

**THE PRESIDENT'S INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
BUDGET REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
**COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

—————
FEBRUARY 12, 2003
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Serial No. 108-18

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Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international_relations

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

84-944PDF

WASHINGTON : 2003

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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:20, a.m., in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order.

The procedure, ladies and gentlemen, will be an opening statement made by myself and by Mr. Lantos. There will be no more opening statements, so we can have as much time as possible for questions, but every one of you who has a statement, without objection it will be made part of the record.

Mr. Secretary, welcome to the Committee on International Relations. On behalf of my colleagues, thank you for your dedicated service to our country. We are eager to hear your testimony, but before that, I would like to offer a few thoughts, and I will then ask my friend, the distinguished Ranking Democratic Member, Mr. Lantos, to offer remarks of his own.

We meet at a time of great peril and great opportunity. The peril is obvious: Aggressive regimes armed with weapons of mass destruction, uncontrolled by any domestic political constraints and linked to international terrorist networks in a shadow world of malice where the murder of innocents is considered a noble vocation. These threaten the very possibility of order in world affairs.

In Iraq, the world's 58-year experiment with collective security is being put to the supreme test. If Iraq is permitted to defy 12 years of United Nations resolutions demanding its disarmament, then that 58-year experiment in collective security will be, for all intents and purposes, over.

In enforcing the will of the U.N., as expressed most recently in Resolution 1441, the United States and its allies are upholding the minimum conditions for world order. Let us hope that Iraqi disarmament can be enforced with the united support of the Security Council, but let us make certain that effective and decisive enforcement takes place by what the President has called a coalition of the willing, if necessary.

This peril also contains, in my view, a great opportunity. The opportunity is to recast the politics of a turbulent region of the world so that opportunities for real stability are created.

What we often call "stability" in the Middle East has been, for the past half-century, a most volatile instability. The world cannot

live with this instability much longer. It threatens world peace, it threatens the global economy, and as the bitter lesson of September 11 taught us, the instability of the Middle East can now reach around the globe and directly threaten the security of the people of the United States.

America is often said to be a “hyperpower,” yet our actions are repeatedly frustrated by an endless train of objections and obstruction. America has fought distant wars to defend whole continents from a succession of aggressors, but the beneficiaries of the safety we have ensured often devote their energies to impeding our efforts to help others. We shoulder burdensome responsibilities for the benefit of the entire globe, but too often we must do it alone.

Americans are rightly puzzled by this, and by what appears to many to be ingratitude and even hostility on the part of friends and allies. We see our own motives as noble, and believe this fact to be self-evident. We are not an imperial power, coldly focused on the subjugation of others, or on securing some narrow advantage for ourselves. Instead, we are frequently moved to action by the plight of others, often losing sight of our own self-interest in our zeal to make the world right.

None can doubt that for over half a century, we have employed our power in the service of making the world safe, peaceful, and prosperous to the extent of our ability to do so. It is true that we are not motivated by altruism alone. We cannot be, for we have a responsibility for our own welfare that cannot be delegated to others, not even the United Nations. But altruism has always been woven into the policies of our republic. Given the nature of our fundamental principles and beliefs, that cannot be otherwise.

How is it, then, that we do so much for so many others and yet have to plead for their support? Why is it always so difficult to enlist others in causes from which all benefit? Why do we carry global responsibilities, yet others feel no need to assume a share of the collective burden?

While it may be tempting to resent our allies and others for what appears as cynical and perverse behavior, the truth is, this puzzle is one of our own making. It is, in fact, the product of our very success in remaking the world. It is the defining trait of what may be termed “the pathology of success.”

Great success often prompts a corresponding envy in others, and our occasional humbling is a rich and guilty pleasure often indulged in by friends and foes alike. That is the principal reason Castro is celebrated by a spectrum of leaders stretching from Third World dictators to our NATO allies. The former take heart from the fact that he has defied the power of the United States and survived; for the latter, cultivating ties with our declared enemy has long been an easy and risk-free way for them to demonstrate their independence from us, even as we remain pledged to their defense.

Dependence can also evoke a corrosive resentment that can slumber in the deepest layers, even with friends. This is especially true among those whose ambitions are not matched by their capabilities and who are reminded of their less-than-central role in the world by what they believe is our failure to sufficiently consult with them regarding our own decisions.

Ultimately, however, these explanations do not adequately describe the phenomenon. The fundamental problem is simply this: Given our strength, the urgency of our many concerns, and our willingness to proceed alone, if necessary, we have liberated others from the responsibility of defending their own interests, to say nothing of any responsibility for the collective interests of the West.

Many would watch the night descend on others in faraway countries, of which they know little, without any feeling that perhaps they should do something to halt it, and that not doing so might be a perilous option. Far from assisting, they might even devote their energies to preventing others from doing something. The vast extent of our success has created the equivalent of a moral hazard, the dangers of which we are encountering with increasing frequency.

The clearest example of this in the international system is Europe. In the 1,500 years following the fall of the Roman empire, Europe was a warring continent where suspicion and betrayal were forces of nature, and peace but an uncertain interlude between conflicts.

This world was upended by the United States. In the aftermath of World War II, with Europe devastated and still smoldering from ancient hatreds, the United States assumed a dominant role in all aspects, reviving the prostrate economies with unprecedented aid, shoring up weak democracies, insisting on ever closer cooperation between former enemies, establishing the institutions by which a unity of purpose came into being, weaving the whole into a community.

Embracing it all, the United States provided an absolute guarantee of safety. Problems shrank to the scale of daily life. Dangers evaporated into abstract metaphors. Sheltered by American power, the hostilities of the untamed world beyond became remote, and then imaginary.

This unearned inheritance did not require any of the beneficiaries to assume any risk, take on oppressive burdens, acknowledge their debt, or do anything other than focus on a pursuit of self-interest. They remained safe, regardless of what they did or did not do. The natural state of the world was transformed from one ruled by fear and competition to one of safety and peace; and like nature, it required no effort on the part of man to bring it into being. Instead of hard choices of war and peace, it was more akin to selecting from an a la carte menu, guided only by one's activities and momentary preferences.

It was a profoundly false view of the world, but can we fault those who were raised in this cocoon of our own making? We may blame others for their shortsightedness, but it was we who have distorted their perceptions of reality. It is we who have created a beneficial but artificial environment so secure that its beneficiaries believe it to be self-sustaining. They feel neither need nor obligation to do anything to defend their interests, to secure those of the West, to ensure order rather than disorder in the world beyond their garden.

Seen from this perspective, the United States becomes not the protector of the West in Iraq and elsewhere, but its tormentor, its power, not the source of security, but of disorder, a blundering and

myopic Goliath whose misguided efforts are threatening to all. If only the United States were to desist, they say, we would once again be serene. The image is so inverted that one can almost hear the distant musical strains of "The World Turned Upside Down."

To a lesser degree, a similar situation prevails in east Asia, where the conquest, oppression, fear, and war of the past have given way to a prosperous, cooperative, secure system of free states, one which I am pleased to say is populated by an increasing number of democracies. The United States played a direct hand in bringing about many of these historic changes, but its most profound contribution was to create and defend a nurturing and secure environment in which this transformation could take place, and we have defended it with tens of thousands of American dead and uncounted billions in treasure.

But here again, we see the dangerous abdication of responsibility that has risen out of the artificial environment we have established. All problems have become America's responsibility while others, even those with more immediate interests than our own, stand on the sidelines offering passive encouragement or vocal abuse.

We see the absurdity of this situation in the current crisis regarding North Korea. Somehow, this problem is judged by both ourselves and others to be ours, and ours almost alone. It is not seen as a challenge to be met by the countries of East Asia, which watch to see the course we will take in order to tack to the prevailing winds. It is not assumed to be that of the rest of the world, which distractedly wonders why the United States has not yet resolved this faraway problem; nor is it that of China, whose influence in Pyongyang is paramount, and without whose assistance the regime would quickly collapse. It is not even that of South Korea, which we liberated at great cost in young lives and have defended from conquest for over half a century, but where we are now openly accused of being the unwelcome source of that peninsula's misfortunes.

The familiarity of these problems, however, obscures a deeper danger: We have entered a new and more threatening century, one in which the civilized world will be under increasing assault from the forces of terror and dismemberment. These forces cannot be dissuaded by reason or by the paying of tribute. We are certain to discover that our ability to hold back the rising tide of disorder is finite, and we cannot by ourselves defend the West from those who even now are plotting our destruction. Others must now take up their long-ignored responsibility and assume their place in the line, not only for their own sake but for all of us.

We cannot wait for disaster to awaken them from their dreams of summer. Instead, we must expose them to the dangers of a rough reality, for only with the ensuing abrasions is there hope that their comforting illusions can be worn away. The alarm has already begun to sound, but as yet it remains unheard.

Justice demands that I make an exception to my reproach, and that exception is Britain. Our ties are deep. Britain remains the mother country, even for those Americans whose ancestors never touched British soil. We are joined not merely by common interests

but by a shared recognition that if our world is to be preserved, we have no option but to accept our duty.

For Britain, the term “ally” is insufficient; we are, in truth, partners. In saying this, I do not mean to fail to express my admiration for the dozens of countries who have bravely offered their support.

We have made much of the world a welcoming one for all the wondrous things to which mankind has aspired over the centuries, but we have also established it on a perilous foundation, one that permits its citizens a fatal irresponsibility. The fault is ours, not theirs. It is we who have mistakenly allowed others to learn a false and dangerous lesson: To believe that the peace and safety of the West, the product of centuries of effort, will maintain itself; that order need not be wrested from the storms and chaos that surround us.

To believe that our world is not a fragile thing is to risk everything. We have, in fact, made our world safe in the disastrous belief that others need not share a part of the collective burden, that there is no burden to be borne by all. We may in fact be risking everything.

Let me quote the warning by the philosopher, Ortega y Gasset:

“If you want to make use of the advantages of civilization but are not prepared to concern yourself with the upholding of civilization, you are done . . . Just a slip, and when you look around, everything has vanished into air.”

One of the paradoxes of our time is that the American people, who have never dreamed dreams of empire, should find themselves given this unique responsibility in the course of world history. As you said so eloquently during your recent speech at Davos, Mr. Secretary, Americans did not go into the world in the 20th century for self-aggrandizement but, rather, for the liberation of others, asking of those others only a small piece of ground in which to bury our dead, who gave their lives for the freedom of men and women they never knew or met.

Now, these these first determinative years of the 21st century, we are being challenged to such large tasks again. We did not ask to be so challenged, but we dare not let the challenge go unanswered.

That is why we are grateful for your time this morning, Secretary Powell. That is why we are grateful for you, because there are many things to discuss as we consider how our actions in the next weeks and months can create conditions for a new Middle East, for a new and more humane method of managing world affairs, so that freedom’s cause may flourish.

I apologize for the prolixity of my remarks, but there were things I wanted to say.

Now with pleasure I yield to Mr. Lantos for an opening statement.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first commend you on a powerful and thoughtful statement, and let me identify myself with it. This Congress and this country are fortunate to have you in a position of leadership in the field of foreign policy.

Secretary Powell, let me thank you for joining us today. I believe I can speak for all of us in expressing my deepest gratitude for your extraordinary public service on behalf of our Nation.

Let me also add my voice to the chorus praising your presentation at the United Nations Security Council last week. It was a brilliant performance, revealing not one smoking gun but a hundred. You removed all doubts that Saddam Hussein is deliberately and systematically hiding his weapons of mass destruction in clear violation of his international obligations. You made an utterly compelling case against Saddam Hussein, and in doing so, set a new standard at the U.N. Security Council.

Prior to your presentation, Mr. Secretary, we spoke of a Stevenson moment, referring to Ambassador Adlai Stevenson's dramatic performance during the Cuban missile crisis. Hereafter, we shall speak of a Powell moment.

Although the case against Saddam is closed, the course we now take to disarm him remains open to debate. I, for one, support the strong position as the best means of achieving disarmament and peace. Other Members of Congress and other Members on this Committee honestly disagree. As we consider the question of deploying our Armed Forces, let no one question the patriotism of those who oppose doing so. All of us are patriots, devoted to protecting our Nation's interests and promoting our values.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I do not hold many of our so-called European allies in the same esteem. As one born in Europe and who I think fully understands the unlimited cynicism of some European leadership, I am particularly disgusted by the blind intransigence and utter ingratitude of France, Germany, and Belgium, countries which blocked our efforts to even engage in contingency planning if our ally, Turkey, were attacked by Iraq.

In my judgment, NATO is a two-way street, providing protection and demanding commitment. The United States has upheld its commitments, and if it were not for the heroic efforts of our military, France, Germany, and Belgium today would be Soviet socialist republics. I wish to repeat that: Had it not been for our military commitment, France, Germany, and Belgium today would be Soviet socialist republics. The failure of these States to honor their commitments is beneath contempt.

Mr. Secretary, thanks to your efforts, I believe the Administration has succeeded in making a compelling case against Iraq. It has not yet succeeded, however, in marshalling the energies, resources, and passions of the American people for this fight.

While our brave men and women in uniform, active duty reserves, National Guard, prepare to make the ultimate sacrifice if called upon, the President has asked virtually nothing, virtually nothing of Americans on the home front. The recent deaths of U.S. military and diplomatic personnel to enemy fire in Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Jordan just underscore the disparity in the sacrifices Americans are called upon to make.

Mr. Secretary, you certainly know the meaning of sacrifice. As a lifelong soldier and public servant, you have laid your life on the line for your country for decades. Many of us of earlier generations also know the meaning of sacrifice. We know that our freedom is not free, that our Nation's blessings as very much hard-earned as

they are God-given. We also know the value of shared sacrifice in unifying our Nation behind a worthy cause.

The Administration, however, clearly does not fully appreciate the value of shared sacrifice. This is most evident in its tax policies. Mr. Secretary, you do not lead the Department of Treasury and this is not the Ways and Means Committee, but the misguided tax cuts proposed by the Administration impact our national security by exempting the most affluent Americans from any sacrifice. It is fundamentally unfair to ask some to possibly sacrifice all and ask others to sacrifice nothing.

As the Nation prepares for war and our military men and women risk their lives, how can anyone possibly justify such palpably unfair tax breaks for our wealthiest citizens? The Administration's proposed tax cuts denigrate the patriotic sacrifices some of our fellow Americans are asked to make. They also threaten to undermine the cohesion of the Nation.

I look forward with great anticipation to your presentation, Mr. Secretary. You have done the Nation extraordinary service and we are deeply in your debt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

We will now go to the part of the program involving questions. I would ask Members to—I'm sorry. I thought I would save you from defending tax policy.

Mr. LANTOS. It is indefensible, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. We will have Economics 101 later, but Mr. Secretary, please take extra time.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COLIN L. POWELL,
SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I was about to lay prostrate before the Committee.

It is, of course, a pleasure for me to appear again before the Committee, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for your powerful opening statement, and Mr. Lantos, I thank you for your words as well. With your permission, I will leave tax policy to Mr. Snow and other members of the Administration.

Mr. LANTOS. It shows great wisdom.

Secretary POWELL. It is a pleasure to be before the Committee again, and I begin by thanking all of the Members of the Committee for the solid support that you have provided to me, to the Department and, even more importantly, to the men and women of the Department of State who are serving their Nation with such distinction around the world; and, as was noted by Mr. Lantos, putting themselves also in harm's way and taking casualties, just like soldiers do. Knowing that they have your support means a lot to them.

I am here this morning to ask for your support again in the upcoming fiscal year. I will get, I'm sure, in the course of questioning, the opportunity to talk about all of the various regional issues you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, but I hope that you will bear with me as I focus on the budget for just a few moments.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I do have a full statement which I would like to submit for the record, and then propose to end that statement with a few words.

Chairman HYDE. Without objection.

Secretary POWELL. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here to testify before you in support of the President's international affairs budget for fiscal year 2004.

Funding requested for FY 2004 for the Department of State, USAID, and other foreign affairs agencies is \$28.5 billion. The President's budget will allow the United States first to target security and economic assistance to sustain key countries supporting us in the war on terrorism and to help us stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Next, this budget will help us launch the Millenium Challenge Account, a new partnership generating support to countries that rule justly, that invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom; also, to strengthen the United States in its global commitment to fight HIV/AIDS and alleviating humanitarian hardships; next, to help us combat illegal drugs in the Andean region of South America as well as bolster democracy in one of that region's most important countries, Colombia; and to reinforce America's world-class diplomatic force, focusing on the people, places, and tools needed to promote our foreign policies around the world.

I am particularly proud and committed to that last goal, Mr. Chairman. For the past 2 years, I have concentrated on that in each of my jobs, as primary Foreign Policy Adviser to the President but, just as importantly, also as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Leader of the State Department.

Under my leadership or CEO hat, we are asking for \$8.5 billion within that \$28.5 billion number. Let me give you some highlights of what these particular funds are for.

First, we have been reinforcing our diplomatic force for 2 years and will continue to do so in FY 2004. For some period of time in the last decade, we simply weren't hiring new Foreign Service officers and civil service employees into the Department. It was a disaster. If you want to have an Ambassador in 15 years, you have to hire a junior officer now. If you want to have a battalion commander in 15 years, you have to hire a second lieutenant now. You can't have air bubbles in a personnel pipeline.

We have turned that around, and we are encouraging Americans to come forward to apply to be members of this wonderful State Department of ours, and they have been responding. Some 80,000 young Americans in the last 2 years have signed up to take the Foreign Service written exam, a very tough exam.

We are also reaching out more throughout our society to ensure that the State Department can look more like America and more like the world. I am pleased that in the last Foreign Service exam, for example, 38 percent of those passing the exam were minorities. We are reaching out throughout all of the communities of America to get more young Americans to step forward, and they are stepping forward. But if Congress does not give me the money to hire some of them, then I am wasting my time.

I am very pleased that Congress has been willing to do that and, in this new submission, I will be able to hire 399 more professionals to help the President carry out the Nation's foreign policy. This third year of increased hiring will amount to 1,100 new professionals within the Department. It gets us above, well above, the

attrition level, so people can go to training and people can do other things other than just deal with the daily workload. We will have a little bit of flexibility in our personnel system.

Moreover, completion of these hires will show to the Department that what we said at the beginning of this Administration came true: We believe in the Department, we believe in taking care of our people and giving them the additional people to join them to get the work done.

Second, I promised to bring state-of-the-art communications capability to the Department, because people who can't communicate rapidly and effectively in today's globalizing world can't carry out our foreign policy. I told the members of the Department that, before I left, I wanted every person in the Department, no matter where they were in the world, to have Internet capability on their desk, classified and unclassified. We are charging forward on that goal. We have to make sure that we are in tune with the kind of world we are living in with this information technology and with respect to the speed of communication.

By way of illustration of how we are trying to do this, within minutes after my presentation to the U.N. last Wednesday afternoon, it was all being translated into multiple languages and being instantly downloaded at all of our Embassies. All of our Embassy teams were prepared to take that presentation, turn it around, get it out to the people in the countries in which they are posted. We have to be able to do that more and more on an instantaneous basis.

I told some of my staff members that on Thursday morning, looking at the reviews of Wednesday's presentation and some of the pictures, the picture that touched me the most as I looked through the newspapers was a picture of a ready room in an aircraft carrier. These Marine aviators were sitting in their flight seats, where they get briefed for a mission, and they were sitting in the ready room watching the presentation that I was making at the U.N. the day before.

They are not waiting to read it in a newspaper, they are not waiting for a brilliant talking head to explain it to them, they are not waiting for the evening news; they are getting the information instantaneously, direct to the consumer: Them. Nobody had more of an interest in what I was talking about than these young aviators, who may well have to go into combat.

That ability to communicate instantaneously, to spread knowledge instantaneously, is something I have to drive into every single corner of the State Department and put on every desk in the State Department. We are well along the way to doing that. I ask for your continued support.

Also with respect to my CEO role, I wanted to sweep the slate clean and completely revamp the way we construct our Embassies and other overseas facilities. I found a program that was in some difficulty when I arrived. I put in charge General Chuck Williams, who you have all come to know, a former Army officer with the Corps of Engineers. He has turned the place around. He has a great team working with him. Our Embassies are now coming in under cost, more cheaply. We have reduced the cost of building, and we are using the most modern management techniques with

respect to construction. I ask you again for solid support for that program, which is in the neighborhood of \$1.5 billion this year.

Mr. Chairman, as the principal foreign policy adviser to President Bush, I have budget priorities as well in that hat. Let me highlight just a few of our foreign policy funding priorities before I stop and make a few remarks in response to you, Mr. Chairman, and you, Mr. Lantos, and then turn it over to questions.

The 2004 budget proposes several initiatives to advance the U.S. national security interests and preserve American leadership. The 2004 foreign operations budget that funds programs for the Department of State, USAID, and other foreign affairs agencies is \$18.8 billion.

Today our number one priority is to fight and win the global war on terrorism. The budget furthers this goal by providing economic, military, and democracy assistance to key foreign partners and allies, including \$4.7 billion to countries that have joined us on the front line of the campaign against terrorism.

Of this amount, the President's budget provides \$657 million for Afghanistan, \$460 million for Jordan, \$395 million for Pakistan, \$255 million for Turkey, \$136 million for Indonesia, and \$87 million for the Philippines.

In Afghanistan, the funding will be used to fulfill our commitment to rebuild Afghanistan's road network. In addition, it will establish security through a national military and national police force, establish broad-based and accountable governance through democratic institutions and an active civil society, ensure a peace dividend for the Afghan people through economic reconstruction, and provide humanitarian assistance to sustain returning refugees and displaced persons.

United States' assistance will continue to be coordinated with the Afghan government, the United Nations, and other international donors.

That is pretty bureaucratic, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, but the bottom line is that we have a success story in Afghanistan. Is it still fragile? Yes. Are there still al-Qaeda elements and Taliban elements running around? Yes. Are we going to be there a long time? Yes.

But, what we have accomplished in the last year and a half or so has been rather incredible when we consider that we removed a terrible regime; we flushed al-Qaeda, and they are on the run; we put in place a government that is representative of the people, representative of the people and respectful of the people; we have started the reconstruction effort to put in roads and schools and hospitals; women are now being integrated into public life throughout Afghanistan; and over 1 million refugees have returned to this country. By voting in that way, with their feet, they are showing confidence in the future of Afghanistan, and we can be proud that we helped give the Afghan people that confidence.

Mr. Chairman, I also want to emphasize our efforts to decrease the threats posed by terrorist groups, rogue states, and other non-state actors with regard to weapons of mass destruction and related technology.

To achieve this goal, we must strengthen partnerships with countries that share our views in dealing with the threat of terrorism

and resolving regional conflicts. The 2004 budget requests \$35 million for the nonproliferation and disarmament fund, more than double the 2003 request. It increases funding for overseas export controls and border security to \$40 million and supports additional funding for science centers and biochem redirection programs.

Funding increases requested for these programs will help us prevent weapons of mass destruction falling in the hands of terrorist groups or states by preventing their movements across borders and by destroying or safeguarding known quantities of weapons or source material.

The science centers and biochem redirection programs support the same goals by engaging former weapons scientists and engineers in peaceful scientific activities and by providing them an alternative to marketing their skills to states or groups of concern.

The budget also promotes international peace and prosperity by launching the most innovative approach to U.S. foreign assistance in more than 40 years. The new Millennium Challenge Account, an independent government corporation funded at \$1.3 billion, will redefine development aid. As President Bush told African leaders meeting in Mauritius recently, this aid will go to nations that encourage economic freedom, that root out corruption, and respect the rights of their people. It is money that will be used to reinforce their commitment to democracy; to make sure that they stay on the path of the rule of law, of democracy, of economic freedom, and of the rights and privileges of their people to select their own leaders and to seek their own destiny within a democratic system.

Moreover, this budget offers hope and a helping hand to countries facing health catastrophies, poverty, despair, and humanitarian disasters. The budget includes more than \$1 billion to meet the needs of refugees and internally displaced peoples. The budget also provides more than \$1.3 billion to combat the global HIV/AIDS epidemic. The President's total budget for HIV/AIDS is \$2 billion, which includes the first year's funding for the new emergency planning for HIV/AIDS relief that the President announced in his State of the Union Address. These funds will target 14 of the hardest-hit countries in Africa and the Caribbean.

This budget also includes almost half a billion dollars for Colombia. This funding will support Columbian President Uribe's unified campaign against terrorists and the drug trade that fuels their terrorist activities. The aim is to secure democracy, to extend security, to restore economic prosperity to Colombia, and to prevent the narcoterrorists from spreading instability to the broader Andean region.

To accomplish this goal requires more than simply funding for Colombia. To deal with other nations in the region, our total Andean counterdrug initiative is for \$731 million. Critical components of this effort include resumption of the airbridge denial program, to stop internal and cross-border aerial trafficking in illicit drugs, stepped-up eradication and alternative development efforts, and technical assistance to strengthen Colombia's police and judicial institutions.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, in order to advance America's interests around the world, we need the dollars that have been requested for my Department in the President's fiscal

year budget for 2004. We need the dollars under both of my hats, CEO as well as principal foreign policy adviser.

Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to answer all of the questions you might have on the budget and other matters, but for just a moment, let me just say a word or two about some of the issues raised in the opening statements.

First, with respect to Iraq, Mr. Chairman, when the international community came together after President Bush's speech to the United Nations on the 12th of September, it came together with the certain understanding that if the United Nations was going to remain relevant, it had to act on this challenge that had been put before the United Nations by Saddam Hussein. For the previous 12 years and through 16 resolutions, the United Nations had demanded compliance by Saddam Hussein of his obligations under those resolutions. He has ignored the United Nations.

The President went to the United Nations because this was a problem, as you noted, sir, not just for the United States but for the whole world. Saddam Hussein is a threat to his own people, he is a threat to his neighbors, and ultimately he will be a threat to the whole world with the development of weapons of mass destruction. This was not a charge dreamed up by the United States of America. It was a statement of the Security Council of the United Nations repeated year after year after year.

What the President said on the 12th of September was that it is time to get serious and put action to the words. Over the next 7½ weeks, I worked with my colleagues on the Security Council and we came up with a strong resolution, Resolution 1441, which was passed on the eighth of November. This Resolution did several things which sometimes people forget, and some of the people who voted for the resolution forget.

First and foremost, it said that Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime are guilty; it is not a matter of needing more evidence. They have been found guilty previously, they are guilty now, they remain in material breach of their obligations under previous resolutions. There is no question about whether they are guilty or not. Every member voting that day understood that simple proposition.

