

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

JOINT FTC/DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HEARING
ON HEALTH CARE AND COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY

Friday, May 30, 2003

9:15 a.m.

601 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.

1st Conference Room

Washington, D.C.

For The Record, Inc.
Waldorf, Maryland
(301) 870-8025

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

I N D E X

1		
2		
3		
4	Welcome and Introduction - David Hyman,	
5	Federal Trade Commission	5
6		
7	Chuck Darby, Co-Project Officer, Consumer	
8	Assessment of Health Plans Survey, Agency	
9	for Health Care Research and Quality	7
10		
11	Chris Crofton, Social Scientist, Center for	
12	Quality Improvement and Patient Safety,	
13	Agency for Health Care Research and Quality	16
14		
15	Arnold Milstein, Medical Director, Pacific	
16	Business Group on Health	28
17		
18	Stuart Bondurant, Professor of Medicine and	
19	Dean Emeritus, School of Medicine, University	
20	of North Carolina	33
21		
22	Drew Kumpuris, Cardiologist, Little Rock,	
23	Arkansas and Visiting Professor, Health Care	
24	Policy, Washington and Lee University	41
25		

1	CONTENTS (con'd):	
2		
3	LaMar McGinnis, Clinical Professor of	
4	Surgery, Emory University and Medical	
5	Director, Eberhart Cancer Center of	
6	DeKalb Medical Center	50
7		
8	Peggy O'Kane, President, National Committee	
9	for Quality Assurance	63
10		
11	Reed Tuckson, Senior Vice President of	
12	Consumer Health and Medical Care	
13	Advancement, United Health Group	74
14		
15	Discussion	89
16		
17	Thomas B. Leary, Commissioner, Federal Trade	
18	Commission	132
19		
20	Glen Mays, Health Researcher, Mathematica	
21	Policy Research	139
22		
23	Wendy Levinson, Professor of Medicine,	
24	University of Toronto	159
25		

1	CONTENTS (con'd):	
2		
3	Joanne Lynn, Director, Washington Home	
4	Center for Palliative Care Studies	174
5		
6	Shoshana Sofaer, Professor of Health Care	
7	Policy, Baruch College, City Universities	
8	of New York	201
9		
10	Nancy Nielsen, Vice Speaker, House of	
11	Delegates, American Medical Association	221
12		
13	Robert Berenson, Consultant, Academy	
14	Health	233
15		
16	Discussion	240
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

P R O C E E D I N G S

1
2 MR. HYMAN: Good morning and welcome to the
3 Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice
4 hearings on Health Care Competition Law and Policy.
5 Today, we are going to continue our discussion of quality
6 and consumer information. The focus today is physicians.
7 This week we have had three separate sessions -- one an
8 overview, the second a focus on quality and consumer
9 information for hospitals, and today, as I said, is
10 quality, consumer information, and physicians.

11 We have a very distinguished panel with us this
12 morning. Each of them has very distinguished
13 biographies, which we bound into a handsomely appointed
14 document you can pick up outside and keep for posterity.
15 Our rule here is you came to hear them rather than me or
16 me talking about their biographies. So each of them gets
17 a one sentence or so introduction.

18 As usual, the Power Point presentations that
19 will be shown will be posted on our website reasonably
20 shortly. And a transcript of this session and all prior
21 sessions will be available on the website. There is
22 typically about a one-month delay between actually
23 holding the hearing and getting the transcript up. I am
24 also told those of you who are desperate for
25 entertainment can purchase a video of the events and

1 build a whole library of the hearings.

2 But, in any event, the order in which we are
3 going to go is more or less the following. Our first
4 speaker of the morning is Chuck Darby, who is the co-
5 project officer on the Consumer Assessment of Health
6 Plans, which no one calls it anymore. Everyone calls it
7 CAHPS, Survey at the Agency for Health Care Research and
8 Quality or AHRQ. Chris Crofton, his colleague, is a
9 social scientist in the Center for Quality Improvement
10 and Patient Safety at AHRQ. They will be followed by
11 Arnie Milstein, who is the medical director for the
12 Pacific Business Group on Health, and has what I have
13 remarked previously the coolest title in the room,
14 National Thought Leader for Mercer. Next will be Stuart
15 Bondurant, professor of medicine dean emeritus of the
16 School of Medicine of the University of North Carolina at
17 Chapel Hill. He is appearing on behalf of the American
18 Association of Medical Colleges. Following Stuart will
19 be Drew Kumpuris, a cardiologist in private practice in
20 Little Rock, Arkansas and a visiting professor in health
21 care policy at Washington and Lee University. Next will
22 be LaMar McGinnis, clinical professor of surgery at Emory
23 University, medical director of the Eberhart Cancer
24 Center of DeKalb Medical Center. And he is here on
25 behalf of the American College of Surgeons. And then

1 Peggy O'Kane, the president of the National Committee for
2 Quality Assurance or NCQA. And then finally, battling
3 cleanup, Reed Tuckson, senior vice president of consumer
4 health and medical care advancement at United Health
5 Group.

6 And we will sort of take a break probably two-
7 thirds of the way through. And then we have built in
8 enough time for a moderated panel discussion at the end,
9 assuming everyone keeps more or less to their time
10 restrictions. Cecile Kohrs, over in the corner there,
11 will flash you things that say when you have got a couple
12 of minutes left. And we would certainly appreciate if
13 everyone would respect one another's property rights in
14 the time allotted.

15 So with that, let me turn things over to Chuck.

16 MR. DARBY: Good morning. I am impressed that
17 anyone is here, considering this is the first day of
18 sunshine we have had in about two weeks and it is Friday.

19 I chose to focus on the consumer's perspective
20 of health care. And I will go through and define what I
21 mean by that; why one bothers to measure it; what we are
22 measuring; evolving strategy for measuring the consumer's
23 perception of health care quality; problems of measuring
24 at the physician level; and also wanted to just address
25 briefly what we see or maybe my personal feelings as to

1 what the role of the federal government is in quality
2 measurement development and use.

3 Probably no one in this room needs measurement
4 101 but let me just for the sake of laying out the
5 territory define two types of quality measurement. One
6 the technical aspects of care. And the second, the so-
7 called interpersonal aspects of care. Those things that
8 the patient is in the best position to report on: the
9 social components of the interaction with the individual
10 provider and the patient; and the interaction required to
11 arrange and to receive care.

12 The original justification for measuring the
13 consumer's perspective was that it was based on other
14 things. Does it affect the outcome? Does it affect the
15 process of care? And there is evidence that satisfied
16 patients are more likely to comply with treatment
17 regimens, satisfied patients are more likely to return
18 for care, and there is correlation with these technical
19 care processes, and even outcomes in some cases.

20 Other reasons have evolved for measuring it,
21 and we see now that measuring the consumer's perspective
22 is important in its own right. Consumers help define
23 what quality of care is based on -- what they value. For
24 example, patients value having communication with their
25 provider, being able to have things explained to them in

1 a way that they can understand, and that the provider
2 will listen to them and answer the questions that they
3 have. So that by doing that, the consumer has helped
4 define what quality is, a coordination of care. The
5 National Health Care Quality Report, which will be out
6 this year, that the Agency for Health Care Research and
7 Quality is producing, has as one of its components
8 patient-centered care. So there is an acknowledgment
9 there of the importance of it. And that also of course
10 was documented in Crossing the Quality Chasm.

11 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
12 used the cap surveys for evaluating medicare
13 beneficiaries' assessment of their health plans and
14 within the next year or so will also be using that to
15 evaluate the quality of care for hospitals. The National
16 Committee for Quality Assurance uses patient assessment
17 measurement in the form of caps to accredit health plans
18 and get the view of the consumer.

19 The World Health Organization in its system for
20 measuring health systems performance worldwide is
21 measuring something called responsiveness, which is in
22 fact the consumers' perspective on their health care.
23 And recently the National Cancer Institution developed a
24 whole series of quality measures and one of the
25 cornerstone pieces of that were measures of the patient's

1 assessment.

2 In general, what are the domains that are
3 measured? Communication? Getting care quickly? Getting
4 needed care? Getting care quickly? Respect and dignity?
5 Coordination of care? Being involved in decision-making
6 or autonomy? And also measurement of the quality of
7 amenities? We could talk a lot about what are the key
8 domains but I think most of the research shows that
9 communication probably has the greatest influence on the
10 overall rating of care. Also, coordination of care is
11 important to patients, particularly those who have
12 chronic conditions. And from our work we see that
13 getting care quickly, and particularly outside of normal
14 office hours, is obviously important for those wanting
15 pediatric care.

16 In the science of survey research there has
17 been an evolving measurement strategy and the CAHPS
18 development drew upon that work that had been done
19 previously, and I think hopefully advanced the science
20 there. The focus had really been on measuring overall
21 satisfaction -- was someone satisfied with their care?
22 And this tended to yield high, very high scores. But
23 research showed that consumers in fact may indicate that
24 they were happy overall with the care that they got but
25 they might be unhappy with certain selected aspects of

1 that.

2 So it was quite clear that the consumer's
3 assessment of care was multi-dimensional, that it was not
4 a single overall. There is still that overall rating.
5 And we have perception involved in all of this
6 measurement. And so it isn't that it is all objective
7 but at least we know that it is multi-dimensional and
8 that just looking at overall satisfaction is not enough
9 in and of itself. The evolving strategy looks to measure
10 reports of care -- how often did a doctor explain things
11 in a way you could understand? A report of the
12 experience that was obtained by the patient during that
13 visit with the doctor or visit in the hospital, whatever
14 it would be, indicates a more direct measure of quality.

15 Again, perception is involved, but the idea is
16 not just to look at what is the final satisfaction
17 assessment of that but what was the report of it. And
18 then a rating of that to get an evaluation also. Both
19 components are very important. This addresses the multi-
20 dimensionality because it gets the specific individual
21 behaviors and domains and sub-domains and then it also
22 allows, if we can do it and ask enough questions, to look
23 at quality improvement of the details.

24 Problems of measuring an individual provider
25 level and CAHPS, as David indicated, we are sort of

1 morphing, we think we should use a symbol that says
2 "formerly known as the Assessment of Health Plans," and
3 that is still a critical area for us. But we are also
4 getting into the measurement of quality of care from the
5 consumer's perspective in hospitals. We have developed a
6 group practice level instrument, which we are in the
7 process of revising, and we will be submitting it for
8 consideration by NCQA. And then moving down to the
9 individual provider level at some point. So we are
10 beginning to address some of these problems now.

11 Obviously, resistance from those who are being
12 measured, wanting to make sure that what is being done is
13 valid and can be shown to be valid and useful to not only
14 the patients but also to the provider themselves.

15 Also, a concern about case mix. We think at
16 this level that it is going to be very important to look
17 at what variables are correlated with the assessment of
18 care. We have found at the health plan level that things
19 such as age and overall health status, education, and
20 gender could be important although they don't explain a
21 whole lot of the variance. But at this level there may
22 be other sets of case mix variables we need to look at.

23 Obviously, the cost to do this. And with that,
24 thinking about ways to creatively collect the data so
25 that you could reduce the cost. Being able to produce an

1 adequate sample. And looking, and of course I think the
2 field is going in the area of trying to measure at three
3 levels at once: the health plan, the group, and the
4 individual provider. Again to reduce the burden of cost
5 and also the burden on those being measured and the
6 burden on those who are providing the answers to the
7 questions.

8 Also, attribution of accountability. To what
9 element does the patient attribute different aspects of
10 care? For what do they say is the health plan
11 responsible? For what is the group responsible? And for
12 what is the individual provider responsible?

13 Just to wrap up, the role of the federal
14 government in quality measurement. I will use the CAHPS
15 project as an example. We were addressing the need for a
16 standard survey that would allow valid comparisons across
17 health plans. The project developed questionnaires and
18 reports with consumers' perspective on the quality of
19 care from health plans. And we then evaluated the
20 process and the outcome of that project. The strength of
21 the project was that there was a defined need. There
22 absolutely was a need to come up with a standard measure.
23 We had a quality research team. The initial round of
24 CAHPS included Harvard, Rand, and the Research Triangle
25 Institute. We have that same team back with the

1 exception that we now have an organization called the
2 American Institution for Research.

3 I think another strength was AHRQ's reputation
4 for applying the science to practical problems. After
5 the project was over, we went to many of the people who
6 had been involved in the project and those who had used
7 the surveys and said, "What were the strengths and
8 weaknesses, what would we do the same, and what we do
9 different?" And it was clear that the industry wanted an
10 agency, such as AHRQ, involved in the science, to put
11 that stamp of approval on the science that was done and
12 also obviously to be able to fund it and get it done, to
13 pay for it.

14 But also then what we are looking at now is
15 what is the transition from a federal agency doing that
16 work and then how do you turn it over to the industry to
17 carry it out from there. We used the sound methodology,
18 we developed the reports and the questionnaires side by
19 side, which was important, to know when you are going to
20 report this out. It tells you a lot about how to collect
21 it. We used stakeholder input throughout. And the
22 participation of key organizations, such as CMS and NCQA
23 and others, in the process was just absolutely critical.

24 The outcome was that CAHPS was adopted by NCQA,
25 CMS, the Office of Personnel Management, and the

1 Department of Defense and others, the Medicaid programs I
2 failed to mention here. We use the number whenever
3 Congress asks us, "Well, what is the impact," 123 million
4 Americans are enrolled in health plans for which CAHPS
5 data are available. It is accepted industry standard,
6 and that was really the goal, to come up with something
7 that would allow you in a comparable way, in a consistent
8 and valid way to compare across health plans. And we are
9 trying to do the same thing with hospitals and other
10 areas.

11 There has been wide interest, as I indicated,
12 we have one now that has been adopted by NCQA for
13 behavioral and substance abuse. It is a survey called
14 ECHO. It is part of the CAHPS family. We are developing
15 ones for nursing homes, hospitals, and so forth. And we
16 continue to provide technical assistance to end users.

17 The role of the government I think is to fill
18 the need when there is little motivation on the part of
19 the private sector to do this. There may be little
20 motivation, for example, to actually develop a comparable
21 survey, bring the science to bear, be a facility for
22 getting stakeholder input, have the visibility to get
23 adoption from key stakeholders, and the ability to
24 provide technical assistance throughout.

25 Here is some contact information for myself and

1 Chris. And we also have something called the Survey User
2 Network, and you can go on site and look at all the tools
3 that have been developed or are in the process of being
4 developed.

5 Thank you.

6 (Applause.)

7 MS. CROFTON: Good morning, I am Chris Crofton
8 from AHRQ. And I am going to talk a little bit at a bit
9 of a finer grain level about reporting quality
10 information to consumers about physicians and
11 institutions and other entities as well, a little more
12 finer grain than the presentation that Chuck gave.

13 First of all, let me start off by telling you
14 that in the CAHPS project we developed a number of
15 templates for reporting the information from the survey
16 to consumers and other people who would use it. We have
17 a print version of a template called, "Compare Your
18 Health Plan Choices." We also have an electronic version
19 of that report called, "Decision Helper." And we
20 developed for Medicaid audiences a version of Decision
21 Helper with more cues and prompts in it to help people
22 through the information and show them how to apply it to
23 a decision.

24 The templates that we will be developing in the
25 next phase of CAHPS are somewhat different. They are

1 going to be for providers, for performance at the group
2 practice level, for care received in hospitals, for
3 people with mobility impairments, and also for people who
4 use facilities for end-stage renal disease.

5 What I have done here is pull together some of
6 the lessons that we have learned across the past I guess
7 eight or nine years on CAHPS. And throughout I have
8 sprinkled a few quotes from focus groups and other
9 testing situations that we have had to enable us to know
10 what the change is, what is working, and what is not
11 working about the templates. The first lesson that we
12 learned is that people want information about health care
13 quality but they won't use that information unless it is
14 easy to understand and to apply. Now that isn't really a
15 blinding flash of insight for anybody. I think everybody
16 knows that it has got to be simple or people aren't going
17 to use it. But in the focus groups in other types of
18 testing we have done, the fact that the material needs to
19 be easy to grasp really leapt out at us. In many of the
20 focus groups from which I drew quotes for this, people
21 spent up to 25 percent of their annual income on health
22 care costs.

23 So it is a huge ticket item for them.
24 Nonetheless, if the information that we give them isn't
25 easy to understand and absorb, they said flat out that it

1 is information that they would just ignore. They would
2 just go on their own instincts to pick a health plan.

3 Something else that I thought was really
4 interesting about these group discussions that we had was
5 that there is a clear difference between knowing
6 something and knowing how to apply that information to a
7 decision. In one of the groups that we ran, one
8 participant looked at the data displays we were giving
9 them as examples and chunks of texts we were giving them
10 as an examples and says, "All this information is great
11 but you should send it to me after I have chosen a health
12 plan because that is when I will really have to time to
13 sit down and look at it."

14 So it sort of just slid right over the point we
15 wanted to make, which was that the data can help people
16 to select a better health plan or a health plan that is
17 better suited to their needs.

18 So that was a clear warning to us that we
19 needed to put information in the report, not just about
20 what the numbers were and what they meant, but how to
21 apply those numbers to a decision situation. And that
22 also creates some tension because we wanted to keep the
23 reports as simple and brief as possible, but we knew that
24 we needed to put in some information to tell people how
25 to use the numbers or it just wouldn't serve the purpose

1 that we had in mind for it.

2 Another piece of information that we learned is
3 that using multiple sources of information to make a
4 decision is a cognitively complex task. When a person is
5 approaching a decision about which health plan to pick,
6 for example, there are a lot of variables they have to
7 keep in their working memory, what kind of plan it is and
8 what that means for the services they will receive, what
9 kind of costs are associated with it, whether those are
10 premiums, out-of-pocket costs, costs for prescriptions or
11 whatever else, some convenience factors, how easy it is
12 to get appointments, what kinds of clinical locations or
13 doctor's offices are close to you or distant from you,
14 whether your provider is in that network, whether the
15 providers in the network are accepting new patients.
16 There is this whole cluster of information that people
17 have to keep right in front of their faces for one, two,
18 five or more health plans before they make that decision.
19 That is cognitively challenging. And research about how
20 we process information tells us that human beings can
21 only really hold about five variables in their mind at
22 once.

23 So that means that we have to make the
24 materials as easy to use as possible and build in cues
25 that will help people organize the information and retain

1 the important stuff.

2 Okay, another lesson that we learned was the
3 only way to know if you have created either a
4 questionnaire or a report template that succeeds is if
5 you go out and ask people. You need to take examples of
6 your questions or examples of texts from a report and get
7 people to talk to you about it, about where it works and
8 doesn't work. There were a couple of different tools
9 that we had for getting that information and they fall I
10 guess basically into what we call cognitive testing.
11 That can be concurrent or retrospective interviews or
12 observing how people use the materials. For a concurrent
13 interview, you sit down with the person who represents
14 your target audience, either with a questionnaire or a
15 text example, and ask them to think out loud as they are
16 going through it.

17 So that helps you pinpoint the moment where
18 they get off track or fail to understand something or
19 understand something in a different way than you
20 intended. You can also do that retrospectively. In
21 other words, the person can sit down with a
22 questionnaire, fill it out, or read the entire report and
23 then tell you about their thought processes as they went
24 through it. That kind of information was invaluable for
25 us as we were putting together both the questionnaires

1 and the reports.

