

The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the accident was the inability of the crew to abort successfully at their takeoff speed. The abort, however, was understandably initiated because of the first officer's belief that his plane had collided with the twin-jet aircraft. A contributing factor was that the twin-jet crew advised the tower that their plane was clear of the runway without carefully ascertaining the facts. Actually, their aircraft was not at a safe distance from another aircraft taking off on that runway.

the Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration and other segments and organizations in the aviation community:


- 46- (1) Reemphasize and communicate directly to airport designers and operators the hazards associated with jet blast from wide-body aircraft, with particular reference to protecting passengers, ramp and maintenance personnel.
- 47- (2) Reemphasize and communicate directly to operators of small aircraft, maintenance ground crews and airport personnel techniques for avoiding jet blast.

In addition, the Board recommends that:

- 48- (3) In connection with the airport safety inspection program, as required by the Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970, the FAA require incident reporting of events involving damage/injury from jet blast during ground operation not incident to flight.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

To protect the public, ground crew personnel and other members of the aviation community from accidents and injuries related to jet blast,



Damaged Transport Aircraft