Second, we said that there is a way to resolve this to the Iraqi regime. There is a way to get out of this problem that you have put yourself in. That way is to comply, to give up your weapons of mass destruction, to turn over the documents, to make people available to be interviewed, scientists and engineers, to bring them out of the country so they will not be intimidated, and to show us where these facilities are; in sum, to bring forth all that you have been doing. That is what the resolution called for Iraq to do.

To help you, we said, we will strengthen the inspection system and give more authority to Dr. Blix and Dr. Al-Baredei in order to help Iraq comply. Then, finally, to make sure that Iraq understood the seriousness of this issue, the final part of the resolution clearly said that if there are new material breaches, further material breaches, meaning Iraq has not complied as it must, then serious consequences will flow.

Every member sitting in the council that day understood that "serious consequences" meant if Iraq did not take this last chance, this last opportunity to come into compliance, Iraq would face mili-

tary force in order to bring it into compliance, in order to disarm Iraq. There was no confusion in that council that day, I can assure you, because we worked on that document for 7½ weeks.

We now have 3 months of experience under that Resolution. Saddam Hussein has not complied. He sent forward a false declaration 30 days after the resolution was enacted, 1 day short of 30 days. In that declaration he gave us a lot of smoke. We specifically put that in there as an early requirement, a 30-day requirement, in order to test him to see whether or not he was going to undertake seriously his obligations. He failed the test. Nobody can dispute that.

He has also failed to give the inspectors the kind of cooperation that is needed for the inspectors to do their work. I don't think there is any dispute about that, and we will hear more about this from Dr. Blix and Dr. Al-Baredei on Friday.

We are reaching a moment of truth with respect to this resolution and whether it meant anything or not. We are reaching a moment of truth with respect to the relevance of the United Nations' Security Council to impose its will on a nation such as Iraq, which has ignored the will of the Council for the last 12 years. We are reaching a moment of truth as to whether or not this matter will resolve peacefully or if it will be resolved by military conflict.

The President still hopes it can be resolved peacefully. I think everybody has that hope. I have that hope. I don't like war. I have been in war. I have sent men into war. I have seen friends die in war. Nobody wants war, but sometimes it is necessary when you need it to maintain international order.

The United States is prepared to lead a coalition, either under U.N. auspices, or if the U.N. will not act to demonstrate its relevance, then the United States is prepared with a coalition of the willing to act. It will be a good coalition, a strong coalition.

There are some of my European colleagues right now who are resisting the natural flow of this Resolution and what is supposed to happen. They want to have more inspectors. More inspectors are not the issue. Dr. Blix has not asked for more inspectors. Dr. Al-Baredei has not asked for more inspectors. It is not clear Saddam Hussein would like more inspectors. But that is not the issue, the issue is lack of Iraqi compliance.

Just to say we need more inspectors is a way of delaying, of diverting attention from the basic proposition that Iraq is not complying, and the resolution spells out clearly what should happen at that time. The United States will not shrink from the obligations that we undertook when we worked to get that resolution passed.

I hope that, in the days ahead, we will be able to rally the United Nations around the original resolution and what other resolution might be necessary in order to satisfy the political needs of a number of the countries. But the United States will not be deterred. Iraq must be disarmed, peacefully, or through the use of military force.

It is interesting and challenging, Mr. Chairman, to watch the politics of this unfold, especially within Europe. France and Germany are resisting. They believe that more inspections and more time is necessary. The question I put to them is why more inspectors and how much more time, or are you just delaying for the sake

of delaying, in order to get Saddam Hussein off the hook and have no disarmament? That is a challenge that I will put to them again this Friday and next week as debate continues on this issue.

Nations such as the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and many of the newly-independent states who were once enslaved and understood dictators, who understand the consequences of not dealing with a dictator when one should deal with a dictator, are solidly on our side.

We have these debates within NATO and within Europe all the time. The Financial Times made reference this morning to Charles DeGaulle back in 1956 saying the United States is a superpower that has to be brought under control; thus, we have seen these kinds of expressions and hyperpower complaints previously.

I still believe that it is possible to rally the international community to discharge its obligations. All of the nations that we are now having debates with are, at the end of the day, allies and friends of ours. We have had our disagreements, we have had our fights in the past, but we have always managed to find a way forward. It is my job as Secretary of State to work with these nations and to find a way forward, never by compromising our principles and our strong beliefs, but by using the power of our principles to convince others of what we should do in a collective fashion.

One final point, Mr. Chairman. Somebody asked me yesterday, well, suppose there is a military conflict? Infidels will be going into Iraq. Isn't that going to be terrible? Isn't all kinds of heck going to break loose? I said, yes, well, nobody complained when infidels went into Kuwait to save the people of Kuwait from an Iraqi invasion. We were welcomed by the Muslim population of Kuwait, which had been invaded by a Muslim nation.

Nobody talked about infidels when we acted in Kosovo a few years ago. Nobody talks about infidels now that we are in Afghanistan today, because what the Afghan people are learning today, what the people of Japan and Germany and so many other places have learned over the years, is that America comes in peace. America comes as a partner. America comes to help people, to put in place better systems of government that respect the rights of men and women. America never comes as a conqueror. America comes to do the principal thing in the interest of peace and the interest of stability. That will continue to be the philosophy by which this President runs our foreign policy.

Mr. Chairman, let me just stop here in the interest of time.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much for a very fascinating statement.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Powell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you to testify in support of the President's International Affairs Budget for Fiscal Year 2004. Funding requested for FY 2004 for the Department of State, USAID, and other foreign affairs agencies is \$28.5 billion.

The President's Budget will allow the United States to:

Target security and economic assistance to sustain key countries supporting us in the war on terrorism and helping us to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

Launch the Millennium Challenge Account—a new partnership generating support to countries that rule justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom;

Strengthen the U.S. and global commitment to fighting HIV/AIDS and alleviating humanitarian hardships;

Combat illegal drugs in the Andean Region of South America, as well as bolster democracy in one of that region's most important countries, Colombia; and

Reinforce America's world-class diplomatic force, focusing on the people, places, and tools needed to promote our foreign policies around the world.

I am particularly proud of the last bullet, Mr. Chairman, because for the past 2 years I have concentrated on each of my jobs—primary foreign policy advisor to the President *and* Chief Executive Officer of the State Department.

Under my CEO hat, we have been reinforcing our diplomatic force for 2 years and we will continue in FY 2004. We will hire 399 more professionals to help the President carry out the nation's foreign policy. This hiring will bring us to the 1,100-plus new foreign and civil service officers we set out to hire over the first 3 years to bring the Department's personnel back in line with its diplomatic workload. Moreover, completion of these hires will allow us the flexibility to train and educate all of our officers as they should be trained and educated. So I am proud of that accomplishment and want to thank you for helping me bring it about.

In addition, I promised to bring state-of-the-art communications capability to the Department—because people who can't communicate rapidly and effectively in today's globalizing world can't carry out our foreign policy. We are approaching our goal in that regard as well.

In both unclassified and classified communications capability, including desk-top access to the Internet for every man and woman at State, we are there by the end of 2003. The budget before you will sustain these gains and continue our information technology modernization effort.

Finally, with respect to my CEO role, I wanted to sweep the slate clean and completely revamp the way we construct our embassies and other overseas buildings, as well as improve the way we secure our men and women who occupy them. As you well know, that last task is a long-term, almost never-ending one, particularly in this time of heightened terrorist activities. But we are well on the way to implementing both the construction and the security tasks in a better way, in a less expensive way, and in a way that subsequent CEOs can continue and improve on.

Mr. Chairman, let me give you key details with respect to these three main CEO priorities, as well as tell you about other initiatives under my CEO hat:

THE CEO RESPONSIBILITIES: STATE DEPARTMENT AND RELATED AGENCIES

The President's FY 2004 discretionary request for the Department of State and Related Agencies is \$8.497 billion. The requested funding will allow us to:

Continue initiatives to recruit, hire, train, and deploy the right work force. The budget request includes \$97 million to complete the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative by hiring 399 additional foreign affairs professionals. Foreign policy is carried out through our people, and rebuilding America's diplomatic readiness in staffing will ensure that the Department can respond to crises and emerging foreign policy priorities. This is the third year of funding for this initiative, which will provide a total of 1,158 new staff for the Department of State.

Continue to put information technology in the service of diplomacy. The budget request includes \$157 million to sustain the investments made over the last 2 years to provide classified connectivity to every post that requires it and to expand desk-top access to the Internet for State Department employees. Combined with \$114 million in estimated Expedited Passport Fees, a total of \$271 million will be available for information technology investments, including beginning a major initiative—SMART—that will overhaul the outdated systems for cables, messaging, information sharing, and document archiving.

Continue to upgrade and enhance our security worldwide. The budget request includes \$646.7 million for programs to enhance the security of our diplomatic facilities and personnel serving abroad and for hiring 85 additional security and support professionals to sustain the Department's Worldwide Security Upgrades program.

Continue to upgrade the security of our overseas facilities. The budget request includes \$1.514 billion to fund major security-related construction projects and address the major physical security and rehabilitation needs of embassies and consulates around the world. The request includes \$761.4 million for construction of secure embassy compounds in seven countries and \$128.3 million for construction of a new embassy building in Germany.

The budget also supports management improvements to the overseas buildings program and the Overseas Building Operations (OBO) long-range plan. The budget proposes a Capital Security Cost Sharing Program that allocates the capital costs of new overseas facilities to all U.S. Government agencies on the basis of the number of their authorized overseas positions. This program will serve two vital purposes: (1) to accelerate construction of new embassy compounds and (2) to encourage Federal agencies to evaluate their overseas positions more carefully. In doing so, it will further the President's Management Agenda initiative to rightsize the official American presence abroad. The modest surcharge to the cost of stationing an American employee overseas will not undermine vital overseas work, but it will encourage more efficient management of personnel and taxpayer funds.

Continue to enhance the Border Security Program. The budget request includes \$736 million in Machine Readable Visa (MRV) fee revenues for continuous improvements in consular systems, processes, and programs in order to protect U.S. borders against the illegal entry of individuals who would do us harm.

Meet our obligations to international organizations. Fulfilling U.S. commitments is vital to building coalitions and gaining support for U.S. interests and policies in the war against terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The budget request includes \$1 billion to fund U.S. assessments to 44 international organizations, including \$71.4 million to support renewed U.S. membership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Support obligations to international peacekeeping activities. The budget request includes \$550.2 million to pay projected UN peacekeeping assessments. These peacekeeping activities ensure continued American leadership in shaping the international community's response to developments that threaten international peace and stability.

Continue to eliminate support for terrorists and thus deny them safe haven through our ongoing public diplomacy activities, our educational and cultural exchange programs, and international broadcasting. The budget request includes \$296.9 million for public diplomacy, including information and cultural programs carried out by overseas missions and supported by public diplomacy personnel in our regional and functional bureaus. These resources are used to engage, inform, and influence foreign publics and broaden dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.

The budget request also includes \$345.3 million for educational and cultural exchange programs that build mutual understanding and develop friendly relations between America and the peoples of the world. These activities establish the trust, confidence, and international cooperation with other countries that sustain and advance the full range of American national interests.

The budget request includes \$100 million for education and cultural exchanges for States of the Former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, which were previously funded under the FREEDOM Support Act and Support for East European Democracy (SEED) accounts.

As a member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, I want to take this opportunity to highlight to you the BBG's pending budget request for \$563.5 million. Funding will advance international broadcasting efforts to support the war on terrorism, including initiation of the Middle East Television Network.

Mr. Chairman, I know that your committee staff will go over this statement with a fine-tooth comb and I know too that they prefer an account-by-account laydown. So here it is:

Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP):

The FY 2004 request for D&CP, the State Department's chief operating account, totals \$4.164 billion.

D&CP supports the diplomatic activities and programs that constitute the first line of offense against threats to the security and prosperity of the American people. Together with Machine Readable Visa and other fees, the account funds the operating expenses and infrastructure necessary for carrying out U.S. foreign policy in more than 260 locations around the world.

The FY 2004 D&CP request provides \$3.517 billion for ongoing operations—a net increase of \$132.7 million over the FY 2003 level. Increased funding will enable the State Department to advance national interests effectively through improved diplomatic readiness, particularly in human resources.

The request completes the Secretary's 3-year Diplomatic Readiness Initiative to put the right people with the right skills in the right place at the right time. New D&CP funding in FY 2004 of \$97 million will allow the addition of 399 professionals, providing a total of 1,158 new staff from FY 2002 through FY 2004.

The FY 2004 D&CP request also provides \$646.7 million for Worldwide Security Upgrades—an increase of \$93.7 million over last year. This total includes \$504.6 million to continue worldwide security programs for guard protection, physical security equipment and technical support, information and system security, and security personnel and training. It also includes \$43.4 million to expand the perimeter security enhancement program for 232 posts and \$98.7 million for improvements in domestic and overseas protection programs, including 85 additional agents and other security professionals.

Capital Investment Fund (CIF):

The FY 2004 request provides \$157 million for the CIF to assure that the investments made in FY 2002 and FY 2003 keep pace with increased demand from users for functionality and speed. Requested funding includes \$15 million for the State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset (SMART). The SMART initiative will replace outdated systems for cables and messages with a unified system that adds information sharing and document archiving.

Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM):

The FY 2004 request for ESCM is \$1.514 billion. This total—an increase of \$209.4 million over the FY 2003 level—reflects the Administration's continuing commitment to protect U.S. Government personnel serving abroad, improve the security posture of facilities overseas, and address serious deficiencies in the State Department's overseas infrastructure.

For the ongoing ESCM budget, the Administration is requesting \$524.7 million. This budget includes maintenance and repairs at overseas posts, facility rehabilitation projects, construction security, renovation of the Harry S Truman Building, all activities associated with leasing overseas properties, and management of the overseas buildings program.

For Worldwide Security Construction, the Administration is requesting \$761.4 million for the next tranche of security-driven construction projects to replace high-risk facilities. Funding will support the construction of secure embassies in seven countries—Algeria, Burma, Ghana, Indonesia, Panama, Serbia, and Togo. In addition, the requested funding will provide new on-compound buildings for USAID in Ghana, Jamaica, and Nigeria.

The ESCM request includes \$100 million to strengthen compound security at vulnerable posts. The request also includes \$128.3 million to construct the new U.S. embassy building in Berlin.

Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE):

The FY 2004 request of \$345.3 million for ECE maintains funding for exchanges at the FY 2003 request level of \$245 million and adds \$100 million for projects for Eastern Europe and the States of the Former Soviet Union previously funded from Foreign Operations appropriations.

Authorized by the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Fulbright-Hays Act), as amended, exchanges are strategic activities that build mutual understanding and develop friendly relations between the United States and other countries. They establish the trust, confidence, and international cooperation necessary to sustain and advance the full range of U.S. national interests.

The request provides \$141 million for Academic Programs. These include the J. William Fulbright Educational Exchange Program for exchange of students, scholars, and teachers and the Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Program for academic study and internships in the United States for mid-career professionals from developing countries.

The request also provides \$73 million for Professional and Cultural Exchanges. These include the International Visitor Program, which supports travel to the United States by current and emerging leaders to obtain firsthand knowledge of American politics and values, and the Citizen Exchange Program, which partners with U.S. non-profit organizations to support professional, cultural, and grassroots community exchanges.

This request provides \$100 million for exchanges funded in the past from the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) and Support for East European Democracy (SEED) accounts.

This request also provides \$31 million for exchanges support. This funding is needed for built-in requirements to maintain current services.

Contributions to International Organizations (CIO):

The FY 2004 request for CIO of \$1.010 billion provides funding for U.S. assessed contributions, consistent with U.S. statutory restrictions, to 44 international organizations to further U.S. economic, political, social, and cultural interests.

The request recognizes U.S. international obligations and reflects the President's commitment to maintain the financial stability of the United Nations and other international organizations that include the World Health Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The budget request provides \$71.4 million to support renewed U.S. membership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). UNESCO contributes to peace and security in the world by promoting collaboration among nations through education, science, culture and communication and by furthering intercultural understanding and universal respect for justice, rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, notably a free press.

Membership in international organizations benefits the United States by building coalitions and pursuing multilateral programs that advance U.S. interests. These include promoting economic growth through market economies; settling disputes peacefully; encouraging non-proliferation, nuclear safeguards, arms control, and disarmament; adopting international standards to facilitate international trade, telecommunications, transportation, environmental protection, and scientific exchange; and strengthening international cooperation in agriculture and health.

Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA):

The administration is requesting \$550.2 million for CIPA in FY 2004. This funding level will allow the United States to pay its share of assessed UN peacekeeping budgets, fulfilling U.S. commitments and avoiding increased UN arrears.

The UN peacekeeping appropriation serves U.S. interests in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, where UN peacekeeping missions assist in ending conflicts, restoring peace and strengthening regional stability.

UN peacekeeping missions leverage U.S. political, military and financial assets through the authority of the UN Security Council and the participation of other states that provide funds and peacekeepers for conflicts around the world.

Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG):

The FY 2004 budget request for the BBG totals \$563.5 million.

The overall request provides \$525.2 million for U.S. Government non-military international broadcasting operations through the International Broadcasting Operations (IBO) account. This account funds operations of the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), and all related program delivery and support activities.

The IBO request includes funding to advance broadcasting efforts related to the war on terrorism. The request includes \$30 million to initiate the Middle East Television Network—a new Arabic-language satellite TV network that, once operational, will have the potential to reach vast audiences in the Middle East. The request also includes funding to double VOA Indonesian radio programming, significantly increase television programming in Indonesia, and expand BBG audience development efforts.

The IBO request reflects the shifting of priorities away from the predominantly Cold War focus on Central and Eastern Europe to broadcasting in the Middle East and Central Asia. Funds are being redirected to programs in these regions through the elimination of broadcasting to countries in the former Eastern Bloc that have demonstrated significant advances in democracy and press freedoms and are new or soon-to-be NATO and European Union Members.

The IBO request also reflects anticipated efficiencies that achieve a 5-percent reduction in funding for administration and management in FY 2004.

The FY 2004 request also provides \$26.9 million through Broadcasting to Cuba (OCB) for continuing Radio Marti and TV Marti operations, including salary and inflation increases, to support current schedules.

The FY 2004 request further provides \$11.4 million for Broadcasting Capital Improvements to maintain the BBG's worldwide transmission network. The request includes \$2.9 million to maintain and improve security of U.S. broadcasting transmission facilities overseas.

That finishes the State and Related Agencies part of the President's Budget. Now let me turn to the Foreign Affairs part.

THE FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR RESPONSIBILITIES: FUNDING AMERICA'S DIPLOMACY
AROUND THE WORLD

The FY 2004 budget proposes several initiatives to advance U.S. national security interests and preserve American leadership. The FY 2004 Foreign Operations budget that funds programs for the Department State, USAID and other foreign affairs agencies is \$18.8 billion.

Today, our number one priority is to fight and win the global war on terrorism. The budget furthers this goal by providing economic, military, and democracy assistance to key foreign partners and allies, including \$4.7 billion to countries that have joined us in the war on terrorism.

The budget also promotes international peace and prosperity by launching the most innovative approach to U.S. foreign assistance in more than forty years. The new Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), an independent government corporation funded at \$1.3 billion will redefine "aid". As President Bush told African leaders meeting in Mauritius recently, this aid will go to "nations that encourage economic freedom, root out corruption, and respect the rights of their people."

Moreover, this budget offers hope and a helping hand to countries facing health catastrophes, poverty and despair, and humanitarian disasters. It provides \$1.345 billion to combat the global HIV/AIDS epidemic, more than \$1 billion to meet the needs of refugees and internally displaced peoples, \$200 million in emergency food assistance to support dire famine needs, and \$100 million for an emerging crises fund to allow swift responses to complex foreign crises. Mr. Chairman, let me give you some details.

The U.S. is successfully prosecuting the global war on terrorism on a number of fronts. We are providing extensive assistance to states on the front lines of the anti-terror struggle. Working with our international partners bilaterally and through multilateral organizations, we have frozen more than \$110 million in terrorist assets, launched new initiatives to secure global networks of commerce and communication, and significantly increased the cooperation of our law enforcement and intelligence communities. Afghanistan is no longer a haven for al-Qaeda. We are now working with the Afghan Authority, other governments, international organizations, and NGOs to rebuild Afghanistan. Around the world we are combating the unholy alliance of drug traffickers and terrorists who threaten the internal stability of countries. We are leading the international effort to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of those who would do harm to us and others. At the same time, we are rejuvenating and expanding our public diplomacy efforts worldwide.

Assistance to Frontline States

The FY 2004 International Affairs budget provides approximately \$4.7 billion in assistance to the Frontline States, which have joined with us in the war on terrorism. This funding will provide crucial assistance to enable these countries to strengthen their economies, internal counter-terrorism capabilities and border controls.

Of this amount, the President's Budget provides \$657 million for Afghanistan, \$460 million for Jordan, \$395 million for Pakistan, \$255 million for Turkey, \$136 million for Indonesia, and \$87 million for the Philippines. In Afghanistan, the funding will be used to fulfill our commitment to rebuild Afghanistan's road network; establish security through a national military and national police force, including counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics components; establish broad-based and accountable governance through democratic institutions and an active civil society; ensure a peace dividend for the Afghan people through economic reconstruction; and provide humanitarian assistance to sustain returning refugees and displaced persons. United States assistance will continue to be coordinated with the Afghan government, the United Nations, and other international donors.

The State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program will continue to provide frontline states a full complement of training courses, such as a course on how to conduct a post-terrorist attack investigation or how to respond to a WMD event. The budget will also fund additional equipment grants to sustain the skills and capabilities acquired in the ATA courses. It will support as well in-country training programs in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia.

Central Asia and Freedom Support Act Nations

In FY 2004, over \$157 million in Freedom Support Act (FSA) funding will go to assistance programs in the Central Asian states. The FY 2004 budget continues to focus FSA funds to programs in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, recognizing that Central Asia is of strategic importance to U.S. foreign policy objectives. The FY 2004 assistance level for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is 30 percent above 2003. Assistance to these countries has almost doubled from pre-September 11th levels. These funds will support civil society development, small business promotion, conflict reduction, and economic reform in the region. These efforts are designed to promote economic development and strengthen the rule of law in order to reduce the appeal of extremist movements and stem the flow of illegal drugs that finance terrorist activities.

Funding levels and country distributions for the FSA nations reflect shifting priorities in the region. For example, after more than 10 years of high levels of assistance, it is time to begin the process of graduating countries in this region from economic assistance, as we have done with countries in Eastern Europe that have made sufficient progress in the transition to market-based democracies. U.S. economic assistance to Russia and Ukraine will begin phasing down in FY 2004, a decrease of 32 percent from 2003, moving these countries toward graduation.

Combating Illegal Drugs and Stemming Narco-terrorism

The President's request for \$731 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative includes \$463 million for Colombia. An additional \$110 million in military assistance to Colombia will support Colombian President Uribe's unified campaign against terrorists and the drug trade that fuels their activities. The aim is to secure democracy, extend security, and restore economic prosperity to Colombia and prevent the narco-terrorists from spreading instability to the broader Andean region. Critical components of this effort include resumption of the Airbridge Denial program to stop internal and cross-border aerial trafficking in illicit drugs, stepped up eradication and alternative development efforts, and technical assistance to strengthen Colombia's police and judicial institutions.

Halting Access of Rogue States and Terrorists to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Decreasing the threats posed by terrorist groups, rogue states, and other non-state actors requires halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related technology. To achieve this goal, we must strengthen partnerships with countries that share our views in dealing with the threat of terrorism and resolving regional conflicts.

The FY 2004 budget requests \$35 million for the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), more than double the FY 2003 request, increases funding for overseas Export Controls and Border Security (EXBS) to \$40 million, and supports additional funding for Science Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection Programs.

Funding increases requested for the NDF and EXBS programs seek to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of terrorist groups or states by preventing their movement across borders and destroying or safeguarding known quantities of weapons or source material. The Science Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection programs support the same goals by engaging former Soviet weapons scientists and engineers in peaceful scientific activities, providing them an alternative to marketing their skills to states or groups of concern.

Millennium Challenge Account

The FY 2004 Budget request of \$1.3 billion for the new Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) as a government corporation fulfills the President's March 2002 pledge to create a new bilateral assistance program, markedly different from existing models. This budget is a huge step toward the President's commitment of \$5 billion in annual funding for the MCA by 2006, a 50% increase in core development assistance.

The MCA supplement U.S. commitments to humanitarian assistance and existing development aid programs funded and implemented by USAID. It will assist developing countries that make sound policy decisions and demonstrate solid performance on economic growth and reducing poverty.

MCA funds will go only to selected developing countries that demonstrate a commitment to sound policies—based on clear, concrete and objective criteria. To become eligible for MCA resources, countries must demonstrate their commitment to economic opportunity, investing in people, and good governance.

Resources will be available through agreements with recipient countries that specify a limited number of clear measurable goals, activities, and benchmarks, and financial accountability standards.

The MCA will be administered by a new government corporation designed to support innovative strategies and to ensure accountability for measurable results. The corporation will be supervised by a Board of Directors composed of Cabinet level officials and chaired by the Secretary of State. Personnel will be drawn from a variety of government agencies and non-government institutions and serve limited-term appointments.

In FY 2004, countries eligible to borrow from the International Development Association (IDA), and which have per capita incomes below \$1,435, (the historical IDA cutoff) will be considered. In 2005, all countries with incomes below \$1,435 will be considered. In 2006, all countries with incomes up to \$2,975 (the current World Bank cutoff for lower middle income countries) will be eligible.

The selection process will use 16 indicators to assess national performance—these indicators being relative to governing justly, investing in people, and encouraging

economic freedom. These indicators were chosen because of the quality and objectivity of their data, country coverage, public availability, and correlation with growth and poverty reduction. The results of a review of the indicators will be used by the MCA Board of Directors to make a final recommendation to the President on a list of MCA countries.

Africa Education Initiative

With \$200 million, the United States is doubling its 5-year financial commitment to the African Education Initiative it launched last year. The initiative focuses on increasing access to quality education in Africa. Over its 5-year life the African Education Initiative will achieve: 160,000 new teachers trained; 4.5 million textbooks developed and distributed; an increase in the number of girls attending school through providing more than a quarter million scholarships and mentoring; and an increase African Education Ministries' capacity to address the impact of HIV/AIDS.