2 Something that I think of as a special category
3 of cognitive testing is usability testing. And that is
4 really a test of the question, "Did your materials work
5 or not? Did the materials give the person the
6 information they needed to make a decision?" And to do
7 that you need to take the whole product, the entire
8 report itself, and have a person read it and attempt to
9 use it for the purpose that you had in mind. And in the
10 case of CAHPS, it was for selecting a health plan.

11 When we did usability testing in the early
12 stages of report development in CAHPS One, we learned
13 some really interesting and humility engendering things
14 by doing this kind of testing. In terms of usability
15 testing, through the cognitive testing, we learned that
16 some people were missing the distinction between
17 different types of health plans. We had the ratings
18 clustered as HMO, PPO, fee for service or whatever. And
19 people weren't making the connection that they were
20 divided into categories like that. So one of the changes
21 we made was to emphasize those topic headings to make
22 them bolder and in a bigger typeface than the other
23 material on the page.

24 But that sort of backfired on us in a way that
25 we really couldn't have anticipated. When we put that

1 version through usability testing, we found that when we
2 asked people what they thought the booklet was for,
3 rather than telling us it was to give us information that
4 will help us choose a health plan, they said it was
5 trying to convince us to join a managed care plan. And
6 we were befuddled by that. But as we did observations of
7 how people were using the booklets, we saw that they
8 didn't go from back to front. And actually people rarely
9 do in a document like that. They sometimes would start
10 at the end and flip backwards or start at some other
11 point in the document and go thru.

12 So that just maximized the chances that they
13 were missing material in the beginning that told them
14 what the purpose was and how to apply the information to
15 their decision. And if we hadn't done that type of
16 testing I think we would have been just in the dark about
17 that kind of use of material.

18 I think we have done around 300 cognitive
19 interviews or focus groups on the questionnaires and the
20 campus reporting templates. We learned a lot of things,
21 a lot of things that really helped us improve both those
22 products. And I picked out a few of those lessons here
23 to tell you about today. When we started developing the
24 initial reporting template, we thought it would be a good
25 idea to put in ratings, not just from people with a

1 normal range of health problems but for people who were
2 high users of health care services as well.

3 So we had a couple of different ratings there.
4 Our thinking was that if you give information about how a
5 plan treats people who are chronically ill, that really
6 puts the plan to the test and can give you some valuable
7 information about how it functions across the board.
8 When we did the testing on that, however, that was not a
9 connection that people automatically made. If you were a
10 health consumer and you looked at these ratings, it
11 wouldn't necessarily be clear why you should be
12 interested in how a plan treats somebody with a chronic
13 disease. So that ultimately led us to pull out that
14 information and just go with information across the
15 board.

16 Another thing that we learned is that not all
17 people shared the Western or Anglo-American idea of
18 individualism and making your own choices as being a
19 positive thing. There are many cultures in which making
20 choices about health care decisions, for example, is
21 something you do with family members, especially elders
22 in the family. And it isn't necessarily of value that
23 you be pulled in and made a part of the health care
24 decision-making as a partner with your provider. So
25 that, of course, had consequences for the types of

1 questions we asked and for the information that audiences
2 across lots of different cultures, the use that they
3 would have for CAHPS data.

4 Another lesson, and this was also a surprise
5 for me, is when you are developing texts, shorter isn't
6 always better. We were really motivated to try to go for
7 the headlines and to try to pare down the information we
8 gave back to people as much as possible so that they
9 could absorb it quickly and apply it to their decision.

10 But we found that that sometimes backfires. In
11 a lot of readability tests you will find that short,
12 choppy texts, like the original text that I have listed
13 in the notes here, will score at a lower reading level.
14 And that could prompt one to include that kind of
15 information in a report. But we found that there were
16 other things besides word length and sentence length that
17 were really affecting comprehension of the materials.
18 And that was the flow of sentences and that how the ideas
19 connected together across sentences makes a difference in
20 the way a person understands it. So we learned that for
21 things like, certainly for titles for data displays and
22 other things, it was sometimes a better approach to use
23 something that was a longer sentence than it was to break
24 it up into several short and choppy phrases.

25 Okay, usability testing I have talked about.

1 And another lesson that we have learned, Chuck talked
2 about including stakeholders in our process, is that if
3 you don't include stakeholders in critical points in the
4 process, it dramatically decreases the chances that your
5 product will be adopted and used. And thinking of
6 providers in particular, in the provider instruments that
7 we are developing, we have learned that we need to
8 include both providers and consumers in the development
9 of what content is appropriate for the questionnaire; in
10 the format of the report, and the explanatory information
11 that goes in there; and in the plan for disseminating
12 survey results.

13 I think that is a pretty commonsense type of
14 notion, that you are going to gain the respect and trust
15 of the organization or person you are evaluating if they
16 are pulled in and given a decision-making role in some of
17 the processes. But it is something that we have tried to
18 be very careful to implement in CAHPS and careful to
19 implement at many different points in the process.

20 Another thing we have learned that relates to
21 providing information about physicians is that consumers
22 find it easier to talk about what they see as high-
23 quality providers or even high-quality hospitals than
24 they do about health plans. When we have asked people to
25 describe a high-quality health plan as we are putting

1 materials together, they can talk about a plan that gives
2 prevention care and a plan that has materials that are
3 easy to read. But when we ask them to describe a high-
4 quality provider, they can go into much more detail and
5 pull up some very elaborate examples about what they
6 mean. And on the slides after this, I have given you a
7 few examples of that from our cognitive testing. What we
8 are hoping that means, and what we think it means, is
9 that if people see that quality link more easily in
10 evaluating physicians and using that information, we are
11 hoping that that will translate into greater use of the
12 information to select a provider than we have seen for
13 selecting a health plan.

14 These are some of the characteristics of good
15 providers that we have learned about. Another thing that
16 we have learned about both physicians and providers or
17 hospitals is that if we are using that information to
18 give to consumers so that they can make a better choice
19 of provider or of a health plan, it is very important to
20 the organization or to the person being evaluated that we
21 report how they have improved over time. And really it
22 is the only fair thing to do. If you publicly go out
23 there with a statement that a provider group or a
24 hospital received low scores in X, Y or Z area, then you
25 are obligated to go back and say and this is how they

1 used information from you to improve. I think that is
2 something that could motivate people to complete the
3 forms and give the information, and also motivate
4 organizations and providers to use the information once
5 they know about it.

6 That is kind of a quick overview of some of the
7 things that we have learned in the past eight years of
8 CAHPS. There are many things, many more things that we
9 have to learn about developing reports. One, I know Judy
10 Hibbard has talked to this group or will talk to this
11 group. One of the pieces of research that she has worked
12 on talks about how to frame a message and emphasize the
13 risk of not using the information versus the benefit of
14 using it. Those kind of framing messages we need to
15 learn a lot more about. We need to learn about how
16 incentives might affect provider behavior in using
17 quality assessments from consumers and changing their
18 practice behaviors. And lots of things about how to
19 communicate things electronically versus in print.

20 If you want to see how we are doing with these
21 questions in the future, you can check the Survey User
22 Network website because that gives pretty frequent
23 updates about what is going on in the project and where
24 we are headed.

25 And I will end it there. Thank you.

1 (Applause.)

2 MR. HYMAN: Thank you, Chris. Next is Arnie.

3 DR. MILSTEIN: Good morning. My remarks this
4 morning will address the question, "What features of the
5 physicians services market require a more proactive
6 federal competition policy?" My comments amplify on
7 prior testimony on February 27th and on work which I
8 published in the April 2003 issue of Health Affairs.

9 The market for physician services exhibits
10 several features that imply, I believe, the need for
11 vigorously pro-competitive public policies. I will
12 briefly outline these features and the proactive
13 competitive policies that might best address them. Since
14 some of these features and remedies are similar in the
15 hospital services market, a few of my remarks will
16 parallel testimony I gave yesterday on hospital
17 competition policy.

18 First, most physician service use is by seniors
19 and individuals who have not had the benefit of a college
20 education. These populations commonly take advice from
21 peers and, most importantly, their physicians when newly
22 selecting a physician. Physicians have not successfully
23 advocated for the service line specific public physician
24 performance reporting needed to assure that their
25 physician selections on behalf of consumers would

1 optimize consumers' health or financial outcomes. In
2 essence, consumers in need of physician services rely
3 upon physician agents who are not assuring the objective,
4 quantified information flow on the performance of their
5 peers that successful agency would require.

6 Second, most consumers requiring physician
7 services are either chronically ill or unfamiliar with
8 specialty-specific physician services which they may
9 need. Chronically ill individuals suffer from a much
10 higher incidence of depression that commonly impairs the
11 critical thinking capabilities that careful physician
12 selection requires. Both chronically ill and new
13 consumers of physician services tend to experience health
14 care as stressful. Irving Janus at Yale and other
15 researchers have documented that such health care-induced
16 stress typically creates idealization in the minds of
17 patients of their care-givers and physicians in
18 particular. Idealization of physicians is the antithesis
19 of the critical thinking required for consumers to
20 transform performance information into a physician
21 selection likely to generate the best health outcome or
22 the most affordable financial outcome. This idealization
23 is well-documented in the Hayes research referenced in my
24 Health Affairs article.

25 Third, as summarized in the Health Affairs

1 review, there are seven to eight other well-documented
2 psychological barriers to accurate consumer perception of
3 quality unreliability at the physician level and also
4 successful navigation to physicians likely to deliver a
5 higher level of performance. Examples of these
6 psychological barriers include what psychologists refer
7 to as the "familiarity heuristic." This, in essence, is
8 consumers' automatic inclination to associate
9 familiarity, such as a physician who they commonly see or
10 hear about in their daily life or have previously used,
11 to associate that with trustworthiness. And, secondly,
12 optimistic bias, especially in health care, and this is
13 well-documented in the psychological research literature.
14 Consumers tend to believe, without any foundation in
15 reality, that their own personal risk of bad outcomes is
16 much lower than average.

17 The familiarity heuristic warrants careful
18 consideration by the Federal Trade Commission and the
19 Department of Justice. It implies that if a physician is
20 familiar to a consumer, he or she may enjoy market power,
21 especially among sicker consumers who utilize
22 disproportionate levels of physician services that
23 substantially exceeds what is conveyed by a simple
24 calculation of a physician's market share.

25 In essence, this market features

1 psychologically-disadvantaged consumers, relying on
2 physician agents, who are largely failing to ground their
3 failures and other aspects of agency for quality for
4 affordability in an evidence base. This central reality
5 and several other unique features of the market for
6 physician services imply the need, especially in more
7 concentrated physician markets, either for aggressive
8 regulation of physician quality and efficiency, or better
9 enabling of the market's invisible hand. Since the
10 market's enablement is the subject of today's hearings
11 and aggressive regulation of physician performance has
12 never succeeded, I will briefly recommend an illustrative
13 list of these enablements.

14 The first recommendation. Require physicians
15 to publicly disclose and/or allow disclosure by payers of
16 readily comparable measures of quality and efficiency,
17 for specific diagnoses they treat, for categorical
18 service lines, such as a primary care physician that
19 treats both pediatric and adult patients, and for
20 physician performance overall. Granularatory of
21 performance reporting is needed because research to date
22 suggests that no physician excels in treating all
23 conditions. Secondly, aggregate performance reporting is
24 also needed because many consumers enter the physician's
25 office without knowing their diagnoses or likely

1 treatment.

2 Second recommendation. Required disclosure
3 should be keyed to measures endorsed by the National
4 Quality Forum, the majority of whose board is comprised
5 of consumer organizations and purchasers. It should also
6 be keyed to performance measures requested by
7 aggregations of customers, including health plans,
8 purchasers or consumer organizations who together are
9 fiduciaries for a significant fraction of any physician's
10 patient mix.

11 Third recommendation. Prohibit physicians or
12 physician organizations from in any way restricting payer
13 efforts to recognize and reward physician excellence by
14 assigning physicians within a multi-physician
15 organization, or, for that matter, service lines or
16 individual treatments by single physicians to different
17 performance tiers, tiers that are made visible to
18 consumers and/or subject to variable consumer out-of-
19 pocket costs. Such performance-based tiering is the
20 essence of how the market's invisible hand can be most
21 feasibly enabled in all American health benefit plans.
22 Freedom to tier physicians should be vigorously protected
23 by the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice
24 Department.

25 In my testimony on February 27th, I supported

1 several other pro-competitive policies that I continue to
2 recommend for your consideration. As described in my
3 prior testimony, significant efforts by the Leapfrog
4 Group, the Consumer Purchaser Disclosure Project, and
5 other progressive market forces, such as those catalyzed
6 by NCQA, are already promoting such transparency-based
7 market solutions. These efforts would benefit from
8 support by the FTC and Justice Department.

9 America is spending almost 15 percent of its
10 GDP on health care services, and physicians determine the
11 vast majority of this spending. As clearly stated in the
12 IOM's Reports on American Health Care Quality, the
13 services that Americans are getting back for these
14 internationally unprecedented levels of spending are
15 characterized by serious and widespread quality defects,
16 and significant economic waste. The FTC and Justice
17 Department's competition policies can and should play a
18 critical role in healing America's under-performing
19 health care system.

20 Thank you.

21 (Applause.)

22 MR. HYMAN: Dr. Bondurant, you are next.

23 DR. BONDURANT: Thank you. Good morning. I am
24 here to represent the Association of American Medical
25 Colleges. And I thought that in these introductory

1 remarks I might address two questions that are included
2 in the list. The first is the extent to which the
3 patients in academic medical center hospitals are
4 informed of the level of training of their care-givers.

5 Could everyone hear what I was saying before or
6 do I need to start again? I won't go all the way back.
7 Is that better? Is that better now? Good, thank you.

8 So that I thought I would address two questions
9 in these introductory remarks. The first is the extent
10 to which patients in academic medical center hospitals
11 are informed of the level of training of their care-
12 givers. And the second is the amount of experience of
13 the care-giver who the patient encounters.

14 Before addressing each of those specifically,
15 there are four or five general observations that I would
16 like to make that bear on the subject. The first is that
17 every teaching hospital that I know of has an informed
18 consent form that includes on it the statement that
19 students and residents will be involved in the care of
20 the patient so that pro forma at least there is a signed,
21 informed consent. I don't mean to make the argument that
22 that is an adequate way to explain the level of training
23 but at least it needs to be in the record that that is
24 done.

25 Second, most, if not all, teaching hospitals,

1 all of them that I know about at least, do have specific
2 policies that articulate the requirement that the level
3 of training of the individual be clearly identified to
4 the patient during the time of their hospitalization.

5 Third, different hospitals have differing
6 degrees of participation by learners of different levels
7 so that in putting in policies of this kind they have to
8 be sculpted to fit the individual hospital.

9 Fourth, as we consider the role of the
10 learners, we need to remember I think that the persons
11 ultimately responsible for the quality of care of the
12 individual patient is the attending physician and not any
13 of the learners. The fact that the learners are involved
14 does not absolve the attending physician of that
15 responsibility in any way.

16 And the final thing I would say is that a lot
17 of experience suggests that in the vast majority of
18 situations the presence of students and learners
19 interacting with the patients is a presence that is
20 welcomed and appreciated by the patients. The feedback
21 is almost universally positive but not by any means 100
22 percent positive.

23 Now to turn to the two specific questions, in
24 the view of AAMC, there certainly is an ongoing need to
25 examine the adequacy of the formal and informal means by

1 which the level of training of learners is identified in
2 encounters in the academic health care settings. And I
3 will have more to say about some of the specific things
4 that are now being done in just a moment.

5 There also is a longstanding dilemma of how to
6 teach doctors to execute especially procedural
7 interventions, such as suturing. Sooner or later for the
8 first time, they have to do that on a patient, no matter
9 how much prior experience there has been. But there has
10 been a great deal of thought and innovation as well put
11 into that so that the state of the art is advanced now
12 over where it was just a short while ago.

13 Well, to come back to the question of learners
14 then and how they can be stratified and those
15 stratifications communicated fully, more fully to the
16 patients, the AAMC believes that all medical schools and
17 teaching hospitals should have well-articulated policies
18 and guidelines that require the identification of the
19 level of all kinds. There are a number of things in
20 place now in addition to the policy statements that I
21 mentioned a moment ago. Hospitals do have policy
22 requirements that learners identify the level of their
23 learning.

24 In addition to that, every teaching hospital
25 that I know of and practically every hospital requires

1 all providers to wear name tags or badges, and every one
2 that we know of requires that there be identification on
3 that badge that this is a student or a resident at all
4 times. Now it has been said that some of the print on
5 some of those badges is so small that the average
6 patient, the average Medicare patient, can't read the
7 print. So it doesn't guarantee just because the badge is
8 there that this is sufficient. I don't mean to make that
9 argument.

10 The second point is that in every medical
11 school that I know about, that I have encountered, there
12 is a burden placed on the students to introduce
13 themselves, and they are taught how to introduce
14 themselves to each patient as part of the learning for
15 the patient encounter. And a part of that introduction
16 is a description of their role in relation to the
17 patient. And that introduction, that format of the
18 introduction is supposed to obtain consent for the
19 student, the resident, and the attending physician as
20 well. I don't know of studies that measure the
21 compliance with those requirements but they are
22 universal, and I believe are widely followed.

23 Third, most of the learners work as members of
24 teams. And the attending physician who has the ultimate
25 responsibility for the team quite regularly introduces

1 the members of the team to the patient and explains the
2 role of each member to the patient. In one particular
3 situation that I know of that has caught some attention
4 lately, and that is the matter of students doing pelvic
5 examinations on anesthetized patients, I have checked
6 with two institutions in which in both institutions for
7 many years it has been the practice of the gynecologist
8 in those institutions to sit down with the patients
9 before the surgery and say these are the people who will
10 be on the team in the operating room and these are the
11 things that we would expect each team member to do. I
12 can't say how universal that practice is, but I can say
13 that there are two institutions in which the OB-GYN
14 departments feel very comfortable that it is a
15 traditional practice in those institutions and is now
16 done.

17 So those are some of the things that are now
18 going on to ensure that patients have a sense of the
19 level of learning of the people. The AAMC is not
20 satisfied that these are really adequate. And it just so
21 happens it had long before, many months ago, scheduled a
22 meeting of the directors of the courses that teach
23 students how to interact with patients. It is scheduled
24 for the third and fourth schedule next week, Tuesday and
25 Wednesday. Course directors from all over the country

1 will be here. And one of their charges is to develop an
2 explicit model policy for all schools to adopt and for
3 all of the organizations to adopt that will spell out
4 guidelines to assure that patients are informed of the
5 level of experience of the learners.

6 With respect to the second question, and that
7 is the level of experience with procedures and how many
8 procedures individuals have done and how well informed
9 the patients are those observations, the AAMC is aware
10 that most medical schools and most hospitals have begun
11 to take steps to ensure that students and residents have
12 acquired the fundamental capacity to do many of these
13 procedures, if possible, before they do them for the
14 first time on any patient. For example, again in two
15 schools that I know well, students do their first pelvic
16 examination on women and genital urinary examination on
17 men on volunteers, normal subjects who volunteer to
18 participate or are paid, so that the first time the
19 student does a rectal or a pelvic examination on a
20 patient, he or she will have already learned how to do
21 that on a normal volunteer. And the students in these
22 two schools, and I think they are representative but I
23 can't say how universal that is, never do their first
24 pelvic or rectal examination on a subject.

