

1 BOB HALSTEAD: Good evening. Thank you all
2 of you who came to this public meeting. [And we very
3 much appreciate the fact that the Department of
4 Energy has decided to go back to this hearing format,
5 which some of you will remember has not been done for
6 a few years because of the court reporter mechanism.
7 So we believe this is a much better way to have
8 people speak to one another about these important
9 issues.]

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10 My name is Bob Halstead. I'm transportation
11 advisor for the State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear
12 Projects in Carson City. This is the state agency
13 that is responsible under state law for representing
14 the state in its interactions with the Department of
15 Energy regarding the entire Yucca Mountain project.

16 Tonight we're going to be talking about some
17 narrow, specific aspects of the Yucca Mountain
18 repository project. And the way we've designed our
19 comments, all of which are preliminary at this point,
20 because, like most of you, we've only had access to
21 the documents for about five weeks, we're still
22 developing our detailed comments.

23 Before I go any further, I'd like to say for
24 anybody in the audience who would like to contact us,
25 and we would certainly invite you to share your views

1 canisters and they're over-passed. Proof of concept
2 design have been developed by the contractors and we
3 don't know whether when June of next year comes
4 around and DOE puts the license in we'll see detailed
5 designs.

6 The cost and financial arrangements for
7 these TAD systems haven't been worked out. The
8 systems are not compatible with the dry storage
9 technologies that utilities are using for the most
10 part as we discussed the current systems with the
11 utilities.

12 And, indeed, it's not clear that the
13 utilities are actually going to use the TAD system;
14 and moreover, if you read closely the no action
15 alternative that DOE is supposed to put forward says,
16 well, if we don't go forward with the TAD, DOE would
17 not construct a repository at Yucca Mountain.

18 So this notion, this hardware system has the
19 potential to completely change the basis of whether
20 or not DOE has to license the repository.

21 Let me also point out the complications that
22 the TAD system creates for repository transportation.
23 It's so large and heavy that it virtually requires
24 rail transportation. Yucca Mountain lacks rail
25 access. The estimated cost for building the Caliente

1 on the DOE project so we can include them in the
2 State's views, and also we'd be happy to just provide
3 you with any information that we can. The telephone
4 number is (775)687-3744. It's hard to read e-mail
5 addresses to people. Anybody who wants the e-mail
6 address, please see me later in the meeting, but it's
7 www.state.nv.us/nucwaste with a C.

8 [I'd like to start with some comments on the 2
9 TAD canister system, and then when I'll be speaking
10 for Steve in that second slot, we'll talk
11 specifically about the rail alignment.

12 It's important to understand that the
13 supplemental EIS is required because, and its focused
14 primarily on the proposal to use a new hardware
15 system, the so-called TAD (transport aging and
16 disposal) canister system for storage, transportation
17 and disposal. This introduces a number of
18 uncertainties into the environmental review and the
19 licensing process for the entire repository.

20 Based on our preliminary review, the State
21 has concluded that the proposed action in the use of
22 these TAD canisters cannot be evaluated under NEPA
23 because the Draft Supplemental EIS doesn't provide
24 enough specific information. Specifically you'll
25 notice there aren't any final designs for the TAD

1 railroad has gone up from an estimate of \$800 million
2 in 2002 to somewhere in the range of a little over
3 2 billion to a little over 3 billion in 2007.

4 There's strong opposition to building this
5 railroad in Nevada. If it's built it's likely to be
6 significantly delayed. One-third of the shipping
7 sites don't have the ability to ship their waste out
8 by rail, so there are all these exotic plans for
9 using barges or 200-foot long heavy haul truck rigs
10 to move them.

11 There are also new post 9-11 security
12 concerns about shipping high-level nuclear waste
13 through highly populated urban areas, which of course
14 is necessary to make cross-country shipments on the
15 rail line if we use the current interchange yards.

16 So there are a whole bunch of transportation
17 uncertainties that come out of this proposal to use a
18 new hardware system, as well as the uncertainty about
19 licensing the repository itself.]

20 Finally, before I turn to talking about the
21 railroad, [let me just list some issues about safety
22 and security that the State does not believe are
23 adequately addressed in the Draft EIS. One, DOE does
24 not consider worst case transportation accidents.

25 I appreciate the fact that they spelled out

1 their thinking in this regard. They said a
2 combination of the factors for worst case accidents
3 are, quote, not reasonably foreseeable, but that
4 doesn't mean that those accidents can't occur, and
5 that was one of the things that we'll be addressing
6 in detail in our written comments in January.

7 In particular with accidents the
8 consequences of long duration, high temperature fires
9 in rail environments are at issue. We believe that
10 the DOE analysis regarding terrorist attacks is good
11 in the sense that it acknowledges the vulnerability
12 of the shipments by terrorist attacks, it's not so
13 good in that it has constrained those attacks.
14 Again, we'll be developing very detailed written
15 comments in that area.

