of being hungry during harvest. Over the last year, Zimbabwe has lost its position as a net exporter of both grain and family remittances due to its economic and political crises. Government mismanagement of strategic grain reserves, which normally fill gaps in drought years for Malawi, has left the country without a safety net.

While serious droughts have taken their toll on the southern Africa region periodically in the past, the crisis emerging today is not the result of just adverse weather conditions. For example, even if the weather had been good in the past agricultural season in Zimbabwe, it still would have produced only half of its own food consumption needs. However, under political and economic conditions of previous years, the country would have been able to commercially import the balance.

In Zimbabwe, several economic missteps have contributed to the regional crisis. First, the government of Zimbabwe implemented price controls for staples, such as corn, which inhibit production and trade. Second, it has backtracked on the liberalization of grain marketing, bringing corn back under the control of the grain marketing parastatal and creating a monopoly that prohibits open commercial trade. Third, the government's irresponsible expropriation of land from commercial farmers has decimated the most productive part of Zimbabwe's agricultural sector. The Government of Zimbabwe also has serious foreign exchange restrictions, prohibiting its ability to import sufficient grain and making ancillary farming inputs (fuel for tractors, fertilizer, etc.) either unavailable or exorbitantly expensive. Fourth, the Zimbabwean Government's regressive policies have collapsed the national economy, sharply reducing family income.

All of these economic policies have tied the hands of the private sector, and when coupled with the drought have meant that even families with money can't find food, and that an increasing number of people are becoming vulnerable and unable to purchase food.

In addition, we are deeply concerned about serious allegations that the Government of Zimbabwe has manipulated the current food security situation for political purposes since food shortages began in December of last year. It has been credibly reported that opposition party members have been prevented from buying corn from the Grain Marketing Board, and that jobs in public works programs have been reserved for government supporters. In addition, the children of opposition party members have been driven away from school supplementary feeding programs in rural areas. It is important to note that these alleged political uses of food have not involved food aid received from donors, but food distributed and sold under government control. USAID is working exclusively through international and private voluntary organizations in Zimbabwe, which have in place systems to minimize the potential for politicization of food aid distribution.

In Malawi, the primary cause of the current food security crisis is low production during the 2001/2002 growing season, which followed a mediocre 2000/2001 harvest. Another important cause of the crisis is poor government management. Between Au-

gust 2000 and 2001, the government disposed of 167,000 tons of corn reserves. There are legitimate questions as to how this corn was sold, who benefited and if proper procedures were used. Moreover, the government of Malawi's privatization of agricultural parastatals is only half completed. Currently, more than 70% of the people cannot afford to buy corn since price controls have been eliminated. The government has responded by subsidizing prices for the poor rather than encouraging the private sector to play a more active role in the importation of corn.

The high rates of HIV/AIDS has also exacerbated the effects of the drought by both reducing family income, and by increasing the costs to the household. HIV/AIDS should be recognized as one of the greatest threats to the Southern Africa region. With the highest HIV prevalence rates in the world, Southern Africa has 28.1 million people living with the disease. The economic impact is massive as investments are depleted and human resources are lost. HIV/AIDS is causing the collapse of social safety nets and faith communities, leaving people even more vulnerable. As people become increasingly desperate for food and other resources, they may engage in high-risk behavior such as prostitution or migration that leaves them vulnerable to infections. It is thus important to ensure that districts and communities affected by food shortages and high HIV prevalence have food available in the local economy.

USAID'S EARLY WARNING SYSTEM AND PROACTIVE RESPONSE

Beginning in the fall of 2001, USAID has been working closely with its field Missions and Embassies in the region, and has taken the following actions to address the impending crisis:

- USAID notified inter-agency committees of the USG of the developing food security crisis in southern Africa—in particular in Zimbabwe.
- USAID notified the World Food Program (WFP) of the developing situation in southern Africa and asked that it immediately expand its presence and its response capacity in the region—which it did.
- USAID began working with NGOs in Zimbabwe to establish an emergency food aid program in Matebeleland South—an area particularly hard-hit by the drought.
- USAID's Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) monitored the development of the food security crisis through regular USAID field assessments and participation in wider assessments conducted by the international humanitarian community.

So far this year, the U.S. Government has approved 132,710 metric tons (MT) of food aid, valued at approximately $68.4 million, to address food insecurity in southern Africa. We are currently supplying about 75 percent of the total resources for WFP's existing operations in the region, making us by far the largest contributor. Even with that, however, WFP still faces a 56 percent shortfall in its current operations, and will be launching a regional appeal in about a week requesting 1.2 million MT of maize to feed 12.8 million people over the next nine months. Other donors need to step in and take action, and while in Rome earlier this week I encouraged many of my counterparts in Europe and other donor countries to do so.

The 132, 710 MT is allocated as follows:

- USAID approved 106,210 MT, valued at approximately $55.1 million.
- USDA approved 26,500 MT, valued at approximately $13.3 million.
- Of the approved commodities, 82,000 MTs have been allocated to WFP, 14,000 MT has been allocated to World Vision, and 36, 450 is currently in the process of being allocated.
- The first 8,470 MTs of corn meal arrived in Zimbabwe in March. The bulk of the remaining commodities was shipped in April for arrival in the region between May and early August.
- This assistance has been provided to our implementing partners in Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

USAID MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR CRISIS RESPONSE

On April 11, 2002, a United States Government (USG) Inter-Agency Policy Coordination Committee Sub-Group (PCC Sub-Group), co-chaired by USAID's Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) and the Department of State Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (DOS/PRM), agreed that a working group of USAID, DOS, National Security Council (NSC), Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Department of Defense (DOD) should be established to de-

velop a USG policy framework to respond to the emerging southern Africa complex food security crisis. This USG inter agency working group has been established and is chaired by USAID's Director of the DCHA Office of Food for Peace (DCHA/FFP). The first working group meeting was held on April 27, 2002.

USAID also established a Southern Africa Action Team (SAAT) in Washington. SAAT is serving as the principal USAID humanitarian point of contact for this region with all outside and interagency stakeholders.

USAID emergency response field staff have been mobilized from throughout Africa to conducted assessments in the following countries:

- Swaziland—April 21–24
- Lesotho—April 30–May 4
- Zimbabwe—May 5–11
- Malawi—May 5–11
- Zambia—May 12–20
- Mozambique—May 20–24

USAID staff also participated as observers in the WFP/FAO Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions conducted in Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (not those in Lesotho and Swaziland).

CALL TO ACTION

1) USG Response Mechanisms

Based on initial field assessments, the Food Assistance Policy Council agreed that food aid requirements in the region would exceed the level of USG food aid funding available in Fiscal Year 2002 and approved a drawdown of 275,000 metric tons of wheat from the *Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust* (Emerson Trust). This wheat will be converted (swapped) by USDA into a total of approximately 190,000 metric tons of corn, beans, and vegetable oil. While the Trust is held in wheat, the 1998 Africa Seeds of Hope Act allows the Secretary of Agriculture to swap wheat for commodities of equal value. This she has agreed to do.

Under the guidelines of the Emerson Trust, the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to release up to 500,000 metric tons for urgent humanitarian relief in disasters, in the case of unanticipated need, and to provide an additional 500,000 metric tons of eligible commodities that could have been released but were not in previous years. The Secretary of Agriculture is also authorized to release eligible commodities from the reserve when U.S. domestic supplies are so limited that eligible commodities cannot be made available for programming under PL 480.

U.S. missions and embassies in the region have been encouraged to engage other donor government representatives in the affected countries regarding the probable magnitude of the upcoming food-deficit, USG resource limitations, and the need for other donor assistance in the region.

2) Policy Reform

In Zimbabwe, commercial mechanisms are currently hampered from functioning to close the cereal deficit, so adequate quantities of food are not available and affordable to the majority of people. Thus, a critical focus must be on policies that allow the private sector in Zimbabwe to close this deficit. This will help to moderate prices and ensure food access to the greatest number of people.

Policy advice coming from the Western world, however, no matter how expert and correct, is not likely to achieve any policy changes within a Mugabe government, given its current mood. However, if an influential African (e.g. Kofi Annan) were to become involved, recommendations might be more easily accepted.

In Malawi, management of the strategic grain reserve must be modified to create a transparent and reliable system, and privatization of food markets must be completed.

If policy change does take place to allow the commercial sector to react to close the cereal gap, then USAID needs to send a clear signal to the commercial sector that any emergency food aid provided will be done only to protect those without usual market access. This is important so that commercial importers understand that emergency food aid will not depress market prices, since projected selling prices are the basis upon which importers have an incentive to import.

3) Regional Leadership

USAID will continue to support the SADC Drought and Flood Post Rainy Season Forum to address regional trade problems in relationship to the cereal deficit. We will attempt to re-initiate discussion with SADC about market-based regional grain security enhancing mechanisms (e.g. use of catastrophe bonds) that would provide

greater food security for the region, should drought continue (possibly El Nino affected) next year.

4) Regional Transportation Coordination

Southern Africa's transport system has, by all accounts, less capacity than it did during the crisis in the early 1990's. In order to maximize the capacity of the regional transportation infrastructure, all countries in the region will have to coordinate the movement of both commercial and humanitarian shipments. At this time, WFP will is working with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) to establish a regional logistics center to facilitate and coordinate the transport of food aid in the region. USAID has requested that US Missions keep it informed of any issues relating to port and transport activities that could delay the delivery of humanitarian food and non-food assistance.

5) Waiver Of Requirement For Non-Genetically Modified Commodities

During past humanitarian interventions in southern Africa, the USG provided significant quantities of bulk corn, as it is the staple grain in the region and it can be delivered more quickly and cost-effectively than other USG commodities. Today, the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) restricts the import of U.S whole kernel yellow corn, because it contains corn produced through biotechnology. DCHA believes that unless the GOZ will waive its restrictions on the import of U.S corn, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the USG to respond to the extensive food requirements that have been identified.

USAID is working with USDA and the USAID Mission in Zimbabwe on actions that can be undertaken to remove import restrictions related to the importation of U.S. whole kernel corn—perhaps via a humanitarian waiver.

USAID is also evaluating the availability of U.S. sorghum as an alternative grain. It is highly unlikely, however, that a sufficient quantity of sorghum will be available this year. Thus, USAID has informed the US Missions in the region that the USG is prepared to provide both whole grain corn and U.S. processed corn products for use in food aid activities in the region. However, neither USDA nor USAID will pay any special handling, processing or labeling costs associated with recipient country restrictions on the import of U.S. transgenic commodities.

TARGETING OF ASSISTANCE

To help prevent increases in malnutrition in Southern Africa, the USG is supporting a general food aid targeting approach to help meet the needs of specific categories of vulnerable groups. These categories include:

- those with specialized needs, such as children under five, orphans, households affected by HIV/AIDs, and the elderly.
- those with needs within the worst drought-affected areas, particularly rural households whose livelihoods have been most affected by drought and/or policy-induced shocks.
- those individuals in rural and urban households, including those affected by HIV/AIDS, whose extremely low incomes place them at the highest risk of severe under-consumption because of inadequate purchasing power.

In bringing food and non-food aid to the region, USAID will address the qualitative aspects of its partners' operations, such as: 1) sensitivity to the needs of vulnerable groups, especially women; 2) health and nutritional services; and 3) long-term food-security activities. In the interests of post-emergency recovery, USAID will use food aid, not only to ensure the nutritional objective of providing affected people food to eat in the short term, but also to support economic activities to encourage long term food-security, self-sufficiency and protect, or build, productive and market assets.

Using local democratic structures for the targeting and distribution of USG food will create a nucleus for strengthening community responsibilities for future development activities. Supplementary and Therapeutic feeding programs will be established to address serious mal-nourishment situations. And, ultimately, market intervention activities will be implemented in those countries and locations where groups have access to income, but where the market is unable to use normal commercial channels to obtain food resources.

CONCLUSION

In southern Africa, we face an extremely difficult situation—one of the worst in the last ten years—but it is not yet a famine. There are, however, clear indications that the specter is on the horizon. We have taken stock of the current needs and

have already taken action to prevent famine before it occurs. However, the primary responsibility for the food security of these people rests, of course, with the governments of the countries concerned. Our role will be to complement government efforts and to ensure loss of lives and livelihoods is minimized.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Mr. Morris.

STATEMENT OF JAMES T. MORRIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, UNITED NATIONS WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

Mr. MORRIS. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, have a prepared statement, along with the WFP–FAO crop assessment in the six countries that I would like to submit for the record.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Without objection, your testimony and that of Mr. Natsios, any written submissions, will be made a part of the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, sir. It seems to me that in both the opening statements of you and your colleagues and what Andrew had to say, the magnitude of the issue has been more than adequately and accurately described and covered.

May I say that the World Food Programme is the largest humanitarian agency in the world, the largest activity of the United Nations, and our job is to feed the hungry poor who are severely at risk wherever they may be around the world, essentially without political considerations. We are a humanitarian agency, and I should say that the best partner we have is the United States of America.

Ten years ago working with USAID, the Congress, the people that administered 416(b), the Department of Agriculture, we averted a famine in Africa, and I am here, sir, to assure you and your colleagues that we are as committed to the statement that Andrew made, that we will avoid this terrible famine-like situation. We are committed to seeing that food is provided, generated in support of the needs of the people in the six countries affected.

Essentially, the magnitude of the problem has been accurately stated. There are nearly 13 million people at risk in six countries—half the people in Zimbabwe, a fourth of the people in Malawi. The next largest country affected is Zambia, and Andrew correctly assessed the situation in Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho.

The World Food Programme convened a meeting last Thursday and Friday in Johannesburg of about 100 people from all of the relevant U.N. agencies, from the donor countries, from the six countries affected, and from our NGO partners. And the World Food Programme has a relationship with about 1,100 NGOs around the world, and we have an extraordinary relationship and partnership and could not do our work without them.

In essence, this session in Johannesburg concluded that the World Food Programme, working with OCHA, which is the humanitarian coordinating agency of the U.N., should be the lead agency to coordinate the world's response to this crisis. As a result of that, we have set up an office to coordinate the efforts in Johannesburg that we are moving our logistical staff around the world as well as our regional staff from the—normally headquartered in Kampala to Johannesburg to coordinate this effort.

It is our view that we will need to raise from the donor community something more than 1,500,000 metric tons of food, nearly all

of that cereals, and we will be looking at this sort of in a 9-month horizon from the end of this crop until the next crop. We will know more about it come late March. WFP has committed $5.5 million from our reserves to set the operation up and to get it going.

I mentioned our partnership with the NGOs. We anticipate a major pipeline that will flow in from our donors to serve the region. We are comfortable with the notion of pipelines being put in place to support the work of the NGOs. We believe that that ought to be coordinated, and that we ought to have a single effort sort of focusing on the negotiations with the ports, the transport operations, the fees, et cetera, so we don't find ourselves in competition with one another.

The rationale for why this is occurring has been accurately stated. Clearly Zimbabwe has had the worst drought in 20 years; weather, natural circumstances are a major factor.

WFP will do its work without political considerations. We will not tolerate for a second any foolishness on behalf of the governments we do business with, and if we are—if we have cause to believe that—we are told that we have to prefer one group over another or we can't go somewhere, we will simply sit down and work it out, and otherwise we would pull away. We will not allow the World Food Programme, this precious, incredibly strong asset of the world, to be politicized. It just will not happen.

I have had—I am probably the only person in the room that has had two face-to-face conversations with Mr. Mugabe this week, and I made it very clear to him that we, one, needed his cooperation to make it easy for us to do business in the country both for the World Food Programme and our NGO partners. I made it very clear to him that we will tolerate no political interference as to where we would do our work; that we would have access to the entire country, and we would determine where the needs are. One of the things the World Food Programme really does well is the vulnerability assessment of the problems in the country, and we would do our work accordingly. And, third, I made it very clear to him that in, our judgment, there was no chance to solve the problem unless he was willing to let free market grain traders come in and provide part of the resources needed.

Those conversations went well, and I will keep you informed.

I should mention briefly the issue of genetically modified food. There have been some conversation on this issue. I should tell you that the United States has now committed 332,000 metric tons of support for the six countries. There was a shipload of 33,000 tons headed to Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Zambia a few days ago. The people in Zimbabwe simply did not get their paperwork done in time to get this shipment adequately unloaded and delivered; they did not reject a genetically modified shipment.

Our policy on this matter is to ask the donor government to certify that what they are providing for our recipient countries meets the health and safety standards of their own country and meets the health and safety standards of the Codex Alimentarius, which is the code of the WHO and FAO certifying food safety. Once that is done, we then transmit that information to the recipient country, and they have the option of saying, yes, we want that; no, we don't want that. And virtually, every situation—we work in 85 countries

around the world—it is never rejected. And I am optimistic that we will have, over the next few days, satisfactorily worked through these issues in Zimbabwe.

This crisis is heightened by the AIDS situation. Forty million people in Africa are affected; 20 million people have lost their lives. Huge impact on children. Just a huge impact on children. AIDS orphans are rampant, and the economic effect of this whole added issue to the dilemma exacerbates clearly the food situation.

The good news is that we have had good conversations, obviously, with Andrew, and, as an American, I have to tell you, as I look through the work we do, and every conversation I have relates to a very troubled situation somewhere around the world, and, as Americans, we should be very proud of the role our government, our country—we are incredibly generous. In every place we do business, the U.S. leads the way.

I have had a good conversation this week with Commissioner Paul Nielsen of the European Community, and have been as sured of their generous support. They have some of the same political misgivings that have been expressed this morning, but focused on the humanitarian crisis, we will have them as a good partner. I have had strong support from the UK. They have committed right up front $45 million in cash to our efforts. I am going to meet with Claire Short in London on Monday to continue this conversation.

The challenge is for us to be about the business of—we know how to do this logistically. We have worked in the Horn of Africa, we have worked in Southern Africa before. What the World Food Programme did, once again, in partnership with USAID and so many more in Afghanistan was a remarkable accomplishment. We know how, working with incredibly strong and good-hearted NGO partners, how to do our work. Our challenge is in generating donor resources. And when you look at the magnitude of what faces us in Korea, in Afghanistan, in West Africa, in Angola, in Palestine, and Central America, and then to put a challenge to generate this kind of support on top of that at a time when, generally, food resources for these kinds of things have been decreasing around the country, the challenge to us is enormous.

But please know that we take this seriously. We understand completely what is at risk, and we are going to work as hard as we could possibly work to generate the resources and deliver the food in such a way that we avert this terrible catastrophe on the horizon.

So I would be happy to, in a few minutes, answer your questions. But what has been said is accurate. The demands on us with our partners have been stated accurately, and the impact on all of our work at a time when we are also focused on feeding 300 million children in the world who are not well fed, who are poorly nourished, half don't go to school, half have serious health problems. We have a very full plate right now, and to say the least, we will desperately, desperately need your continued good support and goodwill. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Morris.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Morris follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES T. MORRIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, UNITED NATIONS WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

Chairman Hyde, members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the alarming and complicated food crisis now unfolding in southern Africa.

A FAMINE AVERTED

It was almost exactly a decade ago that the House Select Committee on Hunger held a hearing on impending famine in southern Africa. The memory of a million lives lost in Ethiopia in the mid 1980s was still fresh then. In 1992, all the danger signs were there again in southern Africa—food prices were spiking, livestock was being sold or dying, people were migrating out of the countryside. At least twenty million people were at risk. But in the end there was no famine.

Not long after that hearing, the United Nations launched its most ambitious relief operation to date. What made it a success was the very early attention of this Congress, USAID, and the World Food Program. Americans did not turn on the televisions to see horrible footage of dying children, there were no editorials condemning the failings of the aid agencies, no follow-up hearings to pinpoint just went wrong. It was a famine averted.

From a food perspective, what really saved the day was the availability of large amounts of Section 416b surplus commodities from USDA, otherwise USAID and WFP would have been overwhelmed. Were there headlines in the Washington Post and the New York Times announcing "Major Famine Averted"? No. The media sadly misses successes of this kind. Only the Christian Science monitor ran a laudatory history of the operation.

There were two other things that were unique about the food crisis in 1992 in southern Africa. First, it marked the first official cooperation by the apartheid regime in South Africa with its neighbors. And second, it was the beginning of a string of devastating natural disasters that have gripped the developing world over the last decade.

If you permit me, I would like to develop this thought a bit because it explains how we have reached a point that the major donors have little food aid or cash to spare today. The rising number of natural disasters led donors to divert food aid normally allocated to helping chronically hungry people to these emergencies. At the same time, there were major political crises that also required emergency food aid—Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan.

Partly because of this emergency demand, we have barely made a dent in the number of hungry people globally, which only declined from *822 million* in 1992 to *777 million* today. The food aid that might have gone to the chronically hungry was quickly absorbed by all these emergencies. As we meet. USAID has already programmed its entire Title II budget and we are not yet half way through the year.

THE DIMENSIONS OF A FOOD CRISIS

There has been progress since the 1992 drought in southern Africa on several fronts. We are—thanks to work by USAID, FAO and WFP—better able to pinpoint where and when there will be trouble. Our early warning systems are far more sophisticated than a decade ago. Joint FAO/WFP assessment teams have already delineated the areas with the greatest need, and our preliminary estimates are that roughly 13 million people are in trouble at least until the harvest next spring (March-April 2003). The regional shortfall for cereals will be roughly 3.5 million mts. These are poor countries with limited cash for imports. So we expect food aid needs just for cereals alone to amount to over 1.2 million metric tons.

Southern Africa, in particular the Republic of South Africa, is normally a surplus producer and WFP often buys food there to help out in other parts of the continent, but the drought has been persistent and most farming in the region is still rainfed. While this is not as bad as the regional crisis in 1992, it is still severe. The worst hit areas are Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, but there are also pockets of hunger in Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland. Food prices have risen sharply and there are shortages of corn in many markets so even people with cash cannot obtain enough food. Desperate families have sold off livestock and other assets and eaten green corn, tree roots and other pre-famine foods, which has caused an increase in disease.

COUNTRY SPECIFIC HIGHLIGHTS

We have provided to you estimates of food needs for all the countries involved from the FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions. (See Appendix 1.) Permit me to summarize the situation for each:

Zimbabwe:

- From June, more than 5 million people will need food aid in Zimbabwe, increasing to 6.1 million from December—4.4 million people in communal and resettled rural areas, 850,000 urban residents plus 825,000 farm workers.
- The extremely poor main growing season has been caused by a combination of severe drought between January and April in many parts of the country and the near collapse of large-scale commercial production due to the Government's land redistribution activities. Abnormally high rainfall preceded the drought.
- We estimate cereal production at 670,000 MT, a drastic 57% drop from last year's already poor harvest and only two thirds of the 1999/2000 harvest.
- With expected corn imports of 300,000 MT, and current food aid pledges of 60,000 MT, a huge cereal gap of about 1.5 million MT remains. Some 852,000 MT of food needs could be covered by the private sector, but this would require a change in the Government of Zimbabwe's policy regarding grain importation.
- If neither the Government nor the private sector is able to provide large quantities of food to the markets, and if food aid does not arrive in the quantities needed at the right time, the food crisis could evolve into a famine.

Zambia:

- More than one person in five, about 2.3 million people, will need some 174,000 MT of food aid until the next harvest.
- Overall, there has been a substantial decline in corn production this season in Southern Province, and parts of Central, Eastern and Western Province. This was partly due to acutely irregular rainfall as well as more chronic problems of loss of cattle/draught power from Corridor disease, untimely provision of fertilizer and quality seeds, recycling of hybrid seeds and heavy reliance on a single crop for income and consumption. Several of the most affected areas also experienced drastically reduced yields last season as well.
- There is likely to be a problem of drinking water for animals this year in the plateau and hilly areas, due to the poor rainfall. This has already had a negative impact on the quality of pasture for livestock and some farmers are forced to travel greater distances with their animals to locate adequate food and water sources.

Malawi:

- About 3.2 million people will need emergency food, mainly corn. The number will increase from the present 545,000 to 2.1 million in September and to 3.1 million from December to March.
- Corn production has been estimated at 1.5 million MT, 10% less than last year's poor harvest. But we expect the actual harvest to be lower because many people are so hungry they are already eating green corn.
- The cereal supply is about 1.7 million MT against a national requirement of 2.2 million MT, leaving an import requirement of 485,000 MT. Commercial cereal imports are forecast at 225,000 MT and, in addition, there is a good supply of tubers. That leaves food aid needs of roughly 208,000 MT, which the Government and external assistance will need to cover.

Mozambique:

- About 515,000 people in poor households in 43 districts of the Southern and Central regions of Mozambique are facing severe food insecurity. Of these, 355,000 require immediate food assistance of about 53,000 MT from June 2002 through March 2003, while a second group of 160,000 people will require 16,800 MT starting from September 2002, when their current-year harvest will be exhausted.
- Severe dry weather during the 2001/02 cropping season sharply reduced crop yields in southern and parts of central Mozambique. In the main cereal growing areas of the northern region and remaining parts of the central region, abundant and well-distributed rains led to increased production of cereals.
- Overall, the 2002 cereal output will be about 1.77 million MT, 5 percent above last year, and corn output at 1.24 million MT, an increase of 8 percent. We expect an exportable corn surplus in northern and central areas of 100,000 Mt. However, high internal transport costs make it uncompetitive to move this corn from the north to the deficit areas of the south, and it is instead exported to Malawi and other neighboring countries.

Lesotho:

- We believe 444,800 people will require emergency food aid at the peak of the crisis.
- Lesotho has faced severe and variable weather for the second year in a row—heavy rainfall, frost, hailstorms and tornadoes. This affected crops at both planting and critical development stages.
- We estimate cereal production at 53,800 MT, which is a third lower than the already-reduced harvest last year.
- The domestic cereal supply will be about 74,000 MT, against national consumption of 412,000 MT. The gap of 338,000 MT will need to be covered by about 191,000 MT of commercial imports and food aid amounting to 147,000 MT for the 2002/03 marketing year, of which the humanitarian community will be asked to cover some 50,000 MT. In particular, food aid needs will be most acute from November until March of 2003.

Swaziland:

- We estimate that 144,000 people in Lowveld, Middleveld and Lubombo Plateau need food assistance for 6 months, with 87,000 more needing it for the last 3 pre-harvest months.
- Erratic weather for a third consecutive year, including a prolonged dry spell, severely affected crops during flowering stage.
- Production is 18% below last year's poor harvest and 37% below the average output in the last 5 years.
- We estimate domestic cereal supply in 2002/2003 at 77,000 MT against national consumption requirements of 188,000 MT. After deducting likely commercial imports of 96,000 MT, Swaziland will need 15,000 MT of food aid.

AN EARLY RESPONSE

We have taken the following actions to help these countries cope with the developing crisis——

1. WFP has already expanded existing emergency activities in the six affected countries as bridging operations while we put together a regional operation we will manage out of Johannesburg. In the last few weeks, our caseload has doubled from 2.3 million to 4.6 million. The sharpest expansion is in Malawi, from just 260,000 beneficiaries up to 2.1 million.
2. All the detailed food assessment reports were reviewed at an interagency meeting in Johannesburg on 6 and 7 June, which set the outlines for a regional operation and a Consolidated Appeal (CAP) from all the UN and private voluntary agencies that will be working on the operation. We are now preparing the regional emergency operation, which will start 1 July for a duration of 9 months. Our goal is to reach some 12.8 million people with around 1.6 million MT of food over the full course of the operation. It's important to note that the population in need will increase dramatically in the months to come, when the meager yield of this year's harvest is consumed. The current numbers are 7.7 million people in need in July-August. This will increase to 11.2 million in September to November, and peak at 12.8 million for the period December to March.
3. I have already approved a Special Operation (SO) to ensure adequate managerial support and enhanced logistics coordination for the regional EMOP. WFP has already committed $5.2 million from its emergency funds to jumpstart this regional operation, which will be up and running at the beginning of July and will gradually absorb the other emergency operations we just expanded. A Management Coordination Unit has been established in Johannesburg, this unit will also handle the logistics coordination. At the Johannesburg meeting, WFP was asked to continue overall coordination of the crisis, under the leadership of Ms. Judith Lewis, Regional Director of East and Southern Africa. Ms. Lewis helped lead our recent and successful drive to prevent a similar food crisis in the Horn of Africa two years ago.
4. We have long established ties with many NGO partners in the region such as World Vision, CARE, Save the Children, Africare and Catholic Relief Services. Without their involvement in local food distribution we will not succeed. Coordinating all this will be a massive challenge and while each organization may prefer its own food pipeline, we believe that is an invitation to duplication, higher logistics costs and trouble.

5. We are keeping up the pressure on our donors. Fortunately, we have had Andrew Natsios and his team on our side and we are getting initial support from the United Kingdom and EU as well. USAID has already committed 105,000 MT to the effort. We are hoping for a very significant amount of additional commodities from the Emerson Trust. We have some breathing room as the region's harvests—generally very poor harvests—are in and buying us some time. We expect peak need at the end of the year.

If we have any break at all in the food pipeline the situation could be disastrous. And we need other donors beyond the United States to jump in on a larger scale soon. It is a dangerous business to rely just on a single donor.

LOGISTICS

The movement of humanitarian cargo in Southern Africa will rely heavily on the Mozambique ports, railways and road infrastructure. Since the South African transport system has been extensively utilized for regional imports and exports, it will be difficult to find spare capacity for additional large movements of food aid. The Mozambican routes have been carrying less regular commercial traffic and have the advantage of geographical proximity and unused capacity.

Therefore, to complement the traffic that will continue to be routed via the South African ports, WFP will concentrate its logistics efforts on maximizing the capacity of the Mozambican corridors, namely Beira, Nacala and Maputo. But we will also utilize the port of Dar es Salaam, mainly for deliveries eastern Zambia and the north of Malawi.

Logistics capacity assessments of other ports in the region, such as Walvis Bay in Namibia, will be carried out within the next two weeks.

A COMPLEX EMERGENCY

There are lessons to be learned in any humanitarian crisis and this one has more than its share. Like most major food crises in recent years, the causes are partly environmental—there have been severe weather disturbances, including drought, flooding, erratic rainfall and hail in some areas. But there are also issues of economic decline and disruption and political mismanagement. This is very clearly and uniquely a food crisis, though if it is not contained it may soon become political, especially in Zimbabwe.

There is a complex interplay of politics, economics and trade at work here. There are a whole range of factors beyond the obvious problem of weather anomalies—economic mismanagement in Zimbabwe, problems in implementing policy advice from the World Bank and IMF in Malawi, and the debilitating effect that AIDS is having on the agricultural output of all these countries. There are definitely governance and corruption issues as well. We are even confronting controversies over GM foods and agricultural trade.

GOVERNANCE

Like so many other natural disasters, the damage caused by erratic weather has been amplified by very human failings.

One of the development themes my colleagues at USAID and in the United Nations keeping hammering on is the need for good governance. WFP is not a political agency, but a humanitarian one, so I will leave a detailed analysis to them—but there have been clear failures in governance in this crisis.

In Malawi, national grain stocks were liquidated and no one has been able to trace the funds. Some people are blaming this on the World Bank and IMF policy advice, but they are, of course, not responsible for the fact the funds were misappropriated. On a positive note, the Government of Malawi does appear to be making good faith efforts to trace these funds.

In Zimbabwe, the land redistribution scheme promoted by President Mugabe has caused economic turmoil and a collapse in food production due to the lack of professional management of the appropriated lands.

FAILED ECONOMIC POLICY

Finally, the government in Zimbabwe maintains too much control over food marketing and the donors are pressing them to liberalize the market so there can be broader commercial imports. That would help somewhat, but the amount of food available in the region, however, is very limited since South Africa has also been affected by dry spells. The forecast of further depletion in commercial food stocks is a looming problem that may well affect political stability. Unless the market is opened up, the likelihood of the food gap being filled is remote.

THE ISSUE OF GM FOOD

At the same time, Zimbabwe has been reluctant to take donations of US or Canadian corn as about a third of it is genetically modified, though they are permitting entry now for aid provided the corn is milled immediately. They want to export livestock to the EU and are concerned some GM corn may be fed to livestock. In fact, the EU has publicly stated they are not concerned about this but rather with the prevalence of foot and mouth disease in Zimbabwe.

WFP's position is to be neither pro nor anti GM foods. If a contribution of food meets a donor's food safety standards and a recipient's, we provide it. Obviously, foods containing commercially produced GM corn have been safely consumed on billions of occasions. So, from my personal perspective, it is hard to justify withholding food from people on the basis that it is GM. There are also no UN food safety guidelines that would call for that under the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius. There is a great deal of misunderstanding on this issue we need to overcome, but that is more properly left to FAO and WHO. Some African scientists are actually quite keen on GM, seeing it as presenting the possibilities for a second Green Revolution.

A CRISIS WITHIN A CRISIS

This is the first major food crisis in history in which we clearly see that AIDS is playing a major role. The countries most affected by the drought are also at the epicenter of the global AIDS pandemic. AIDS has raged like a wildfire across sub-Saharan Africa, infecting up to 41 million people, which is more than 75 percent of the world's cases, and already killing more than 20 million.

There are actually three emergencies raging in southern Africa as we sit here today. In addition to the unabated weather disturbances and the AIDS pandemic, we should add the exponentially growing number of orphans. We are witnessing the demise of an entire generation of parents—parents who are leaving behind youngsters who lack the cultural, social and familial ties, including basic farming know-how, that typically pass from generation to generation.

The US Census Bureau estimates that as many as 15.6 million children were orphaned by 2000 in the 23 hardest hit countries in sub-Saharan Africa. What we in the US refer to optimistically as "the future generation" is, in this case, a generation of children with the bleakest of outlooks. In Zambia, just last month, a WFP team met with a family headed by an elderly woman and her blind husband. They have survived all nine of their children, and find themselves thrust into the role of guardians for eight of their grandchildren and several great-grandchildren. These are some of the individuals who are most at risk of starvation today.

Poor families in the drought-affected region have already sold off their assets and spent their paltry savings on what food and medicine was available even before the food crisis became apparent. Children have already been withdrawn from school to replace their parents in the fields, beg on the street, look after their younger siblings or provide home-care for a sick family member. Agricultural production was already depressed because so many adults are too sick to work. And, young women, even girls as young as 10 and 12 years old, are exchanging sex for food, basic goods, or the money to buy them. In their desperation, they risk contracting HIV and then giving birth either to infected babies or the orphans of the future.

In the African context, the role of good nutrition in slowing the progression of disease from HIV to AIDS cannot be understated. People living with HIV require more energy and more protein, along with the necessary micronutrients, than do healthy people. Existing therapies require sound nutrition. Adequate food is essential for prolonging the lives of parents and enabling them to have a few more precious weeks, months or maybe even years to be productive work and spend time with their families. Perhaps we cannot give them hope, but we can give them time.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, we must move quickly in southern Africa. Working with Andrew Natsios and our partners at USAID and in the NGO community, I know we can beat prevent a famine as we did a decade ago. We were very pleased to see that Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman recently approved a drawdown of wheat from the Emerson Trust for 275,000 MT that will be exchanged for corn and vegetable oil. That should be a great help. To be candid, we expect that given the severe demands for food aid worldwide, it may be necessary for her to draw on the Emerson Trust again to avert more crises in the near future. President Bush has made a commitment that there will be no famine on his watch. It is up to all of us to help him meet that commitment.

Andrew and I just returned from the World Food Summit plus 5 meeting in Rome. Five years ago, the United States and other nations made a pledge to try to cut hunger in half by 2015. And, as I noted earlier, we are falling far short of that goal. Building real food security for people as we have here in the US is no simple task. I think USAID is to be commended for investing 38 percent more money in food and agriculture projects in the poorest countries. We must make more progress on hunger. Hungry people simply cannot produce, cannot compete and cannot be good neighbors.

Food aid needs a strong boost too. The 300 million children all over the world who are hungry today cannot wait for development to catch up with them. Hunger is devastating their bodies and their minds now—192 million of them are already stunted because their families could not feed them properly. But we are helping not more, but less. In 1999, global food aid was 15 million MT. Last year it had dropped to 11 million MT—a loss of 25 percent, despite all the food crises that now challenge us.

WFP is severely pressed for resources. We recently had to cut a million beneficiaries in North Korea and were only able to restore them after a new US contribution. We have also delayed food for school feeding and food for work projects in Afghanistan. Those two countries are not only humanitarian priorities for the United States; they are politically sensitive as well. While other donors are critical too, the US has always taken the lead on food aid, especially in emergencies. I am deeply proud of that fact. I hope this Congress will reach out to the hungry who have always seen the United States as a symbol of hope for the future.

FAO GLOBAL INFORMATION AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEM ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

SPECIAL REPORT

FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SUPPLY ASSESSMENT MISSION TO LESOTHO

28 May 2002

MISSION HIGHLIGHTS

- Domestic cereal supply in 2002/03 is estimated at 74 000 tonnes, while total national consumption requirement is estimated at 412 000 tonnes. This results in an import requirement of 338 000 tonnes. Commercial imports are estimated at 191 000 tonnes and food aid at 147 000 tonnes which needs to be met by the Government and external assistance.
- The mission estimates that a total of 444 800 people throughout Lesotho will require emergency food assistance. The districts hardest hit by this year's poor harvest are Qacha's Nek, Quthing and Mohale's Hoek. Not all individuals will require food assistance for the whole year and, therefore, assistance needs to be carefully targeted and phased so as to avoid disruption of domestic markets. Overall, the Mission recommends targeted emergency assistance of approximately 68 955 tonnes of food, including maize, pulses, vegetable oil and iodised salt. The GOL has already allocated 5 400 tonnes of maize for distribution to the most vulnerable people.
- Emergency provision of agricultural inputs such as seeds is recommended to enable disaster-affected farming families to restart agricultural production during the next main planting season starting in October 2002. Promotion of seed multiplication and horticultural production are recommended measures to further improve food security at household level.
- Agriculture in Lesotho faces a catastrophic future. Crop production is declining and could cease altogether over large tracts of the country if steps are not taken to reverse soil erosion, degradation and the decline in soil fertility. Crop yields are generally very low and declining. In the mid 1970s average maize and sorghum yields were in the order of 1 400kg/ha, but today they average 450-550kg/ha.

1. OVERVIEW

Lesotho faced severe weather variability for the second year in a row, characterized by heavy rainfalls, frost, hailstorms, and tornadoes. The erratic timings of rainfall and frost severely affected crops at planting time and during their critical development stages. Heavy rainfall in October and November delayed or prevented planting of crops in many areas and frost in March curtailed the end of the growing season. The Government of Lesotho, anticipating another poor harvest, declared a state of famine and requested FAO and WFP for assistance in reviewing the country's food situation and outlook for the 2002/03 marketing year. Consequently, an FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission was fielded from 25 April to 4 May 2002 to estimate the current season cereal production, assess the overall food supply situation and forecast import requirements for 2002/03 marketing year (April/March), including food assistance needs. A representative of Southern African Development Community (SADC) Regional Early Warning Unit (REWU) participated in the mission as an observer.

The Mission received full cooperation from the Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperatives, and Land Reclamation, Ministry of Economic Planning, Disaster Management Authority, Ministry of Industry,

Trade and Marketing, and Bureau of Statistics. Discussions were also held with relevant UN agencies including UNICEF, WHO, UNDP, as well as donor representatives, NGOs, and grain importers. The Mission split into two groups and was able to cover all the ten districts of the country. Interviews were conducted with each District's Principal Secretary and staff from crops, livestock, extension, disaster management, nutrition, and health divisions to get information and their assessment of the situation within their districts. Interviews were also conducted with Village Chiefs, households farmers, and traders. Overall, more than 120 interviews were conducted during the course of the mission.

The Mission forecasts 2001/02 cereal production at 53 800 tonnes. Maize production is estimated at 34 500 tonnes, wheat at 14 100 tonnes and sorghum at 5 200 tonnes. Other crops such as beans, potatoes and peas were also observed on most farmers' fields that contribute to the diet of families and cash incomes when grown in larger quantities. The Mission used last year's FAO/WFP assessment mission figures for comparison of cereal production levels. On this basis production for this year will be 33 percent lower than the already reduced production last year. The Mission estimated the total cropped area of 133 600 hectares, about 60 percent of the area in normal years. The drop was partly due to heavy and widespread rains during the land preparation and planting period. Large areas in the lowlands with impermeable clay sub-soils were water-logged and took considerable time to drain and dry for tractors and machinery to operate, coupled with a shortage of tractors and oxen for ploughing in many areas.

With an estimated total domestic cereal supply of 74 000 tonnes, and total utilization requirement of 412 000 tonnes (Table 5), the country faces a shortfall of 338 000 tonnes for 2002/03 marketing year. Commercial imports are estimated at 191 000 tonnes, and food aid at 147 000 tonnes, which needs to be met by the Government and external food assistance.

The mission has estimated that a total of 444 800 people throughout Lesotho, but particularly in the districts of Qacha's Nek, Quthing and Mohale's Hoek which have been the hardest hit by this year's poor harvestwill require immediate emergency food assistance. Total emergency food assistance is estimated at approximately 68 955 tonnes of food, including such commodities as maize, pulses, vegetable oil and iodised salt.

Different approaches to food distributions need to be examined. In less affected areas, self-targeting through food-for-work may be more appropriate than free distribution. In the worst affected areas free distribution will be required.

Agriculture in Lesotho faces a catastrophic situation: crop production is declining and could cease altogether over large tracts of the country if steps are not taken to reverse soil erosion, degradation and the decline in soil fertility. The foothill and mountain areas are unsuitable for intensive cropping due to their fragile and poorly structured soils and should concentrate on livestock production. Crop yields are generally very low and declining; in the mid 1970s average maize and sorghum yields were in the order of 1 400kg/ha but today they average 450-550kg/ha.

2. ECONOMY

The Kingdom of Lesotho is a landlocked mountainous country of 30 355 km2 that is completely surrounded by South Africa. The entire country lies 1 000 meters above sea level with mountains reaching well over 3 000 meters. Only 406 500 ha (13 percent) of the total land area is arable, the remainder being mountainous . The country is divided into four agro-ecological zones and ten administrative districts. The Lowlands is the most populated and intensively cultivated zone, followed by the Foothills, the Mountains, and the Senqu River Valley which is the smallest zone. Climatic conditions also vary widely by region and altitude - 85 percent of rainfall occurs from

October to April, while snow occurs in the mountains from May to September.

Lesotho's economic performance over the last decade has been relatively mixed. The early to mid 1990s saw an economic boom that was driven by the construction of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project and the expansion of the manufacturing sector. The GDP grew at an annual average rate of 6.3 percent. However, there was a severe contraction in GDP growth in 1998-99 resulting from civil unrest. Growth resumed in 1999-00 and 2000/01, but at a slower pace of 2.4 percent and 3.2 percent, respectively. It is expected that the growth rate will remain around 3 percent for the current fiscal year. Major contributors to real GDP growth in 2000/01 were agriculture (15 percent), manufacturing and construction (40 percent) and services (36 percent).

The budget for fiscal year 2002/03 projects a deficit of M423.5 million before grants-5.5 percent of GDP. However, after grants the deficit drops to M28.1 million. Major budget allocations include 22 percent for education, 8.2 percent for health, and 4.8 percent for agriculture.