Increases in Funding for Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)

The FY 2004 budget provides \$1.55 billion for the MDBs, an increase of \$110 million over the FY 2003 request of \$1.44 billion. This includes \$1.36 billion for scheduled payments to the MDBs and \$195.9 million to clear existing arrears. The request provides \$950 million for the International Development Association (IDA) for the second year of the IDA-13 replenishment, \$100 million of which is contingent on the IDA meeting specific benchmarks in the establishment of a results measurement system. By spring 2003, the IDA is to have completed an outline of approach to results measurement, presented baseline data, and identified outcome indicators and expected progress targets. By that same time, the IDA is also to have completed specific numbers of reviews and assessments in the areas of financial accountability, procurement, public expenditure, investment climate, and poverty.

World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)

The WSSD engaged more than 100 countries and representatives of business and NGOs. Sustainable development begins at home and is supported by effective domestic policies and international partnerships that include the private sector. Self-governing people prepared to participate in an open world marketplace are the foundation of sustainable development. These fundamental principals guide the U.S. approach to Summit initiatives. At the 2002 Summit the U.S. committed to developing and implementing realistic results-focused partnerships in the areas of: Water for the Poor; Clean Energy; Initiative to Cut Hunger in Africa; Preventing Famine in Southern Africa; and the Congo Basin Partnership. At the end of the Summit new relationships and partnerships were forged and a new global commitment to improve sanitation was reached. The FY 2004 Budget supports these partnerships with \$337 million in assistance funding.

The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative

The President's Budget includes \$145 million for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). This initiative gives us a framework and funding for working with the Arab world to expand educational and economic opportunities, empower women, and strengthen civil society and the rule of law. The peoples and governments of the Middle East face daunting human challenges. Their economies are stagnant and unable to provide jobs for millions of young people entering the workplace each year. Too many of their governments appear closed and unresponsive to the needs of their citizens. And their schools are not equipping students to succeed in today's globalizing world. With the programs of the MEPI, we will work with Arab governments, groups, and individuals to bridge the jobs gap with economic reform, business investment, and private sector development; close the freedom gap with projects to strengthen civil society, expand political participation, and lift the voices of women; and bridge the knowledge gap with better schools and more opportunities for higher education. The U.S.- Middle East Partnership Initiative is an investment in a more stable, peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Arab world.

Forgiving Debt—Helping Heavily Indebted Poor Countries

The Administration request provides an additional \$75 million for the Trust Fund for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). These funds will go toward fulfilling the President's commitment at the G-8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada to contribute America's share to filling the projected HIPC Trust Fund financing gap. The HIPC Trust Fund helps to finance debt forgiveness by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to heavily indebted poor countries that have committed to economic reforms and pledged to increase domestic funding of health and education programs. In addition, the President's request provides \$300 million to fund bilateral debt reduction for the Democratic Republic of the Congo under the HIPC Initia-

tive, as well as \$20 million for debt reduction under the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA).

The Administration believes that offering new sovereign loans or loan guarantees to indebted poor countries while providing debt forgiveness to those same countries risks their return to unsustainable levels of indebtedness—a situation debt forgiveness seeks to resolve.

In order to address this situation, the Administration recently invoked a 1-year moratorium on new lending to countries that receive multilateral debt reduction. U.S. lending agencies have agreed not to make new loans or loan guarantees to countries that receive debt reduction for 1 year. The measure will not be punitive. Should countries demonstrate serious economic gains before the end of the moratorium, lending agencies may, with interagency clearance, resume new lending. The Administration hopes that this policy will bring to an end the historically cyclical nature of indebtedness of poor countries.

American Leadership in Fighting AIDS and Alleviating Humanitarian Hardships

This budget reaffirms America's role as the leading donor nation supporting programs that combat the greatest challenges faced by many developing countries today. The FY 2004 budget proposes a number of foreign assistance initiatives managed by USAID and other Federal agencies to provide crucial resources that prevent and ameliorate human suffering worldwide.

Fighting the Global AIDS Pandemic

The FY 2004 budget continues the Administration's commitment to combat HIV/AIDS and to help bring care and treatment to infected people overseas. The HIV/AIDS pandemic has killed 23 million of the 63 million people it has infected to date, and left 14 million orphans worldwide. President Bush has made fighting this pandemic a priority of U.S. foreign policy.

The President believes the global community can—and must—do more to halt the advance of the pandemic, and that the United States should lead by example. Thus, the President's FY 2004 budget request signals a further, massive increase in resources to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic. As described in the State of the Union, the President is committing to provide a total of \$15 billion over the next 5 years to turn the tide in the war on HIV/AIDS, beginning with \$2 billion in the FY 2004 budget request and rising thereafter. These funds will be targeted on the hardest hit countries, especially Africa and the Caribbean with the objective of achieving dramatic on-the-ground results. This new dramatic commitment is reflected in the Administration's \$2 billion FY 2004 budget request, which includes:

- State Department—\$450 million;
- USAID—\$895 million, including \$100 million for the Global Fund and \$150 million for the International Mother & Child HIV Prevention; and
- HHS/CDC/NIH—\$690 million, including \$100 million for the Global Fund and \$150 million for the International Mother & Child HIV Prevention.

In order to ensure accountability for results, the President has asked me to establish at State a new Special Coordinator for International HIV/AIDS Assistance. The Special Coordinator will work for me and be responsible for coordinating all international HIV/AIDS programs and efforts of the agencies that implement them.

Hunger, Famine, and Other Emergencies

Food Aid—Historically the United States has been the largest donor of assistance for victims of protracted and emergency food crises. In 2003, discretionary funding for food aid increased from \$864 million to \$1.19 billion. That level will be enhanced significantly in 2004 with two new initiatives: a Famine Fund and an emerging crises fund to address complex emergencies.

Famine Fund—The FY 2004 budget includes a new \$200 million fund with flexible authorities to provide emergency food, grants or support to meet dire needs on a case-by-case basis. This commitment reflects more than a 15 percent increase in U.S. food assistance.

Emerging Crises Fund—The budget also requests \$100 million for a new account that will allow the Administration to respond swiftly and effectively to prevent or resolve unforeseen complex foreign crises. This account will provide a mechanism for the President to support actions to advance American interests, including to prevent or respond to foreign territorial disputes, armed ethnic and civil conflicts that pose threats to regional and international peace and acts of ethnic cleansing, mass killing and genocide.

SUMMARY

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, to advance America's interests around the world we need the dollars in the President's Budget for FY 2004. We need the dollars under both of my hats—CEO and principal foreign policy advisor. The times we live in are troubled to be sure, but I believe there is every bit as much opportunity in the days ahead as there is danger. American leadership is essential to dealing with both the danger and the opportunity. With regard to the Department of State, the President's FY 2004 budget is crucial to the exercise of that leadership. Thank you and I will be pleased to answer your questions.

Chairman HYDE. I will now go to the questions. I ask the Members to be as succinct as they can and not trespass on someone else's 5 minutes.

We will start with Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for a thoughtful presentation, particularly your ending assertions. It strikes, I think, all of the American people that the Iraqi dilemma is self-evident in the sense that there are a massive number of unknowns; that is, intervention could be short, decisive, respected around the world, if not actually supported. On the other hand, rather than lessening the likelihood of the use of weapons of mass destruction, it might precipitate their utilization and might well increase terrorism from many quarters. In this context, as well as in the context of the amassing of forces in the region, the only win-win prospect for the American people and the Iraqi people and everybody else in the region would be in the next few days for Saddam Hussein and his cohorts to abdicate and accept asylum. The problem with asylum is that it is an idea in search of a strategy.

And so my question is: Is the United States prepared to accept as part of the U.N. resolution, or in other ways to urge the Secretary General of the United Nations to advance an asylum strategy to Saddam and his cohorts? The likelihood of its acceptance might not be high.

On the other hand, an offer would underscore to the world that our issue is with Saddam, our issue is with the weapons of mass destruction program, and not necessarily with Iraqi sovereignty or Iraqi oil. And so, my query is: Is there more than simply contemplation of asylum within this Administration? Is there a strategy to advance it and is the United States prepared to press an asylum option before invading?

Secretary POWELL. We are not only discussing it, we are in touch with a number of countries that have expressed an interest in conveying this message to the Iraqi regime that time is up, and that one way to avoid a lot of suffering is for the regime to step down, Saddam Hussein and his cohorts. We are looking at the various aspects of such a strategy: Asylum where, with what protection, and we know exactly how you would operationalize this. I haven't had a direct conversation with the Secretary General about it, but as part of our contemplation and our strategizing on this issue, it would ultimately require some kind of United Nations participation in order to make sure that we can do it in a way that would actually entice him to seek asylum.

It is something we are looking at, and we recognize the attractiveness of such an option. It avoids a lot of problems. And it would have to include him and it would have to include his top

level. We would have to get the whole infection out, and then get on with the healing process.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman HYDE. The next will be Mr. Lantos. I might announce to the new Members the procedure we follow is, we call you in the order in which you arrived at the hearing. That score card is kept by the staff, and so if it seems to be going out of order occasionally, it is due to the idiosyncracies of that tradition which we still live by.

Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for a very cogent statement. Let me assure you that the Department's requests will be given very careful and very sympathetic consideration, as we have done in the past. You indicated, and we all know, that in the next few days, the U.N. Security Council will be at the focus of attention globally. Now, I think it is important for us to spend a minute and get your views of what, in fact, the United Nations is.

The first legislative act of the House of Representatives yesterday evening was to pass a resolution overwhelmingly, expressing our outrage at Libya's chairmanship of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, expressing our outrage that within a few weeks, Iraq—and I am sober—Iraq will be the chairman of the U.N. Conference on Disarmament.

Now, I think it is sort of important for you as Secretary of State to make it clear to the American people that while the U.N. has many useful functions, it does not represent the conscience of mankind and it does not represent a seal—a good housekeeping seal of approval—if they do something or if they fail to do something. You know, as well as I do, statistics show—public opinion surveys show—that there is far greater support for action vis-a-vis Iraq if it is following a U.N. Security Council resolution than without a U.N. Security Council resolution. I think to some extent, with the best of intentions, we have been guilty in building up the importance of the U.N. in the public mind, way above what it deserves.

The U.N. is a useful instrument, but there are profound limitations on its usefulness. And as you have stated so often, the U.N. Security Council must demonstrate that it is still relevant. And if it is irrelevant, we must say so and proceed.

As you know, many of us in this body are working for an alliance of democratic nations within the U.N. structure, nations which should have jobs such as chairmanship of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, rather than this absurd phenomenon of Libya, one of the prime violators of human rights globally, serving as chairman.

I would be grateful if you would share with us your view of the U.N., the U.N. Security Council, and their relevance to what will happen in the next few weeks.

Secretary POWELL. Mr. Lantos, we were as outraged as you are and the Members are over the fact that, under the procedures of the U.N., Libya will chair the Human Rights Commission. Trying to accommodate the desires, needs and wants of some 190-odd nations—I think it is 191 now—with regional groupings, the U.N. has put in place a set of procedures and rules over the years as to who gets to Chair what committee.

With respect to Libya chairing the Human Rights Commission, it is ludicrous. Nevertheless, the rules that were being followed teed that up. We fought it, and we voted against it. We forced a vote so everybody could see who is in favor and not in favor of this.

Mr. LANTOS. And let the record show that only Canada and Peru stood with us.

Secretary POWELL. Yes, Canada. I'm not sure about Peru. But, yes, only three nations voted for not seating Libya.

The case of Iraq is even more outrageous in the sense that the Conference on Disarmament runs its chairmanship by alphabetical order. And Iraq, who is coming up in May, is probably going to get advanced to March, because Iran would have come first, but it removed itself from consideration, and that means Iraq takes over in March.

Now, we will see where we are in March. A lot remains to be seen, but we have expressed our outrage over this and we will do what we can to see if there is some way to break this accession to the chairmanship of the CD. And if we are unable to do that because of the rules of the U.N., then we will act accordingly during the period that Iraq would be in the chairmanship, and we would, you know, simply find ways not to participate.

With respect to the U.N., I am a great believer in and supporter of the United Nations. It is a complex organization, but I think you have got to have something like it, and it has done remarkably good work over the years. It is not well suited to running a military operation, for example. But when you look at what it has done in other areas, peacekeeping—when you look at East Timor, when you look at Cambodia, and some of the things that have been done here in our region, the United Nations has performed a valuable role.

But it should not always be seen that you can't do anything unless the U.N. says you can do it. We have a lot of experience, Kosovo being a perfect example, where we acted in the absence of U.N. permission.

When we defended our interests in Panama in 1989, the U.N. condemned us. We did what we had to do anyway with the Panama invasion.

It should not be seen as a good housekeeping seal of approval. But at the same time, I think we have an obligation, as the most powerful Nation in the world, to try to make our case before that body, and then let's see how that body responds to the case.

And, if I may, Mr. Lantos, many of our friends and closest allies, such as the United Kingdom, do have more of a need for this kind of support, both as a legal matter in some circumstances as well as a political and public matter, in order to join us in some of the efforts that we undertake.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your statement and your leadership. I wanted to inform you, Mr. Secretary, that in October of this past year, Congressman Berman and I initiated a letter to the President asking for a robust increase in the fiscal year 2004 International Affairs budget as a key component to our military and intelligence capabilities in the battle against terrorism and the effort to build global stability. It was signed by 103 Members, in-

cluding 26 people that you have before you here, and many of the Members who are not in the Congress or not on this Committee are on that list as well. This follows a similar action last year.

I think that the charge that we are not supportive in any fashion for spending what is necessary, especially since it is being spent well under your leadership, is bogus. And I wanted you to have that reassurance. It includes the Chairman and the Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos, as well.

I am doing a few things you might guess on the NATO issue, and I won't go into details except that we are going to try to reassure Turkey that, failing to convince the three recalcitrant members of NATO, the House will express its intent to assist Turkey in its defense and enlist all the potential allies that we can in that effort.

I want to particularly commend you for what you are attempting to do with respect to Embassy construction. And I think that the initiative on the capital security cost-sharing program, while on an interagency basis complicated and contentious, is the right way to go. If you need legislation, I am sure that this Committee would consider it and act expeditiously. That is my expectation.

I also think that your effort to bring the State Department into the 21st century on information technology is certainly overdue and deserves our full support.

With respect to the Embassy construction, you may remember, this is the first thing I came to talk to you about after you took over your job about 2 weeks into your tenure. And you expressed your confidence in General Williams, and I am sure that was well placed and the progress you have made is great. I still think, as you may know, that this half step is important and it needs to be followed by more steps, including potential for lease-purchase and for turnkey operations.

Serbia is one of the countries you have listed for a new Embassy. I walked through that Embassy just after we were able to do that again. I am glad that you have squelched any interest in the Department about reconstruction. It is not feasible. A new Embassy, absolutely, is the way to go. I hope that the minuscule site that we have will not be considered for the new Embassy because you can't build a safe one there.

Finally, I have two questions; the first one on Kosovo, the second on Afghanistan. I want to have a confirmation, if I could, that it has been the Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration policy that we are not encouraging independence for Kosovo at this point, since there is an effort being led by a former Member of Congress to push the Congress for action on that. I would like a confirmation that is our continued position.

Secondly, on Afghanistan, I have felt that one of the keys to Afghanistan's success as a viable economic country, a democratic country, would be to restore its ability to feed itself, to focus on that rural economy, and the fact they don't have any components to make it viable.

You might want to comment on that subject and whether or not the delay in appropriations for AID under fiscal year 2003 has hurt our efforts, and, finally, to suggest that perhaps your top person, the Administrator, could explain to us what they are doing on rural

development in Afghanistan as a part of an overall program. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary POWELL. On Kosovo, sir, I reaffirm the policy. On Afghanistan, any delay in getting appropriated funds, especially the 2003 request, keeps us from doing the kind of things we ought to be doing. We need to be pushing as much of the money that we have appropriated or plan to appropriate for Afghanistan into those programs. We have to get the agricultural sector up as fast as possible, especially restoring irrigation systems. This is a country that can feed itself. This is a country that, if we can get the agricultural sector back up, will not only feed itself, but it will really help jumpstart the economy.

Anything that can be done to get funds into the pipeline is very, very important to our efforts in Afghanistan. For that matter, that is true for many other places in the world.

With respect to the rural development issues, I would like to provide for the record a better answer on that after talking to our AID folks.

If I may just say, sir, Turkey will be defended. We have already determined how to do that. It would be much better if NATO would act as an alliance on this and not allow itself to be tied up in knots by 3 of the 19 nations. Sixteen nations are ready to act, ready to do the job. And I still have some optimism that we will find a solution over the next 2 to 3 days.

In my car driving up here, just a few moments before the hearing, I had another conversation with German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who was about to enter a meeting with the French Foreign Minister to discuss this issue. Let's hope we can find a way forward on that particular issue.

Thank you for your support of our construction efforts, and I will make sure that we have the Serbian one under control. I just was showing these to the President this morning, Mr. Bereuter. That is the new Embassy at Dar es Salaam in Tanzania that has just been opened, and Nairobi has just been opened. A wonderful facility will be opened in Istanbul, Turkey in the very near future as well—in April.

These things are coming on line. There is commonality of utilities. There are construction efficiencies that we are now starting to achieve, and I think we have this program well under control.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I remember, Mr. Secretary, when you came here 2 years ago, and you made very clear your commitment to ensure that the downward spiral of funding for both the State Department's diplomatic operations and the foreign assistance program would not continue and that, to the contrary, it would increase. And I think, notwithstanding my terrible distress at certain aspects of the President's budget—and Mr. Lantos made reference to it—the fact is in the foreign relations function, with some questions still to be answered about to what extent assistance and millennium challenge account funding are double-counted, it looks like you have made a serious reversal in that downward decline with this year's budget. And I think my own sense is that wouldn't have happened without your

very strong efforts with the Office of Management and Budget, and I think you are to be congratulated.

But what I would like for you to do is to talk once again—you must get tired of talking about it—but about Iraq. I believe in the correctness of what the Administration is doing here, and the pressure that it is applying in a very serious way to try and produce the desired result. But there is a reasonable and rational alternative which many of my constituents—more than I would like to see, given my position—many of my constituents hold to and other people do as well. And they say we recognize that force sometimes has to be an option, and we recognize that the evidence is compelling and the recent history is compelling—he has weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and the evidence is clear that he is in material breach of the United Nations resolution—but the better course of action here is a course of containment and deterrence; that that will do the job with less risks, with less potential dangers than what can possibly lead from the use of force. And that is the strategy—I think that argument fails, but I think you could point out, more effectively than I have been able to, why it fails. And I would like you to take your shot at dealing with that argument.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Berman. We have been applying containment for the last 12 years.

Mr. BERMAN. Yeah, but now you have got the inspectors back. Now you have people willing to talk more about what is coming into the country, and there were people, now at least who are serious about it.

Secretary POWELL. Yeah. And the only reason they are acting seriously, if one calls it seriously, is because there are tens upon tens of thousands of U.S. troops who are heading their way. I mean, they didn't even think about letting the inspectors back in. They were just thumbing their noses at the U.N. from 1998 until the 14th or 15th of September of last year, 3 days after President Bush made his speech; and they said, "Oh, my God, they are serious. How can we frustrate their desire to get our weapons of mass destruction. Let's let the inspectors back in." And they have been playing dribble ball ever since. Let the inspectors in, but don't show them anything.

Okay, we have to show them something. Oops, more troops are coming. Show them something. Do anything we can to frustrate the inspection effort while making it look like we are cooperating with the effort until the international community gets tired, until the United States gets tired of having troops mobilized, and everybody goes away and we are back to where we were before the President made his 12 September speech.

The reason that no longer is viable is because even with 12 years of containment and deterrence, Saddam kept moving forward. He continued to develop weapons of mass destruction. I was reading intelligence again this morning. There is no question that he is still trying to deceive. He is still trying to hide. Even after my speech last Wednesday which pointed out a lot of the stuff, he is still at it. There is no change.

Containment is not really working. Saddam continues to develop these weapons of mass destruction. I wish it did work. But how do we know it will continue to deter him? How do we know—particu-

larly in the post-9/11 environment, which I think really just fundamentally changed things, you really cannot just leave a place alone now and think it is contained, when you know that within that place they are developing weapons of mass destruction and—let's put it very directly—ricin. They have anthrax they haven't accounted for, and botulism toxin. They have mobile laboratories that we know exist. We know that if they had a free hand, and nobody was looking, or if they could figure out how to get out of the oversight of those who are looking, they would develop a nuclear weapon.

Saddam Hussein has never lost his intent. He is contained only until he can get out of containment. And if we don't deal with this problem here and now, it will not go away. It will not remain contained. He will pop out of the box. And if we don't use the pressure we have been able to generate over the last several months, if we don't now force him to disarm, either peacefully by cooperating with the inspectors, or, by heaven, taking it away from him through the force of arms, then we will be dealing with this problem evermore.

Now, everybody is concerned about the consequences. Terrible things are going to happen. There will be terrorism. We will have all kinds of trouble in the region. But you know what? If we are successful—and we will be successful—we will have gotten rid of a dangerous regime and we will be putting in place a stable country in that part of the world.

We will use our military force. We will use our humanitarian efforts. We are positioning humanitarian supplies. We are going to work with our friends and allies. We are going to work with the neighbors in the regions. We will be able to change the present levels of American troops throughout that region. In the absence of a threatening regime like Saddam Hussein's Iraq, we will get up all the weapons of mass destruction, and we may find ourselves, instead of having more problems, having a lot fewer problems. Success could breed a lot of new opportunities rather than a lot of new problems.

And so I would say to your constituents, Mr. Berman, that we have been containing for the last 12 years, but it isn't working. And we can't allow it to continue in this manner in the post-9/11 environment where these kinds of technology, these kinds of weapons, could be given to terrorists or provided to terrorists in some way or another, or stolen by terrorists, or terrorists get their hands on them, and then we are faced with that problem.

And this is not hypothetical. The ricin that is bouncing around Europe now originated in Iraq. Now, not a part of Iraq directly under Saddam Hussein's control, but his intelligence people know all about it. There is cooperation taking place in the manner I described last week, and I have no reason to step back from anything I said last week. It is this nexus between weapons-of-mass-destruction states that are developing it in cooperation with nonstate actors such as Osama bin Laden or some other nut case who might come along in due course. It is a risk that we strongly believe, the President strongly believes, and I think most members of the international community strongly believe, we should not take any longer.

Mr. BERMAN. You have convinced me.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Chris Smith.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for the extraordinary job you are doing on all of our behalves.

I have just a couple of questions on human rights and especially on hunger. As you know, there are more than 35 million people at risk of starvation in sub-Saharan Africa. Robert Mugabe has become so desperate that he recently signed an accord or is in the process of signing one with a Chinese firm to develop his farming. I know we are trying to respond aggressively. Frank Wolf did brief many of us, upon his return from Eritrea and Ethiopia, that you were very responsive in getting some of that food aid that had been held up released. So thank you for that.

There is, as you know, a \$250 million increase in the omnibus. Many of us would have hoped—and Chairman Hyde wrote a letter which we all backed, that we would get the \$500 million needed. Anything that could be done this late in the day to get that to \$500 million would be appreciated.

On trafficking, you talked about public diplomacy and the fact that our aviators were watching your speech. We have a window of opportunity with regard to public diplomacy now to push the envelope, hopefully, notwithstanding the problems we have with terrorism and the amount of time that that takes, but it should not crowd out, obviously, other concerns and human rights concerns.

We now know that there are at least 4 million, mostly women, who are trafficked, and that does not count the number of women in a country like India, where there are so many young girls being exploited.

This year after the TIP report is proffered by the Administration to Congress, there will be a 90-day window in which the President will have to make a decision: Sanctions or not on Tier 3 countries. It seems to me that right now, our Ambassadors ought to be raising the issue—especially in the Tier 3 countries—to get it right. Crack down the way people as in Serbia did, for example, by raiding their brothels and releasing these women. I would hope you would admonish our folks to do just that.

On refugees, several of us signed a letter. It was very bipartisan, asking that the ceiling be raised to \$100,000.

And, finally, on justice. The Rwanda Tribunal has nine convictions. David Crane in Sierra Leone is setting the model as to how a tribunal, regional or country-specific, ought to be done, and hopefully that can be replicated and looked at when we go to Iraq.

Mr. Secretary.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. Let me touch very quickly on the points on trafficking. Sounds like you were in my staff meeting this Monday morning when we talked about it.

TIP report is coming up. Third time sanctions, no. Get word out to all of our bureaus, all of our Ambassadors, to go into the Tier 3 countries and tell them, “Show time, and the law will require us to apply sanctions, so you have to get with it.”

With respect to hunger, it is a challenge to the world to do something about this problem in sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa and other places in the world. And when you take hunger and match it up against HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, they feed on each other. Weakened people are not resistant to those kinds of diseases, and I will take all the money anybody wants to give me. There is a new famine fund for \$200 million in the fiscal year 2004 budget that I hope Congress will also support.

With respect to refugee admissions, we are having trouble, principally in the clearance of people to come into the country, as well as some problems of misrepresentation where people are taking advantage of their refugee admissions program. We are working on all of that, and I hope to meet the goal that we have set for ourselves this year. But we have to accelerate the admissions coming in.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your presentation. New York remains even more proud of its favorite son. You bear a heavy burden, most of us believe, in probably being the most credible spokesman for our country and our policies certainly around the world. And we want you to continue to make our case because you make it quite well.

Listening to the ironies about who is chairing what committees at the U.N., I think one of the total ironies raises the question of what are we going to do about France adopting a policy that they are totally opposed to U.S. military intervention. The strangeness of that is, as most of us believe, that they would all be speaking German today if it were not for U.S. military intervention, and that would be an intolerable humiliation for them, knowing how finicky they are about their language. You can answer that some other time.

It seems to me, on a different note, Mr. Secretary, that we seem to be lacking a coherent policy against weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. A few months ago, as you know better than anybody else, with the help of the Spaniards a North Korean ship laden with Scud missiles was bound for Yemen; and the White House response to that was that there is no international law prohibiting the sale of North Korean missiles to Yemen. And so we let the ship proceed.

Similarly, there doesn't seem to be any response to the allegations that Pakistan provided nuclear-weapons-related technology to North Korea. Maybe we are going to sanction Pakistan and maybe we won't.

And lastly on that, we as a Nation don't seem to be very concerned, at least outwardly, about the apparent speed with which Iran is pursuing its own nuclear weapons program.