25 In addition to that, schools are turning more

1 and more toward the use of either panels or patients who
2 are drawn especially to make themselves available for
3 student examination on special occasions. Their only
4 reason for being available is to be examined by the
5 student or professional actors. In many schools, there
6 are now professional actors who are trained to play the
7 role of patients and both of these groups participate in
8 the evaluation of the students so that their feedback
9 counts for the student's grade, how well the student
10 interacts with them.

11 So that there is little doubt, there has been
12 great progress, I think, in this in one other way that I
13 need to mention. And that is the development of devices
14 that are used to simulate, to simulate everything from
15 cardio-pulmonary resuscitation to breast examination to
16 heart examination, genital and rectal examination, a
17 whole body of puppets that are highly instrumented and
18 are used as simulators. So that with the combination of
19 the simulators and the volunteer subjects, we have made a
20 lot of progress. Nonetheless, there still is a long way
21 to go. There is little doubt in my mind and the AAMC's
22 view is that the time will come soon when students will
23 be required to demonstrate their proficiency with every
24 clinical interaction that they have with a patient and
25 the AAMC supports that development.

1 Thank you.

2 (Applause.)

3 MR. HYMAN: Next is Dr. Kumpuris.

4 DR. KUMPURIS: Good morning. Perhaps the best
5 way to make a presentation is not to read your remarks,
6 but because of the time constraints I wanted to make sure
7 that I got everything I wanted to say said before I got
8 the 2-minute warning and got yanked off the podium.

9 First of all, I would like to thank the Federal
10 Trade Commission and the Department of Justice for having
11 me today. I don't know how many practicing physicians
12 they have but it is an honor to be here. Secondly, in
13 reading the questions that were asked about what was up
14 for discussion, it was clear that there were no clear and
15 concise answers, that the questions were provocative and
16 contentious, and that the process of arriving at an
17 answer is going to be arduous indeed. And for that
18 reason I appreciate the opportunity to come.

19 First of all, let me just say that the efforts
20 to improve health care quality are not only needed, but
21 long overdue. In 2001, the Institute of Medicine
22 published, "Crossing the Quality Chasm," which found that
23 the United States health care system does not uniformly
24 and consistently deliver high quality care to all
25 patients. A diverse literature addresses this variation

1 in health quality and the difficulties in measuring those
2 differences. Although the conclusion of this landmark
3 IOM report are seldom disputed, the reasons are far from
4 agreed upon.

5 The first point I would like to make actually
6 goes beyond the borders of what the limits of this
7 discussion are about. But that is just to bring up the
8 point of the interrelationship between health care
9 quality and the access to care. To address one and
10 ignore the other is not only mis-directed, but it
11 represents a lack of appreciation of the day-to-day
12 realities of delivering health care.

13 In geographic areas, access to health care is a
14 major issue. The standards of quality care delivery may
15 vary. Any agreed upon quality standard would need to
16 take into account issues of access to a delivery system
17 capable of fulfilling those standards. In many areas in
18 this country it is the lack of adequate access to
19 acceptable care, rather than inadequate quality of care,
20 that determines poor outcomes. It should go without
21 saying that problems of access are not simply due to
22 geographic reasons, but things like financial
23 considerations, transportation, cultural and many other
24 reasons. Issues of access as they pertain to quality,
25 are not only not mentioned by this committee, but I would

1 be remiss if I did not mention them at this time.

2 Now to move on to what the committee wants to
3 discuss. The evolution of the methodologies to measure,
4 or at least understand, the determinants of physician
5 quality of care, make up an interesting history of well-
6 intended false starts. The importance of quality
7 measurement and documentation goes without saying.
8 However, for complex reasons, the results of most prior
9 systems have been sub-optimal. Initially, retrospective
10 efforts to identify bad doctors through chart reviews
11 have been tried. This model attempted to identify and
12 modify out layers, but did little to address the overall
13 performance of most good doctors with the goal of making
14 them even better. Because of its marginal success this
15 model has been mostly abandoned and replaced by other
16 approaches.

17 Most health service researchers have organized
18 health quality into somewhat arbitrary components. These
19 would include structure, such as qualifications and board
20 certification, process or the appropriateness and
21 timeliness of delivered care, and outcomes or subsequent
22 results of care. From a purely theoretical standpoint,
23 outcomes afford the best assessment of quality. But
24 there are major difficulties in accounting for measuring
25 outcomes. And these include varying inputs, such as

1 disease severities, co-morbidities, and patient
2 compliance. For these reasons, there is now a general
3 consensus that objective measures of process of care
4 provide a superior methodology to assess quality of care.

5 Explicit review has several obvious advantages.
6 First, it can be primarily disease specific. Did a
7 patient who had a myocardial infarction receive an
8 aspirin? Second, it can be standardized across large
9 delivery systems and regions. Third, data acquisition is
10 not terribly labor-intensive. Fourth, data development
11 is sustainable and ongoing for an individual physician.
12 Fifth, it can be applied to all physicians. And, lastly,
13 results of intervention to improve care can be measured
14 and monitored in real time.

15 Most of the research to measure quality of care
16 has occurred in the health services arena. However, it
17 needs to be remembered that there is a parallel course in
18 clinical medicine. Patient care guidelines for best
19 practices have been developed in the clinical arena.
20 These guidelines are evidence-based and therefore
21 represent best practice guidelines and are currently
22 available to all practicing physicians. Very rapidly
23 these evidence-based guidelines are becoming the standard
24 methodology of assessing clinical decisions, documenting
25 quality, and determining appropriateness of care.

1 Of interest, it is not health care researchers
2 who are the drivers of the application of these
3 guidelines in clinical practice. Rather, it is those who
4 are financially responsible to purchasers for using this
5 information. The reasons are obvious. With the rapid
6 and seemingly uncontrolled escalation of health care
7 costs, insurance companies and businesses have a vested
8 financial interest in the quality and appropriateness of
9 care provided to their clients and employees.

10 Just as measurements of explicit parameters of
11 care has been wed to evidence-based guidelines, now cost-
12 effectiveness is being linked to both. Those paying for
13 health care are increasingly becoming more sensitive to a
14 basic value equation in providing care. More than any
15 other, the cost motive will move quality and cost-
16 effectiveness and their measurements into the
17 marketplace.

18 The only real question to my mind at this point
19 is who will set the standards, who will control the data,
20 and how will the data be used? Will it be government?
21 Will it be business? Or will it be medicine? The answer
22 will greatly influence how the physician marketplace
23 transforms and responds. In rapid order, it could
24 potentially alter the environment and competition between
25 physicians. Patients who were once uninformed and

1 insulated from the cost of health care will request
2 reliable data on quality and costs before making health
3 care decisions. This process will likely be encouraged
4 by the insurance providers and employers.

5 Adherence to evidence-based guidelines with
6 documented cost-effectiveness may well be the major
7 driver of market share and competition for doctors, as
8 well as for entire delivery systems. A case in point is
9 Kaiser Permanente, the nation's largest non-profit HMO.
10 Recently, they announced they would publish on their web
11 page all clinical guidelines used by their physicians.
12 In addition, Kaiser agreed to share with the public
13 information on how they pay their doctors including
14 financial incentives. This policy prompted Dr. John
15 Windburg, the health policy scholar at Dartmouth, to say,
16 "This sets a new standard for competition for doctors."
17 Dr. Carol Clancy, who I believe has testified before this
18 group, the acting director of the Agency for Health Care
19 Research and Quality, was quoted as saying, "Kaiser's
20 decision conforms to IOM's recommendation, basing medical
21 practice on evidence and sharing that evidence with the
22 public."

23 It appears the rapid escalation of health costs
24 coupled with the desire to purchase appropriate, quality,
25 and cost-effective care will be the primary movers in

1 directing health care purchasers and consumers into
2 considering issues of quality and issues of cost.
3 Quality care and cost of care are intertwined into one.
4 And reimbursement will inevitably be tied to providers of
5 best care, best cost.

6 The rate of adoption of this marketplace
7 approach will vary from locale to locale. Areas with
8 higher health care costs, homogeneous delivery systems,
9 and large employer groups will see the most dramatic and
10 rapid changes.

11 Currently, some physicians are reluctant to use
12 practice guidelines. Reasons vary but some reasons cited
13 include skepticism of whether guidelines truly improve
14 outcome, cynicism about the efforts to measure quality,
15 challenges to physician autonomy, and inertia and
16 ingrained practice patterns. All of these reasons may
17 rapidly disappear as reimbursement is linked to measures
18 of quality and measures of cost.

19 And to change gears just a second, this
20 committee, the FTC has posed several intriguing questions
21 as topics and questions for discussion today. To select
22 a few, the first, should physicians disclose to potential
23 patients the existence of volume-quality relationships
24 and how many procedures they have done? Second, should
25 physicians disclose to patients the existence of

1 geographic variation in practice patterns? Thirdly, and
2 I added this one, should physicians disclose to patients
3 any financial relationships that they have that might
4 influence their decision-making? Do they own imaging
5 centers, do they own hospitals?

6 I have no ready answers to these, but I would
7 like to offer several questions that make the answers
8 even more difficult. If the answer were yes, how would
9 you enforce it? If the answer were yes, who would
10 enforce it? If the answer were yes, would you
11 criminalize the doctors who do not follow it? If the
12 answer were yes, would you make an already litigious
13 environment worse?

14 In my view, although consumer information and
15 consent are extremely important, the practical aspects of
16 the stated questions make their application to everyday
17 practice of medicine almost impossible. Rather, I would
18 suggest that as reimbursement becomes tied to evidence-
19 based guidelines and cost-effectiveness, these issues and
20 questions will become less important. Quality of care
21 standards will be established using objective data.
22 Cost-effectiveness will be determined using a clinical-
23 value equation. And reimbursement will eventually set
24 standards for both determinants in clinical practice.
25 For physician practices, all else will fade as the market

1 responds to price and quality.

2 While it is true that many others have
3 predicted this marketplace evolution and as yet it has
4 failed to materialize, the environment is changing.
5 Because of improved informational systems and rising
6 health care costs, many organizations are now rapidly
7 moving towards finding ways to link reimbursement,
8 cost-effectiveness and quality.

9 The final point I would like to raise also goes
10 somewhat beyond the scope of this organization but once
11 again I am going to use my time to make mention of it.
12 And that is relating to medical errors. In 1999, the
13 Institute of Medicine released a report entitled, "To Err
14 is Human." This report documented that medical errors
15 are a leading cause of mortality in the United States
16 with over 100,000 deaths. At issue is whether these
17 errors represent failure of individuals or failure of
18 systems. The vast majority of physicians are good
19 doctors, motivated to provide quality of care using
20 evidence-based clinical pathways. However, good doctors
21 and bad systems will still result in adverse and
22 undesirable outcomes.

23 The IOM report called for Congress to provide
24 legal protections with respect to information reported
25 for the purpose of quality improvement and patient

1 safety. Over 50 organizations, both physician, provider,
2 hospital, academic medical center, have endorsed the
3 proposed legislation. A bill has passed the House, but
4 appears to be stymied in the Senate. Until such time as
5 delivery systems can document, discuss, and share
6 information to improve quality of the systems that
7 provide care, absent the threat of legal action, the
8 evolution of quality improvement will be stymied.

9 I thank you for the time, and I will appreciate
10 discussing this at a later date.

11 Thank you.

12 (Applause.)

13 MR. HYMAN: Thank you, Dr. Kumpuris. If I can
14 be allowed a personal note, I actually met Dr. Kumpuris
15 at Washington and Lee, where he is visiting. And
16 although Dr. Kumpuris is a physician, he is visiting at
17 the law school and you can tell that it has an effect
18 because he didn't like the questions that got asked, and
19 so he added some of his own and chose to answer those.

20 So with that, Dr. McGinnis?

21 DR. MCGINNIS: Good morning. It has certainly
22 been an enlightening morning already. As a physician, it
23 is my mission to deliver the highest quality of health
24 care for every patient. As a surgeon, I am dedicated to
25 the ethical and competent practice of surgery. The

1 single most important aspect of practice has always been
2 my responsibility to my patients. I speak to you today
3 from my experience of 40 years as a surgeon and on behalf
4 of the American College of Surgeons, an organization
5 founded to raise the standards of surgical practice and
6 to improve the care of the surgical patient.

7 Quality improvement rests on a composite of
8 factors within the totality of the health care system.
9 In surgery and in specialties, safety relies on the
10 presence of competent and informed surgeons, a safe
11 institution, and a system of good practices within which
12 the surgical care is rendered. Therefore, quality
13 improvement and patient safety are obviously of great
14 importance to the surgical community and certainly have
15 an impact on the bottom line. The College wishes to
16 commend the FTC and the Department of Justice for
17 undertaking these hearings, and we are pleased to have
18 this opportunity to present testimony regarding quality
19 improvement and consumer information.

20 With more than 64,000 members representing all
21 surgical specialties, our College has been concerned with
22 quality improvement since its founding. In 1918, the
23 College initiated a hospital standardization program in
24 an effort to ensure a safe environment and an effective
25 system for care of surgical and other hospitalized

1 patients. That program ultimately led to the
2 establishment of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
3 Health Care, JCAHO. And this commitment continues
4 through our College's representation on the JCAHO board,
5 as well as other programs and initiatives conducted by a
6 number of our committees and departments.

7 Some of these initiatives include the
8 Commission on Cancer which, established in 1922, now sets
9 standards for nearly 15,000 hospitals where 80 percent of
10 the cancer care is administered in this country. It has
11 a significant quality component based on the survey
12 process and the standards that have been established.
13 Our grant from AHRQ, a grant to further validate the
14 Department of Veterans' Affairs National Surgical Quality
15 Improvement Program, is ongoing in 14 hospitals.

16 I would like to particularly emphasize the
17 importance of the NSQIP program. We presently view this
18 as a potential gold standard for the evaluation of
19 quality in that it embodies careful collection of risk
20 and complexity adjusted data, which is then fed back into
21 the system for a continuous cycle of improvement. We are
22 very dedicated to this program and its evaluation because
23 we believe that it would not only benefit patients, but
24 would evolve data that physicians and surgeons would
25 respect and adhere to.

1 Clinical trials have been designed to assess
2 comparisons of procedures. There is one going on
3 presently, funded through AHRQ and the VA Cooperative
4 Studies Program, comparing watchful waiting open
5 operation and laporscopic repair of hernias, for
6 instance.

7 We have established the American College of
8 Surgeons Oncology Group, which presently has 14 ongoing
9 trials comparing a variety of areas of surgery where
10 there are differences of opinion. Our Advance Trauma
11 Life Support Program is now the worldwide standard for
12 training providers who first attend injured patients, and
13 sets up a system of evaluating and approving hospitals.

14 In short, for the last 90 years, through the
15 programs and initiatives outlined by these and other
16 efforts, the College has consistently emphasized patient
17 safety and quality of care. Surgeons have a
18 responsibility to share as much information as possible
19 with their patients, and that includes information about
20 how many procedures they have performed, whatever data
21 may be available on the outcomes, infection rates, and
22 assessment of the risk and benefits to the individual
23 based on his or her particular situation. The lack of
24 information, and to some degree a lack of agreement on
25 what constitutes high-quality surgical care from both the

1 clinical and patient perspectives creates confusion. We
2 feel it is vital for clinicians and consumers to have an
3 open dialogue to determine the kind of information that
4 can truly be useful in informing consumer health care
5 choices.

6 The challenge for surgical patients can be
7 particularly difficult because many of them have little
8 opportunity to use such information or exercise choices.
9 So many procedures are performed on an urgent basis that
10 there is simply no time to provide patients with
11 comparative information so that they can actually use
12 this information to make their own assessments and
13 perhaps choose alternatives. Instead, they count on
14 their physicians to help them make informed decisions
15 based on their own unique circumstances. Consequently,
16 an even greater burden is placed on our profession to not
17 only define and measure quality but to develop the
18 systems and practices that can actually elevate the
19 quality of care generally.

20 The College takes its responsibility to share
21 information with patients very seriously. To that end,
22 the College has produced information that enables
23 patients to protect themselves from unfair, deceptive and
24 fraudulent practices. The College also publishes a wide
25 variety of tools designed to educate consumers about

1 quality and to enable them to make informed decisions
2 about their surgical care.

3 However, comprehensive and system-wide efforts
4 to measure and ultimately improve health care quality
5 have really just begun. As a result, the availability of
6 truly useful comparative information for consumers
7 remains limited. Nonetheless, quality improvement is a
8 founding principle of the College and will continue to
9 remain an essential part of our initiatives in the
10 future.

11 It is important to keep in mind that the
12 quality of the information is only as good as the tool,
13 the data that is used to populate it and the context in
14 which it is considered. Administrative data sets are
15 frequently used to populate most quality measures,
16 primarily because of their relatively low cost.

17 However, we believe these data are unsuitable
18 for use as a proxy for surgical quality because major
19 operations are billed under a 90-day global service
20 period that includes pre-, intra-, post-operative
21 services. All their components are not individually
22 documented and billed. As a result, there is no way to
23 conduct a meaningful assessment by administrative means.
24 Patients vary, as do the steps taken within the service
25 period to solve their problems, and billing codes simply

1 do not capture this information. Further, these data do
2 not give a clear sense of the outcome. They fail to
3 exhibit the cause, effect, and the likely changes that
4 need to be made to improve health care quality. Again,
5 because they are not sensitive to the differences in
6 patients, risk and complexity adjusted.

7 In addition, surgeons in the systems of which
8 they are a part are hard to separate. This makes it
9 difficult to develop meaningful surgeon-specific quality
10 data. Primary care lends itself more to adherence to
11 public health driven protocols that prevent and
12 ameliorate chronic disease. There are guidelines at work
13 to manage ischemic heart disease, high blood pressure,
14 diabetes, and other conditions.

15 On the other hand, surgical quality does not
16 lend itself as easily to process measures. We feel
17 strongly that the only appropriate way to measure the
18 quality of surgical care is truly risk-adjusted outcome
19 assessments reported before, during, and after the
20 procedure. Risk adjustment allows both the patient and
21 the health care system to know that the service rendered
22 was appropriate considering the state of the patient and
23 their disease.

24 Recently, private payers have started offering
25 incentives to improve quality. Bonuses based on measures

1 that are proxies for surgical quality at best are likely
2 to cause system gaming. They provide a perverse
3 incentive for provider groups to take on those procedures
4 and patients at less risk of adverse outcomes. High risk
5 procedures, on the other hand, will be left to a small
6 number of centers, many of which cannot clinically or
7 financially accommodate the demands that this high risk
8 patient mix puts on them.

9 To summarize, the impact of quality improvement
10 initiatives is increasing. The importance of
11 understanding the distinctions between primary care
12 services and surgery and the impact they have on the way
13 quality can be reported and measured cannot be
14 understated. Without risk adjustment of outcome
15 measures, there is no meaningful way to evaluate surgical
16 care. As payers move forward with incentive-based
17 quality improvement programs, surgeons will continue to
18 be faced with difficult practice management decisions.
19 Surgeons have a legitimate incentive to engage in
20 collective action to increase their bargaining power on
21 quality-related issues.