The latest IMF review of Lesotho's economic performance under the three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) programme was generally favourable. Of the SDR24.5 million (US$31 million) available under the programme, SDR 10.5 million has been released. IMF has acknowledged the Government's overall commitment to the programme and the fact that all quantitative performance criteria have been met.

Lesotho has been steadily improving its revenue collection, particularly of income tax, with relatively stable customs revenues (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Central Government Revenue Generated by Customs and Income Taxes



Source: Central Bank of Lesotho, Bureau of Statistics

Under the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Free Trade Area Protocol signed in 1996, Lesotho is committed to gradually removing import restrictions and tariffs over a period of 8 years. The loss in customs revenues is projected to reach 17 percent by the time the Protocol is fully implemented. The recent trade agreement between the European Union and South Africa will further increase the fiscal deficit, as the country will lose its share of revenue from the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU).

Lesotho's current account deficit in 2000/01 improved by 30 percent and the capital and financial accounts together declined by 16 percent, resulting in a relatively better balance of payments

position than in 1999-00. However, there still remains a significant trade deficit. The total export earnings average around 25 percent of total imports (Figure 2). The main exports are textiles, footwear, mohair and some live animals.

Figure 2: Imports and Exports of Lesotho 1997-98 to 2000-01



Source: Central Bank of Lesotho, IMF Country Report 2002

The external debt stood at US$ 546.7 million at the end of fiscal year 2000/01. The multilateral component was 76 percent, bilateral 11 percent, and commercial 14 percent. The external debt to GDP ratio was 62.8 percent, and debt service as a percentage of total export revenue was 13.2 percent. Official foreign exchange reserves remain above the target floor set by the Central Bank, at 7.4 months of imports of goods and services.

Lesotho's currency, the Maloti, which is pegged at par with the South African Rand, has been declining against the dollar since 1998-1999. During the fiscal year 2001/02, the Moloti fell over 38 percent against the US dollar. Commercial bank lending interest rates during the fiscal year 2000/01 ranged between 16-25 percent.

The average unemployment rate for Lesotho is about 30 percent, but is higher in the rural areas. The economy has only been able to absorb about a third of individuals entering the work force every year. The unemployment situation is exacerbated by the continuing retrenchment of Basotho workers from South African mines (Table 1). Since 1991 the number of Basotho working in South Africa has declined by about 50 percent.

Table 1: Number of Basotho Working in the South African Mines (1991-2001)

Year Number of Workers Year on Year Change (%)
1991 122 188
1992 119 596

-2.1

1993
116 129
-2.9

1994
112 722
-2.9

1995
103 744
-8.0

1996
101 262
-2.4

1997
95 913
-5.3

1998
80 445
-16.1

1999
68 604
-14.7

2000
64 907
-5.4

2001
59 900
-7.7

Source: IMF Country Report 2002

3. FOOD PRODUCTION IN 2001/02

The agricultural sector in Lesotho is facing extremely serious structural problems. The key issues are severe soil and land degradation, lack of proper land and crop husbandry practices, limited use of improved seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, and almost non-existent extension services. Without serious long-term interventions, it is highly probable that crop production will completely cease on large tracts of agricultural land. Lesotho's last agricultural census (1999/00) highlighted the fact that the country's cultivated land has increased from 317 900 to 406 500 hectares between 1989 and 2000, with the increase attributed to extension of cultivation to marginal lands that were previously fallow/grazing land.

3.1 Agro-meteorological conditions

Unexpected heavy rain fell in late August over most areas of the country, which benefited some early land preparation for the summer cropping season. October was characterized by very wet conditions, particularly during the last ten days, which restricted land preparation and planting activities.

November rainfall was normal to above normal in most areas, but was particularly heavy during the first two dekads, further delaying crop establishment, especially in southern districts. Rainfall remained above normal in December and this trend continued through January. However, February was generally dry throughout the country with erratic rainfall (Figure 3). On a cumulative basis, rainfall was above normal for the 2001/02 season, but quantities and distribution were erratic and delayed planting of crops. A widespread frost in March severely affected crops in most districts, and localised hailstorms exacerbated the problem.

Figure 3: Actual vs. Normal Monthly Rainfall, September 2001-March 2002




Mohales Hoek 2/
250
200
150
100
50
0
Rainfall (mm)
Sept
Oct
Nov
Decr
Jan
Feb
Mar
Actual
Average


Leribe 3/
200
150
100
50
0
Rainfall (mm)
Sept
Oct
Nov
Decr
Jan
Feb
Mar
Actual
Average



Source: Department of Agro meteorology 1/Northern Lowland, 2/ Foothills, 3/ Southern Lowland, 4/ Mountains

3.2 Supply of agricultural inputs

The demand for fertilizer is heavily dependent on rainfall and consequently varies from year to year. Fertilizer use for food crop production has ranged between 5 835 tonnes and 9 460 tonnes during the period 1996/97 to 2000/01. This translates into a national average of about 43kg of fertilizers per hectare, which is low by regional standards. Statistics for 2001/02 were not available to the mission, but it is believed that fertilizer usage decreased, largely because of the reduced purchasing power of farmers and excessively wet conditions. The low levels of fertilizer use are despite the fact that farmers of Lesotho have enjoyed highly subsidized fertilizer since the 1980s.The subsidies have ranged from 5 to 30 percent for the period 1994-95 up to the present. The marketing of fertilizers is in transition towards market liberalisation; both the private sector and cooperatives are currently distributing fertilizers that are imported from South Africa.

Seeds have been equally subsidised. However, from discussions with farmers, most of the maize varieties used are local or recycled hybrid seed and only 21 percent of wheat seed used by farmers are improved varieties. For sorghum, a negligible amount of improved seeds is used.

3.3 Areas planted

It was very obvious from the amount of land lying fallow in all districts that large areas of arable land had not been planted during the 2001/02 cropping season, as reflected in Table 2, which compares the estimates of the Mission with last year's Mission estimates. Except in Mohale's Hoek, cereal areas in 2001/02 were lower than in 2000/01, with the national total declining by 22.4 percent. This was due to the heavy and widespread rains from the second half of October to the middle of November, which delayed land preparation and planting. Large lowland areas have an impermeable clay subsoil, which when waterlogged takes considerable time to drain and dry sufficiently for tractors and machinery to work the land. The area planted was further reduced because the optimum planting date of the main food crops (maize and sorghum) was missed, and farmers decided not to plant at all. Another reason was a shortage of tractors and oxen, once conditions permitted land preparation and planting.

The area planted to each of the major summer crops in each district is given in Table 3. The total national maize area is estimated at 91 300 ha, while the area under sorghum and wheat is estimated at 13 400 ha and 28 900 ha respectively.

Table 2: Total Summer Cereal Area (Hectares) in 2001/02 compared to 2000/01 FAO/WFP Mission Estimates

District	2000/01	2001/02	Percent of Average
Butha-Buthe	8.3	4.4	53.0
Leribe	33.7	21.2	63.1
Berea	28.6	20.1	70.3
Maseru	30.7	22.9	74.6
Mafeteng	20.2	18.0	89.1
Mohale's Hoek	11.8	13.5	114.4
Quthing	12.3	10.7	87.1
Qacha's Nek	5.6	5.1	91.1
Mokhotlong	6.7	6.2	

										92.5
Thaba-Tseka										
										14.3
										11.5
										80.4
Lesotho										
										172.2
										133.6
										77.6

Source: Estimates by the Dept. of Crops and the 2002 Mission

3.4 Crop yields

The Mission's estimates of crop yields for the year 2001/02 are based on data provided by the Department of Crops, adjusted on the basis of field assessments. The adjusted yield figures are given in Table 3. Yields per hectare are universally poor but highly variable between districts, with southern and central districts (Mafeteng, Mohale's Hoek, Quthing, Qacha's Nek and Thaba-Tseka) showing the lowest. In many areas of these districts the crops produced no grain at all and were being harvested as fodder for livestock. Northern districts (Berea, Leribe, Butha-Buthe and Mokhotlong) were relatively less affected by the disasters and yields were slightly better.

Table 3: Area and Yield of Summer Crops in 2001/02, by District

DISTRICT	**Wheat**			**Maize**			**Sorghum**		
	Area ('000 ha)	**Yield (kg/ha)**	**Prod. ('000 tonnes)**	**Area ('000 ha)**	**Yield (kg/ha)**	**Prod. ('000 tonnes)**	**Area ('000 ha)**	**Yield (kg/ha)**	**Prod. ('000 tonnes)**
Butha-Buthe									
									1.1

	440
	0.5
	3.0
	450
	1.4
	0.3
	400
	0.1
Leribe	
	2.6
	750
	2.0
	16.4
	500
	8.2
	2.2
	450
	1.0
Berea	
	2.2
	700
	1.5
	15.6
	500
	7.8
	2.3
	450
	1.0
Maseru	
	4.2
	500
	2.1
	16.3
	400
	6.5
	2.4
	400
	1.0
Mafeteng	
	2.5
	470
	1.2
	13.6
	300
	4.1
	1.9
	350
	0.7
Mohale's Hoek	
	3.0
	400

	1.2
	9.0
	250
	2.3
	1.5
	350
	0.5
Quthing	
	2.2
	400
	0.9
	7.2
	250
	1.8
	1.3
	300
	0.4
Qacha's Nek	
	1.4
	350
	0.5
	3.5
	200
	0.7
	0.2
	300
	0.06
Mokhotlong	
	4.9
	500
	2.5
	1.2
	250
	0.3
	0.1
	200
	0.02
Thaba-Tseka	
	4.8
	350
	1.7
	5.5
	250
	1.4
	1.2
	300
	0.4
LESOTHO	
	28.9
	488
	14.1

91.3	
378	
34.5	
13.4	
388	
5.2	

Source: Department of Crops and Mission estimates 2002

During discussions with farmers, District Agricultural Officials, the Ministry of Agriculture at Headquarters, and the Disaster Management Authority Officials, it was established that late planting because of waterlogged fields, widespread early frost and hail were the main causes of the poor crop yields. The most important factor was the late planting of the maize and sorghum crops, for which any delay after the optimum planting date considerably reduces yield. The length of the growing season was further reduced by a widespread early frost, which curtailed crop growth at the grain filling stage. Localised hailstorms also caused serious damage in some districts, and cutworms and stalk borers caused further damage to the crops, particularly those planted late.

It was also reported that inputs arrived late in some areas. While private traders market some inputs, these were expensive and largely inaccessible to many farmers who have no source of credit. The overall result was that the majority of farmers used farm-saved, low yielding seeds including recycled hybrid seeds.

National average yields of maize and sorghum are estimated at 378 kg/ha and 388 kg/ha, respectively. Combined summer and winter wheat average yields are estimated at around 488 kg/ha.

3.5 Estimated cereal production in 2001/02

Table 4 compares this year's estimated total cereal production with the estimates made by last year's FAO/WFP Mission.

At the time of the visit, some farmers were busy sowing winter wheat that will be harvested in December/January 2002/03. Planting of winter wheat normally starts mid April making use of the residual moisture and small amounts of rainfall. The late rains experienced in April and May should bode well for the winter crop, with soil moisture levels high. It is expected that there will be an increased area planted to winter wheat after the poor summer cropping season.

Aggregate cereal production in 2001/02 is estimated at 53 800 tonnes compared to 80 300 tonnes estimated by last year's Mission, a decline of 33 percent on an already poor harvest.

Table 4: Total Cereal Production (tonnes) in 2001/02 compared to 2000/01 Mission Estimates

	2000/01	**2001/02**	**Percent of 2001/02 or 2000/01**
Butha-Buthe			
		3.3	
		2.0	
		61.0	

Leribe	
	19.7
	11.2
	56.8
Berea	
	11.9
	10.3
	86.5
Maseru	
	14.8
	9.6
	64.9
Mafeteng	
	8.0
	6.0
	75.0
Mohale's Hoek	
	3.7
	4.0
	108.1
Quthing	
	5.6
	3.1
	55.4
Qacha's Nek	
	1.8
	1.3
	72.2
Mokhotlong	
	2.2
	2.8
	127.3
Thaba-Tseka	
	3.3
	3.5
	106.1
LESOTHO	
	80.3
	53.8
	67.1

Source: Estimates by the Dept. of Crops adjusted by the Mission for year 2001/02

3.6 Other crops

Beans and peas are extensively grown, largely for home consumption, but also for cash when

grown in larger quantities. Most households grow beans during the summer in rotation with cereals while peas are grown during the winter using residual moisture and any rain. Bean yields during the last cropping season were extremely low and will considerably reduce the dietary protein available to households. Other crops observed were potatoes, pumpkins, sunflower, fruit trees and vegetables, which will supplement the reduced supplies of maize in household diets.

3.7 Livestock situation

The majority of rural households, (perhaps over 80 percent) own livestock, mainly cattle, sheep and goats. Many also have a horse, two or more donkeys and chickens. Large herds of cattle and flocks of sheep were noted in the mountain areas in particular, where pastures were excellent after the heavy rainy season. However, theft has become a major problem in the country. Thefts occur in and between villages, between districts, and across borders. The situation is getting worse and becoming increasingly dangerous, and is having a serious negative impact on household food security. Livestock are a vital source of cash to purchase food when agricultural production is low, as it is this year; and supply draught power for cultivation.

4. FOOD SUPPLY AND DEMAND SITUATION

4.1 Access to food and prices

Lesotho is a net importer of maize, wheat, pulses, dairy products and other food commodities. In a typical year, roughly half of the food consumed in the country is imported. For maize, the main staple food, imports represent 60-65 percent of national requirements. Other than for wheat, virtually all imports come from the Republic of South Africa (RSA). In accordance with the SACU agreement, Lesotho does not impose duties on imports from RSA. Thus, food prices in Lesotho are closely linked to those in RSA.

The annual inflation rate in February 2002 was 12.9 percent compared with 7.6 percent in October 2001. This increase is largely attributable to higher food prices as a result of domestic and regional food shortages, increasing oil prices, and the depreciation of the South African Rand. Consumer prices for bread and cereal groups rose by over 14 percent between January and February 2002. The price of an 80 kg bag of sifted and un-sifted maize has almost doubled since June 2001 (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Prices of 80 Kg Bags of Sifted and Un-sifted Maize (June 2001/May 2002)



Source: Marketing Section of Ministry of Agriculture

The mission observed that there was no shortage of food products in the markets of all districts. Given the high rate of unemployment in the rural areas, extremely limited income generating opportunities, and high incidence of poverty, the purchasing power of most households is extremely low. People, particularly in the foothills and mountain areas are surviving through bartering, home brewing, selling livestock, reducing consumption, and taking children out of school. Individuals infected with HIV/AIDS are also forced to reduce consumption, when in fact they should be increasing their intake of carbohydrates and proteins by 15 and 50 percent above normal levels.

The serious decline in domestic cereal production, combined with decreased cereal production in the region as a whole and hence increased cereal import needs in several countries, is exerting an upward pressure on maize prices, restricting access to food for large segments of the population in Lesotho (and elsewhere in the region).

The Government of Lesotho has declared a state of famine, highlighting the seriousness of the current food situation, and introduced a short term plan to assist the most vulnerable groups. Some M14 million (for 5 400 tonnes of un-sifted maize meal) have already been allocated for immediate intervention.

The Government has also commissioned Lesotho Flour Mills Ltd. and Lesotho Milling Company to produce 50 kg bags of un-sifted maize meal clearly marked for immediate free distribution to the most vulnerable groups of the population. A 20 percent subsidy on un-sifted maize meal for the general population is being effected through normal market channels.

4.2 Cereal supply/demand balance, 2002/03

The forecast of the cereal supply-demand situation for the marketing year 2002/03 (April/March) is based on the following assumptions and Mission observations (Table 5):

- Farmers interviewed by the Mission stated that they had no stocks due to the poor harvest last year. Therefore, it has been assumed that the opening on-farm stocks are zero. Government and millers' opening stock figures (1/04/02) were provided by the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing.
- The mid-marketing year 2002/03 population is estimated at 2 209 743 and per capita consumption at 127 kg for maize, 42 kg for wheat and 16 kg for sorghum. The per capita consumption figures are based on the average of a linear trend of consumption over the last ten years.
- "Other uses" cover essentially post harvest losses and seed use. They are estimated at 6 percent for maize and sorghum and 5 percent for wheat.

Table 5: Lesotho: Cereal Balance Sheet for 2002/03 ('000 tonnes)

	Maize Wheat Sorghum Total
Domestic availability	
	41.5 **27.1** **5.2** **73.8**
Opening stock	
	7.0 13.0 0.0 20.0
Domestic production	
	34.5 14.1 5.2 53.8
Total utilisation	
	283.0 **93.5** **35.7** **412.2**
Food use	
	281.0 92.8 35.4 409.2

Feed and seed use and losses	
	2.0
	0.7
	0.3
	3.0
Import requirements	
	241.5
	66.4
	30.5
	338.4
Anticipated commercial imports	
	125.0
	66.4
	0.0
	191.4
Food aid	
	116.5
	0.0
	30.5 1/
	147.0

1/ Sorghum shortfall to be met by maize imports.

Table 5 shows a cereal import requirement of 338 000 tonnes. Commercial cereal imports are estimated at 191 000 tonnes and food aid at 147 000 tonnes which will need to be covered by the Government and external assistance.

5. EMERGENCY FOOD REQUIREMENTS

5.1 Food insecurity

Food security in Lesotho depends on the availability of employment opportunities in addition to the availability of adequate supplies. The most food insecure households in Lesotho are those that have the most difficulty generating sufficient income to meet food needs. Even in years of reasonable harvest and stable prices, some two thirds of Lesotho households are estimated to live below the poverty line (based on income needed to meet basic needs) and nearly half are classified as destitute. The recent dramatic increases in food prices have helped to push a greater proportion of the population below the poverty line, and worsened the situation of those who were already struggling.

The great majority of rural Lesotho households must depend on cash income in order to survive. For the average rural household, agriculture of all types accounts for less than ten percent of income. For most households, crop production is only one of many survival strategies. However, livelihood strategies, especially of the poor, give more emphasis to agriculture than appears to be warranted by the economic facts alone. Thus even though agricultural production is never sufficient to meet all food needs, it does provide a vital supplement to other sources of food, as well as employment opportunities (through odd jobs during harvest and other peak demands for agricultural labour) for people who have few other employment options. Hence a crisis in

agricultural production reduces employment (and cash) opportunities, while simultaneously forcing people to turn to the market for an increased proportion of their food needs. In the current situation, most rural people are being forced to obtain a higher proportion of food from the market, at the same time as market prices have reached very high levels.

Although wage labour is seen as the key to overcoming food insecurity in Lesotho, the unemployment rate - estimated at more than 30 percent nationally - is a major barrier. Employment in the mines of South Africa has traditionally been the prime source of income for male workers. But restructuring of the mining industry towards less labour-intensive production, combined with the depressed prices for gold in the late 1990s and South Africa's preferential employment policy for its nationals, have restricted employment opportunities, and the flow of remittances back to Lesotho, plummeted over the past decade. Thus traditional coping strategies based upon seeking wage employment in South Africa are no longer viable for most of the rural poor.

Livestock ownership, including cattle, sheep and goats, is seen as a major safety net for rural households. Livestock are used as a "savings bank", and are a vital source of income to purchase cereals when agricultural production is low. However poor households usually have few, if any, livestock resources on which to rely. The situation has been exacerbated by rampant and increasing livestock theft, which has become a serious threat to rural livelihoods.

Even in relatively normal periods, carbohydrates (of which, roughly 80 percent is maize) account for on average three quarters of total calorie intake, and vegetable sources provide most protein. The dramatic increases in food prices has resulted in increased cereal food purchases by poor households, with a corresponding decline in purchases of other foodstuffs. Thus, there has been a decline in both total energy consumption and consumption of micro-nutrients. As a result, nutritional deficiencies have become a growing concern. Intake of animal protein is negligible in most rural areas. Vegetable intake depends on whatever is harvested from small kitchen gardens, or can be gathered wild. The increased reliance on maize to meet most energy needs has resulted in an increase in Pellagara. Intake of iodised salt has also fallen.

The extremely high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Lesotho affects all districts, and has serious repercussions for household food security, including:

- Loss of adult males, the primary income earners
- Potential loss of secondary income earners, if spouses catch the disease.
- Additional household expenses to care for HIV positive individuals, particularly children
- Increased nutritional requirements (up to 15 percent more calories and 50 percent more protein) of HIV/AIDS affected individuals
- Increased burden of child support by single mothers or grandparents, already among the most food insecure groups.

In other words, households affected by HIV/AIDS have fewer income-earning opportunities, but simultaneously face higher food and non-food costs.

5.2 Vulnerability

In early 2002 WFP undertook a Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) of food security and vulnerability in Lesotho, based on secondary data sources. On the basis of 13 indicators, the VAM analysis identified the mountain areas of Lesotho as having the greatest food insecurity and

highest levels of vulnerability.

Mohale's Hoek, Qacha's Nek and Quthing Districts were identified as being the most vulnerable to food insecurity. These are the districts that have been most affected by the 2002 food crisis and are particularly vulnerable to climatic shocks. Most of the population is poor by income and asset measures, and coping strategies are largely based on agriculture. The remoteness from urban centres restricts market access and employment opportunities. Thus the reduced agricultural production of 2002 has severely exacerbated the situation in an already food insecure region.

The VAM analysis further identified the mountain districts of Thaba Tseka and Mokhotlong as having severe levels of income poverty, but less vulnerable to shocks to agricultural production caused by abnormal weather. These districts have been less affected by the 2002 food crisis.

Of the lowlands and foothills areas, only those of Quthing were identified by the VAM analysis as being vulnerable to food insecurity. In the current crisis, the foothills and lowlands of Qacha's Nek, Mohale's Hoek, Mafeting and Maseru Districts have also been severely affected.

The VAM analysis also noted that even in wealthier districts, such as Maseru, Leribe and Berea, mountain areas tended to contain vulnerable and food insecure populations. Of these areas, the Maseru mountain areas have been most affected by the current crisis.

The VAM analysis identified the most food insecure households in Lesotho as having the following characteristics:

- Multiple income-earning strategies
- High reliance on farming, herding, informal business or casual labour for most of their income
- Households headed by widows
- Households headed by older household heads (above 60 years)
- Households with a high age dependency ratio.

In other words, the households that suffer the deepest poverty and food insecurity in Lesotho are those headed by individuals who have few employment opportunities and few assets.

5.3 Required food assistance

Market interventions (price subsidies, monetization of donated food aid) could help improve the overall food security situation, by lowering prices and thus increasing accessibility. However, for a significant proportion of the population, the severity of the food and poverty situation this year, along with the reduced availability and effectiveness of usual coping strategies, means that market interventions are unlikely to be sufficient to bring food prices within their reach. For these people, some sort of targeted food assistance will be required.

On the basis of the characteristics of the most vulnerable households, as determined by the WFP VAM analysis, and the level of expected harvest in 2002, it is estimated that some 444 800 people will require targeted food aid in 2002/03 (Table 6). Not all these people will require external food assistance for the whole year.

Table 6: Estimated Number of Rural People Requiring Food Aid (2002/03)

District	Total Rural Population

(estimated 2002)
Estimated Number of Rural People Requiring Food Assistance, 2002/03

Buthe Buthe	92 752 2 800
Leribe	195 006
Berea	176 622
Maseru	225 086 79 500
Mafeteng	172 236 101 300
Moahale's Hoek	150 510 76 900
Quthing	101 733 46 400
Qacha's Nek	64 550 34 000
Thaba Tseka	112 909 56 600
Mokhotlong	80 739 47 300
TOTAL	**1 372 140** **444 800**

Major parts of Qacha's Nek, Quthing and Mohale's Hoek have been the areas hardest hit by this year's agricultural crisis. This is the second year that these districts have suffered from a poor harvest. Vulnerable people in these districts will require full food rations with immediate effect, up until the next harvest period (April-May 2003).

Although the harvest has also been poor in Thaba Tseka, Mafeteng and part of Mohale's Hoek, households are likely to obtain some production from their fields, which should support them for

some months. Thus targeted food assistance to meet full food requirements is likely to be required for nine months.

Mokhotlong has achieved a better harvest than the other mountain districts, and the mountain areas of Butha Buthe and Maseru have a greater range of coping strategies. Consequently these areas are likely to require targeted food assistance for a shorter period - six months. (Alternatively, half rations could be provided for 12 months). It may also be expected that, even in the worst affected areas, most households will have some, even if limited, options to obtain food through various coping strategies. Thus it is expected that direct food assistance would be required as follows:

	Number of people
Assistance for 12 months	80 400
Assistance for 9 months	234 800
Assistance for 6 months	129 600

Food rations supplied through direct distribution should meet overall calorie needs, taking into account the extra calorie needs of people living in cold areas (at least during winter), and requiring additional energy to meet the physically demanding way of rural life in Lesotho. Rations should also be sufficient to meet the additional calorie requirements of people affected by HIV/AIDS (which can be assumed to affect at least one third of all beneficiaries). Insofar as possible, the rations should also meet the basic micro-nutrient requirements of a population whose diet has consisted almost entirely of maize meal.

Consequently, it is expected that approximately 68 955 tonnes of food, including such commodities as maize, pulses, vegetable oil and iodised salt will be required for direct food assistance.

Different approaches to food distributions should be examined. In less affected areas, self-targeting through food-for-work may be more appropriate than free distribution. In the worst affected areas (Qacha's Nek, Quthing and Mohale's Hoek), free distribution will be required. However the implementation of a broad programme of free distribution should be based on a strict registration system to ensure that food aid is targeted to those most in need.

6. LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Agriculture in Lesotho, which has struggled for many years, is currently facing a catastrophic situation. Crop production could cease altogether over large tracts of the country unless steps are taken to reverse soil erosion, soil degradation and the decline in soil fertility. The foothill and mountain areas are unsuitable for intensive cropping on the fragile and poorly structured soils and should concentrate on livestock production.

The physical soil conservation structures throughout the country originally designed and established when the soils were stable and of good quality, have deteriorated alarmingly and erosion has escalated as soils have become more leached, less structured and unable to hold moisture and support crop production. These terrace ridges/contours in use with the degraded

soils now commonplace throughout Lesotho need to be constructed much closer together in order to deal with the increased runoff and erosion. However, this is a monumental task which would require massive funding. In addition, such physical runoff control measures can only be used safely and effectively in support of optimum soil management, together with better crop and livestock husbandry practices.

Declining cereal and other crop yields are the result of a combination of factors including the continued, unsustainable use of land resources in the country, unfavourable climatic factors and worsening crop husbandry practices. Crop yields are in general very low because most of the cultivated soils have low levels of fertility, high acidity, low organic matter content and poor moisture retention capacities. As soil fertility has declined, yield levels have also decreased. In the mid 1970s average maize and sorghum yields were in the order of 1 400kg/ha. Today the average is 450-550kg/ha.

Maize and sorghum cannot continue to be mono-cropped year after year. Rotations, fallows and mixed, relay and inter-cropping practices with leguminous (particularly) and other crops must become part of the farming system. In Berea District, this technique was noted by the Mission on a visit to an area of land (15 hectares), originally earmarked for an irrigation scheme. The scheme did not materialise, but the land had been under lucerne/fallow for five years; it was planted to maize and sorghum this season by a number of individual small farmers. The resultant crops were infinitely better than anywhere else in the country. Estimated yield of maize was 6.5-7 tonnes/ha and for sorghum 4-5 tonnes/ha. This also compared with maize variety trials conducted under good management nearby, with estimated yields of only 2-2.5 tonnes/ha (one third of the yield), and local farmer yields of 0.4-0.5 tonnes/ha (one fifteenth of the yield). The concept of an enriched fallow (containing legumes) in the crop rotation cannot be overemphasised. Farmers should be encouraged to produce only one good grain crop a year on their land, utilising the best crop husbandry techniques available. After harvest, a suitable fallow crop should be established to help improve soil fertility, soil structure and soil moisture retention capacity for the next food grain crop.

As recommended in the Soil Fertility Initiative Document, prepared for Lesotho by FAO (1999), what is needed is a comprehensive participatory approach that takes advantage of synergies of practices at field level, offering production, economic and conservation benefits. This approach would emphasise building of soil organic matter levels through proper use of inorganic fertilizers, manure and ash, coupled with intercropping of improved cereals and legumes, conservation farming and agro-forestry practices. The overall benefits are the improvement of soil structure and fertility, food security, cash incomes, dietary diversity and protection of the environment. The improved soil structure and fertility result in increased efficiency in plant nutrients uptake and water storage, thus enhancing the profitability of crop production as well as enabling crops to withstand dry periods and drought.

Another major issue is that the majority of farmers around the country are unable to follow any of these initiatives or improve their crop husbandry practices, because they are isolated and marginalised within the system. The agricultural extension service in the villages and field areas is totally inadequate - very understaffed, lacking in motivation and short of transport.

6.1 Possible future FAO technical assistance to develop agriculture in Lesotho

1. Land Tenure: A study of the present land tenure situation in Lesotho, together with a strategy to promote secure access to land for farmers throughout the country should be carried out. In addition to expanding access to credit and limiting existing disputes, the development of an effective tenure system will have a profound impact on the ability of communities to enter into

productive partnership arrangements and to intensify production. Some aspects of the traditional land tenure system work against the adoption of soil restorative practices. Land that has not been cultivated for three successive years can be reallocated to another household, thus mitigating against the use of fallows in crop rotations. Furthermore farm households only have exclusive centers to their crop fields up until the time the crop has been harvested. Thereafter the land and any remaining crop residues becomes an open access grazing resource until the next cropping season, so it would be going against the social norms of the community for an individual household to fence its crop fields. Such free grazing can also lead to the destruction of grassed waterways and conservation banks within the arable lands.

2. Watershed Management: An FAO/TCP project undertaken in 1988/89 was instrumental in introducing to Lesotho the concepts and principles of a broader more holistic approach to soil and water conservation known as "better land husbandry". Within this approach, the technical focus for soil conservation is on combating soil productivity decline, which is a result not only of soil erosion but also of changes in a soil's biological, chemical and physical properties. Following on from this work, there is now a need for a broader study of complete watersheds in order to improve their management and long-term sustainability, and to benefit downstream farmers and the country as a whole.

3. Conservation Agriculture Technology: This technology has proved to be extremely successful in many countries in Africa and around the world. It conserves, improves and makes more efficient use of natural resources through integrated management of available soil, water and biological resources. It leads to environmental conservation as well as enhanced and sustained agricultural production. It is a no tillage system involving the maintenance of crop cover (live or dead) on the soil surface, and direct seeding or planting of crops through this cover using specialised equipment. Besides protecting the soil and the crop against erosion and water loss by run-off or evaporation, the soil cover also inhibits the germination of many weed seeds. A programme should be devised under a TCP project to provide a national level conceptual and policy framework for the formulation and implementation of a series of area based and farmer centred field projects, with complementary institutional strengthening and in-service training programmes at national and district level.

4. Improved seed production and promotion at community level, and assistance to enhance the performance of the livestock sector.

This report is prepared on the responsibility of the FAO and WFP Secretariats with information from official and unofficial sources. Since conditions may change rapidly, please contact the undersigned for further information if required.

Office of the Chief
GIEWS, FAO
Fax: 0039-06-5705-4495
E-mail: giews1@fao.org

Ms. J. Lewis
Regional Director, ODK, WFP
Fax: 00256-41-255115
E-mail: Judith.Lewis@wfp.org

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1 Lesotho Agricultural Census 1999/2000. Volume 1: Rural Households and Crop Statistics. Bureau of Statistics (BOS), Lesotho.

FAO GLOBAL INFORMATION AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEM ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

SPECIAL REPORT

FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SUPPLY ASSESSMENT MISSION TO MALAWI

28 May 2002

MISSION HIGHLIGHTS

- Maize production in 2002 is estimated at 1 539 000 tonnes, 10 percent below last year's poor harvest. The major cause was erratic rainfall with

long dry spells.

- Cereal supply in 2002/03 marketing year (April/March) is estimated at 1.721 million tonnes, while the national cereal requirement is estimated at 2.206 million tonnes. This results in an import requirement of 485 000 tonnes.
- Commercial imports of cereals are forecast at 225 000 tonnes and food aid requirements at 208 000 tonnes which will need to be covered by the Government and external assistance.
- Approximately 3.2 million people seriously affected by the combined effects of reduced food availability and purchasing power need emergency food assistance estimated at approximately 207 689 tonnes of cereals, mainly maize.
- National production of roots and tubers has increased, and this will moderate the maize shortage in many areas.
- Emergency provision of agricultural inputs such as maize seed, bean seed, fertilizer and hand hoes is recommended to assist affected farming households to carry out winter cultivation in wetlands and irrigated areas in May/June and for the main planting season in October/November. Rapid cassava multiplication and provision of treadle pumps are recommended measures to further improve food security at household level.

1. OVERVIEW

A number of factors, including a poor harvest in 2000/01, very low levels of stocks of maize, rapidly rising food prices, a generally late start to the planting rains for the 2001/02 season, flooding in several districts, and a dry spell early in 2002, pointed to a developing food crisis in Malawi. This prompted the Government to declare a state of national disaster at the end of February, and to request FAO and WFP to carry out an assessment of the food situation in the country. Accordingly, an FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission visited Malawi from 21 April to 11 May 2002. The Mission's objectives were to assess the country's 2001/02 crop production, estimate the levels of existing food stocks, review the overall food supply situation, and draw up a national food balance sheet indicating the magnitude of the food gap. A representative of SADC's Regional Early Warning Unit (REWU) participated in the Mission as an observer.

The Mission was briefed in Lilongwe by the staff of various departments in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI), the National Food Reserve Authority (NFRA), the Agricultural Marketing Development Corporation (ADMARC), the Reserve Bank of Malawi, UN and other international and bilateral organisations, and NGOs. In addition, the Mission was provided with extensive documentation prepared by the Government and non-government agencies on recent weather conditions, current crop assessments and forecasts, and reported food shortages. Most importantly,

the Mission had access to MAI's Second-Round Agricultural Production Estimates which had been prepared in March 2002.

After its initial briefing, the Mission split into two teams to visit the southern part of the country, and into three teams to visit the northern part. Between them, the teams visited all the country's eight Agricultural Development Divisions (ADDs) and its 26 mainland districts. The local situation was discussed with MAI and other Government officials at each ADD headquarters and again in each district, with a view to establishing the continuing validity or otherwise of the forecasts presented in the Second-Round Agricultural Production Estimates. The teams also travelled extensively in the field in order to observe and evaluate standing crops, and to discuss with farmers their experiences of the summer cropping season, their plans for the winter cropping season, and their perceptions of their level of food security at present and for the coming twelve months. Markets were visited in order to observe the level of availability and prices of staples, and the current season was discussed with traders and owners of small maize mills. Some health officials were also interviewed in order to get an indication of the effects of the recent food shortage on people's health.

On its return to Lilongwe, the Mission briefed the Government and donor agencies on its preliminary findings.

Maize is the preferred staple of the vast majority of Malawians, and a lack of maize is generally interpreted as a lack of food. Poor production in 2000/01 led to serious shortages towards the end of 2001 and during the first three months of 2002. Hopes of a better harvest in 2001/02 were dashed by flood damage in several areas, followed by a prolonged dry spell over most of the country during the critical months of February and March. Furthermore, the actual harvest is expected to be lower than the second-round estimates as a result of the widespread pre-harvest consumption of maize in the field, a consequence of the shortages caused by last year's poor harvest. With virtually no carryover stocks, and a forecast maize harvest of only 1.54 million tonnes, the national maize requirement of about 1.72 million tonnes for human consumption alone (based on the average historic rate of consumption of about 151 kg/caput/annum) will not be fully met internally. Taking total utilization requirements (including seed, feed, losses, etc.) of all cereals, the country faces an import requirement of about 485 000 tonnes. Malawi's production of roots and tubers has increased significantly in recent years, as has the acceptance of these crops as an important contributor to household food security. These crops will contribute to reducing the cereal deficit. Commercial cereal imports are forecast at 277 000 tonnes and food aid at 207 687 tonnes for an estimated 3.2 million people affected by the combined effects of reduced food availability and declining purchasing power.

2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT

2.1 Macro-economic situation

During the last twenty years Malawi has faced two central economic challenges: the need to reduce the level of absolute poverty and to cut the budget deficit. The strategies for poverty alleviation have included liberalisation of domestic markets, relaxation of agricultural marketing arrangements and privatisation of parastatal companies, together with specific rural development programmes. Overall, there has been little noticeable diversification of the production base, agriculture being by far the dominant sector. Between 1981 and 2001, real GDP growth averaged 3 percent a year.

In December 2000, the IMF approved a three-year poverty reduction and growth facility that formalised the objective of poverty reduction and emphasized fiscal policy reform and promotion of private-sector development and investment.

Macro-economic instability has been a major problem in recent years. The Government has been attempting to control public spending through the introduction of a medium-term expenditure framework, but it is believed that the budget deficit target of 1.9 per cent of GDP for 2001/02 is unattainable. Between 60 and 70 per cent of government expenditure is funded from external sources in the form of grants and loans. There has been rapid growth in money supply and inflation, as the Reserve Bank covered the government budget deficit with internal credit. Open-market operations, mainly issuance of treasury bills, have been used in an attempt to minimise the inflationary effect of public sector borrowing and to support the national currency, the Malawi kwacha (MK). This has resulted in high nominal and real interest rates.

High levels of inflation have historically made the kwacha vulnerable to depreciation, but a rare appreciation occurred in 2001 that caused profit uncertainty among traders who had signed future contracts in US dollars. Tobacco export revenues are expected to increase this year, following a switch to the higher-value flue-cured tobacco and an improvement in the quality of the burley tobacco crop. However, declining international prices for coffee and tea are reducing export receipts from these crops.

Public and publicly guaranteed long-term external debt was US$2,596 million at the end of 1999 and debt service was US$44 million. Total foreign currency reserves at the end of 2000 were US$248 million, representing less than six months of imports of goods and services.

2.2 Performance of the agricultural sector

Agricultural output generates over 90 percent of export earnings, mostly from tobacco, and 30-40 percent of GDP. The agricultural sector is dualistic, consisting of small-scale farmers and an estate sub-sector. The two sub-sectors have been historically distinguished on the basis of legal and institutional rules regulating land tenure, type of crops and marketing arrangements. The smallholder sub-sector is based on a customary land-tenure system and is primarily subsistence, providing the bulk of food production. The main food crop is maize, supplemented by rice, sorghum, pulses, cassava and sweet potatoes. Since the mid-1990s, smallholders have been allowed to produce export/industrial crops, and this has generated great response in production, particularly of tobacco. Other cash

crops include cotton, groundnuts and pulses. The estate sub-sector comprises about 14 700 estates occupying some 850 000 hectares of leased land. The main crops are tobacco, tea and sugarcane. Approximately 80 percent of the workforce is employed in the smallholder sub-sector and 11 percent on estates.

Agricultural production grew at an annual rate of 2.1 percent from 1980 to 1993, down from a high of 4.4 percent per annum between 1970 and 1980. This was mainly because ADMARC's purchases were drastically reduced in 1986/87, with maize purchases going down from 271 000 tonnes in 1985 to 59 500 tonnes in 1987, as result of excessive stocks and Government budgetary constraints. Furthermore, guaranteed producer prices were held down to reduce Government expenditure, with the price of maize constant for three years up to 1997. This led to a steep fall in the marketed maize and a resurgence of food shortages after many years of surpluses.

Throughout the 1990s, agricultural production was characterized by marked swings, mainly due to droughts. Following a drop in maize production in 1996/97, there was a significant recovery in 1998/99 and 1999/00, which was attributed to increased use of modern agricultural inputs (improved seed and fertiliser) under the Starter Pack scheme, and increased cropped area. During the 2000/01 season, distribution of inputs was drastically reduced due to very limited donor involvement in financing the scheme, and reduced credit availability following extensive defaults by farmers in 1999/00 due to very low maize prices.

2.3 Population

The size of Malawi's population is a contentious issue, and one which has very significant implications for the assessment of national food security. The figure currently used by MAI is 11.44 million, which is based on an annual growth rate of 2.7 percent since the 1998 census. This is higher than the inter-censual annual growth rate of 1.9 percent for 1989-1998. On the other hand, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which explicitly takes into account the effects of high mortality attributable to AIDS, assumes an annual population growth rate of only 1.5 percent. Using this rate, the CIA arrives at a population figure of about 10.6 million in 2001.

For the purpose of calculating national food requirements, the Mission has used the Government's population figure of 11.44 million.

3. FOOD CROP PRODUCTION IN 2001/2002

3.1 Main factors affecting production in 2001/2002

Agricultural credit

Credit was less available to small farmers this year because of poor repayment of loans in 2000/01. Shortage of credit generally resulted in reduced ability to purchase seed and other inputs.

Rainfall

In reviewing rainfall for the 2001/02 cropping season, the Mission examined recent precipitation records from around the country, as well as satellite imagery of the country for the three summer seasons 1999/00, 2000/01 and 2001/02. Discussions were also held with farmers and extension workers concerning the effects of the season's rainfall on crop production.

In most parts of the country, rainfall was the most significant single determinant of crop production in 2001/02. Rains in mid-November prompted many farmers to plant early, especially in the central and southern zones, where these early rains appeared to indicate the beginning of the season. However, this turned out to be a false start in many cases, and, where emergence was hampered by dry conditions in late November and early December, farmers were forced to replant later. Drier-than-normal conditions prevailed over the northern and central zones until the second half of December, by which time much of the country's planting had been significantly delayed. Abnormally heavy rains at the end of December and the beginning of January led to flood damage and some crop loss in parts of all three regions. Rainfall then stabilised to a normal pattern during January, leading to expectations that the maize crop could, after all, be quite satisfactory. Then, towards the end of February, when much of the late-planted maize was at the teaselling stage, rainfall declined dramatically over most of the country. Central and southern regions were most seriously affected, but all parts of the country experienced below-average rainfall until late March, when the rains returned to normal or above-normal. A further setback came in the second week of April when rainfall stopped abruptly in many parts of the country, especially in the southern and central regions; late-planted maize was again adversely affected.

The late start to the season, the flooding, the dry spell during February-March, and the early cessation of rains in April all contributed to reduced maize production this year, despite the fact that total rainfall recorded up to the end of March was not very different from normal. Roots and tubers, however, were relatively unaffected, and the above-average rainfall in many areas at the beginning of April facilitated further planting of these crops. This should go some way towards reducing the impact of low maize production on national and household food security. Figure 1 shows three representative rainfall profiles from October 2001 to March 2002 (the latest month for which rainfall records were available at the time of the Mission.)



Area planted

The area planted to maize in 2001/02, estimated at 1.49 million hectares, is marginally less than for either 1999/00 or 2000/01 (both about 1.51 million hectares). Some of the loss to maize may have been taken up by tobacco, the area under which expanded slightly from 114 000 hectares in 2000/01 to 122 000 hectares in 2001/02 in response to expectations (unrealised) of enhanced financial returns. Likewise, groundnuts, which are regarded partly as a cash crop, have been planted to increasingly large areas in recent years. The area under rice has also expanded from 44 000 hectares in 1999/00 to 57 000 hectares in 2001/02. The area under roots and tubers has shown a steady expansion in recent years from a reported combined total of 351 000 hectares in 1999/00, through 394 000 hectares in 2000/01, to 431 000 hectares in 2001/02. (The reliability of these figures, however, is suspect since they may include intercropping, but they do nevertheless indicate real expansion. See below (Roots and tubers) for further discussion.) The recent evolution of major crop areas is given in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 2.