The first question I have is, exactly what is our nonproliferation policy? And secondly, the proposed budget calls for \$395 million for Pakistan for fiscal year 2004, and yet as I understand it, the operation of current law would require the reimposition of democracy-related sanctions on Pakistan for the coming fiscal year, which carry a prohibition on any U.S. assistance. Is the Administration

going to seek authorization to waive the democracy sanctions on Pakistan in 2004?

And similarly, it is my understanding that the Administration hasn't yet exercised the existing authority to waive democracy-related sanctions for fiscal year 2003 and that no 2003 money is being provided to Pakistan because of their concerns with the relationship with North Korea and allegations in the press that Pakistan might have provided highly-enriched-uranium technology to North Korea in exchange for Scud missiles.

Will the Administration be making a decision on the various applicable sanctions provisions, including the democracy sanctions, the Glenn sanctions, Symington sanctions, as well as MTCR-related sanctions?

Secretary POWELL. Our nonproliferation policy, Mr. Ackerman, is to do everything possible to stop the flow of technology, to stop the flow of equipment, to stop the flow of precursor materials, and to do everything we can to keep brain drain from going from these countries who have knowledge of such weapons to those countries who are trying to acquire such knowledge. And I touched on that briefly in my statement.

With respect to Pakistan, we are reviewing all of the various sanctions legislation that has been in existence for a number of years, the democracy waiver, other waivers now, back to a number of things that we are working our way through now. We will need the democracy waiver—which I think we will get—back in the omnibus bill for 2003, and then of course also 2004 as well. The continuing resolution allowed us to use the waivers from 2002 into 2003 while we awaited action on the omnibus bill and, of course, we would ask for it in 2004 as well, both for missile technology transfers and democracy.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I would like to request if you could give us, our Committee, an intelligence briefing on what is going on.

Secretary POWELL. We are aware of the request, yes, sir.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Lastly, with the balance of my time, in the Middle East, could you bring us up to date on the loan guarantee and military help that has been requested by Israel.

Secretary POWELL. We are aware of the request that, of course, the Israeli government has presented to us, and we are studying it, but no decision has been made and no action has been taken on the request at this time.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. [Presiding.] The Chair recognizes Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to add my voice to the chorus of accolades that you are deservedly receiving today on your masterful presentation at the United Nations. We are very proud to have you represent our country in such a dignified manner.

Following up on Mr. Ackerman's question, as the new Chair of the Middle East Subcommittee, I will be traveling to Israel on Friday, and I know that our counterparts are very worried about their survival as well as their economic stability and economic survival. Following up on Gary's question, the supplemental aid request which is so needed for Israel, as you know, the last 2½ years of

Palestinian violence, the ever-growing threat on the Lebanese border, the impending action with Iraq, they have placed an incredible strain on the Israeli defense budget and its overall economy. And furthermore, as you know, the bursting of the high-tech bubble and the international economic slowdown has hit Israel particularly hard.

I wanted to know if you had any more specifics to add to Mr. Ackerman's question regarding the status of the possible U.S. multiyear assistance package of loan guarantees and military aid to Israel to help them weather the current economic and security crisis and when that decision will be made.

And following on to that, Mr. Secretary, although the Syrians might have been thought of as being helpful in the past in our war against terrorism, I hope that our Administration does not turn a blind eye to the sum and substance of Syria's behavior as a result of some somewhat cooperative acts. Syria continues to support and allow groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and nearly 10 other groups to operate from Syrian territory.

I wanted to ask you about the status of Syria's extensive weapons of mass destruction program, specifically its chemical and biological weapons capability.

And then related to Cuba, I will defer that for the written part. I have two Cuba-related questions, Mr. Secretary. Thank you.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you very much ma'am. With respect to the Israeli request, we are very sensitive to the difficult economic situation that Israel finds itself in after several years of the Intifada and all of the issues you mention that relate to this. I might also add the drop-off in tourism has also had an impact on the Israeli economy. We will review the request with seriousness and deal with it as quickly as we can. But I don't have an answer for you at this time as to what action the Administration will be taking on that.

With respect to Syria, they have been helpful in some aspects on the war against terrorism, and we are appreciative of that, but that has not kept us from engaging with them and being critical of their efforts with respect to supporting terrorist organizations. We have also spent a lot of time with them discussing the need to keep things quiet on the northern border of Israel with respect to Hezbollah activity, and clamped down on those kinds of terrorist activities directed toward Israel. We do not shrink from that kind of demarche simply because they happen to be cooperating in one aspect in the war on terrorism. We know that Syria has an interest in various weapons of mass destruction. And what I would like to do is, if you would like, ma'am, have the Agency provide that to you in a more classified setting.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

My Cuba-related items would deal with praising the USAID program for a very strong proposal that they have put forth to help the independent libraries in Cuba, building solidarity with the human rights organizations, and the growing dissident and opposition movement in Cuba, and I will submit those in writing. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary POWELL. And I was pleased to meet with the leader of the Varela recently.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I'm so pleased that you did. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. [Presiding.] Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's always a personal pleasure to welcome our Secretary of State here before the Committee, Mr. Chairman. I, too, echo the sentiments that have been expressed earlier by our colleagues to the outstanding leadership that you have demonstrated, Mr. Secretary, in serving our Nation in such an important role and the responsibility that you bear not only for our Nation but certainly for the world.

Mr. Secretary, shortly after World War II, our Nation unilaterally declared certain Micronesian islands as a strategic trust. We didn't even seek United Nations approval, we just went and grabbed these Micronesian islands. Our strategic and security interest in Micronesia became more apparent when our military presence in the Philippines and Subic and Clark Air Force Base were no longer needed. Even more critical, at the height of the Cold War, our Nation detonated some 67 atomic and hydrogen bombs in the Marshall Islands, and, as a result, several Marshallese men, women, and children were directly exposed to nuclear contamination.

In short, Mr. Secretary, the Administration's proposed 2004 budget gives no indication on the continued funding for the Federated States of Micronesia, nor providing any assistance or compensation for medical health care for the Marshallese victims who were subjected to nuclear fallout. I would really appreciate, Mr. Secretary, if the Administration will submit a proposed budgetary line item for this very important area. I realize there are not very many Micronesians out there, but they certainly are very critical as far as our strategic and military interests are concerned.

I am also glad, Mr. Secretary, that you have commented about the encouraging number of minorities that are making every effort to become members of our foreign service program with the Department of State; 38 percent, that is pretty good. I would continue to encourage the Department to do so.

Mr. Secretary, you, more than anyone in this room, know more about this most critical issue that our Nation and the whole world is confronted with, and that is whether our Nation, and the United Nations for that matter, should wage war against Saddam Hussein and Iraq. I was about to ask about your consideration about containment, as we did against Gadhafi and Libya, and I think you have responded accordingly.

Could it be possible also that the reason why the United Nations have been very passive for the past 10 years in enforcing these resolutions was because Saddam Hussein was no longer a danger as he was before he took military control of Kuwait? I am just passing that on for your consideration.

I noted also in your statement, what you had quoted from Carl Von Clausewitz's statement, no one starts a war—or, rather, no one in his senses should do so without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to achieve it. You give an indication that if it is absolutely necessary

for a Nation to wage war, the military, the government, and the people must all act in unison; you cannot just depend on the military. All these three factors must come into play.

I am not necessarily a fan of France and President Chirac, especially when he violated our moratorium on nuclear testing in the South Pacific. By applying the standard that you have given a suggestion to, Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding, if the media is correct, that 80 percent of the people in France do not support our going to war against Iraq. President Chirac also has about 6 million Muslims living in his country, so all these factors perhaps may have added into his problem in offering resistance, and maybe there may be some other areas on how we can properly address Saddam Hussein's problems as we dealt with him 10 years ago.

But we talk so much about defending Turkey. Has the Administration given serious consideration of how we are going to defend Israel? I am asking all kinds of questions, Mr. Secretary.

And last, if three of the five permanent members of the Security Council do oppose the idea of waging war against Iraq, what are the consequences? I am sorry to give you all of those questions.

Secretary POWELL. Well, as you know, we are working on an amended compact legislative proposal that we will submit later this spring. The total economic assistance package for the area, I believe, is fair and adequate, \$3.8 billion in 2004 to 2023, and I am sure you are familiar with that as well, sir.

With respect to your comment on my good friend, Von Clausewitz and his thinking, which is my thinking, sometimes you can't just sit back and reflect public opinion. You have to lead in order to shape public opinion. That is what I think President Bush has been doing, and I think the American people are responding to his leadership. And other nations have chosen not to try to lead the public opinion. Or, you know, it is just may be the view of President Chirac that he does not want to lead public opinion in that direction because he feels strongly in another direction.

We liberated France, and we freed Germany as well from its dictatorial leadership of World War II so that they could be free, independent, thinking nations. They are democracies. They have a right to determine what their positions will be. If these nations that do have a permanent seat on the Security Council—United States, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and China—if any one of them vetoes, then the United Nations Security Council cannot act. The President has made it clear that he reserves the right at that time to act with a willing coalition, as has happened on previous occasions in the past at the United Nations.

With respect to Israel, the same kind of conversations that we have had with respect to the defense of Turkey we have had with Israel, and actions have been taken.

Mr. FALCOMA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Secretary Powell. You traveled to the African nation of Gabon last year to examine efforts undertaken by its government to protect the forest and wildlife, and the Administration has announced a Congo Basin initiative aimed at these environmental protection efforts in Gabon and in neighboring states there. Your

ally in this effort, environmentalist Michael Fay, I wanted to mention to you, was gored by an elephant last month; but he reports that he is on the mend and looking forward to returning to his role of charting the rainforest and to leverage those governments to set aside that national park system for the Congo Basin initiative.

I was going to ask you if you wanted to explain to the Members the initiative a little bit, what it attempts to do in terms of protecting the environment there.

I also wanted to say that later today our Subcommittee, the one I chair, will be holding a hearing on the crisis in the Ivory Coast. That West African state is imploding. It is a victim of armed rebellion. One area in the region where we have had some success with considerable effort has been Sierra Leone, where horrific atrocities were being committed. A measure of stability and hope has been established, but only through a major peacekeeping operation, once at 18,000 troops, the largest in the world, backed by British troops, with support from Nigerians and others. Rebels aren't running around cutting off the arms and legs of little boys and girls, as a result. This peace, however, is young and precarious, especially as long as Liberian President Charles Taylor—who backed the Sierra Leonean rebels and I believe is backing rebels in the Ivory Coast—is still in power. I want to make that point and I hope we are not winding down that operation too quickly in Sierra Leone, because the gains that have been made there could be lost quite quickly.

I also wanted to ask you about Zimbabwe and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the personal sanctions we tried to put in place on President Mugabe. There is a report coming out of Harare, where he has arrested the mayor of that city, also the mayor of Bulawayo, and is replacing them with his own political people. They say, well, that is just hot air. So I wanted to ask about the sanctions, the status of those sanctions against Mugabe.

I also wanted to express my appreciation for the Administration's new departure on foreign aid with the millennium challenge accounts, with its emphasis on markets and rule of law and reform, and thank you for that.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you very much, sir. On the Ivory Coast, we stay in very close touch with my French colleague, Dominique de Villepin, and monitor his efforts. The French have been in the lead on this. And I hope that as a result of efforts made by President Gbago in recent days, the situation is stabilizing a bit now and we can see some forward movement.

On Sierra Leone, the drawdown is taking place, but we will monitor it carefully to make sure it isn't precipitous and leave a condition of vulnerability and fragility that is not warranted based on the situation. I think we should be very proud that we were the major financial contributor to that peacekeeping effort during its height.

With respect to Zimbabwe, sir, you have heard me speak about Mr. Mugabe and the disaster he has created in Zimbabwe in every way imaginable with respect to its economy, its agriculture, its political system, its human rights situation, and there is an issue of reimposition of sanctions. We would certainly welcome that. And we are very unhappy that France, for example, has included Mr.

Mugabe in some upcoming conference, which essentially breaks him out of the travel containment plan we had around him.

With respect to the Congo Basin initiative, for the benefit of all of the Members, this is a terrific program that the United States is participating in with other nations and a number of nongovernmental organizations and wildlife federations and the like, to set aside parts of Africa around the Congo Basin for wildlife and to preserve it so that it will not be exploited for oil, timbering, agriculture. I was there last year to dedicate a national forest in Gabon. President Gbago has set aside 10 percent of the whole country forever to be natural preserves.

Michael Fay is a marvelous man, a naturalist, who walked the whole length of the Congo Basin. This is described in a wonderful series of articles in *National Geographic*, and he was recently gored by one of his elephants that he had yet to make friends with, obviously. But I am very pleased to know that Michael is recovering well. The day I visited with Michael and he took me through his forest preserve, we were looking for animals and didn't see a one. My security had driven them all away. Helicopters flying all over, boats everywhere, there wasn't a mosquito in sight. And so I saw a lot of plants, but no animals.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you. I just have a couple of quick comments regarding the situation in Iraq and then some specific questions regarding Africa.

I do think that we have a very serious situation in Iraq. However, I still feel strongly that our number one problem is Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda terrorists who are terrorizing this country daily with all kinds of alerts that we have to be on, and I do feel that American people are getting a false sense of comfort by virtue of our going into Iraq and doing what we intend to do; that that will have an impact on the threats of Osama bin Laden and terror. I don't think the two are really connected. I do believe that in this tape that Osama bin Laden recently made, he even called Saddam Hussein an infidel, a Socialist. So I see this—I think that Osama bin Laden is the most dangerous person in the world, and I think that we ought to really be concentrating on that and need to be telling the American people that this ragtag group of people that he gets from all over the country is different than the State of Iraq.

And I think that Saddam is a bad person. I think that he should disarm. I think it would be good if he is out of power. But I think the more we co-link those two and make them one and the same, we do a disservice to the American people by giving them a false feeling of comfort as we go into Iraq. I do think, too, listening to my colleagues trashing France and Germany, that we ought to understand that there may be difference of opinion. I can't understand how Secretary Rumsfeld called them "Old Europe." I don't know what that means. I don't know what Great Britain is if the sun never set on the British Empire. I mean, what are they?

So I think we are dividing our potential allies unnecessarily. We should try to convince them that they ought to see it our way. We ought to even do a better job convincing the American people they

ought to see it the way the President sees it. However, to really bash these people at this time, I think that in the long run I don't see it being very helpful.

I was appalled by my good friend, the Secretary of Defense, when Congressman Rangel talked about reinstating the draft, I think Secretary Rumsfeld said, "Well, the draft never worked anyway. They were just a bunch of old people that didn't, you know, get the exemption and I don't think very much about the draft."

I feel very angered for the many draftees who served in the military throughout our decade, and I know you are not Secretary of Defense, but I thought I would just mention that. Some of these statements, I don't see where it helps us at all.

Just getting on with the U2s and the French Mirages and the Antanovs from Russia they said they allowed to come in, do you think that would be of any assistance in that whole theater? That is about all that I will ask on that.

And, just quickly, let me just say about Africa: First, I was pleased to hear the President talk about 10 million in new dollars. However, I am hoping it is not reprogrammed money. There has been a 50 percent reduction in the 2004 budget for peacekeeping from 2002, and I just question in Africa, with a tremendous reduction in the peacekeeping, many of the fragile democracies, or Sierra Leone and those others areas that we help to support peacekeepers, it looks like a lot of good work that we have done may go to naught if we defund that.

Secondly, I think that the reduction in aid to Africa, where you have got probably 10 times more Muslims in Africa than you have in all of the Arab countries put together, to me we need to be paying more attention to Africa in general where we are seeing the Christian/Muslim question coming up in Nigeria and other places even Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea. The fact that Africa has been decreased in overall funding is disturbing to me. And I just wonder if you could touch on that situation.

Secretary POWELL. Very quickly, Mr. Payne. First, with respect to al-Qaeda and Iraq, when we start our day everywhere in the Administration, every senior leader gets a threat matrix of what we are facing. That is the first thing the President looks at. We focus on al-Qaeda and the kind of terrorist threats this Nation faces as the number one item. That isn't to say, however, that we can't also deal with a problem like Iraq, and we are not neglecting any of our obligations with respect to al-Qaeda or the war on terrorism. And we have been seeing some success. They are still out there. They are trying to regroup, but with each week that passes, we find another cell detected and broken up, some of them broken up by our best friends in Europe who we are having fights with about Iraq, but who are still cooperating on al-Qaeda. And so I don't think that is the case.

And it is not that we are trying to find a connection between al-Qaeda and Iraq. It is there. It is not something we are making up. It is there, and we can't fail to take note of it or to talk about it or to report it.

With respect to Mr. Rumsfeld on the draft, I do have to say a word about this. The morning that this was reported, and I was driving to work, and I saw this little squib in *The Washington Post*

suggesting that Don had said something unkindly toward Vietnam draftees, I just looked at it, and I said, "This can't be." Don would not have said anything like this. As soon as I got to the office I went to my new State Department Internet computer, and I went to the DoD Web site and pulled down Don's transcript. Don was in no way trying to disparage anyone who had served their Nation as a draftee. He was making a point on the personnel system and personnel flows, and how with draftees you get people in, they serve well, they serve nobly, but they leave. It is not part of the sustaining base of the military. That is the context in which he was speaking.

I called him that morning and I said, "Hey, Don, you'd better get ready for this one, because people are going to read this little squib, and think that is what you said." When he looked at it, he called me back, and he said, "My God," and he corrected it quickly in his statements and by putting out a letter to the veterans' organizations.

Secretary Rumsfeld served on active duty and was in the Reserves for decades, and he knows full well the contribution made to our Nation by both those who served voluntarily, or those who responded to the call of their Nation under the draft.

With respect to U2 Mirages and MiGs, we can use all the help we can get, but it has to be in the context of Iraq cooperating and Iraq complying. Otherwise we are just adding more to the detective hunt, and that is not what this is about.

With respect to Africa, overall there is a 4.1 increase in the amount of funds we are asking in 2004. But, you know, it may not be uniformly an increase in every one of the individual country accounts or functional accounts, but we will be happy to give you more information for the record, Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. King.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want to again commend you and the President for the tremendous leadership you have shown on this whole issue of Iraq and on foreign policy across the board.

If I may just for a moment before I ask my question, I would like to comment on something my good friend Mr. Lantos said, with whom I usually agree. But on this one I just would like to make a point. When he spoke about the President asking for sacrifice and bringing in the question of tax policy which can be debated in another forum, I would like to point out it was President Kennedy who called on the country to bear any burden or make any sacrifice. At the time when the Berlin Wall was going up, and there was the Cuban missile crisis and our military strength in Vietnam was being increased by 200 percent and we were trying to put a man on the Moon, President Kennedy proposed the largest tax cut in history. The same arguments were made because most of the money went to those at the top. The fact is the tax cut did work. And I only point that out to show that as we do go forward, enduring many years of this war on terror, good Americans can have honest differences of opinion as to military policy, diplomatic policy, and also economic policy, and no one's motives should be ques-

tioned and no one should be questioning the extent to which sacrifice is being called for.

Now, my question to you, Mr. Secretary, and I think I will follow up on what Congressman Hyde was saying, and that is what is the extent of our obligation around the world and the fact that the President has said time and again that we are involved in a war which could go on for many years, in many ways, and perhaps different from any war we fought before. The American people are going to be called to stand with the President as Commander in Chief. And I think that the average American, whether they are pro-war or anti-war or whatever, whatever their gut feelings is, they are willing to stand with a Commander in chief, but they have to feel that we are getting a fair shake out of this.

And when they see a place like South Korea where we have 37,000 troops and we are being criticized by the new President of South Korea, where they see a situation like Germany where we still have troops in Europe, and the Germans seem to be turning their backs on us, I am not saying we should spite ourselves by pulling troops out, but I think it is important as we go forward in the years ahead that the American people be convinced that every troop we have overseas is really there in the interest of the United States. When you realize that in South Korea those 37,000 could suffer catastrophic losses in the first hours of an attack from the North, and if we are asking Americans to make that sacrifice, what are we getting in return from South Korea? Is it really in our national interest to keep our troops there? I am not saying whether it is or not, but I think the American people have to be assured of that.

The same when it comes to a place like Germany and they see American troops there.

So as we go forward with our foreign policy—and you have done a masterful job—I think it is important, if I can look beyond Iraq, that if future sacrifices are being asked and future engagements are going to be entered, that the American people know that we are not being played for suckers by certain countries.

I was listening to a debate the other day with a French reporter. He was saying, what is the big excitement about Turkey? Because whether or not NATO provides this protection, we know the United States is going provide it anyway. And it is almost with that feeling that they can take shots at us. They can turn their back on us when we need them, but they know that in the end we are going to do the job.

Again, I am not saying we should spite ourselves. But I would just ask to have that type of evaluation and that type of statement made to the American people so they know exactly where we are coming from and every dollar that is being spent and every potential American life that is being put at risk is there for the purpose of the United States and not for Chancellor Schroeder or not for the new President of South Korea.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Mr. King. If I could just respond briefly. The President-elect of South Korea is very supportive of U.S. presence. He has reaffirmed the desire of the South Korean people and of his administration, when it takes office in 2 weeks'

time, to keep a strong American presence. We may want to take a look at exactly how we are distributed on the peninsula, but they want us there.

Even after unification, when it comes, they want the U.S. to remain because they know that U.S. presence on the peninsula and in the region is stabilizing for the region. It is in their interest, and it is also in our interest.

The new President-elect, Roh, visited with the U.S. commanders 10 days ago. He has been visiting with our troops. He has been demonstrating to the South Korean people that we are partners with them. The United States and South Korea are together. There will be these disagreements, there will be demonstrations from time to time, but I think the alliance between the United States and South Korea remains strong. We are working with them now to find a way forward on the North Korea nuclear problem, and I still am optimistic that we will find a way forward.

With respect to Germany, there is a lot of angst right now. There is a lot of concern over the position that Germany has taken with respect to Iraq. Germany is still a close friend of the United States, an ally of the United States. Some of the people who are most critical of our policies right now with respect to, say, Iraq are also very, very pro-American. They speak out in defense of the partnership between Germany and the United States.

When we were looking for a country to take over leadership of the international assistance force in Afghanistan, the Germans stepped forward. The Germans are doing things in other parts of the world, working with us. The Germans went to their legislature, the Bundestag, and got changes in their law so they could participate in out-of-area operations.

While we are focusing right now on this problem on Iraq, I don't think we should ignore all of the areas of cooperation that have existed between us and Germany over the years, and the fact that we do remain friends, partners, allies. They appreciate what we have done for them over the last 50 years.

I started my career there, and I kind of ended my military career there as well. I know there is still this residual, deep feeling for America, a feeling of friendship and appreciation. That does not mean that they will not disagree when there is something they want.

In the heat of debate and argument, I don't think we should throw out all of the past on what I thought and what I still think will be a promising future.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for the job you are doing, and the way you represent both our country and our State.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Let me join the chorus of voices that have chimed in complimenting you on your service to our country, Mr. Secretary.

There are some questions, though, that I would like to ask. I think they are important questions in the context of the national debate as we approach a looming war in Iraq. They are questions that should be asked and answered as simply, as clearly, and as

honestly as we can to the American people. I think that those questions can be summed up in four parts:

How many lives will be lost if we are to engage militarily in Iraq?

How much will it cost the American taxpayers?

How long will we be there after we defeat Saddam Hussein? I have no doubt that that will be done, but how long will we be there, and exactly what are our plans while we are there?

And is this not, as we are doing in Afghanistan, nation-building, something that I heard my colleagues for the past decade that I have been here rail against on the Floor and in this Committee about America's role in being part of nation-building?

It certainly seems to me, from everything I have heard to date from the Administration, that, in essence, part of our obligations, both in Afghanistan and possibly in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, will be about nation-building. What exactly does that mean? I would like to hear some of your responses to that.

Then the second set goes to the Western Hemisphere, the Subcommittee on which I am the Ranking Member. This budget is totally unacceptable in the context of the Western Hemisphere. It has been unacceptable for several years now, going between this Administration and past Administrations.

The President's budget increases law enforcement and military support for the region while at the same time decreasing the hemisphere's development and humanitarian assistance. Child survival health programs receive very little new funding. The requested levels for development assistance were decreased nearly \$24 million, a 9 percent decrease. The Administration's request for economic support funds for the region is 48 percent lower than its request in fiscal year 2002. Yet, we will have a 1,000 percent spike in the FMF account, primarily to defend the pipeline in Colombia.

Now, when I see what is happening in the hemisphere, I think we have not paid the attention that we should. We have tremendous economic difficulties in Argentina, we have very serious social unrest in Venezuela, we have the continuing problems of Colombia, we have significant difficulties in Brazil, and I am only touching the surface of some of those difficulties.

When we look at what is happening in this hemisphere in these countries, both in terms of social and economic unrest, and what that unrest creates in the context of breeding grounds and opportunities for terrorism right here in our back or front yard, however you may look at it, in the context of this hemisphere, and I see what we are doing in terms of this budget in the Western Hemisphere, I say, boy, how shortsighted this is.

I know there is always going to be the question of the resources, but it is also a question of prioritizing in those resources. I clearly believe that we treat the hemisphere as a stepchild against our national interests, and I would venture to say even against our national security interests. So I would like you to address that.

Lastly, I would like you to address how much of the Millennium Challenge Accounts, the \$1.3 billion or so, is going to be dedicated to Latin America and the Caribbean. I look forward to your answers, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary POWELL. On the first set of questions, Mr. Menendez, I don't know how many lives would be lost in a conflict. I know that our military, in its plan for such a conflict, in the hope that it may never occur, is taking actions and developing their plans in such a way as to minimize the loss of U.S. and coalition lives as well as minimize the loss of civilian lives of Iraqi citizens.

It will depend, frankly, on the resistance that is put up by Iraqi forces. They might collapse quickly, or it may be a more prolonged conflict, particularly if we get into some sort of siege situation in Baghdad. It is simply not possible, certainly not for me, and I would not have made an estimate even when I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, because you cannot give a solid estimate to a question such as that.

The dollar amount I also cannot answer at this point, because so much depends on the length of the conflict and the length of the work that has to be done afterwards, but it is going to be a considerable amount of money. We should not shrink from that realization or pretend it can be done on the cheap.

How long after is also in a similar vein. A lot depends on how long it takes to get out the infection of the Saddam Hussein regime and get down to a good baseline and put in place a responsible leadership.

People talk about reconstruction as if the place is a devastated area now, or we are going to devastate it. We did not devastate it during the Gulf War, and I don't expect we are going to devastate it if there is a conflict in the future. Most of the infrastructure will be intact. The plans we are looking at for the after would include using the institutions that are there, but purged of Saddam Hussein's cohorts; to build on what is there and put in place a new government, and get out as fast as we can.