22 Clinical integration presents a number of
23 opportunities for surgeons to undertake quality
24 improvement initiatives. I will now detail opportunities
25 for surgeons to come together in a lawful manner to

1 achieve these objectives. The College suggests these
2 following five areas for quality improvement initiatives
3 for clinically-integrated groups. One, surgeon
4 competence. A program administered by the College's
5 Committee on Continuing Education helps surgeons stay
6 abreast of current practice standards. This program,
7 Surgical Education and Self-Assessment Program, SESAP,
8 provides the opportunity to test personal knowledge of
9 the current standards of surgical practice by reproducing
10 the diagnostic and treatment challenges faced in the
11 practice of surgery and to obtain immediate feedback for
12 self-improvement. Furthermore, one often overlooked
13 component of research and its competence is the ability
14 to effectively relate to patients and peers. The
15 College's task on professionalism seeks to
16 comprehensively address this issue across the continuum
17 of professional development. We aim to use contemporary
18 educational principles and state-of-the-art technology to
19 achieve optimal outcomes. The College strives to make a
20 number of tools available for surgeons to incorporate in
21 their practice.

22 Two, introduction of new surgical technology.
23 In addition to the generic issue of physician competence,
24 an important consequence of the continuing evolution of
25 health care technology is that surgeons are increasingly

1 finding it necessary to acquire new skills after
2 completion of their formal surgical residency program,
3 sometimes many years later. And this is occurring at an
4 accelerated pace. The College was founded initially for
5 the purpose of providing a forum for continuing education
6 for the surgeons of North America and, as a result, we
7 have established multiple programs to accomplish this
8 goal. Our Committee on Emerging Surgical Technology and
9 Education studies the implication of innovations in
10 surgical methods and technology, and develops policies to
11 promote appropriate training for surgeons and to protect
12 the welfare of the surgical patient. The College also
13 sponsors a wide variety of courses and educational
14 activities specifically including those aimed at ensuring
15 the safe and effective dissemination of new technologies.
16 Recently, these have included stereo-tactic biopsy of the
17 breast, diagnostic use of ultrasound, single node biopsy,
18 and management of breast tumors, et cetera.

19 Number three, best practices for common
20 surgical procedures. It has been repeatedly documented
21 that there are significant geographic and other
22 variations in the way patients are managed, even for
23 ultimately common ailments. In some cases, it is clear
24 that this variation is appropriate. In other cases,
25 however, it is less clear that the variations are

1 warranted. A study sponsored by Health Services Research
2 and Development Service of the VA found that centers with
3 the lowest risk-adjusted post-operative morbidity and
4 mortality rates made greater use of clinical pathways,
5 protocols, guidelines, if you will. In fact, these
6 centers tended to make pathway development a much higher
7 priority than did centers with poor surgical outcomes.

8 It is important to assess whether the use of
9 these critical pathways or guidelines improves outcome
10 for surgical patients. This could be tested for common
11 procedures performed by each of the major surgical
12 specialties. An obvious step would be to develop a
13 consensus for critical pathway management for such
14 procedures. The College is the obvious vehicle to
15 develop and disseminate best practices, practices which
16 could be utilized and incorporated in their quality
17 improvement initiatives.

18 Number four, addressing areas of error
19 avoidance in surgery. The College aims to enhance the
20 care of surgical patients, and actively promote quality
21 improvement through leading-edge educational programs and
22 products that effectively address the needs of practicing
23 surgeons, surgical residents, medical students, and
24 surgical patients in the public. We are committed to
25 supporting continuous professional development of

1 individuals, and to this end, the College offers skills-
2 oriented post-graduate courses, didactic post-graduate
3 courses, video-based education sessions, research paper
4 presentations, peer reviewed scientific exhibits and
5 technical exhibits. Furthermore, we intend to
6 comprehensively evaluate the impact of these educational
7 interventions on physicians' learning and behaviors and
8 patient outcomes through a process of continuous quality
9 improvement.

10 Number five, evidence-based surgery. Most of
11 what surgeons do is based on common practices, published
12 case studies, expert opinion, and is rarely tested in the
13 rigor of a controlled clinical trial. Support of
14 clinical trials in surgery should be strongly encouraged
15 and surgeons must be stimulated to require evidence and
16 to acquire comprehensive knowledge and skills before
17 adopting a technique into their practice.

18 The College recently established components
19 within its Division of Research in Optimal Patient Care
20 to improve the quality of surgical care by enabling all
21 surgeons to apply the best scientific evidence available
22 in all aspects of their daily practice. Its objectives
23 include the development of practice guidelines, encourage
24 application of practices of proven value, discourage
25 application of practices of no proven value, and applying

1 statistically rigorous validated risk-adjusted
2 measurement of outcomes.

3 In sum, the College believes that these five
4 areas for quality improvement initiatives can be an
5 important part of clinical integration. Physicians
6 should be able to rely on quality improvement measures as
7 a sign of significant clinical integration to justify a
8 rule of reason analysis when engaging in joint
9 contracting with payers. The College does maintain
10 serious concerns about the factual issues implicit in
11 measuring quality improvement before deciding whether per
12 se or rule of reason treatment is appropriate. These
13 five areas each represent acceptable quality initiatives
14 that surgeons can undertake as a part of clinical
15 integration. Quality improvement is an important aspect
16 of practice that has efficiency enhancing effects,
17 greatly outweighing their anti-competitive effects. The
18 College stresses the importance of practices
19 implementing, tracking, incorporating, and updating data
20 measures or standards of care suggested by their
21 professional societies, formulated in conjunction with
22 patient advocates and consumers at large. We continue to
23 encourage surgeons to include the consumer dimension in
24 their clinical discussions. The give-and-take of that
25 dialogue will help formulate what is best for the

1 patient's care in a truly collaborative way.

2 We are firmly committed to enhancing quality
3 improvement and patient safety as is evident from our
4 longstanding efforts. We appreciate this opportunity to
5 offer this discussion.

6 Thank you.

7 (Applause.)

8 MR. HYMAN: Thank you, Dr. McGinnis. I think
9 we will take a 10-minute break and then come back for two
10 additional sets of remarks, and then go directly into
11 moderated roundtable.

12 (A brief recess was taken.)

13 MR. HYMAN: Let's continue now so we can stay
14 on time. And our next speaker is Peggy O'Kane, from
15 NCQA.

16 MS. O'KANE: Thank you, David. I appreciate
17 being part of such a distinguished panel, and I
18 appreciate the thoughtful remarks about the complexity of
19 trying to drive a value agenda in health care. I am
20 going to start out, well, first of all, we are a private,
21 nonprofit health care quality oversight organization. We
22 measure and report on health care quality. Our mission
23 is to improve the quality of health care everywhere
24 through information. And you probably have seen the
25 reports we have done on health plan quality in our annual

1 State of Health Care Quality Report, which is usually
2 picked up very well by local media and so forth.

3 But I just want to emphasize here the urgency
4 of this agenda. And Dr. Kumpuris talked about the
5 urgency of thinking about access. And I agree with him
6 very much, but I think we really need to understand that
7 access and cost-effectiveness of the system are very
8 related concepts. If the system is out of control, there
9 will be less access because people will have less
10 insurance in the first place and less comprehensive
11 coverage. And we are seeing that very much happening.
12 So we very much need to use whatever tools there are.
13 And I think the tool of the market is a very powerful one
14 that we really haven't seen used to its full potential.
15 We clearly have a system where costs are out of control,
16 where quality is not what it should be, and we have a
17 potential for much greater return, both in terms of
18 improved health and in terms of greater cost-
19 effectiveness for the health care dollars that we are
20 spending.

21 Why the market needs help, and I learned this
22 in graduate school, but insurance creates a barrier
23 between the patient and the cost that makes it less
24 relevant to them. But I think what we are here to talk
25 about today is getting relevant information on quality

1 out there so that not only consumers can use it to drive
2 their choices but so their intermediaries and the people
3 who have fiduciary responsibility for helping them get
4 good health care can use the information to drive the
5 agenda.

6 I think the regulatory environment has actually
7 impeded the ability to drive competition in health care
8 and some of the legal environment. But we also
9 appreciate and are very humbled by the complexity of what
10 we are talking about here.

11 You have probably seen this chart somewhere
12 during these couple of days. This is actually a Mercer
13 survey of employer-sponsored health plan cost increases.
14 And I can tell you as a small employer of 180 employees,
15 our health care costs went up \$100,000 last year. That
16 is a lot of money. Our budget is \$25 million. And if
17 you think we can keep affording that year over year, we
18 can't. So the attention of the employer community, not
19 just the large employers, who by the way get a better
20 deal because they are big, is riveted on these costs.
21 And we feel great urgency to get the quality agenda
22 aligned with the cost agenda. And that is why we are
23 using the concept of value more and more.

24 Health insurance is changing. I think we are
25 seeing a lot of talk about consumer-directed plans. They

1 are very different in construct, but the bottom line is
2 there is a whole lot more costs being passed back to the
3 patient. And we know from Rand experiments and so forth,
4 that that will impact their use of services and not
5 necessarily in the way that we would like. So we want to
6 be sure that consumers are focusing on, "How much health
7 am I getting for my health care dollar?," not, "How much
8 am I spending?," as the only question.

9 So the urgent agenda is to promote transparency
10 of quality and cost to redesign benefit structures to
11 drive value. I want to emphasize that. We have heard
12 from Chris very thoughtfully about some of the barriers
13 to expecting consumers voting with their feet to drive a
14 value agenda as effectively as we would like. And we
15 need to learn more about that. But we also need to
16 understand that we have the potential for people to be
17 market-makers, health plans, employers, I will be talking
18 about some of that.

19 We need to educate the public about this. I
20 think we have been really very behind other countries
21 where they tend to have national health insurance and
22 where the public understands that not everything will be
23 paid for, not everything will be covered. There will be
24 trade-offs made. We have not really educated the public.
25 In fact, I think we have done the opposite in terms of

1 saying it is the insurance industry that is creating this
2 problem. There is a problem for everybody in that we
3 have a lot more potential things that we could pay for
4 than we have the money to do it.

5 I am -- disgusted I think is too strong a term
6 -- when I see these issues that are really about a common
7 problem that we face being turned into partisan issues.
8 This is an agenda for the American people. We need
9 unification of the parties. We need to forget our
10 ideologies. And we need to be very practical about how
11 we are going to move from the public sector to the
12 private sector. We know quality can be measured. We
13 talked about how this measurement and accountability
14 drive improvement, and consumers do want information.
15 And I think there was a comment about how, as much as we
16 have talked about this, there is really precious little
17 information out there right now for people to use.
18 Currently, the percent of the insured population for
19 which performance data are available at the plan level is
20 28 percent. So we have got a tow hold I think for
21 accountability for quality, but we have got a long way to
22 go.

23 It drives improvement. This is just showing
24 you trends among health plans in Beta blocker treatment.
25 I remember Steve Sumerei published a report in 1990

1 saying only 20 percent of the patients who should get
2 beta blockers after a heart attack in the Medicare
3 program were getting them. When we first started
4 reporting this at the plan level in '96, it was 69
5 percent. It is now about 90 percent. And we believe
6 this public reporting has played an important role in
7 riveting the attention of plans and providers on getting
8 these numbers up.

9 Also, those who publicly report do better than
10 those who don't publicly report, although it is kind of
11 maybe about like if you got a good report card, you are
12 more eager to show it to your parents. But there is no
13 question that having the numbers out there, no matter
14 what happens with the consumer end of it, does raise the
15 conversation among providers about why aren't we doing as
16 well as we thought we were.

17 We get real ROI by improving care in chronic
18 illnesses. I will talk more about that and about some of
19 the creative ways in which employers are trying to share
20 that return on investment with physicians who are doing a
21 good job with these kinds of things.

22 But I think we focused on under-use, NCQA has,
23 because of looking at managed care plans, but there is a
24 lot of waste in the system that we need to go after as
25 well in terms of overuse and misuse. Some examples, and

1 we have two new HETAS measures that are focused on
2 overuse, overuse of antibiotics. So there are two new
3 measures focusing on appropriate treatment of children
4 with colds who should not be given an antibiotic within
5 the first three days. And children with sore throats, no
6 antibiotic without a strep test. This is an area which
7 has huge public ramifications, as well as cost
8 ramifications. There are plenty of other opportunities,
9 inappropriate use of imaging, unnecessary use of surgery,
10 use of generic drugs when they are available and
11 therapeutically equivalent and so forth.

12 Misuse I think is much more challenging. How
13 do you go after the costs, let alone the human suffering
14 cost? But there is real money going down the drain
15 because of medical errors, hospital-acquired infections,
16 poorly executed care. The human suffering angle of this,
17 and I move this really to the top of the agenda, but the
18 technical challenges of this are sobering. But we will
19 be really trying to develop an agenda around this as
20 well.

21 This is basically just to show you about the
22 drop in potential I think that we get when care, the
23 potential of evidence-based medicine, which is not
24 everything that happens in medical practice, up on the
25 left, is when we fail to apply the knowledge that we know

1 improves health, we get one drop. When we fail to
2 execute appropriately or when patients don't comply for
3 whatever reason, we get another drop. So the actual bang
4 for the buck that you see from the evidence-based
5 medicine box up in the left-hand corner is really --
6 there is a lot lost along the way. By the use of
7 guidelines systems, including information systems and
8 EMRs and patient support, which is another evolving area
9 of knowledge, we can get a much better return from what
10 we know in the investment that we have made in medical
11 research. So I sort of think of NCQA's job as getting
12 more health for the investment that we make.

13 I wanted to talk a little bit about some of the
14 physician initiatives that we are working on. We have
15 three physician recognition programs. One is currently
16 out and live with 1,800 physicians recognized and that is
17 our diabetes physician recognition program. We partner
18 with the American Diabetes Association there, and it is
19 amazing to me that 1,800 physicians stepped up to the
20 plate with absolutely no incentive to do it. We have a
21 new program coming out together in partnership with the
22 American Heart Association and American Stroke
23 Association focused on patients with ischemic heart
24 disease and focusing on secondary prevention of stroke
25 and heart attacks.

1 And a third one that really takes a lot of the
2 quality chasms systems, turns that into something that a
3 physician can have in their office, and then allows the
4 physician to self-evaluate. These are all self-
5 evaluation programs with an audit for a sample. And it
6 is kind of where we are.

7 But I want to say that I think there really
8 needs to be some energy and an engine behind these kinds
9 of initiatives. Doctors are busy people. It takes a lot
10 of extra work to do these things, going in and reviewing
11 your charts, setting up these systems. So benefit design
12 is something that we want to make sure that the FTC is
13 working vigorously to defend as an engine for this.

14 So let's pay for quality. Where somebody is
15 doing a good job, let's recognize that. Let's enable
16 plans to tier networks and payers to tier networks.
17 Let's incentivize use of high-quality providers and also
18 let's work on the patient to promote their own self care
19 because physicians know that their responsibility only
20 goes so far and their ability to create high quality only
21 goes so far.

22 This is a program we are very excited about.
23 This was really catalyzed by General Electric. And it
24 includes different employer partners in the three pilot
25 cities of Louisville, Cincinnati, and Boston. We are

1 basically taking these provider recognition programs that
2 I just told you about, and the doctors that get
3 recognized are being recognized in a gain-sharing model
4 where they will get, for example, in the diabetes
5 program, for each diabetic patient that is an employee of
6 the participating employers, the doctor will get an extra
7 \$100 a year. That translates to \$1,000 to \$2,000 for the
8 average solo practitioner. There is one group where
9 there could be up to \$100,000 of gain. And it is a gain-
10 sharing model that was developed by Hewitt, the actuaries
11 at Hewitt. They basically looked at the return on
12 investment in terms of prevented hospital days, prevented
13 emergency room visits, actually prevented primary care
14 visits that would be avoided by this better adherence to
15 the guidelines, and they estimate the cost at \$350 per
16 patient per year.

17 And GE is now turning around, taking \$175 of
18 that money, giving \$100 to the doctor, and \$75 to the
19 patient that will go to a recognized physician and that
20 will also self-manage on a web-based tool their own
21 health indicators. So it is a very thoughtfully crafted
22 program that recognizes that these gains could be
23 appropriately shared and that may be a way to drive the
24 agenda forward in a real win, win, win for the employer,
25 the physician, and the patient.

1 I won't go into -- I think Chris raised a lot
2 of the issues. We do report to consumers in a way -- we
3 have done a lot of focus group work with consumers and
4 they told us, "We don't want to hear about these HETAS
5 measures. We didn't get a Ph.D., but we are interested
6 in hearing about how this plan helps me stay healthy, how
7 well they take care of people with chronic illness and so
8 forth."

9 So what do we need to do? We need to create
10 and drive a value agenda. I think we need to identify
11 value providers and drive market share to them. We need
12 to educate the consumers. They need to understand what
13 we are talking about and why this is in their interest.
14 And we need to create a regulatory framework that permits
15 value-based competition. And it is very hard I think in
16 the quality world to find examples where we really get
17 alignment, but I think it behooves all of us that play in
18 this world to get our act together and to work together
19 to drive this agenda and not neutralize each other.

20 So the government, as payers and regulators,
21 has a huge leveraging role and enabling role here.
22 Private payers, include health plans and self-insured
23 employers, really they should not be thought of as
24 separate. I think there is a common agenda. And
25 consumer organizations who I think have really not been

1 mobilized as they need to be in understanding their
2 interest in driving this agenda. So I think we are
3 talking about a tall order here and a lot of emotional
4 intelligence, but I am confident that this is so
5 important that we are going to have some real progress
6 here.

7 Thank you very much.

8 (Applause.)

9 MR. HYMAN: Okay, finally is Dr. Tuckson.

10 DR. TUCKSON: I liked that last part, the
11 emotional intelligence part, that was very good.

12 First of all, who we are, just so you get a
13 sense. We view these issues as a very large and complex
14 health and wellness company of which we are, I guess,
15 right now the largest traditional what you would call a
16 health care plan, United Healthcare. Our Uniprize
17 company provides health care services to corporations,
18 the large Fortune 200 and 300 and 100 companies. We also
19 are a company providing health care to seniors. We are
20 heavily associated with the AARP and those kinds of
21 things and health care to nursing homes and frail elderly
22 persons. Specialized Care Services is a variety of
23 companies that do everything from vision and dental,
24 chiropractic alternative medicine and a variety of such
25 things. Then finally we are a very large data and

1 information company. So we view these issues from the
2 point of view of an organization that touches more than
3 40 million lives, coordinating care for 17 million
4 people. We are involved in a daily way with 400,000
5 physicians and 4,000 health care institutions. So we do
6 appreciate this issue.

7 We view this very much as others have, from the
8 point of view of the quality chasm. And I appreciate
9 Peggy's comment on the urgency. Change has to occur.
10 The system needs to fundamentally change, as the IOM has
11 called for. These three reports we see are key. We, and
12 I am particularly pleased to be leading the Crossing the
13 Quality Chasm Summit process, which will start its work
14 officially on Monday. And so we are excited by the IOM
15 recommendations and view them.

16 I think this point about the relationship
17 between quality and access is absolutely fundamental.
18 This \$1.4 trillion system that is growing at \$100 billion
19 a year in contra-relationship with the fact that there is
20 41 million people without health insurance absolutely
21 means that we have got to provide information for
22 everyone to be able to make intelligent, cost-effective
23 decisions. Squandering resources is absolutely the death
24 knell to access. And these two pressures, the pressures
25 on employers around the increasing costs that is lifting

1 them off of the bottom line and the fact that we waste
2 resources so terribly, leading to more and more people
3 not getting access to anything, is an absolutely defining
4 paradigm in our mind.