Table 1. Malawi: Areas ('000 hectares) under major crops, 1999/00-2001/02

	Maize	Rice	Roots and tubers 1/	Groundnuts	Tobacco
2001/02	1 488	57	431	209	122
2000/01	1 507	50	394	189	114
1999/00	1 507	44	351	176	119

1/ The figures for roots and tubers may not be reliable in absolute terms (see text).

Figure 2. Malawi: Major crop areas, 1999/2000 - 2001/2002



Agricultural inputs

Low maize production was attributed in many areas to a shortage of seed, retained seed having often been consumed as a result of the poor harvest of the previous year. A further problem was the necessity to replant in those areas where there had been a false start to the season, followed by a period of relative drought, during which emerging plants dried out. Farmers often had no more seed left after the first planting. DIFD's Targeted Inputs Programme (TIP) was reduced significantly in 2001, with the result that many farmers who were depending on seed from this programme for their summer planting were disappointed. On the other hand, the late distribution of winter-TIP seed in 2001 prompted some farmers to keep it for the 2001/02 summer planting.

A significant proportion of Malawi's maize area is planted to hybrids (though the MAI's extension service is now advocating greater use of composites and OPVs), and there appear to be many cases where farmers, unable to purchase new seed, plant the seed retained from their hybrid crop, with a consequent yield reduction.

Farmers in many areas experienced difficulty in obtaining cassava cuttings and sweet potato vines. Nevertheless, the area under these crops has increased, and the MAI is successfully encouraging the establishment of nurseries for planting material.

Malawian smallholders purchase relatively little fertilizer for their food crops since the price, now no longer subsidised, is often unaffordable. (Current prices of 25 kg bags of urea, 23.21.0, and CAN are approximately MK 1,060, 1,260 and 960 respectively.) A great many farmers continue to depend on fertilizer distributed either free or on credit through various programmes such as TIP and the EC's Agricultural Productivity Investment Programme (APIP). The reduction in these programmes during 2001 had a detrimental effect on fertilizer use and on total maize production. Compost-making is being actively encouraged by the MAI.

Weeds, pests and diseases

The contribution of weeds to crop yield reduction was relatively high this year, since many farmers, more occupied than normal with finding food elsewhere, had less time to weed their gardens. There were reports of very localised striga infestations, but their severity was minimal.

Armyworm outbreaks were reported and contained in a number of locations. Yields of sorghum and millet were reduced by quelea birds, especially in Shire Valley; the severity of attacks, however, was not abnormal.

The most serious diseases of maize during the summer season were grey leaf spot and streak, both of which led to significant yield reductions locally. Sorghum was attacked by smut, and some downy mildew was noted on bulrush millet, but the level of incidence was about normal in both cases.

3.2 Food crop production estimate

Cereals

Following the Mission's observations and discussions, four separate adjustments were made to the MAI's Second-Round Agricultural Production Estimates for maize.

1. Since the Second-Round Estimates did not take into account the extensive pre-harvest consumption of maize during the month of March, a reduction of the final production figure was deemed necessary. It was considered reasonable to suppose that about 40 per cent of the nation's monthly maize consumption requirement of 143,000 t would have been consumed straight from the field during March. A factor of 4 per cent was therefore applied to each ADD's summer production figure as given in the Second-Round Estimates, resulting in an overall national reduction of 59,380 t. (Any pre-harvest consumption during April was regarded as part of production for the marketing year 2002/03.)

2. Since the Second-Round Estimates were carried out prior to the early cessation of the rains in April, a further adjustment was required to take account of this. First, an estimate was made of the proportion of the crop that would have been affected by the early cessation of rains; this varied according to ADD in order to allow for the geographical differences both in crop maturation date and in date of cessation. An estimate was then made of the extent to which the yield of the affected portion of the crop would have been depressed as a result of the early cessation of the rains. These two factors were applied to the amount of crop still standing in the field at the beginning of March, i.e. following the adjustment for pre-harvest consumption in March. The result was a further reduction of 42 133 tonnes.

3. The early cessation of the rains in April resulted in drier-than-normal soil conditions at the beginning of the winter season. Since the Second-Round Estimates were made on the assumption that soil-moisture levels at the beginning of the season would be normal, the Mission considered it necessary to reduce the MAI's projected production figures for winter maize by 10 percent or 14 148 tonnes.

4. The Second-Round Estimates were carried out prior to the finalisation of the winter-maize TIP, and therefore did not take into account the extra

production that is expected to result from this programme. The average yield of winter maize, based on the MAI's area estimates and on production figures adjusted for low soil moisture at the beginning of the season, is 1.53 tonnes/hectare. The TIP will cover 30 000 hectare, and the average yield expected from TIP plots is 2.5 tonnes/hectare. Therefore an increment of 0.97 tonnes/hectare over 30 000 hectares, or a total of 29 060 tonnes, is expected. (The TIP organisers anticipate an increment of about 75 000 tonnes to result from the programme, based on the assumption that all the TIP plots will be on land that would otherwise be either uncultivated or under a crop other than maize. However, from discussions with farmers, the Mission concluded that the vast majority of TIP plots would be on land that was already destined for winter maize). The figures showing these adjustments are presented in Table 2.

Rice production for 2001/02 is estimated at 94 400 tonnes, the bulk of it coming from Machinga and Salima ADDs, with a national average yield of 1.67 tonnes/hectare. Sorghum and millet are expected to contribute 37 800 tonnes and 20 500 tonnes respectively, with national average yields of 0.69 and 0.60 tonnes/hectare.

Wheat is grown in a few highland locations, especially in Blantyre ADD. In 2001/02, it is forecast to contribute about 2 400 tonnes to the national food balance.

Total cereal production for Malawi in 2001/02 is therefore estimated at 1.69 million tonnes, as shown in Table 3. The trend in production of the major food crops over the last three years is illustrated in Figure 3.

Roots and tubers

Estimation of cassava production over large areas is notoriously difficult. In Malawi, both bitter and sweet varieties are grown, with maturation periods ranging from eight months to two years. Consequently, the area under cassava at any one time is no more than a very approximate indication of the amount of produce that will be available in the next twelve months. Populations in the north of the country and close to Lake Malawi, such as Nkhata Bay, mostly grow bitter cassava, which they regard as their staple. In most other areas, however, where maize is regarded exclusively as the staple, sweet varieties are grown for consumption as 'snacks'. Official production figures for cassava in recent years have been extremely high. For instance, the estimate for 2002 (Second-Round Crop Production Estimates) gives the total national production as more than 3.5 million tonnes fresh weight, with average ADD yields ranging from 12 tonnes/hectare (Shire Valley and Machinga) to 23 tonnes/hectare (Mzuzu). Although Malawi is a reasonably good cassava producer, its growing conditions, especially for the short-cycle varieties planted at the end of the summer season (shortening day lengths at planting, cool nights and dry conditions during bulking) are not ideal. Much of the crop is also grown as an intercrop. Taking account of these facts, as well as the fact that 3.5 million tonnes of cassava would provide each person in Malawi with more than 300 kg annually, the Mission considers - and many agriculturalists in Malawi agree - that the production projection for the year 2001/02 is a gross over-estimate. What appears to be irrefutable though is that the area

under cassava is growing steadily and that traditional maize-eating populations are consuming more cassava. The latter is especially evident this year, following the shortages of 2000/01.

The official MAI production figures for sweet potato (more than 3 million tonnes fresh weight, with a national average yield of 14 tonnes/hectare) are, like those for cassava, considered to be grossly over-estimated. (3.5 million tonnes of cassava and 3 million tonnes of sweet potato would provide more than half a tonne of root crop to each Malawian over the course of a year, and this in a population in which more than 30 percent are under the age of 10). The Mission suspects that both the total area and the yield of the crop may have been over-estimated, largely as a result of the inclusion of intercropped stands. However, again as for cassava, the area planted to sweet potato has also increased significantly in recent years, as has the crop's acceptability as a valuable food in the predominantly maize-consuming populations.

In attempting to deal with the problem of estimating the amount of cassava and sweet potato that would be available during the current marketing year, the Mission decided that it would be realistic to divide the MAI's production figures for cassava by 3.5 (taking account of possible over-estimation of area, of probable over-estimation of yield, and of the non-availability in the current year of the produce from long-cycle varieties), whilst those for sweet potato could be divided by 1.5 (taking account of possible over-estimation of area, and of probable over-estimation of yield). This gives a supply of one million tonnes of fresh cassava, and two million tonnes of fresh sweet potato.

Irish potato is produced in several high-altitude locations. The main area of production is around Dedza Hills in Lilongwe ADD, but significant amounts are also produced in Blantyre ADD. The MAI estimates national production for 2001/02 at about 377 000 tonnes, which is an increase of more than 50 000 tonnes on the previous year.

The MAI's production figures for roots and tubers in 2000/01 and 2001/02 are given in Table 4.

Legumes

Groundnut production in 2001/02, estimated at more than 175 000 tonnes, is higher than either of the previous two years (155 000 tonnes in 2000/01, and 122 000 tonnes in 1999/00). Estimated pulse production (mainly beans and pigeon pea) in 2001/02 is, at just over 300 000 tonnes, similar to that of 2000/01. The figure, however, shows a significant increase on 1999/00, when total production was estimated to be about 267 000 tonnes.

Table 2. Maize production, 2001/02, adjusted for pre-harvest consumption, early cessation of rains in April, low soil moisture at the beginning of the winter season, and winter TIP.

ADD		MAI Round-2 Estimates	Summer production	Winter production	

		Total	Summer	Winter	R-2 minus pre-harvest consump-tion	% affected by late drought	Affected summer prodn.	% redn. due to late drought	Prod. redn. due to late drought	Adjusted summer prod	Round-2 minus 10% for dry start	Increment due to TIP	Adjusted winter prodn.	Adjusted 2001/2002 prodn. with TIP
Karonga	Area ('000 ha)	35.9	33.5	2.4						33.5	2.4	1.5	2.4	35.9
	Yield (t/ha)	1.33	1.32	1.47						1.26	1.32	1.18	2.06	1.31
	Production ('000 t)	47.7	44.2	3.5	42.4	5	2.1	10	0.2	42.2	3.2	1.8	4.9	47.2
Mzuzu	Area ('000 ha)	143.5	139.4	4.2						139.4	4.2	5.0	4.2	143.6
	Yield (t/ha)	1.15	1.13	1.88						1.07	1.69	0.81	2.65	1.12
	Production ('000 t)	165.5	157.6	8.0	151.3	10	15.1	10	1.5	149.8	7.2	4.0	11.2	161.0
Kasungu	Area ('000 ha)	270.6	253.3	17.3						253.3	17.3	4.0	17.3	270.6
	Yield (t/ha)	1.31	1.26	2.00						1.16	1.80	0.70	1.96	1.21
	Production ('000 t)	354.2	319.7	34.6	306.9	30	92.1	15	13.8	293.1	31.1	2.8	33.9	327.0
Salima	Area ('000 ha)	115.3	110.1	5.2						110.1	5.2	2.3	5.2	115.3
	Yield (t/ha)	1.07	1.05	1.43						0.97	1.29	1.21	1.82	1.01
	Production ('000 t)	122.9	115.5	7.4	110.9	20	22.2	20	4.4	106.5	6.6	2.8	9.4	115.9
Lilongwe	Area ('000 ha)	285.4	269.6	15.8						269.6	15.8	4.6	15.8	285.4
	Yield (t/ha)	1.07	1.02	1.89						0.94	1.70	0.80	1.94	0.99
	Production ('000 t)	304.9	275.0	29.9	264.0	30	79.2	15	11.9	252.2	26.9	3.7	30.6	282.7
Blantyre	Area ('000 ha)	236.0	232.9	3.0						232.9	3.0	3.0	3.0	236.0
	Yield (t/ha)	1.11	1.10	1.80						1.05	1.62	0.88	2.50	1.06
	Production ('000 t)	261.8	256.4	5.4	246.1	10	24.6	10	2.5	243.7	4.9	2.7	7.5	251.2
Machinga	Area ('000 ha)	301.1	289.5	11.7						289.5	11.7	5.4	11.7	301.1
	Yield (t/ha)	0.90	0.86	1.76						0.80	1.58	0.92	2.01	0.85
	Production ('000 t)	269.6	249.2	20.5	239.2	20	47.8	15	7.2	232.0	18.4	5.0	23.4	255.4
Shire Valley	Area ('000 ha)	98.9	75.3	23.6						75.3	23.6	4.5	23.6	98.9
	Yield (t/ha)	1.00	0.89	1.37						0.84	1.23	1.27	1.47	0.99
	Production ('000 t)	99.2	67.0	32.3	64.3	10	6.4	10	0.6	63.6	29.0	5.7	34.8	98.4
Malawi	**Area ('000 ha)**	**1486.8**	**1403.7**	**83.2**						**1403.7**	**83.2**	**30.3**	**83.2**	**1486.8**
	Yield (t/ha)	**1.09**	**1.06**	**1.70**						**0.99**	**1.53**	**0.94**	**1.87**	**1.03**
	Production ('000 t)	**1626.0**	**1484.5**	**141.5**	**1426.1**		**289.6**		**42.1**	**1383.0**	**127.3**	**28.4**	**155.7**	**1538.7**

Table 3. Malawi. Cereal production, 2001/02

ADD		Maize	Rice	Sorghum	Millet	Wheat	Total cereals
Karonga	Area ('000 ha)	35.9	9.7	0.3	2.2	0.0	48.1
	Yield (t/ha)	1.3	1.68	0.36	0.74		

	Production ('000 t)	47.2	16.3	0.1	1.6	0.0	65.1
Mzuzu	Area ('000 ha)	143.6	2.0	0.0	8.6	0.1	154.3
	Yield (t/ha)	1.1	2.04		0.67	1.02	
	Production ('000 t)	161.0	4.2	0.0	5.7	0.1	171.0
Kasungu	Area ('000 ha)	270.6	0.3	0.1	0.8	0.04	271.8
	Yield (t/ha)	1.2	1.30	0.57	0.46	1.32	
	Production ('000 t)	327.0	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.05	327.8
Salima	Area ('000 ha)	115.3	13.0	1.6	2.5	0.0	132.4
	Yield (t/ha)	1.0	2.00	0.77	0.66		
	Production ('000 t)	115.9	26.0	1.2	1.7	0.0	144.7
Lilongwe	Area ('000 ha)	285.4	0.1	0.3	12.4	0.3	298.4
	Yield (t/ha)	1.0	1.28	0.60	0.57	0.77	
	Production ('000 t)	282.7	0.1	0.2	7.1	0.2	290.3
Blantyre	Area ('000 ha)	236.0	7.1	26.3	1.2	2.5	273.1
	Yield (t/ha)	1.1	1.08	0.73	0.48	0.80	
	Production ('000 t)	251.2	7.7	19.1	0.6	2.0	280.5
Machinga	Area ('000 ha)	301.1	19.6	18.5	1.1	0.0	340.4
	Yield (t/ha)	0.8	1.76	0.75	0.52		
	Production ('000 t)	255.4	34.4	13.8	0.6	0.0	304.2
Shire Valley	Area ('000 ha)	98.9	4.8	7.4	5.3	0.0	116.4
	Yield (t/ha)	1.0	1.16	0.45	0.54		
	Production ('000 t)	98.4	5.5	3.3	2.9	0.0	110.1
Malawi	**Area ('000 ha)**	**1486.8**	**66.6**	**54.4**	**34.1**	**2.9**	**1634.9**
	Yield (t/ha)	**1.03**	**1.67**	**0.69**	**0.60**	**0.81**	
	Production ('000 t)	**1538.7**	**94.4**	**37.8**	**20.5**	**2.4**	**1693.8**

Table 4. Malawi. Comparative root and tuber production, 2000/01 and 2001/02

ADD		Cassava		Sweet potato		Potato	
		2000/01	2001/02	2000/01	2001/02	2000/01	2001/02
Karonga	Area ('000 ha)	14.2	15.4	6.6	6.4	0.3	0.0
	Yield (t/ha)	15.7	17.8	17.2	16.2	10.0	8.9
	Production ('000 t)	223.8	274.5	113.4	104.0	2.8	0.3
Mzuzu	Area ('000 ha)	38.7	43.7	13.1	17.5	1.3	1.3
	Yield (t/ha)	25.2	23.0	15.4	15.6	9.9	10.3
	Production ('000 t)	973.1	1005.0	200.9	274.2	12.6	13.2
Kasungu	Area ('000 ha)	16.6	18.5	24.7	30.3	2.2	2.2
	Yield (t/ha)	14.7	15.3	13.5	13.9	12.5	12.3
	Production ('000 t)	245.4	282.6	332.1	423.2	27.3	26.5
Salima	Area ('000 ha)	27.5	30.2	11.0	14.9	0.0	0.0
	Yield (t/ha)	17.5	19.3	9.6	11.0		
	Production ('000 t)	482.3	581.7	105.4	164.1	0.0	0.0
Lilongwe	Area ('000 ha)	20.2	23.5	24.0	26.2	15.3	18.4
	Yield (t/ha)	13.8	14.6	14.7	15.3	13.7	14.0
	Production ('000 t)	278.3	344.0	353.5	401.2	209.8	256.4
Blantyre	Area ('000 ha)	40.4	42.7	62.8	65.2	3.6	4.1
	Yield (t/ha)	12.9	13.2	12.9	13.5	19.4	19.0

	Production ('000 t)	519.7	563.7	808.4	881.3	69.6	78.1
Machinga	Area ('000 ha)	43.2	38.4	40.9	46.4	0.1	0.2
	Yield (t/ha)	14.3	11.6	13.2	14.8	9.1	9.7
	Production ('000 t)	616.5	446.7	540.5	687.9	1.2	2.1
Shire Valley	Area ('000 ha)	1.5	1.6	9.6	10.0	0.0	0.0
	Yield (t/ha)	15.6	12.3	13.9	11.9		
	Production ('000 t)	23.3	20.2	132.6	118.9	0.0	0.0
Malawi	**Area ('000 ha)**	**202.3**	**214.0**	**192.5**	**217.0**	**22.8**	**26.2**
	Yield (t/ha)	**16.6**	**16.4**	**13.4**	**14.1**	**14.2**	**14.4**
	Production ('000 t)	**3362.4**	**3518.3**	**2586.8**	**3064.8**	**323.3**	**376.7**

Figure 3. Malawi. Major food crop production, 1999/2000 - 2001/2002.
(NB Cassava and sweet potato figures should onlybe regarded as internally relative)



	Maize	Total cereals	Cassava	Sweet potato
1999/2000	2501	2631	2795	1918
2000/2001	1713	1866	3362	2587
2001/2002	1539	1692	3518	3055

3.3 Livestock and pasture

Livestock condition in Malawi is currently good, and pasture is considered to be adequate for the coming year. Large numbers of livestock were sold at greatly reduced prices during the period of food shortage at the beginning of 2002, by families desperate for cash to buy maize and other foodstuffs. Some of these animals undoubtedly went for slaughter, but a significant number are thought to have merely changed hands. Consequently, although the country's total livestock population may have decreased only slightly, some owners now have larger herds, while a great many others have lost a valuable buffer against future food shortages.

4. AGRICULTURAL SITUATION BY ADD

Karonga

Rains started sporadically at the beginning of December, but amounts sufficient for planting were not received until the second half of the month. Some areas had excessive rainfall at the end of the year, and 1 850 hectares of maize were reported to have been affected by flooding. Rainfall

in January and February was generally good, with some diminution in March. The early cessation of rains in April was less dramatic than elsewhere in the country. With the generally high moisture content resulting from the satisfactory rains, winter maize planting is expected to increase. Despite an overall reduction in area, maize production in 2001/02 is estimated to be higher than that of last year. Cassava, sweet potato, rice, groundnuts, tobacco and cotton have all performed well; tobacco and rice showed an increase in area, although the irrigated summer rice area declined.

Mzuzu

Some areas received rains in October, prompting farmers to plant their maize, but this was followed by a dry spell. Some of these early-planted crops survived, but some dried out, necessitating replanting. In most parts of the ADD, effective planting rains were not received until the second half of December. They were then well distributed, except in some areas which experienced a dry spell of two to three weeks after mid-February. Some parts of Rumphi District experienced slight flooding. Maize production is forecast to be down on last year's by about 20 000 tonnes. Significant increases in the areas under cassava and sweet potato were registered. Fungal disease and beetle infestation were reported to have reduced bean yields. The generally late arrival of the rains is reported to have resulted in local shortages of water and pasture for livestock.

Kasungu

Mchinji was the first district to receive planting rains in mid November. Elsewhere the rains arrived in late December, leading to a very wide range of planting dates within the ADD. Following good rains in January and February, most districts experienced an unusually long dry spell in March. The rains returned at the end of March, but stopped abruptly in most places in early April. Maize production for the ADD, which is one of the country's most important producers, is forecast to be about 35 000 tonnes down on last year. Most of the reduction will be in Kasungu and Mchinji districts. Both cassava and sweet potato production are expected to show an increase over 2000/01; most of this will be attributable to an increase in planted area. Tobacco production is down slightly on last year, but groundnut production shows an increase.

Salima

Dry conditions up to the second half of December were followed by heavy rains which caused flooding in most areas of the ADD. The rains became more normal later in January and February, and, in the north of the ADD, continued normal during March. However, Salima district experienced an unusually long dry spell in March. Rains generally stopped early in April. Maize production is forecast to be similar to that of last year. Although the area under rice has increased significantly over last year, production is forecast to be about the same. The area under cassava and sweet potato has also increased and production is forecast to be considerably higher than that of last year; production of sweet potato alone is expected to increase by 50 percent.

Lilongwe

Some parts of the ADD experienced a false start to the rains in October, which frequently led to the need to re-plant later in the season. Good planting rains generally did not arrive until late December. Rains were normal during January and February, but this was followed by a prolonged dry spell from the end of February to mid March when much of the maize crop was at the critical teaselling and cobbing stages. Maize production this year is forecast to be down about 50,000 t on last year. On the other hand, substantial increases in cassava and sweet potato production are forecast. Lilongwe ADD is the country's main producer of potatoes, and this year's production estimate of about 256 000 tonnes is more than 45 000 tonnes up on last year's, mostly as a result of an expansion of area. Tobacco production is also higher this year for the same reason.

Blantyre

The arrival date of the rains in Blantyre ADD was very varied, resulting in a wide range of planting dates. Thyolo received good rains in October, but elsewhere the rains started at different times in November. Heavy rains in December resulted in some flooding in all districts. A dry spell over most of the ADD in early January had little effect on crop production since by then the soil moisture status was generally adequate to withstand it. Rains resumed later in January and continued satisfactorily into February, but another dry spell struck at the end of February and lasted until mid March. By this time, however, most of the maize crop was already mature. Both the area and production of maize are forecast to be slightly lower than last year. Cassava and sweet potato areas and production are estimated to be up on last year.

Machinga

Although there were some light rains during October and November, planting rains did not arrive until late December. These were heavy, but were quickly followed by a dry spell in January, which, because of the high soil-moisture status at that time, was not particularly damaging. Heavy rains returned later in January and continued into February, causing extensive flooding and water-logging, and yield reduction over an estimated 4 000 hectares of maize. Dry conditions returned at the end of February and lasted up to mid March. Late-planted maize was badly affected by this drought, especially in Mangochi District. The area under maize this year is greater than last year, but production is forecast to be lower. However, rice production is forecast to be up by about 3 000 tonnes on last year. Machinga is the only ADD in which a reduction of area under cassava has been reported; sweet potato, however, shows an increase in area and production.

Shire Valley

Erratic light rains fell in late November and early December, leading to some false starts to the season and often necessitating re-planting. Good planting rains arrived in the second half of December. These turned very heavy, causing flooding in low-lying areas. A dry spell in early January was followed by more flooding at the end of the month. Dry conditions returned

in late February, but by this time most of the maize crop was mature. Total maize production is forecast to be slightly down on last year. The relatively dry start to the winter season is expected to have an impact on winter maize production, which is very important in this ADD, especially on the Shire floodplain. Cotton production shows little change compared with the last few years.

5. FOOD SUPPLY SITUATION

5.1 Market conditions

Malawi has a relatively free market for maize and other staple foods. Prices are freely determined in the market, but during periods of scarcity the Government has tended to maintain some control on consumer prices through ADMARC's retail sales of the Government-owned strategic grain reserve. Exports are usually banned and only allowed during periods of production surplus.

After a bumper crop in 1999, a strategic grain reserve of 167 000 tonnes was established. However, this reserve was released both domestically and for export between mid 2000 and early 2001. By March 2002 (the end of marketing year 2001/02), and following a severe shortage of maize on the domestic market, the National Food Reserve Agency imported 106 000 tonnes of maize, which were channelled into the market through ADMARC and private traders initially, but later through ADMARC alone at a fixed price of MK 17/kg, which, at the prevailing exchange rate and rising maize prices in South Africa (the main source of imports) included a subsidy element.

In marketing year 2001/02, maize prices rose sharply from around August 2001 (Figure 4) reaching a national average of 32.5 MK/kg by January/February 2002. This reflected the serious maize shortage and slow arrival of imports. The increase in prices severely curtailed access to food for a large section of the country's population.

Figure 4. Trends in maize consumer price, Lilongwe



5.2 Food supply/demand in marketing year 2002/03

The 2002/03 projected balance for cereals is summarized in Table 5, based on the following parameters and assumptions:

- The 2001/02 cereal production is estimated at 1 694 000 tonnes.
- About 20 000 tonnes of maize stocks are currently held by ADMARC, on behalf of the National Food Reserve Agency from imports that arrived late at the end of the marketing season. In addition, major milling companies based in Blantyre normally hold normally about 7 000 tonnes of maize, wheat and rice in stock for their operations. Other major traders indicated to the Mission that they had no stocks of cereals from the past marketing season, and it is also assumed that farmers and small-scale traders have no cereal stocks following the extreme shortage of maize during the past few months. Total opening stocks are therefore estimated at 27 000 tonnes.
- Food consumption in marketing year 2002/03 is forecast on the basis of a mid-marketing year population of 11.44 million, derived from the official figure from the National Statistical Office, and an annual per caput consumption of cereals of 165 kg, the per caput apparent consumption.
- Other uses include seed requirements and post harvest losses; no significant use of domestically produced grains for animal feed. Use of sorghum for brewing purposes is assumed to be part of the overall food consumption requirement.
- Even though maize exports are currently banned, some outflow through unrecorded cross-border exchange occurs with neighbouring countries. However, given the severe domestic food shortage during the last months of the last marketing year and the significant shortfall forecast for 2002/03 marketing year, with maize prices expected to be higher than in Mozambique and Tanzania, it is assumed that no exports will take place.
- Closing stocks are estimated at 7 000 tonnes, the minimum required by milling companies to operate. Any replenishment of the strategic grain reserve, which is targeted at 60 000 tonnes, will be carried out through tendering for additional commercially imported grain.

Table 5. Malawi: Cereals balance sheet, April 2002-March 2003 ('000 tonnes)

	Maize	Rice	Sorghum/Millet	Wheat	Total
Domestic availability	**1 563**	**96**	**58**	**4**	**1 721**
Opening stocks	24	1	0	2	27
Production	1 539	95	58	2	1 694
Total utilization	**1 996**	**100**	**58**	**52**	**2 206**
Food use	1 724	62	52	50	1 888
Other uses	268	37	6	0	311

Closing stocks	4	1	0	2	7
Import requirements	**433**	**4**	**0**	**48**	**485**
Estimated commercial imports	225	4	0	48	277
Food aid	208	0	0	0	208

Estimates of commercial imports of about 225 000 tonnes are based on planned amounts by the NFRA, the milling industry, leading private sector trading companies and other traders. Companies are already planning ahead in anticipation of transportation congestion in the sub-region from August/September. Cross-border unrecorded grain inflows from Tanzania and Mozambique could also be substantial, given the expected high cereal prices in Malawi relative to the two countries.

Cassava and sweet potato production and consumption have increased in recent years, as maize production has become unreliable from year to year. However, as available official production figures appear to be grossly overestimated, it was difficult for the Mission to integrate them into the overall food supply calculations. In general terms, therefore, it can be said that substantial quantities of cassava and sweet potato will be available for consumption during the marketing year, and this will moderate the impact of the maize shortage in many areas.

Food aid estimated at 208 000 tonnes will need to be provided through Government import and external food assistance.

6. HOUSEHOLD VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATION OF EMERGENCY FOOD AID NEEDS

To better understand household vulnerability analysis and to make estimation of emergency food aid needs, three field assessment teams augmented the core FAO/WFP Mission. These vulnerability analysis teams each focused on a specific region in Malawi. Fifteen professionals from WFP, UNDP, government, FEWSNet, NGOs, and donors composed these teams, which conducted their field research simultaneously with the main FAO/WFP teams. The vulnerability analysis team members used a consistent assessment instrument conducting over 200 community and household interviews, facilitating the integration of their findings.

The following analysis of household vulnerability and emergency food needs draws information from both the core FAO/WFP Mission and the complementary vulnerability analysis assessment.

Underlying vulnerability

The majority of Malawians are highly vulnerable to disturbances in access and availability of food. This is mostly due to deep structural

issues (economic, geographic, and political), but also includes some characteristics that could be changed in a short time frame. The UNDP Human Development Report for Malawi estimates that over 65 percent of Malawians live below the poverty line, making it one of the poorest countries in the world. Malawi is a landlocked country with poor infrastructure connecting it to major ports, having a direct effect on the availability of commodities and their prices.

Over 80 percent of Malawians are directly engaged in agricultural activities for their main livelihoods, and 82 percent of the poorest 50 percent of the population has access to some land. The average household land holding size in this group, however, is less than .87 ha, with a national average of less than 1 ha. This is further compounded by the fact that nationally the most fertile lands in the country (particularly in the districts of Thyolo and Mulanje) are mostly dedicated to private estate cultivation of tobacco, tea, macadamia nuts, and other export oriented crops that do not directly benefit household food security of the rural poor (excepting for the small percentage of people employed on the estates). In general the rural farming systems are not sophisticated with regards to soil fertility management, water management, and holistic farming systems including agro-forestry and animal husbandry. The percentage of cropland under maize is disproportionately high (roughly 75 percent), especially considering the sensitivity of maize to climatic variations as compared with more robust crops like sorghum, millet, cassava, and sweet potatoes.

Two health indicators represent both causes and outcomes of vulnerability to food insecurity, and poverty in general. The percentage of children under 5 who are <2sd from the mean in stunting averages to 49.3 percent for the whole of Malawi, with some variation by district (see Table 6). These rates are averaged over several years of nutritional surveillance from UNICEF, and thus represent a chronic problem. Indeed, the relative poverty assessment release by the government in December 2001 indicates that the poorest 50 percent of the population regularly consumes roughly 1 800cal/capita/day, less than the WHO standard of 2 100 cal/capita/day.

Another health indicator is the very high prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS. The national average is 19.5 percent prevalence throughout the country, again with some variation by district (Table 6). The field assessment confirmed the direct linkages between household food security and HIV/AIDS, including loss of able-bodied labour within the household, loss of remittances from a working family member, adoption of orphans by the elderly, child-headed households, increased expenditures on health care and funerals, inter alia. While HIV/AIDS devastates all social groups, as survivors of HIV/AIDS victims women, children, and elderly are particularly affected. This is due to their relative lack of opportunity for wage labour as compared with able-bodied men. This is further discussed on the section below discussing access issues.

Table 6: Percent Under 5s <2sd in Stunting and HIV/AIDS Prevalence, by District

District name	Under 5 years percent <sd Stunting	HIV/AIDS prevalence
Chitipa	51.3	12.1
Karonga	38.8	16.9
Nkhata Bay	51.3	13.7
Rumphi	51.3	12.3
Mzimba	43.9	13.8
Likoma	51.3	21.9
Kasungu	47.4	12.6
Nkhotakota	51.3	12.6
Ntchisi	51.3	9.6
Dowa	51.3	10.1
Salima	54.6	21.8
Lilongwe	54.2	19.4
Mchinji	51.3	11.7
Dedza	51.3	10.1
Ntcheu	51.3	10.0
Mangochi	47.5	24.7
Machinga	44.5	24.4
Zomba	45.7	27.2
Chiradzulu	51.3	24.8
Blantyre	38.1	38.5
Mwanza	51.3	25.1
Thyolo	46.3	26.0
Mulanje	49.5	26.2
Phalombe	51.3	24.6
Chikwawa	51.3	25.8
Nsanje	51.3	25.7
Balaka	51.3	24.7
Average	49.3	19.5

Source: UNICEF and UNAIDS, 2001

And lastly, when examining vulnerability for this coming consumption year (through March 2003), it is critical to understand the stressed conditions experienced by most farmers last year. There was a humanitarian crisis in Malawi last year due to low production and extremely high prices of maize, leaving the majority of farm families without enough food, particularly during the months of November through April. This has had a direct impact on nutritional well-being (with some deaths due to lack of food), as well as stretched the coping capacities of most households (see below for a more thorough discussion on coping). The European Union conducted a nutritional comparison of comparative months in 2001 and 2002. For the month of February, cases of severe malnutrition increased by 80 percent in

clinics throughout the country. WHO has recently completed a field assessment of crude mortality rates in the country for the six months prior to April 2002, and found the rate to be a staggering 1.9, whereby anything above 1 is considered to be indicative of an extreme anomaly. Thus, farm families entered this coming consumption year in a very precarious condition. Successive years of stress will surely compound food insecurity this coming year. Furthermore, early indications are that the coming agricultural year is under threat of a possible El Nino event. If this occurs, precedent in Malawi indicates that the coming agricultural year could be even worse than this past one

Issues of access

Maize prices are key to understanding food security in Malawi. Current market prices for maize (about 12 Kwacha per Kg) have dropped significantly from their peaks in February (about 30 Kw/kg). This is reflects the arrival of the new harvest. The concern is, however, that the current price of roughly 12 Kw/kg is already roughly 60 percent more than the price at this time last year.

Based on monthly data from twenty markets around the country, the National Statistics Office reports that by November 2001 maize prices were reaching 250 percent higher than that of November 2000 (18 kw/kg and 7 kw/kg respectively), and by March 2002 they were almost 400 percent higher than that of March 2001 (30 kw/kg and 7 kw/kg). While ADMARC sold limited amounts of maize last year for a fixed price of 17 Kw/Kg, this was also an increase from the fixed price of 5 Kw/Kg the previous year. The ADMARC price level reflected the import parity price from South Africa by September 2001. However, the need to import derived not only from the low availability, following a bad harvest in the 2000/01, but also reported mismanagement of the national strategic grain reserve, which was sold off early in the year creating a scarcity of maize in the ADMARC outlets throughout the country. The dramatic increase in prices played a critical role in contributing to the humanitarian crisis experienced last year.

The core reasons for the access effects on household food security are three-fold, having to do with rural livelihood patterns, household purchasing power, and the anticipated costs of required maize. Firstly, maize is the dominant crop both in terms of production and consumption, accounting for nearly 80 percent of the Malawian diet. The vast majority of rural farmers, and increasingly so for the poorer households, normally depend on purchasing their maize from December until the next harvest. Due to a bad harvest last year, however, most farmers had to start purchasing from October/November, as their own supply of food stocks had been consumed. Such reliance on purchasing is expected to begin even earlier this year.

Secondly, the purchasing power of the poorest 50 percent of Malawians is extremely low, with a combined net worth (i.e., all income sources plus the value of consumed goods) in the range of

15-20 MK per household per day (Government of Malawi Relative Poverty Study, December 2001). During the most critical food security months, however, household purchasing power is less than 15-20 MK/day because this is estimated on equal distribution of daily income throughout the year. By December, most households have typically sold and spent much of their cash crop incomes, leaving a proportionately lower amount available up until the next harvest. While common throughout the year, the rural poor typically rely on casual labour (ganyu) as an income source to purchase food, especially from December onwards. Casual labour rates in Malawi (20 MK/day) have not increased in the past five years, despite overall inflation in the economy. Ganyu is piece-meal labour typically conducted on nearby farms, and is not available on a daily basis.

In the coming year there will be an expected increased number of people searching for ganyu, leading to a decline in both opportunities for casual labour and in the actual daily rates. This dynamic will most directly affect the elderly and women, who have lower priorities in the competitive ganyu market. The increasing prevalence of HIV/AIDS further exasperates ganyu availability, especially for the elderly and children. Given the importance of purchases for poorer household food consumption and the heavy reliance on ganyu as an income source, loss of able-bodied household members has a direct effect on the household income, and thus food acquisition potential. Whereas a young child or elderly person at least has some potential to work on their own farms to contribute to household food needs, the ganyu market is competitive and stronger persons are given priority, making ganyu a increasingly non-viable option for households with disproportionate numbers of children and elderly. Thus, while HIV/AIDS undermines both availability and access to food, its affects on the household unit are particularly pronounced with regards to access issues. For rural Malawians HIV/AIDS will continue to have a severe effect on their food security.

This year the main smallholder cash crop prices (including tobacco and cotton) are also down from previous years. Some farmers are currently selling tobacco at 15 MK/Kg, whereby the auction floor price fluctuates around 78 MK/Kg. Even the current auction floor price is roughly 50 percent less than that realized in recent years. These prices will directly impact the overall household economy for the majority of farmers.

Thirdly, a typical household of 5 people requires approximately 2 kg of maize for daily consumption, allowing for additional required calories to come from other foodstuffs. With a daily purchasing power of 15-20 MK/day, the price of maize from December to March last year was almost 200 percent more than what 50 percent of Malawian households could afford. With maize prices already 60 percent more than what they were this time last year, the trajectory for the coming year is set to reach or exceed the high maize prices of last year. This is further supported from analysis of high import parity prices for landlocked Malawi and interviews with private traders who indicate that they will have to sell imported maize at a

minimum of 24 MK/kg. Although the free market price is expected to exceed this amount, even the minimum commercial price of maize is more than twice as much as what the poorest 50 percent of the population can afford.

Thus, maize prices reached unprecedented levels last year, the demand for purchases increased due to bad harvests, and purchasing power was a fraction of what was needed to purchase household food supplies. All indications are that the high maize prices of last year will again be realized this year if not higher, especially in the absence of humanitarian intervention. These access issues seriously throw into question the extent to which the commercial sector can alleviate the expected food crisis this year, especially for the rural poor (see further discussion below).

Issues of availability

This year's maize harvest is expected to be 1.54 million tonnes, which is a decline of 10 percent from the estimated harvest of last year. These estimates are further confirmed with our household surveys, which indicate that the majority of farmers expect their harvest to last to September/October, whereby it normally last through December. Section 3 of this report details the reasons for this and the extent of the problem. Indeed due to erratic rainfall, lack of inputs, early consumption, and other factors, a smaller percentage of farmers expect their harvest to only last through June. This severe decrease in availability will have combined negative effects on farmers: increasing their reliance on purchasing earlier than normal, and effectively increasing the price of maize due to increased demand.

To some degree, the decrease in maize production from the main harvest will be offset by an anticipated increase in normal winter cropping and an increase in normal root and tuber crops (see discussion is section 3.2 of this report). That said, there is expected to be a severe shortage of available grain in the country, with an estimated gross deficit of 485 000 tonnes. This will have to be brought into the country through the combined efforts of the government, commercial traders, petty traders, and the humanitarian community. vernment, commercial traders, petty traders, and the humanitarian community.

Coping strategies

Because last year was a stress year, it is possible to ask what farmers did to cope last year, and anticipate that similar strategies will be employed this year. Following are commonly cited coping strategies during the household interviews.

Because of the need to purchase more maize last year, and with little other income opportunities, an increased number of the rural poor relied on ganyu if it was available. Some farmers reported that whereby they normally employ others to work on their farms, this past year they themselves were seeking labour opportunities. While

ganyu is a normal strategy, any increased dependence on it has a direct effect on the amount of time a farmer can spend on his/her own farm. This can lead to diminishing long-term returns as the farmer attempts to meet immediate needs.

Households and district officials reported that the majority of farmers this past year began to consume their harvest prematurely. While this is a normal occurrence for some, the widespread nature and the amounts well exceed normal strategies. The food balance sheet (Table 5) takes into consideration early consumption for the month of March.

Rampant theft of cassava and maize was widely reported. While in an abstract way this can be seen as a redistribution of calories, it does have negative effects on long term food security for households as well as negative effects on social cohesion and community trust.

Although livestock numbers in general are low throughout the country, those who had goats or chickens readily sold them to purchase food. This is indicated in the price of livestock with decrease in the goat price from roughly 400 Kw during a normal year to 150 Kw last year for comparative months, and in the chicken price form 70 Kw to 15 Kw. The sale of livestock as a coping strategy is a classic example of how successive years of stress compound food insecurity - sale of livestock to meet food needs one year means less livestock for potential sale in a successive stress year, like what is expected this year.

Other households reported sale of capital assets including cooking materials, farming implements, and other items. In some parts of the country there was out migration from one district to another in search of ganyu or food. Skipping meals and/or eating unknown and sometimes poisonous wild roots were also widely reported.

All of these negative or distress coping strategies can be expected this year without significant humanitarian intervention.

On the positive side, the shock from last year and concerns for this year has encouraged many farmers to engage in positive strategies for the coming season. These include increased planting of cassava and sweet potatoes (see discussion is section 3.2), decreasing the amount of maize sold immediately post-harvest, and increasing cultivation of more drought resistant grains such as millet and sorghum. These strategies will contribute to alleviating the expected crisis this year, and should be encouraged.

Distribution of problem and food needs analysis

Combining data sources from secondary indicators such as nutrition rates, HIV/AIDS, market prices, and crop production with primary data collected during the field assessments, the team has developed a relative severity map to illustrate the expected distribution of food crisis by district in the country (Map 1).

Map 1. Estimated Distributions of Relative Severity of Food Crisis, by District



The main differences in vulnerability between districts concerns the anticipated harvests from last year, access to sources of income other than ganyu, degree of reliance on maize versus root and tubers, and proximity to external markets (such as Tanzania and Mozambique). The analysis was done at an EPA level (for all 154 EPAs and then aggregated up to districts. Thus, for some districts that may not have an overall severity, there are possibly pockets of EPAs for which the situation will indeed be severe this coming year, making the district as a whole appear to have relatively low severity. Also note that the lowest category of severity includes both districts that are not expected to need food assistance along with some that will indeed require assistance for up to 17 percent of the population. The map illustrates the broad spatial pattern of severity in the country. See Table 7 for specifics by district.

Due to the combined effects of reduced availability of food along with an anticipated very much reduced access to food (through declining purchasing power), the assessment recommends assistance to roughly 3.2 million beneficiaries in the form of 207 687 tonnes of food aid so as to avert a humanitarian crisis. The national levels of recommended humanitarian assistance are also consistent with findings from a recent Save the Children-UK Risk Map study. The district specific analysis in Table 7 indicates the cumulative

percentages of people who will need food aid and metric tons. The metric tonnages of maize are calculated on a 10 kg/person/month ration level. This amount is less than a full ration of 15 kg with the assumption that households will have access to a least some alternative food sources. Additionally, other food basket considerations are not included here, but should be part of an emergency package, which would total closer to a full ration. This is also consistent with previous food aid distributions in Malawi whereby each household (average 5 persons) has been allocated 50 Kg/month. Furthermore, distributing 10kg/person/month rations allows for a wider distribution of beneficiaries for what will most likely be a limited amount of food aid.