We should be under no illusions, however, that we are going to be taking over the country 1 day and have no responsibilities for it the next day. We will have to stay there with coalition partners and with the international community and provide for the Iraqi people until a responsible form of government can be put in place. That is going to take some time. I can't tell you how long, but it is not going to be a matter of a few weeks. It is going to be longer than that.

With respect to nation-building, there is a nation there. What it has is a rotten leadership. It is a nation that has wherewithal, \$20 billion in year in oil revenue; it has an educated population. They are traders, they are entrepreneurs, they are bureaucrats. I think all of that gives us a base to build on, unlike some of the other places we have dealt with over the years, such as Afghanistan, where truly it was total deconstruction of the society and of the infrastructure that we are now rebuilding.

With respect to WHA, the overall level is \$1.576 billion in our request, up from \$1.54 billion in our 2003 request. Developmental assistance is \$404 million. There have been some puts and takes. It is less than it was last year. I need to pursue that in greater detail and give you detail for the record.

With respect to the Millennium Challenge Account, we have not allocated it to a particular region. It will be a function of those countries that meet the criteria we are establishing, and who has

the best game plan moving forward with respect to democracy, the rule of law, the end of corruption, economic development, and investing in their human potential and their human capital.

With respect to the countries you have touched on, we have not been ignoring our responsibilities with any of the countries, especially with respect to Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. I participated in OAS meetings just recently to create the Friends of Venezuela to work with the Secretary General of the OAS in finding a way forward. I think we have seen some progress in recent weeks.

We worked hard to find an IMF solution for Argentina recently. President Lula is here, and we are working with Brazil to help them. I was in Colombia in December to spend time with President Uribe and all of his ministers on his new comprehensive, solid plan to move forward, and to see how we can best help him. We are helping him financially.

Even though there are challenges around the world, we are focusing on all the accounts that you mentioned, all of the Western Hemispheric accounts that you mentioned, both with financial aid, where appropriate, and certainly with political assistance and diplomatic support, as appropriate.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being with us here today. You are doing a wonderful job on behalf of our Nation. We all wish you well as you continue to do your work at this critical time in world history.

I want to compliment you on your address to the U.N. Security Council last week. You made a very compelling argument and presented detailed evidence that Saddam Hussein continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. History has clearly taught us that we cannot permit a murderous tyrant like Saddam to discard agreements he has made with the international community and continue to build his arsenal.

It is unfortunate that some of our nominal allies do not agree. It troubles me, as one with the surname of Chabot, or as the French pronunciation is, "Shabo," to say this; but one would think that the French, of all people, would be quick to understand the high price of appeasement.

Let me change course for a moment, Mr. Secretary. I just returned from Taiwan, where I was joined by Chairman Emeritus Gilman and several of my colleagues from this Committee, Mr. Rohrabacher, Mr. Wexler, and Ms. Berkley, and many other members of the Taiwan Caucus.

While in Taipei, we had the honor of meeting with President Chen Shui-Bian, with Vice President Lu, with former President, Lee Ten-Hui. As you know, each of these individuals has a remarkable life story.

President Lee is called the father of Taiwanese democracy. President Chen once served several months in a penitentiary for criticizing the government. Vice President Lu was sentenced to 12 years in prison—12 years in prison for giving a 20-minute speech on human rights.

Each of these statesmen has played a major role in the growth of democracy. Yet, due to the opposition from the Communist dictatorship in Beijing, these world leaders have not been allowed to make official visits to the United States, the cornerstone of world democracy and freedom.

Taiwan, of course, is an important player in Asia. During these uncertain times it can be of great help to the international community. I hope, Mr. Secretary, as we move ahead our government will reassess its policy and permit our Taiwanese friends to come to our Nation's Capitol on official visits.

I accompanied about 25 of my colleagues to New York City, where we met with President Chen Shui-Bian because he could not come to Washington. I just think it is absurd that they can't come here. We hope that we would again look at that policy.

Finally, Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you again for your work on the issue of international parental child abduction. You have been very gracious and were gracious enough to meet with me and a left-behind parent from Cincinnati, Mr. Tom Sylvester. We appreciate your efforts very much. I hope you can stay in touch with us on this matter, and hopefully make some progress on this unfortunate case. We thank you for your good work to date, and hope we can continue to count on your support.

Again, I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary. If you have any comment on any of those issues, I would love to hear it.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you very much, sir. I appreciate your kind words. With respect to Taiwan, we are constantly reviewing our policies, but we have to make sure our policies are coherent and consistent with our obligations with respect to our one-China policy and with respect to the various communiques that go along with that, but also consistent with our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. I know you understand that.

On child abduction, I spent a lot of time on this. I am very moved by the visit I had with Mr. Sylvester. We followed that case. New Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs Maura Harty is all over this. She created the Child Office in the Department of State some years ago, and in her first few months as Assistant Secretary of State she has gone after these kinds of issues. I think what we have done in a number of countries recently to rescue children who have been abducted shows the commitment she has made to this effort. We will continue to make a commitment to this effort.

She has also traveled to Saudi Arabia, and she is traveling to other parts of the world where we have had difficulty with these abduction cases to press our case home. I must say that she was criticized in certain quarters rather severely and unfairly as she went through the nomination process, but her record of accomplishment in her first few months of service will wash out all of that criticism rather quickly.

Chairman HYDE. We have the Secretary until 1 o'clock, I am told, so we will try to be mindful of that.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

When our Nation is deciding what to do in Iraq, it seems the fundamental question that the people are asking is, does a preemptive

attack without U.N. support make the United States safer, make our civilians here and abroad safer?

Some three-fourths of our generals testifying in the Senate last fall said that a preemptive attack without U.N. support would, in the words of one of them, supercharge al-Qaeda recruiting. The CIA analysis of last fall talked about blowback; that if we attacked unilaterally, if we attacked without U.N. support preemptively, that there is a much greater chance of an attack on the American civilian population if you back Saddam into a corner. That is pretty clear that common sense would say that.

I want to shift, though, to something else. No mention has been made that I have heard from this Administration of something that every schoolboy and every schoolgirl in America seems to know, and that is the links between the Saudi Arabian government and al-Qaeda, because they are our friends. But the Administration has tried pretty unconvincingly, to me, and it seems not particularly convincingly to the American people to establish ties between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi government.

The President and the State Department are touting the Osama bin Laden tape release yesterday as an inarguable link between al-Qaeda and Iraq. In that recording bin Laden states that the war concerns Muslims, regardless of whether the Socialist Party and Saddam remain or go.

My question is twofold. First, in that tape bin Laden does not praise Saddam Hussein. Actually, as his own remarks reveal, he has a marked indifference to whether Saddam and his regime lives or dies. You, Mr. Secretary, said 16 months ago that Osama bin Laden does not care one whit about Iraq. I think that is still pretty clear. There has been no proven evidence of real collaboration between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.

Second, it is well known that bin Laden despises Saddam. If the U.S. attacks the differences in religion, clearly Osama bin Laden despises the secular state of Iraq and the leadership from Saddam Hussein in that way. So if the U.S. attacks Iraq preemptively without U.N. support, I would offer, and ask for your comment, that bin Laden succeeds on four fronts:

Number one, there will be U.S. casualties of war, something Osama bin Laden would be thrilled with; second, Saddam Hussein's regime, which is not fundamentalist enough for bin Laden's liking, is likely toppled; number three, al-Qaeda will gain thousands of terrorist recruits to attack the free world in reaction to a Middle East conflict, and especially a Middle East conflict where Al-Jazeera televises every Iraqi civilian death throughout the Arab world; and fourth, our own CIA talks about blowback, which again plays into Osama bin Laden's hands.

So it seems, Mr. Secretary—here is my question—if the U.S. attacks preemptively without U.N. support, doesn't that actually serve bin Laden's interests more than it does our own?

Secretary POWELL. No, I don't think so. First of all, if it is necessary to attack, I am sure there will be disturbances. I am sure there will be some blowback, as you mentioned. That is to be expected. But we can't say that because there is going to be blowback we should not act, either with or without U.N. permission. If we think it is necessary to remove this regime because they are devel-

oping weapons of mass destruction, then we will have to accept some risk in doing that.

I also think that after we have dealt with this regime, and we have been successful, which we will be, and when the people of the world and the people of the region realize that we have not come to impose our will on a Muslim state but to come help people—there is no love lost for Saddam Hussein anywhere in that region, and I would submit even with Osama bin Laden. What makes the connection between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein interesting, and between Iraq and al-Qaeda interesting, is because they have found something that they do have in common. That is a desire to hurt America, and they see ways of cooperating with each other in that Iraq is a potential source of weapons—

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Secretary, are we bringing them closer together?

Secretary POWELL. No. I think what is bringing them closer together is their common hatred of the United States, and the nexus between terrorist organizations that would love to get their hands on weapons of mass destruction.

But guess what, if there ain't no Saddam Hussein there, there isn't any Iraqi regime there. If there is a different kind of leadership that does not have any weapons of mass destruction, then we will go back to the natural hostility that would exist between Osama bin Laden and a responsible regime, a responsible leadership in Baghdad that did not have any weapons of mass destruction of any interest to Osama bin Laden.

You know, even in my testimony last week before the Security Council I made the point that we have this secular state and this religious fanatic, if that is what one would call Osama bin Laden. What they have found common of interest is this nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

That is why we find, guess what, lieutenants of Osama bin Laden getting in touch with Hussein operatives. That is why we see al-Qaeda-linked organizations operating out of Baghdad. There is the Zaqawi case that I mentioned. It is that nexus that we are trying to break up, as well as break up Saddam Hussein's ability to develop weapons of mass destruction.

Yes, we do have to face the possibility of blowback and disturbances, and we are preparing ourselves for that. But I believe in the aftermath of a successful operation that these problems will be dealt with and mitigated, and we will be on a stronger footing, both within the region and with respect to the war on terrorism.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Tancredo.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It does seem like, in listening to my colleagues and others, that—oh, by the way, ditto. You are a great guy and doing a wonderful job.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you.

Mr. TANCREDO. I am instituting a Rush Limbaugh time-saving factor here.

It does seem, however, that one of our problems with public policy that is difficult to explain, and maybe where we are losing in terms of that particular aspect of our endeavor, is that we keep identifying that the problem here and the enemy here is an individual; sometimes is a guy by the name of Osama bin Laden, sometimes an organization that we call al-Qaeda, and a government or

country that sometimes we call Iraq, as opposed to I think what our real enemy is; that is, of course, fundamentalist Islam.

Regardless of whether or not we are able to accomplish our goals in each one of those specific areas dealing with each one of either those individuals or countries, we can't tell the American people that everything will be okay afterwards because there is a bigger, broader problem. That is one of the things I think that is happening here that is confusing people, the American public and even our colleagues.

But one of the things I wanted to mention, Mr. Secretary, goes away from this area entirely. About a month ago I initiated a letter to you, I think signed by a dozen or so of my colleagues, specifically asking about a problem that I see developing around the country, and that is that the Mexican government has tasked all of its 40-order consular officials with the responsibility of going out and actually lobbying States, cities, municipalities, counties, for the purpose of getting them to adopt and accept matricular consular, the Mexican ID.

Essentially, when it boils down to it, what they are doing is asking these levels of government to help people violate the law; because, of course, as you know, the only people here who need a foreign ID is someone who is here illegally. So I am not asking you to respond to that today, necessarily, unless you are inclined to it, but to just respond to the letter that I sent, because it has been a month and I have not heard anything.

A year ago, while you were here—you said something that was certainly quotable, and I did quote it, so did a lot of other folks; something to the effect that there was no greater human rights tragedy or disaster on the face of the Earth than what was happening in Sudan.

The U.S.-sponsored civilian protection monitoring team this week issued a report accusing the government of Sudan of deliberate attacks against civilians in Western Upper Nile, and in violation of the cessation of hostilities agreement. As you know, we passed the Sudan Peace Act and authorized \$300 million for reconstruction and development in Sudan beginning in fiscal year 2003. The President has requested an estimated \$82 million in assistance for Sudan.

What I am wondering is, are the requested funds for southern Sudan or for Sudan? Are they tied to a final peace settlement? What are your observations about what is happening today, this minute, in Sudan, and what can we do about it?

Secretary POWELL. With respect to your letter, you will get an answer very promptly, Mr. Tancredo. We are reviewing the whole concept of the matricular consular and will see what needs to be done on that. I am aware of the lobbying efforts that are taking place.

With respect to Sudan, I will give you an answer for the record on how the money is being spent and our plans for the money. I think we have made some progress with the IGAD effort in recent months. We have got discussions taking place now. It has been two steps forward and one step backwards for most of the last 2 years that we have been in office, but I think we owe a lot to Senator Danforth for his effort, and we are following up on his effort. He

remains engaged, and we believe we have seen some progress toward finding a way forward, but we still have a very long way to go in the Sudan. But I am a little more optimistic this year than I was last year.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for an outstanding opening statement that described our position in the world. I would also like to commend the Ranking Member for his opening statement, particularly the portions praising the efforts of our Secretary of State.

We are here to talk about the budget, but there are more important things even than the State Department budget. I hope that you could respond perhaps in writing to a few comments I have about your budgetary proposal.

First, you have over half a billion dollars for broadcasting. I commend you for that effort. I would hope to see an even larger portion of that budget for broadcasting go into broadcasts aimed at the Muslim world, aimed not with shortwave radio but rather with AM-FM television, and especially satellite broadcasting.

Second, I note with regret that your proposal cuts from \$15 million down to \$7.5 million money for Cyprus, which is spent chiefly on intercommunal efforts. I hope we in Congress push that back up to the \$15 million that we provided last year.

You spoke with pride about our efforts to build new Embassies. I am thinking perhaps it might be appropriate to build a new NATO headquarters, since NATO faces its greatest threats in the southeast portion of the NATO area, and Brussels just seems way too far from that, not only geographically but perhaps psychologically as well.

You know, Mr. Secretary, that I have taken a great interest in spouses coming to live in the United States when an American citizen marries someone from a foreign country. We have added section 233 to the State Department authorization bill that provides a 30-day processing period as your goal. I want to commend the State Department for its good-faith efforts to achieve that.

Unfortunately, the INS can take a year or years when there is no doubt that it is a legitimate marriage, when there is no issue of national security. They can separate a married couple for well over a year, and what is shocking is that they are doing so in part to enforce a law that says if an American marries someone from a foreign country, they cannot live together in the United States until they prove that they are not poor.

Perhaps that would be difficult to explain from a human rights perspective, that we believe in the permanent separation of husbands and wives if they happen to be poor and one happens to be an American.

But I want to focus and give you a chance to respond with regard to the national security threats. Thirteen months ago, the President showed incredible perception and incredible nondiplomatic honesty in identifying three nations in the axis of evil. My concern is that all of our attention is on only one of those three axes. I would feel, and I think my constituents would feel, a lot more secure if we had Hans Blix in three places, rather than the 101st Airborne in Baghdad and virtually nothing but angry rhetoric directed

toward North Korea, and perhaps nothing at all directed toward Iran.

What I wonder is whether we would be in a better position to secure the economic sanctions that could cause a disarmament of North Korea if we were more compromising, perhaps even more compromising than would be optimal, on the issue of Iraq.

Do we have a better chance of getting China to stop providing aid to North Korea and loans and low-cost exports to North Korea if we take a somewhat different position with respect to Iraq? Or are these, in effect, three separate problems, and can we craft our Iraqi policy independent and without regard to our concerns about Iran and North Korea?

Secretary POWELL. I think we can craft them separately. I speak rather regularly to my Chinese colleagues about North Korea. I had a long meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister last week and expect to see him in the not too distant future. They see it separately. They are not measuring what they might or might not do in North Korea with respect to what we are doing in Iraq.

We are doing everything we can to persuade the Chinese that the problem in North Korea is not just a problem between North Korea and the United States. It is between North Korea and the region and North Korea and the world.

Earlier today the International Atomic Energy Agency meeting in Vienna decided to report North Korea's noncompliance and North Korea's ignoring of the last resolution of the IAEA to the Security Council. We are all united in that effort, for the most part, to include China.

I think China understands that it has an issue with North Korea, too, because the Chinese position is the Korean Peninsula will be denuclearized. We are saying, fine, then why do you just turn to us to make it happen? You should be part of this effort. And since you provide half of your foreign assistance to North Korea, of your annual foreign assistance, and 80 percent of energy and 80 percent of economic activity is from China, you have leverage that we would think it would be in your interest, as well as our interest and the interests of the region, to use.

We are pressing the Chinese with this case. We are hopeful that they will respond. So I think the two issues are separable.

With respect to Iran, we have a different set of issues there. We are talking to our Russian colleagues and, as recently as yesterday, about the announcement of Iran that they intend to have a full nuclear cycle for their power generation needs, and that will include the ability to generate fuel that can be used for reprocessing into nuclear material. We find this troublesome, and we are working with the Russians to help us bring this under control.

Iran is undergoing a great deal of turmoil right now between those forces one might call moderate and those that one might call extremist. We are encouraging moderates. We think that change will take place in Iran, but it is not a situation that seems at this moment to us to be appropriate to start threatening anyone or to get moving down a track of the kind we have in either Iraq, and it is quite different from the track we are on in North Korea. Even though there are similarities in terms of their desires to have weapons of mass destruction and the actions that have been taken

in that regard, each has to be dealt with with a different set of tools from a very large toolbox that we have.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlewoman from the First District of Virginia, Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you Mr. Secretary, for being here.

First of all, let me say I am sorry I missed most of your verbal statement, but I did read your written statement. I was meeting with the Speaker's Drug Task Force and President Gutierrez from Ecuador, which brings me to a question. There is a key position in the State Department in support of the overseas war against narcotics that has been vacant for nearly 6 months. I was wondering if you could tell us when the position of Assistant Secretary of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs will be filled.

The second question is, there is a lot in the media here lately, and we have heard it somewhat with our colleagues here today, that the transatlantic relationship over the last 50 years has really eroded, particularly with the core values that we have held with Europe, that have held us together.

I was wondering if you could tell us where you see our transatlantic relationship going. How do you see it today?

Secretary POWELL. On the first issue, there are two good candidates for the position, and the decision is imminent. We should have somebody nominated for the position in the very near future.

With respect to the transatlantic relationship, it is changing. It is evolving. We went from 16 members of NATO to 19 members of NATO, and we will be going to 26 members of NATO in due course. The European Union is growing in size by at least 10 nations or so, and I find myself spending as much time with the European Union leadership as I do with the NATO leadership. We added so many countries to the transatlantic community over the last 10 years since the end of the Soviet Union, that one would expect evolution to take place.

But what I find to be a common thread through this evolutionary process and period is the desire on the part of all of the nations of Europe to have a good relationship with the United States and to recognize that ultimately their security rests on the commitment of the United States to transatlantic security.

Now, one of the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union is that all of these nations are now democracies, and democracies have people who vote. People have opinions. All of these leaders now have public opinion. This may sound a little odd, but it was easier to work with the Soviet Union than it is with a dozen-and-a-half countries, but I would want it no other way.

However, it also means more time has to be spent listening, cajoling, debating; not unlike what happens in Congress at a hearing, or perhaps even when you are behind closed doors. One never knows. Democracy is not the easiest system in the world, especially when it is in a coalition. A lot of my time is spent arguing, debating, and not just saying I am America, we are the strongest, you have to do it our way. I want to hear what the smallest country thinks. I want to listen to that foreign minister and hear what he or she has to tell me about the aspirations, fears, anxieties of their people.

Because we are the largest and because we are the most powerful, that places an obligation on us to listen and to use our power with care and with understanding and with restraint, but when it comes time to use our power in the right cause, to use that power.

I think we are mindful of the views of others, considerate of the views of others, but we have principles we stand on, and we have things we believe in strongly and feel strongly about. We should not be afraid to act strongly when we have strong views and strong principles that we are executing.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I can appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. I would just ask that we pay close attention to what is going on with the war on drugs, especially in South America. I, along with many others, believe there is a direct link with terrorism and drugs.

Secretary POWELL. There is no question about it, they are now merged.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Wexler.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I watched, Mr. Secretary, your presentation, as we all did, to the U.N. I watched with extraordinary pride because of who the messenger is, but probably more so because of what your message was. I think you hit on the head both the case against Iraq and the principles of why America is doing what it is doing. I applaud you for that.

I also cannot commend you more, and respectfully suggest that you continue articulating the bravery of the men and women at the State Department and the extraordinarily crucial role they play. But what I would like to do is what Mr. Berman did, and share with you what my constituents are saying to me.

If we were in my part of south Florida today and we walked into a supermarket, we could not find a bottle of bottled water to buy. They are all bought up. If we went to Home Depot, if we went to any hardware store, we would see hundreds if not thousands of World War II and Korean veterans standing in line buying duct tape that they are going to take home to put on their windows and their doors to figure out how they are going to protect their two-bedroom condo, and figure out which room in the condo is going to be their safe room during the impending biological or chemical attack that the newspapers say will be occurring.

Mr. Secretary, what they are saying to me yesterday and today is, Wexler, why are we in Code Orange? If we are in Code Orange because of Saddam Hussein and Iraq, then what are we waiting for? Let's go. But if we are in Code Orange because of something totally unrelated to Saddam Hussein and Iraq, then what are we doing? We are going to fight a war, win the war, and when the war is over, we are still going to be in Code Orange, or maybe then we will be in Code Red, because we will have totally emblazoned all the people who have put us in Code Orange to begin with.

So I think the American people, regardless of how they feel about whether we should or should not engage in inspections, are totally confused. With all due respect, the one part of the Administration's response I don't fully appreciate, which—I think, in part to Mr. Payne and Mr. Brown, you are absolutely right—is unfair, it is ridiculous, to ask you to predict how many people we are going to lose or how long it will take.

But what I do not think is unfair to ask of you and the President for the American people is what is our plan when we win the war, if we have to fight it? Is General Franks going to be the modern day General MacArthur? Is it going to be the kind of thing where American troops are planning and committed to occupying an Iraq? Or are we talking to our allies about how they are going to help us in the occupation? Is it going to be led by a Muslim country? That might soften the way. Is that Muslim country going to be Turkey?

It seems to me there are plans that need to have been made if we are going to prosecute this successfully to the end and accomplish what you call the liberation of Iraq. But I don't think the American people have heard that. If they did, I think they would feel a lot more comfortable about the risks they are taking today at Home Depot about what it is we are doing.

I would ask respectfully if you could explain to my constituents why we are in Code Orange, does it relate to Iraq, and when we get done with the war, if we need it, are we still going to be in Code Orange? If we are, does that mean we have not eliminated the threat one bit as it relates to the homeland security?

Secretary POWELL. We are facing different types of threats, sir. Code Orange or whatever code we happen to be at really doesn't reflect a particular threat from Iraq but a threat from international terrorism, and especially from al-Qaeda.

The reason for elevating the level of concern now is because there was specific intelligence that suggested that there were people who were targeting us in various ways, in the ways that you describe. As a prudent measure, the President decided, based on the advice from all of his intelligence and national security advisers, that it would be a prudent thing to do.

I don't think it is the kind of thing that should cause the Nation to panic, but as Tom Ridge pointed out the other day in his press conference with the Attorney General, be prudent and maybe stock up on some things that you might want to have in your house, but go about your daily life. Otherwise we will be scared forever.

Now, that is easy for me to say, and it is a little harder for you to explain in a Wal-Mart in south Florida, but I hope that people will realize that we have to be alert to these threats that will come along from time to time. It is irresponsible of the government not to share this kind of information with the public so that we can be more cautious.

With respect to where we are going in Iraq, plans are being made, and we are starting to share the details of those plans with the public through Congressional hearings. Yesterday Under Secretary Grossman and Under Secretary Feith briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. There will be more such briefings.

The fact of the matter is, if we have to go with a military force, yes, it will be an American commander who will initially be in charge of that. When the conflict has been prosecuted successfully, as I am sure it will be, as quickly as we can we want to transition out of military government. But we have an initial responsibility that is best handled by a military leader and then transitioned to civil authority, and ultimately to Iraqi civil authorities, as fast as possible.

I am not sure the answer is for another Muslim country to be in the lead. It is not clear to me that that would mix as well as America. See, the thing about America is our power is understood, it is trusted. People can look at our history and see what that history tells them about what we are doing when we are faced with a situation like this.

We are thinking about humanitarian concerns, we are thinking about building on the existing infrastructure that is in Iraq, we are thinking about how to put in place a civil society, how to bring in our friends and allies to work with us. There are lots of people who have signed up to be part of this. Even those organizations, those countries rather, that are, shall we say, most vocal right now with respect to "let's not get into a conflict" are going to be there to help us if a conflict does come along and in the aftermath of such a conflict. We know that. They have said so.

I think you can say to your constituents that we have a problem in Iraq, and we also have a problem with al-Qaeda. What we are fighting hard to do now is to keep those two from joining that nexus between terrorism and sources of weapons of mass destruction, as represented by what is happening in Iraq.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Secretary, the time you have allotted to us has expired. May I impose for one more question?

Secretary POWELL. Sure.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Governor Janklow.

Mr. JANKLOW. Mr. Secretary, as I told you once before several years ago, every time I have a chance to meet you in public or private, you remind me of the growing greatness of America, where cream still can rise to the top.

Mr. Secretary, I am new on this Committee. I am new to the Congress. I am the son of an Army officer who was involved in the war trials in Nuremburg, Germany. We lived in Nuremburg when I was young. I have vivid memories, even though I was young, of what went on during that period of time.

I heard you today reference Charles DeGaulle and a comment that he made I believe in 1956. I am old enough to remember that when Charles DeGaulle assumed the presidency of France and gave up Algeria, which he had indicated he would not, the Foreign Legion and other French generals revolted, and there was a great fear in the world that the French army from North Africa was going to invade France once again, post-World War II.

It was a President of the United States who said that an attack on France proper by the Army of France from outside of France would be an attack on the United States, and the generals stood down.

I can also remember that it was, I believe, Charles DeGaulle who, when few Frenchman were fighting the Germans, he went to Britain. And when Americans and Brits and others were landing on the shores of Normandy and dying, he was on the radio broadcasts from Britain to France.

I am also an American who remembers that the French are great allies of ours, and when this is all over they are still going to be our friends. They just happen to be our friends who sometimes put

their mercenary interests and—monetary interests, not mercenary—ahead of other people's interests.