5 We know this agenda is moving forward. We have
6 already heard about the ARS Human Report which is getting
7 people's attention. But also we see again even in
8 excellent institutions, wonderful places like the
9 hospital down South that had trouble with the transplant
10 recently, even in the best of institutions, people see
11 that there are issues and that is causing great
12 attention.

13 In the marketplace, employers or the people
14 that are paying for care are very, very clear, "What are
15 we paying for? What is the value equation?" They see
16 the variation. They see the quality and safety issues.
17 And they are saying to people, to companies like ours,
18 health plans, we need your help because we also are
19 worried who is going to pay the bill for what is
20 increasingly becoming more expensive. And, as we have
21 heard already, the shifting of cost and payment to
22 employees means that they have to have information around
23 how to make those kinds of choices.

24 We believe that the strategy for quality was
25 correctly laid out in the IOM Quality Chasm Report. I

1 won't take time to read all of them, but clearly the six
2 aims for improvement are the right ones. The 10 rules to
3 guide the redesign of care, I would emphasize the point
4 of not only continuous healing relationships and
5 evidence-based decisions, but the patient as a source of
6 control, shared knowledge, and we have heard this
7 important word, "transparency" I think is key. The key
8 to all of this they describe, and what has to occur, is
9 investing in information technology, which will allow us
10 to have the information, share that information in an
11 actionable way to lead us to improving quality.

12 This information is I think best described as
13 the IOM observation that physicians, hospitals, and
14 health care organizations operate as silos, providing
15 care without the benefit of complete information. A
16 company like ours is able to take massive amounts of
17 information, prescription drug, laboratory, all of our
18 claims data, almost seven terra bytes now of information
19 that is housed in a data warehouse, which then is
20 augmented by a variety of other information that is in a
21 daily interaction between consumers/patients and other
22 interactions that gives us even more, and then applying a
23 set of analytic components, regression models, analytic
24 issues, interpretive analysis leading to applications
25 that allow us to be able to provide this information in

1 actionable ways.

2 The observation, though, and one of the key
3 things is that health care now is operated in silos. We
4 do not have the ability to share information effectively
5 across systems. And so if there was one thing that I
6 would urge attentiveness to or the coming bills or the
7 coming initiatives around sharing information freely and
8 easily, we have got to break down these silos so that
9 every component of the system can have access to the
10 necessary information that allows quality to then result.
11 If we keep this siloization and these barriers, we are
12 not going to reach the health care system that we want.
13 And so it is always amazing that you can go to the ATM
14 machine, regardless of your bank, and pull out your money
15 but you go to try to do this across the health care
16 system and you can't. It doesn't make sense why this
17 would work for your money but not for something more
18 important than money called your life.

19 The third observation that the IOM report makes
20 is that the system falls short in translating knowledge
21 into practice. And the care depends upon the clinical
22 decision-making capacity of autonomous individual
23 practitioners for problems often beyond unaided human
24 cognition. Doctors are very smart. It is though
25 unfortunately very difficult for them to keep up

1 individually with everything that is happening. The
2 20,000 new journals -- 20,000 journals are now available
3 in the system, 17,000 new books a year, 6,000,000
4 references, 400,000 new entries, you have the new
5 genetics now bound to new diagnostics for genetics, the
6 new drugs, the new imaging stuff, and now you can swallow
7 a pill and do a radiological procedure. It goes on and
8 on in terms of the amount of information.

9 Jack Windburg in his work though shows us that
10 as all of this information pours into the system, the
11 variation in care is very great. This is not just some
12 variation around surgical procedures. You can pick
13 whatever area you want. But at the end of the day we see
14 enormous variation. I respect the point from Dr.
15 McGinnis he makes in terms that some of this variation is
16 appropriate. But we also are aware that so much of it is
17 not appropriate. And what is even more important in
18 today's environment is that this reality of inappropriate
19 variation is known. It is not a secret. It is shared
20 widely.

21 And so we think that what is essential is to
22 provide information to clinicians that is evidence-based,
23 the best evidence. And we are particularly pleased about
24 being able to provide to almost every practicing
25 clinician in America twice a year a copy of the

1 definitive guide of what works and what doesn't work
2 based on the best evidence available in the world to
3 physicians. And we do make that available along with
4 workshops and putting this information at the point of
5 care delivery.

6 The challenge is taking that information that
7 is in books or taking information that is in paper or in
8 charts and making that available for the cognitive
9 decisions of physicians in real time. And so that means
10 the Internet is going to be particularly important. We
11 are urging that anything that can be done to improve and
12 increase the use of the Internet by clinicians is going
13 to be essential. We now make most of our business
14 transactions on the Internet. And we have 300,000
15 physicians, we are encouraged to report, who are now
16 registered for our Internet portal, and a 30,000,000
17 transaction per year run rate. This is just over the
18 last two years of having introduced this new technology
19 and device.

20 What is now our key is to translate and
21 integrate all of that with data. And so now we have on-
22 site best treatments, which is an Internet version of the
23 clinical evidence work from the BMJ, providing again
24 actionable information from the best possible sources,
25 and we also provide this same instrument to patients on

1 our consumer website so that physicians and patients
2 together will have access to the best information. We
3 are encouraged by the letters we get from physicians who
4 thank us for providing clinical evidence to them because
5 they share it with their patients to try to disabuse them
6 of some of the overuse that Peggy O'Kane talked about,
7 particularly in the area of antibiotics and viral
8 illness.

9 So now what we move towards then is providing
10 online, and I talked about those data assets, combining
11 the information around how clinicians are actually
12 practicing by organizing medical pharmacy and laboratory
13 data into performance profiles and matching those against
14 nationally-accepted physician-derived, evidence-based
15 best practices. For us, as a company, we believe that
16 any analysis of physician performance must be led and
17 informed by the profession itself, that there is no one
18 qualified to tell physicians how to practice other than
19 physicians. And so we now put online that performance
20 profile on a series of important metrics of clinical
21 behavior and we will have given an individual physician
22 that information. So we are able to take this
23 information that we have from our databases, provide
24 rules that are defined by professional societies and
25 evidence-based information, putting certain priorities on

1 them, such as safety and so forth, and then reporting
2 those back.

3 Here is the challenge. The challenge is that
4 we are in this wonderful moment where a lot of attention
5 is being directed towards this. So CMS is about to come
6 out with their physician performance measures. The
7 Bridges to Excellence we just heard about. The IOM has
8 its guidance. NCQA has been leading this for years now.
9 NQF has its performance measures that it is moving
10 forward with. The Leapfrog Group is moving from
11 hospitals to performance measurement. And at the base of
12 all of this for us is the essential organization, the
13 AMA's Physician Consortium for Performance Improvement.
14 Lots of people are in the drama.

15 The concern we have now is how do we get to an
16 industry standard so that physicians don't get whip-sawed
17 by multiple competing measures of what they do. This
18 will lead to waste, confusion, and frustration for the
19 practicing clinician. And so what we are calling for,
20 and will hope that we can help facilitate, is to get us
21 to the right set of measures that everybody can buy in on
22 that then will give physicians a coherent and logical way
23 of proceeding. And that is what we hope.

24 We heard that in fact we can see improvement
25 when you do this. Physicians want to do the right thing.

1 And we have learned that if you give them the right
2 information, they will do that. We now have taken on a
3 new addition to giving physicians' performance, and that
4 is to provide them opportunities for continuing medical
5 education credits for interacting with this data and for
6 doing this kind of work. Giving a real tangible
7 incentive for doing the right thing and interacting with
8 their actual clinical performance. And so we have moved
9 forward to make that available as well.

10 We do think the Bridges to Excellence Program
11 is an excellent way of going forward. And we participate
12 in this Bridges to Excellence Program. We did not enjoy
13 the way the Wall Street Journal reported this initiative,
14 "A New Way to Get Doctors to Take Better Care of
15 Patients, Bribe Them." That is just wrong-headed. And I
16 put that there because it is wrong-headed. We think that
17 there ought to be a way to look at learning around
18 aligning incentives. And we are going to study with the
19 leaders of this effort carefully how do you do this and
20 how do you do it right because we think this in fact may
21 have great promise.

22 The other thing that we think is also essential
23 about having online information is you get a new article
24 out about breaking information, let's say in terms of the
25 effect of low-dose warfarin anti-coagulation therapy,

1 that may be very important for some patients and
2 physicians. How many physicians actually know how many
3 of their patients are actually on these drugs? It is
4 very difficult for many physicians in their offices to be
5 able to pull that up. We can make that available
6 instantly to them and give them a record and say, "Dear
7 Physician, here are the people that we know in your
8 practice that are on these drugs. You may want to
9 consider this new information as you make your clinical
10 decisions."

11 The safety issues we think are important have
12 been alluded to. Unless your hospital is in the U.S.
13 News & World Reports, this is not science and this is not
14 great. And it is just basically nonsense. We have to
15 give much better than that. We think that the Leapfrog
16 effort is important, and we are big supporters of the
17 Leapfrog effort as it goes forward. As it goes forward,
18 it has got to get even better. Volume, for example, one
19 of the criteria for Leapfrog isn't always a useful
20 measure. There is one major hospital that has been in
21 the news -- system that has been in the news lately.
22 They did real great on volume. They referred lots of
23 people for surgery except the problem was that hardly any
24 of them needed the surgery. So we know volume is going
25 to be important.

1 And so this point that has been alluded to
2 around centers of excellence and tiering is essential.
3 You have got to be able, and it would be a tragedy if
4 anybody was to slow down the movement of identifying
5 centers of excellence and then being able to basically on
6 really good criteria and increasing intensity of centers
7 of excellence, you want to have broad networks. People
8 want to be able to go to the hospital in their community.
9 So you need to have that. But for specialized things,
10 where you are not doing that many of them, you want to
11 have better criteria. And for really rare things,
12 transplants or congenital heart surgery or doing Whipple
13 procedures for certain kinds of cancer of the pancreas,
14 you really want to have the really best places and you
15 want to have criteria that make sense. And then you want
16 to be able to reward those hospitals that are the best at
17 being able to do those things.

18 Even when we disagree with folks in the health
19 care marketplace, we are able to work together. We have
20 worked with VHA around patient safety to send to every
21 hospital administrator in this country a copy of clinical
22 evidence, and to explain to them what and how they could
23 create a culture of evidence-based clinical practice that
24 promoted safety and evidence-based decision-making in
25 their hospitals. And the reaction to that has been just

1 tremendous.

2 The last point I wanted to make is this idea of
3 then making all this available for patient's decision-
4 making. People who have chronic illness need a lot of
5 different services. And most people with chronic illness
6 have more than one chronic illness now. And they require
7 not only medical intervention but non-medical
8 intervention, whether it is Meals on Wheels or a home
9 health aide to transfer you from bed to chair, mobile
10 vans to get you to your clinic visit and those sorts of
11 things. And so how we are able to coordinate care for
12 people who need multiple interventions is exceedingly
13 important. And, again, evidence and data that allows
14 trained people to predict who is at need and at high
15 risk, getting them to the right care arrangements, and
16 coordinating their care is going to be extremely
17 important. This is also important, to provide consumers
18 and patients with information so they can make good
19 decisions.

20 Everybody wants everything. The circle there
21 is the budgets for each of the largest and most marketed
22 consumer prescription drugs, every one of those is bigger
23 than the advertising budgets for companies like Dell,
24 Campbell Soup, Nike tennis shoes. It is an enormous
25 amount of effort that goes in to trying to convince

1 people to do things. And so what we have been able to
2 do, and think it is important, is to provide information
3 that is integrated.

4 I really like the point that Christine and
5 others from AHRQ made about how important it is to
6 integrate this data so that if a person goes on to our
7 site, consumer site, for their transaction information,
8 what they also will be able to do is to go in and learn a
9 great deal about their disease from evidence-based
10 information, about the cost of treating their disease,
11 down to five digits of their six-digit zip code. So in
12 their city what does it cost to get such and such a thing
13 done, to provide information about the hospitals that do
14 this work, how do you in terms of picking the best
15 hospital for what they want and increasingly and soon we
16 will be providing information around physicians. It will
17 probably be from our perspective on this information
18 around patient satisfaction criteria, along the line that
19 we heard earlier. We don't think this field is good
20 enough yet to provide information about the quality of
21 the individual physician. That information is probably
22 not yet ready or not appropriate, but we are going to be
23 continuing to watch carefully what happens out of the AMA
24 and its consortium as it moves its field forward, and we
25 will see where we go there. But, clearly, transparency

1 of information is the key and we've got to keep working
2 at getting that done.

3 And, finally, at the end of the day, even after
4 patients and consumers will look at this information,
5 they are still going to need help. Many people are going
6 to have trouble trying to interpret all of this. And so
7 we are able to provide 24 hours a day, seven days a week
8 people on the phone or on the computer who are able to
9 have a chat, to be able to say let's go through this
10 information with you and help you to actionable decision-
11 making based on the best information, the best science,
12 based on the interpretation of the data and also with
13 things to do with performance assessment.

14 So at the end of the day, we think that one of
15 the things that the marketplace is doing well, and has to
16 have the ability to continue to do, is to have access to
17 this data that allows you to have seamless care
18 coordination across settings, connecting multiple
19 physicians, having them have access to the best evidence
20 at the point of care, having supportive care to provide
21 better safe care in hospital environments, connecting
22 patients across hospitals, nursing homes, physician
23 offices, and community and social support settings, and
24 then finally sharing knowledge of information to patients
25 for actionable decision-making. And I think that we are

1 moving forward on that, and we would urge whatever can be
2 done to not put barriers in the way of the continuing
3 evolution of these movements.

4 Thank you.

5 (Applause.)

6 MR. HYMAN: Thank you, Dr. Tuckson. I would
7 now like to ask all the speakers to come up and have a
8 seat at the table, and we can have a moderated roundtable
9 on these subjects.

10 Okay, well, I sort of carefully laid out the
11 order of the panel so we had the government perspective
12 first, followed by the provider perspective and payers at
13 the back-end. And so a slight exaggeration. Peggy is
14 not really a payer.

15 MS. O'KANE: I am not a payer.

16 MR. HYMAN: Fair enough. And our usual
17 practice is to ask the people who went at the outset
18 whether they had reactions or responses that they would
19 like to make to subsequent speakers because the later
20 speakers always have the advantage when they make their
21 remarks of having heard what has gone first. So I will
22 just start with that and then depending on where that
23 goes, I have a number of other questions that I wanted to
24 have people to discuss. Unfortunately, both Dr. Milstein
25 and Dr. Kumpuris had to leave, but I am sure that won't

1 interfere with our ability to have a great roundtable.
2 So let me start with Chuck. Do you have anything you
3 would like to add?

4 MR. DARBY: I guess I was encouraged by the
5 fact that the patient was brought up a number of times,
6 patient-centered care is at the core of this. The
7 measurement aspect was mostly about clinical kinds of
8 measures, and I think that in some ways I think we are
9 further along in measuring the patient's assessment of
10 their care than we are in some of the clinical measures.
11 But I find it encouraging that we keep coming back to the
12 patient as at the center of this. And not only as the
13 client but also as someone who can bring about change.

14 MR. HYMAN: Chris?

15 MS. CROFTON: I was impressed by the fact that
16 there are these common themes through all the remarks
17 that people made, certainly about patient-centered care.
18 And I think also about involving all of the players at
19 critical points in the process of change. I think that
20 the only way we can move forward is together, and there
21 is clear evidence that we really need to, as somebody's
22 slide said, not just try harder but change things, change
23 the system.

24 MR. HYMAN: Dr. Bondurant?

25 DR. BONDURANT: I was going to make the same

1 point about involving all of the players in this
2 consideration. And I was especially interested in the
3 involvement of the patient's perspective in some of those
4 evaluations. But it seems to me that one of the things
5 that continues to bug the quality assessment is the
6 capacity to estimate risk accurately and to stratify for
7 risks, as Dr. McGinnis was pointing out in his comments.
8 The technology of risk stratification, to my knowledge at
9 least, hasn't yet reached the point that allows as
10 precise an estimate of the meaning of outcome differences
11 as one would like to have in order to use outcome
12 estimates most efficiently. And I would be interested in
13 more discussion of that point.

14 MR. HYMAN: Dr. McGinnis?

15 DR. MCGINNIS: It is good to see the continued
16 emphasis, and I see it everywhere, on patient-centering.
17 And I think as long as we keep the patient at the center,
18 we rarely go wrong. But we do deviate from time to time
19 because of individual group interests.

20 Another thing that came through to me, and I
21 have been concerned about this for some time, is there is
22 so much silo activity. There is a lot going on in
23 quality and a lot of different silos, but how do we
24 interrelate this?

25 The other thing that I think we all need to be

1 concerned about is when we talk about quality, the driver
2 must be quality data. How do we get quality data? The
3 College had a meeting a few weeks ago, we are an umbrella
4 of all the surgical specialties, we brought all the
5 groups together and we had a great discussion from many
6 quarters about the quality issue, a lot of input.

7 But the thing that kept ringing in my mind
8 after that meeting is Janet Kerrigan from IOM who, in
9 response to a question about data, used the analogy of
10 post-World War II when the government evolved the
11 National Highway system that is a model for the world.
12 Is it time now, possibly with the government as the
13 leader, to evolve a national real-time electronic data
14 collection system so we don't have to keep getting these
15 pieces here and there. She made the statement and then
16 Barbara Paul from CMS backed it up, that this is where we
17 need to be going. I would certainly be supportive of
18 that sort of a movement. We need good data that everyone
19 can respond to as accurate data and not tear apart.

20 MS. O'KANE: I don't really have anything to
21 add at the moment.

22 DR. TUCKSON: I just would applaud this work of
23 not only the physician performance assessment I talked
24 about, but what the College of Surgeons is doing, that
25 risk adjustment stuff. And I would just sort of say to

1 you that I have seen that pretty carefully, and I have
2 had a chance to study it. It is impressive. And I think
3 what we have to do is to find ways of helping them to
4 move that faster because, while at the same time that
5 they recognize, and they are very good at pointing out,
6 the challenges that their data bring us, the world can't
7 stop and wait. And it is not going to stop and wait.

8 And so that what you have got to do is to try
9 to help provide the resources for these good people to do
10 their professional job in a way they are doing it. And I
11 think that is really where the issue is.

12 MR. HYMAN: Okay, consistent with I think all
13 of those remarks, let me start with what seems to me in
14 some ways chicken and egg problems. That is to say, who
15 you identify as the provider? The level at which you are
16 going to aggregate to collect data is going to influence
17 what data you collect and the extent to which anyone, and
18 who those "anyones" will be, will be interested in the
19 data and the use they will be able to make of it. And,
20 conversely, who you identify as the recipient of the
21 information is going to influence how you collect the
22 data, who you are interested in getting the data from,
23 and what that data is going to look like So let me just
24 be very concrete here -- if you think the focus is
25 individual patients, the data collection is going to look

1 rather different than if you think the focus is CMS or
2 individual employers or employer coalitions. And
3 flipping it over on the other side, if you are interested
4 in collecting data at the level of physician groups, you
5 follow a different strategy than individual physicians or
6 state-wide or hospital referral regions, depending on the
7 level of aggregation. So, "Who is the patient?," or,
8 "Who is the customer?," and, "Who is the provider?," I
9 think is the starting place for this question.