Table 7. Cumulative Food Aid Estimates, by District

Region	DISTRICT	EST. 2002 POP. 1/	Total Cumulative Percentage PPND	Total Cumulative Number of Beneficiaries	Total Cumulative MT from June to March 2003
Central	Salima	290 119	53	153 763	9 458
Southern	Mangochi	698 246	39	269 988	17 503
Central	Lilongwe	1 594 011	38	610 413	37 806
Southern	Blantyre	958 210	35	335 373	22 039
Southern	Zomba	627 535	35	216 948	14 514
Central	Nkhota kota	275 982	33	89 694	5 658
Central	Ntcheu	402 475	32	128 792	8 412
Southern	Mwanza	154 531	30	46 875	3 127
Southern	Mulanje	463 601	30	139 080	9 040
Southern	Nsanje	206 201	30	61 860	4 207
Southern	Balaka	286 732	30	86 020	6 021
Central	Dedza	550 372	30	163 277	10 329
Southern	Machinga	423 576	26	111 189	7 148
Southern	Phalombe	254 487	25	63 622	4 263
Central	Dowa	476 209	25	116 671	7 810
Northern	Mzimba	727 937	23	167 425	10 628
Central	Ntchisi	199 071	21	41 805	2 867
Southern	Chikwawa	398 136	20	80 954	5 866
Northern	Rumphi	151 236	17	25 710	1 754
Southern	Thyolo	502 948	17	83 825	5 868
Central	Kasungu	582 604	15	87 391	6 117
Central	Mchinji	378 586	14	53 002	3 824
Southern	Chiradzulu	262 496	13	32 812	1 903
Northern	Karonga	227 433	7	15 920	1 114
Northern	Chitipa	148 194	4	5 928	415
Northern	Nkhata Bay	190 427	0	0	0
Northern	Likoma	8 646	0	0	0
TOTAL		**11 440 000**	**28**	**3 188 337**	**207 689**

1/ The population figures by district are proportioned estimates based on the current official national figure of 11.44 million. The proportions are derived from the district populations indicated in the 1998 census.

The mission recommends a phased approach divided into three time periods. The first time period (June through August) would assist those people currently in need of assistance due to carried over effects from last year and/or minimal to no harvest this year. The second time period (September through November) would assist people whose current stocks are only expected to last to August or September. Food assistance for these people provides both a necessary caloric input as well as reducing the need to search for ganyu or other income sources, while neglecting their own farms. The third time period (December through March 2003) is the most critical time period, as maize is expected to be in limited supply and/or sold at a price with is vastly unaffordable for at least the poorest 50 percent of households. The recommended phases and metric tons are displayed in Table 8.

Table 8: Recommended Phases for Food Assistance and Amounts

Timing	Percent of Population	No. of Beneficiaries	Tonnes
June through August	5	545 132	15 904
September through November	19	2 141 699	64 250
December through March 2003	28	3 188 337	127 533
Cumulative Totals	28	3 188 337	207 687

The phased approach to food aid distribution is predicated on the need to distribute only minimal required food aid in the early months and expand as the hungry seasons approach. There are three main reasons for starting small and enlarging over time: (1) the majority of farmers do have a harvest that will last for several months, and early large-scale distribution would give the wrong signal to farmers who are busy preparing their winter crops and taking many other proactive or risk aversion measures in anticipation of hard times to come, (2) it would give the wrong signal to commercial traders who will have a critical role in this coming year but will be looking to the government and international community to see if there is a danger that the market will be flooded with maize from food aid shipments, and (3) if one assumes that there will be a limited and finite amount of food aid coming to the country, it would be very unwise to use significant portions of that assistance during months when it is not really needed, as opposed to December through March when the situation will be most critical.

While Table 8 indicates timing for phasing in distribution to beneficiaries, it is imperative that international supplies of maize be mobilize immediately so that there is minimal disruption to the pipeline. Furthermore, logistic difficulties due to the rainy season in December are expected, advising for early pre-positioning of food aid

stocks to the remote extended delivery points well ahead of scheduled beneficiary distributions.

The estimated food aid requirement of 207 687 tonnes is needed to cover the gap indicated on the food balance sheet, after subtracting expected imports of the commercial sector.

Being a function of both availability and access, analysis of household food security needs to consider the price of commercially supplied maize vis a vis the household purchasing power. From a humanitarian perspective, maize brought into the country by the commercial sector will likely be inaccessible to the rural poor, as it was last year (discussed above). While the food assistance indicated above will alleviate food insecurity for 3.2 million beneficiaries, both the import actions by commercial traders and the market prices should be closely monitored. If the commercial sector does not import the expected amounts and/or the maize prices continue to climb even higher than last year, there will be a need for immediate increases in humanitarian assistance. Also, the food balance sheet considers expected increases in winter harvesting. Such should be closely monitored, and if increased winter harvests are not realized for whatever reasons there will also be a need for immediate increases in assistance so as to avert a humanitarian crisis

The vulnerability analysis agrees with the principle not to flood the market with free maize distributions to the point where it will disrupt incentive to grow maize in the future. With prices expected to reach levels of last year (up to 400 percent of what they were the previous year), however, there will still be incentive for farmers to grow maize for their own household consumption and/or sale. Regarding effects on the commercial sector, the recommended food aid would be targeted to the most vulnerable populations through both geographic and social targeting (reaching a maximum of 28 percent of the population). This will leave substantial maize consumption needs during the lean months to the commercial sector. For this strategy to be realized, the anticipated role of the commercial sector (i.e., the amount of maize it is assumed they will import) must be clearly communicated so that the large traders are assured of a market for their investments. If the large traders do not import the expected amounts, there promises to be an even larger scale humanitarian crisis.

Current WFP Assistance

WFP began an emergency operation in March to assist approximately 300 000 Malawians through May. An Emergency Operation appealing for 54 426 tonnes has recently been submitted to meet immediate food aid needs as specified in this document. Thus, of the total recommended food aid of 207 687 tonnes through March 2003, 54 426 tonnes should already be covered through donor assistance, leaving an unmet deficit of 153 261 tonnes, which will have to be appealed for from the international community.

This report is prepared on the responsibility of the FAO and WFP Secretariats with information from official and unofficial sources. Since conditions may change rapidly, please contact the undersigned for further information if required.

Office of the Chief *GIEWS, FAO* *Fax: 0039-06-5705-4495* *E-mail: giews1@fao.org*	*Ms. J. Lewis* *Regional Director, ODK, WFP* *Fax: 00256-41-255115* *E-mail: Judith.Lewis@wfp.org*

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FAO GLOBAL INFORMATION AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEM ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

SPECIAL REPORT

FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SUPPLY ASSESSMENT MISSION TO MOZAMBIQUE

4 June 2002

MISSION HIGHLIGHTS

- Severe dry weather during the 2001/02 cropping season sharply reduced crop yields in southern and parts of central Mozambique.
- In the main cereal growing areas of the northern region and remaining parts of the central region, abundant and well distributed rains led to increased production of cereals.
- Overall, the 2002 cereal output is estimated at 1.77 million tonnes, 5 percent above last year, and maize output at 1.24 million tonnes, an increase of 8 percent. Exportable maize surplus in northern and central areas is projected at 100 000 tonnes. High internal transport costs make it uncompetitive to move the maize from the north to the deficit areas of the south.
- Cereal import requirements for marketing year 2002/03 are estimated at 642 000 tonnes, mostly wheat (260 000 tonnes), rice (262 000 tonnes) and maize meal for urban markets, to be covered commercially.
- Approximately 515 000 people in poor households in 43 districts of the Southern and Central regions, are facing severe food insecurity due to drought-devastated agricultural production and exhaustion of their coping abilities over the last four years. This population is about 15 percent of the total population of the two regions but less than 3 percent of the country's total population These severely food insecure people require food aid

totalling 70 050 tonnes between now and April 2003.

- About 355 000 of the proposed 515 000 beneficiaries require immediate food aid of 53 250 tonnes through March 2003, while a second group of 160 000 people requiring 16 800 tonnes should be added in September 2002 because their current-year harvest production will be exhausted at that time.
- Emergency provision of agricultural inputs such as seeds are urgently required to enable drought affected farming families to restart agricultural production during the main planting season 2002/2003. Promotion of seed multiplication and improved seed storage are recommended measures to further improve food security at household level.

1. OVERVIEW

An FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission visited Mozambique from 21 April to 10 May 2002 to estimate the country's 2001/02 production of food crops, assess the overall food supply situation, forecast cereal import requirements and possible exports in 2002/03 (April/March) and determine the likely food aid needs. The Mission was joined by observers from the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Regional Early Warning Unit (REWU), the USAID supported Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS-NET) and World Vision International. In conducting crop assessment, the Mission was split into three teams so that as many provinces and districts as possible could be visited. One team visited the three northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula, and the central province of Zambezia. The second team covered the other three central provinces of Tete, Sofala and Manica, while the third team covered the three southern province of Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo. The Mission received full cooperation from relevant Government departments, donor representatives and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Maputo and in the provinces.

Field visits enabled the Mission to get first-hand views of farmers, traders, field staff of humanitarian organizations and provincial and district level Government officials, regarding problems faced by farmers during the current agricultural season and harvest outcome.

Relevant statistics provided by the National Early Warning System (*Sistema Nacional de Aviso Prévio,* SNAP) at the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADER), as well as complementary information provided by provincial and district officials were thoroughly examined by the Mission. These included estimates of area planted and harvested, yields of different crops, amount and types of agricultural inputs used, prices of agricultural products, and damage to crops caused by the drought that hit the southern and part of the central regions during the growing season. Half of all districts in the country, or

sixty districts in all the ten provinces, were visited. The Mission carried out crop inspections in all the districts visited, to cross-check the official yield data and opinions expressed by individual farmers. For the districts not visited, estimates were made on the basis of information obtained from various sources. Thus, based on information from the field visits and other sources, the Mission adjusted the yield estimates provided by SNAP as appropriate.

The total area planted to cereals and other food crops in the 2001/02 agricultural year is estimated at 3.8 million hectares, including about 1.3 million hectares of maize, 173 000 hectares of paddy and 607 422 hectares of sorghum and millet. This is some 3 percent lower than last year and reflects mainly decreases in the south due to poor rains.

The 2001/02 main season was characterized by irregular and insufficient rains in the south and parts of the central region. In these areas, rains started in October, then stopped briefly and resumed in November-December and then ceased completely in January. In some places the rains stopped as early as mid-December, while in other locations they stopped in mid-January. There was virtually no rain in the south from January to March, resulting in poor grain formation in maize. Yields were greatly reduced all over the south and parts of the centre. SNAP has estimated that about 60 000 hectares yielded less than 10 percent of their usual output. Maize was especially affected, while sorghum and cassava were more resistant to the drought. The absence of rains also adversely affected the second season for grains and vegetables in south and south-central provinces. The poor conditions of the second crop was apparently at the time of the mission. The second season, harvested between mid-June and August, represents only some 10 percent of the annual cereal and bean production, but it accounts for 50 percent in Gaza and 10 to 15 percent in Inhambane and Maputo provinces. By contrast, rains were normal in the north and the rest of the central region, where a good cereal harvest has been obtained.

Including the second season cereals and beans, total 2001/02 production of cereals is estimated at 1.77 million tonnes, an increase of 5 percent on last year. Nation-wide maize production was 8 percent higher, but this reflects an increase of 27 percent in the north and 13 percent in the centre, compared to a 38 percent decrease in the south. Cassava tolerated the drought well in the south and centre, but the brown-leaf virus caused output to decrease by 6 percent in the north, the main growing region. Total cassava production is estimated at 5.9 million tonnes fresh weight, around the level of 2001. The production of beans is estimated to have increased by 15 percent over the previous year.

Overall, an exportable surplus of about 100 000 tonnes of maize is forecast. However, due to high transport costs, surpluses available in northern areas are not easily accessible to the southern parts of the country. They are instead exported to Malawi and other neighbouring countries. The shortfall in the south and part of the centre is expected to be covered by food aid and increased commercial imports.

The Mission estimates that about 515 000 persons are in need of food aid due to a combination of structural economic deficiencies, the cumulative effect of several recent natural shocks, the current dry spells which led to an almost total harvest failure, and a sharply reduced ability of the most affected households to replace their lost production with other income and production. Of these, 355 000 people are estimated to be severely affected and in need of immediate food assistance. Another 160 000 people were

moderately affected and their food production is expected to last only until September 2002, when they will require food assistance. Emergency food aid requirements for the first group through March 2003 are estimated at some 53 250 tonnes, while an additional 16 800 tonnes are required for the second group. Most of the food aid requirement will have to be imported, but a part of it may be procured locally. Total assistance requirements for the all of these populations should be reassessed later in the year, looking particularly at the final outcome of the second-season crops that are so important in these same areas. Seed assistance for planting in the next season is also required.

2. ECONOMY AND AGRICULTURE

Mozambique has a total area of 789 800 sq. km, with approximately 45 percent of the country, or about 36 million hectares, considered suitable for agriculture. However, only four percent of the total arable land is presently cultivated. The population, growing at about 2.4 percent per annum according to official projections, is estimated at 18.08 million by mid-2002. Over 80 percent of the labour force is engaged in agriculture and employment opportunities in the non-farm sector are very limited. However, the share of the urban population in the total is growing, especially in and around Maputo, the capital city, which already holds about one million people.

The country's infrastructure was devastated by more than 15 years of civil strife. Following the peace accord signed in October 1992 between the opposing groups, a climate conducive to the implementation of an economic recovery programme now prevails. The Government has initiated several rural development programmes and projects and is pursuing a strict structural adjustment programme (SAP) in cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank. Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, the country is in a position to benefit from debt relief and new loans and has recently had US$152 million of bilateral debt written off. Several important development projects are underway, including the MOZAL aluminium production project, the proposed natural gas pipeline from Beira to South Africa, a project for metal extraction from superficial ores, and several projects funded by donors for road construction and other endeavours. Foreign investment is growing at a relatively high rate, but the impact on production, employment and incomes is so far very limited. Tax revenue is still insufficient to cover the whole range of Government responsibilities, with foreign grants covering about one half of public expenditure at all levels, even after debt service reductions following the HIPC initiative. Mozambique has had healthy rates of GDP growth in recent years, though they are slowing down lately. For 2001 and 2002 the growth in GDP is estimated to be at most 3 percent.

The reforms which have been carried out so far seem to have brought about the desired results in several areas. Inflation which was reduced to 15 percent in 1997 from over 50 percent the previous year, stood at about 10-11 percent in 2001. Real interest rates which had been negative for several years, have been brought to positive levels and, in fact, appear to be rather too high. Commercial farmers complain that high interest rates are hindering rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure and other investments required to increase agricultural output. Most trade restrictions have been removed and market forces operate relatively freely.

For the agriculture sector, growth has been mainly due to favourable weather conditions and the prevailing enabling environment for investment. Agricultural products which have benefited most from reforms are export crops like cotton and cashew nuts. Recovery in production of tobacco in the north and centre, following years of decline due to civil strife, is also proceeding.

In the small-scale farm sector, given the low level of farming techniques, with virtually all crop land being cultivated by hand, the prospects for substantial increases in food production are unfavourable. Unless more land per family can be brought under cultivation and productivity increased, it will not be possible to meet the needs of the country's growing population with its rising urbanization. Even small improvements in farming techniques could significantly increase yields. Also, the lack of developed markets for farm products and inputs is a serious constraint. The recent introduction of seed fairs with FAO assistance is worth considering for possible expansion.

The current policy regarding land tenure does not encourage long-term investment in agriculture. At present, all land belongs to the State as it was nationalized at independence. Foreign investors would require legally defined individual tenure arrangements for sustained investment in agriculture. Small and commercial farmers have no permanent ownership title, and this limits their acccess to institutional credit.

3. FOOD PRODUCTION IN 2001/02

The data-gathering capability of the public sector in Mozambique was destroyed by the civil war. A considerable effort was made during the 1990s to collect agricultural statistics, mainly based on FAO assistance in establishing a national Early Warning Unit. Parallel efforts have been made to improve population data and economic statistics. However, there is still a serious lack of adequate and up-to-date information on several aspects of the economy, and particularly on agricultural production and food consumption. The Mission, therefore, had to rely on information derived from indicators such as numbers of households, average farm size, area planted and yields, seeds and tools distributed, crop conditions, rainfall situation, as well as on discussions with farmers and traders, to estimate food production.

3.1 Factors affecting area planted and yields

About 90 percent of food production is rainfed. The rainy season is from September to April. The major food crops are maize, sorghum, millet, rice, cassava, beans and groundnuts. In addition, a number of other crops are produced on a small scale, such as sugarcane, sunflower, tobacco and cotton, which contribute to cash income. Second season plantings based on residual moisture or irrigation take place from March to July but this is mainly in southern areas. At national level, the area planted to cereals and beans in the second season is usually estimated at 10 percent of the main season. Most crop production is for subsistence on holdings averaging less than 1.5 hectare per farm family. Commercial farming contributes about 4 percent of total production.

Rains

Early forecasts of weather conditions in Southern Africa were promising, anticipating adequate rainfall and good 2001/02 crop production. However, during the season it became apparent that the rains were more favourable in the northern region (Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula provinces), with normal and fair to good distribution, while in the central region (Zambezia, Sofala, Manica and Tete provinces), they were irregular. In Zambezia Province rains were normal in amounts and distribution but in other provinces they started later than usual and were poor. A serious dry spell in January and the early cessation of the rainy season affected crop production in several districts. Early planted maize had to be re-planted in a number of districts. In the Southern Region, some good rains at the beginning of the season were followed by a prolonged dry spell from mid-January to February and an abrupt early end of the rains in March. There were virtually no rains for half of the growing season. Where possible farmers re-planted cereals but even then the results were poor. Crop production, therefore, was extremely poor in this region. The behaviour of rainfall in 2001/02 is depicted in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Mozambique - Rainfall distribution in 2001/02 agricultural season

A. NORTH



B. CENTRE



C. SOUTH



Inputs

Farming in Mozambique is of a very low input/low output nature. Farmers do not use fertilizer and chemicals on their foodcrops. Only some vegetable farmers use these inputs. Manure is also not applied since few subsistence farmers have any cattle.

Improved seeds are available in limited quantities and are not of high quality. Farmers in general use retained seed from the previous crop. Hybrid seed is used by some farmers but it is kept for more than one year, with consequent

deterioration of the yield potential. Bean seeds are also of poor quality. For cowpeas and pigeonpeas, farmers are more interested in the leaves as a vegetable and seed is of secondary importance.

Area planted

Land preparation is done by hand. Farmers in most areas only clear the land from weeds and plant seeds in holes. Since land availability is not a problem in the country, farmers move to new land when their cultivated plots are no longer productive. The system of shifting cultivation is common. Inter-cropping is practiced in all parts of the country, as it increases total income per unit of land and is a hedge against total crop failure. Table 1 below shows the area planted to major crops in the 2001/02 cropping season.

Table 1. Mozambique: Area Planted to Major Food Crops, 2001/02 by Province (hectares)

	Total seven Crops	Maize	Sorghum	Millet	Rice	Beans	Groundnuts	Cassava
COUNTRY TOTAL	**3 756 484**	**1 270 714**	**501 623**	**105 799**	**172 638**	**406 255**	**279 787**	**1 019 668**
Total North	**1 557 818**	**337 633**	**229 398**	**13 120**	**54 288**	**189 083**	**108 627**	**625 669**
Cabo Delgado	440 409	86 173	66 813	4 491	14 360	55 947	44 166	168 459
Niassa	271 396	135 856	39 171	1 886	4 544	61 005	3 902	25 032
Nampula	846 013	115 604	123 414	6 743	35 384	72 131	60 559	432 178
Total Centre	**1 529 802**	**647 913**	**232 219**	**69 655**	**110 509**	**119 380**	**61 073**	**289 053**
Zambezia	734 569	210 184	69 828	14 313	80 663	53 723	32 575	273 283
Tete	309 818	162 250	57 563	28 132	277	44 111	16 095	1 390
Manica	263 341	190 100	46 978	15 866	710	3 972	4 392	1 323
Sofala	222 074	85 379	57 850	11 344	28 859	17 574	8 011	13 057
Total South	**668 864**	**285 168**	**40 006**	**23 024**	**7 841**	**97 792**	**110 087**	**104 946**
Inhambane	332 044	102 060	25 589	14 315	3 354	50 939	72 601	63 186
Gaza	245 583	123 384	13 055	8 709	2 772	35 275	26 507	35 881
Maputo	91 237	5 9724	1 362	-	1 715	11 578	10 979	5 879

Pest and diseases

Farmers reported some localized outbreaks of pests but, overall, they were within normal levels. The brown leaf disease on Cassava in the coastal areas of Nampula was the most serious problem this season.

3.2 Foodcrop production in 2001/02

Mainly because of the insufficient rainfall during the growing season in the central and southern regions, the target set by the Ministry of Agriculture of 1.9 million tonnes of cereal crops for 2001/02 could not be achieved. Tables 2 and 3 below provide a breakdown of production of the major foodcrops by province. These figures include projections of the second season cereal and bean crops.

The national total cereal production in 2001/02 is estimated at 1.77 million tonnes compared to 1.68 million tonnes in 2000/01, an in increase of 5 percent. Total maize production is estimated at 1.236 million tonnes, an increase of 8 percent on the good harvest of last year. The Northern Region produced 32

percent of the total, the Central Region 58 percent and the Southern Region only 10 percent.

Table 2. Mozambique: Production of major food crops, 2001/02 by province (tonnes)

	Maize	Sorghum	Millet	Rice (paddy)	Beans	Groundnuts	Cassava
COUNTRY TOTAL	**1 236 667**	**314 136**	**66 761**	**167 926**	**177 366**	**109 786**	**5 924 661**
Total North	**396 779**	**162 046**	**8 331**	**52 649**	**92 638**	**62 768**	**3 530 077**
Cabo Delgado	105 565	49 910	2 992	16 714	32 515	17 693	1 094 983
Niassa	178 633	28 203	1 226	3 635	27 540	1 757	162 705
Nampula	111 581	83 933	4 113	32 200	32 483	33 318	2 272 389
Total Centre	**716 989**	**134 460**	**38 221**	**102 906**	**67 118**	**28 214**	**1 870 030**
Zambezia	260 066	48 409	8 992	78 944	32 292	18 895	1 776 340
Tete	177 798	29 119	11 600	200	16 387	4 765	7 643
Manica	207 891	23 087	6 284	497	1 368	1 273	7 706
Sofala	70 234	33 845	11 345	23 265	7 071	3 281	78 341
Total South	**123 889**	**17 630**	**9 209**	**12 470**	**27 699**	**28 804**	**624 444**
Inhambane	40 014	11 259	5 726	2 147	12 735	18 880	315 646
Gaza	51 343	5 744	3 483	8 658	10 681	6 374	179 404
Maputo	32 532	627	-	1 665	4 283	3 550	29 394

Table 3. Crop production in 2000/01 and 2001/02 by Region ('000 tonnes)

	Maize	Sorghum	Millet	Rice (paddy)	All cereals	Beans	Groundnuts	Cassava
North								
2000/01	312	145	7	43	507	73	48	3 765
2001/02	396	162	8	53	619	93	53	3 530
Percentage	27	12	14	23	22	27	10	- 6
Centre								
2000/01	632	149	42	109	932	54	30	1 673
2001/02	716	134	38	103	992	57	28	1 870
Percentage	13	- 10	- 9	- 6	6	6	- 7	12
South								
2000/01	199	20	13	14	246	27	30	537
2001/02	124	18	9	12	163	28	29	524
Percentage	- 38	- 10	- 31	- 14	- 34	4	- 3	- 2
Mozambique								
2000/01	1 143	314	62	167	1 685	154	109	5 975
2001/02	1 236	314	56	168	1 773	177	110	5 925
Percentage	8	0	- 10	1	5	15	1	- 1

In the Southern Region, many farmers obtained very low yields of maize, often less than 10 percent of the expected.

The estimated total overall production of sorghum and millet for the 2001/02 season is approximately 370 000 tonnes (85 percent of sorghum, 15 percent of millet), which is slightly below last year's level. These crops are mostly produced in the north. Sorghum did quite well under the drought conditions in the south,

but in most areas it was grown only in small quantities because the population in this region strongly prefer maize for food. Efforts by the Ministry of Agriculture to promote drought resistant crops such as cassava and sorghum have not been successful.

Paddy production is forecast at 167 925 tonnes, almost unchanged from 2000/01. Out of this 32 percent is grown in the north, 61 percent in the centre and 7 percent in the south. Production in the south was affected by poor rains, but also by deterioration of irrigation facilities in the Chokwe Scheme. Rehabilitation of irrigation channels, both to the fields and within fields is urgently needed. Cleaning and repairs to the canals would improve irrigation efficiency and reduce the high percentage of water loss. Out of the 33 000 hectares of the scheme, it was reported that only 8 000 hectares are potentially suitable for production, but that less than 1 000 hectares were cropped because of machinery limitations and credit constraints. Yields in the Chokwe Scheme were about 4 tonnes/hectare for the more commercially oriented farmers, and about 3 tonnes/hectare for farm families.

The total bean production for the season was estimated at some 177 355 tonnes, 15 percent higher than last year mainly reflecting a good crop in the Northern Region.

Cassava is a very important crop in all regions, but it is a major crop in the Northern Region, where it is both a food and a cash crop. Official figures for planted area and yields are inconsistent. The Ministry of Agriculture estimates an overall area of around 1.0 million hectares with an average yield of around 6 tonnes/hectare. The Mission believes that the area is overestimated, and the yield probably underestimated. An in-depth survey should be undertaken to get a proper baseline from which future estimates can be made. In coastal Nampula in the Northern Region, a severe attack of the Brown Leaf Virus caused losses of up to 50 percent in some areas. This was the main cause of the fall in production of about 6 percent compared to last year in the northern region, in spite of an increase in area planted. At national level, however, cassava production is estimated almost unchanged from the previous year at 5.9 million tonnes.

Additionally an overall production of 110 000 tonnes of groundnuts is anticipated this season. The crop is extremely low yielding and the variety is of small nut type.

3.3 Other crops

There are clear indications that cash crops are becoming important in the cropping pattern of small farmers. Tobacco production is on the increase in the higher altitude areas of Manica and Tete Provinces, close to Malawi and Zimbabwe borders. Farmers are being supported with inputs by private companies which also purchase the crop. Through the influence of some NGOs, farmers have started growing sesame and sunflower in the last few years. Cotton is also being introduced. Vegetable production is a profitable activity for farmers during the limited second season, particularly around urban areas.

3.4 Livestock

Losses of livestock during the civil war and subsequently to the 2000 floods have still to be recovered. The country has relatively low numbers of livestock,

particularly cattle. Goats are abundant in the north and central regions and have a good market in urban areas where prices are attractive. Backyard poultry rearing is very common in most areas but Newcastle disease is a problem.

4. SITUATION BY PROVINCE

4.1 Northern Region

Cabo Delgado Province

The province has three distinct agro-ecological zones. The major part of the province is situated in zone 10 at an average altitude of around 500 metres, with average annual rainfall across the province ranging between 800 and 1000 mm.

Rains started in the second decade of December, a month later that normal. This resulted in poor germination of early planted crops and extensive replanting. As the subsequent rains were adequate, crops developed well and production is anticipated to be normal.

Farmers who lost their seeds to floods during the last season had adequate access to seed, which was distributed by the Government and NGOs. Cassava stems were also distributed in some districts of the province.

It is estimated that 171 837 hectares of cereals, some 100 000 hectares of vegetables and almost 170 000 hectares of cassava were planted this season. Another satisfactory harvest, with a surplus over local demand, is expected.

Niassa Province

Annual rainfall across the province ranges between 800mm and 1 400mm, depending on altitude.

While farmers in the province have more than adequate access to land, inputs are difficult to obtain, with chronic shortages of good seed and farm implements. Farmers who cultivate vegetables for sale may use fertilizer.

The growing season was slightly delayed, as rains did not start until around 20 November. However, they were good thereafter and crops developed well throughout the season, with good crop yields forecast. Some 271 396 hectares were planted this season including some 181 000 hectares of cereals and 25 000 hectares of cassava. Most of the crops were in good condition at the time of the Mission's visit.

Nampula Province

The major part of the province falls in altitudes of less than 500 metres, with an average annual rainfall of between 900 and 1 200 mm.

Land is not a limiting factor in the province. The overall area planted was slightly larger than last year. However, cassava plantings were constrained by shortages of planting material.

Rains started late in the province, the first showers having been received in the last week of December, delaying sowing by about a month. Farmers started planting in November but the sowings were largely lost. Eventually crops were re-planted and developed well due to good and regular rains.

Overall, good yields are anticipated for most crops except cassava that suffered tuber rot and Brown leaf virus This virus is a serious problem and calls for special attention from researchers and extension staff of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Total production is estimated at some 2.27 million tonnes of cassava and 232 000 tonnes of cereals, mainly maize.

4.2 Central Region

Zambezia Province

Average annual rainfall across the Province ranges between 1 000mm and 1 600mm depending on altitude. Rains were slightly delayed this season and did not start until mid-December. As a result, sowing was somewhat delayed, but good and regular rains made it possible for farmers to plant until February. Only areas at lower altitudes experienced some dry periods in the early part of the year, which adversely affected rice crops.

Input supplies, mostly seeds, for farmers who lost crops to the previous year's floods were short. Farmers not affected had adequate supplies in stock from the previous season's crop.

Few problems with pests and diseases were reported in the province and in general crops were in good condition at the time of the Mission. Production of maize is forecast at 260 066 tonnes and that of cassava at 1.776 million tonnes.

Tete Province

Average annual rainfall across the Province ranges between 800mm and 1 600mm, with altitude ranging from 200 metres to 1 500 metres.

Rains started in the second decade of November and continued until the end of December and were adequate in most of the northern part of the Province. By contrast, the districts in the southern part had insufficient and irregular rainfall in November, but this situation improved during December. However, rains in January and February were insufficient and the maize crop was seriously affected in southern districts. Poor rains continued during the remainder of the season, which, combined with poor sandy soils, aggravated crop conditions.

Farmers affected by floods in the previous year received seed and farm tools from the Government and various NGOs.

Overall, the 2001/02 production of cereals is estimated at around 218 700 tonnes. Maize is put 177 800 tonnes.

Manica Province

Average annual rainfall across the Province ranges from 400mm in low altitudes of less than 200 metres to 1 200mm in the highest altitudes of up to 600 metres.

The first rains started in the middle of November prompting most farmers to sow the first crops and were fairly regular until February. The crops established well particularly on heavier soils. The districts with sandy soils (and less water holding capacity) did not perform well, as the rains failed in the later part of the season. Farmers in these districts lost some of their crops and were unable to replant. Overall, due to the early end of the rains, yields were seriously reduced in several areas of the province.

Cereal production is forecast at some 237 800 tonnes of cereals, including 207 900 of maize. Cassava production is estimated at around 7 706 tonnes.

Sofala Province

Average annual rainfall across Sofala ranges between 800 - 1 300mm according to altitude. The rainy season started late in all parts of the province. Rains diminished in the last decade of December in several districts and were reduced until early February, seriously affecting yields in several areas. The main affected districts are Chibabava, Machanga and Bozi.

Farmers who were affected by floods last year were assisted by the Government and NGOs with seeds and other agricultural inputs. Fertiliser and chemical use was limited to vegetable farmers near towns where there was a good market.

Production of cereals is expected at 139 000 tonnes and that of cassava at 78 000 tonnes.

4.3 Southern Region

Inhambane Province

Average annual rainfall across this Province ranges between 400 - 1 000mm from east to west. The rainy season started normally in October. Rains were abundant and most of the crops were planted early, with 70 percent of the crop planted between the last decade of October and the second decade of November. However, a dry spell from the first decade of December prevailed over most of the province for the rest of the growing season, leading to very low crop yields.

Some 145 000 hectares of cereals and 63 000 hectares of cassava were planted this year. It is estimated that about 59 000 tonnes of cereals will be produced, including 40 000 tonnes of maize. Total cassava production is estimated at 315 600 tonnes and vegetables at some 31 500 tonnes.

Gaza Province

Average annual rainfall across Gaza ranges between 400 - 1 000mm. The first rains of the season occurred in the last decade of September but were followed by dry weather until the last decade of November when they resumed but were regular only until the first decade of December. From then, a prolonged drought prevailed until the end of the season. The early plantings in September/October

were virtually lost but later plantings performed relatively better although yields were reduced by the second dry spell. The outlook for the second season is also poor, reflecting the lack of rains.

The area planted was around the previous year's level. Overall production of cereals in the province is in the order of some 70 000 tonnes, including 51 300 is maize. Cassava production is estimated at 179 000 tonnes.

Maputo Province

Average annual rainfall across Maputo Province ranges between 400 - 1 000mm. The rainfall pattern in this province was somewhat similar to that in Gaza province. The rainy season started in the first decade of October and then a dry spell followed which lasted until late November. Another dry spell occurred in December. The crop planted with the first rains suffered badly from the drought and replanting was necessary. Crops on the remaining area (about 70 percent) which were planted with the second rains developed well. There was a remarkable difference in the plantings on the clay soils and those on the sandy soils, with the latter severely affected by drought.

Farmers that suffered heavy crop losses due to the flood last year were adequately supplied with inputs this season. Other farmers planted seeds from their own stocks and used available planting material for cassava and sweet potatoes.

Production is forecast at about 35 000 of cereals (mainly maize and only some small quantity of rice). Cassava production is forecast at 29 400 tonnes.

5. FOOD SUPPLY/DEMAND SITUATION

5.1 Food prices

There are significant seasonal fluctuations in the price of cereals, and also significant disparity between regions, accentuated this year by the drought which affected the southern region and part of the central region. However, in the north where food surpluses are forecast, increased food demand from Malawi and Zambia is expected to raise prices.

During the 2001/02 agricultural year real prices of maize were much higher than in previous years, reflecting increased demand from neighbouring countries, mainly Malawi (see charts below). In April and May 2002 (not reflected in the charts), prices were falling, not only in the north but also in the centre and south, as the new harvest arrived on the market. However, prices remained generally higher than at the same time in previous years (Figure 2). This surge in the real price of the main staple food will have an adverse impact on access to food for low-income sections of the population.

Figure 2. Mozambique: Retail Prices of Maize by Region
April 1999 to Feb 2002 (in meticais)

SOUTH



CENTRE



NORTH



5.2 Overall food supply situation and access to food

The Mission estimates that the national cereal production increased by 5 percent in the agricultural year 2001/02 over the relatively good harvest of 2000/01. The overall food supply situation in marketing year 2002/03 (April-March) is expected to remain satisfactory. Furthermore, substantial amounts of cassava, a major staple in the north, will be available.

However, the national picture masks striking disparities among regions. Maize surpluses will be available in the north and parts of the centre, which are likely to be largely exported to neighbouring countries. In the south and parts of the centre, where cereal production of the first and second seasons has been adversely affected by severe dry weather, imports would be needed as high internal transport costs make it uncompetitive to move maize from the north to the south compared with imported South African grain.

High prices of maize in local markets are seriously undermining household food security for a significant section of the population in the centre and south. For the most affected households, alternative sources of income are limited. Forestry-based products such as charcoal face increasing scarcity of forestry resources, and employment in South Africa has also been dwindling. Families that have lost all or most of their crops have exhausted their stocks (even those necessary for seed) and are already depending distress sales of livestock. This and other un-sustainable subsistence strategies are taking place at a relatively early time of the year.

5.3 Supply/demand balance for 2002/03

A projected population of 18 192 204 has been used for the middle of the 2002-2003 marketing year (30 September 2002), based on official population projections from 1997 to 2010 released by the National Institute of Statistics (INE). These projections reflect data from the 1997 Population Census and its estimated rate of omission.

Opening stocks

Carry-over stocks of maize at the end of March 2002 are estimated at 80 000 tonnes, of which about half was held by traders in the north, as estimated by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Small amounts are estimated to exist in the south. Stocks of imported wheat and rice, also held by traders, are estimated at 46 000 and 82 000 tonnes respectively.

Food use

Following increased cereal consumption in recent years, reflected in rising trends in imports of maize meal, wheat and rice (mostly for urban areas), as well as higher volumes of food aid, per capita annual consumption has been revised upwards to 54.5 kg of maize, 19 kg of rice and 14 kg of wheat from 50 kg, 14.3 kg and 10 kg respectively. Per capita consumption of pulses and cassava are estimated at 20 and 228 kg/year respectively, somewhat above the estimate for the past two years.

Losses and other uses

Storage losses have been estimated at about 15 percent for maize and 10 percent for rice, sorghum and millet. Losses for cassava are estimated at 20 percent. Other uses include seeds and industrial consumption.

Exports

The large increase in maize production in the north (27 percent) will result in increased exports to neighbouring countries, mainly Malawi. Total maize exports are projected at 100 000 tonnes as strong demand and attractive prices exist for shipping to Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia, where maize harvests this season have been reduced for the second consecutive year. At the time of the Mission, informal border traffic was intense, reaching about 200 tonnes per day in some locations. The high internal transport costs reduce the likelihood of the available surpluses being transported to the drought-affected areas in the centre and south.

Closing stocks

The level of stocks of imported rice and wheat are estimated to remain near the opening levels. Closing stocks of maize at the end of March 2003 are expected to be somewhat higher than in March 2002, held mainly by farms and traders in the north. This estimate is dependent on the amounts actually exported, and the extent of local purchases for food aid.

Table 4. Mozambique: Staple food supply/demand balance 2002/03 ('000 tonnes)

	Maize	Rice (milled)	Wheat	Sorghum/millet	Total cereals	Cassava
Domestic availability	**1 316**	**191**	**46**	**380**	**1 933**	**6 083**
Opening stocks	80	82	46	10	218	158
Production	1 236	109	0	370	1 715	5 925
Utilization	**1 436**	**453**	**306**	**380**	**2 575**	**6 083**
Food use	991	341	255	327	1 914	4 150
Other uses, losses	250	30	5	43	328	1 775
Closing stocks	95	82	46	10	233	158
Exports	100	0	0	0	100	0
Import requirement	**120**	**262**	**260**	**0**	**642**	**0**
Commercial	70	262	260		592	0
Food aid	50*				50	0

*Total food aid requirements amount to 70 000 tonnes. The difference will be procured locally.

Import requirement

An estimated 120 000 tonnes of maize will have to be imported to cover domestic requirements. Of this, 70 000 tonnes would be imported commercially, mainly in the form of maize meal to cover the urban consumption. Food aid supplies from abroad, representing about 70 percent of the total food aid required in maize-deficit areas, are estimated at 50 000 tonnes. Given the above-mentioned marketing problems, only about 20 000 tonnes of the food aid requirement might be purchased locally. Donor assistance may be necessary in

the mobilization of surplus from north to south to reduce the imported food aid requirement. Imports of wheat and rice to supply the cities, are expected to follow past trends at 260 000 and 262 000 tonnes respectively. Total cereal imports would therefore be about 642 000 tonnes.

6. Emergency food aid requirements

Despite the fact that Mozambique will enjoy a normal to good harvest on a national basis, and especially in the most agriculturally important food systems of the northern region's "planalto" (plateau), food security conditions within most of the districts in the semi-arid food systems of the Southern and Central regions vary from generally poor, to alarming in some sub-district areas. As described in the food availability analyses above, these Regions were selected as the geographic focus of the Mission's food security assessment, and are the subject of the rest of this section of the CFSAM report.

The main factors of the current acute food insecurity conditions being experienced in the semi-arid districts of the Southern and Central regions include a combination of: structural economic deficiencies, the cumulative effect of several recent natural shocks - especially flood/excessive rains and cyclones that hit the same areas during the last three seasons, the current dry spells which led to almost total harvest failure in these areas, and a sharply reduced ability of households in these areas to replace the lost production with other income and production until at least April 2003. Food aid is considered an appropriate and necessary response for some of the populations of these areas.

6.1 Recent context of vulnerability and food insecurity

Most of the Mozambican population, about 70%, live below the absolute poverty line. The chronically food insecure are generally considered to be about one third of the total population, and an additional 20 to 25% of the country's total population is generally considered highly vulnerable to transitory food insecurity.

Food security conditions across the country are strongly influenced by weather, as subsistence agriculture is the most dominant form of livelihood, providing more than 80% of basic food needs to more than 70% of the population. Livelihood options outside agriculture are limited for the great majority of this segment of the population. The marketing network is weak, and limited by extremely difficult physical access in many areas. As well, the country's infrastructure of health centers and schools is still in the process of rehabilitation and expansion after many years of war. All of these factors increase vulnerability to natural or economic shocks, such as drought and flood, or a decline in the terms of trade for agricultural production.

Food security conditions are normally fragile in districts located in the semi-arid regions of the Southern and Central regions of Mozambique. Farming in the dry highlands is unproductive, and the poorest segments of society in these areas have limited access to the most productive lands in the river basins. The area a household may decide to put under agriculture is limited by a number of factors, including the gender of the head of family, the number of active adult family members, the financial capacity of the family to hire labour and animal traction,

the fertility of the local soils, and the availability of moisture in the early part of the season.

Recent studies from the INIA (National Agricultural Research Institute) indicate that the average area cultivated by households in the semi-arid zones of Mabalane, Guija, Chokwe, and Mabote (Gaza District, Southern Region) varies between 0.9 ha to 1.60 ha. In these same areas, yields of about 400-600 kg per hectare only provide enough average production to cover less than 5 months of a normal household's food needs. This is generally true of most of the semi-arid districts in these regions[1]. Despite the agro- ecological potential for livestock in these food deficit districts, 40 to 50% of the small-scale farmers living there do not own any animals.

Since 1999, farmers of these semi-arid districts have experienced below normal harvests, due to both floods and dry spells, sometimes occurring in the same season. In 1999, districts and the majority of households found in Inhambane Province and northern Gaza Province were affected by excess rainfall and flooding in low-lying areas. That flooding caused displacement and loss of property for approximately 180 000 people. In 2000, the same areas, as well as most of Maputo Province and southern Sofala and Manica provinces suffered from the worst flood disaster in 50 years, that caused extreme food access difficulties for more than 650 000 people, out of which 500 000 were displaced.

6.2 Current food insecurity features and patterns

The Mission carried out a broad number of visits in most of the districts of both the Southern and Central regions, meeting with Government officials, NGOs, and members of the public in focused discussions on current food security conditions. Estimates of need were developed on the basis of these discussions, and then compared, contrasted and modified using data and insight provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Institute of Disaster Management (INGC), FEWSNet, NGOs, and a variety of other agencies.