I have three questions that I am concerned about.

One, has America's Government ever disclosed to our people the economic interests that our friends the French, our friends the Germans, and our friends the Russians, have with Saddam Hussein's regime in terms of the financial benefits that they reap from their relationship with Saddam Hussein?

Two, Saddam Hussein is a man who has always been at war. We talk about war crimes trials, and we go around and pick up some of these lesser war criminals and put them on trial in Europe before the world's community and by the world's community. But if I recall, I may be incorrect, I recall this is the guy, the only person, who has used poison gas since the First World War, and he used it in a conflict with his nextdoor neighbors in Iran.

I believe he is the only person in history who has publicly gassed his own people when they disagreed with him, in the south the Shiites, and I believe this is the same individual whose regime slaughtered the Kurds in the northern part of the country after the Kuwaiti incident.

I believe this is the same individual who tried to assassinate the former President Bush when he visited one of the countries in the Middle East. I believe this is the same individual that sent rockets and bombs to attack the nation of Israel, that had no public hostility with him, back when the people of Kuwait were being freed, yet he saw fit to attack the nation of Israel with rockets.

What I was wondering for my second question was, are there any plans by our friends in Europe and Russia to put this war criminal on trial, he and the senior members of his regime, like they do others in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere for war criminal activity—crimes against humanity—that they have done against their neighbors and their own people?

And third, and I realize these are disconnected questions, but my third question is, have our friends and allies, the British, the French, and the Russians, who have marvelous intelligence services, have any of them ever indicated that, through their intelligence services, that they do not believe that Iraq possesses this minute weapons of mass destruction in the biological field, in the chemical field, and that they are working on acquiring the weapons in the nuclear field? Have any of those people ever indicated this?

I don't ask you to divulge confidence or secrets, but have any ever indicated that their intelligence services tell them Iraq this minute does not possess these types of weapons?

Secretary POWELL. On the third question, I don't think any of their intelligence services would dare give such an assessment, because I am quite confident that the KGB has not entirely disappeared from the mentality of the Soviet bureaucracy. They still have competent intelligence services. They know they cannot give such an assurance that they are gone.

The British intelligence service essentially agrees with our assessment. The others are much quieter with respect to what they say or do not say. In some cases they just say they don't know. I believe that they really do know, but on purpose they say that they do not know.

With respect to war crimes, we believe a solid case could be made that Saddam Hussein is subject to prosecution for war crimes, and we are constantly reviewing evidence and information, should that ever come to be something that was about to be pursued. I don't think our colleagues, the ones you have mentioned, have been forthcoming with respect to that regard.

The first one with respect to economic interests, it is well known that all of the nations that you touched on, Governor, have a debt outstanding from Iraq. Iraq owes them money. They have had financial interests in that country over the years.

I suspect at some point in the future they will seek to deal with their debt, and they understand, and I hope they keep in their calculus, that sooner or later Iraq will be returned to a world of normal commercial activity. I assume at that point they would want to have good relations with Iraq and the new leadership.

Mr. JANKLOW. One final thing. You indicated in your response that you suspect that one or more of these nations had indicated they just don't know, through their intelligence service. You said you thought maybe they did know, but they said that. These people that you suspect know but have told us no, they are also our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, correct?

Secretary POWELL. Let's just say they are friends of ours.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has long expired. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for a most illuminating and instructive morning.

I yield to Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, before asking permission that Members be permitted to submit questions, Mr. Secretary, on behalf of all the Democratic Members, we express our deep appreciation to you and our admiration for your work.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, the gentleman's request is granted.

The meeting stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BARBARA LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Lantos. I look forward to working with you again this year on the House International Relations Committee.

Secretary Powell, it is always an honor and a pleasure to have you here with us, and we appreciate your coming here today to discuss these all important issues of war and peace.

Last week at the United Nations, you made an extremely convincing and compelling case regarding Iraq. You offered a very thorough and convincing explanation of why the international community must remain engaged in the process of Iraqi disarmament and why inspections are so important.

Those inspections have really just begun. It is imperative that we give the inspection teams the time and resources to do their jobs and seek out and destroy any weapons of mass destruction.

Today we are already seeing the dangerous effects of the doctrine of preemption. We face a crisis in North Korea where the dangers of nuclear proliferation are now increasing exponentially. Disengagement followed by the Axis of Evil speech made a difficult situation far worse. We need to act now to bring the countries involved back to the table, to discuss nuclear proliferation concerns, to become engaged on humanitarian and economic levels, and to seek a peace treaty for the Korean War and greater stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. Secretary, while we face many urgent crises today. I would like to discuss several of these crises: Iraq, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, North Korea, and Haiti.

(The Member's questions are included with those sent from all Members of the Committee to the Secretary of State. These questions, and the responses, appear elsewhere in this document.)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NICK SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

I would like to thank Secretary of State Colin Powell for coming before us today. He is among our nation's best and most decorated representatives, as he demonstrated yet again last week during his masterful presentation to the U.N. Security Council.

Secretary Powell proved Iraq's continuing violation of various U.N. resolutions using disclosures from American intelligence to show that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction, has lied about those weapons, conspires to thwart U.N. inspections, and aids terrorists. A lot of the evidence was heretofore classified. However, there is still significant classified evidence that has not been revealed because it would compromise our sources. This compelling case against Iraq means that the U.N. must make some decisions. As President Bush said to the U.N. last year, and Secretary Powell reiterated, the U.N. must now move to enforce its resolutions or forfeit its credibility as a body.

Last October, Congress authorized the President to use force, if necessary, to protect American security and disarm Iraq. It also called on the President to work with the U.N., which subsequently passed a unanimous resolution calling on Iraq to "actively" cooperate to disarm of all weapons of mass destruction. Responding to that resolution, Iraq submitted 12,000 pages of documents on December 7th that the U.N.'s chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, said was "not helpful." Blix also said that

Saddam Hussein has offered no proof that he has rid himself of chemical or biological weapons and has shown little willingness to get serious about disarming.

Iraq's many denials are not credible. The easy course of action would be to do nothing, saving money and lives. But that would leave the problem of Iraq and of weapons build-up in other rogue countries to future Presidents and generations.

During the prior inspections which ended in 1998, Iraq already admitted to possession of large quantities of chemical and biological weapons, including 3.9 tons of VX gas, 2,850 tons of mustard gas, 1,800 tons of nerve agents, 8,500 liters of anthrax, 19,180 liters of botulinum toxin, and 10 liters of ricin. Aerial photography and intelligence agents indicate that Iraq's stock of poisons has only grown since 1998.

We all hope that we can achieve Iraqi disarmament without war. But given the blatant Iraqi defiance of the U.N. Security Council along with the threat to our security and that of our allies, we must be willing to act militarily. I agree with analysts who believe that if Saddam Hussein is convinced we will go to war, he is likely to give up the weapons or accept exile and take his multibillion dollar fortune with him. Being prepared and willing to enforce compliance with U.N. resolutions actually reduces the chances of war. If Saddam Hussein does change course and accept exile or disarmament, it will be only because he fears gathering allied forces that are ready and willing to act.

Our State Department has increasing responsibility to improve communications with citizens of all countries that have a stake in this and other pressing issues.

I appreciate Secretary Powell's contributions to this debate and look forward to his comments.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DIANE E. WATSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Thank you Chairman Hyde for holding this important hearing on the FY 2004 International Affairs Budget Request. And thank you, Secretary Powell, for taking time to address the International Relations Committee during these challenging times.

The President's overall request for FY 2004 represents a significant increase in the 150 account. Although it exceeds the rate of inflation, over last year's budget request, it still under-funds core development and humanitarian assistance accounts outside of the Millennium Challenge Account and resources directed to combating HIV/AIDS. For example, the Administration has proposed cutting Development Assistance to Africa by \$42.6 million from the FY 2003 request level. Funds are cut for 26 African countries. Many of the nations that have been cut are considered on the front line in the war on terrorism (for example, Kenya, Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia).

This is unfortunate. The long term effectiveness of U.S. assistance is measured by continuity and consistency. Cuts in essential programs, such as child survival, will not guarantee the long term success of HIV/AIDS programs or the President's new Millennium Challenge Account. It is regrettable that in a time of incredible national and international uncertainty that, putting the Millennium Challenge Account and funds directed to HIV/AIDS aside, international development and humanitarian aid remain flat in absolute terms and actually experience declines when measured against inflation.

The most immediate issue, however, is the very real potential for war in Iraq. I am disappointed that the Administration's budget omits costs associated with the possible war in Iraq. It fails to discuss the likelihood of humanitarian and reconstruction costs that could arise with a possible war with Iraq. Press reports indicate the possibility of additional foreign assistance to Turkey, Jordan, and Israel in connection with a possible war in Iraq. But there is no mention of this in your budget presentation—not even mention of contingency plans and the potential effect on other programs—should the United States go to war in Iraq.

Mr. Secretary, I have made very clear my opposition to the use of force in Iraq. Any decision to invade Iraq must be measured against the terrorist threat. I am still not convinced that the Administration has made a credible argument that a war in Iraq will lessen the threat to our homeland security. It is ironic that we are now being told by our Director of Homeland Security and CIA Director that a terrorist threat is imminent. But that terrorist threat is not Saddam; it is Al Qaeda.

At this time, I believe the United Nations weapons inspectors must be allowed to continue their inspections and come to a final determination as to whether Iraq is complying, dissembling, and, if so, whether it can be made to comply through diplomatic and other means short of war. Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons inspector,

reports that in two months he has built the staff in Iraq from zero to two hundred and sixty. The team has eight helicopters and will soon have the use of unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles and U-2 aircraft. The chances of a conclusive discovery, or a conclusive Iraqi effort to evade one, are growing. More time would lessen the real damage to allied unity as well as mitigate the isolation of the United States and create an atmosphere for a united and international solution to the problem in Iraq.

Mr. Secretary, most of the debate on Iraq has focused on the before and after. Little of it has focused on the war itself. We are led to believe that Saddam's forces have been irrevocably weakened by the Gulf War and that this war will be short and relatively bloodless. However, as a former General, you know perhaps better than anyone that war seldom unfolds as planned. Today Saddam's forces may be weaker, but they are scattered throughout the country and major urban areas in a land mass the size of Germany. A war plan leaked by David Martin, of CBS News, calls for eight hundred cruise missile strikes during the first two days, twice as many as during the entire Gulf War. The plan has been described as "shock and awe," and "its goal is the psychological destruction of the enemy's will to fight." However, any campaign will probably begin with bombs over Baghdad. But what if the Iraqis' resolve is stiffened, as was the resolve of residents of London during World War II or of Hanoi during the Vietnam War? Then no one can say how much blood will be let and, in the long term, how our troops and the American public will react to such a scenario.

I pray that this scenario does not unfold. It is my hope that the UN weapons inspectors will be allowed the time to continue inspections in order to determine, beyond a shadow of doubt in the eyes of the world community, whether or not Iraq can be disarmed in a manner that does not lead to all-out war.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND VICE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Question:

Mr. Secretary, one of the main justifications for our country's so-called "engagement" policy with the People's Republic of China is that in exchange for our Nation's toleration of enormous bilateral trade deficits; massive human rights violations, including the arrest and mistreatment of many American citizens and permanent residents; intellectual piracy; aggressive and belligerent behavior towards Taiwan; espionage of our top nuclear secrets; illegal subversion of our election contribution laws; continued nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation; and the arming of rogue regimes who are dedicated to America's physical destruction—and I'm sure I've inadvertently left out several other forms of outrageous and unacceptable international behavior by the People's Republic of China—in exchange for American acceptance of all of these outrageous things, we were supposed to get Chinese cooperation in our efforts to keep North Korea from developing more nuclear weapons.

Now here we are, after countless concessions to China later. The North Koreans openly flout the 1994 Agreed Framework, withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and make open moves to develop nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them via ballistic missiles. Mr. Secretary, what kinds of specific cooperation, if any, has the United States received from the People's Republic of China in resolving this nuclear crisis with North Korea? Can you name the specific actions that the PRC has taken to bring pressure on North Korea to reverse course? If the PRC's helpful actions are classified information, I would be interested in receiving a classified Member briefing to hear them.

Answer:

The United States does not accept outrageous and unacceptable behavior from China. The President's policy of seeking a candid, cooperative, and constructive relationship with the PRC specifically targets areas of disagreement, and we have worked assiduously to make progress in issues such as human rights and the proliferation of missile and other technologies. There have been some positive developments, but much remains to be done. We will continue to raise our concerns at the highest levels.

China shares with us the desire for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. The PRC has consistently made clear its desire for a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula and has conveyed to the North Koreans both publicly and privately its disapproval of the DPRK's asserted withdrawal from the NPT.

China voted with us at the February 12 IAEA Board of Governors meeting to report North Korea's non-compliance with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement to the U.N. Security Council.

We have repeatedly and at the highest levels called on China to use its leverage and influence with Pyongyang to persuade the DPRK to fulfill its obligations to the international community, including coming back into compliance with the NPT. We have made clear to China, as we have to North Korea, that this is not a bilateral issue with the U.S., and that we will not be blackmailed by the DRPK. We are confident that China has heard that message clearly, and is acting on it in a way that reflects our shared interest in ensuring North Korea's compliance with its commitments.

Question:

With the war on terrorism waging, the President's budget request has a heavy focus on funding for democracy building activities and counterterrorism initiatives in the Middle East and predominately Muslim states. Given the fact serious human rights abuses continue in East Asia, especially in China, Vietnam, Burma, and Indonesia, my concern, Mr. Secretary, is whether this budget adequately funds democracy-building activities in Asia. The Economic Support Fund request for democracy building in Burma, where there are widespread reports of rape by the military and an estimated 70,000 child soldiers, is only \$6.5 million and the request for the newly independent and fragile democracy in East Timor is only \$13.5 million. Do you believe these amounts are enough to make a difference in the region?

Answer:

The Economic Support Fund funds for Burma go to a number of NGOs (including the National Endowment for Democracy, Open Society Institute, and Internews) primarily working with refugee and exile communities outside the country. Their programs focus on democracy and capacity-building activities for a future, more democratic, Burma. We are looking for ways to support more political freedom inside Burma and are supporting programs to do so as we identify them. At this point in time, the capacity of such projects would not be able to support an increase in funds.

Given the corruption, ineffectiveness, and illegitimacy of the current regime, our ability to operate inside Burma is greatly circumscribed, despite the great needs of the people. The Administration would seek to increase the funding if Burma made major steps toward democracy, and we could operate more effectively inside the country. For now, given the limitations we face, current funding levels are sufficient.

The ESF request for East Timor is \$6 million less than our FY'03 budget. This reflects the need to wean the East Timor budget from reliance on foreign aid toward self-sufficiency, and reflects expectations that natural gas revenues will begin to flow within several years. However, on a per capita basis, East Timor remains our largest aid recipient in the East Asia Pacific region. The ESF funds enable USAID to provide technical assistance and training programs to promote economic revitalization and democratic institution building, including the judicial system and the rule of law capacity.

Question:

Last year, the President's budget request was \$755 million for the New Independent States, while this year, only \$576 million is requested. What are the reasons for such a steep reduction of assistance, especially for Ukraine (from \$155 million to \$94 million) and Russia (from \$148 to \$73 million)? Is this a reflection of any changes in policy towards the countries of the former Soviet Union? Is the reduction in Ukraine's assistance due to President Kuchma's authorizing the sale of the Kolchuga anti-radar system to Iraq?

Answer:

Regarding the FREEDOM Support Act, I should first note that while we are requesting a significant reduction (\$179 million below the FY 2003 appropriated level), it is not as dramatic a drop as it seems. Due to a decision to shift funding for exchange programs in both SEED and FSA accounts from those accounts into the Educational and Cultural Exchanges (ECE) account, the FSA request is approximately \$90 million lower than it would have been otherwise. The Department plans to fund these exchange programs—which we consider to be a vital component of our effort to change attitudes and mindsets in these former Communist countries—at the \$90 million level in FY 2004.

Even taking the shift of exchange programs into consideration, however, the FSA request is lower, with most of the reduction coming from Russia and Ukraine. This reflects difficult budget realities as well as a shift in focus towards Central Asia. These are the front-line states in the ongoing effort in Afghanistan, and expanded

assistance there will bolster stability and attack the root causes of extremism: economic desperation, political frustration, social degradation, and isolation. We also see opportunities to phase out assistance in some sectors due to progress on macroeconomic structural reform (Russia) and nuclear safety (Ukraine).

As for the Kolchuga affair, the United States Government initiated a broad policy review of its bilateral relations with Ukraine. Concurrently, a temporary pause was initiated in new obligations of FY 2002 FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) assistance benefiting the central government. The policy review was completed in January 2003 and our views have been shared with the Government of Ukraine. The Department has now lifted the pause.

While simultaneously keeping President Kuchma at arms' length, we will engage broadly with Ukraine in an effort to promote genuine reforms, both political and economic, and to advance Ukraine's integration into Euro-Atlantic and global institutions. The shift of FSA assistance away from the central government will be accelerated and its top priorities in FY 2003 and FY 2004 will be to strengthen civil society, independent media, small business development and land titling, reflecting our reform-oriented policy goals.

Question:

Mr. Secretary, we understand and fully support the Administration's efforts to combat international terrorism wherever it appears on the globe. In this connection, we note press reports that in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), you may be planning to designate certain organizations associated with the Chechen resistance in the Russian Federation as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). However, we all recognize that much of the Chechen population is not associated with terrorism, and is suffering immeasurably as a result of the conflict. What steps, political and humanitarian, is the Administration taking to assuage the plight of the Chechen population?

Answer:

This Administration remains concerned about the situation in Chechnya and the plight both of the population of Chechnya and the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Chechnya and neighboring regions of Russia. On the political side, we are encouraging the Government of Russia to follow through with public commitments it has made in relation to the March 23 constitutional referendum, which we hope will initiate a political process leading to the creation of institutions of self-government acceptable to the people of Chechnya.

The United States Government is well aware of the humanitarian needs arising from this long and painful conflict, and contributes significant sums to various international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dispensing assistance to vulnerable portions of the population in Chechnya, and to Chechen IDPs in Chechnya and in neighboring regions of Russia. Overall, the U.S. Government contributed \$17.2 million in FY 2002, and has given \$75.4 million since 2000 to meet the humanitarian needs of the Chechen people in Chechnya and surrounding areas of the North Caucasus. These funds go to international NGOs (for example: International Medical Corps, Mercy Corps International, the International Rescue Committee, and World Vision, to name a few). Programs we finance help the needy in Chechnya and Chechen IDPs in other parts of the North Caucasus with food, shelter, water and sanitation, health care, children's education, protection and detention issues, mine awareness training, and local capacity building. We will continue to program funds to our international organizations and NGO partners in FY 2003.

Question:

I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for delivering a powerful and well documented presentation to the United Nations on the vast evidence of Iraqi noncompliance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. Iraqi disarmament must be the outcome and goal of our foreign policy. There appears to be only one way in which Iraqi disarmament can be secured via nonviolent means—a conscious decision by the Iraqi national leadership that the benefits of possessing and developing weapons of mass destruction are not worth the risk of regime destruction.

To the extent that Iraq believes that there exists a credible threat of force for Iraqi noncompliance, their incentive to cooperate and disarm peacefully is increased. Do you believe that this is an accurate assessment of the current situation? Is it accurate to say that the closer America and our "coalition of the willing" come to war with Iraq, the greater the chances become that Saddam Hussein will recalculate the costs and benefits of noncompliance and decide to end the cat-and-mouse game?

Answer:

A growing international consensus that Iraq must comply with 12 years of UNSCRs and the credible threat of force compelled Iraq's grudging "acceptance" last November of UNSCR 1441. By contrast, Iraq never accepted UNSCR 1284 which established UNMOVIC in 1999.

More recently, the credible threat of force has led Iraq to make piecemeal, tactical 'concessions' in the hopes of averting military action. None of this changed the basic equation, however. It was our hope that Iraq would fully understand the consequences of its choices and voluntarily comply in the face of overwhelming force. Iraq, however, never made a strategic decision to disarm and comply with UNSCR 1441 and previous resolutions.

Iraq has failed to live up to its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions. A disarmament process that UNSCR 687 ordered to be completed in 90 days has entered its 12th year. UNSCR 1441 gave Iraq a final opportunity to comply. The Iraqi regime failed this final opportunity.

Question:

With respect to the budget, if war does break-out in Iraq, what planning has been done to handle the expected humanitarian needs of Iraq, including the possible out-flow of refugees and the internal flow of displaced persons? When the conflict ceases, how will the U.S. rebuilding effort be funded?

Answer:

The United States is committed to assist the Iraqi people, providing humanitarian relief during and immediately after conflict, and in the reconstruction and development of their nation once Saddam Hussein is no longer in power. As the President has made clear, this must be an international effort. Iraq's liberation will be the beginning, not the end of our commitment to its people. We will supply humanitarian relief, bring economic sanctions to a swift close, and work for the long-term recovery of Iraq's economy. The United States will insure that Iraq's natural resources are used for the benefit of their owners, the Iraqi people. Our goal is a democratic, free-market Iraq fully re-integrated into the world community.

There is currently a massive humanitarian and reconstruction operation gearing up in Iraq. This includes U.S. government funds as well as multilateral assistance from coalition partners. This operation is the result of months of planning and pre-positioning food and disaster relief equipment in the region. For example, the World Food Program, with support from the U.S., has pre-positioned 130,000 metric tons of food for Iraqi refugees, IDPs and other conflict victims. The U.S. has 200,000 metric tons of title II food in the pipeline, the first 18,000 metric tons of which will arrive in Iraq in about a month. An Emerson Trust drawdown of 600,000 metric tons of wheat has been authorized and will be converted to 500,000 metric tons of wheat and rice. The first 200,000 metric tons of this drawdown are being mobilized immediately, with 50,000 metric tons scheduled to depart the U.S. o/a April 1. The Australians have announced their intention to donate 100,000 metric tons of wheat to WFP for the Iraqi people as well.

The U.S. has also provided \$105 million to the U.N. and other international organizations, including the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, the International Organization for Migration, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Another \$15.3 million has been provided to NGOs, and \$16.3 million for the prepositioning of non-food relief items for up to 1 million Iraqis. Efforts continue at the United Nations to pass, on an urgent basis, a resolution to authorize the Secretary General to take the steps necessary to sustain the Oil-for-Food Program, which feeds most of the Iraqi people and has food and supplies in the pipeline for delivery as soon as the Secretary General has the necessary authority and the situation on the ground in Iraq permits.

We will continue to consult fully with the Congress as further information develops regarding the reconstruction process and humanitarian needs in the coming months.

Question:

Even with increases within the Embassy Security Construction and Maintenance Act and Worldwide Embassy Security earmarked for FY 04, are there worthwhile security enhancement and maintenance projects that aren't going forward, or are being delayed, due to resource limitations.

Answer:

Over the last few years the Department has requested and Congress has provided an unprecedented level of funding for security upgrades and construction of new embassy compounds.

In FY 2004, the Department is requesting \$100 million to continue the Department's compound security upgrade program and another \$761.4 million to construct safe and secure embassies and consulates. While, at this funding level for construction, it would take more than 26 years to fully fund and build the needed replacement facilities, a proposed Capital Security Cost Sharing program is expected to reduce full implementation time to 12 years. With this program in place, the Department's funding for security projects would be sufficient to achieve current security goals in a reasonable timeframe.

BACKGROUND:

The existing compound security upgrade program includes the construction of safe havens, emergency generator enclosures, forced entry/ballistic resistant roof hatches and vault doors, a ramp-up of a residential security program and maintenance of existing security features.

Approximately 160 facilities must be replaced because upgrades alone are not sufficient to meet security standards, most notably setback requirements. At an estimated total cost of \$16 billion, the majority of the replacement facilities will be new embassy compounds (NECs). The Department is also replacing some facilities by retrofitting existing, newly acquired, or leased buildings.

The Executive Branch's proposed Capital Security Cost Sharing program will allocate capital costs to each agency and provide additional budgetary resources to accelerate the construction of replacement facilities to 12 years, beginning in FY 2005 and phasing in over 5 years.

This program will allow the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations to proceed at or near capacity (Maximum capacity is \$1.8 billion in security construction projects each year). In addition, because this program allocates agency costs based on overseas positions, the program also provides an incentive for agencies to rightsize.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BY THE HONORABLE TOM LANTOS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Question:

Last year the Senate passed S. 1777, the International Disabilities and Victims of Landmines, Civil Strife and Warfare Assistance Act of 2002. Does the Administration have any objections to this legislation?

Answer:

Because S. 1777 makes no provision for funding the survivor assistance activities it authorizes, the Department is concerned that its implementation will result in the diversion of funds appropriated under the Foreign Operations Appropriation. While assistance to landmine victims is an essential component of our overall humanitarian mine action program, the clearance of landmines and unexploded ordnance, as well as mine risk education programs, significantly reduce landmine casualties, thereby reducing the need for survivor rehabilitation.

Question:

As you know, the Trafficking in Persons Report due in June will have a list of countries that will be subject to sanctions beginning next year. Can you assure us that you will identify all countries that do not meet minimum anti-trafficking standards in that report? Can you further assure us that even if countries appear for the first time in the report because of new information, that you will put them on the list of countries that do not meet minimum anti-trafficking standards, if the information so warrants?

Answer:

Our embassies have submitted their initial analyses of the trafficking problem in their host countries and we are working diligently to identify those governments that do not comply with the U.S. law's minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. In fact, we have sent staff to numerous countries worldwide in an effort to garner more information. If warranted, countries will be placed on tiers two and

three even if this is the first year they appear on the report. It appears likely that the 2003 TIP Report will contain more countries than the previous two reports.

Question:

Mr. Secretary, last fall with strong bipartisan support in both the House and Senate, the Congress passed landmark legislation to strengthen the Department's human rights machinery called the Freedom Investment Act. The Act set suggested targets for funding the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) and the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF). It also gave DRL control over the selection of the principal officer responsible for monitoring and reporting on human rights issues in each U.S. diplomatic establishment abroad. Will the Department meet the proposed spending targets for DRL and the HRDF and what steps have you taken to implement the mandate that DRL be given control over the selection of the primary human rights officer in each U.S. diplomatic establishment?