10 MS. O'KANE: I think what you want is a
11 strategy that informs multiple audiences. I think we
12 shouldn't set up a false choice between the things that
13 might be top of mind for patients and the things that if
14 you actually explain to them what the implications of the
15 information are. In our focus groups, patients really
16 respect the need for experts to look at whether the right
17 thing is happening and is it happening the right way. So
18 they see that. I am a consumer of airlines. I don't
19 want to know how they maintain their safety systems, but
20 I do want to know that they are really doing it and the
21 experts agree that it is happening the right way. So I
22 think that one is a lot easier.

23 And I think there the challenge is to take the
24 patient-centered information, the technical information,
25 and other things that patients need to know about and

1 translate that into something that means something to
2 them or to use it in a way that makes them safe. I don't
3 discount the use of this information for regulatory
4 purposes either.

5 So I think we just need to be very strategic
6 about making sure we are collecting no more information
7 than we need, but we should definitely not be setting up
8 these false choices. I think there really is common
9 interest in having the right thing happen and having it
10 happen in a patient-centered way.

11 MR. HYMAN: I wasn't, just so we are clear,
12 trying to set up a choice, let alone a false choice. But
13 to suggest the range of possibilities and what you target
14 influences what you get. So Dr. Tuckson?

15 DR. TUCKSON: I just think that Peggy is right
16 on track here. And I think that the challenge then
17 becomes -- because, first of all, all of these things are
18 integrated. If you think about the data that you need
19 regarding a center of excellence or a tier, in terms of
20 the best kinds of facilities for a particular condition,
21 that will be interrelated with, in some ways, what the
22 individual clinicians do at that level. So you will have
23 some individual clinician issues. You will have a
24 facility issue and so forth.

25 And so I think one of the real things that we

1 have to focus on is, as Peggy just expanded on, she said,
2 "Make sure we don't collect too much. Collect the right
3 things." And the other thing is let's collect it once.
4 Let's have all of the data that we need, so let's find a
5 way to have all these things line up because the last
6 thing you want to do is, let's say, have a physician have
7 to collect stuff at the office level, then you go to the
8 hospital, they have got to collect something and it is
9 different and so forth and so on. You waste a lot of
10 time and energy. So I think if we can start to put that
11 together.

12 Finally, the real thing is you have got to
13 start somewhere. And we are having enough trouble, but I
14 think encouragingly we are getting somewhere today with
15 the caveats we have heard. But now you start thinking
16 about that comprehensively ill person who requires
17 multiple interventions across clinicians, across health
18 settings. The unit of measurement that is going to be
19 relevant for that person will be very individual compared
20 to another person in the system. And so the unit of
21 measure may include a physical therapy, occupational
22 therapy, home health aide experience along with an in-
23 patient ICU and so forth. And you can just make up such
24 multiple permutations for many other patients.

25 And so at the end of the day you are going to

1 need to eventually get there. We are a long way from
2 that now, but I think of this idea of a common data
3 highway and collecting intelligently and getting to some
4 kind of metrics that allow us to build what we want for
5 the future, then we can sort of address those as we get
6 more mature and sophisticated.

7 MS. CROFTON: I think that is a really
8 important area and a very sticky set of problems because
9 the kinds of data you might want for one purpose aren't
10 necessarily the kinds of data you might use for another.
11 An example from the CAHPS project is when we started
12 developing the surveys, we had the clear focus in mind of
13 using the information for consumer choice. This is
14 information we would give back to consumers so they could
15 use it to select a health plan and as we have gone down
16 the road to select a provider, a hospital or whatever
17 else.

18 But if you want to collect information that
19 will allow a person to compare across a lot of different
20 health plans, hospitals, or whatever, the questions have
21 to be somewhat general. That isn't the case if you want
22 to use the information for quality improvement. The
23 information you get from people has to be a lot more fine
24 grain to tell you where the problem is, what specifically
25 is going on, and what you need to do about it.

1 So given that there is this dilemma of these
2 competing needs and how it affects the questions you ask
3 and the information that you put out, I think we need to
4 have some kind of grand conversation with representatives
5 from all the groups that might want to use the
6 information, to talk about what we are collecting when.
7 And I think also to develop good lines of logic for why
8 we are doing that because I think that people are more
9 likely to complete a longer survey or to be surveyed
10 about what they see as the same topic if they understand
11 that it is not just sloppy management but that there is a
12 real reason for going after different pieces of data in
13 different ways at different times.

14 So I think, again, we need to pull the
15 stakeholders together and have a conversation about that
16 and see what we all agree is the most effective way to go
17 about it and the most efficient way to go about it in
18 terms of cost and burden.

19 MR. HYMAN: Chuck?

20 MR. DARBY: Related to that, there are major
21 challenges in doing surveys of patients and this idea of
22 what level you are going to do it at. And I talked a
23 little bit about it on my slide, being able to collect
24 data about health plans, about groups, and about
25 individual providers. If you could possibly do that at

1 the same time rather than with duplicative surveys, you
2 have reduced burden and you have reduced cost. But it is
3 a challenge because in each market in the United States
4 there is a little bit different structure in terms of
5 groups and how they relate to plans. The simple issue of
6 drawing a sample of patients -- do you draw it at the
7 individual provider level and then roll the data up to
8 groups and plans or do you draw a sample of plans and
9 then try to break it down to the various providers? That
10 differs depending on what part of the country that you
11 are in.

12 DR. MCGINNIS: I have another shot at this data
13 issue because I think it is so important. We keep trying
14 to fix the system based on the history of the way we have
15 been collecting data. And most of our data has been
16 collected retrospectively or we collect it piecemeal or
17 we collect it for certain purposes, payers, insurers, all
18 interested in different pieces of the data. But what I
19 am trying to get us to think about is a new vision, an
20 over-arching vision of the importance of data in health
21 care. And if we could -- we are the marvel -- this
22 nation is revered the world over because of the way we
23 handle data electronically. If we could move to this
24 where, in treating patients, that data was collected on a
25 real time basis electronically, we would have the

1 capacity to analyze this for use by all of the different
2 groups. Everybody has a different need for the data.

3 But I think we do need to put this think tank
4 together. But to think in a global visionary manner.
5 The opportunity is here, and I hate to see us continue to
6 go down the pathways that we have in the past. We spend
7 a lot of money on data collection, but does it serve us
8 well?

9 MS. O'KANE: I just wanted to go to the second
10 part of your question, which is, "What is the right level
11 to be looking on the provider side?" And I think, in my
12 mind ideally, you would have an accountable clinical
13 entity of some kind. On the hospital side, it seems to
14 me, it should be the hospital. On the outpatient side,
15 it could be a medical group, but we know there aren't
16 that many medical groups out there. It is not a good
17 approach for the whole country.

18 But I think that there would be, this would
19 take some work and some heavy lifting policy-wise, but
20 physicians could be asked to affiliate with an entity
21 like this, and using IT you can create the connections
22 that allow for the kind of communication and coordination
23 that we know is absolutely crucial. I mean the questions
24 about, I forgot whose slide it was, "Who is accountable
25 when there are five doctors involved?" Well, nobody

1 really is.

2 So I think that there are some different ways
3 of thinking about what is the entity because we are not
4 going to get the kind of coordination or efficiency that
5 we really could get until we have this kind of
6 aggregation.

7 But that is a longer term agenda. And I think
8 too often in the world of policy we get hung up on the
9 longer term questions, and we don't move forward on the
10 shorter term questions, which actually help us think
11 about the longer ones better. So I would just like us to
12 think about moving forward rapidly on things that we know
13 we can do that aren't going to do harm, but also keeping
14 the other one on a parallel track.

15 DR. TUCKSON: And as regards to the second
16 point, clearly, we do need to be able to report about the
17 behavior of individual clinicians, just as we report
18 about individual facilities and hospitals and renal
19 dialysis centers and nursing homes and so forth. The
20 issue is how sophisticated can you be today? I think we
21 all are clear, and we have at least resisted the need, or
22 the desire, or the call, to put individual performance
23 data that we now have available on our consumer website
24 for patients to see. As I said in my remarks, I don't
25 think it is ready for that. We don't think it is

1 statistically valid and so forth.

2 However, there have to be some intermediary
3 steps. And I think, for example, the Bridges to
4 Excellence idea and the NCQA certification for diabetes
5 and the new measures that they will have coming forward
6 in terms of certifying that a clinician has kept faith
7 with a process, with the guidelines that have been
8 recommended by their colleagues. I think CME credits,
9 the new move towards continuing certification on the part
10 of the boards, these are all positive things which I
11 think can be used. So I would say if your question was
12 designed to see whether or not there is movement, and
13 interest, and a push, for some level of individual
14 clinician measurement and also performance satisfaction
15 that we heard from AHRQ, if there is a move to make that
16 available, there absolutely is and has to be going
17 forward, even as we get to the level of actually being
18 able to talk about specific clinical issues.

19 What I would finally say is that what we are
20 not excited by are the report cards, the grades, the five
21 star doctor based on malpractice data and those sort of
22 things, those we don't think are very useful.

23 DR. BONDURANT: I was just going to do the
24 theme that Reed just touched on, and that is to point out
25 the power of the kinds of information systems that we are

1 now describing in the educational system at all levels.
2 And Reed mentioned the re-certification. But in terms of
3 even enhancing the adaptability of the systems so that
4 when new kinds of information or new kinds of problems
5 come along, the system can respond more efficiently and
6 effectively. Bio-terrorism is a quick and simple current
7 example of that. But I think it applies to all of
8 medical education, not just for physicians but for all
9 providers throughout the system. And that is part of the
10 great vision that LaMar was referring to I think.

11 MR. DARBY: I think it was Dr. Tuckson's slide
12 that showed that we are sort of collecting data in silos
13 and we sort of think of health care in these silos. And
14 when you think of a patient who has a chronic condition
15 or some episode of illness, they see more than one doctor
16 and go to specialists and go to the hospital or go from
17 the transition of a hospital to a nursing home. And I
18 think a challenge that we need to face in measurement is
19 how we look at the coordination of care because it is
20 absolutely critical to those patients when they have that
21 kind of situation.

22 DR. McGINNIS: If we are going to continue on
23 this data area a little bit longer, in reference to
24 Reed's comment about what we do -- and Margaret's comment
25 about what we do now until we get to this vision of the

1 future, let me just talk a little more about the NSQIP
2 program because I think it is important to think about
3 that. It is interesting to look at the history of the
4 way this evolved. In the late 80's, some really dramatic
5 incidents came out of the VA system of error and poor
6 quality. And it caused Congress to give a direction to
7 the VA, study this, act on it, and report out. And over
8 the years, this National Surgery Quality Improvement
9 Program evolved. And so it began in '94 and it has been
10 extended through the 112 VA hospitals. It now has data
11 on almost a million patients. And they have successfully
12 been able to lower morbidity by 47 percent and mortality
13 by 27 percent -- now those are big numbers to me -- in
14 this system.

15 And so it went through an alpha trial at three
16 hospitals, Emory was one. And now it is out in 12
17 hospitals for beta tests. It still looks good. Chukra
18 Khuri, who is the PI of this out of Harvard, feels that
19 it is adaptable across the board. It is not just
20 surgically confined. And the thing is, the value is the
21 risk adjustment and that is what really causes physicians
22 to pay attention to it because they know there are
23 enormous differences in patients. And particularly with
24 the aging of American and our ability now that cancer has
25 moved into the consideration of chronic disease, we have

1 a whole new range of what we look at as a chronic
2 disease. And so we have got to be able to look at the
3 complexity of patients and collect data in that regard.

4 MR. HYMAN: Let me sort of push this in a
5 slightly different direction but based on what we have
6 already talked about. Obviously, how you rate care is
7 going to turn out to be multi-dimensional. So the data
8 that you are going to gather is going to vary
9 tremendously based on what it is that you are interested
10 in. And I will just give a couple of things that we have
11 some formal framework. Process versus outcome is one
12 obvious cut, subjective versus objective, global measures
13 versus disease-specific measures versus treatment-
14 specific measures. Okay, so we have a sort of range of
15 possibilities here.

16 But that is a completely different inquiry from
17 who puts demands on providers to collect and either just
18 turn over or collate, aggregate, analyze the data and
19 what the list of data collection is. We have heard some
20 discussion about a meeting where we would all come up and
21 meet together and decide what we all wanted. And I think
22 Dr. McGinnis' point about the path dependence problems
23 with our current use of measures, we came up with them
24 for reasons that don't necessarily have anything to do
25 with our interest in quality. So that suggests maybe it

1 is time to step back and think about new data measures.

2 But a common -- and then I will get to the
3 question, a common complaint of providers is the burden
4 of having to collect multiple measures for multiple
5 entities, some of which account for a big chunk of their
6 practice, some of which are a very small chunk of their
7 practice, and all of them are different. That is a very
8 commonly heard provider complaint. So what is at stake
9 here is, "Are we going to do this top down or bottom up?
10 And how do we end up making sure that it is worth the
11 effort?" That is probably the basic question I want to
12 put on the table now.

13 MS. O'KANE: First, I am going to kind of rain
14 on your parade, I guess, because NCQA actually when it
15 was launched as an independent organization, our mission
16 was to try to get standardization of performance
17 measures. Our original grant to RWJ in 1990 was about
18 that. And I think we have achieved some -- at least as
19 far as health plans go, there has been some
20 standardization around HEDIS. The National Quality Forum
21 was then established to do the same thing.

22 There is an insatiable desire to control the
23 agenda by the different parties. And I think it is
24 really our common problem.

25 MR. HYMAN: I am shocked, shocked.

1 (Laughter.)

2 MS. O'KANE: I think there are certain things
3 that need to be done by a group that has multiple
4 stakeholders and that is not beholden to any single
5 stakeholder. Guidelines, for example. We have a
6 horrible story of what happened to what was then AHCPR
7 and now AHRQ in terms of the ability of one individual
8 and one organization to sandbag something that was an
9 essential public good that is crucial to the future of
10 performance measurement and improvement. We really need
11 a constituency that represents the public interest here.
12 And there are certain things that have to be delegated to
13 that constituency. We do not have that. At NQF, I think
14 there is a lot of goodwill around that table but there is
15 still plenty of ability to go off the reservation and it
16 has happened.

17 So there is a political challenge that is
18 sitting here that is not to be ignored or underestimated.

19 MR. HYMAN: Hence, my question.

20 DR. TUCKSON: First of all, I think it is a
21 very good question. There is a dynamic here, I think,
22 that while I can understand physicians and hospitals
23 being concerned about the leadership of the employer
24 community, the insatiable push as they try to figure out
25 how they are going to stay in business everyday and as

1 those constituencies go forward, there is this push now
2 that they are having. It is an uncomfortable push I am
3 sure but I think it is one that is leading us to change.
4 And I think that is a healthy movement.

5 Similarly, I think that the ability for and the
6 leadership that we are seeing by organized medicine,
7 whether it is the physician performance consortium or
8 specific colleges like the ACS, is encouraging because
9 they are moving forward. Now the dilemma is how fast and
10 how well will organized medicine be able to address the
11 need for change. They have a resource problem and they
12 have a membership problem. What is great about the
13 leaders of organized medicine is that they are committed.
14 Their members don't often like what they are committed to
15 because they see threat there.

16 And so the issue is, "how do you have the right
17 political mix?" And I think Peggy is right in saying
18 this is a political issue, how do you have the right mix
19 between the push from outside and the speed and pace of
20 change from within? And you sort of need a spur there.
21 I think that that becomes key.

22 Finally, the place in which this occurs, I
23 think there was a very important moment, I think in the
24 history of this, when CMS announces that it is going to
25 measure physician performance. That was a very important

1 moment. What is even more important I think is that they
2 went to the AMA consortium and said you should be the
3 place to develop the measures. Now it didn't work out
4 perfectly but I think at least we know, at least from
5 what I understand, there is some relationship there, that
6 they are working together.

7 I think that it is also clear, that it is on
8 the public record that a number of the health plans,
9 several, have come forward and said that they would be
10 willing to participate in a synergistic effort that uses
11 those same measures as the core. And that they are
12 willing to change their behavior. I do know in fact, and
13 I can say that we are one so that this is not
14 theoretical. So I think what you are starting to see are
15 folks lining up. Now the National Quality Forum I think
16 is really going to be a critical place that ultimately
17 brings a lot of this together, and we would have to say
18 that we are encouraged by the potential there. And I
19 think that Peggy's cautions are appropriate and we have
20 to help find ways to make sure that that is the place.

21 So I guess the long and short of it is that
22 this may be an uncomfortable moment but the marketplace
23 is working. People are pushing. Things are happening.
24 And that there still will need to be some attentiveness
25 to the pace and speed of change. It will be

1 uncomfortable but the terrible thing to do would be to
2 create any environment that thwarted the movement that is
3 already now moving forward.

4 MS. O'KANE: Can I ask you a question? I don't
5 know if this came up yesterday but there has been
6 consolidation of providers in many markets that really
7 make it impossible to make this agenda work. I am
8 talking about in the hospital sector. I suppose it could
9 happen in the physician sector. But I know that the FTC
10 did try to raise concerns about this and that these
11 issues kind of fell apart in the courts. And I have
12 heard some discussion about the current leadership of the
13 FTC being concerned about this issue. I don't know if
14 you are able to speak for this but I think it would be an
15 incomplete discussion if we didn't talk about some of the
16 factors that, even if you have good transparency, it is
17 hard to know what the mode of action is?

18 MR. HYMAN: Yes, good law professor question.
19 Let me respond to the question with a question.

20 MS. O'KANE: I am not a lawyer.

21 MR. HYMAN: But I am. Let me for the members
22 of the audience who were not here yesterday or aware of
23 the Federal Trade Commission's record in enforcement
24 issues. The Commission has brought a series of cases and
25 taken consent judgments in cases involving physicians who

1 essentially organize themselves in ways that are not
2 consistent with the antitrust laws. And there have been
3 five or six of those cases within the last year. The
4 Commission has also challenged a variety of hospital
5 mergers, alleging that they are anti-competitive and
6 along with the Department of Justice says failed rather
7 miserably in those challenges since the mid-1990s for
8 reasons that we actually held a full day of hearings
9 devoted to. I guess it was a half a day.

10 But the chairman of the Federal Trade
11 Commission announced last year that he would start a
12 merger retrospective to look at consummated mergers and
13 see whether the predicted adverse consequences had
14 actually materialized and has also announced that
15 depending upon the results and if he can see a viable
16 remedy, they will pursue those cases administratively.

17 But that takes us to the question, which is
18 sort of the level at which there is push back, okay.
19 There has been remarkable unanimity around the table and
20 at all of the speakers about the benefits of information,
21 the importance of collecting it, aggregating it, using it
22 to drive the marketplace. To which the obvious question
23 is, "Who is not in the choir and what are they doing to
24 sandbag what is going on here?" So without pointing
25 fingers at individually identifiable individuals, what is

1 the pockets of resistance? And is it that hospitals are
2 essentially unwilling to accept additional data gathering
3 responsibilities without additional compensation? Are
4 there legal or regulatory barriers that complicate the
5 process? If everybody is in agreement this is a good
6 idea, why haven't we done it already?