Overall, the following factors or combination of conditions were judged to have had great influence in creating the current food insecure conditions that about 15% of the households in these regions are experiencing:

- A drop of more than 60% in the total expected output of cereals and grains (beans and groundnuts) of most households due to drought;
- Lack of household stocks[2]. due to the cumulative effect of three failed seasons, with consecutive below-normal harvests of most staple crops, including cereals and beans;
- Deterioration of physical access conditions (especially road surfaces and bridges) that have had a very negative impact on the flow of food **to** these relatively isolated areas, and the movement of goods for sale **out** of these areas;
- Significant increases in the retail prices of the most important staples, including maize and beans, and a deterioration of the terms of trade/ barter for animals and other local production;

- A decline of remittances from cross-border employment in South Africa because of tighter immigration controls; and,
- A reduction of local resources for coping (firewood, charcoal, wild foods, etc.) as a result of intensive use over the last 4 years.

The number of households without sufficient production or stocks to meet minimum needs will likely increase later in the year, considering that the second crop in most of these drought affected districts was failing at the time of the Mission's assessment visit (note that the normal harvest period of the second crop is June-August).

6.3 Coping mechanisms

Coping mechanisms and alternative strategies to complement access to food in the Southern and Central regions include: game hunting, the sale of firewood and charcoal, sale of goats and chicken, sale of local beverages, casual agricultural wage employment in local farms, and labour emigration to neighbouring countries. Most of these have been severely compromised by over-use during the last four years.

The capacity of local well-off farmers to hire local casual labour has been greatly reduced by the cumulative effect of consecutive disasters and the current poor harvest. There is therefore little agricultural wage labour currently available. Prices of maize and grains in the deficit districts are much above the level of previous years, and more important, barter conditions have deteriorated. In the most isolated maize deficit localities of the Southern and Central regions, there are indications that maize prices have risen more than double the price found in recent years. Malnutrition rates are high, and elevated mortality, due to malaria; diarrhoea and HIV/AIDS is showing an alarming trend in the most recent official statistics.

6.4 HIV/AIDS and food insecurity

The prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Mozambique is high and rising (see Table 5). The most recent estimates indicate that the highest rates are found in Central Region where the overall rates are above 21% in recent years. In the other regions, they range from 11 to 14%. Note also that female rates of HIV/AIDS are generally several percentage points above those of males. The impact of HIV/AIDS on food security is likely significant and increasing in Mozambique, due to lost or weakened agricultural labour in households, absence from the fields due to participation in funerals, and in a large variety of other ways that need further formal measurement and documentation.

Table 5. Mozambique: Percentage HIV/AIDS Prevalence Rates

Region/Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Southern Region					
Female	11.9	13.00	13.8	14.4	14.8
Male	9.9	10.8	11.5	12.0	12.3
Total	11.00	12.0	12.8	13.3	13.7
Central Region					
Female	22.0	22.4	22.7	22.9	23.0

Male	18.4	18.7	18.9	19.1	19.2
Total	20.3	20.7	20.9	21.1	21.2
Northern Region					
Female	14.2	14.8	15.1	15.4	15.5
Male	11.8	12.3	12.6	12.8	12.9
Total	13.0	13.6	13.9	14.1	14.2
Country					
Female	16.7	17.3	17.8	18.1	18.3
Male	13.9	14.5	14.8	15.1	15.2
Total	15.4	16.0	16.4	16.7	16.8

6.5 Changes in dietary patterns

In many of the districts visited, the poorest households have indicated that they have already begun reducing their daily meals from three to one, and in these same and other districts, households are relying on consumption of wild fruits and tubers to stabilize their diet.

6.6 Required food assistance

The Mission's assessment shows that approximately 515 000 people, found in poor households in 43 districts of the Southern and Central regions (see Table 6, below), are facing severe food insecurity. They require food aid totalling 70 050 MT between now and April 2003. This represents about 15% of the total population of the two regions, and less than 3% of the country's total population of 18 082 519.

These current acute food insecure conditions are a direct result of the devastation of this year's agricultural production in these areas by drought, and an exhaustion of coping resources due to over-use during a 4-year series of floods and droughts. It is anticipated that 355 000 of the total proposed beneficiaries require immediate food aid, while a second group of 160 000 people should be added in September 2002 because their current-year production will only last that long.

Table 6: Affected Populations, Food Aid Needs, and Phasing of Needs

Province/District	Estimated 2002 Population	Number of beneficiaries from June2002 to August 2003	Number of beneficiaries from September 2002 to March 2003	Total Estimated Food Aid June 2002 to March 2003 (tonnes)
Gaza				
Massangena	13 859	7 000	8 000	1 155
Mabalane	28 689	8 000	9 000	1 305
Chigubo	14 740	4 000	6 000	810
Bilene	161 092	9 000	11 000	1 560
Guija	64 832	10 000	13 000	1 815
Chokwe	226 049	10 000	13 000	1 815
Cidade De Xai-Xai	144 773	2 000	5 000	615
Chicualacuala	38 298	6 000	12 000	1 530
Chibuto	164 672	10 000	23 000	2 865
Massingir	25 051	10 000	10 000	1 500
Mandlakaze	176 117	14 000	14 000	2 100
Xai-Xai	208 259	5 000	5 000	750

Total	**1 266 431**	**95 000**	**129 000**	**17 820**
Inhambane				
Mabote	38 416	10 000	11 000	1 605
Panda	49 293	6 000	7 000	1 005
Funhalouro	33 283	9 000	11 000	1 560
Inhassoro	49 727	8 000	10 000	1 410
Inharrime	92 563	3 000	5 000	660
Morrumbene	128 764		3 000	315
Homoine	103 955		3 000	315
Govuro	30 568	10 000	13 000	1 815
Vilankulo	130 155	8 000	12 000	1 620
Massinga	203 639	5 000	11 000	1 380
Zavala	157 216		7 000	735
Total	**1 017 579**	**59 000**	**93 000**	**12 420**
Manica				
Macossa	15 585	10 000	13 000	1 815
Guro	43 895	10 000	15 000	2 025
Tambara	33 886	20 000	27 000	3 735
Machaze	80 055	20 000	27 000	3 735
Total	**173 421**	**60 000**	**82 000**	**11 310**
Maputo				
Namaacha	41 131		3 000	315
Manhica	137 423	7 000	11 000	1 470
Marracuene	47 560	3 000	8 000	975
Magude	33 555	5 000	5 000	750
Moamba	40 512	5 000	5 000	750
Matutuine	37 657	6 000	6 000	900
Total	**337 838**	**26 000**	**38 000**	**5 160**
Sofala				
Muanza	13 908	5 000	6 000	855
Machanga	44 349	15 000	20 000	2 775
Chibabava	66 887	10 000	10 000	1 500
Total	**125 144**	**30 000**	**36 000**	**5 130**
Tete				
Zumbu	42 528	7 000	9 000	1 260
Cahora Bassa	70 205	18 000	21 000	3 015
Changara	137 701	35 000	40 000	5 775
Magoe	49 608	15 000	20 000	2 775
Chiuta	69 330		5 000	525
Moatize	121 234		7 000	735
Mutarara	138 527	10 000	35 000	4 125
Total	**629 133**	**85 000**	**137 000**	**18 210**
Grand Total	**3 549 546**	**355 000**	**615 000**	**70 050**

The 2000/01 flood emergency programme of assistance terminated in April 2002 in a number of districts in Zambezia Province that are now recovering and enjoying normal to above normal rainfall. However, the recovery of other districts covered by this programme, especially in northern Manica and southern Tete provinces, was seriously slowed by the current drought, and some of these districts are now experiencing new difficulties. The Mission considers that the proposed current emergency operation should include these districts.

Considering the above-indicated levels of current food insecurity, the Mission concludes that:

- Immediate emergency food assistance should be provided in these areas to about 355 000 of the hungry poor in households without recent agricultural production and with no food stocks. Most of these households have no other significant means of acquiring income to purchase food to cover the current food losses, and may soon face acute malnutrition if external food assistance is not provided.
- The Mission suggests that this number should stay at around 355 000 until September, when it would need to be increased to 515 000 from September to March 2003. These new beneficiaries would be added because they will exhaust their meagre harvest production by that time.
- It is also possible that the impacts of a failed second harvest, which was becoming apparent during the Mission's visit, might push these numbers up after the second harvest can be assessed in September. Therefore it is recommended that a rapid food monitoring exercise should be undertaken sometime in September to provide additional information on these new, and potentially extremely food insecure, populations.
- A total of 70 050 tonnes of food assistance needs to be provided as food aid to these populations, starting from June 2002 and running through March 2003. The ration used to calculate this amount of food aid is a daily ration that would supply approximately 2 100 Kcal and would likely include maize, beans, sugar, oil and iodised salt, per person per day.
- Since most of the currently affected districts are chronically vulnerable to food insecurity due to economic and natural shocks, the Mission suggests that longer term, development-oriented interventions should be prioritised for these areas.

6.7 Other Recommended Actions

A monitoring exercise comprised of Government, SADC, FAO, WFP, FEWSNet, NGO, and other active partners in assuring food security in Mozambique should be designed with the aim to inform all of changes in food security levels due to the expected impacts of food aid. This exercise might use the food economy and livelihood assessment capabilities of the national Vulnerability Assessment (VA) Group , as well as selected indicators of household food access, including changes in retail food prices, availability of food in markets, migration, and others that may determine further deterioration of the current conditions.

The multisectoral VA Group should continue to plan to undertake detailed food economy analysis to determine, at the sub-district household levels, the magnitude and implications of the current food scarcity. WFP should continue to cooperate with government committees and relevant NGOs, as well as District Food Committees for the registration of beneficiaries, to assure that only the most food insecure households are targeted, including women headed households, pregnant mothers and children and overall the poorest households without alternative means of purchasing food.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FAO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

The mission has identified the following areas for possible future FAO technical assistance:

7.1 Improve crop data gathering

The National Early Warning System in Mozambique has developed over the years a comprehensive system to forecast and assess planted areas and yields of major food crops. Technical capabilities have been established at provincial and district levels to ensure that basic data are collected. However, the necessary field surveys have not been carried out regularly in recent years. For instance, a measurement of planted area per family was last attempted in 1998, and the assumed cropping pattern is also in need of updating. Improvements in the ground-level meteorological data gathering is also needed. The points of rainfall measurement are few and far apart, not allowing a correct assessment of rainfall at district level in years of irregular rainfall like 2001/02.

7.2 Study on the cassava economy

A special study is needed on production, marketing and consumption of cassava. Its objectives would be to assess the area planted in the various regions, as well as the harvesting time-pattern and yields; also, marketing, processing, storage and consumption patterns for cassava and its by-products in the various regions of the country.

7.3 Study on the food consumption patterns

Another recommended study concerns food consumption patterns. No food consumption survey has been done in Mozambique in recent decades, and little is known about regional differences in food consumption patterns, and distribution of food consumption among the population by area, socio-economic status, occupational position, and other possible differentiating factors. Estimates of income elasticities of demand should also be an objective of such study. Data on food consumption patterns will help prepare better food balances at national and subnational levels.

7.4 Improve seed quality

Some farmers are using old hybrid seed, which by definition should be replaced annually. In addition, hybrid varieties will only perform well if adequate agronomic practices are applied, such as better land preparation and the application of fertilizer. Open pollinated varieties are recommended under the present cultural practices, as seed can be retained for several years (4- 5 years).

Office of the Chief *GIEWS, FAO* *Fax: 0039-06-5705-4495* *E-mail:* giews1@fao.org	*Ms. J. Lewis* *Regional Director, ODK, WFP* *Fax: 00256-41-255115* *E-mail:* Judith.Lewis@wfp.org

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1 **(Mozambique VA Committee reports 1997, 98, 99)**

2 **Poor households of the districts of upper Limpopo and interior of Gaza are food insecure `because they cannot earn enough extra cash income to cover the loss in crop production, and they do not have sufficient stocks to buffer themselves either'' (FEWSNET-FEG/ VA Group)**

FAO GLOBAL INFORMATION AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEM ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

SPECIAL REPORT

FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SUPPLY ASSESSMENT MISSION TO SWAZILAND

28 May 2002

MISSION HIGHLIGHTS

- Domestic cereal supply in 2002/03 is estimated at 77 000 tonnes, while total national consumption requirement is estimated at 188 000 tonnes. This results in an import requirement of 111 000 tonnes.
- Commercial imports are estimated at 96 000 tonnes and food aid at 15 200 tonnes which will need to be covered by the Government and external assistance.
- The mission estimates that a total of 144 000 people in Lowveld, Middleveld and Lubombo Plateau will need food assistance. However, the duration for food assistance will vary between vulnerable groups based on their coping capacities and, therefore, assistance needs to be carefully targeted and phased. Overall, the Mission recommends targeted assistance of approximately 17 720 tonnes of food, including such commodities as maize, pulses, vegetable oil and iodised salt. The Government has already allocated 1 500 tonnes of maize for distribution to the most vulnerable people.
- Emergency provision of agricultural inputs such as seeds is recommended to enable drought-affected farming families to restart agricultural production during the next main planting season starting in October 2002.

- There is a potential to produce irrigated maize before the sugar cane crop is planted, and this should be part of irrigation development, so that maize production in the country is increased.

1. OVERVIEW

Swaziland faced erratic weather for a second consecutive year, characterised by prolonged dry spells that severely affected crops during their critical flowering stage. The Government of Swaziland, anticipating another poor harvest, requested FAO and WFP for assistance in reviewing the country's food situation and outlook for the 2002/03 marketing year. Consequently, an FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission visited the country from 15 to 24 April 2002, and was joined by a representative of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Regional Early Warning Unit (REWU) as an observer.

The Mission received full cooperation from the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, the National Early Warning Unit (NEWU), the National Disaster Task Force, and the United Nations Development Programme. Discussions were also held with relevant UN agencies, donor representatives, NGOs, the National Maize Corporation, Ngwane Milling, and the National Agricultural Marketing Board. The Mission split into two groups and was able to cover all four districts and agro-ecological zones of the country. Interviews were conducted with district extension officers, farmers, households, and traders. Overall, more than 120 interviews were conducted during the course of the mission.

The Mission forecasts 2001/02 total domestic cereal (maize) production at 68 000 tonnes. According to Government statistics, this is 18 percent below last year's poor harvest and 37 percent below the average of the last five years. Production in the dry Middleveld, Lowveld, and the Lobombo Plateau has been particularly poor, due to a long dry spell from December through February. The Highveld is the only region where cereal production is estimated to have increased on last year. Other crops which are important sources of food and cash such as cotton, beans, potatoes, cassava, tobacco and cowpeas were also observed in farmers' fields. The Mission estimated total planted area at 61 000 hectares, about 4 percent more than last year.

The estimated domestic cereal supply of 77 000 tonnes falls far short of the total national consumption requirements of 188 000 tonnes, resulting in an import requirement of 111 000 tonnes. Commercial cereal imports are forecast at 96 000 tonnes and required food aid at 15 200 tonnes.

An estimated 144 000 vulnerable people will need emergency food assistance in 2002/03, estimated at approximately, 17 720 tonnes of food, including such commodities as maize, pulses, vegetable oil and iodized salt. The Government of Swaziland has already allocated 1 500 tonnes of maize to assist the most vulnerable people.

2. ECONOMY

The Kingdom of Swaziland is a landlocked mountainous country some 17 364 km2 in size, bordered by South Africa on three sides and Mozambique to the east. Arable land is only 11 percent of the total area, the remainder consisting of permanent pasture, forest and woodland. The country is divided into four agro-ecological zones and administrative units. The Highveld and Middleveld are the two most populated and intensively cultivated zones, followed by the Lowveld, and the Lubombo Plateau. Climatic conditions vary from tropical to near temperate.

Swaziland is classified as a lower middle-income country with a per capita income of US$1 360. However, per capita income of the poorest 40 percent of the population is only US$230, and 66 percent of the population live below the poverty line. The income distribution is skewed, with about 43 percent of the total income received by only 10 percent of the population.

Swaziland's economy is largely dependent on agriculture and manufacturing sectors. During the period 1997-2000, the real GDP growth rate varied between 2.5 percent and 3.9 percent, but sharply declined to 1.8 percent in 2001 due to weak external demand and prices for its agricultural exports. The projected real GDP growth rate for 2002 is 2.1 percent. The performance of the manufacturing sector is expected to be weak due to the closure of some key companies.

The budget for fiscal year 2002/03 projects a deficit of Emalangeni 654.4 million, 5.5 percent of GDP. Total revenue including grants is estimated at E3 329.6 million, and total expenditures E3 984 million. Receipts from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) account for about 49 percent of total revenue, followed by income taxes. The total external debt at the end of fiscal year 2001 was US$ 314 million.

Swaziland's balance of payments recorded an overall deficit of E 45.9 million in 2000 after five consecutive years of surplus. Even though the financial account posted a net inflow of E 58.4 million, the current account deficit of E 279 million was largely responsible for the deficit in the balance of payments. Main merchandise exports include soft drink concentrates, sugar, wood pulp and refrigerators. In 2000, soft drink concentrates contributed 25 percent to the total export earnings, while sugar exports increased by 24 percent despite declining world market sugar prices.

The average unemployment rate in Swaziland is about 40 percent, but higher in the rural areas. The closure of major manufacturing companies in the urban areas, retrenchment from South African mines, and limited domestic employment opportunities are some of the key causes of such a high unemployment rate. The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA), the recruitment agency for South African mines, secured jobs for only 650 Swazis in 2001, compared to 11 500 in 1997.

The average inflation rate in 2001 was 7.5 percent, with a peak in December at 10 percent due to a sharp depreciation of the Lilangeni against major currencies. It is expected that the rising oil and food prices will add more pressure on consumer prices and push the inflation rate to higher levels.

Swaziland's currency, the Lilangeni - pegged at par with the South African Rand - has continued to decline against the dollar since 1998/1999. During the fiscal year 2001/02, it fell by over 38 percent against the US dollar.

3. FOOD PRODUCTION IN 2001/02

There are two forms of land tenure, Swazi Nation Land (SNL) which accounts for approximately 60 percent of the total land area and Title Deed Land (TDL) which accounts for the other 40 percent. SNL is held in trust by the king and controlled and allocated by chiefs according to traditional arrangements. Because it is dependent on rain-fed cultivation, SNL is highly vulnerable to drought. It produces the national maize crop, and accounts for 80 percent of all cotton growers and 77 percent of the total cattle herd.

TDL on the other hand is freehold. Large areas are under irrigation and used for commercial production, with company estates and plantations (forestry, sugarcane, citrus and pineapples) and cattle farming. Further growth on TDL is expected from river basin development schemes. The Komati Basin scheme will provide water for an additional 7 400 hectares, and 14 000 hectares more could be irrigated if the Usutu Basin scheme becomes operational.

Rainfall

As in 2000/01, the rainy season was erratic in 2001/02 cropping season. In the early months of the season (September and October), rainfall was normal in all the agro-ecological zones of the country. During the month of November it was higher than normal (152 percent in the Highveld and 270 percent in the Lowveld). However, during the latter half of December, as the maize crop was flowering/tasselling, the rains tailed off, with totals falling below normal for all regions of the country, particularly in the Lowveld, dry Middleveld and Lubombo Plateau, until March. The Lowveld was very hard hit, receiving only 21 and 24 percent of its long-term average rainfall for February and March (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Swaziland: Actual vs. Normal Rainfall by Agro ecological Zone for the 2001/02 Cropping Season




Middleveld
400
300
200
100
0
Rainfall (mm)
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Actual
Normal


Lowveld
400
300
200
100
0
Rainfall (mm)
Sep
Oct
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Dec
Jan
Feb
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Actual
Normal



Supply of agricultural inputs

National fertilizer use for food crop production (excluding commercial farming) ranged between 14 000 tonnes and 17 000 tonnes during the period 1995/96 to 1998/99, and was 12 700 tonnes in 2000/01. Fertilizers, which are no longer subsidized, are traded by the private sector and cooperatives through national networks, but farmers are becoming less able to afford them.

Hybrid maize seed use went down from 4 000 tonnes in 1995/96 to 1 183 tonnes in 2000/01. This huge decline followed a Government decision to stop providing free seeds to farmers; seeds are now supplied at market prices by the private sector and cooperatives.

Planted areas

The Missions' estimates of planted areas of maize for the past growing season are based on data provided by the National Early Warning Unit as presented in its report of April 2002. The data had been collected by the Extension Service in each agro-ecological zone, and were the most reliable at the time of the Mission. The Central Statistical Office (CSO) will provide final estimates during the course of the year. The area planted to maize in each district is given in Table 1. The total national maize area (excluding TDL land), is estimated at 60 133 hectares, which is slightly lower (about 3 percent), than the five-year average.

Table 1: Total Planted Area for Maize (Hectares) in 2001/02 Compared to 1996/97-2000/01

Agro-ecological Zones	1996/97	1997/98	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01	5-year Average

	2001/02 Percent of average
Highveld	
	14 639
	21 068
	20 025
	20 338
	20 672
	19 348
	17 620
	91
Middleveld	
	22 908
	25 481
	21 241
	27 003
	19 434
	23 213
	22 905
	99
Lowveld	
	20 166
	14 983
	12 096
	18 886
	14 771
	16 180
	15 820
	98
Lubombo Plateau	
	3 192
	3 617
	2 608
	2 306
	2 974
	2 939
	3 788
	129
Swaziland	
	60 905
	65 149
	55 970
	68 533
	57 851
	61 680
	60 133
	97

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives; NEWU.

Conditions for early planting of the maize crop were excellent in all regions, but as always planting dates varied and the resultant crops were affected to a greater or lesser extent by the dry conditions in December and January. Poor access to tractors, equipment and purchased inputs in some areas of the Middleveld, the Lubombo Plateau and the Lowveld also delayed or restricted planting. The estimated maize area and production in each agro-ecological region are shown in Table 2. The area planted to sorghum has declined to insignificant levels because of labour problems associated with bird scaring, lack of appropriate varieties, lack of interest in the grain for food and a poorly developed market for the crop. Even though the Mission observed efforts by the Extension Service in promoting cassava and sweet potato production, uptake by farmers has been slow and it noted the limited crop diversity in the fields of farmers, particularly in the Lowveld. Rice is grown on four irrigation schemes in the country with a total production of about 150 tonnes.

Table 2. Estimated Area, Yield and Production of Maize in 2001/02, by Agro-ecological Zone

Zone Planted Area (ha) Yield (t/ha) Production (tonnes)
Highveld
17 620 1.78 31 364
Middleveld
22 905 1.04 23 821
Lowveld
15 820 0.46 7 277
Lubombo Plateau
3 788 0.64 2 424
Total SNL 1/
60 133 1.08 64 944
TDL 2/
857 3.50 3 000
Swaziland
61 000 **1.11**

67 886

Source: National Early Warning Unit and Mission Estimates.
1/ Swaziland National Land - State Land.
2/ Title Deed Land - Commercial farmers' land.

With further development of irrigation being planned by the Government, the area under maize is also likely to be reduced. There is potential to produce an irrigated maize crop before the sugar cane crop is planted, and this should be part of the irrigation development plan, so that maize production in the country is increased. In fact at current prices, the gross margin per hectare for maize is higher than that for sugar cane. Some 2 000-3 000 hectares of irrigated land planted to maize could augment the country's maize production by some 10 to 15 000 tonnes.

Yields

The yield forecast for each agro-ecological zone is also presented in Table 2. When the final maize production estimates for the year 2000/01 season are released by the CSO, the yield and production figures may need to be revised. The Mission assessed crop yields on randomly selected farms in all agro-ecological regions, and this led to some adjustments of the estimates made by NEWU. Yields vary with crop management, rainfall and agro-ecological conditions even within the same agro-ecological zone. In general, production of maize has tended to decline from west to east across the country.

Highveld

The Mission visited 15 farmers in different areas of this zone, the best for maize production, to accurately assess maize yields and compare with those of last year. Overall, the rainy season was considered good for maize production, provided the crop was planted early. Generally good crops were seen and some farmers had already started harvesting. Of the farmers interviewed, some felt that their yields would be lower than in 2000/01, while others expected the same yields or higher. Overall, expected production for this year may be 10 percent higher than in 2000/01.

Middleveld

The Mission visited 22 farmers in different parts of this agro-ecological zone, where the maize crop was fully matured for harvesting. There was a big variation in maize yield potential between the moist and the dry Middleveld areas, depending on the severity of the extended dry spell from mid-December. In general, apart from isolated pockets, the moist Middleveld suffered less and yields were only marginally lower that last year, but in the dry Middleveld yields were considerably reduced. Overall, expected production for this year may be 30 percent lower than 2000/01.

Lubombo Plateau

The Mission visited 10 farmers in this zone, where the crop was fully mature and harvesting had started. The crop condition was generally poor due to the poor rainfall from December to March, although the southern part of the plateau was less affected than the northern. Overall, expected production for this year may be 40 percent lower than 2000/01.

Lowveld

The Mission visited 25 farmers in this zone, the worst affected in the country. The dry conditions severely affected the maize crop and some 50 percent of farmers will harvest nothing. Overall, expected production for this year will be greatly reduced, maybe 60 percent lower than 2000/01.

The Mission came across farmers who had very little harvest and others who had up to 5

tonnes per hectare, within the same locality. This indicates that husbandry practices (early planting, use of appropriate hybrid seeds, proper use of fertilizer and animal manure, and rotational practices) can make a great difference to the impact of dry conditions. However, low purchasing power for poorer farmers limits their ability to purchase the necessary inputs.

Overall situation

In general, maize yields declined substantially compared to the average of the last five years (1996/1997 to 2000/2001). This yield decline was particularly serious in the dry Middleveld, Lowveld and Lubombo Plateau where the December-February dry spell affected the late planted crops at the critical flowering/tasselling stage The early-planted crops escaped the effects of the dry spell and generally produced good yields.

Based on the mission's investigation and assessments, the national average yield of maize on SNL for 2001/02 is estimated at 1.08 tonnes/ha. Total production at 64 984 tonnes, represents 61 percent of the average for the last five years, 79 percent of the official production figures for last year, and 90 percent of the 72 554 tonnes estimated by the assessment mission last year (Table 3). Figure 1 shows that maize production is trending downwards, despite price support. This is mainly due to adverse weather and falling land productivity.

Table 3: Total Cereal Production in 2001/02 Compared to 1996/97-2000/01 Average (`000 tonnes)

Agro-ecological zones	1996/97	1997/98	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01	5-year average	2001/02	Percent of average
Highveld	30 630	44 741	45 486	38 721	33 493	38 614	31 404	81
Middleveld	37 134	50 661	39 939	43 514	28 995	40 049		

	23 921
	60
Lowveld	
	32 527
	24 562
	17 358
	27 627
	16 860
	23 787
	7 223
	30
Lubombo Plateau	
	7 916
	5 240
	4 557
	2 917
	3 187
	4 763
	2 436
	51
Swaziland	
	108 207
	125 204
	107 340
	112 779
	82 535
	107 213
	64 9841/
	61

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives; NEWU.
1/ Does not include an estimated 3 000 tonnes of maize produced on TDL.

Other crops

Sugar cane is cultivated on 44 000 ha in the country; raw and refined sugar, sugar products and ethanol are now the main agricultural export and an important source of foreign currency. There is continuing development of areas for irrigated sugar cane, which has over the years fetched good export prices, but prices have fallen recently, and this could alter the cropping pattern.

Cotton, one of the major cash crops, was only planted on 11 082 ha in 2001/02 but still plays an important role in the food security of many households, particularly in the dry Middleveld and Lowveld. However, production is on the decline; the area is down 35 percent on last year's and very much lower than the 35 000 ha grown during the 1998/99 production year. The area planted continues to decline because of poor prices.

Grapefruit, orange, soft citrus and lime also form an important part of nutrition and are another source of foreign currency. Sorghum, pumpkins, sweet potatoes, beans, peanuts, cowpeas, cassava, bananas, peaches and avocados are also produced, but in limited quantities. Sorghum has real potential for the drier parts of the country, but requires a national marketing effort because it is not a popular foodgrain.

Livestock situation

Livestock production is a major agricultural activity, with small farmers owning about 77 percent of the total cattle population. The condition of pastures and livestock in most areas visited was reasonable. Late rains have helped to bring on a flush of grass, but this is only temporary; drinking water availability in streams and dams has not improved.

Although Swaziland has a quota to export 3 360 tonnes of beef to the EU, it only manages to export a fraction of this. Exports to the EU increased by more than 50 percent to 665 tonnes in 2000 from 416 tonnes exported in 1999. Farmers seem reluctant to sell good quality cattle unless forced by economic or climatic conditions, and this year, particularly in the Lowveld, farmers will have to sell their animals to buy maize for household consumption. Livestock prices have already started to fall.

4. FOOD SUPPLY AND DEMAND SITUATION

Prices and access to food

Swaziland is a net importer of maize, wheat, dairy products and other food commodities. In a normal year, roughly 60 percent of the food consumed in the country is imported. For maize, the main staple food, imports averaged about 30 000 tonnes over the last five years, slightly over a third of national maize requirements (Figure 2). About 10 percent of domestic production is marketed, mostly through the National Maize Corporation (NMC) and Ngwane Milling. NMC is also the sole importer of maize and is a semi-autonomous non-profit organization. Ngwane mills is a major importer of wheat and its imports have averaged about 38 000 tones over the last 10 years. Importation of all foods, other than maize, is liberalized but requires a permit from the National Agricultural Marketing Board. With the exception of wheat, virtually all imports come from the Republic of South Africa (RSA).

Figure 2: Annual Maize Imports (1997/98-2001/02)



Source: National Maize Corporation

Prices of maize meal have been increasing since October last year (Figure 3).

While the Mission was still in the country, NMC announced that maize prices would be increased by about 25 percent to E2 330 per tonne. Ngwane Milling followed by announcing an increase in the wheat price by about 10 percent to E2 695 per tonne.

Figure 3: Monthly Average NMC Selling Prices for Maize



Source: National Maize Corporation

The prices for maize and wheat have continued to rise since October and it is likely that they will rise even further, given the serious decline in regional cereal production and therefore increased competition for available exportable supplies in the sub-region, mostly from South Africa and Mozambique.

Low-income families are having difficulty in coping with the increasing prices. With the high rate of unemployment in the rural areas, limited income generating opportunities and high levels of poverty, the purchasing power of the majority of the rural population is extremely low. Over the last four months, livestock prices have fallen by more than 30 percent in the Lowveld, indicating that a significant number of poor households have started to sell their livestock.

Cereal supply/demand balance, 2002/03

The forecast of the cereal supply/demand situation for the marketing year 2002/03 (April/March) in Table 4 below is based on the following assumptions and Mission observations.

- Farmers interviewed by the Mission stated that they had no food stocks due to the poor harvest last year. Government and millers' opening stock figures were provided by the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing, National Maize Corporation, and Ngwane Milling.
- The mid-marketing year 2002/03 population is estimated at 1 064 096 and the per capita consumption at 127 kg for maize, 42 kg for wheat and 4 kg for rice.
- "Other uses" cover essentially post harvest losses and seed use, estimated at 6 percent for maize.

Table 4: Swaziland: Cereal Supply/Demand Balance for 2002/03 ('000 tonnes)

Maize

	Wheat	Rice	Total
Domestic availability			**68.4**
			8.9
			0.0
			77.2
Opening stock			0.4
			8.9
			0.0
			9.3
Domestic production			68.0
			0.0
			0.0
			68.0
Total utilisation			**139.2**
			44.7
			4.3
			188.2
Food use			135.1
			44.7
			4.3
			184.1
Feed and seed use and losses			4.1
			0.0
			0.0
			4.1
Import Requirements			**70.8**
			35.8
			4.3
			110.9
Anticipated commercial imports			55.6
			35.8
			4.3
			95.7
Food aid			15.2
			0.0
			0.0

Table 4 shows a cereal import requirement of 111 000 tonnes. Commercial imports are forecast at 96 000 tonnes and food aid requirement at 15 200 tonnes which needs to be covered by the Government and external assistance.

In previous years Swaziland has imported its maize requirements primarily from South Africa, and the one-to-one convertibility of the Linengani to the Rand has meant that availability of foreign exchange has not been a major constraint. However, currently there is high demand for South African grain from other countries in the region, and available supplies will not meet this demand. As a result, Swaziland, like other countries in the sub-region, may have to import some of its grain requirements from elsewhere, and this will expose the country to foreign exchange constraints.

5. EMERGENCY FOOD REQUIREMENTS

Food insecurity

Food security in Swaziland depends on the availability of employment opportunities. Households that suffer the most poverty and food insecurity are those headed by individuals who have the least employment opportunities and very few assets. Even in years of reasonable harvest and stable prices, some two thirds of Swazi households are estimated to live below the poverty line. The recent dramatic increases in food prices have pushed a greater proportion of the population below the poverty line, and worsened the situation of those who were already struggling.

The great majority of rural households have to depend on cash income for survival. For most households, crop production is only one of many survival strategies. However, livelihoods strategies, especially of the poor, give more emphasis to agriculture than appears to be warranted by the economic facts alone. Thus even though agricultural production is never sufficient to meet all food needs, it does provide a vital supplement to other sources of food, as well as employment opportunities (through odd jobs during harvest and other peak demands for agricultural labour) for people who have few other employment options. Hence a crisis in agricultural production reduces employment (and cash) opportunities, while simultaneously forcing people to turn to the market for an increased proportion of their food needs. In the current situation, most rural people are being forced to obtain a higher proportion of food from the market, at the same time as market prices have reached very high levels.

The coping mechanisms of certain segments of the population are on the decline. Employment in the mines of South Africa used to be the traditional prime source of income for many male workers. But restructuring of the mining industry towards capital intensive production, combined with the depressed prices for gold in the late 1990s and South Africa's preferential employment policy for its own nationals has resulted in increasingly reduced employment opportunities and income flows for the Swazi migrants.

It appears that school dropout rates for the Swazi children who are living in vulnerable households are increasing. The rationale is that the school fees for a quarter can feed a family for a month. The sale of livestock tends to be the coping mechanism of the last resort. Many vulnerable households consider livestock as their long term investment and do not sell until it is absolutely necessary. However, later in the year, necessity requires

them to sell in droves, resulting in substantially lower livestock prices.

The extremely high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Swaziland (20-30 percent) has impacted all sectors, socio economic groups, and geographic areas. Households affected by HIV/AIDS have even fewer income-earning opportunities, but simultaneously face higher food and non-food costs. The direct linkages between HIV/AIDS and household food security include:

- Loss of able-bodied workers, the primary and secondary income earners
- Child-headed households
- Increased expenditures on health care
- Increased nutritional requirements of HIV/AIDS affected individuals
- Increased burden of child support by single mothers or grandparents, already among the most food insecure groups.

Even in relatively normal periods, carbohydrates (of which, roughly 80 percent is maize) account for on average three quarters of total calorie intake, and vegetable sources provide most protein. The dramatic increases in food prices has resulted in increased cereal food purchases by poor households, with a corresponding decline in purchases of other foodstuffs. Thus, there has been a decline in both total energy consumption and consumption of micro-nutrients. Intake of animal protein is negligible in most rural areas. Vegetable intake depends on whatever is harvested from small kitchen gardens, or can be gathered wild.

Required food assistance

The hardest hit areas of this year's reduced agricultural production have been Lowveld, dry Middleveld, and northern Lubombo Plateau. The mission estimates that a total of 231 000 people will require some type of food assistance (Table 5). The distinction of seriously and moderately affected is based on the extent of reduced harvests, but more importantly, on the differences in the coping capacities of the people.

Table 5: Number of Seriously and Moderately Affected People

Zone	Seriously Affected	Moderately Affected	Total Affected
Middleveld	30 000	45 000	75 000
Lowveld	96 000	24 000	120 000
Lubombo Plateau	18 000	18 000	

	36 000
Total	**144 000**
	87 000
	231 000

Source: Mission estimates

Market interventions (price subsidies, monetization of donated food aid) can help to improve the overall food security situation of those moderately affected, by lowering prices and thus increasing accessibility. However, for individuals seriously affected, the severity of the food and poverty situation this year, along with the reduced availability and effectiveness of usual coping strategies, means that some sort of targeted food assistance will be required. The mission estimates that the people seriously affected will require six months of direct assistance and those moderately affected will need assistance for three months.

	Assistance for 6 months	**Assistance for 3 months**
Number of people	144 000	87 000

Food rations supplied through direct distribution should meet overall calorie needs, taking into account the extra calorie needs of people living in cold areas (at least during winter), and requiring additional energy to meet the physically demanding way of rural life in Lesotho. Rations should also be sufficient to meet the additional calorie requirements of people affected by HIV/AIDS (15 percent more carbohydrates and 50 percent more protein). Insofar as possible, the rations should also meet the basic micro-nutrient requirements of a population whose diet has consisted almost entirely of maize meal. Consequently it is expected that approximately 17 720 tonnes of food, including such commodities as maize, pulses, vegetable oil and iodised salt, will be required for direct food assistance.

Different approaches to food distributions should be examined. In less affected areas, self-targeting through food-for-work may be more appropriate than free distribution. In the worst affected areas free distribution will be required. However the implementation of a broad programme of free distribution should be based on a strict registration system to ensure that food aid is targeted to those most in need.

This report is prepared on the responsibility of the FAO and WFP Secretariats with information from official and unofficial sources. Since conditions may change rapidly, please contact the undersigned for further information if required.

Office of the Chief
GIEWS, FAO
Fax: 0039-06-5705-4495
E-mail: giews1@fao.org

Ms. J. Lewis
Regional Director, ODK, WFP

Fax: 00256-41-255115.
E-mail: Judith.Lewis@wfp.org

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FAO GLOBAL INFORMATION AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEM ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

SPECIAL REPORT

FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SUPPLY ASSESSMENT MISSION TO ZIMBABWE

28 May 2002

MISSION HIGHLIGHTS

- Zimbabwe is facing a serious food crisis, even at harvest time, and unless international food assistance is provided urgently and adequately, there will be a serious famine and loss of life in the coming months.
- Cereal production for consumption in the current marketing year (April 2002 to March 2003) is estimated at about 0.67 million tonnes, 57 percent down from last year's poor harvest and 69 percent down from production in 1999/00.
- The production of maize, the main staple, is estimated at 0.48 million tonnes, down by 67 percent on last year and by 77 percent on 1999/00.
- The major cause of the collapse of the 2002 main season food production has been a severe prolonged drought between January and March which wiped out crops in most parts of the country. Land reform activities contributed to the steep fall in production.
- Cereal import requirements for the marketing year 2002/03 are estimated at a staggering 1.869 million tonnes, of which maize accounts for 1.705 million tonnes or 91 percent. Taking into account an anticipated commercial cereal import of 312 000 tonnes and 60 000 tonnes of food aid pledges, the total uncovered cereal deficit for the year is 1.497 million tonnes with the maize deficit amounting to 1.345 million tonnes.
- Approximately 6.074 million people are estimated to have insufficient production, income and other entitlements to be able to meet their minimum food requirements throughout the coming year. Emergency food assistance in the amount of 705 000 tonnes of cereals, in addition to other supplementary food items, is needed to support their minimum cereal consumption requirements.
- Millions of people who have the resources to purchase their cereal staple food are increasingly unable to do so because grain is not widely available in the markets, or is selling at very high prices.

- Emergency provision of agricultural inputs is recommended to enable drought-affected farming families to restart agricultural production during the next main planting season starting in October 2002.

1. OVERVIEW

Zimbabwe was hit by a severe drought during the 2002 main cereal growing season (January to March). This came on the heels of significantly reduced cereal production the previous year. In order to determine the impact of the drought and last year's poor harvest on Zimbabwe's food security, an FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission visited the country from 23 April to 11 May 2002 to estimate the 2001/02 production of the main cereal and pulse crops, forecast the 2002/03 winter crop production, review the overall food situation and determine food import requirements, including food assistance needs, for the next 12 months.

In Harare, the Mission held meetings with the FAO Sub-Regional Representative, WFP Country Director, UNDP Resident Coordinator, The Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (MLARR), as well as with the National Early Warning Unit (NEWU)/Agritex, Grain Marketing Board (GMB), FEWSNet, Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), Zimbabwe Farmers Union, Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union (ICFU), Millers Association of Zimbabwe and a number of NGOs. The Mission also obtained estimates of area planted and crop production, prepared by the National Crop Forecasting Committee, and remote sensing data on rainfall, vegetation indices and various interim assessment reports.

For field visits the Mission was accompanied by observers from SADC's Regional Early Warning Unit (REWU), USAID, FEWSNet, EC and Save the Children Fund-UK. It was assisted by specialists from MLARR and an FAO staff member from the country office. The Mission split into teams and was able to visit 24 districts in all eight provinces. Interviews were held with farmers, labourers, traders, NGOs, project workers and Government officials during field visits. Market surveys and livestock condition observations were conducted enroute and in the districts visited. GMB food distribution depots were inspected. Virtually no grain crops or stocks were found to inspect. Field assessments were also made regarding household food security, vulnerability, coping mechanisms and social welfare assistance programmes. Data and information received from secondary sources were reviewed in the light of data, information and insights obtained during field visits in arriving at the estimates made by the Mission. The crop production and vulnerability situation obtaining this year was compared with the previous year, as well as with 1991/92, the last most severe drought year.

Rainfall started early (in September 2001 in some areas) and was very favourable in all parts of the country until December 2001, which encouraged early and extensive plantings. But a dry spell began in January 2002 throughout the country (in late December in certain areas) and continued up to end March/early April, devastating virtually all crops. Only in a few small pockets, particularly in the north, small quantities of maize were harvested, mainly from early sown crops. Rainfall received in April in most parts of the country has only been helpful in improving grazing conditions and water availability for livestock.

The area planted to various grains in 2001/02 main season actually increased by about 9 percent compared to the previous year and area to maize by about 14 percent. The increased maize area reflects expansion in communal and resettled areas, as there was a reduction in the large-scale commercial sector due to land reform activities.

The Mission estimates a national cereal harvest of 669 000 tonnes in 2001/02 main cropping season for consumption in the marketing year 2002/03, of which maize accounts for 481 000 tonnes. These figures represent drastic reductions of 57 percent and 67 percent, respectively, compared to last year's already significantly reduced production. Compared to 1991/92, when the main season outputs of all cereals and maize were, respectively, 463 000 tonnes and 361 000 tonnes, the 2001/02 harvests are actually 44 percent and 33 percent respectively higher. But food supply and food access conditions in 2002/03 are much worse compared to 1992/93, mainly because there are virtually no carryover maize stocks in 2002 compared to some 739 000 tonnes in 1992 (sufficient then to meet the national maize consumption requirement for about five months); the import capacity of the country is extremely low; and there is little donor interest at the present time.

Winter wheat which is being planted now is also forecast to fall sharply as it is almost exclusively grown on large-scale commercial farms. An output of 150 000 tonnes is forecast for 2002 compared to 250 000 tonnes last year and 276 000 tonnes average of the last five years. Winter maize is not expected to be of much significance. Based on the estimated main season cereal output and projected wheat production, the total cereal import requirement in 2002/03 (April/March) is estimated at 1.869 million tonnes, of which maize constitutes 1.705 million tonnes.

In view of steep reductions in tobacco and cotton production and export, the Government's ability to import maize during 2002/03 is extremely limited, considering, in addition, competing claims to the available, extremely limited foreign exchange, by the critically needed import of fuel and electricity and the servicing of the external debt. With the Government import of 300 000 tonnes of maize and allowing for the 60 000 tonnes of pledged food aid, the gap remains a staggering 1.497 million tonnes of cereals, including 1.345 million tonnes of maize.