16 There are two specific issues in
17 transportation risk analysis that concern us. Again
18 we appreciate the fact that you spelled that out very
19 clearly in the EIS, so you know where it conflicts
20 between DOE and the nuclear industry on the one hand
21 and the State of Nevada.

22 One is DOE dismisses the potential for human
23 errors to exacerbate the consequences of the
24 accidents. So things like were the lid bolts
25 properly torqued, was there an accident, was there a

1 mistake in design, was there a mistake in fabrication
2 of the package and so forth. These are things that
3 we've documented in the past that we believe are
4 important.

5 A second specific risk analysis issue is
6 that DOE says we've taken this general approach that
7 we think captures all the bad things that can happen.
8 Our position is in any specific route that's chosen
9 there are unique local conditions that can make an
10 accident much worse than what we might have
11 anticipated in a more general assessment.

12 Finally, we do want to point out that the
13 DOE does acknowledge in appendix G, which if you get
14 to there it's about eight or 900 pages, that the
15 cleanup after a very severe accident could be as high
16 as \$10 billion. That's worth keeping in mind.]

17 One other issue about the general
18 transportation, we're going to submit for the record
19 a copy of the map that we prepared. [The map that
20 show the cross-country routes possibly underestimate
21 the impacts of shipments from across the country on
22 Reno and Las Vegas, whether the Mina or the Caliente
23 routes are chosen.] And I'm not going to go into
24 great detail about that tonight, but anybody who
25 wants to discuss that, I'll be around later.

4

1 Let me turn quickly to some general comments
2 with the EIS on the rail alignment. And it's hard to
3 know what we're talking about here because this is
4 definitely the longest type of document that I have
5 ever seen. You know, it's actually two documents in
6 one. So I'm going to talk about both of those rail
7 documents together.

8 First, [we don't believe DOE has yet provided
9 information to support the selection of the Caliente
10 corridor as their preferred corridor.] 5

11 Second, [we think that they're wrong to go
12 forward with the consideration of the Mina corridor
13 as a nonpreferred alternative, given that the Walker
14 River Paiute tribe has withdrawn their support.] 6

15 Third general issue, [we believe that DOE's
16 selection of the shared use option means that DOE
17 should now ask the Surface and Transportation Board,
18 which is the regulatory body that would normally
19 regulate common carrier railroad, they should
20 actually ask the STB not just to be a cooperating
21 agency but to be the lead agency in preparing the
22 EIS.] 7

23 Fourth, [there is a contention in the EIS
24 that the shipments that aren't made by rail would be
25 made by overweight trucks rather than legal weight 8

1 trucks. We don't find any evidence or references to
2 substantiate that. To the extent that there is a
3 long record of transportation of spent fuel in this
4 country, about 80 to 90 percent of the shipments that
5 have been made are by legal weight trucks.

6 And, finally, we believe the no alternative,
7 the no action alternative for the EIS should be the
8 mostly legal weight truck scenario that was presented
9 in the 2002 Final EIS.]


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[Let me quickly make three points about the
11 Mina rail corridor and the way that it's been
12 evaluated in these documents. First, we don't
13 believe the DOE has adequately assessed all of the
14 environmental impacts of constructing the rail
15 corridor, in particularly that portion that involves
16 the relocation of the existing rail line, which is
17 primarily where it goes across the Walker River
18 Paiute Reservation.

19 Secondly, we don't believe that DOE has
20 assessed, in fact we know it hasn't assessed the
21 environmental impacts of developing the Mina rail
22 corridor on the communities along the existing rail
23 lines in Northern Nevada that would be along the
24 feeder lines that come down to Hazen where the
25 connection would be made for the Schurz Mina route.

1 And, finally, DOE has not assessed the
2 potential for larger than projected numbers of rail
3 shipments if Mina were to be developed on the
4 Reno/Sparks area. And they've also failed to look at
5 unique local conditions in that area, the best
6 example which is probably, for those of you who know
7 Reno, the rail trench in downtown Reno.] Thank you
8 very much for the opportunity to give these comments.

Potential Rail Routes to Yucca Mt. via Proposed Mina Spur (Suite of Routes from Kansas City and Memphis Gateways)



Legend

- ▲ Yucca Mt
- Shipping Sites
- Rail Routes to Yucca Mt.
- - - FEIS barge routes
- Likely Truck Routes under Mostly Rail Scenario

This map depicts routes for the Mostly Rail Scenario from nuclear waste shipping sites to the proposed Yucca Mt. repository via the proposed Mina spur. It shows routes on Class I Track from the shipping sites to the gateways of Kansas City and Memphis. The map also depicts likely highway routes from six reactor sites that ship by legal weight truck under the Mostly Rail Scenario.