7 MS. O'KANE: I think it is wrong to think
8 everybody is in agreement about this. I think there is
9 tremendous resistance to this. I think sometimes the
10 resistance is appropriate caution. Oftentimes it is just
11 what you expect. There have been other examples outside
12 of health care of industries that didn't want to be
13 particularly accountable for things and so on. So I
14 think it is a reality. I think it really would be unwise
15 to underestimate the power of the forces because there
16 are reasons why we don't have some information that we
17 should have today. It is not an individual, it is a
18 common behavior of industries I think. And part of the
19 reason the FTC has its role is because if you own a
20 market, you are in a position to dictate prices. And
21 that works in health care even in a more insidious way
22 because in health care we are able to create our own
23 demand. So if we create more supply, there will be more
24 demand.

25 MR. HYMAN: Fair enough, but there is a

1 difference between inertia and anti-competitive behavior.
2 The antitrust laws are appropriately concerned with the
3 latter. And the former we depend on markets to sort of
4 motivate people which is why miles per gallon go up
5 relative to what they were in 1970. Law professors are
6 very fond of automobile metaphors for those of you who
7 haven't heard that one.

8 Does anybody else want to be heard on that
9 particular issue?

10 DR. TUCKSON: I am not going to be able to give
11 you the level of detail, I am not a lawyer. And there is
12 some lawyer stuff in there, your question somewhere, so I
13 am going to be careful. But I think that there is no
14 question that we have experienced dominant players in the
15 marketplace who basically can say to us, and who say to
16 employers as well on whose behalf we operate, "We don't
17 have to play this quality game because (A) we have got
18 the market; or (B) we are the only game in town. And
19 either way we can thumb our nose at this thing and we
20 will continue to do what we are doing and provide lip
21 service to the people who come here saying we are going
22 to give you some information about quality." And so that
23 is a concern. There is no question about it. And that
24 could frustrate this movement.

25 And I think the other area in terms of these

1 FTC or Justice Department issues, again, would be
2 anything that would impede the free flow of information,
3 that allow us to break down these silos for whatever
4 kinds of reasons. We have had enough experience with
5 state attorneys general who may want to interpret some
6 legitimate concerns around privacy and those issues in a
7 way that would stop the flow of information for health
8 and safety purposes. And so I think we have to be
9 concerned there.

10 But there is no question that there are many
11 markets where we see this occurring, where we don't need
12 you. And if you want to try to play an incentive game by
13 providing information in a way around quality,
14 differentiation of quality will drive patients into the
15 system. If we don't need any more patients, we don't
16 have to play this game.

17 DR. MCGINNIS: As Reed said, the leadership of
18 medicine is committed to what we are talking about. But
19 when you look out at practicing physicians, physicians
20 still are practicing in small groups. There are very few
21 individual practitioners but they practice mainly in
22 small groups. They have been through a sea change over
23 the last 10 or 15 years. They are trying to survive.
24 They are busy. They get up early and go to bed late.
25 And get called during the night and work on weekends.

1 They have a presumption of quality. So for them to
2 accept the notion of making changes relative to quality,
3 they have to receive quality data from institutions that
4 they respect. But, as Reed also said earlier, physicians
5 will respond to information. They want to do the right
6 thing.

7 And so I think to get their attention we have
8 to supply the data that indicates more heavily than the
9 IOM reports, and they are monumental, that there is a
10 problem in quality. I know physicians that have taken
11 the time to look at the IOM reports do note very rapidly
12 that despite the impressive membership, there is
13 virtually not a practicing physician on the IOM. And
14 that does have some bearing on how much attention they
15 pay to that report. But the report is having a
16 resounding effect, unquestionably.

17 MS. O'KANE: Can I make a comment?

18 MR. HYMAN: Sure.

19 MS. O'KANE: I think that this is a moment that
20 is a real opportunity for physician leadership. And I
21 think that -- I don't underestimate the challenge that it
22 presents for organizations like the College. I think
23 physicians feel very beleaguered, and appropriately so.
24 They have all these different regulatory things that make
25 no sense to them. They have different plans coming in

1 with different formulary forms and there is just a lot of
2 stuff that makes their lives full of, it feels like, non-
3 value added activity. I believe that, I say this, stick
4 my neck out, I think that if the physicians could come
5 forward with sort of a proposition for plans and for
6 others, that in return for some standardization on their
7 side and in return for some relief of non-value added
8 regulatory stuff the physicians face, and in return for
9 some rationalization of the malpractice system, they
10 would be willing to have certain things that they would
11 do, like have systems, follow guidelines.

12 DR. MCGINNIS: Now you are talking.

13 MS. O'KANE: I think that there is a moment
14 where a new bargain could be struck between physicians
15 and society. And physicians are in the driver's seat in
16 many ways. They are the stewards. And they don't make
17 all the money for all the tests that they order and so
18 forth. But physicians I think, I hear physicians from
19 many of the specialty societies that we talk to saying
20 that they understand that the system is going to crash
21 and burn if it doesn't start working more effectively.

22 So I would encourage the college or others to
23 sort of come together and really listen and be in the
24 dialogue. I think part of the problem is that each of
25 our sectors wants to come and inflict our strategy on the

1 other. And I think it really is important to get a
2 dialogue going to recognize that there are appropriate
3 concerns being expressed by each sector and that maybe
4 there is a collaborative solution that would work.

5 MS. CROFTON: I wish I had an answer to this
6 question or some kind of resolution, but I just wanted to
7 comment on what you said about having so many choir
8 members here. And I think there were a lot of common
9 things in what we were talking about and acknowledgment
10 of common problems, but I don't think in terms of
11 collecting and disseminating quality data that we have a
12 group of people who are linking hands singing Kumbaya.
13 We are just not in that place. And I think the reasons
14 that we are not vary from user to user, user of quality
15 data to user of quality data. But something that I think
16 is encouraging to me is that that there are processes for
17 that that can bring about alliances over time that will
18 make these things happen.

19 And I am thinking particularly of the early
20 days in our project, in CAHPS, when we were working on
21 the health plan questionnaire. NCQ had a questionnaire
22 that they were using for the same purpose that was a
23 giant leap forward from what had been done in the past
24 through a long, collaborative, sometimes contentious
25 process through which we all collected a whole lot of

1 data and reported on it to each other. Over a process of
2 years we came to agreement about what that questionnaire
3 should be. And I think part of the reason that we did
4 was because we realized what we all had to lose if we
5 didn't have that common measurement tool. And I think
6 that is what really clinched the deal.

7 But I didn't want to let this moment pass
8 without some acknowledgment of the facts that those are
9 long, time-consuming processes and they are well worth it
10 in the end if you get to that point of common agreement.
11 And I think that we have got more than one demonstration
12 of the fact that it is possible.

13 DR. TUCKSON: And I would just underscore that
14 even though you are right, we may have -- this is not
15 perfect yet and we are not singing Kumbaya but let's take
16 the example that both Peggy and I used in our
17 presentations, which is the Bridges of Excellence. Here
18 you have a disease that is important to talk about,
19 whether it is global or disease specific. This is a good
20 one, that is a good disease, epidemiologically important.
21 You got a good set of measures that include process and
22 outcome. The measures were developed in part by the AMA
23 performance consortium, so physicians were at the table
24 around the diabetes measures, along with multiple other
25 stakeholders. And everybody agreed, through a consensus

1 process of evidence-based criteria, so there is no
2 argument around the measures, it aligns incentives, it
3 connects the marketplace of payers, plans, and physicians
4 and aligns incentives around behavior. And then makes it
5 transparent for patients.

6 So there are examples. And this is a new
7 thing. How long did it take for that to get done? It
8 didn't take years and years and years. This was done in
9 a pretty expedited way. From soup to nuts, in a year.

10 MS. O'KANE: Not to be negative, but it built
11 on like 10 years of back and forth and squabbling. We
12 had to work it with the DQIP project, which was started
13 by the American Diabetes Association and CMS and so on.
14 But I think your point is really well taken. And I think
15 we can sort of -- there is a way of expediting, sort of
16 looking at past history and saying why did that take so
17 long and how do we get to yes faster.

18 MR. HYMAN: Well, let me see if I can get some
19 disagreement on a specific issue, then. The first issue
20 I want to just put on the table is public dissemination
21 of measures as opposed to private use for quality
22 improvement. What I heard from NCQA is it is very
23 important to have public reporting so I wrote this down
24 to rivet provider attention on the issue. Get them to
25 focus on it. And I don't think we will have time but it

1 is an interesting question, how you go about doing that.
2 Is it simply the publicity? Is it money that will flow
3 from it directly or volume that will flow from it? An
4 interesting set of questions.

5 But I also heard from Wellpoint that some of
6 the measures are ready for public dissemination and
7 others are not. And that is a particular decision that -
8 - I am sorry, United Health Group, excuse me -- that they
9 are not going to use all of them. And I heard from the
10 American College of Surgeons that it is important to have
11 data for private, internal CQI usage. And I didn't hear
12 any particular mention of public dissemination of the
13 results. And I don't want to speak for everybody else
14 because I didn't hear anything explicit on that. So
15 public dissemination, everything? Some things? Nothing?

16 MS. O'KANE: Not everything. I think it is
17 very important in areas where we are very clear about the
18 science base, we are clear that the data are reliable and
19 so forth. In our provider recognition program, it is a
20 different model. You have to reach a target in order to
21 get the recognition. And it is set very high. It is set
22 way above the national average for health plans. So we
23 don't report, for example, on how Dr. Jones in
24 Minneapolis did on his diabetes measures. He made it
25 over the bar and that is what we report. We do report on

1 an aggregate basis and we have seen improvements over
2 time among the 1,800 doctors that are in the program.
3 But I think that one needs to be sort of practical about
4 this in that certainly if you want to have public
5 reporting of problems, I think it becomes very difficult
6 because there is a real incentive to hide problems.

7 So I think you have got to realize this is more
8 complicated. I am sorry we don't have any easy answers
9 to any of your polar questions.

10 DR. TUCKSON: Let me be very clear in terms of
11 how we view this. We brought together the leaders of the
12 American Board of Medical Specialty Societies, the
13 Council of Medical Specialty Societies, the AMA, the
14 Performance Measurement Consortium, the ACGME that
15 credits graduate training programs, and commissioned the
16 best paper, the best thought we could get on this field.
17 And they made it very clear that at this point in time it
18 would be inappropriate, and basically we would also drive
19 physicians underground almost essentially if we were to
20 release the data, just raw data around performance,
21 around specific diseases. This is just not appropriate
22 at this time to do it.

23 So there are fall back positions. And I think
24 those fall back positions are actually pretty good. They
25 are not bad. There are other things like the NCQA

1 recognition program that says, "Did your physician
2 actually comply with the guidance that they were supposed
3 to do? Did they do the things they were supposed to do
4 consistent with agreed upon standards? And we will
5 certify that in fact this has occurred for this
6 particular disease." And that is an important thing.
7 Without presenting all the raw numbers and the data, it
8 simply says that they have met a standard. And we will
9 put that on our provider directory and say to the
10 patients, "this person has done this thing." And that is
11 a kind of a reasonably intermediate.

12 In our company what we think we will do in
13 addition is to say, "Did your physician review and study
14 and interact with their actual clinical data? Did they
15 learn from it? Did they read the literature associated
16 with this particular disease? Did they comment to us
17 about their performance and talk to us about whether they
18 are going to continue to do what they are doing or have
19 they changed and why? Have they read literature and
20 showed those things?" Then we will be able designate as
21 part of continuing medical education, or as Dr. McGinnis
22 more aptly named it, continuing professional development,
23 and be able to indicate in the provider directory this
24 clinician has actually worked with this information,
25 showed signs that they know it, have gotten continuing

1 professional development credits for it and you can
2 designate that.

3 So I think that there are things that are
4 reasonable and legitimate to do without frustrating
5 clinicians in their desire to improve performance and
6 still let patients know information that is actionable
7 for them in terms of making their decisions. And we
8 could take this into greater depth but we don't have time
9 now.

10 MR. HYMAN: Feel free to correct my
11 characterization of the ACS position.

12 DR. MCGINNIS: I was going to say if I said
13 what you said, I mis-spoke because we do not have
14 organizationally or philosophically opposition to
15 transparency. But it is the kind of information that is
16 reflected. We want it to be accurate.

17 Let me give you some specific examples. The
18 College, through our Commission on Cancer and in a
19 collaboration with the American Cancer Society, in trying
20 to give information to the public, we have on both the
21 College's website and the Cancer Society website
22 information about hospitals, facility information, what
23 they have available, specialists, technology. We have a
24 level of information regarding experience, that is the
25 numbers of breast cancers treated, the numbers of colon

1 cancers, that is available. The third area we wanted to
2 have was outcome information but since the outcome
3 information in the National Cancer Database is not risk
4 adjusted, hospitals are obviously reluctant to have that
5 sort of information released. So we have not done that.

6 Relative to guidelines and giving public
7 direction to guidelines, we have begun to recognize from
8 the Cancer Society's standpoint that the National
9 Comprehensive Network has these guidelines for the care
10 of cancer patients that we believe are gold standards
11 because they are evidence-based and updated annually.
12 And so we have promulgated those to the professional
13 community, and we have translated those to lay language.
14 And further translated them into Spanish and are doing
15 this into Chinese and making these available so that they
16 can be available to the patient. When they go talk with
17 their doctor, they can sit down and understand what the
18 doctor is saying. So we want to have this openness but
19 it has to be properly based.

20 DR. TUCKSON: Now you did want to try to get a
21 little bit of -- I will provoke just a little bit in the
22 sense of saying, "By the way the scenario I described
23 will only hold up for another 12 months." It is not
24 going to hold up much longer. And I will tell you, just
25 in terms of the real world out there, we get smashed by

1 purchasers who are very frustrated with the answer I just
2 gave and are essentially saying, "Why are you not giving
3 our employees this information?" And they are only going
4 to buy off another 12 months, 18 months on waiting for
5 all this stuff to get moving a little bit faster. And so
6 we will be back here, if you hold this meeting a year
7 from now and you come back and say where are we now, you
8 are probably going to see a lot more tension or we will
9 have seen a lot more movement.

10 The other thing is that, and I think Peggy's
11 point, I don't want it to get lost, is essential and that
12 is the tort system. If the tort system is not addressed,
13 this stuff goes down the toilet quick because you can't
14 release this information in the litigious environment
15 that we have today and not expect doctors to get the heck
16 sued out of them.

17 DR. MCGINNIS: Amen.

18 DR. TUCKSON: So we just have got to get it
19 done.

20 DR. MCGINNIS: And that is particularly --
21 well, it is pertinent to all of this but when you get
22 down to errors, if the reporting of errors is not
23 protected, it is just not going to happen. And that is
24 so hurtful to a system of correcting errors.

25 MR. HYMAN: Let me just mention something that

1 I think has not really been mentioned yet, which is the
2 issue of privacy, HIPPA, the extent to which that
3 interacts with the ability to get data and to disseminate
4 data. And if anyone wants to say whether it is a real
5 problem -- well, I won't give you a false choice. Tell
6 me whether it is a problem.

7 MS. O'KANE: They teach you to think like that
8 in law school I think.

9 I think there have been a lot of problems with
10 HIPPA. We know a lot of the people who are involved, we
11 and the joint commission co-convened meetings on privacy
12 when these issues were being debated, and we believe
13 very, very strongly that there are real serious issues
14 related to privacy, that they are huge concern to
15 patients and that they ought to be.

16 But I think there was a sort of separate
17 community of the privacy advocates that really wasn't in
18 dialogue with anybody in health care. So the goal of
19 maintaining privacy became the paramount goal. And the
20 way HIPPA was originally written and the way it is
21 interpreted I think by many is that privacy should
22 overwhelm other concerns like accountability and
23 coordination of care and so forth. We have written
24 numerous white papers talking about conflicts between
25 what HIPPA was proposing and what were other regulatory

1 goals and CMS goals for Medicare and so forth. But I
2 think that there are still -- and I think that there are
3 people out there on the provider side who are using
4 privacy as a shield against accountability.

5 So it is a cautionary tale about the conflict
6 between various important goals and the need to reconcile
7 them and to have sort of -- it is very difficult when you
8 have different agencies implementing different things.
9 But, again, it is very important. It is a concern, and
10 it continues to be a concern.

11 DR. TUCKSON: Just only, again as a company
12 that provides and coordinates health care benefits for
13 people in 35 of our states, so many of our customers are
14 regional customers. To try to be able to move
15 information in a way that benefits them across states
16 even is tough, with the individual state mandates, state
17 kind of rules and regs. But at the end of the day, as I
18 tried to show in my slides, you cannot possibly
19 coordinate care for people, particularly again with the
20 range of things that a person needs who is ill today. It
21 is extremely important to make sure that you can connect
22 the information systems around Meals on Wheels, home
23 health aid, mobile vans, with the endocrinologist, the
24 cardiologist, and the physical therapists. If those
25 folks can't all work together, this poor patient falls

1 through the cracks. And what falling through the cracks
2 means is 14 different people providing different
3 medications, some of whom are not compatible with each
4 other and interact poorly with each other, missed
5 appointments or too many appointments, waste in the
6 system.

7 It would be a tragedy if we were to take a
8 legitimate interest in privacy and confidentiality. And
9 of course you have to. We are all, as physicians trained
10 in that from day one, about the importance of that as an
11 ethical issue. But to misuse that provision in a way
12 that caused death, misery and suffering would be just
13 horrible.

14 MR. DARBY: From the standpoint of doing
15 research and collecting data, I think there is chaos at
16 the moment. And it created an industry. I get at least
17 three e-mails a week inviting me to a seminar to explain
18 it to me. I don't know whether all three of them would
19 explain it in the same way. I suspect not. But I think
20 it has set us back some. I think long-term though the
21 issue of privacy was critical and hopefully it will be
22 sorted out.

23 MR. HYMAN: Let me just give each of the
24 panelists a very brief opportunity if they wish to make
25 any closing remarks and let me go in reverse order. So

1 Dr. Tuckson?

2 DR. TUCKSON: I have said too much already.

3 MR. HYMAN: We accept waivers.

4 MS. O'KANE: I just appreciate the opportunity
5 and the intelligence of the questions that you have
6 posed. And I also learned a lot from my fellow
7 panelists.

8 DR. MCGINNIS: To comment just a little bit
9 further on HIPPA, I think the question is out largely.
10 It is a great hassle. It was very important but it is
11 another example of excess that comes out of Washington.
12 So in correcting something good, they have the potential
13 for causing real harm and particularly as it relates to
14 the research but to patient services and many other
15 areas.

16 It has been a pleasure to be here. Thank you.

17 MR. HYMAN: Mr. Bondurant?

18 DR. BONDURANT: It has been a pleasure to be
19 here and thank you and the FTC for holding the hearings.
20 And I would like to identify myself with Dr. McGinnis'
21 remarks about HIPPA.

22 MS. CROFTON: We appreciate the opportunity to
23 be here to speak and also to learn from people on the
24 panel. I think if somebody asked me what was the big
25 take-home message here, the one recommendation I would

1 like to see carried away, it is about the power and
2 importance of evidence in straightening some of these
3 dilemmas, and particularly in the task of getting people
4 to unlock their grip on the agenda and to make it a
5 shared agenda across the board. I think evidence is
6 really going to be the key to that.