Livestock condition is generally good with adequate pastures and water availability throughout the country. But prices of livestock have already fallen significantly and will plummet as distress sales increase and demand dwindles. Other coping mechanisms are already much stressed; some may have already been exhausted. Thus, the food shortage is virtually universal throughout the country. Under the circumstances, targeting of any supplies that may be forthcoming is an extremely difficult task.

Some people may find money through various means (sale of livestock, remittances, cash for work, petty trade, gold mining/panning, etc.) to buy maize or maize meal, if available in the market at the current GMB price of about Z$900 per 50 kg bag. But maize is simply not available in the market in most areas, even at this harvest time. Some supplies are available in certain areas but at three to four times the GMB price. The crisis, therefore, looms large, and will seriously affect many more than the 3 million people indicated above as being the most vulnerable.

2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC SETTING[1/]

2.1 The general setting

Zimbabwe's economic decline continues unabated. Available data show that the economy contracted by 4.2 percent in 2000 and by a further 8.6 percent in 2001. In view of the collapse of agricultural production in 2002, with the other sectors of the economy performing poorly in tandem, a further and larger contraction seems inevitable this year. Business closures and downsizing and consequent job losses have been rampant as indicated by a recent survey. With the population increasing, the decline in per capita income has been steeper than in the aggregate GDP.

A budget deficit for 2002 was originally set at 14.9 percent; but it may rise further due to a supplementary budget likely to be introduced providing additional funds to be raised for addressing the country's food shortage. However, if money supply is increased, the prevailing inflation, which is already running at 113 percent as of March 2002 on a year-on-year basis, may be further accelerated with consequent adverse impact on people's already precarious livelihoods. The Government's ability to import food grains is extremely limited, given that foreign exchange earnings from tobacco, gold and cotton are steeply reduced and there are competing claims from critically needed imports of fuel and electricity for the foreign exchange available. The foreign exchange reserve in 2001 was a meagre US$65 million, which is sufficient for about half a month's imports, even when the reduced import level of that year is considered. The situation is likely to have worsened since then, given the declining exports and sanctions applied by the USA and EC.

There is also a serious anomaly in the currency exchange rate. While the officially fixed rate is Z$55 to US$1, the parallel market rate as of early May 2002 was around Z$330. Clearly this is exacerbating the problem of hard currency shortages of the Government as much of the incoming foreign currency finds its way into the parallel market. In 200, the external debt was US$4.37 billion according to official data, about 68 percent of the GDP. The debt service ratio was 25 percent of the export earnings in that year. Available data from different sources suggest that the external debt outstanding may have risen to over US$5 billion since 2000, becoming a larger proportion of the significantly reduced GDP. As of December 2001, Government's domestic debt also stood at a high level of Z$194 billion, about 38 percent of the GDP. The domestic debt is also likely to have increased further since then. These high levels of external and internal debt spell serious difficulties for macroeconomic management.

The nature and extent of the food crisis faced this year can be gauged from the fact that, at the harvest time, most people are without food and, in most areas little or no maize is available in the market. Whatever little maize or maize meal is available in certain areas is priced at 3 to 4 times the GMB maize price of about Z$900 per 50 kg bag. It is possible that certain groups of people may be able to mobilize some money through sale of livestock, petty trading, remittances from relatives working in cities or abroad, gold mining/panning, etc., but most of them will be unable to access adequate food at the high prices prevailing already now. A large proportion of the population cannot access funds to even partially meet their food needs. The GMB can meet only a small fraction of the nation's food needs. That too, is irregularly supplied. It has been reported that while the daily national maize need is about 5 000 tonnes, GMB can currently supply only about 400 tonnes. The food outlook is simply bleak.

High and increasing unemployment combined with high and increasing cost of living over the past few years and particularly in recent months has caused the poverty situation to worsen to extreme levels. Even before this year's severe crop failure, 75 percent of the population were classified as poor, and 42 percent as very poor. The situation at the present time, is certainly much worse following the collapse of food production. The poor include the rural population of farmers, petty traders and farm workers, as well as urban unemployed and informal sector operators.

2.2 Agriculture in the national economy

Agriculture is one of the most important sectors of Zimbabwe's economy. It provides over half of the country's total employment and contributes about 15 percent to the Gross Domestic Product. It generates about 40 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings and provides the bulk of raw materials to the manufacturing sector.

Zimbabwe's land is divided into five natural regions on the basis of soil type and climatic factors. Natural regions 1, 2 and 3 are suitable for intensive crop cultivation and livestock raising, while regions 4 and 5 offer limited scope for agriculture. The bulk of Mashonaland (West, East and Central), Midlands and Manicaland provinces are under regions 1, 2 and 3, while Matebeleland (North and South) and Masvingo provinces are under natural regions 4 and 5.

Zimbabwe's farming sector can and has in the past produced exportable surpluses of maize and certain other food crops.

2.3 The Land Reform Programme

At the time of Independence in 1980, land distribution was as follows:

Sector	Million hectares	Percentage
Large-scale commercial	15.5	39.1
Small-scale commercial	1.4	3.5
Communal	16.4	41.4
National parks and urban	6.0	15.2
State land	0.3	0.8
All	39.6	100.0

The large-scale commercial farms were owned by white farmers, who constituted less than one percent of the country's population. A land reform programme was initiated following independence to increase the access of the indigenous people to land. The first phase covered the period 1980 to 1998, during which 3.5 million hectares of large-scale commercial farm land were acquired and 71 000 indigenous families were resettled. The second phase was initiated in 1998, but only 0.17 million ha were acquired and 4 697 families were resettled. In July 2000, the "Fast Track" resettlement phase was launched to speed up land acquisition and resettlement. A law was enacted for the purpose, with compulsory acquisition and resettlement being the key focus.

Data provided by CFU show that from the beginning of the Fast Track in July 2000, until 17 April 2002, a total of 5 069 out of about 6 000 commercial farms have been issued with notices. Out of the farms under notice, about 2 000 have been issued with acquisition orders, requiring the farmer to cease all operations and to leave the property within three months.

Data provided by the Zimbabwe Ministry of Local Government indicate that over 114 000 households had been resettled as of 5 March 2002. Aside from the official process, there have also been informal farm invasions, which have occurred regardless of the legal status of those farms under the land reform programme. According to a Ministry of Local Government estimate, over 14 000 settler

families were informally resident on commercial farms as of 5 March 2002.

These activities and processes have disrupted farming activities and contributed to the fall in maize and wheat production.

3. FOOD PRODUCTION IN 2001/02

Rainfall

The 2001/02 rainfall season was generally poor for agricultural production. It has been characterized by two opposite extremes. The first half of the season (October to December) was excessively wet, particularly in the southern areas of the country. The second half (January to April) has been marked by the longest dry spell in the last twenty years. This dry spell began from the end of December for most areas in the southern districts. The largest rainfall deficits for the period January to March were in the Midlands, Masvingo, Matabeleland South, Mashonaland East, Manicaland and south of Mashonaland West provinces.

During the first half (October to December), substantial rains were received throughout the country. More than three quarters of the country received more than 80 percent of their long term mean rainfall. Areas to the South of the country such as Zvishavane, Masvingo, Gutu and Lowveld received above average rainfall with some areas recording an excess of up to 400mm of their long term mean for this period. However, areas to the east of Harare stretching through Mazowe up to Nyanga, Kariba and the surrounding areas received below average rainfall during the same period. Most areas to the north received rainfall in the average range. The Mazowe area and parts of Gwaai area also received above average rainfall. Cumulative rainfall for Matebeleland South was considerably above normal.

The second half of the season (January to March) was dominated by a severe dry and very hot spell, although some isolated thundershowers were experienced in the extreme northern areas. This dry spell began from end December for most areas in the southern districts. Some areas in these districts (Gweru, Beitbridge, Bulawayo, etc.) received virtually no rain from January to March 2002. Most areas along and to the south of the main watershed received less than 30 percent of their long term mean for the period January and February. Areas to the extreme north (parts of Gwaai, Makonde, Mazowe, etc.) received slightly more than 75 percent of their long-term mean. Rainfall below 75 percent of the long-term mean for a prolonged period usually indicates meteorological drought. An analysis of the January to March dry spell for the past twenty years indicates that this year's dry spell was not only the longest in the past 20 years, but also ranks fifth in drought severity since 1900: 1991/92, 1946/47, 1972/73, 1921/22 and 2001/02. This analysis has been carried out using a few selected stations in the

eight provinces of Zimbabwe. Cumulative rainfall for the same period indicates that the majority of the country received less than 40 percent of normal rainfall. Under normal climatic conditions in Zimbabwe, January and February are the peak season in terms of rainfall, but this season has been a complete departure from normal with January to February being dry over the whole country. However, Zimbabwe was not the only country that was affected by the January to March dry spell. Other SADC countries such as Swaziland, South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia were also affected.

In the previous season (2000/01), which had a relatively long dry spell during the last part of December and the whole of January, at least the late planted crops recovered when rains resumed. The 2001/02 season, on the other hand, suffered three consecutive dry months, resulting in total failure of most crops. Even though cumulative rainfall for Masvingo was above normal, little or no rain was received from January to March 2002.

Substantial rains were received in April in most parts of the country, but they came too late to resuscitate the food crops. However, these late rains have had the effect of revitalizing grass growth and thus the condition of grazing for livestock is favourable.

Inputs

Use of credit by the smallholder sector for the purchase of inputs is generally very limited. GMB provided seeds and fertilizers under an input credit scheme, but this scheme was often criticised for being late or for delivering wrong inputs. This resulted in some inputs not being used at all. Many maize crops did not receive a basal fertilizer dressing and this adversely affected potential root growth and retarded the early development of the crop, rendering it vulnerable to the drought. Traders reported some difficulty in obtaining sufficient seed and fertilizers.

The major maize seed supplier, Seedco, reported that theft of maize cobs from fields and lower yields due to the drought have considerably reduced the seed harvest. In normal years this company produces considerable quantities of seed for export but the total output will be reduced considerably this year, giving rise to the possibility of seed shortages for the coming season. Substantial amounts of dressed seed, held over since last year, were seen by the Mission in various trader outlets. Although the germination percentage may be reduced substantially, this seed could be utilized, following a germination test, in the event of shortages during the 2002/03 planting season.

Wheat plantings now underway are anticipated by the CFU to be at most 20 000 hectares, against 45 455 hectares in 2001. As up to 60 percent of the installed irrigation capacity is out of service and it would take many months to re-install it, the potential wheat plantings are considerably reduced. The Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union indicated that its members would be planting wheat

this year, but credit for inputs and availability of irrigation were listed as constraints. The Resettlement areas also produce some wheat, but have little economy of scale and access to irrigation is reduced.

The use of Compound D (7N-14P-7K) basal fertiliser and Ammonium Nitrate (34.5 percent N) for top dressing, which are the two main types used for maize, varies significantly among provinces based on the rainfall conditions. Fertiliser use in the northern provinces is generally much higher than in the south, because of better rainfall distribution compared to the southern and eastern provinces where the conditions are generally drier with erratic rainfall. The GMB Inputs Distribution Scheme was widely criticised by farmers for not supplying inputs on time, forcing them to plant without basal fertilizer, with resulting poor root growth and susceptibility to drought.

Sources in the fertilizer industry reported that the national fertilizer supply for the coming season will be 584 000 tonnes. The Mission learnt, however, that price control is still in force on seed and fertilizer and suppliers cannot sell at the controlled price regarded as too low. If price control is still in force at the planting time in October/November, the amount of fertilizer that will be sold will be sharply reduced. If, on the other hand, price controls are lifted, then the industry will be able to supply the necessary fertilizer. However, many farmers have been rendered destitute by the poor outcome of the 2002 harvest and will not have the cash or the credit to buy hybrid seed or fertilizer.

Pests and diseases

The drought in 2002 was so devastating that pest and disease influence on yield was minimal. Stalk borers were reported to have damaged crops in Mashonaland West. The groundnut crop was so badly affected by drought that no harvest was produced.

Quelea quelea birds were reported to have damaged sorghum and millet crops all over the country. Cob rot was reduced this year due to the dry conditions, though this disease was seen on some mountain farms in Chimanimani on steep mountain slopes and which received more than adequate rainfall.

Area planted

The total area under grain crops in the 2001/02 crop season is estimated at 1 620 542 hectares, of which 1 395 371 ha, or 86 percent, was under maize. Total maize area increased by 172 271 ha, or 14 percent compared to the previous year. This increase was mainly in the resettlement area, with an estimated 8 percent increase in the communal areas. The area of maize planted by large scale commercial farmers declined again from 74 000 ha in 2001 to an estimated 61 800 ha. This is 62 percent below the area planted by large scale farmers in 1999/2000 season. The area of maize planted by small scale commercial farmers remained at 65 220 ha,

while there was a doubling of area in resettlement farms from 100 000 ha to 204 693 ha. Given the vastly greater yield potential, about 5:1 in most years, of the large scale commercial sector, the decrease in the area planted in this sector, had a significant adverse impact on food production (Table 1). A further important factor was the lack of a guaranteed, economic pre-planting price for maize. Farmers were reluctant to commit themselves to producing a crop for which there had been a low return in the previous year. Late payment by GMB for maize deliveries in the previous season also adversely affected maize area. Late deliveries of seed and fertilizer under the GMB inputs distribution scheme for resettlement and communal farming areas also reduced potential planted area as many farmers depended on this scheme for their inputs.

The area planted to sorghum and pearl millet decreased by 23 percent and 29 percent, respectively, while the area under finger millet increased by 23 percent to 70 347 ha. Nationally, the area planted to cereals, pulses, oilseeds and cash crops in 2001/02, is estimated at 2 479 million hectares, an increase of about 4.8 percent compared to the previous year, but this masks a decline of 28.9 percent in the cropped area in the large scale commercial sector. Cotton, soyabean and tobacco area in the large-scale commercial sector decreased by 66 percent, 43 percent and 15 percent, respectively, while in the smallholder sector, production of these cash crops increased by 7, 75 and 92 percent, respectively. These are all major foreign exchange earners for the country. The by-products of cotton and soyabean, cottonseed and soyabean cake, are important ingredients in the animal feed industry.

Yields

This year, average maize yield in the predominantly smallholder sector is expected to be around 0.25 tonnes/hectare and in the large scale commercial farming sector around 2.4 tonnes/hectare. These yields have been calculated from the estimates provided by the AGRITEX district/provincial staff and the National Early Warning Unit of the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, and Rural Resettlement. They were cross-checked with historical data, key respondent information and field observations. Information was also gathered on yields from the Commercial Farmers Union and from the Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union. Maize yields are drastically reduced in both the commercial and smallholder sectors, by 54 percent and 73 percent, respectively. The overall average yield of maize is 0.34 tonnes/hectare, which is 72 percent down on the previous year. Yields of the other cereal crops are also reduced, at 0.11 tonnes/hectare for sorghum; 0.11 tonnes/hectare for pearl millet and 0.06 tonnes/hectare for finger millet, reflecting severe drought conditions in the drier parts of the country where these crops are mainly grown. On commercial farms, 3 tonnes/hectare was obtained from sorghum crops, but only an estimated 5 000 hectares was planted.

Cereal production forecast for 2001/02

Zimbabwe has two cropping seasons, the main one which provides the main harvest, usually starting in October-November and ending in April-May, while the second one called the winter season, is dependent on irrigation and is almost wholly farmed by the commercial sector. The main crops, wheat and barley, are planted in April-May and harvested in September-October. This year, however, over 60 percent of the installed irrigation capacity is not available and cannot be easily re-instated in time for the crops of wheat and barley, both of which must be planted by mid-May. The Mission has therefore sharply reduced estimates of expected area and production for wheat to 37 500 hectares and 150 000 tonnes, respectively. Considerable efforts are being made by the Government to increase smallholder wheat production. Average expected yields have been reduced to take into account the relative inexperience of smallholders with this crop.

Areas planted to barley, which competes for land with wheat and which is mainly used as a raw material in the brewing industry is estimated at 3 000 hectares, producing 16 500 tonnes.

The possibility of producing maize in the winter season during the fallow period on sugar estates is being actively investigated by the Government. However, it is not likely to make a significant contribution to food supply due to the likelihood of infestation by pests and diseases which attack both maize and sugar cane.

3.1 Main season crop production

Table 1 shows a national cereal harvest of 0.52 million tonnes in 2001/02 main cropping season. This is 76 percent lower than the 2.15 million tonnes produced in 1999/00 and 73 percent less than the 1.9 million tonnes average of the last ten years.

Maize production this season is estimated at 0.48 million tonnes or 92.7 percent of the total main season grain production. Maize area on commercial farms dropped from 74 000 hectares to 62 000 hectares, of which 15 000 hectares was yellow maize, normally destined for use in animal feed. Yields on commercial farms declined from 5.19 tonnes/hectares in 2001 to 2.4 tonnes/hectares this year, due to drought and disruption.

Yields on communal areas and on resettlement farms were greatly reduced by the drought, lack of inputs at normal planting time, labour constraints, shortage of draught power, and inadequate experience of newly-resettled farmers. Other factors responsible for the disastrous harvest included late planting caused by late delivery of seed and fertilizer by the GMB Credit Scheme and competition for labour with cash crops such as cotton.

Table 1. Zimbabwe : Area and production of cereals, pulses and cash crops in 2001/02 main cropping season compared to 2000/01

CROP/SECTOR	2001/02 MAIN CROPPING		2000/01 MAIN CROPPING		2001/02 Vs.2000/01	
	Area (ha)	Production (tonnes)	Area (ha)	Production (tonnes)	% Change in Area	% Change in Production
MAIZE						
COMMERCIAL SECTOR 1/	61 800	148 320	74 005	384 316	-16.5	-61.4
SMALLHOLDER SECTOR 2/	1 333 571	332 118	1 149 061	1 082 432	16.1	-69.3
TOTAL MAIZE	1 395 371	480 438	1 223 066	1 466 748	14.1	-67.2
SORGHUM 3/						
COMMERCIAL SECTOR	5 000	15 000	5 300	18 550	-5.7	19.1
SMALLHOLDER SECTOR	80 070	9 187	105 000	42 190	-23.7	-78.2
TOTAL SORGHUM	85 070	24 187	110 300	60 740	-22.9	-60.1
PEARL MILLET						
SMALLHOLDER SECTOR	69 754	3 912	98 870	2 0151	-29.4	-61.2
FINGER MILLET						
SMALLHOLDER SECTOR	70 347	10 736	57 200	22 880	23.0	-53.1
ALL CEREAL GRAINS	**1 620 542**	**618 912**	**1 489 436**	**1 670 619**	**8.8**	**-67.0**
SOYBEANS						
COMMERCIAL SECTOR	37 000	74 000	65 000	162 500	-43.1	-54.5
SMALLHOLDER SECTOR	21 229	9 139	12 150	12 580	74.7	-27.4
TOTAL SOYBEANS	58 229	83 139	77 150	175 080	-24.5	-52.5
GROUNDNUTS (Unshelled)						
COMMERCIAL SECTOR	1 000	1 800	2 000	5 000	-50.0	-64.0
SMALLHOLDER SECTOR	270 163	58 857	274 120	166 784	-1.4	-64.7
TOTAL GROUNDNUTS	271 163	60 657	276 120	171 784	-1.8	-64.7
SUNFLOWER						
COMMERCIAL SECTOR	1 800	3 600	2 000	2 000	-10.0	80.0
SMALLHOLDER SECTOR	24 378	4 067	42 500	29 500	-42.6	-86.2
TOTAL SUNFLOWER	26 178	7 667	44 500	31 500	-41.2	-75.7
PAPRIKA						
COMMERCIAL SECTOR	3 000	9 000	3 250	11 375	-7.7	-26.4
SMALLHOLDER SECTOR	13 179	3 984	4 985	1 414	164.4	181.8
TOTAL PAPRIKA	16 179	12 984	8 235	12 789	96.5	1.5
TOBACCO						
COMMERCIAL SECTOR	56 700	162 100	67 112	187 064	-15.5	-13.3
SMALLHOLDER SECTOR	23 819	16 306	12 395	8 841	92.2	84.4
TOTAL TOBACCO	80 519	174 000	79 507	195 905	1.3	-8.9
COTTON						
COMMERCIAL SECTOR	5 800	12 000	17 000	32 666	-65.9	-63.3
SMALLHOLDER SECTOR	400 121	188 417	373 473	253 447	7.1	-25.7
TOTAL COTTON	405 921	200 417	390 473	286 113	5.6	-30.0
GRAND TOTAL	**2 478 721**		**2 365 421**		**4.8**	

1/ Commercial sector includes large scale commercial farmers.
2/ Smallholder sector includes communal farmers, small scale commercial farmers and resettled farmers.
3/ For crops other than maize, no district-wise data for all sectors was made available hence the national level estimates prepared by

MLARR and the Crop Forecasting Committee are judged as reasonable and are used in this report by the Mission.

Regarding cash crops, cotton production is expected to be reduced by 30 percent, while Virginia tobacco production, at an estimated 174 000 tonnes is reduced by 11.2 percent below last year's Mission estimate.

3.2 Winter season crop production

Wheat production reached a record 324 430 tonnes in 1999 season from a planted area of 57 574 hectares. This year, however, great uncertainty still surrounds the wheat area on large scale commercial farms. Last minute efforts by the Government to increase plantings on commercial farms were reported and the area planted is now expected to exceed the previous estimate of 20 000 hectares. Assuming the Government's efforts to raise wheat areas on smallholder and resettled farms are successful, the wheat harvest could be as high as 150 000 tonnes, though this figure may need to be revised later in the season. The Mission estimates that up to 37 500 hectares will be planted this year, including plantings by smallholders on resettled farms. With an average yield of 4 tonnes/hectare, total harvest is forecast at 150 000 tonnes, a decrease of 40 percent compared to last year.

3.3 Livestock

According to the 2000 Livestock Census, the total number of various livestock in the country is as follows: cattle: 6 186 312; sheep: 690 643; goats: 3 803 589; pigs: 339 977; donkeys: 424 123; and horses; 8 952. Due to considerable late rains, pastures and water availability are generally good in most provinces, but in the Lutumba area of Masvingo and in Buhera, grazing is not expected to last beyond August. Substantial and widespread late rains late in March and April gave an unexpected boost to grazing lands and this has ensured that livestock are in good condition. Large scale de-stocking was reported by the commercial sector, with beef cattle numbers declining from 500 000 in March 1999 to an estimated 282 000 now. These high quality livestock will be difficult to replace quickly and this will have profound effects on exports of meat, which have been buoyant in recent years.

Dairy cow numbers declined by 22 percent between 1995 and 1999 and have continued to decline due to disturbances on farms, and as a result the availability of milk has declined sharply.

Table 2. Zimbabwe: Wheat and barley area, yield and production for 1991-2001 and forecast for 2002

	Wheat			Barley		
	Area (ha)	Yield (t/ha)	Production (tonnes)	Area (ha)	Yield (t/ha)	Production (tonnes)
1991	44 000	5.9	259 320	5 605	5.6	31 600

1992	11 180	5.1	56 920	1 136	4.3	4 900
1993	48 000	5.8	277 109	6 400	5.2	33 102
1994	52 647	5.5	287 904	5 650	5.8	33 000
1995	13 860	5.1	70 000	2 355	5.3	12 500
1996	47 843	5.5	263 134	5 300	5.7	30 000
1997	55 200	4.5	250 000	10 700	4.3	45 500
1998	50 000	6.0	300 000	9 879	5.8	57 234
1999	57 574	5.6	324 430	3 079	5.4	16 671
2000	46 375	5.5	255 063	5 128	6.2	32 200
2001	45 455	5.5	250 000	4 545	5.5	25 000
2002	37 500	4.0	150 000	3 000	5.5	16 500

Source: Zimbabwe Cereals Producers Association; 2001 forecast by the Mission.

4. PRODUCTION SITUATION BY PROVINCE

As noted earlier, the rains began well and in fact water-logging was widely experienced early in the season, delaying planting operations in many areas. In normal years, a dry spell occurs in January, but this year, over virtually the whole country, the rains stopped in late December and did not appear again until late March. This extended drought had a devastating effect on crops, especially those which had been sown late in November/December and which had not developed a good root system before the onset of the drought.

The land reform programme affected mainly the higher potential areas in the northwest quarter of the country, particularly the provinces of Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East and Manicaland.

Table 3. Zimbabwe: Maize Production Estimates by Province in 2001/02 Main Cropping Season (tonnes)

Province	Smallholder production 2001/02	Smallholder production 2000/01	Percentage change in production
Manicaland	41 354	161 684	-74.4
Mashonaland Central	84 649	220 211	-61.6
Mashonaland East	47 369	248 740	-81.0
Mashonaland West	81 964	188 045	-56.4
Masvingo	21 279	111 119	-80.9
Matabeleland North	3 189	63 486	-95.0
Matabeleland South	234	10 034	-97.7
Midlands	52 080	79 112	-34.2
National Smallholder Total	**332 118**	**1 082 432**	**-69.3**

National Commercial Total	148 320	384 316	-61.4
Overall National Total	480 438	1 466 748	-67.2

4.1 Mashonaland West

This province has historically produced the biggest crops of maize and tobacco, having as it does, a high proportion of land in Agro-ecological Region II (intensive farming). The land reform programme was implemented on many large commercial farms for the first time and this caused serious disruption of normal farming practices. Large areas were as a result left fallow, causing a steep reduction in production. All areas of the province were hit by the drought from December and only those farmers who had planted early obtained any crop. The districts of Zvimba, Chegutu, Kariba and Kadoma suffered almost complete crop failure, while crops in the district of Hurungwe were less than a quarter of normal production. Total maize production in Mashonaland West is estimated at 81 964 tonnes, compared to 188 045 tonnes in the previous year.

4.2 Mashonaland Central Province

Mashonaland Central has large areas of good crop land especially in the districts of Mazowe, Bindura and Guruve. This year crops were hit hard by the drought in December and yields, especially in communal areas and resettlement farms, were reduced by more than 75 percent in many cases. In Rushinga, farmers planted cotton before planting maize and the maize crop was destroyed in its early stages, leaving many families with no harvest at all. Maize production is estimated at 84 649 tonnes, compared to 220 211 tonnes in the previous year.

4.3 Mashonaland East

The effects of the drought were especially harsh in the districts of Seke and Chikomba, where virtually all crops were lost. Farmers in Murehwa also suffered widespread crop failure, but here the effect of early planting was seen, whereby Agritex staff who had been allocated farms were able to harvest relatively good crops through early planting and by using basal fertilizer dressings and the recommended top dressing while the rains lasted. This was sufficient to carry the crop through to maturity. Maize production is estimated at 47 369 tonnes, compared to 248 740 tonnes in 2001, including 45 000 tonnes from large scale commercial farmers in 2001.

4.4 Manicaland

Manicaland has considerable mountain areas and also good land in agro-ecological regions I, III and V. Crops in western parts of the district of Chimanimani and the whole of Buhera District were destroyed by the drought and farmers have virtually no food left from the harvest. Production of maize is estimated at 41 354 tonnes, reduced substantially from the 161 684 tonnes estimated in the previous year.

4.5 Masvingo Province

This province mainly in agro-ecological region V and most of the land is suitable only for livestock grazing and extensive farming. This year, along with the rest of the country, heavy rains fell during November and early December and crops got off to a good start, but then they were destroyed by the drought. As a result, the Mission estimates total maize production at 21 279 tonnes, compared to an estimated 111 119 tonnes in the previous year. Most farmers harvested nothing at all and so are dependent on their livestock for their survival.

4.6 Matabeleland North Province

Matabeleland North is a predominantly dry-land area most of which is in agro-ecological zone V (extensive farming). The rains normally begin in mid-November and last until March. This year the rains began about two weeks late, in early December, and then there was a drought which lasted for over three months and virtually all crops were lost. Early planted crops reached tassel ling stage, but most were destroyed before they reached this stage. Only about 1 280 small farmers with access to irrigation were able to grow some maize. Maize production is estimated at 3 189 tonnes as against a total of 63 486 tonnes in the previous year. Drought resistant crops such as sorghum and pearl millet were also destroyed by the drought, including commercial seed plots, leaving no stocks of sorghum or millet seed for the 2002/03 crop season.

4.7 Matabeleland South Province

Maize production in Matabeleland South is estimated at only 234 tonnes, compared to 10 034 tonnes in 2001, indicating the extent of the drought. Livestock raising is the main activity in this province and thanks to the unusual rains in April, grazing and browse is in better condition than normal. This province is always a net importer of maize, but this year, due to overall national shortages, the normal maize for cattle trade is not available.

4.8 Midlands Province

Maize is the main crop in Midlands Province, with cotton and groundnuts also important. In 2002, maize production in Midlands province dropped from 79 112 tonnes in 2001 to 52 080 tonnes. Unlike in other provinces, some rains were recorded in Gokwe North District, with 55 mm in January and 55.5 mm in February and this probably accounts for the relatively better crops in Midlands Province.

5. CEREAL SUPPLY/DEMAND SITUATION, 2002/03 (APRIL/MARCH)

A food surplus country until recently, Zimbabwe faces a food crisis this year, even at harvest time, because cereal production has collapsed and there are no stocks carried over from last year's poor cereal harvest. This year's agricultural collapse has been largely due to the prolonged drought, but the disruptive land reform activities have also contributed significantly to the production shortfall. The food production crisis is compounded by the Government's extremely limited ability to import foodgrains, and severely stressed or exhausted coping mechanisms for a large part of the population.

Zimbabwe's cereal supply/demand balance sheet for the 2002/03 marketing year (April/March) is shown in Table 4 and is based on the cereal production estimates shown in Table 1 and the following assumptions:

- Of several estimates available of the population of Zimbabwe, the Mission decided to use the UN's estimate of 13.018 million projected to mid-marketing year 2002/03.
- There was no Government held stock of maize at the beginning of the marketing year. Privately held stocks (by farmers and traders) of only about 2 000 tonnes are assumed. In the case of wheat, official stocks amounted to 165 000 tonnes as at 1 April 2002.
- Per caput cereal consumption of 163 kg per annum is assumed, similar to that used by last year's FAO/WFP Mission and consistent with the average of the past five years. Maize is the main staple, accounting for 120 kg/per caput/per annum, with wheat at 29 kg, millet and sorghum at 13 kg and rice at 1 kg. At 163 kg of cereals per caput/annum, about 85 percent of calorie needs of a person would be met on average. The remainder is expected to come from other foods such as groundnuts, meat, poultry, fish, vegetables and wild foods.
- Use of cereals and cereal by-products for animal feed will be very limited, given the severe shortage of grain. Thus, the quantity of maize to be used as feed is assumed at last year's low level of 250 000 tonnes.
- Hybrid maize seeds purchased from seed suppliers are used almost universally in Zimbabwe. Hence, very little maize needs to be set aside for seed. For other uses and losses, 50 000 tonnes of maize is assumed. For other grains, small quantities are set aside for seed use and losses.
- A strategic reserve closing stock of 150 000 tonnes of maize, sufficient for a month's national need, is assumed. In the case of wheat, the closing stock is assumed to be 70 000 tonnes, about two month's supply (the current marketing year began with a stock of 165 000 tonnes of wheat for 4-5 months' requirements).

- From information provided to the Mission, the Government has imported some 40 000 tonnes of maize since April 2002 and another 260 000 tonnes are underway (already contracted or in the process of importation). Thus, the anticipated Government import of maize during 2002/03 is put at 300 000 tonnes. It is assumed that 13 000 tonnes of rice will be imported commercially. Food aid in terms of maize/maize meal in pipeline is about 130 000 tonnes.

Table 4. Zimbabwe: Cereal Supply/Demand Balance, April 2002/March 2003 ('000 tonnes) 1/

	Maize	Millet & Sorghum	Wheat	Rice	All Cereals
Domestic Availability	**483**	**39**	**315**	**1**	**838**
Opening stocks	2	1	165	-	168
Production	481	38	150	1	670
Utilization	**2 188**	**39**	**467**	**13**	**2 707**
Food use	1 600	173	387	13	2 173
Feed use	250	-	-	-	250
Seed use and losses	50	4	10	-	64
Cross commodity substitution	138	(138)	-	-	-
Closing stocks	150	-	70	-	220
Import Requirements	**1 705**	**-**	**152**	**12**	**1 869**
Anticipated commercial imports	300	-	-	12	312
Food aid pledges	60	-	-	-	60
Deficit	1 345	-	152	-	1 497

1/ Barley production is not included in this food balance sheet since most of it is used for commercial brewing purposes.
- Negligible or none.

The total cereal import requirement in 2002/03 is estimated at 1.869 million tonnes (69 percent of the total cereal requirement) and that of maize, the main staple, at 1.705 million tonnes (78 percent of the total maize requirement). Taking into account the anticipated cereal imports of 300 000 tonnes and food aid pledges of 60 000 tonnes, the deficit is estimated at 1.497 million tonnes (55 percent of the total cereal requirement) for all cereals and 1.345 million tonnes for maize. The situation is desperate, even at the harvest time. It affects most of the people throughout the country. The situation will turn into a grave crisis in the next few months with tragic consequences, unless the emergency is addressed urgently and adequately. A further constraint on securing foodgrain supplies quickly within the sub-region is the increased maize import demand from Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland which have also had poor harvests this year.

6. EMERGENCY FOOD REQUIREMENTS

6.1 Recent developments affecting vulnerability levels

Current levels of food insecurity in Zimbabwe are the result of a continuing and substantial deterioration in the macro-economy of the country over the 1990s, recent climatic factors, a broad disruption in the patterns of national food production due to 'fast track' land reform activities, and more recent events of civil disturbance. The worst-affected by these factors have been vulnerable rural populations in chronically food-deficit areas in the south, west and extreme north of the country, the urban poor who are entirely dependent on the market to meet their food needs, and commercial farm worker families.

Following a reduced 2001 harvest, the FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission of May 2001 identified the need to import 447 000 tonnes of maize for the April 2001 to March 2002 marketing year, to meet consumption requirements and to maintain basic food reserves in case of another reduced harvest in 2002. Because of an extreme shortage of foreign exchange, only 80 000 tonnes of maize were actually imported during that year. In October 2001, the Government of Zimbabwe launched an appeal for food assistance for vulnerable communal-sector populations in the south, west and north of the country. In support of this appeal, a WFP Emergency Operation was approved in December 2001 for the provision of 117 000 tonnes of maize and other food commodities to meet the needs of 558 000 affected rural populations for 12 months. Distributions to affected populations are underway in all affected districts. While this operation was underway, Government's inability to import the required quantities of maize has led to a current rationing of available supplies in most of the country, and to the virtual exhaustion of reserve stocks by the end of the 2001/02 marketing year on 31 March 2002.

Prospects for a recovery in food production this year have been dashed by a severe drought in January and February of 2002 that devastated food and cash crops for this year's harvest, and by continuing disruptions in production caused by the implementation of the land reform programme.

6.2 Government policies and actions regarding food insecurity

The Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) has been aware for several months of the deteriorating food and agriculture situation in the country and has taken several measures to cope with the situation. The Inter-Ministerial Committee of Ministers on Drought and Social Protection has been meeting regularly in recent months to review the situation and to make presentations to Cabinet to support requests for supplementary funding. The GOZ has also defined a maize import program for 2002/03, and opened GMB selling points in all districts to facilitate access to food at Government-controlled prices to a part of the affected population in rural areas.

On 26 April 2002, the President of Zimbabwe declared a State of Disaster in all communal lands, resettlement and urban areas as a result of the drought. This declaration allows extraordinary measures to be taken to assist populations affected and invites donors and international relief agencies to jointly plan emergency assistance programs. In the declaration, the GOZ estimated the number of affected people in rural and urban areas to be 7.8 million, or over 50 percent of the total population of the country. At the time of the FAO/WFP Mission's visit, the Government was finalizing plans for a ZW$ 95 billion programme to fund maize imports through the Grain Marketing Board, a Drought Relief Food Aid Programme, child supplementary feeding schemes, and inputs for increased crop production during the winter.

The Drought Relief Food Aid Programme is intended to implement a social safety net to vulnerable households by providing a monthly cash payment of ZW $ 500 per person/month for the destitute elderly, the chronically ill, and the disabled. Other affected populations are eligible to participate in a Public Works Programme (PWP) providing labour for development projects. The PWP is implemented both in rural and urban areas, and beneficiaries are identified by Local Authorities on the basis of their vulnerability and food shortages. Under the PWP, an individual can work for a maximum of 5 days in a month at a daily rate of Z$200, and heads of households with dependents can work for an additional 5 days for each dependent for a maximum of 20 days per household in any one month.

A large majority of households interviewed in the field by the Mission indicated that they were enrolled in the PWP, but had received payments only once, or very irregularly, and that the last payments were several months ago. In many cases it was clear that these payments would have been an important source of cash and food purchase for these families. Overall, these income transfer programmes appear grossly under-funded when compared to the needs of the affected populations they are intended to serve

At the time of the Mission's visit, the Government was also planning to re-introduce the Child Supplementary Feeding Programme (CSFP) for children under five, and under-14 school-going children, to prevent an increase of malnutrition in the food deficit areas. Government estimates that about 5.4 million of these children will require food assistance in 2002/03. To assist in the implementation of CSFP activities, a joint Government/UNICEF nutritional status assessment of children was underway during the Mission's visit.

During its field visits, the Mission visited GMB depots and selling points and a considerable number of households to obtain first hand impressions of the efficacy of Government programmes to alleviate food shortages. The Mission found that only minimal supplies of maize were made available to district populations at the Government-controlled price. In the north, some bags of maize were reported to the Mission to be available for sale at around twice the official GMB price (ZW$ 875/50kg. bag). In the south and southwest

parts of the country, maize was not seen in any market, and prices for the small quantities reported to be available were up to 4 times the GMB price.

In most GMB depots and selling points, maize stocks were minimal or exhausted, and no information was available if and when new supplies would arrive. To avoid long queues, GMB had stopped for some time the direct sales from depots, and was selling almost exclusively through Ward counsellors. At the village level the Counsellor reportedly collects money from villagers, buys the maize from GMB, and then delivers the quantities he is able to purchase on a pro rata basis to the households. The Mission could not ascertain if all households in need received something through this system.

Overall, the inadequacy of food supplies from their own production or GMB has forced many households to reduce the number of meals consumed each day and to resort to other foods, including bread, which was found to still be available in local shops at a much higher price than maize. The Mission was informed by GMB in Harare that against the need of 5 000 tonnes of maize a day to meet national needs, it was able to distribute only 2 000 tonnes a day, and sometimes only 400 tonnes a day.

6.3 Vulnerability and coping mechanisms

Sources of livelihood

About 70 percent of the Zimbabwe's 13-14 million people live in rural areas. Prior to 2000, 51 percent of the population lived in the communal areas, 11 percent on commercial farms, 4.1 percent in resettlement areas and 1.6 on small-scale commercial land. In 2001 the Government passed the Land Acquisition Act with the aim of decongesting the communal areas by resettling the population from communal areas into commercial areas. The passing of the land reform followed by its rapid implementation, under "fast track land redistribution", is changing the distribution of the population within these sectors. Between June 2000 and March 2002 about 129 187 households were resettled from communal areas into the commercial farms.

Livelihood Patterns in the Communal and Resettlement sectors

The livelihood pattern of a particular Communal or Resettlement area is determined by the agro-ecological zone it is found in. In Regions I, II and III, which are fairly fertile and have high rainfall, crop production is the major livelihood. In Regions IV and V, which receive low and erratic rainfall and are found primarily in the southern, western and extreme northern parts of the country, the major livelihood is livestock production with crop production as secondary source of income. Food crops become increasingly significant in general as one moves further north in the country, but also with increasing wealth within any given area. Other income

sources are important, particularly in the south where most families do not grow enough grains to last to the next harvest. Incomes sources range from gold panning/mining, remittances from neighbouring South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, vegetable production, crafts sales and beer brewing.

SCF (UK) analyses show that in a normal year, crop production contributes to 15-20 percent of annual food needs for poor households in the south (Beitbridge) while better off households obtain 60-70 percent of annual needs from crops. In some communal areas in the north, a poor household may produce enough for 45-50 percent of their food needs, while a better off family produces enough to feed itself and a sell a sizeable surplus. Poor families undertake a number of activities to meet their food needs such as working on wealthier farmers' land, or doing piecework on nearby commercial farms, with payment being made in form of food rather than cash. In a normal year an average person could earn up to 15-18 kg. of maize grain per day, but payment could drop to 5-10kg per day in a bad year.

Current-year food problems in the Communal and Resettlement sectors

This year, the massive crop failure and a loss of opportunities to work for food have reduced a poor family's capability to ensure a minimum of consumption requirements. Furthermore, the impact of food shortages on food prices in the market has severely eroded the purchasing power and/or terms of trade for poorer households.

The early termination of rains has devastated communal and resettlement production of all crops, even drought tolerant ones such as sorghum, millets, and cotton, and minor crops like sweet potatoes, pumpkins and watermelons. Cash crops were also severely affected by drought, thereby reducing cash earnings of these families. In addition, the terms of trade between cotton and maize have roughly halved since last year. In Binga, 20 kg of maize currently costs the equivalent of 16-22kg of cotton, while this would have cost the equivalent of only 9.4 kg of cotton last year. The dry conditions have even disrupted the breeding cycle of the mopane worms (or edible caterpillars), an important protein and income source for some rural households.

The drought has affected all households within the communal areas, including middle-income and better off families who are better able to cope with the food crisis through cuts in non-essential expenditure or increased sale of assets especially livestock. Better off families are presently able to purchase maize on the informal sector at higher price and /or substituting with more expensive wheat flour, but even they are being forced to reduce food consumption to enable stretch maize stocks, as supplies on the informal markets and at GMB are erratic. Additional family members may have to seek work to compensate for declining wages, resulting in less time being spent in school by children and on caring for young children. In some

districts, some households were able to increase earnings by involving all household members, including children, in gold panning/mining. Less time may have to be spent tending to their own fields, having possible knock-on effects on production potential for the 2003 harvest.

Although it has been reported that pasture and water conditions for livestock have not been affected this year, as was the case during the 1991/92 drought, the current drought is likely to affect livestock prices as hungry households attempt to sell more animals to enable them to buy grain. Even before the drought, livestock prices had been declining due to a general de-stocking in the commercial sector and the closure of the Cold Storage Commission. The increase in animals for sale will further depress prices, which will in turn further erode the purchasing power of livestock holding households, especially in the south.

Remittances and cross border work and trade in South Africa and Botswana are an important sources of income particularly in the border districts in the south. However, these opportunities have been declining over the past year due to lower employment opportunities and tighter immigration regulations.

The shortage of food in the markets is driving prices of the little grain that does arrive in the market higher. This will be exacerbated by any problems later this year in insuring adequate imports of food. Price controls are tending to exacerbate the food supply problem, as those who have food for sale refuse to sell it at Government-controlled prices. Controlled prices are only benefiting those close to GMB depots when grain arrives, and the few who are able to purchase the rare stocks delivered to supermarkets. Grain is presently being sold in small quantities on the black market both in rural and urban areas. In these markets, maize prices were 2-4 times compared to the GMB price, with even larger price differentials in the south where there was very little grain production this year.

