

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

ISSUED: October 24, 1980

Forwarded to:

Mr. Theodore C. Lutz
Administrator
Urban Mass Transportation Administration
400 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590

SAFETY RECOMMENDATION(S)

R-80-48

About 6:55 p.m., on April 9, 1980, Western Pacific Railroad (WP) freight train Extra UP 3734 West (Sealand 6) had its caboose, three helper locomotive units behind the caboose, and seven freight cars derailed at the Industrial Parkway overpass at Hayward, California. Of the nine crewmembers, two were killed and two were injured. Three locomotive units and the caboose were destroyed. Damage was estimated at \$1,382,000. 1/

The fuel tanks of the locomotive units ruptured in the derailment, and escaping fuel was immediately ignited by severed 15,000-volt powerlines. The resulting fire consumed more than 10,000 gallons of fuel oil, engulfed the width of Industrial Parkway, and threatened the adjacent overpass of the Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART). The powerlines sagged over the BART tracks, and there was danger that the remaining clearance would be critically reduced by the loss of the remaining pole support. About 11 minutes after the derailment, a northbound five-car BART train with passengers aboard crossed the Industrial Parkway overpass through the emergency area.

The investigation disclosed that BART's Central Control received immediate notification from BART supervisors that explosions were heard and fire and smoke were seen at the accident site. BART Central was advised that a WP train had derailed 3 minutes after the accident, and 6 minutes after the accident, it was advised by Hayward police not to operate trains into the emergency area. However, the WP and the BART had no joint procedure for timely notification when emergencies occurred on the 20-mile right-of-way they share between Oakland and Fremont, California. BART Central was not notified by the WP and the supervisor at the BART Central did not know who to call at the WP to determine the extent of the emergency. Subsequently, the BART supervisor decided to operate the northbound BART train into the fire area to assess the situation.


There are other existing rapid transit lines which are immediately adjacent to the lines of railroads over relatively long distances. This accident demonstrated that a lack of timely notification of an emergency occurring on one of the paralleling lines could pose a serious and unnecessary hazard to passengers on rapid transit lines.

1/ For more detailed information, read "Railroad Accident Report--Derailment of Western Pacific Railroad Company Freight Train Extra UP 3734 West (Sealand 6), Hayward, California, April 9, 1980" (NTSB-RAR-80-10).

As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Urban Mass Transportation Administration :

Require other rapid transit operations to establish adequate mutual emergency notification procedures in instances where rapid transit trains operate in close proximity to an operational railroad line.
(Class II, Priority Action) (R-80-48)

KING, Chairman, DRIVER, Vice Chairman, McADAMS, and GOLDMAN, Members, concurred in this recommendation. BURSLEY, Member, did not participate.


By: James B. King
Chairman