Answer:

The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) has been allocated \$23,500,000 for the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) in FY 2003. Of this amount, \$8,942,000 has been earmarked for democracy, human rights and rule of law in China; \$6,954,000 has been allocated for projects in countries with significant Muslim populations. The remaining \$7,604,000 will be directed to address priority human rights and democracy concerns in other parts of the world. DRL will maintain maximum flexibility with its funds in order to address the highest priority challenges. Based on past experience with our FY01 and FY02 funds, we have no doubt that we will meet these spending targets for FY03.

For example, by November 2002 DRL internally approved the use of \$13 million in FY02 ESF, responding to the China democracy and Muslim world earmarks of \$5 million and \$6 million, respectively, required by Section 526 of the FY02 Foreign Operations Act. The remaining \$1.5 million was approved by January 2003. DRL's capacity to manage additional programs in FY02 was limited only by the funding levels. The number of quality projects possible far exceeded the funds available.

DRL expects to receive strong responses to Requests for Proposals for FY03 funding that it intends to announce in the Federal Register.

Regarding Section 663(b) of the FY03 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, we share Congressional interest in advancing human rights and making sure that Department staff are sensitive to human rights concerns. We are currently implementing a plan to meet both the letter and spirit of this provision. The Career Development and Assignment Office in the Bureau of Human Resources (HR/CDA) recently met with DRL to determine how best to comply. It was agreed that DRL would begin the process by completing an inventory of overseas positions that are engaged in human rights work. This inventory, which would be conducted with HR/CDA support, has never been done before and is an important first step. Once this review is complete DRL will work with regional bureaus to identify candidates for those positions. The HR/CDA Assignment Officer who acts on behalf of DRL has made a commitment to advance DRL views and concerns during assignment paneling. The process we envision will result in closer communication and policy coordination between DRL and HR on personnel issues, as well as closer coordination between DRL and regional bureaus.

Section 663 has been very helpful in identifying and highlighting Congressional intent. We sincerely appreciate Congressional interest that human rights considerations be a key component of our foreign policy.

UNESCO

Question:

Mr. Secretary, I am concerned that the UNESCO inter-agency review process is stalled, and that the U.S. is losing a golden opportunity to leverage U.S. re-entry to shape the organization to support U.S. national interests. When will you upgrade our diplomatic representation at UNESCO? Have you considered a temporary appointment of a high level representative in lieu of the appointment of an Ambassador? Have any decisions been made on which proposed biennium budget to support, and is due consideration being given to supporting a budget that will put the new U.S. funds to work serving U.S. interests rather than letting them be rebated to other donors? Will the U.S. push for the creation of a second Deputy Director General post for policy to be headed by an American so that we can be more confident that our priorities can be implemented throughout the agency?

Answer:

The Department's plans call for U.S. rejoining UNESCO no later than October 1, and to stand for a seat on the Executive Board during an election provisionally

scheduled for October 10. We are well underway in plans to establish a fully staffed U.S. Mission to UNESCO. Lobbying has begun for our election to the Executive Board, including world wide demarches to capitals, in Paris, and to all UNESCO Member State Embassies in Washington. We agree that high level representation is an important indicator of U.S. commitment to UNESCO; as an interim measure we are sending Ambassador Negroponte's deputy in Washington to head our delegation to the Executive Board meeting and to engage in extensive lobbying for our election to the Executive Board.

UNESCO's decision regarding its budgetary levels for the 2004–2005 biennium will be made by the Member States during the April and September Executive Board meetings, and given final approval during the General Conference in October following our return. Our interagency process has developed some program proposals that we will work to incorporate into UNESCO's budget and work plan. We are also looking carefully at the draft report of the GAO team's visit to UNESCO and look forward to the conclusions of a Department expert currently in Paris to evaluate UNESCO's programs and budget. At the end of the day, we join you in wanting to ensure that the payment of U.S. assessments to UNESCO will work to serve U.S. interests, though we also want to ensure you are aware that other major donors' assessed contributions will decline regardless of which budget option is adopted.

With regard to creating a Deputy Director for Programs, we believe such an action would violate the very discipline for which we have commended Director General Matsuura, and question whether pressing UNESCO to do so would really serve U.S. interests. Instead, we are focusing on placing Americans in pivotal UNESCO positions, and have asked the relevant USG agencies to review UNESCO professional level vacancies and to pinpoint those vacancies worth pursuing and suggest worthy candidates. We will engage in the same process as vacancies in senior level positions emerge, and will place particular focus on assistant director general positions, where primary program responsibility currently resides.

Question:

Is the President still committed to funding the MCA at \$5 billion in FY06 and future fiscal years? Has the Administration begun searching for a possible CEO to head up the proposed Millennium Challenge Corporation? In addition to proposing authorizing language for the MCA, is the Administration currently making preparations to stand up the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and, if so, what steps are currently being taken? What is the Administration's ideal timetable for enacting authorizing legislation, establishing the administrative mechanism for the MCA, educating potentially eligible countries about the program, and beginning to distribute funds from the account?

Answer:

The President remains committed to the MCA and to ramping up funding to \$5 billion per year by FY 2006. The Administration has begun identifying potential candidates to fill the CEO position of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), but actual selection will await passage of authorizing legislation. The Administration continues to work on various elements of the MCA, including collecting data to update selection indicators and preparing options for how to proceed with standup once the MCC is authorized, but intends to leave decisions not already in the proposed legislation or its accompanying notes and background papers to the MCC, when established, and its Board of Directors.

Ideally, authorizing legislation would be passed by late spring of this year, with a clear prospect for appropriations, so that the MCC could begin to be stood up and MCC qualifying countries could be identified in early summer. This timing would allow preparatory work to begin anticipating MCC administrative procedures, staffing requirements and groundwork with qualifying countries over the late summer and early fall. The MCC would be in a position to ramp up to full operation as soon as funds are appropriated at the beginning of FY 2004 in October. Disbursement of funds for technical assistance in program development could begin soon thereafter, but funding of MCA programs would not commence until after MCA contracts are developed and mutually agreed upon.

Question:

The administration has been strongly advocating a resumption of military ties with Indonesia by, among other things, pushing for the renewal of the IMET³ relationship. In light of the recent killings of two American teachers in Papua, which allegedly involved the Army's Special Forces, does the Administration feel that there's a need to change the position? What are the actions being taken by the Administra-

tion to pressure the Indonesian Government to allow the FBI to fully investigate the killings and to bring the perpetrators to justice?

Answer:

We have requested the resumption of our IMET program because it is in the U.S. national interest to engage with the Indonesian armed forces. IMET courses provide the professional military education critical to expectations that the TNI will become a professional military, oriented towards external defense of their nation. This education provides the opportunity for TNI personnel to be exposed to concepts of civilian control of the military and accountability that are not available in Indonesia. Officers who have studied in the United States and are familiar with the U.S. system are more likely to provide the U.S. with access that will allow for the promotion of U.S. national interests. For many TNI officers, IMET would represent the first time in their lives that they have been challenged to think for themselves as opposed to receiving conventional wisdom.

The U.S. Government views the attack on American citizens in Papua in August 2002 as an extremely serious matter. We have closely monitored the Indonesian investigation of this crime, and we have repeatedly made clear our expectation that the Indonesian Government would act to identify and punish all those responsible, including those who may have planned or given orders to commit this crime. The Indonesian Government has been informed, in each and every encounter between senior U.S. and Indonesian officials, that anything short of a full accounting and punishment for those responsible would be unacceptable and could harm our entire relationship. The FBI recently traveled to Papua to assist the Indonesian Government in its ongoing investigation of the attack. We understand that the FBI plans to return to Indonesia in the near future to continue its investigation of this case.

Question:

For over 2 years, Burmese dissident and Nobel Laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi engaged in quiet, behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Burmese Government. While the Burmese Government has now released Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, the discussions have produced little in terms of charting a future course for democracy and political change in Burma. Does the U.S. believe that the Burmese Government has made far-reaching and meaningful concessions to the opposition so far? Given the failure of these discussions to produce tangible results, should the U.S. consider additional sanctions against Burma, such as a total ban on Burmese imports, until such time as Burma makes real progress towards democracy and human rights?

Answer:

Efforts to foster peaceful democratic change in Burma have come to a halt. The regime has released only a few political prisoners since late November (and those in advance of a visit by the U.N. Special Rapporteur), and has made new arrests of political activists in that same timeframe. Most seriously, the junta has not demonstrated a willingness to begin a real dialogue with the National League for Democracy on substantive political issues. There have not been far-reaching or meaningful concessions. The United States already has tough sanctions on Burma in place. Absent progress toward national reconciliation, we will consider, in conjunction with the international community, what additional, meaningful sanctions and/or other measures might be taken. We also continue to support the efforts of U.N. Special Envoy Razali Ismail to broker a solution in Burma.

Question:

The Council of Foreign Relations recently published a "Balkans 2010" report, which calls for the dedicated involvement by the U.S. and the Europeans in the region, such as continued NATO mission, and funding of democracy, rule of law, and market economy programs. Judging from the 2004 budget request, which shows significant decreases for all Balkan countries, including Kosovo, we are concerned about the U.S. ability to maintain its commitment to the Balkans. Is the U.S. prepared to be engaged in the region for a minimum of 7 to 8 years to help consolidate democracy and rule of law there?

Answer:

For the first time ever, the Balkan states are governed by nascent democratic governments and are committed to good relations with neighboring countries and to integration into the European Union (EU) and NATO. Further, Europe has a growing interest in and capacity to manage and promote peace and reform in the Balkans. It is also clear that, since 9/11, we have urgent priorities in other parts of the world. These factors must affect our assistance to the Balkans.

The region still faces serious challenges. Balkan economies are weak, extremist forces have not been extinguished, and ethnic nationalism remains strong. Continued assistance is clearly required. Nonetheless, progress in the Balkan states on economic reform and democratic transition, the stimulus for reform provided by potential EU accession, and positive European leadership now allow us to realign our assistance priorities.

As the Western European nations assume more responsibility for the region and as Balkan states move ever closer to EU and NATO membership, our resource commitments can decline. During this process, however, we will need to stay engaged to ensure that the Europeans succeed and U.S. national interests are well served. Provided that adequate resources remain available, the U.S. assistance program should support European leadership with our assistance programs in the region, and emphasize programs in effective governance and civil security, as well as continuing programs that foster new enterprises and entrepreneurship.

Our policy in Southeast Europe is to promote democracy, market orientation, regional stability and peace, and integration into EU and NATO membership. We will stay engaged in the region to ensure the positive developments over the last several years continue, and will continue to work closely with the countries of the region and the international community as Southeast Europe moves towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

Question:

None of the post-Soviet ethnic and territorial conflicts (Abkhazia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya) appear closer to being resolved, despite significant bilateral and multilateral efforts spent to solve them. Does the Department have a new strategy of dealing with these conflicts? What are the realistic chances that at least some of these conflicts may be resolved in the next 2 years?

Answer:

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States has supported the independence and development of Georgia, Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the goal of achieving a democratic, stable and prosperous region linked to Europe and the world. The unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh and Chechnya continue to impede regional stability and development. The United States will continue to work through the U.N. and OSCE as well as bilaterally to achieve peaceful, negotiated political settlements to these disputes. Of the four conflicts, all have the realistic possibility of achieving significant progress toward peace in the next two years, with Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh showing the most promise for resolution during that time period.

New strategies for dealing with Abkhazia and Transnistria were launched in early 2003. Regarding Abkhazia, a U.N.-hosted brainstorming conference of the U.N. Secretary General's Friends of Georgia (which includes the United States) in Geneva in February developed in a new blue-print for invigorating dialogue between the two parties in three key areas: economic cooperation, the return of internally displaced persons, and Abkhazia's political status.

Our new Transnistria strategy may have already had a positive impact. Imposition of our joint visa ban was followed shortly thereafter by some positive moves by the Tiraspol regime. Transnistria accepted Moldovan President Voronin's invitation to participate in drafting a new federal constitution as the basis for a political settlement, and agreed to end its obstruction of Russia's military withdrawal from Moldova, in keeping with Russia's commitments at the 1999 Istanbul Summit and the 2002 Porto OSCE Ministerial. We and the EU will continue to put pressure on Transnistria while encouraging Russia and Ukraine to play a positive role.

Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, presidential elections in both Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2003 have complicated efforts to achieve a breakthrough this year. However, the U.S. and our fellow OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs (France and Russia) are working to lay the groundwork for serious negotiations as soon as the two sides are ready to move forward.

Finally, there remains the conflict in Chechnya. We have always held that the solution to this conflict must be a political one. The chances of this being accepted by the people of Chechnya as legitimate will increase if the follow-on presidential and legislative elections provided for in the new constitution are carried out according to OSCE standards of democratic elections. Russia must also halt the human rights abuses committed by its armed service personnel against civilians and bring violators to account. We also call on the separatists to cease acts of terror and extrajudicial killings of civilian administration officials. We believe that a continued presence by the OSCE could prove helpful in bringing about a resolution to the many problems plaguing the area.

Question:

Last year, the Congress authorized the use of counter-narcotics assets for counter-terrorism purposes in Colombia. The FY02 emergency supplemental included \$6 million to begin training two Colombian brigades in counter-terrorist tactics so that the Colombians could protect the Caño-Limon petroleum pipeline, which is partially owned by Occidental Petroleum Corporation. The President's FY03 budget request included an additional \$98 million for essentially the same purposes. How many U.S. special forces are currently conducting counter-insurgency training in Colombia?

Answer:

The submitted answer is classified and will not be reprinted here.

Question:

Does the Administration intend to interpret the troop cap, which limits the number of military personnel in Colombia at any one time to 400, to include U.S. military personnel conducting counter-terrorism activities? How long will the search-and-rescue operations currently underway for the three kidnaped Americans continue to be considered as a permissible exception to the troop cap before the Department will seek new authority? In addition to the Caño-Limon petroleum pipeline, what other infrastructure sites is the Department considering as requiring future assistance to protect against potential Colombian terrorist threats?

Answer:

The submitted answer is classified and will not be reprinted here.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BY THE HONORABLE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Question:

Mr. Secretary, I wanted to take an opportunity to praise the Agency for International Development (USAID) for its successful programs assisting the Cuban democratic opposition. For the past 5 years, it has helped build solidarity with Cuba's human rights activists, given voice to Cuba's independent journalists, defended the rights of Cuban workers, helped develop independent Cuban non-governmental organizations, provided direct outreach to the Cuban people, and contributed to USG planning for assistance to a future transition government in Cuba. In light of this performance, I am keenly interested in hearing from you on the level of Economic Support Funds which will be directly provided to USAID to continue and to expand its successful Cuba program.

Answer:

The Department shares your high opinion of the excellent work done by USAID to assist the democratic opposition in Cuba. Our policy is to encourage a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba, and supporting Cuba's fledgling civil society with informational materials and humanitarian goods, as USAID and its grantees do, is the best way of encouraging such a transition.

We continue to support Cuban civil society. Economic Support Funds provided to the Department for this purpose will be forwarded as appropriate to USAID.

We have sought increased funding for FY 2004; Cuba is one of only two programs in the hemisphere for which we have sought an increase. The Administration has requested \$7 million for FY 2004, up from \$5.75 million in FY 2003.

Question:

Mr. Secretary, I fully support the Administration's efforts in Iraq, including supporting the Iraqi opposition so that they can free themselves from the oppression they are subject to under the brutal rule of Saddam Hussein. However, Mr. Secretary, just 90 miles from U.S. shores, there are innocent Cubans who continue to suffer unspeakable abuses at the hands of the Castro regime. Could you please elaborate upon the obstacles to providing direct financial assistance to the Cuban opposition? Why has the U.S. been able to take such steps in support of the Iraqi opposition but has not with respect to the Cuban opposition?

Answer:

We have authorization under law to provide such assistance. USG policy has been—and will continue to be—to work through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to support the pro-democracy movement.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BY THE HONORABLE BARBARA LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Question:

In terms of another urgent crisis, we now face a deeply troubling situation in North Korea and increasing tensions with our South Korea ally. Do you, in fact, consider this a crisis, with North Korea? How does the Administration propose we resolve it and how can we address broader concerns on the Korean Peninsula, including food and energy aid, conventional arms buildups, and the 50-year cease fire that has never become a peace treaty?

Answer:

I do not consider the current situation on the Korean Peninsula to be a crisis. The Administration, however, shares the international community's serious concern over North Korea's nuclear weapons program and the threat it poses to peace and stability and to the general non-proliferation regime.

As you know, the present tension is the direct result of North Korea's violation—beginning many years ago—of a bilateral agreement already reached between the U.S. and North Korea in 1994, the Agreed Framework, to end North Korea's nuclear arms program. During the 1990's, several U.S. security assurances were given to North Korea, as well. But neither the Agreed Framework, nor security assurances prevented North Korea from covertly proceeding with its uranium enrichment program at the same time.

Given North Korea's record of cheating on its bilateral commitments, we believe that the international community must take a new diplomatic approach. North Korea knows well that beginning preprocessing of spent nuclear fuel would be a most serious step. The U.S. has made clear its willingness to meet with North Korea in a multilateral framework to discuss a verifiable and irreversible end to its nuclear weapons program. We believe the DPRK will be more likely to abide by its commitments and obligations when it understands that its actions are of concern to all countries, and when a resolution has the active contribution and support of those countries most deeply concerned to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Resolution of the international community's concerns over the DPRK's nuclear weapons program is our top priority and will lay the basis for resolving our broader concerns with regard to the North's threatening conventional military posture and other issues.

Regarding food aid, the U.S. has been a significant donor of food aid to North Korea through the World Food Program's annual appeals. We are concerned about monitoring and access to all those in need in North Korea; we have presented these worries directly to the North Koreans. Additional food aid donations will be based on need in North Korea, competing needs elsewhere in the world and improvements in food aid monitoring in North Korea.

Question:

Mr. Secretary, at the U.N. Security Council you recently released a wide range of examples that you argued proved Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Why did the Administration choose to share that information with the entire world on live television, rather than providing it to the U.N. inspections teams on the ground looking for those very weapons? I have to ask you, Mr. Secretary, does the Administration want the inspections to succeed?

Answer:

All relevant and actionable intelligence presented by Secretary Powell on February 5 was provided to the inspectors weeks prior to the U.N. Security Council briefing, as part of our regular meetings with senior U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) officials.

Additional information presented by the Secretary was not previously provided to the inspectors because it had minimal "operational" relevance, and was not actionable.

This additional information gave general insight into Iraqi intentions, patterns of denial and deception, and operational methods, but it was not intelligence that would directly enable weapons inspectors to physically locate weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or verify WMD information provided by Iraq in its declarations.

We received sensitive information from a variety of sources that indicated Iraqi non-cooperation with weapons inspections. Some of that evidence was laid out in the Secretary's February 5 presentation, but other information could not be publicly disclosed because of the sensitive sources and methods used to collect it.

We advocated the return of weapons inspectors in Iraq and hoped that they would succeed in verifying Iraq's peaceful disarmament. To that end, we provided significant intelligence, reconnaissance, logistics, and personnel support to inspectors to ensure they had every capability needed to carry out their mandate. Examples of this support included: U-2 aerial surveillance, ground penetrating radar, computer forensics equipment and specialists, chemical and biological testing capabilities, and interview training.

The one element we could not provide—the element required for inspectors to successfully execute their mission—was Iraq's full, active and complete cooperation.

Question:

Last fall, in a now declassified but then closed Senate briefing, a CIA official was asked by Senator Levin whether it "is likely that [Saddam] would initiate an attack using weapons of mass destruction?" The official answered, "in the foreseeable future, given the conditions we understand now, the likelihood I think would be low." If the U.S. were to launch a military attack against Iraq, however, the intelligence official said that the likelihood of an Iraqi chemical or biological weapons response was "pretty high."

Mr. Secretary, have those circumstances drastically changed, or is the danger of Iraq's using weapons of mass destruction still much higher if the U.S. launches an attack than if we do not?

Answer:

Despite four months of weapons inspections, and notwithstanding its obligations to disarm, Iraq still maintains a chemical weapons capability. The risk exists that the Iraqi regime will employ such weapons against coalition forces now operating in Iraq. The Iraqis surely know, however, that to do so would expose to the world their longstanding deception about their capabilities. Whether this fact serves to deter their use of chemical weapons remains to be seen.

I defer to my colleagues in the intelligence community to provide more specific assessments of Iraq's likelihood to employ weapons of mass destruction.

Question:

We must discuss AIDS, which kills 8,500 people every single day. During his State of the Union Address, President Bush announced his historic initiative to combat global HIV/AIDS. I applaud him for his leadership and look forward to working with the Administration to develop legislation here in our Committee to make this initiative a reality. Can you explain to us why the proposal would place most of the authority for the program in a coordinator at the State Department and not within the Global Fund? How do you envision this position coordinating the global HIV/AIDS programs of the Federal Government?

Answer:

U.S. support for the fight against HIV/AIDS is directed through bilateral and regional programs, and multilateral institutions such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.

Our support for the Global Fund is clear. The President has increased our pledge to the Global Fund to \$1.65 billion, 50 percent of the total \$3.36 billion pledged to date. Our fiscal year 2003 commitment alone accounts for 42 percent of all resources available to the Fund this year (\$350 million of a total \$835 million pledged or in the bank), and the U.S. is responsible for 30 percent of the Fund's cash currently on hand. Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy G. Thompson was elected in January to serve a one-year renewable term as Board Chair. However, the role of the Global Fund has always been to complement and add to bilateral and regional assistance programs, not replace them.

The Special Coordinator will oversee and coordinate all U.S. international HIV/AIDS programs and policy. Such a role is a national responsibility that must be performed by the U.S. government, not by other international institutions, as important and helpful as they are. I am currently considering options, in coordination with other parts of the Administration, for how to best establish this position, including what mechanisms the Special Coordinator will use to coordinate U.S. international HIV/AIDS programs and policy, and to ensure that our activities complement those of other entities, such as the Global Fund.

Question:

One of my staff members recently returned from a trip to Zambia, where she visited a number of HIV/AIDS prevention projects. In Zambia, the major family planning organization involved in HIV/AIDS prevention efforts—often in partnership with faith-based organizations—is no longer eligible to receive U.S.-donated condoms

because of the organization's refusal to be bound by the Mexico City policy restrictions, which apply not just to U.S. funding for services but to condoms and contraceptive supplies. For example, the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia was a source of U.S.-donated condoms for other, smaller Zambian NGOs, such as the Society for Women and AIDS in Zambia (SWAAZ) that operates family support homes in some of the large slum areas of Lusaka. Does it make sense from a public health perspective to disqualify organizations that are among the principal sources of condoms in some African countries from receiving U.S.-donated supplies?

Answer:

In Zambia, the country referenced in Representative Lee's question, the British development agency, DfID, has provided most of the donated condoms to the public sector (clinics and hospitals) in Zambia. In fact, in FY2002 USAID shipped no condoms to Zambia.

The vast majority of foreign non-governmental organizations in all of the countries where we provide family planning assistance have accepted the Mexico City Policy and continue to participate in USAID-funded family planning programs. Numerous factors determine whether USAID and a given foreign non-governmental organization will work together in a particular country or program and why a foreign NGO would choose to seek funding from USAID or other donors. Since the restoration of the policy, USAID has successfully programmed all population-directed funds. No country that receives our assistance is without family planning services.

Question:

Can you assure me that there are no plans to apply the Mexico City policy restrictions to organizations receiving only USAID HIV/AIDS assistance?

Answer:

USAID has not received an instruction to expand the Mexico City Policy. We have been told that "any and all organizations may receive funding for HIV/AIDS work".

Question:

Epidemic poverty, high HIV-infection rates, and nearly universal unemployment continue to grip the Haitian people. And yet, total U.S. assistance to the Haitian people has decreased drastically over the last 3 years. Regardless of one's position concerning the release of funds from multilateral development banks to Haiti, the incongruity between the overwhelming needs of the Haitian people and plummeting U.S. bilateral assistance to that country is very disturbing. Should U.S. policy on the humanitarian crisis in Haiti be revised? If so, how do you envision addressing the dire circumstances of the poorest country in the hemisphere?

Answer:

U.S. assistance toward Haiti needs to be viewed in the context of Haiti's overall political-economic situation. Since the restoration of the democratically elected government in 1995, much of the United States' assistance has gone to creating, training and equipping of the Haitian National Police as the nation's sole security force, funding programs to build an independent judiciary, supporting national elections, and providing funding to the successive U.N. peacekeeping missions, the last of which ended in March 2001.

Thus, while our total assistance to Haiti has declined in recent years, our humanitarian efforts, which address the dire circumstances you allude to, have been largely stable. For example, our food aid over the last four years (including FY03) has ranged from \$20-\$26 million; this year we have obligated \$24.9 million and may supplement that with additional assistance if needed. The U.S. remains the number one donor to Haiti, and disbursed more than \$840 million in assistance to Haiti in FY1995-2002.

No change in U.S. policy toward the crisis in Haiti will have any appreciable effect unless the government of Haiti and the people of Haiti work together to build civil society and the institutions that allow the development process to become self-sustaining. Experience has shown that assistance is most effective when the government is committed to democratic and market reforms and transparency. The GOH to date has come up short on these basic requirements.

For that reason, we have used both our diplomatic and assistance efforts to promote such changes in Haiti. Diplomatically, we have been at the forefront of efforts to promote the Organization of American States' Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti. The Special Mission was created in March 2002 pursuant to OAS Resolution 806; its mandate was expanded in September 2002 by OAS Resolution 822, with the Government of Haiti joining the OAS Permanent Council's unanimous consensus on the resolution.

Our assistance for democracy and policy reform has been ongoing, funded at roughly \$3 million in FY 2002 and 2003. Our democracy programs focus on increasing the professionalism of political parties, strengthening independent media and civil society organizations and promoting judicial reform and human rights. Training and other support is also provided for independent election observation groups. Our public diplomacy programs also bring Haitian government officials, journalists, and academics to the U.S. to observe and learn about U.S. public policies and programs.