The widespread maize shortages are changing the lifestyle of rural populations. Many communities are pooling their money to purchase maize from GMB, often sending a representative to do the purchasing. Two to four households are now sharing a 50 kg bag of maize, which they consume in a few days, before starting again to look for additional maize. Life is centred on sourcing maize. In some areas, households are travelling as far as 70 km to purchase maize. In Beitbridge where GMB is still selling from the depot, women in the queue to purchase maize indicated they had slept there for up to 7 days to be able to buy limited supplies. They reported having left children at home in the care of older siblings or without adequate care.

Livelihood patterns of urban and peri-urban populations

Food security in urban and peri-urban populations has only become an issue of significant concern in the last 2-3 years due to the nation's poor macro-economic performance. Assessments carried out

recently in Harare and Bulawayo by FEWSNet and WFP show some significant patterns to food insecurity in urban areas.

Poor households have limited labour resources, often only one income-earner in the family, very limited capital, and are typically engaged in the informal sector. According to the Bulawayo Urban assessment, many households are increasingly having difficulties in finding jobs and therefore informal sector work is becoming the most important income source particularly in the high-density suburbs. However, this sector is progressively becoming saturated, with about one in three households engaged in petty trade, selling similar goods to the same population thus reducing potential incomes for all. The poorest households are unable to afford many services such as healthcare and transport, and purchase a food basket that lacks diversity. They live in peri-urban settlements or high-density areas, and are often in debt on water and electricity bills.

Current-year food problems in the urban and peri-urban sector

In Harare in mid-2001, the poor were found to be spending approximately 40 percent of their incomes on food, while in Bulawayo almost a year later; the poorest were estimated to be spending 50-60 percent on food. A large part of their calories are derived from maize. Major causes of the current urban and peri-urban food insecurity and vulnerability in Zimbabwe includes high and rising food prices, low-wages in the formal sector, high rates of employment in a declining informal sector income-generating activities, unemployment due to company closure, inflation, death in the family, divorce or long illness of family members. A review of Harare City clinic records of the period January to September 2001 show an increase in the incidence of malnutrition in the high density areas. Pellagra, a nutrition deficiency associated with maize consumption without complementary protein from legumes, dairy or meat was found to be on the increase in the high-density suburbs, an indication that poor households are changing food consumption for the worse.

Livelihood patterns of Commercial Farm workers

Commercial farm workers have livelihood patterns and vulnerabilities that are entirely different from those of the communal sector and therefore warrant separate consideration. Prior to the start of the "Fast Track" land reform, there were about 350,000 full-time farm workers. With an average family size of 5, about 1.65 million people, or 13 percent of the total population lived on commercial farms.

Over 80 percent of the farm workers were employed in the Mashonaland provinces and Manicaland. Although a substantial percentage of them have distant foreign origins, the majority do not actually hold foreign citizenship, but rather are second- or third-generation Zimbabweans. This means that many of them do not have any access to communal lands in Zimbabwe, nor homes in

Malawi, Zambia or Mozambique. Only approximately 40 percent of farm workers in the Mashonalands have a communal home. For other provinces the percentages range from 56 percent in Matabeleland South to 74 percent in Midlands. This makes many farm workers, particularly in Mashonaland, very vulnerable in the event of displacement from their farms. Of particular concern is that there are often large numbers of orphans and single mothers (especially among seasonal workers) within the farm worker population. Retrenchment or other disruption of farm worker communities places those groups at especial risk.

Farm workers' livelihoods are relatively simple. Their employment on the farm – typically including permanent work for a man and seasonal work for his wife – provides for over 75 percent of total household income. This income is used to purchase around 80 percent of their food needs, with the balance coming from production of crops on small plots provided by the commercial farmer. Small amounts of money are earned from petty trade and non-food production. Farm workers are usually not allowed to keep livestock other than poultry. Wage levels are low, but are usually adequate to meet basic needs, particularly where farmers supplement wages with the provision of free or subsidized food, healthcare and education. Permanent workers and some seasonal workers are also housed on the farm. With housing, food, income and most services sourced on the farm itself, it is clear that the workers' livelihoods are inextricably linked with the fate of the farm.

Current-year food problems of the Commercial Farm workers

Commercial farm seizures and resettlement are severely affecting the household livelihood security of farm workers. Data collated from district Agritex offices by FCTZ in April 2002 indicate that in the three Mashonaland provinces and Manicaland, a total of 2 239 farms out of 4 858, or almost 50 percent, have ceased their normal commercial operations, meaning that their workers have no more work or housing. It is estimated that 143 088 farm workers in those provinces have lost almost their entire livelihoods. This translates into 715 440 people when their family members are taken into account. Out of the 143 088 farm workers estimated to have lost their jobs in those 4 provinces, the Ministry of Local Government reports that only 1 183 have been resettled under the Fast Track programme, i.e. 0.8 percent. Farm workers have received minimal attention in the land reform programme, with only 2 087 farm worker families countrywide having been resettled.

On a national scale, and using a 50 percent rate of job loss of commercial farm workers, this means about 825 000 commercial farm worker families have lost their livelihood and are vulnerable to severe food insecure. It is estimated that about 169 900 commercial farm worker families have communal links and may have moved back to their communal homes. This population is unlikely to have

grown crops and/or had been affected by the same drought conditions.

Changes in dietary patterns

The widespread maize meal shortages have led to significant changes in food consumption among the above-described population groups. Many families are unable to access maize due to limited supplies on the market and are substituting maize with other foods, and reducing the number of meals. The patterns of food substitution vary by income group and urban-rural location.

In rural areas, households consume cow peas, round nuts sweet potatoes and pumpkins in addition to maize meal at harvesting period. However, the drought has wiped out these important minor foods as well, thus putting more pressure on the little maize available. Households reported consuming more maize now at the time of harvest due to lack of other foods to eat. The better off rural families are buying barley and wheat to fill the gap but this is out of reach for many poor families as the price of these commodities is costing twice the price of maize. Many households reported a reduction in the consumption of variety of foods. Children are coping by looking for wild foods more so now than prior to the drought.

In urban areas, poor households obtain a large part of their calories from maize grain compared to better off households. The lack of maize is therefore affecting household food security of poor households more. The lowest income families are forced to purchase higher priced substitutes such as bread and therefore are reducing the number of meals or the amount of food consumed. Poorest households reported stretching maize meal by cooking porridge instead of sadza (a stiffer porridge) for some of the days. The expense and unavailability of cooking oil has compelled households to substitute cow fat drippings as a new important source of cooking oil. Substantial differences in caloric intake were found between low and high-income households, which in part reflected these uneven food substitution patterns. Better off households were able to substitute potatoes, pasta, bread and rice and margarine or butter for cooking oil.

Health and nutritional status

Malnutrition continues to be a major public health problem in Zimbabwe. According to the Demographic Health Survey (1999), national acute malnutrition is estimated at 6.4 percent with very high rates in Mashonaland West (19.4 percent), and Mashonaland East (12.7 percent). Rural areas have twice the rate of acute malnutrition (7.7 percent) compared to the urban areas (3.7 percent). More than one out of four children are chronically malnourished. About 5.6 percent of the women of childbearing age are underweight. Other data show the prevalence of children 12-71 months old with Vitamin A deficiency is 35.8 percent. The present precarious food security situation has serious nutrition implications especially for young

children. Anecdotal reports are already showing increases in acute malnutrition in some areas of Kariba where there is no targeted child supplementary feeding. The time lag between the reduction in food consumption and increases in acute malnutrition makes it difficult to evaluate the effects of changes in food consumption on nutritional status.

According to UNAIDS, Zimbabwe along with other southern African countries has one of the highest HIV/AIDS rates epidemic. National adult HIV prevalence rate is estimated at more than 25 percent. About 1.5 million adults are living with HIV/AIDS and 624,000 children have been orphaned due to HIV/AIDS. The high incidence of HIV/AIDS in Zimbabwe has been a major contributor to increasing poverty as well.

HIV/AIDS pandemic is affecting all households, rural and urban. Studies have shown that HIV/AIDS affected rural households have low crop output and revenues due to labour constraints and poor crop management. In urban areas, deaths/illness particularly of breadwinners have resulted loss of income, children dropping out of school and the disintegration of families. HIV/AIDS affected households have higher expenditures on health and funerals, which, compete with food and other basic expenses thus contributing to increased vulnerability. Some communities visited by the Mission reported the presence of child headed families and an increase in the proportion of female-headed households over the last few years. Many orphaned children are however taken into care under the extended family systems particularly elderly grandparents thus increasing dependency burden and destitution. The drought will further increase the burden of taking care of orphaned children and the chronically sick.

The national poverty survey of 1995, reported that 61 percent of the population lived in poverty; the rural areas had disproportionately higher rates (75 percent) than the urban areas (39 percent). Female-headed households were more affected than male-headed, 85 percent against 72 percent respectively. The drought is likely to plunge these households into deeper poverty and deprivation as they try to manoeuvre their income to meet the food and non-food needs.

6.4 Estimation of seriously-affected population and emergency food aid requirements in 2002/03

Population affected and food aid needs

The Mission indicates that a total of 6,074,000 people will require at least 705 000 tonnes of cereals as food aid during the April 2002 to 31 March 2003 period (see Table 5). At least 5 267 000 of these affected populations will require immediate assistance, and for the entire marketing year. Another 807 000 people will require at least nine months of food aid, in the amount of at least 72 900 tonnes of cereals. In addition to these amounts of cereals, other food items,

such as oil and legumes, should be provided to ensure that households have access to a minimally nutritionally-adequate diet.

Table 5. Zimbabwe: Mission estimates of affected populations and food aid requirements for 2002/03

	Popula-tion ('000)	Severely affected		Seriously affected		Total affected	
		Popula-tion ('000)	Food aid needs (tonnes)	Popula-tion ('000)	Food aid needs (tonnes)	Popula-tion ('000)	Food aid needs (tonnes)
Rural population	7 204	3 592	431 071	807	72 900	4 399	503 971
Urban population	4 477	850	102 000			850	102 000
Commercial farm workers	1 650	825	99 000			825	99 000
Total Zimbabwe	**13 331**	**5 267**	**632 071**	**807**	**72 900**	**6 074**	**704 971**

Food requirements of other populations

The populations identified above as requiring food aid assistance include rural households that have lost most of their production and income, at least half of the former commercial farm workers and their families, who have neither income nor food, and an initial estimation of the percentage of the urban poor who have no income, or insufficient income to purchase food because of the current extremely high prices prevailing in the market. But there is also a substantial number of additional people in Zimbabwe who now have the resources to buy food when it is available on the market, but who suffer when it is not. They are rapidly using up their income and savings buying high-priced food, and will eventually need food aid if major new supplies of food do not enter the market soon and moderate prices. This population's food crisis can best be resolved with food imports for the market, not food aid. If their needs are not soon served, the food crisis will become much larger and more difficult to resolve.

Actions required to avert severe malnutrition and elevated mortality due to hunger

Extraordinary measures will be required by the GOZ and the international community to cover both the food aid needs identified, as well as the country's other consumption requirements. At present it appears that the GOZ, through the GMB, will not be able to import a sufficient quantity of cereals to assure other consumption requirements, due to its severely limited foreign exchange reserves. The Mission recommends a combination of private-sector commercial imports (852 000 tonnes) and humanitarian assistance (705 000 tonnes, of which 60 000 tonnes are already pledged) to meet this food gap (see Table 6).

Table 6: Recommended Strategy for Meeting the Uncovered Deficit (tonnes)

Remaining deficit after GoZ GMB imports (from food balance sheet)	1 497 000
Proposed private-sector commercial imports	852 000
Recommended Food Aid (in addition to current food aid pledges of 60 000)	645 000
Balance	0

Private-sector commercial imports would require the removal of the GMB monopoly on the import of maize, maize meal and wheat, removal of Government price controls to allow these products to be sold at prices reflecting the import cost, and the removal of all restrictions on the movement of grain inside the country. For people not able to pay the full price, a consumer subsidy scheme might also have to be introduced, possibly with donor assistance. This strategy will require co-ordination and agreement between Government, donors, and private-sector importers.

The food aid requirements described above assume that both actions, expanded imports and food aid, will be undertaken and completed in the quantities described. If, in particular, the private/sector imports in the amount specified above are not carried out, then the nutritional impacts, associated elevation in hunger-related mortality, and food aid needs would almost certainly be higher in the near future.

Below, the Mission describes the basis for estimates of affected populations and food aid needs for each group considered: rural populations (communal and resettled), urban residents, and commercial farm workers.

a) Communal and resettled rural populations: food aid needs and population affected

For the communal and resettlement sectors, the total number of people requiring food aid is considered to be 4 399 million, who will require 503 971 tonnes of food aid (see Table 7 below). Those who are "severely affected", and who require assistance both immediately and for the 12 months of the marketing year, total 3 592 million people, and 431 071 tonnes of cereals (plus oils, legumes, etc.). Those who are "seriously affected" total at least 807 000, and require food aid of 72 900 tonnes for a 9-month period.

Table 7: Communal and Resettlement sector affected populations and food aid needs

Province	Population ('000)	Total cereal deficit (tonnes)	Severely affected		Seriously affected		Total affected	
			Popula-tion ('000)	Food aid needs (tonnes)	Popula-tion ('000)	Food aid needs (tonnes)	Popula-tion ('000)	Food aid needs (tonnes)
Manicaland	1 203	160 659	694	83 309	149	13 410	843	96 719
Mashonaland C.	782	57 795	184	22 080	77	6 930	261	29 010
Mashonaland E.	965	111 754	518	62 160	107	9 630	625	71 790

Mashonaland W.	607	29 687	86	10 320	27	2 430	113	12 750
Masvingo	1 228	177 609	841	100 922	131	11 790	972	112 712
Matabeleland N.	668	103 555	502	60 240	76	6 840	578	67 080
Matabeleland S.	563	91 123	297	35 640	104	9 360	401	45 000
Midlands	1 187	134 995	470	56 400	136	12 510	606	68 910
Total Zimbabwe	**7 204**	**867 177**	**3 692**	**431 071**	**807**	**72 900**	**4 399**	**503 971**

For the communal and resettled rural population, the assessment of food aid (cereal) requirements and the number of people requiring assistance were based on the following data and assumptions:

- All cereals produced this year were considered to be used for household consumption.
- Incomes from cash crops produced this year were assumed to be used for cereal purchase.
- Households holding livestock were assumed to sell livestock to help bridge their gap in cereals. An estimated livestock off-take rate was used to calculate potential incomes from livestock sales available to buy cereals.
- The uncovered consumption deficit after deducting own production and the amount of cereals bought from the income from cash crops and livestock sales was considered to represent the food aid requirement. This estimate was then used to derive the number of people requiring assistance at the district level. Poverty data were used to further classify the population into severely and seriously affected.

Severely affected communal and resettlement households are estimated to need assistance to cover the entire remaining deficit (12 months of consumption), and have most of the following characteristics:

- Lost all, or most of their food crop production.
- Have no cash crops.
- Have no livestock.
- No or little remittances.v
- No or little income from petty trade.
- Child or elderly-headed households.
- Very large households taking care of orphaned children.
- Households with chronically ill.

Seriously affected households will require assistance to cover 75 percent of the unmet deficit (9 months of consumption). This reflects an assumption that moderately affected populations have still access

to other sources of income such as remittances and/or petty trade, and include those that have:

- Lost a large part of their harvest.
- May have one or two heads of cattle or less than five goats.
- May have remittances that would help cover part of the food deficit.

Communal farmers generally have income from cash crops and other alternative sources of income to meet the gap between what they produce and their total food need. The amounts of food that these alternative sources of income can buy depend on the price at which these foods can be purchased on the market. In Zimbabwe today, even though price controls for basic foodstuffs are in effect, only a part of these needs can currently be met because almost no food is being put up for sale at this uneconomic price. The controlled GMB price for maize is Z$875 per 50kg bag, but prices on the free market are between two to four times higher and could rise even further in the months ahead.

The Provinces with the largest number of affected people in percentage of the total provincial population would be Matabeleland North, Masvingo, Mashonaland East, Manicaland and Midlands, and the number of Districts that are self-sufficient or surplus is only 6 out of the total 57 Districts.

b) Urban food aid needs and affected population

The number of people requiring assistance in urban areas was based upon the results of the Harare and Bulawayo urban assessments. These two assessments found that about 20 percent of the urban population now has inadequate income to assure adequate food consumption. Based on this information, the Mission estimates that 20 percent of the urban population or about 850 000 people are food insecure and require food assistance under current market conditions. Some of the features of these food insecure groups include the following: very poor female headed households, orphans, the chronically sick, elderly households and those that have lost employment due to closures caused by poor macro-economic conditions.

WFP is presently undertaking two sets of analysis to identify the modalities of intervention in urban areas: a) Market analysis will identify the most appropriate channel for undertaking targeted sales to food insecure households; and b) Targeting and institutional analysis to identify the target groups for food aid assistance either through market intervention or free food distribution/food for work. Pending completion of these analyses, these food aid needs may need to be reviewed.

c) Commercial farm workers: food aid needs and affected population

The Mission was unable to visit the commercial farms during the assessment due to insecurity prevailing in the areas visited. Estimates of the number of commercial farm workers requiring food assistance are therefore based on secondary data and previous evidence from other visits, and especially on the number of farms that have been taken over or resettled under the land redistribution programme. The commercial farms had a workforce of about 350 000 permanent workers. With an average family size of 5, about 1 650 000 people lived on commercial farms. Estimates provided to the Mission indicate at least half of the commercial farms have been "settled" or taken over for resettlement, with an equal percentage of commercial farm workers affected. Pending a more complete assessment, the Mission has tentatively estimated the number of former commercial farm workers and families requiring assistance at about 825 000, with food aid needs of 99 000 tonnes of cereal.

6.5 Strategies for WFP assistance

Ongoing Emergency Operation

WFP is currently operating in Zimbabwe an Emergency Operation (EMOP 10140) covering a total of 558 000 beneficiaries in communal areas in 19 districts which were affected by drought and floods 2001 in southern, western and extreme northern parts of the country. The 12-month EMOP began first distributions in February 2002 and aims to provide a total of about 117 000 tonnes of foodstuffs (93 646 tonnes of maize, 2 036 tonnes of oil, 12 215 tonnes of pulses, 5 090 tonnes of groundnuts and 3 664 tonnes of blended foods). Distribution is being undertaken through NGOs implementing partners already operating in the country in close consultation with national and local authorities.

As of mid-May about US$29,620,805 (50 percent of the total value of the EMOP) equivalent to 59 370 tonnes of food commodities had been pledged by donors. Distribution has been hampered by the slow arrival of the commodities in the country. As of 21 May 2002, WFP working through its Implementing Partners had distributed some 9 000 tonnes of food in 15 districts to over 453 000 beneficiaries. It is expected that distribution rate will increase in the near future and to attain the planned monthly distribution level of over 9 000 tonnes. WFP is discussing with NGOs involved in food aid projects a possible expansion of WFP operations with additional implementing partners.

As planned under a proposed Phase Two of the EMOP, WFP is currently undertaking an the study of maize markets and targeting mechanisms in urban areas for the design of an urban intervention programme to address urban food needs.

Office of the Chief *GIEWS FAO*	*Ms. J.Lewis* *Regional Director, ODK WFP*

Fax: 0039-06-5705-4495 *E-mail: GIEWS1@FAO.ORG*	*Fax: 00256-41-255115* *E-Mail: Judith.Lewis@WFP.ORG*

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1 This section is based on a variety of sources including publications and unpublished reports of FAO, UNDP, FEWSNet, Government of Zimbabwe, Save the Children, U.K. and the Economist Intelligence Unit.

2 Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ),is an NGO specialized in providing support to farm workers communities

Mr. SMITH. Thank you for the extraordinary job you do and the World Food Programme does. The Committee certainly, in a bipartisan way, applauds your efforts and looks forward to working with you and doing whatever we can do to be of assistance.

Mr. MORRIS. I appreciate you very much, and I should tell you that I am a very lucky man to be there doing what I am doing.

Mr. SMITH. I can see you have risen to the challenge.

Mr. Wilkinson.

STATEMENT OF BRUCE WILKINSON, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS, WORLD VISION UNITED STATES

Mr. WILKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we are very fortunate to be doing the work that we are able to do here, and thank you for this opportunity to testify before the Committee on International Relations regarding the food security crisis in Southern Africa where we believe 13 million people are at immediate risk.

World Vision estimates that by the end of August or September, which is really the end of the winter for the Southern Africa region, the amount of food available locally as well as donor food will be far from sufficient to meet the minimum needs in the region. So we are advocating for a minimum of 1.2 million metric tons to be provided immediately.

Mr. Chairman, I have described the causes of the food crisis in Southern African in my written testimony, and I humbly submit that to the Committee. For the remainder of the time allotted me, I would like to offer four recommendations on how this Administration and the American private voluntary organizations can work together to effectively ease the suffering of the most vulnerable populations, women, children, the elderly, and especially those impacted by HIV/AIDS.

So, Mr. Chairman, the first recommendation is this Administration must make additional emergency food available to respond to the crisis in Southern Africa. The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust should be used and the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act Authority should replenish the Trust. We recommend that Title II PL 480 development funding must not be used.

World Vision commends the Agency for International Development for its responsiveness by sending food and aid to the region in May and for prepositioning food for quicker access and transport. World Vision also thanks the World Food Programme for its continued partnership, particularly in response to this crisis.

World Vision and the Coalition for Food Aid, a consortium of 13 professional Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), is also pleased that the Administration decided to use 275,000 metric tons of the commodities in the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust; however, this response is far short of the 1.2 million metric tons that are need immediately. We urge the Administration to use the full amount allotted under the law.

The purpose of food aid in emergencies is to shine light and eliminate the need for people to resort to the selling of needed assets for their survival and their recovery. Early provision of assistance also prevents the movement of people in search of food and

creation of displaced persons camps where disease such as HIV can rapidly spread. Resettlement and recovery become more difficult and are very expensive.

It is necessary to ensure that the Trust will be repaid without depleting funds for other food aid programs. In particular, this crisis should not reduce existing or future PL 480 funds. It appears that already it is decided that 50 percent of the title II food aid will be used for emergency programs. This will be devastating to programming worldwide where malnutrition rates are high and agricultural productivity is low. For example, programs in countries such as Guatemala, Sierra Leone, and Angola could be cut. And I understand you will be having further work on Angola this afternoon.

When famine occurs in one part of the world, it is easy to forget other parts of the world until a crisis unfolds there, too. At that point we are too late, and we will be here again.

To fix this standby reserve repayment, repayment should not be required for commodities used in any fiscal year for urgent needs. This will require an amendment to law. However, we suggest that when the commodity prices are low and supplies are abundant, the CCC Charter Act Authority should be used to buy commodities, which would then be transferred to the Trust. This would not require an amendment to the law, but would require a change to the Administration's policy.

Recommendation number 2, Mr. Chairman: U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) must have emergency food aid pipelines in the region to effectively respond to the crisis. World Vision currently is the only U.S. PVO with an emergency food pipeline from USAID into the Southern Africa region, using about 14,000 metric tons of food for Zimbabwe. However, we would ask if USAID would provide more pipeline to U.S. PVOs to address this ongoing emergency in the region.

Aside from the one program, USAID apparently intends to channel most food through the World Food Programme, and, as we heard today, the PVOs can carry additional responsibility in this. And so we ask that that be considered, and thank you for what I have heard in previous testimony, that that will be considered, Mr. Chairman.

It is more effective to employ multiple pipelines going into the region so that if one pipeline has a capacity of breaking down, that other pipelines are actually able to supply the needs for the people. So it is important to note that PVO programs will complement the ongoing distribution of the United Nations World Food Programme. We work in collaboration, and we will complement their activities.

World Vision and other experienced PVOs have submitted a variety of food aid programs and proposals to USAID to respond to this crisis. We have yet to have full response to those proposals, so we encourage that those proposals be responded to. For example, a consortium of three major PVOs—CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and World Vision—have proposed to USAID's Office of Food for Peace a plan to distribute a minimum tonnage level of 298,000 metric tons over a 10-month period to meet the needs of nearly 2.5 million people in all the six affected countries. We estimate that

this amount represents about 20 percent of the total number of people who would require food aid.

Mr. Chairman, I believe it is extremely important that American PVOs that have experience, capacity, and program skills also enter into agreements directly with USAID to deliver emergency food and to hasten the transition of suffering communities in the recovery phase. Emergency food assistance to southern Africa that is purchased with American taxpayer dollars should be distributed by American organizations that are supported by American citizens. Such action reinforces the message that American people care about people in distress around the world. The message needs to be heard now more than ever.

Mr. Chairman, recommendation number 3: This Administration must respond quickly and adequately to save lives. At the same time, emergency food aid must be integrated into programs that address the root causes of famine and ensure that people are on the road to recovery. We recognize that when famine occurs, it is easy to lose sight of a country's long-term development goals, and this, of course, we believe would be a mistake.

World Vision's experience in Zambia demonstrates the need, even in times of famine, for intervention to assist small holder farmers who are deeply entrenched in poverty. To help address this, World Vision, with USAID's support, initiated an agriforestry project. Now there is proof that 14,000 farmers in the program have doubled their yields, and even in the face of this severe drought. In other words, these farmers don't need food assistance in this current crisis; they are actually selling food because of the initial work that we worked on with USAID in agriforestry.

The key to managing the current crisis requires an integrated livelihood/food security approach be used. Food aid alone is not adequate, and the populations in the region need more than just calories over the next few months. Assuring there is a pipeline for recovery activities is an essential part of an emergency response.

And, Mr. Chairman, our fourth and final recommendation: HIV/AIDS exacerbates the effects of food shortages. We encourage the Administration to address the food crisis in the southern African region in a comprehensive manner. Not only are the people of southern Africa facing a devastating famine, but incredibly high rates of HIV and AIDS, ranging from 15 to 25 percent infection rates. This will result in a greater loss of life and more orphaned children.

Mr. Chairman, I believe this is the first time that relief workers have been confronted with famine at the same time as a high prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS. So, it is absolutely essential that we get high nutrition into these families so that these people can endure to help their children transition in life, because we know that loss of life is very quick when people don't have adequate nutrition with HIV/AIDS. Large numbers of breadwinners have been lost, and there is significant increase in aged grandparents and child-headed households. Generations of children are growing up with no knowledge of what it is like to have a parent. Programs must reflect these needs and adequately respond.

As World Vision, other PVOs, and the private sector do their part to respond to the AIDS pandemic. Congress must do its part by ap-

propriating the $2.5 million for fiscal year 2003 for bilateral and HIV programs.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to end my testimony with the story of Rosalina. As you know, we are very practical in the NGO and PVO world, and Rosalina is a Malawian grandmother, and she has three children for whom she cares, and she told her story to our World Vision employee. This is Rosalina speaking:

> "He gave his food to the children. I saw him get weak. Then he got even weaker, and died,"

Rosalina said. She is recounting the death 2 months ago of her husband. Just before that, one of her granddaughters also died of hunger. Rosalina's daughter Aness has left the village to find food or work to help her children survive. Rosalina says of the crisis:

> "This is the first time I have seen this. We have heard of hunger, but we have never experienced it like this before. There have been food shortages before, but this year is different. The difference is that they took place before, but they were isolated in some families, but now it is widespread. The maize was scorched. The rains came for a month, but then it stopped. We planted, but we got very little."

Rosalina is hopeful for some assistance, but acknowledges that the future that she is envisioning for her grandchildren right now is very bleak.

So, Mr. Chairman, it is only by God's grace that you and I are not sitting on the straw mat where Rosalina told her story to World Vision's colleagues last month. We want to help the thousands like her. We can do it, we should do it, we can do it in partnership. We must do it. We urge the Administration to partner with American PVOs and the World Food Programme so that together we can effectively respond to this humanitarian crisis.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Wilkinson. And thank you on behalf of all of us for the great work that World Vision does. I've been a Member of Congress for 22 years, and we all know that World Vision has made the difference in the lives of so many in averting hunger and other problems.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilkinson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRUCE WILKINSON, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS, WORLD VISION UNITED STATES

I am Bruce Wilkinson, the Senior Vice-President of International Programs for World Vision. I worked in Africa for 17 years, with part of my time spent managing food aid programs, responding to drought and famine. World Vision, founded in 1950, is the largest privately funded humanitarian aid organization in the United States. We are a Christian relief and development agency serving the world's poorest children and families in nearly 100 countries, with over 14,000 staff worldwide.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before the House International Relations Committee regarding the crisis in the southern Africa Region ("the Region") that is placing 13 million people in six countries in jeopardy. World Vision operates in all of the affected countries implementing programs that help vulnerable populations improve their food security and livelihoods. We are well-positioned to respond to the famine by enhancing our ongoing development efforts with emergency food aid and by supporting agricultural production to improve prospects for rapid recovery.

It is essential that emergency food aid be in addition to regularly programmed PL 480 Title II food aid in order to avoid displacing vital developmental programming

that mitigates against emergencies around the world and allows people to improve their health, living conditions, and incomes. Moreover, rather than just relying on the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) to deliver commodities to the Region, it is important that Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) that have experience, capacity, and programs in the Region also enter into agreements directly with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to bring in food aid for emergency response and to hasten the transition to the recovery phase. Some of the United States food assistance provided by the American people should be distributed by American organizations that are supported by American citizens. This reinforces the message that the United States cares about the needs of other countries.

Today, I will summarize the genesis and nature of the crisis in the southern Africa Region, efforts to date to address the crisis, and how USAID and PVOs operating in the Region can most effectively integrate emergency aid with developmental aid in order to assure a more complete recovery and the most effective use of resources.

PROBLEM IN REGION

A complex humanitarian crisis is occurring in southern Africa, with nearly 13 million people in need of immediate food assistance. It is estimated that the six affected countries—Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique—need approximately 1.2 million Metric Tons from now until March 2003. We also cannot forget the country of Angola that needs ongoing assistance. Unfortunately, as is the case with most humanitarian crises, it is the most vulnerable populations—the women, children, the elderly, and especially those affected by HIV/AIDS—who are at the greatest risk. It is the poorest populations such as subsistence farmers, who even in the best of times suffer the most.

The factors that have led to the food security crisis in the Region are numerous and complex, and are both man-made and natural. They include floods, drought, crop failures, chronic problems such as poor health care and sanitary conditions, politics, poor policy decisions, the lack of foreign exchange to import food, and last but certainly not least, alarming and growing prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS that are now approaching over 30% in some of the affected countries.

By August and September, the end of winter in southern Africa, it is clear that the total amount of food available locally, as well as that given by donors, will be far from sufficient to ensure that all hungry people throughout the Region receive food. 1.2 million MT is needed immediately. We are prepared to assist and we are assisting.

The most severely affected countries are Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.

It is already well-known that Malawi is facing its worst hunger crisis in 50 years, affecting almost three-quarters of its 11 million population. World Vision in Malawi estimates that the food deficit of grain for the 2002/2003 consumption year will be 485,000 MT (FAO/WFP, May 2002). 545,000 persons will need emergency food aid between June and August and that number will rise to about 2.1 million between September and November 2002 (WFP/FAO, 2002). Making matters worse, the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in Malawi is 16%

In Zimbabwe, disruptions in the farming cycle due to politically motivated land invasions coupled with an inflation rate of around 120% have compounded the situation, as does the fact that one out of every four adults in Zimbabwe is infected with HIV/AIDS. World Vision estimates that 6 million people are in need of food aid, including approximately 705,000 MT of cereals.

In Zambia, where the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is 20%, World Vision estimates that approximately 174,000 MT are needed.

However, food aid alone is not the answer to the Region's problems. A failure of governance has exacerbated the problems in the Region and domestic policy adjustments by all countries affected need to be made to correct these systemic problems. Indeed, World Vision deals with these issues regularly as we conduct our programs in the Region. For example, last year World Vision stepped in to purchase and to assure the distribution of seed when the parastatal organization responsible for food security in Zimbabwe failed to function. However, today World Vision is here to share with the Committee the types of assistance the Region needs, rather than to discuss the political situation and governmental institutions.

The vulnerable populations in the Region need more than just calories over the next few months. Integrated with the provision of emergency food aid must be developmental and emergency assistance to assure that families have the necessary agricultural inputs to sow the next harvest in order to avoid the continuance of the agricultural disaster. World Vision and other PVOs are already engaged in helping subsistence farmers under regular development assistance programs and these can be

adjusted to meet the special and critical needs during this famine. HIV/AIDS is steadily reducing the number of individuals to carry out agricultural tasks, which makes it important to increase access to agricultural technologies that are both cost and labor saving.

We recognized that this crisis was coming last year and actually started to adjust our plans at that time.

Equally important is to continue and to increase efforts during this crisis to assure households access to health care, training on proper nutrition and hygiene, and access to clean water. A recent Nutrition Survey conducted by World Vision in Zimbabwe revealed that one out of four children is chronically malnourished with implications for learning ability and future development. Also, children are seriously at-risk for preventable infections.

We recognize that when famine occurs, it is easy to lose sight of developmental goals for a country. This is a mistake. World Vision's experience in Zambia demonstrates the need, even in times of famine, for interventions to assist smallholder farmers who are deeply entrenched in poverty and where HIV/AIDS continues to reduce the number of individuals to undertake agricultural tasks. "The African continent south of the Sahara is dominated by agriculture. 50 million families derive their livelihood from farming. The vast majority of these farms cover an area of less than 5 ha and are hand-tilled." [1] In Zambia, many farmers are unable to purchase fertilizers and lack markets for their produce. This in turn causes agricultural productivity to decline and farmer incomes to remain low. To help address this, World Vision (supported by USAID) entered into partnership with ICRAF (The International Center for Research in Agroforestry) and the Ministry of Agriculture in 1999 to improve soil fertility. The strategy applied was the dissemination of short-term agroforestry options (which are in harmony with the environment) to farmers, targeting approximately 12,000 resource poor farm households in five districts of eastern Zambia over a five year period.

As of April 2002, three years into the project, 15,000 smallholder farmers had taken up at least one improved fallow technology and the number of fields with an improved fallow crop was 20,000 indicating some farmers had adopted more than one technology. Now, when many farmers in Zambia are facing a serious food deficit, there is general affirmation that the farmers who took on agroforestry have produced enough food, even in the face of a severe drought. There have been significant yield increases of approximately 3.47 ton/ha as opposed to 1.3 tons/ha for farmers who neither applied agroforestry or inorganic fertilizer.[2]

Fortunately, these development programs were being supported by USAID, which helped to mitigate against and prevent the worst impacts of famine on highly vulnerable populations. This is just one of the important opportunities provided by ongoing programming for development. As we face this crisis, we must think of similar development strategies to avoid perpetuation of the emergency, to restore families to levels of production and incomes that can support their families, and to make more effective use of food aid resources than just short-term donations to relieve immediate need.

DONOR RESPONSE TO DATE

The purpose of food aid in emergencies is to sustain life and to eliminate the need for people to resort to selling assets needed for survival and recovery. Early provision of assistance also prevents the movement of people in search of food and the development of displaced persons camps, where there is an increase in economic and social instability and also where disease can readily spread, and resettlement and recovery become more difficult and more expensive.

Thus, it is important to be prepared to respond quickly to avoid the worst impacts and to save lives.

World Vision would like to commend USAID for its responsiveness in sending 33,230 MT of maize, beans, and oil to the Region in May and for prepositioning food for quicker access and transport. We understand that in total, USAID has either shipped or prepositioned 132,000 MT, and that the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust has been activated with a commitment of 275,000 MT. While this response is positive, it is far short of the 1.2 million MT that are needed immediately. Also, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance needs to support the emergency re-

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[1] DeVries, Joe and Toenniessen, Gary. "Securing the Harvest," The Rockefeller Foundation, 2001.

[2] Project staff and area scientists attribute this to: (i) promotion of short-term fallows using leguminous trees and shrubs, (ii) soil and moisture conservation, (iii) improved crop varieties, and (iv) ability to retain all produce as practicing short-fallow farmers do not have to sell off significant portions of their crop to pay for the fertilizer used.

sponse with appropriate financial resources. World Vision would also like to thank WFP for its continued partnership, particularly in response to this crisis.

WORLD VISION RESPONSE

As with many other international aid organizations, World Vision is responding to the crisis, and is providing emergency relief as well as ongoing development support. We believe that it is critical for PVOs working in the areas to have emergency food aid agreements so we can most economically and effectively reach populations that are very vulnerable, including many people who live in regions where we currently work. PVOs have long-term relationships with communities, networks, and governments. PVOs also have distribution systems that can add emergency food aid to ongoing development efforts, as well as continue development efforts that are essential for recovery.

In southern Africa World Vision works in all six of the affected countries implementing multi-sectoral programming focused on transformational development. World Vision uses Area Development Programs (ADPs) as a part of our worldwide strategy for child-focused, multi-sectoral programming, addressing the needs of targeted communities over a period of 10–15 years. Programs are funded by multiple donors including private child sponsors, bi-lateral government donors such as USAID, AUSAID, or CIDA, multi-lateral donors, private special donors, and foundations. In all six countries, World Vision has been distributing food assistance, but the food resources and the cash necessary to cover transportation/distribution costs in order to effectively manage and monitor the food aid is limited.

Importantly as early as June of last year, World Vision conducted food security assessments in Zimbabwe and was already gearing up for a humanitarian crisis. World Vision assisted the Government of Zimbabwe's seed parastatal in an attempt to ensure that seeds would be available for small-scale farmers. Also, an emergency food proposal was submitted to USAID in August of 2001, and approval was received from USAID in March 2002.

World Vision is the only American PVO with an emergency food pipeline from USAID into the Region. We are approved to assist approximately 100,000 people with 14,310 MT of soy fortified cornmeal, kidney and pinto beans, and vegetable oil. Our first shipment with approximately 7,000 has arrived in Durban, South Africa. While there have been problems with importation requirements, particularly regarding the importation of genetically modified commodities due to concerns expressed by the Government of Zimbabwe, World Vision to date has been able to work with the Government of Zimbabwe's requirements. We are working to ensure that proper testing of the commodities occurs so that it is clear that the commodity transported into the country is of high quality and does not pose any harm to the people it is intended to assist. World Vision is also distributing WFP food aid in four districts to assist 156,000 people.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the good efforts of the United States Government in the emergency response, there are critical issues that still need to be addressed. We make the following recommendations to the Committee for your consideration:

1. *This Administration must make additional emergency food aid available to respond to the crisis in southern Africa. The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust should be used and the CCC Charter Act Authority should be used to replenish the Trust. Title II PL 480 development funding must not be used.*

World Vision is pleased that the Administration has decided to use 275,000 MT of the commodities in the Trust, an emergency reserve that currently holds 2.5 MMT of commodities to respond to the famine. The Coalition for Food Aid [3] of which World Vision is a member, also agrees that the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust be used. However, much more will be needed over the next few months and we urge the Administration to use the full amount allowed under the law. Also, it is necessary to assure that the Trust will be replenished without depleting funds for other food aid programs. In particular, this crisis should not reduce existing or future PL 480 funds. It appears that USAID has already decided that about 50% of Title II will be used for emergency programs. (Under PL 480, there is a 75% nonemergency

[3] The Coalition was established in 1985 and comprises US PVOs that conduct development and humanitarian programs overseas. The members are Adventist Development & Relief Agency International, Africare, ACDI/VOCA, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Counterpart International, Food for the Hungry International, International Relief & Development, Mercy Corps, OIC International, Save the Children, TechnoServe and World Vision, Inc.

requirement for Title II programs.) This will be devastating to programming worldwide where malnutrition rates are high and agricultural production low. For example, programs in countries such as Guatemala, Sierra Leone, and Angola could be cut. When famine occurs in one part of the world it is easy to forget other parts of the world until a crisis unfolds there, too. At that point, we are too late.

The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust may hold up to 4 million metric tons of wheat, rice, corn or sorghum, or any combination of these commodities. Rather than waiving the 75% non-emergency requirement under PL 480 Title II, up to 500,000 MT tons of wheat or the equivalent value of another commodity, including processed products, can be provided from the Trust for emergency assistance in any fiscal year. If all or part of the 500,000 metric tons is not used in a fiscal year, the remaining amount can be added to the 500,000 metric tons for the next fiscal year. This reserve has rarely been used for emergencies since its inception in 1980 as a wheat reserve.

There are problems with repayment and replenishment of the Trust. If food is withdrawn, the Trust has to be repaid for commodities used. The Administration will encumber future PL 480 funds for repayment, cutting back on the amount of food aid that can be provided through PL 480 in later years. Further, the law only allows $20 million received as repayment in any fiscal year to be held by the Trust to replenish the commodities, which can only buy about 140,000 metric tons of wheat. This is insufficient to refill the Trust. Although commodities can also be transferred from CCC inventories to replenish the Trust, the Administration has no plans to replenish the Trust through CCC-obtained commodities.

To fix this standby reserve, repayment should be not be required for commodities used in any fiscal year for urgent needs. This would require an amendment to the law. When commodity prices are low and supplies are abundant, CCC Charter Act authority should be used to buy commodities, which could then be transferred to the Trust. This would not require an amendment, but it would require a change in the Administration's policy.

2. US Private Voluntary Organizations must have emergency food aid pipelines into the Region in order to effectively respond to the crisis. PVOs already work in the countries at the local levels and have effective mechanisms to provide the food aid, along with integrating the assistance into recovery efforts. Providing only for a WFP pipeline overlooks the local capabilities of operational PVOs and is not an adequate mechanism for reaching vulnerable populations.

Currently the only PVO with a USAID-funded emergency pipeline into the Region is World Vision with a program in Zimbabwe totaling 14,310 MT over 12 months. Similar to many of the Title II Cooperating Sponsors, World Vision is active in the Region, working in all of the affected countries. PVOs know the communities and we have long-term relationships with local governments enabling PVOs to more effectively navigate the local bureaucracies. We have ongoing agreements in place with various Ministries within the governments. In many cases, we can leverage resources from a variety of donors thereby multiplying the impact of United States Government funding. While PVOs have many very positive working relationships with WFP in a number of countries throughout the world, including in southern Africa, World Vision and other aid agencies have learned that multiple pipelines are not only more effective in emergency situations, they are essential. Given the variety of logistical issues that must be navigated in order to move food aid commodities from the ports of discharge to the final delivery points, having the experiences, networks, and lessons from more than one agency involved with transportation, reduces the risk that all pipelines into the country would break.

American PVOs, including World Vision have proposed a variety of large-scale responses to USAID to respond to the crisis. To date, none of these proposals has been accepted. Currently, a Consortium of three PVOs—CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and World Vision—have proposed to USAID's Office of Food for Peace a plan to distribute a minimum tonnage level of 298,800 MT over a 10 month period to meet the needs of nearly 2.5 million people in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Mozambique. The Consortium estimates that this represents approximately 20% of the total number of people who require immediate food aid. It is the intent of this Consortium to be viewed as a pilot project for future emergency response programs that require the transport and distribution of large quantities of food aid in efficient, cost-effective ways. Importantly, this effort will complement the ongoing activities of WFP. All of the Consortium PVOs are currently active with WFP in the Region and plan to continue our partnerships. However, we do not believe that WFP can or should single-handedly manage millions of Metric Tons, primarily because it is a risky proposition to presume that WFP alone can respond effectively to a crisis of this magnitude.

3. This Administration must respond to the immediate needs and save lives, but simultaneously must integrate emergency food aid into a food security/livelihood approach to programming to address the root causes of famine, to prevent its continued destruction, and to ensure that people are on the road to recovery. Since the most affected populations live in abject poverty, and PVOs are working with many of these populations, development work with these poor communities must continue.

As noted previously, the key to managing the current crisis requires that an integrated livelihood security approach be used. Food aid alone is not adequate and thus, the challenge for food aid programs is to integrate the response to short-term crises with long-term development efforts and activities to mitigate against shocks. Vulnerable populations and regions need programs to help improve their ability to prevent the worst impacts of floods and droughts, such as flood control systems, post-harvest and storage technology, improved seeds and land use methods, improved health care for women and children, and nonagricultural sources of incomes in rural areas. Approved food aid programs in vulnerable countries should be elastic, allowing PVOs to adapt to observed changes in food supply during the life of the agreement.

4. This Administration must recognize that HIV/AIDs further exacerbates the problems and the Administration should approach the crisis strategically with interventions that address this issue. Because of high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates, undernourished people are more susceptible to disease and death.

World Vision has launched a worldwide campaign, the HOPE Initiative, to address the problems of HIV/AIDs throughout the world. The six countries in southern Africa that require immediate food assistance are all experiencing a mature HIV/AIDS epidemic (>10% prevalence).

Countries at this stage of the epidemic are experiencing a significant increase in deaths as a result of HIV/AIDS. Increased numbers of children are being orphaned, and the community is totally overwhelmed by the impact of the disease. The general prevalence rates are greater than 10% and there is a significantly high mortality and orphan rates.

The thrust of programming for countries in this category should be the provision of care and support for orphans and vulnerable children. A number of families have become affected by the epidemic, numerous breadwinners have been lost and the situation is now one in which there is an increase in aged grandparents and child-headed households. Generations of children are growing up with no knowledge of what is like to have a parent and programs need to reflect these needs and adequately respond to the challenges. At the same time there is still a great need for AIDS awareness and prevention activities particularly among the "window of hope" age group (5–15 year olds) in which the infection rate is still relatively low. All the other activities in prior stages of the epidemic will still need to be ongoing at the same time in spite of this increased demand for resources to provide for the sick and dying, and the affected children, households and communities.

Unless these issues are addressed simultaneously in the crisis response, the aid will be insufficient. Additional resources, special aid food rations, and special care programs are required. Also, food aid should be used as a focal point for drawing people and communities toward HIV/AIDS awareness. As World Vision and other parts of the private sector are doing their share, Congress needs to do its part by providing $2.5 billion for the next Fiscal Year for bilateral and global HIV/AIDS programs.

In closing, I ask that you consider the story of Rosalina, the Malawian grandmother of 6 year old Tamara. She told her story to a World Vision employee:

> "He gave food to the children. I saw him get weak. Then he got even weaker, and died," she said recounting the death two months ago of her husband. Just before that, one of her grand-daughters, Pempherania also died of hunger. 56 year old Rosalina cares for her 3 grandchildren, Tamara (6), Gertrude (3), and Pilirani (1 month old), as their mother Aness, Rosalina's daughter has left to find food or work to help her children. Rosalina says of the crisis: "This is the first time I have seen this. We have heard of hunger but never have we experienced it. There have been food shortages before, but this year is different. The difference is that when they took place before, they were isolated to some families. But now it's widespread. The maize was scorched. The rains came for a month, but then it stopped. We planted, but we got very little." The family has not had meat for two months, since their grandfather was alive. Normally, they would eat meat weekly. Tamara, her 6 year-old granddaughter, is malnourished and is suffering from intestinal worms as a result of eating contaminated food.

Rosalina would like to take Tamara to the hospital, a day's walk from the village, but she is weak herself and she doesn't think Tamara would survive the journey. Rosalina is hopeful for some assistance, but acknowledges that the future at this stage is bleak.

It is only by God's grace that you and I are not sitting on the straw mat where Rosalina told her story to World Vision last month. We want to help her and thousands like her. We can do it. We should do it. We must do it. We need your help.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. I do have a few questions, and then I will yield to my good friend Mr. Payne for any questions he might have.

Mr. Natsios, in the words of the main opposition leader of Zimbabwe's ruling government, the movement for democratic change, he stated: The Mugabe who talks about the need for international aid to help tackle the food crisis is the same Mugabe who is blatantly denying food to hundreds of thousands of people suspected of voting for the MDC in recent Presidential elections, close quote.

Is it possible for the international community to circumvent those foods?

Mr. Morris, you were very emphatic that politics will not play a role, but I am reminded, and we have had hearings here, and many of us have raised these questions, about Operation Lifeline Sudan, where Khartoum had a virtual veto as to which flights might occur to starving people, and as a result, most of those or—most of those flights that were denied would have provided food to people that were in the opposition. How can that be overcome now? I know that proactively you are trying to make sure, and you did say you had two face-to-face meetings with Mr. Mugabe. What was his response when you raised these questions? Mr. Natsios and Mr. Morris.

Mr. NATSIOS. Let me first say our policy is, where we do not believe the government can be trusted to distribute the food in a neutral fashion, we don't go through governments to distribute food, but we work with governments in some countries if the government is democratic and well-managed. Mozambique, for example, is a good example of the latter case.

In the case of Zimbabwe, we have seen too much abuse, too much corruption, so we have chosen in Zimbabwe to go through the NGOs alone, working with WFP. None of the food that has been misused for political purposes was U.S. Government food. And the USAID policy in Zimbabwe is not to go through the Zimbabwean Government, because we have seen several instances, confirmed now, of politicization of food. It is not acceptable to us.

We have urged WFP—and Jim has taken the leadership on this—to make clear what the requirements are in terms of the standards that we use for distribution. We will continue to insist on those standards. We are not having trouble in any of the other countries. They are all being very cooperative. I, in fact, had a lunch meeting which Congressman Tony Hall came to, and the Congresswoman from North Carolina Eva Clayton came to it. They were at the World Food Summit with us, with the Ministers of Agriculture from all of the countries. We invited the Minister of Agriculture from Zimbabwe. He chose not to come, and they sent a more junior person from the Foreign Ministry. So they were all there. We had lunch in Rome to discuss how we were going to han-

dle this. They each told us what the severity of the problem was, and we had a good discussion about how we practically can ensure that this works at an optimum level of efficiency.

Perhaps the warning that Jim Morris gave will work. If it doesn't, I am going to elevate the level of rhetoric and the comments, and I may go to the region and make them publicly if it continues.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. I met with him twice this week, on Monday with Kofi Annan, and we made the very clear statement that the food provided by the World Food Programme on behalf of the United Nations and our donors was not to be politicized; that we wouldn't tolerate it being directed or us being told we couldn't go somewhere. We have had a couple of minor squabbles over this in the last couple of months, and we told them that we would back away, we would leave the country if this was a problem. We were able to satisfactorily resolve both issues.

And I met with him again on Tuesday with his Minister of Agriculture and my Deputy Director Mr. Grace, and we made the point again. He assured us that we would have no problems and I told him we are trying to do something that is very difficult to do. We are coming to you, we are coming to the European Community, we are coming to other donors around the world who all have these questions, and we are asking them to be very generous in helping feed half your population, and you have to help us. You have to alleviate, to cure in their minds the fact that what they do to help you will be misused. As I left him, I said, we have an understanding that this is the way it is going to be, and if we have problems, then you and I will have to sit down man to man again and talk it through.

So all I can tell you about are the conversations that I had, both of them. And, as I said, one was with Kofi Annan, who was as strong on this subject as either Andrew or I would be, and we cannot afford to put at risk the humanitarian reputation of the World Food Programme to be perceived as a political agency, because people support us from all over the world. And that is a very good thing, for the world to come together and address multilaterally this issue the way we do.

So we will keep you posted, and we will do our best. He invited me to come back, and I said, I will be there shortly. I am going to work hard at building a relationship with him and his Minister of Agriculture, as my colleagues also will. We have a lot of people there. And we will keep you posted.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Morris.

In the 1980s, I met with the Ambassador to the United Nations from Ethiopia and, like others, made an impassioned plea to allow humanitarian corridors to get food aid when it gets to us using food as a weapon.

Mr. Natsios, is Mr. Mugabe using food as a weapon?

Mr. NATSIOS. We have two instances that have been confirmed. Morgan Tsvangirai and I had dinner when he was in the United States, so I know him. I know members of the Zimbabwe Cabinet whom I met with 10 years ago. Some of them are still there who we worked with in the famine, in the drought, 10 years ago. And

he has made some very serious charges. We have sent people out to confirm this, and we haven't got the reports back yet, but two instances we now have confirmed, and there is sufficient evidence now to conclude that it has happened. Whether or not it was dictated by the central government at a senior level, or whether it was party workers from his party or local officials doing it on their own, we can't tell. No one is giving us a paper trail to tell us how these orders were carried out. All we know is it has happened, it is unacceptable, and we are going to insist that in the future it not be allowed.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. If I could say that we, the World Food Programme, do not distribute our food through their government. We distribute through NGO partners or on our own directly. So there is food in the country that he would have responsibility for or would control and that he might be distributing in one way, which we have said to him also that needs to be pure and properly done. But Mr. Mugabe's government will not have control over the food we distribute that is provided by the United States Government or our donors in general.

Mr. SMITH. Let me just—Mr. Wilkinson asked earlier about the replenishment of the Emerson Trust Fund. Mr. Natsios, is that something that is contemplated so that other contingencies elsewhere could be met?

Mr. NATSIOS. It has to be. It will be refunded. The question is how. We are in discussions with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), right now. In fact, we are putting an options paper together as to how that will happen.

Mr. SMITH. And finally——

Mr. NATSIOS. I might also add that we have made a request for an increase—it is in the budget before Congress for fiscal year 2003—for a $335 million increase in the title II budget. Now, one of the reasons for that increase is we need relief food. That is the largest increase we have had in about 20 years in the regular title II account. Some of that is for development purposes, as Bruce just mentioned, but some of it is for relief. So we have asked for this large increase in the President's budget, and we urge the Congress to approve it, because if we don't have that extra money, we will be in trouble.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. And that is 403.

The relief workers, the relative safety as they deploy, what is your sense looking at this, Mr. Morris, or any of you who might want to touch on that?

Mr. MORRIS. People who do this work for a career are saints. They are greatly at risk. WFP has had 58 people killed in the line of duty in the last 10 years. We lost two last year, one in the Congo and one in Afghanistan. We are very preoccupied with the safety of our team, with our colleagues. The U.N. is doing a better job of looking at security of its field force. But clearly we will not put our people at risk, and if we sense there is any danger at all, we would pull them out quickly.

Mr. WILKINSON. Being an NGO on the ground, we take security very seriously at World Vision. And I have to say that in the Southern African region, we don't find at this point that those who

are contributing and delivering food in that region are putting themselves at risk. There are many, many mine fields to wade through and we really rely on our national colleagues to be able to walk through those mine fields in a figurative sense so that they can actually be effective in food aid distribution.

I also want to just make a comment. Our current food distributions in Zimbabwe, which I am sure could be testified here with some of your staff help—our food distributions in Zimbabwe are going on unimpeded. They are definitely difficult. These are some of the more difficult negotiated distributions, but we are actually seeing that we can distribute to the targeted and beneficiary populations that need the food. So our experience to this point is that it is working.

We have heard also that there are other areas which are being negatively impacted.

Mr. NATSIOS. Could I just add? Virtually all the famines in the last 15 years in Africa took place during war, so there is a distinct connection between drought and war and famine in Africa and other areas of the world. We almost had a famine in Afghanistan because of a war and security between the Northern Alliance and Taliban that predated by 6 months the September 11th events.

We don't have a war in any of these countries. We have political instability. We have serious problems with one government. The rest of the governments are all democratically elected—maybe with the exception of Swaziland—but the rest of the governments are democratically elected. They are being very responsive. They are very worried. They are buying commercially some food as well. So we are not facing the kinds of situations we faced in Afghanistan where there was chaos or in Sudan where you have an oppressive government that is standing in the way of deliveries on a systematic basis over a long period of time. It is not the same. So our people are not physically at risk.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I appreciate the testimony of all three of you.

Just a question regarding the replenishment of the Emerson Trust. If, in fact, Mr. Natsios, the request for additional funding is not approved, would the funds to replace the Trust then come from some other USAID or humanitarian-type program? In other words, would it take from Peter to try to help Paul?

Mr. NATSIOS. I don't think we can use any USAID funds legally. In fact, I am fairly certain. We cannot use any appropriated funds from USAID to replenish the Trust. The options would be around U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) mechanisms, and that is the discussion that we are having now. But I would hope that Congress would approve the $335 million increase in title II, because then we will have sufficient food for what we need to do in other areas of the world.

Bruce is right. There is always a balancing act that you take to satisfy the requirements in other areas. I met with the Finance Minister—I am sorry, the Agriculture Minister in Angola on Saturday. We sent staff in, and they arrived last Saturday, a large team from DCHA, the Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau of USAID. Roger Winter here is the Assistant Admin-

istrator who sent the teams in because we do not want this peace to deteriorate in Angola. It did 10 years ago. We are not going to let it happen again because of mismanagement of the demobilization of soldiers. We have got a team in there working. We are going to provide food assistance there, particularly to the demobilization effort, to make sure there is political stability after this absolutely horrific civil war is finally over.

But we are looking at the other requirements. So, once again, the increase in title II is very important to the stability of our programming around the world.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Here is another question I have regarding supplies. I know that Kenya has had a good crop in grain, either in maize or corn, for the last 2 crop years; and the Government of Kenya has a policy of purchasing the grain from the farmers and storing it—I suppose to keep the price from fluctuating. There was some suggestion that two problems could be solved, one, the problem of the Kenyan Government being strapped for cash and having had purchased and stored the grain. If the World Food Programme or USAID, or whatever agency, could purchase grain or is in the process of purchasing grain, have there been any discussions about being able then to get perhaps lower-cost commodities right from Kenya and, therefore, actually being in the assistance of a government that has a legitimate problem?

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you for the question. I met with President Moi of Kenya on Tuesday of this week. We talked about this very issue, and we prefer to buy locally or regionally when we have the cash resources to do that. It helps the local economy. It obviously lowers our expenses. So we are going to pursue that as aggressively as we can.

It also gave me a good opportunity to ask Kenya to be a donor country in response to this particular issue, and he responded positively. Kenya has been a donor to the World Food Programme, especially with our work in Kenya itself, and they contributed $8 million value to our work last year.

But I have had that very conversation directly with the President this week and his Minister of Agriculture, and we will keep you posted.

Mr. PAYNE. Great. I know it was definitely a problem. The attempt to keep prices from dropping I say is a policy that they have had, and I know they get oversupplied.

On that same line, the food program, I know it is more or less about getting commodities into a place, but do you have or does USAID have a department of planning where—Congresswoman Eva Clayton, who comes from a rural community in North Carolina, has a very strong interest in farming in general, but also in trying to have the whole agricultural program get more assistance because at the present time, as a matter of fact, she had a farmer-to-farmer program where she was looking at historically black colleges or black farmers in the South to be a part of a sort of exchange program to deal with agriculture—have your World Food Organization or USAID done anything in regard to this whole question of agriculture and farming training?

Mr. NATSIOS. Thank you, Congressman. Agriculture is one of our four priorities for Africa; it is my personal first priority worldwide. Three-quarters of the poor people in the world live in rural areas, and they are farmers or herders.

You cannot deal with the problem of poverty in the Third World without dealing with agriculture. We have cut our agricultural funding from the time Peter McPherson—one of the great USAID Administrators for 6 years under the Reagan Administration—was the head of USAID. He was with me in Michigan State. He is the President of Michigan State now, and has been for the last decade. He was with me in Rome.

We had a press conference with President Museveni of Uganda, President Kufuor of Ghana, and President Chissano of Mozambique, three of the most able heads of state in Africa, on a new initiative to end hunger in Africa through agriculture. We have got a $30 million increase in our agricultural funding this year. We have asked for a $70 million increase next year, for a total of $100 million. It is a new initiative.

The budget for agriculture in USAID in 1986 was $1.3 billion. It was cut during the 1990s by $1 billion. It was down to $245 million when I arrived, and I have to say, I was appalled by it. And we had 248 agricultural scientists and agricultural economists on our staff in 1986. We had 42 left when I arrived a year ago.

The 1990s has not been good to USAID and the agricultural sector in particular, because there isn't a big organized interest group in this city behind it. But if you ask the heads of state, if you ask Museveni and Kufuor and Chissano, what we should be investing in first, they will tell you agriculture, because it affects the whole population. That is where the people live, that is where the poor live.

It is interesting. One of the reporters said at the press conference, we notice this new partnership to end hunger in Africa, there are no farmers on the list. And I got up at the press conference and said, we have two farmers standing at the podium, because President Museveni is a farmer, and President Chissano is a farmer. And President Kufuor pulled me aside and said, "I am one, too." So, add three.

The heads of state already know this. The problem is we have not been responsive in the donor community. We announced a major new initiative, and let me tell you what that is composed of. There are a number of seed varieties, improved seeds, not genetically modified, that have been developed by the Consultant Group on International Agricultural Research. It has a chain of 16 research stations developed in the mid-1960s. We are the largest donor. We are increasing our donations to develop these improved varieties of seed.

What do the improved varieties do? They deal with agricultural systems with not enough water; in other words, arid agriculture. We are providing 48,000 tons of seed in Afghanistan that will increase food production by 775,000 tons of food. They will be able to feed their country after 2 years because of this USAID program that we have initiated. It is an improved variety that grows more wheat with less water. Okay? It is genetically modified, so I know it is controversial. Most of these heads of state all said, we want

to make the choice ourselves. Don't tell us we can't do it. Because there are people in other counties who don't think they should have the choice. We do. We are working with them now.

I just opened a biotechnology center in Egypt. Kenya has one. Nigeria has one. President Obasanjo has asked me several times if we can help reinforce these research centers that are run by African scientists. We are also going to increase the training of Ph.D. agricultural scientists from Africa in the United States to go back to run these institutes in Africa. We have a program for training, technology transfer, and particularly scientific research in this area that can revolutionize agriculture.

We believe a lot, but not all, of the agricultural problems in Africa can be dealt with through science, because if you improve these varieties against pests, against viruses, against droughts, you can increase production with no more inputs, no more fertilizer, no more pesticides, no more herbicides, and yet production goes up dramatically. Whenever we have tried it in Africa, the farmers loved the stuff. We only give them seed that we use ourselves in the United States or that have been developed and have passed our own tests.

So we have a program. We are implementing it. It is one of my first priorities and Connie Newman's first priority. She is the Assistant Administrator for Africa who is managing these programs.

Mr. SMITH. The Chair recognizes the Chairman of the African Subcommittee, Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you.

Administrator Natsios, is it true that the reservoirs in Zimbabwe are largely full?

Mr. NATSIOS. Yes.

Mr. ROYCE. I want to share with you a concern that many Africans have, and it is an issue that the Zimbabwean press can't raise because they are in jail. It is a crime against the state there now to say anything critical of the government.

But the issue is this: We had an election in which 40 some percent of the people voted for Mugabe. Mugabe is not exactly happy, but we know from the exit polling that most of the country voted against him. Now we have the question of why water is not released that will help in planting a new crop. This is an issue that comes up repeatedly. And my concern is that when we look at the massive land seizures, when we look at the policy of withholding the water in the reservoirs, and when we look at the foreign exchange restrictions and everything else that makes it impossible virtually to get fertilizer and other necessities for farming into the country, an environment has been created where it is just about impossible to produce agriculturally.

And the people that this falls on—I mean, now the government is in the unique position of being able to dole out—and that is why your work is so important. But the government is in the position of being able to dole out to those who are subservient, to those, you know, who are willing to take up cause with that government, and at the same time to punish those who did not support it. And it is truly a crisis of our time that we see this repeated.

You know, you mentioned the new program for North Korea. I want to share with you what one of the French NGOs told us in

her testimony. And maybe she is wrong, but she says there are 30 some counties in the north where, because of lack of support for the Pyongyang regime, food does not get to those particular counties. They are called "no go" areas. No go. And people can't go in there.

Now, according to her, she says she and her team have interviewed a good number of North Koreans. And, yes, many of them get food, but not any from those counties. If you are from one of those 30 some counties, you have never received these supplements. Where does the food go? And this is what she tells us. She says, look at the photographs of the food in Pyongyang in the market being sold by the government for hard currency reserves.

So the point I am raising, Administrator, is that we have to be cognizant of food used as a political weapon. And I know you are, and I appreciate your efforts to try to overcompensate for the ability of some dictators and political leaders to abuse the sympathy, the empathy of the world in order to further their ends of getting more power and more control over their subject population. But I did want to raise this issue with you and maybe ask you, what has the effect of the land seizures had upon food production?

Mr. NATSIOS. Let me just say, with respect to North Korea, we are very concerned about these very issues. And if you notice, in the statement we made Friday, we have raised those issues publicly and said we are drawing the line now with the North Koreans.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you.

Mr. NATSIOS. I wrote a book about the famine in North Korea. I am intimately aware of it. I interviewed dozens of refugees from North Korea, under cover, in China, along the border, under very difficult circumstances for hours each for weeks several years ago to write the book. And it is a horrific story about what happened to them and how they got there and what is going on in the country. In the counties that are not being served, we believe the food and security are much worse. WFP got into one of those counties that had never been served, and the malnutrition rates there are much higher than other areas. So the theory of the French NGOs that you mentioned may well be true.

Mr. ROYCE. And my other concern is the North Korean Fifth Brigade was down helping Mugabe. I mean, that is kind of the common—and I had not known that. But I was in southern Zimbabwe and I was talking to some people, and they said they had family members thrown down a well because this particular area had not been supportive some years ago of the Mugabe regime. And they said North Koreans had been assisting or organizing the intelligence network and so forth. And I made some inquiries afterwards and found out the North Korean Fifth Brigade had been brought in to assist in setting up the police state. That really was an amazing mess.

Mr. NATSIOS. Very disturbing. We are aware of the reports.

To go back to Zimbabwe, over the last 2 years there has been a 62 percent reduction in the amount of acreage being tilled on the commercial farms, 62 percent, which means they are not producing any food, primarily maize. Now, the important thing to repeat about that is the fact that that is irrigating agriculture which would have used the dam system—it is a very sophisticated agri-

cultural system, one of the best actually in the developing world—to irrigate in the middle of this drought.

There was also a 775,000-ton drop in food production among subsistent smaller African farmers—and another drop. In Matabeleland, in fact that is the area that World Vision is in. These are small producers, but it is rain-fed agriculture, it is not irrigated. So that reduction is as a result of the drought, but the commercial reduction was a function of the confiscation of these farms and of the pricing policies through the state grain board.

So government policy is the result of half the problem. The other half of the problem is the drought in the poorer areas with rain-fed agriculture. But, if we had one and not the other, we could have handled this; but both at the same time taking place, both the collapse of the commercial farming sector and the subsistence agriculturalists, means we are facing this crisis. That is why half the country is at risk now.

Mr. SMITH. Gentleman, I have been advised that Mr. Morris has a plane to catch, and he will be late if he doesn't leave within about 30 seconds.

So I want to thank you, Mr. Morris, for your outstanding testimony, unless you have something else to add.

Mr. MORRIS. No. Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity and would be willing to come back on any occasion. I have to be in Rome to give a commencement address at 11 o'clock in the morning, and it is a tight connection.

Mr. SMITH. Try to get some sleep on the plane. We will have questions that we will submit for the record.

Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to first say to the panel, especially to Mr. Natsios, that I am glad to hear that you are saying that the prevention of an all-out famine is central to our strategy and our response, and that you are supporting the request for $335 million. But I would also like to ask you with regard to an emergency supplemental appropriation, such as the gentlelady from California discussed earlier, because this actually was used recently to fund food aid for Kosovo refugees, in the Balkans, and also to meet the food needs in Afghanistan. So I am wondering if you have considered the possibility of an emergency supplemental in responding to this crisis early as a preventive kind of strategy?

Mr. NATSIOS. We did request money for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, which is in the supplemental, which we very much appreciate the Congress putting in there. It is very important to us, and by doing that you reduce the pressure on the rest of the budget to provide assistance for Afghanistan. None of the food we provided over the last year to Afghanistan came from the regular appropriation. You remember that large $40 billion supplemental? All of the food that we provided to Afghanistan came from that supplemental, so it didn't put pressure on the account.

So it does make a difference. I would prefer the $335 million increase to be in our regular account, and I have to say—be very crassly political—why it is more important. If I had a choice between putting $335 million in the supplemental and the regular appropriation, I would prefer the regular appropriation. Do you

know why? It sets a baseline, and then the next year I can ask for more. If you put it in the supplemental, you know what everyone says, well, that was just a supplemental. It is not in the baseline of appropriation.

Ms. LEE. I understand that, but this would go into the appropriate account. But I believe that because of the emergency nature of the food security crisis and because of our strategy to prevent an all-out famine, that the $200 million added into the emergency supplemental, it could be easily justified if, in fact, that is our goal. And that has nothing to do with the $335 million, which we support and want to see. But, given the emergency——

Mr. NATSIOS. At this point, we have reviewed our budgets and our accounts, and we believe that we have sufficient food to deal with both the emergency there as well as other emergencies in the world. We think we are okay now. I would tell you if we didn't. So I think we are okay now with the amount of food we have without the supplemental, but we do need that $335 million increase next year.

Ms. LEE. And if you don't get the $335 million, then what? Do you have a back-up plan?

Mr. NATSIOS. Then I would say it publicly, that we are going to face a serious situation then.

Ms. LEE. And Congresswoman Waters, Congresswoman Watson, and I—and all of us—who have been working on all of these issues with regard to Africa are concerned about the window of opportunity that we have at this point to address some of these very basic kinds of needs. And for us to believe that we have enough is, I think, fairly short-sighted and doesn't raise the emergency to the status that it deserves within our own government.

Mr. NATSIOS. If we didn't have the 500,000 tons in the Emerson Trust, we would be in trouble right now, I will just tell you very honestly. That trust was designed for these huge food shocks where there is a major emergency, and that is what we are using. We are doing what Congress intended us to do, and we haven't used that all up yet. So to go to a supplemental without having dealt with the problem through the existing mechanisms, to me, I mean, that is not desirable. We haven't got to that stage yet.

Ms. LEE. But I think, though, by your responding in that manner leads me to believe you don't believe that the crisis or the famine is going to explode; that somehow we can contain it with what we have.

Mr. NATSIOS. Well, we can contain it if we keep shipping food in with the Europeans. I want to see what my friend Poul Nielson and the European Union are going to do. We have actually done what we traditionally do as a baseline in this famine. The British have made a large commitment, but that is it for other donors. The Canadians haven't, the Japanese haven't, the Australians haven't, and Europeans have not, other than the British. So we will see what they commit to.

I make a commitment to you now, personally, because I have been through famines, and I have watched them up close. They are horrendous. I never want a famine while I am in charge of USAID, and I have gotten the President's support in that, I have to tell you.

So we are going to do what we need to do. It is just that when people say we need to do more, the question is, it is a 1.2 million tons need. We are not going to provide all of it. Some other countries have to provide some. For the last emergency in Afghanistan, we did 75 percent of the food. That is a little imbalance, to me.

Ms. LEE. Sure. Other countries need to step up to the plate.

Mr. NATSIOS. Sure.

Ms. LEE. All donor countries should.

Mr. NATSIOS. Right.

Ms. LEE. But that, I don't think, should be our position in terms of our response. I think we should do—if we could do the 1.2 million tons, we should do it. And I think we should move in every direction to do that and urge the donor countries to step up to the plate. But certainly we can't stand back and wait, given the magnitude of the crisis.

Mr. NATSIOS. No, we are not waiting. We have been ordering food commodities. But you can't have all of it arrive at the same time, either, because the logistical system won't take it. It will sit at the port, which you don't want to happen because then it rots, and it gets wet and all that stuff. And there aren't enough roads to get the food in or enough trucks to move it, so we phase it in. We are making sure that what we call the food pipeline is full.

What happens in a famine, in a food emergency like this, is a larger portion of the population becomes vulnerable later. In other words, right now it is a relatively small number of people. By September, however, the portion increases, and then by January it will increase substantially. So we phase the requirements in so that the food is distributed as people need it. We are okay so far, but we want to see what the Europeans are going to do, and then we will provide the leadership necessary to make sure that the requirements are met through the system.

Ms. LEE. And that leadership doesn't include supporting an additional 200 million plus for the supplemental as an emergency?

Mr. NATSIOS. I don't think it is necessary, Congresswoman. I don't.

Ms. LEE. Well, we will be working on that.

Mr. NATSIOS. Okay.

Ms. LEE. I guess some of us just don't agree with that.

Mr. NATSIOS. Okay.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. I want to thank the Chair and the Committee for holding this hearing on this issue, and I think that—and, of course, I am one of the newer Members, but I think we should have had this hearing some years ago. I want to thank Congressman Royce, who I have talked to about traveling with him to some of the countries in Africa to get a sense of just how we are relating to these issues.

Now, we can list a multitude of issues that affect this area of Africa or the whole continent, and we know that the droughts and political problems and so on contribute to the problem, but what I would like to see is a stronger projected commitment over a period of time. I don't know if USAID is the only agency that can address this and be effective. I know the European Union and some of the other countries need to step up to the plate. But I think now

that there is new-found interest on the continent of Africa, we could take advantage of that interest, because Africa will soon be our resource of last resort in terms of the natural resources that are found on that continent. It is really untapped in many areas.

So what I would like to see is a long-range plan not only to meet the crisis of food, but the economic crisis that we are facing in this country, and certainly Africa gets impacted. South Africa, for instance, went through its crisis and found out that it had to drop apartheid and had more opportunity for world trade. We need to have a more global plan, and we need to look at that continent that is now being plagued with AIDS, the drought, the lack of food and so on, and start planning so that we will have the resources in place to meet the crises.

What are the best agencies through which to work? And I can't emphasize enough that we don't need to be suggesting pulling out of the U.N. I just heard mention that Kofi Annan was a partner in looking at some of these problems just recently. But I have seen part of a platform coming from the opposition that we ought to pull out of the U.N. You have heard that. I don't think we ought to do that. And I think we ought to be planning with the U.N. as to how we bring all these nations in together, and even if they don't—I see a little shake like that.

I just saw the California Republican platform. One of the points in it is to pull out of the U.N.

And I know I heard one of the Senators give a two and a half-hour speech at the U.N. about 3 years ago about exiting from the U.N. by the United States. So I think we have to look at this on a more global basis. I think that we have to plan and project ahead. I think we have to go into sincere partnership with those Nations that we have worked with and those Nations that present some political challenges and sit down and plan together.

And so my request from the Committee, Mr. Chairman, would be to have another hearing like this where we could hear the projections for a decade away, because it is going to take that kind of time if we are attempting to meet the needs. In spite of what other countries do, I think that the United States as one of the leading nations in the world needs to have a plan. The plan needs to be worked up in conjunction with the United Nations, USAID and the NGOs that have been very active over there. I think in many ways they do a better job, because they don't have to go through bureaucracy. They can just go ahead and address the problem.

The final thing I want to say is that we need to take advantage of many of the local efforts that have been started in these countries by local people, and I found as we were in South Africa last September and addressing some of the problems of AIDS and opening up a clinic in Umlazi out of Durban, that there has already been an effort on the part of the local people. So what we did was to supplement, not supplant but supplement their efforts. And so I think if we are concerned about our staffs that come from abroad, we might want to look at those people who are already there who have made meager efforts on their own with their own resources and see how we can work through them to reach our goals and objectives.

Mr. NATSIOS. Ms. Waters, if I could just answer the comment, first I agree with what you said, Congresswoman. The first comment I would make is that we give a third of our budget from USAID to the NGOs. Many NGOs would not exist without USAID funding. Eighty percent of some of their budgets comes from USAID, so we recognize their ability. I worked for one for 5 years. I know what they are capable of doing.

A third of our budget, an additional third, goes to universities and colleges in the United States that work in the developing world, from trade associations, from hospitals, from nonprofits beyond the NGOs. So a large portion of our budget goes to institutions within the United States that work in the developing world, particularly in Africa.

We have proposed—the President's budget proposes for this year and next year a 25 percent increase in the budget for Africa. This is separate from what he has announced with the Millennium Challenge Account, which I will get to in a minute.

So I am committed to Africa. The budget for Africa has never been increased by 25 percent in 15 years like it has now. It is not widely known, but if the budget is approved the way we proposed it for fiscal 2003, we will have had a 25 percent increase in the spending in Africa, because Secretary Colin Powell and the President and I are fully committed to exactly what you said, a long-term plan.

I can't tell you what is in any state platform. I can only tell you what the Bush Administration's position is.

Ms. WATSON. I can.

Mr. NATSIOS. We are not in favor of abolishing or withdrawing or weakening the United Nations. We are in favor of a competent, well-managed U.N. We work with them. We work through them. Seventy-five percent of the food the WFP got last year came from USAID and the USDA. So we already support the U.N. big time, big time.

The final thing I would say is the President has proposed a 50 percent increase in foreign aid—that is beyond what I just mentioned—called the Millennium Challenge Account, to those countries that are governing justly, improving economic freedom so that we can improve the business climate to get more investment, create more jobs, and finally countries that are committed to providing education, even with meager resources, and health. We will then go in and help them to do that, and we are working through that. We will be presenting it to Congress very shortly.

That is the largest increase in the history of the United States since the Marshall Plan in foreign aid, a 50 percent increase, $5 billion. It is not for 1 year. It is a permanent increase. Our aid program now is about $10 billion from all spigots. This goes up to $15 billion. It is a large commitment by the President and Secretary Colin Powell to do exactly what you have just asked, because I agree with you, and we have stepped up to the plate with this proposal, which we will have before you shortly.

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, if I can just conclude with these remarks. I do want to thank you for your proposals and your efforts in the past, and this is not an attempt to finger point and say where were you. This is an attempt to face the crises and project.

We hope things get better, but right now they are probably at their worst stage. So my remarks are to encourage all of us who are involved, and you heard the commitment on the part of my colleagues on the Appropriations Committee to see that we do get the necessary funding.

I have heard the pleas on the part of my colleagues to give greater appropriations to fight AIDS, to fight food famine, et cetera, and so working together with those goals and objectives that we are all stating here and projecting and continuing to have an action plan and to be committed to that plan is what I want to encourage, but I do want to thank you for your foresight to ask for an increase, the first of its kind.

We need more of that, and we need the support of the rest of our colleagues to see that it happens. I thank you very much.

Thank you for the time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Waters.

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry that Mr. Morris had to leave, because I would like him to know that his testimony here today and his commitment to feeding poor people and dealing with this crisis in Africa was communicated in a very profound way, and I felt him and that commitment, and it certainly did make me feel a lot better about this desperation that I am feeling about this crises.

Also, Mr. Wilkinson, I want to say the same thing for you. I appreciate your testimony here today and your commitment, your experience, and I think that you represent perhaps the strongest arm of feeding people through NGOs such as yours and others that we have. And without you, we wouldn't be able to do this, and so I am so grateful that you are here.

To Mr. Natsios, let me just say that you obviously have a lot of experience. You have been down this road before, and you have a command of the problems on the continent. Let me just tell you what my concerns are about the USAID. First of all, I think you did describe that there have been tremendous cuts, and you were surprised when you came back or when you took over to see what had happened, and let me tell you, you are not out of the woods yet. When you talk about increasing funding to Africa, when you talk about USAID, there are not a lot of friends in the Congress of the United States who see this the way you and I may see it. So this is hard work when you are talking about dealing with the problems of Africa.

Some of us have spent the greater part of our careers just getting rid of apartheid in Africa before I even came to the Congress of the United States, working in the California State Legislature dealing with these problems. So I want you to proceed cautiously with the idea that somehow people understand and that this funding that you are anticipating probably will get done.

Now, I worry about the fact that you don't recognize this window of opportunity with the supplemental appropriations bill. You did say you are not a politician, so maybe I do understand it. But let me just say this, with this supplemental appropriations, where you have money going to Israel, you have money going to Afghanistan, what people are doing is they are ensuring that they deal with their crisis at the point that people understand there is a crisis.

And when you have a vehicle that is moving through the Congress of the United States where crises are being dealt with, it is not the time to say, let my crisis wait because I have got something else down the line. That 325 that you are talking about will be in competition in budget negotiations and may get lost, and you will find that a lot of people that you expect to step up to the plate won't be there for Africa for sure.

This is not easy: Legislating and public policy making for Africa. The reason the funding has not increased for Africa in all these years with Republican and Democratic Administrations is because Africa is at the bottom of the funding barrel, and it does not get the embracing that other places get.

So I worry a bit. I worry a bit when I listen to Mr. Wilkinson tell the story about a woman who died from starvation. As far as I am concerned, it is a famine going on. It is beyond crisis. Any time somebody dies from starvation and families are on the move to talk about trying to find food, we have got a problem. This problem will not be worked out because we are going to manipulate the commerce and that we are going to force governments, whether it is in Zimbabwe or any place else, to charge the right amount for commodities and somehow we factor that into dealing with what we are going to have available to us.

The crisis is going to be managed because we get ahead of it, we get ahead of it, and we have the resources that are necessary to ensure that we don't have any more stories about human beings that are dying from starvation in the year 2002. It is unacceptable. And so whether we are talking about this supplemental appropriation or other ways that you see Members are willing to move to give support to Africa, we are doing it because we have some experience around here, and we are trying to take advantage of a window of opportunity to protect that which we care about. And so I would like you not to close the door on that. I would like you to give that some thought. It won't be good enough at the height of competition to come back and say where are the people supporting me for my 325? People will be in strong competition on those appropriations committees for things they have been trying to get for many, many years, and Africa will go to the bottom of the barrel one more time.

Let me just wrap this up by saying this. In Angola, the problem has persisted because there were some people who were not wise enough to understand what Savimbi was doing in Angola, and the amount of resources that were taken out of that government to pay for the war.

The ongoing, never-ending war has created a catastrophe in Angola, and I want to tell you whether we are talking about Angola right now or these other places, each of them have their own problems. I am not impressed at all with the representation that in Mozambique they have got a little bit more in some section that they could export someplace else. They shouldn't be exporting anything. I saw a woman give birth to a baby in a tree in Mozambique when the floods came. You don't control Mother Nature. A combination of the floods and the drought has helped to create this situation in these six countries that we are identifying, and something could happen tomorrow. Don't export anything from Mozambique. You

better store it and try to get some more money so that you will be ahead of the situation.

Now, having preached my sermon and having said all of that, I thank you for at least being knowledgeable and informed about the work that you do. Oftentimes we get people who don't get it. I want to caution you again about Zimbabwe. Land reform is a big and complicated issue, and if we and the other donor countries had done what we could have done, we could have influenced the right direction for land reform. I am not forgiving Mugabe for the way that he has handled the situation, but let me tell you there were some commitments on the table to buy out some farmers that never, ever took place that helped to get us to where we are today.

Again, let me just wrap this up by saying I want you to leave this Committee today rethinking the fact that we are going forward. We are going to ask for this money. We are going straight to the conference committee, and we are going to say that we know Afghanistan is important, but we also know that the Taliban is still in Afghanistan running across the borders into Pakistan every night and putting our soldiers in danger. We know we don't have a democracy there, and we know that Karzai may never get a chance to do much if the warlords decide that they are not going to let anybody do anything, and we are not going to stop giving money there because we have this war on terrorism and Afghanistan stands at the center of that. And in order to have people understand that we care about it, we have got to do all of those things.

But at the same time that we are giving money to Afghanistan and we are concerned that in Israel they have had to spend so much money dealing with these crazy suicidal bombings that have been going on and they have had to increase the expenditure of dollars—and one thing I like about Israel, it does not mind asking for money, and Israel will tell you we are spending too much money. The Palestine Authority is causing us to take money from budgets in a way that we never anticipated. We don't have a problem now, but we are going to have one in the future if we continue to have to deal with what we are dealing with.

So we want some money now. We want it in the appropriations bill. Fortunately, Israel will get a lot of support, because there are a lot of people who care about Israel. There are a lot of politics. There are a lot of support. There are a lot of things that are going on that Africa does not yet have. I want you to leave here thinking about this window of opportunity, and I would love for you to come back and support the idea that is going to be led by the Congressional Black Caucus for additional money for Africa and this impending crisis.

We do not want the stories of people dying from starvation. We cannot stand to have more people dying on top of the AIDS and HIV and the poverty and all of the other things that we are trying to deal with. So we want your support, and we don't want you to come later and say, if I had only known. We want you to get ahead of it, and we want to be there with you. We will be there with you for the supplemental. We will be there with you for the budget. We are in this for the long haul.

Some people say, you know, they have few reasons that they come here and serve. I have few reasons. I serve poor people in this country. I serve my district, and I serve my mother land of Africa, and I want to help and I want you to do the same thing.

Mr. SMITH. The time of the gentlelady has expired.

Let me recognize the Ranking Member of the Africa Committee, Mr. Payne, for any concluding remarks and I think he has a closing question.

Mr. PAYNE. Well, thank you very much. I thank the members for their testimony and their questions. I thank the Chairman, Mr. Smith, who for so many years has been so supportive on issues of human rights wherever it happens to be. In many instances we will start a hearing at 11 and dwindle down to the two of us, but we do have four today. I would like to commend you for that. Just quickly, I wonder if—probably not time to answer, but I see where Secretary of Treasury O'Neill went to Africa, and Mr. Natsios, perhaps we can find out at another time if that will mean something since he is the Treasurer, whether we will see any new commitment.

I just might mention that there was a request that I made in the appropriations emergency funding that Ms. Waters talked about. It was a $15 million increase. It was $5 million for Burundi, where Mr. Mandela has just negotiated a settlement between the Hutus and Tutsis. They are going to have 18 months of one group, 18 months of another group and hopefully elections that will work.

Secondly, in Rwanda there are 110,000 people in jail. They have a system of judges having these trials in local areas so that they can kind of hopefully halve the number of people in prison, and we ask $5 million to help teach the judges and help train legal professionals and paralegals. And we also talked about $5 million for this fledgling Somali government which has come together and is trying to exist. We were told that none of those three could be done, because there wasn't enough money. However, we saw large appropriations go to Colombia and a number of places. I think you know where it went.

So I just want to say that we do have a lot of work to do, and I would like to associate myself with the remarks of Ms. Waters, and I do thank all of the three panelists for the outstanding work that you all do, and, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much again.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Payne, thank you very much. Mr. Natsios, Mr. Wilkinson and, although he has departed to the airplane, Mr. Morris, we want to thank the three of you for not just your fine testimony today but, more importantly, with the extraordinary work you do on behalf of suffering humanity. We are deeply appreciative. We want to be supportive and look forward to working with you.

Mr. Payne, thank you for your kind remarks. We do work very well as a team. This is a bipartisan Committee to a very large extent, and when it comes to humanitarian issues, there are no parties. There are only attempts to alleviate that suffering. So we look forward to working with you and, Mr. Payne, thank you.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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