In addition to the democracy programs described above, principal USG programs budgeted for FY 2004 include:

- Food Security (\$23.8 million): P.L. 480 Title II (food assistance) improves the nutritional well-being and food security of Haiti's poorest populations, especially children under five and nursing mothers. An early warning system developed to anticipate and prepare for food emergencies in the Northwest region is now being replicated in other parts of the country.
- Health (\$21.8 million): USAID uses a network of over 30 local organizations to provide services to some 2.5 million Haitians, close to a third of the population. Child immunization rates in USAID-assisted areas are nearly double the national average, as high as 85 percent in some parts of the country. Child malnutrition rates in USAID-assisted areas fell from 32 percent to 22 percent in 1995–2000. The percentage of women nationwide seeking prenatal consultation has increased from 68 percent to 79 percent. The national contraceptive use rate has gone from 9 percent to over 15 percent, with even stronger gains—to 22 percent—among rural, illiterate women. This is part of our expanded AIDS prevention program. Haiti is also a beneficiary of the Global Fund against AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.
- Economic Growth (\$4.25 million): Programs are aimed at sustainable increases in income for the poor. They expand availability of small business loans to urban micro-entrepreneurs; provide assistance to small farmers in marketing valuable export crops such as coffee, cacao, and mangos; and help Haitian artisans find niche export markets. Beneficiaries include small entrepreneurs (80% of whom are female), approximately 250,000 hillside farmers, and 2,000 artisans.
- Education (\$4 million): Programs increase pass rates for third and fourth grade students through improved in-service training for 4,000 teachers and school directors, radio education in math and Creole, and the provision of books, teaching aids, and curriculum guides.

Through these programs, we aim to alleviate poverty, illiteracy, and malnutrition and to promote respect for human rights and the rule of law. Effectiveness of U.S. assistance has been shown in the improvement of social indicators in the areas of intervention, despite a deteriorating economy overall.

USAID BILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO HAITI
(INCLUDES PL 480 FOOD)

BUDGET	FY 2001 Disbursed	FY 2002 Disbursed	FY 2003 Estimated	FY 2004 Budgeted
TOTAL in MILLIONS	\$72	\$54	\$58	\$57

The above figures do not include programs funded by the U.S. Departments of State and Defense for training/ equipping units of the Haitian National Police with counter-narcotics responsibilities, Peace Corps, or U.S. contributions to Haiti through international organizations, such as the OAS, UNDP, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BY THE HONORABLE JOSEPH R. PITTS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Question:

The Non-proliferation (NADR) account includes funding of the biological and chemical redirection program to help scientists in the former Soviet Union conduct other research. Would it make any sense to broaden this program to make it avail-

able to encourage potential defectors from rogue states that are developing weapons of mass destruction?

Answer:

Broadening the program would mean attracting to Russia, Ukraine, and other former Soviet countries those scientists and technicians who work on possible weapons of mass destruction (WMD) projects in rogue states. One reason this idea would not be workable is that rogue state governments would prevent their weapons scientists from leaving.

Even if such scientists could defect, they would likely face pay cuts and indefinite separation from their families and native societies if they were to be employed at the bio-chemical institutes in the former Soviet Union. Their extended families might face reprisals. They would have to deal with linguistic and cultural challenges. Thus, few WMD scientists would find employment in the framework of the Science Centers an appealing option.

Question:

Given Pyongyang's appalling human rights record as part of the "axis of evil," it is a curious anomaly that there has never been a human rights resolution directed against the North Korea's human rights abuses. When the U.N. Human Rights Commission convenes in Geneva this year, will we be working with our friends to ensure that a North Korea human rights resolution goes forward?

Answer:

The Department of State will support passage of a resolution addressing the human rights situation in North Korea at the 59th session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (CHR). We will work in close coordination with the EU, which plans to introduce a resolution calling on the Government of North Korea to respect and protect the human rights of its citizens.

Question:

I recently returned from a trip to Burma, Laos, and Thailand. What is the U.S. Government doing unilaterally and multilaterally to address the issue of ethnic cleansing and drug trafficking in Burma? What more should and can we do to recognize the crime, under international legal definitions, of genocide being committed against the ethnic minority groups of Burma by the ruling SPDC? What caused our Government to get involved in Kosovo, yet ignore the ethnic cleansing, systematic rape and scorched earth policy in Burma?

Answer:

We take very seriously the recurring reports of egregious human rights abuses against members of certain ethnic groups by the Burmese military. The U.S. government, in cooperation with other concerned nations has put pressure on the regime to improve its respect for human rights. We have sent State Department officials to the Thai-Burma border in response to alarming reports by several NGOs of human rights abuses by the Burmese military on Burmese ethnic minority citizens—specifically, the rape of ethnic minority women and girls by Burmese soldiers.

The United States has staked out a position as a resolute advocate for human rights and democratic change in Burma. We have also worked with like-minded countries to maintain maximum international pressure for change in Burma. That pressure includes continued trade, investment, and travel sanctions; the denial of any form of aid support, with the single exception of humanitarian assistance; continued public criticism of Burma; support for democratic movements opposed to the current dictatorship; and public diplomacy programs focused on democratic values, human rights, and good governance.

Multilaterally, we have long supported international efforts to foster democratic government and greater human rights in Burma, through the missions of U.N. Special Envoy Razali and U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Pinheiro, as well as the efforts of the ILO, the ICRC, and other international organizations. We have urged all U.N. agencies to join UNHCR (now active among the Rohingya Muslim minority in northern Rakhine State) in providing protection services and advocacy on human rights issues in areas where they are active. We also consistently co-sponsor resolutions at the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights that condemn the deplorable human rights situation in Burma and specifically express concern over treatment of ethnic minorities.

Finally, we have pushed the Burmese government to accept visits by reputed international human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, which completed its first visit to Burma in February 2003.

While Burma has made some progress on counternarcotics issues, the President has determined that Burma “failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts” to adhere to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and to take the counternarcotics measures set forth in U.S. law. We are not considering bilateral narcotics assistance for Burma.

The USG does support the UNDCP Wa Alternative Development Project in the Shan State. The project teaches farmers to grow economically viable crops to replace opium poppy cultivation. It also addresses infrastructure needs, such as health, education, and sanitation systems in the remote project areas. In addition, the USG supports Project Old Soldier, a small crop substitution program conducted among the Kachin ethnic group, operated by the NGO 101 Veterans, Inc. By setting up a series of village cooperatives, the project provides expertise and assistance to enable participants to grow and market legitimate, economically viable crops.

Question:

Laos is one of only three countries in the region that does not have Normal Trade Relations (NTR) with the U.S. What do we need to do to extend NTR status to Laos in order to assist the development of that nation? What is the State Department and the Administration doing to pursue NTR with Laos?

Answer:

One of the ten poorest countries in the world, Laos is the only country with which the U.S. maintains normal diplomatic relations but with which we do not have a normal trade relationship. It is one of only four countries in the world without NTR, the other three are North Korea, Cuba and Serbia & Montenegro. Two-way trade between the United States and Laos amounts to less than ten million dollars annually, and was just 6.5 million in 2001. The main Lao exports are textiles, lumber and coffee.

The Bush Administration supports NTR legislation for Laos, which would put into effect the previously negotiated 1997 bilateral trade agreement. A key step to adding substance to the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) is to grant NTR to Laos, an ASEAN member, so that it may fully participate. In February of this year, U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick and I sent a letter to the Chairs and Ranking Members of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees urging the Congress to consider granting Normal Trade Relations status to Laos.

U.S. Ambassador to Laos Douglas Hartwick and the Department engage in frequent outreach activities with the Lao and Hmong American community to address their concerns and provide information about what NTR could mean for Laos. Some U.S.-based groups which oppose NTR for Laos argue that it should be used as a reward for a completed democratic reform process. We believe that granting NTR status to Laos will benefit the Lao people, and will create a more cooperative environment in which the U.S. can effectively pursue key human rights and democratization objectives. We continue to closely monitor human rights conditions and press for adherence to international standards.

Deputy Trade Representative Jon Huntsman recently visited Vientiane where he met with Lao officials and members of the small business community. Ambassador Huntsman emphasized that the Government of Laos must continue to engage with the U.S. Congress to address areas of concern prior to receiving NTR. He also noted that NTR implies certain obligations such as standards of transparency that the Lao will need to work on complying with on a technical level. US-ASEAN Business Council President Ernest Bower also visited Laos carrying the same message of support and urging the Lao to continue moving to a market-based economy.

Question:

Mr. Secretary, I visited Vietnam in January of this year and was impressed by the economic and social development of the country. I was disturbed, however, by the directive from the recent Party Plenum meeting in which they will systematically attempt to infiltrate every religious group in the country to ensure a “cell” loyal to the central party. Is the State Department expressing our concern about the Vietnamese Government’s actions?

Answer:

The Administration shares your concerns about religious freedom in Vietnam; it is a constant theme in our diplomatic interaction with Vietnam’s Government. Both publicly and privately, Department officials have called upon Vietnam to make meaningful improvements in its respect for religious freedom. The U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom has visited Vietnam and has led bilateral talks on religious freedom with the Vietnamese in Washington.

Specifically, we have asked the Vietnamese Government to: allow churches that have been closed to reopen; end the practice of forced renunciations of faith; permit worshipers to associate freely in the church of their choice; and release religious believers from detention or house arrest.

Under Vietnamese law, individual Vietnamese members of legally authorized religious organizations have the right to worship freely, and the number of legally authorized religious organizations is slowly growing, but the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam and some Protestant organizations remain illegal. The most recent directive from the Party Plenum only illustrates that much work needs to be done to improve Vietnam's record on religious freedom. We have told the Vietnamese Government that such actions put them in danger of designation as a "country of particular concern" under the International Religious Freedom Act. We are urging the Vietnamese Government to take the required steps to ensure that such a designation does not become necessary.

Question:

The request for FREEDOM Support Act funding shows a sharp reduction in the overall amount of funding for FY 04 and an explanation that says, in part, that Russia and Ukraine are to be "graduated" from assistance. Is the totality of the reduction in funding for FSA attributable to decreased funding for Russia and Ukraine, or are some reductions expected in the programs for the 10 other eligible countries?

Answer:

While we are requesting a significant reduction in FREEDOM Support Act funds (\$179 million below the FY 2003 appropriated level), it is not as dramatic a drop as it seems. About half of the "reduction" (\$90 million of the \$179 million) is an accounting change, reflecting our decision to manage visitor exchange programs in the Educational and Cultural Exchanges (ECE) account rather than the FSA account. The Department plans to fund these exchange programs—which we consider to be a vital component of our effort to change attitudes and mindsets in these former Communist countries—at the \$90 million level in FY 2004.

Even taking the shift of exchange programs into consideration, however, the FSA request is significantly reduced, with most of the reduction coming from Russia and Ukraine. Funding for Kazakhstan also is somewhat reduced, reflecting economic improvement there. The other four Central Asian states, however, are slotted for increased FSA funding, reflecting their status as front-line states in the ongoing effort in Afghanistan. FSA programs there will bolster stability and attack the root causes of extremism: economic desperation, political frustration, social degradation, and isolation. Our request for FSA FY 2004 funding for the other Eurasian countries—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova—is substantially unchanged from FY 2003 levels.

Question:

The request for the exchanges account within State looks fairly healthy at \$345 million, but on closer examination, it appears to include sharp cuts in funding for both FSA and SEED (Eastern European assistance), and the probability of some reductions to exchanges worldwide. Is this consistent with our stated objectives for enhanced public diplomacy outreach around the world, and in Central Asia and the Caucasus? Shouldn't we be increasing these accounts by 10 percent or more as we address our relations with the Muslim world and maintain our engagement with our allies and partners?

Answer:

The President's FY 2004 request for Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs is \$345 million, consisting of:

- \$245 million for base exchanges, which is straight-lined from the FY 03 level and \$7 million below the current services level of funding. The Department will pursue prioritization of effort and achievement of efficiencies to maximize the utilization of these funds.
- The request also includes \$100 million, which is \$25 million below the current services level, for the merger of FSA/SEED exchanges from the Foreign Assistance appropriation into the Educational & Cultural Exchanges (ECE) appropriation. In the past, the Department has used Foreign Assistance transfers from USAID to support these key education, visitor, and citizen exchange activities in the NIS and southeastern Europe.

We need ways to reach the youth of the world, to build appreciation for American values as an example of applying universal aspirations for human dignity and freedom to quell hostility towards us, and to engage in constructive dialogue that in-

creases mutual respect and changes anti-American attitudes. Exchanges are central to that long-term effort.

The exchanges funding level reflects overall federal budget constraints.

Question:

What role, if any, will the State Department Coordinator for NIS and East European Assistance have in the Administration of the FSA and SEED exchange programs? Does the transfer to the Educational and Cultural Affairs Bureau eliminate that role, or are you intending that the statutory provisions of FSA, which stipulate a role for that office, would continue?

Answer:

The State Department considers exchange programs to be a critical element of our overall assistance strategy in Southeast Europe and Eurasia. The Office of the Coordinator for U.S. Assistance for Europe and Eurasia will continue to be actively engaged in shaping exchange programs for Eurasia and Southeast Europe once the funding has been directly appropriated to the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. We will work closely with ECA and our embassies to ensure that exchange programs can continue to be responsive to foreign policy objectives in the region.

We are working with ECA on a strategy that will sustain these important programs for the long term, taking into account expected lower levels of funding that will be available.

Question:

I would appreciate it if you could provide a detailed account of FY02 and FY03 foreign assistance for Central Asia from the FREEDOM Support Act. Please include all programmatic categories—exchanges, trade assistance, AID technical assistance, etc.

Answer:

FREEDOM Support Act assistance supports democracy and human rights in Central Asia through technical assistance to local government reform, civic education, independent media, legal education, grants and training to civil society organizations, provision of Internet access, and funding for academic and professional exchanges to the United States.

Market reform assistance focuses on trade and investment, business and economic development, macroeconomic technical assistance, and support for medium, small, and micro enterprises. The Trade and Development Agency (TDA), Export-Import Bank (EXIM), Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States (BISNIS), and Special American Business Internship Training (SABIT) program support trade assistance aimed at increasing U.S. and host country business opportunities.

Security assistance is providing equipment and training to enhance the capabilities of the region's security services to prevent proliferation of weapons, people and narcotics across their borders. Law enforcement programs focus on training and coordination of national agencies to reduce drug trafficking across Central Asia and address demand reduction needs in communities.

Humanitarian assistance includes provision of commodities through the Department of State Humanitarian Transport Program. The main commodities are donated and Department of Defense excess medicines, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, medical supplies, and clothing.

Cross-cutting programs include health, water, conflict reduction, and education. The health reform program is providing technical assistance to implement fundamental systemic changes to create higher quality, more effective primary health care systems in each country, as well as fighting the spread of infectious diseases, including TB and HIV/AIDS. Technical assistance to the energy sector includes reform of environmental regulatory systems and improvement of water management and usage. The new Community Action Investment Program is helping to reduce conflict in at-risk areas through community infrastructure programs. The new basic education program will help better equip students with civic and labor force skills.

Please see attached fact sheets or visit our web site at www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/cacen/c6984.htm for more information about our programs in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BY THE HONORABLE ADAM B. SCHIFF, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Question:

Your eloquence at the United Nations and your diplomatic efforts to reach out to the global community are commendable, yet somehow the message just is not getting through to key allies as successfully as it should. Why then, Mr. Secretary, with such an able messenger as you, is our message on the need for international cooperation to disarm Saddam Hussein not reaching the target audience?

Answer:

I believe our message is reaching the target audience, but, in some cases, those audiences are not receiving it or they are receiving a distorted message. Our foreign audiences bring different perspectives based on history, different culture and, in some instances, different national interests. Sometimes audiences do not want to hear what we must say in our own national interests.

The Department is very active in getting our message out. I have given many interviews to foreign media, as have other Department officials. The President's words are heard around the world, including in language versions provided by the Department. We provide background material, including television footage, for example, of Saddam Hussein's atrocities against Iraqi Kurds, to set the context for our policies and actions. However, serious disagreements persist. We will stay engaged through active public diplomacy, just as we remain engaged in discussions with government leaders. Success will not be a matter of short-term debate. Our public diplomacy efforts must be comprehensive, activist and sustained. Through these efforts I believe we will build better understanding and, ultimately, support for the necessary course we have set regarding Iraq.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BY THE HONORABLE BETTY MCCOLLUM, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

Question:

In October, North Korea revealed to the United States that it has begun the process of reactivating their nuclear weapons program based on the process of uranium enrichment. They have withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, reopened nuclear installations shut down under the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework, and expelled monitors from the international Atomic energy Agency. They have provided dangerous regimes with weapons of mass destruction and exported nuclear technology to assist Iran and Syria in developing chemical and biological weapons capabilities.

Mr. Secretary, can you explain to the Committee why the Administration considers North Korea less of a threat than Iraq, and why the Administration does not consider the escalating issue on the Korean peninsula a crisis?

Answer:

As the President noted in his State of the Union address, different threats require different strategies. The situation with Iraq is very different from the situation with North Korea.

In the case of North Korea, we do not have a legacy of U.N. resolutions that have been disregarded for ten or 12 years. We also do not have a recent history of invasion of neighbors. Iraq has been willing to use weapons of mass destruction, whereas with North Korea, this is only a potential threat.

This is absolutely a situation in which we have to work very closely with South Korea and Japan, as well as with China and Russia, which also have some very significant interests. We seek a diplomatic resolution, however, all options are on the table.

I do not consider the North Korea nuclear situation to be a crisis, because the tactics and strategy the DPRK is employing are all too familiar. The DPRK is seeking to replay the crisis-negotiating scenario of a decade ago that led to the negotiation of the Agreed Framework. We also do not wish to play into North Korea's game by declaring a situation we believe can be resolved through diplomacy, with time, a crisis.

Question:

I appreciate and applaud the practical and realistic positions you have clearly stated toward confronting HIV/AIDS with every tool—education, prevention, including

condom use, risk reduction, care for the sick and, of course, the estimated 11 million children in Africa alone who are orphans because of this disease . . . and too frequently left to care for themselves and other children. Some may say we are spread too thin around the globe to fight AIDS, but I heard President Bush during the State of the Union address make a commitment of support for expanding funding—10 billion new dollars—for fighting HIV/AIDS in Africa and the Caribbean. This is a significant commitment that I intend to support as a baseline, not as high water mark. Mr. Secretary, what U.S. interests are at stake to fight HIV and AIDS in Africa and around the world—not just feel-good humanitarian interests, but strategic geopolitical interests that protect and advance our role in the world?

Answer:

HIV/AIDS is demonstrating its ability to erode stability and development in key countries and regions of significant U.S. interest, and it threatens to expand its grasp. The disease has an impact on every facet of society and threatens to undermine the foundations of future development. HIV/AIDS has worsened many issues that were once “humanitarian,” like support for orphans, to such a degree that they now have strategic implications.

HIV/AIDS is already undermining regional stability in sub-Saharan Africa. Infection rates in some African militaries reach 60 percent or higher, and rates of infection are often highest in the young officers—tomorrow’s leaders. HIV/AIDS may also be eroding the capacity of international peacekeeping efforts. Countries with high infection rates may be less willing to contribute to international missions, preferring instead to retain scarce healthy troops to protect national borders. Other countries may refuse to send their troops, fearing they will be infected by HIV/AIDS during their mission.

AIDS orphans present a particularly troubling threat. Nearly 16 million children have already been orphaned by HIV/AIDS; by 2010, there may be 25 million or more. Most of these children grow up without any guidance or sufficient education, leaving them jobless and more susceptible to recruitment into gangs, prostitution, and other destabilizing criminal activities.

The economic effects of HIV/AIDS are both structural and direct. Education is crucial for participation in the information-based global economy and forms the impetus for economic development. AIDS orphans, who often drop out of school to take care of themselves or their siblings, will find fewer opportunities for work. Even children that stay in school are finding it difficult to get a quality education. Teachers, often disproportionately affected by HIV/AIDS, are becoming sick and dying from AIDS or staying home themselves to take care of ill family members. Without education, development fails and the international economy suffers.

Direct productivity losses from illness and absenteeism are growing, as is the amount of money diverted from investment to mitigating the disease’s impacts. In the hardest hit countries in Africa, GDP growth per year is estimated to be 2.7 percent lower due to HIV/AIDS, leading to a 67 percent lower GDP after 20 years than these countries would enjoy in the absence of HIV/AIDS. This lost development means weaker national budgets, slower international economic growth, and smaller markets for U.S. exports.

In September, 2002, the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) released a report focusing on the expected effect of HIV/AIDS in five countries of particular strategic interest to the United States. In “The Next Wave of HIV/AIDS: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India, and China,” the NIC concluded that the number of infected people in these five countries would likely increase from around 14–23 million people currently infected to an estimated 50–75 million by 2010.

The NIC felt that such an increase would have significant economic, social, political, and military implications, but that these effects would vary substantially depending largely on demographic characteristics and the speed with which these governments devote serious political and economic attention to fighting the disease. Nigeria and Ethiopia are likely to be the hardest hit, with social and economic impacts similar to the hardest-hit countries in southern Africa. Both countries are key to regional stability, and the strain caused by HIV/AIDS in economic and social terms will be felt beyond their borders.

China may have as many as 15–20 million HIV-infected people by 2010, but increased political commitment could help to mitigate social and economic damage. The Russian government, on the other hand has recently cut its HIV/AIDS funding. Without immediate, concerted action led by its top leaders, Russia is vulnerable to a devastating epidemic that would exacerbate the significant social, economic, health, and military problems it already faces.

The U.S. government’s support for the fight against HIV/AIDS is substantial and growing. Our programs in countries beset by the disease will continue, and many

of the hardest-hit countries in Africa and the Caribbean will benefit greatly from the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. The technical agencies of the U.S. government working on HIV/AIDS advance prevention, treatment, care, and mitigation efforts. We have strong and growing programs with businesses, labor forces, faith-based groups, and militaries. Our support for prevention education and capacity building lead the world, as does our support for multilateral initiatives such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. We will continue to work with political, religious, and other leaders to raise awareness of this disease and to identify ways we can work together to fight it.

Question:

On February 10, Colombian Defense Minister Marta Lucía Ramírez informed Administration officials in Washington that Colombian President Alvaro Uribe would use the recent bombing in Bogotá to press for renewed assistance from the United States in battling terrorism.

President Uribe has argued that the urban terrorism waged in Colombia, and his government's actions to prevent these attacks, represents an aspect of the global war on terrorism. President Uribe has even gone as far to propose that a military deployment similar to the one being mounted against Iraq and should be employed in Colombia.

Mr. Secretary, your fiscal year 2004 budget requests \$463 million to combat illegal drugs and help stem narco-terrorism in Colombia. This includes \$110 million in military assistance that will support Colombian President Uribe's campaign against terrorists and the drug trade that fuels their activities.

- 1. Can you please explain to the Committee the Administration's position on the present situation in Colombia, and the rationale behind these funding levels?*
- 2. Furthermore, does the Administration consider the attacks in Colombia and President Uribe's response a facet of the global war on terrorism?*

Answer:

1. We need to sustain the progress that Colombia has made in its campaign against terrorism and narcotics trafficking, while supporting its society and people in order to make peace possible. Colombian terrorist groups, supported by the lucrative drug trade, create a network and an environment conducive to narcotrafficking, smuggling, selling arms, and moving large quantities of money. These illegal activities threaten Colombia's democracy and the stability of the Andean region, and pose a threat to Americans. Faced with more vigorous Colombian Government programs, the FARC has brought its terrorist campaign to the cities. Continued U.S. assistance will fortify Colombian capabilities that are currently lacking to deliver decisive blows against these groups, cut off sources of their funding, and keep cocaine and heroin off our streets.

We see the last half of 2002 and the first part of 2003 as a turning point. For the first time in years, the total hectareage dedicated to coca production has declined. President Uribe and his administration, in office since August 2002, have proven to have the will and the ability to fight narcotrafficking and terrorism at their roots. The terrorists know this and are targeting him and other officials for assassination. We have also seen tremendous results in strengthening democratic institutions, improving protection of human rights, fostering of socio-economic development, and mitigating the violence committed against Colombian civilians. But more is needed.

With President Uribe's strong leadership and the Colombian government's demonstrated political will, an exceptional opportunity exists for U.S. assistance to reinforce these positive developments by continuing programs that help the Government of Colombia extend its presence and guarantee democratic security. Colombians know the U.S. supports their efforts. In turn, they strongly support U.S. counterterrorism and counterdrug policies. They also know they must do their part. We are making a difference, but these challenges clearly require sustained commitment.

Our FY 2004 budget request seeks \$463 million in INCLE funding for Colombia, of which \$313 million would be for counter-narcotics and security, and \$150 million for alternative development, democracy and social and economic development. We are also asking for \$110 million in FMF funding for programs to provide military assistance to additional units of the Colombian military. For FY 2004, we have several planned programs, such as a bomb squad database, that will help the GOC combat urban terrorism. Our counter-terrorism programs (VIP security, anti-kidnapping training, and anti-terrorism courses) initiated with re-programmed FY 2000 supplemental, FY 2002 supplemental and

FY 2003 funds will continue to make an impact. We need to continue implementation for in-country anti-kidnap training and expand it to develop a cadre of Colombian instructors and to provide, upgrade, and update equipment for all trained units. Insofar as U.S. programs supporting Colombia's unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorism are successful, it should contribute to a decrease in both in urban violence and kidnapping.

2. Colombia is a valued ally in the fight against terrorism. Colombia has been wracked by a violent internal conflict for nearly four decades, claiming approximately 3,000 lives per year. Three indigenous foreign terrorist organizations—FARC, AUC, and ELN—are responsible for the breakdown of Colombian security and stagnant economic growth. The United States has offered its strong support to the Government of Colombia to help it in its bid to reduce the twin threats to democracy posed by terrorism and narcotics trafficking. Since 2000, the USG has contributed approximately \$2 billion to support increased training for Colombian military and police forces, carry out eradication of cocaine and heroin crops that finance terrorist operations and plague U.S. streets, reduce the threat of kidnapping which provides another source of revenue to the FARC and ELN and to discourage investor confidence, and create alternative development programs to provide economic opportunities for the Colombian people.

The United States has formally designated all three of these groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. They pose clear threats to U.S. interests by providing 90% of the cocaine that reaches the U.S., by kidnapping and at times killing American citizens in Colombia, and by undermining the stability of the entire Andean region as the conflict spills over Colombia's borders. However, as we move to confront terrorists around the world, we must recognize that each terrorist threat requires a tailored counterterrorist strategy. The Colombian FTOs are not terrorist groups "of global reach." They have international supply lines and are reported to have international training connections, but their operations are confined to the territory of Colombia and its immediate borders.

Our approach to these terrorist groups is, therefore, tailored to the aims and requests of the Government of Colombia. This is decidedly a Colombian fight, but our interest in the Colombian government's ultimate victory is clear. Success in halting terrorist actions in Colombia will strengthen democracy in the Andes, help our efforts to combat narcotrafficking and improve U.S. security.