7 MR. DARBY: I just echo the thank you and it
8 was a great opportunity. I learned a lot also. One
9 thing, just to come back again to patients, I get
10 frustrated because there doesn't seem to be a way to
11 really hear what patients have to say. Organizations,
12 various stakeholders, they spend a lot of time together
13 and we can hear them very clearly. But even though there
14 are some great consumer organizations out there, there
15 doesn't seem to be any that speak for all of them in some
16 way. And until we have that ground swell from consumers
17 to say this has got to happen, it is going to be very
18 hard to make it happen.

19 DR. TUCKSON: I actually would like to get my
20 last comment. And that is just to commend the FTC for
21 its attentiveness to this issue of anti-competitive
22 practices. I think at the end of the day it is tough out
23 there. It is a tough marketplace. It is a tough
24 battleground and health care is different than other
25 environments. And how you exercise your responsibility

1 in public accountability in this regard will say an awful
2 lot about whether or not this movement is frustrated or
3 whether it will go forward. But this is hard ball. It
4 is tough times out there. And we urge you to continue to
5 be attentive.

6 MR. HYMAN: I would like to thank the panel,
7 and I would ask the audience to join me in applauding
8 their efforts here.

9 (Applause.)

10 (Whereupon, a lunch recess was taken.)

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N

1
2 MR. HYMAN: Good afternoon. Thank you all for
3 coming to this afternoon's session of the hearings on
4 Health Care and Competition Law and Policy, jointly
5 sponsored by the Federal Trade Commission and the
6 Department of Justice. We have a very distinguished
7 panel, which I will introduce momentarily, but first,
8 Commissioner Thomas B. Leary of the Federal Trade
9 Commission, one of five commissioners that serve on the
10 Commission, will make some brief opening remarks.
11 Commissioner Leary has extensive experience in antitrust
12 and has been speaking more recently in writing as well
13 about issues relating to the application of competition
14 law to health care.

15 Commissioner Leary?

16 COMMISSIONER LEARY: I am pleased to be here,
17 and I want to thank you for your patience in listening to
18 me because the fact is that probably everybody in this
19 room knows a great deal more about the subject of health
20 care and competition than I do. And that is exactly the
21 point. That is why we have these hearings. The Federal
22 Trade Commission, as you probably know, is not a sector-
23 specific agency, unlike the Federal Communications
24 Commission or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
25 which focuses on specific sectors of the economy. We are

1 supposed to be experts on competition and consumer
2 protection across the entire economy. And, as a result,
3 we do not develop an embedded expertise in any single
4 sector to the degree that a sector-specific agency would.

5 And at the same time we have responsibility for
6 policy development in those areas. We are not just
7 prosecutors. We weren't just created to be prosecutors
8 by Congress in 1914. We were supposed to be policy-
9 makers and we were supposed to listen to people in
10 various affected communities. And we were then supposed
11 to kind of apply our own expertise in general and then
12 make policy on what is sensible competition law or
13 consumer protection law. And that is what we are about.
14 And this is sort of the input part of it and that is why
15 these things are so important.

16 So my basic message to you is I want to thank
17 you. I want to thank you all for the time and the effort
18 that you put into helping us to sort out these problems.

19 As you know, the current hearings on consumer
20 information are part of an extended series of hearings on
21 health care, which we had starting I guess last fall and
22 which will continue into the future. I don't know how
23 many more we are going to have. This is just one segment
24 of the problem and it is a very, very -- it is a piece of
25 a very large problem. As I view this from afar, it seems

1 to me that there are some over-arching, extremely
2 difficult issues in the whole area of health care that
3 make these markets different. And they are all familiar
4 to you. The first one that always occurs to me is the
5 third-party payer situation. We were taught our economic
6 models, the things we deal with basically are by a buyer
7 and a seller.

8 And you all learn what happens in the
9 equilibrium that a market arrives at with a buyer and a
10 seller. And here we have at least three key players.
11 You have the people who pay for the services and the
12 goods; and you have the people who provide the services
13 and the goods; and then you have the people who get them.
14 And the outcome of that equation is not something that we
15 are used to dealing with. And it leads to, as you all
16 know, pressures for more and more and more services. And
17 pressures for more and more expenditures on health care.

18 And yet at the same time, it seems to me, as
19 you get into more and more affluent society, and not
20 withstanding momentary dips, the trend is upward all the
21 time, the real dollar income of the average person in the
22 United States today is four times what it was when I was
23 a boy. And so that is the trend. And, as you might
24 expect, in an evermore affluent society a greater and
25 greater percentage of the overall pie being devoted to

1 health care and a smaller percentage being devoted say to
2 food or various other essentials of life.

3 So it is kind of hard to know how much increase
4 is good or bad. It is hard to measure performance in
5 this business. We are trained as antitrust lawyers to
6 look out for various actions that reduce output and
7 increase price. That is kind of the hallmark of an
8 antitrust problem, something that reduces output and
9 increases price, either by a monopolist or by some kind
10 of a conspiracy. And what does it mean to reduce output
11 and increase price in the area that we are talking about
12 here. It depends I guess on what you consider output.
13 As a provision of procedures, is that an output or an
14 input? It might be a good thing to reduce output if you
15 consider it as an output. And it might be a good thing
16 to substitute high-price procedures that are useful for
17 low-price procedures that are not. It might be a good
18 thing to spend a lot more money up-front on preventive
19 care. And if you do that, why obviously you are going to
20 have price increases, immediate price increases but hope
21 that it will save money in the long run or that people
22 will live longer. The longer we live, the more we spend
23 on medical care.

24 And so all I am saying to you is that for us,
25 in the position I am in as an antitrust lawyer for over

1 40 years, the problems in this area are quite difficult.

2 And finally, specifically what we are talking
3 about here, your piece of it I understand for these days
4 is consumer information. And we come from a -- it is
5 kind of an article of faith with us, that markets work
6 best when you have more and more and more accurate
7 information going to consumers. And they work less well
8 when you have inaccurate information going to consumers.
9 And one of the problems that I see as a kind of an
10 outside observer of this kind of a marketplace is that
11 because of what the Supreme Court called in California
12 Dental case, "information asymmetries," a great imbalance
13 in knowledge between the people who are, say, providing
14 the care and the people who are getting the care. How do
15 you provide more and more information to consumers so
16 that they can make more intelligent choices on their own
17 and at the same time avoid misleading them because they
18 don't have available to them the same critical facility
19 that most of us have as consumers.

20 But that is not a problem unique to health
21 care. There are all kinds of very, very complicated
22 products that we buy in our own lives, apart from medical
23 products and services, where there is the same
24 information asymmetry. So that is not a unique problem,
25 but it is one that characterizes this business.

1 I guess my ultimate belief is that more
2 consumer involvement in their own health care decisions
3 is a great deal better than less. And that one way or
4 the other that is the direction that we should be
5 staggering toward. And I also believe that very firmly
6 that ultimately we ought to be trying very hard to work
7 out a reward system in the medical care field that
8 rewards outcomes to a greater degree than inputs, as it
9 does today. And I realize that these are not easy issues
10 but it seems to me directionally that as personally where
11 I think we have to go.

12 And having said that, I just want to leave you
13 here. I am unfortunately under water on a lot of other
14 stuff, but I promise you I will read the reports and
15 transcripts of these hearings. I always do. And I wish
16 you well, and I want to thank you again.

17 (Applause.)

18 MR. HYMAN: Thank you, Commissioner Leary. As
19 you can see, nobody is seated up at the table. That is
20 because there is going to be lots of Power Point shown,
21 and it is very unpleasant to sit in these seats and try
22 and twirl yourself around to look at it. But the panel
23 is no less distinguished from sitting in the audience
24 than sitting up front.

25 I am going to introduce them in the order they

1 are going to speak. And our rule here is very brief
2 introductions because you are here to hear from them, not
3 from me. We have prepared this bound set of bios, which
4 is available outside on the table, along with some of the
5 hand-outs from individual speakers as well as some hand-
6 outs from this morning.

7 The basic plan is we are going to have a series
8 of presentations. And then at the end of those we will
9 take a short break and then we will use the time
10 remaining to have a moderated roundtable discussion among
11 the panel participants. The focus of this afternoon's
12 hearings, as with this morning, is quality consumer
13 information, focusing on physicians.

14 So I am going to introduce the entire panel and
15 they will sort of come up in order. The first speaker is
16 Glen Mays, who is a health researcher at Mathematica
17 Policy Research. He is speaking here today on behalf of
18 the Center for Studying Health Systems Change. Following
19 him will be Dr. Wendy Levinson, who is a professor of
20 medicine and vice chair of the Department of Medicine at
21 the University of Toronto. Then Dr. Joanne Lynn, who is
22 director of the Washington Home Center for Palliative
23 Care Studies. The next speaker will be Shoshana Sofaer,
24 who is the Robert P. Luciano Professor of Health Care
25 Policy at the School of Public Affairs of Baruch College

1 at the City Universities of New York. And then Dr. Nancy
2 Nielsen, who is an internist from Buffalo and vice
3 speaker of the House of Delegates of the American Medical
4 Association will speak.

5 You will notice there are two additional name
6 tags up here. Dr. Clair Callan is the vice president of
7 Science Quality in Public Health at the American Medical
8 Association. She will be participating in the roundtable
9 and assisting Dr. Nielsen with technical questions. And
10 Bob Berenson, Dr. Robert Berenson is an independent
11 consultant, although it says here Academy Health, that is
12 one of many things that he does with his time. He
13 clearly never sleeps. He has a very extensive career in
14 health policy in Washington. Everywhere I go I meet
15 people who know Bob.

16 So without further ado, why don't we get Mr.
17 Mays up and we can start his Power Point presentation.

18 MR. MAYS: Thank you very much. I am pleased
19 to be here on behalf of the Center for Studying Health
20 System Change to talk with you a bit about the role that
21 health plans are playing across the country in the
22 production of information about quality in health care
23 and the use of that information in creating incentives
24 for quality in health care. And so I will be presenting
25 findings from our most recent round of work in the

1 community tracking study, which I will talk with you
2 about in just a few minutes.

3 Just first by way of background, I wanted to
4 talk a little bit about what the interests are from the
5 health plan perspective in producing information and
6 using information around quality in health care and in
7 using that information specifically to create incentives
8 for physicians in health care delivery. Clearly, a key
9 reason is in creating incentives based on quality is to
10 encourage quality improvement and perhaps foster quality-
11 based competition among health care providers.

12 Additionally, there are clearly interests in
13 the health plan sector of the economy in using that
14 information to reduce unnecessary utilization in health
15 care and thereby reduce costs. However, there is also
16 recognition that by creating incentives linked to quality
17 in health care, there may also be a selection effect in
18 that they may be effective in attracting higher quality
19 providers to a health plan network. And in that regard,
20 these incentives could potentially be used as a mechanism
21 for health plans to compete themselves, compete among
22 health plans on the basis of quality in health care and
23 the quality of their provider network.

24 More generally these incentives potentially can
25 be used to align the financial interests of providers in

1 health plans, purchasers, and consumers, the key
2 stakeholders here, aligning their incentives, their
3 financial incentives toward achieving improvements in
4 health care delivery and improvements in health outcomes.

5 And then, finally, using incentives toward
6 providers based on quality potentially can get health
7 plans away from the business of having to monitor
8 directly delivery of health care services. Monitoring
9 those prospectively through prior authorization
10 requirements and a lot of the tools of managed care that
11 consumers and providers have really objected to in recent
12 years. So it can get health plans out of the business of
13 having to manage -- trying to manage care prospectively
14 or concurrently by creating incentives that allow
15 outcomes to be achieved without having to use those
16 administrative tools of managed care.

17 The potential disincentives, again from a
18 health plan perspective, of using incentives tied to
19 quality. First of all, health plans may have to attach
20 higher payments, to use higher payments along with those
21 incentives in order to attract risk adverse providers and
22 get them to agree to enter into these arrangements,
23 particularly if you are putting a portion of payment at
24 risk based on quality. For risk adverse providers faced
25 with uncertainty about the outcomes of health care, you

1 may need to introduce higher payments in order to achieve
2 agreement with providers.

3 Additionally, quality incentives have the
4 potential to distort the health care service mix or the
5 mix of services that it delivered away from some types of
6 services and procedures that may not be attached to these
7 incentives. So if you introduce incentives for some
8 types of health care and not for others, that may create
9 distortions in the mix of services that are delivered by
10 providers that may not always be desirable.

11 Additionally, the incentives potentially can
12 encourage providers to -- create incentives for providers
13 to engage in preferential selection of patients who are
14 likely to -- particularly incentives that are based on
15 outcomes, encourage providers to select patients and
16 agree to serve patients that are more likely to achieve
17 those better outcomes. And, conversely, they can create
18 incentives for providers to shy away from serving higher
19 risk patients or other kinds of patients that may be less
20 likely to achieve those outcomes.

21 And then, finally, these kind of incentives can
22 be very difficult and potentially costly to administer
23 from a health plan perspective. Acquiring reliable
24 measures of quality, collecting them, doing risk
25 adjustment and other types of processing that may be

1 required in order to use these measures for incentive
2 purposes can be quite costly from a health plan
3 perspective. So the question that many plans have, and
4 continue to have in looking at these arrangements is: do
5 the outcomes justify the costs in these arrangements.

6 I am just going to profile for you some of the
7 major findings that we have had, again looking nationally
8 over the past two years, developments across the health
9 plan marketplace. And what we are seeing with regard to
10 health plan use of quality information and use of quality
11 incentives. One key thing that we have seen is more
12 activity regarding profiling providers and providing
13 feedback to providers using measures of health care
14 quality. Certainly, an up-tick over two years ago.

15 Additionally, we have seen some plans begin to
16 experiment with public dissemination of information on
17 quality, again as a way to begin to encourage consumers
18 to use this information in their decision-making about
19 health seeking behavior.

20 We have also seen some additional
21 experimentation with financial incentives. Health plans
22 are tying financial incentives to quality measures as a
23 way to encourage providers to improve quality and
24 potentially trigger some quality-based competition among
25 providers. And then finally we have seen a very modest

1 amount of experimentation with using quality information
2 in developing provider networks, specifically in
3 developing and differentiating groups of providers based
4 on quality, sorting them into different tiers of
5 networks. This again serves as a way to create
6 incentives for providers to improve quality and as for
7 consumers to seek out higher quality providers.

8 We have also seen the use of quality
9 information incentives migrate from HMO products, which
10 is where we have perhaps historically seen more activity
11 in the use of quality information incentives, migrating
12 these types of activities now to PPO products and other
13 types of more loosely managed products that are becoming
14 more prevalent in the health insurance marketplace now.

15 And, finally, health plans are experiencing
16 continued challenges in the use of quality information
17 incentives, both the cost and the complexity of creating
18 that information and setting up those incentives and the
19 ability to get provider buy-in and acceptance of these
20 measures. And so I will go into detail on these findings
21 more in just a second.

22 I want to give you just a quick sketch of the
23 study that has produced this information for us and the
24 methodology we have used. This is information that is
25 coming from the most recent round of work from the

1 community-tracking study. This is a national,
2 longitudinal study funded by the Robert Wood Johnson
3 Foundation and conducted by the Center for Studying
4 Health System Change here in Washington, D.C. It is
5 designed to produce information about how local health
6 care systems across the country are changing and what the
7 implications are for health care delivery and practice.
8 There is a survey component and a site visit component.
9 And I will be talking specifically about findings from
10 our most recent wave of site visits, which we have just
11 completed over the last couple of weeks.

12 There are a series of 12 markets, communities
13 across the country that were randomly selected to be
14 nationally representative of local health care markets.
15 We visit these markets longitudinally, on a two year
16 rolling basis. So every two years we go into these
17 markets. We conduct interviews with a wide range of
18 health care stakeholders in these markets, including
19 health plans, physician organizations, hospitals,
20 employers, others in the insurance industry, brokers and
21 benefits consultants, as well as policy makers at state
22 and local levels to get a broad and balanced perspective
23 on changes that are underway in the markets. It also
24 allows us to triangulate results across different types
25 of respondents.

1 I will be talking primarily about findings that
2 we have learned from our interviews with health plans.
3 In each of these 12 markets, we interview -- each of
4 these 12 markets we interview three to six health plans
5 in the market that basically cover the largest commercial
6 health plans in the market, but we also make sure to
7 capture health plans that are involved in serving
8 Medicaid and Medicare populations. We interview the
9 largest Blue Cross/Blue Shield health plan in each
10 market, as well as the largest commercial, national
11 commercial health plans and also locally-based health
12 plans in each market to get a broad perspective.

13 And the round four visits that I will be
14 focusing on were conducted between September 2002 and May
15 2003. This just gives you a sense of where the 12
16 markets are located. Again, these were randomly selected
17 to be nationally representative. And we have a good mix
18 of communities across the different geographic regions.

19 I wanted to start by talking about some of our
20 findings related to why health plans are interested in
21 using quality information and incentives tied to quality
22 for their providers. Over the past four to five years,
23 we have seen a decline in the use of many of the tools
24 that managed care health plans have traditionally used to
25 control cost and manage health care utilization. We have

1 seen a pretty marked decline in the use of risk
2 contracting arrangements with health care providers in
3 many of our markets as a result of providers no longer
4 being willing to engage in these arrangements because
5 they are not profitable for them. But in some cases also
6 health plans not finding these arrangements work very
7 well.

8 Additionally, we have seen a loosening of many
9 of the utilization management tools that managed care
10 plans have traditionally used, particularly the use of
11 prior authorization requirements for visits to
12 specialists or for procedures on an in-patient or an out-
13 patient basis, a movement away from primary care
14 gatekeeping as a tool for managing utilization.
15 Additionally, we have seen a migration in many of our
16 markets, a migration away from the most tightly managed
17 products, the HMO products, toward more loosely managed
18 health insurance products, PPO products, that allow a
19 broader array of providers for consumers to choose from,
20 and allow the option for consumers to receive health care
21 from providers that are not included in the health plan's
22 network.

23 And along with that we have seen continued
24 movement to larger, more inclusive provider networks,
25 really across all product types. Even the HMO products

1 have moved increasingly to larger, less restrictive
2 networks of physicians in hospitals. And what these
3 trends have done really is they have weakened the ability
4 of health plans to use contracting and administrative
5 mechanisms to manage health care delivery. Particularly
6 this movement to the larger provider networks has really
7 shifted the focus of quality measurement and quality
8 improvement from the health plan level to the provider
9 level because now in many of our markets the health plans
10 really have comparable physician and hospital networks.
11 They are all using the same basic networks of physicians
12 and hospitals.

13 So there is very little differentiation across
14 plans in the provider network. Plans are no longer able
15 to use selective contracting as a way to try to limit
16 their networks to the most efficient providers or perhaps
17 the highest quality providers. So with this movement to
18 these less restrictive products, there has been a growing
19 focus on looking at ways to monitor quality at the
20 physician level and stimulate quality improvement at the
21 physician level.

22 Along with that, we see continued pressure on
23 health plans to constrain medical costs over the past two
24 years. In most of our markets we have seen -- this has
25 been the third or fourth year of double digit increases

1 in health insurance premiums. And in many markets,
2 health plans are concerned about the continued
3 affordability of their products and are looking for ways
4 to respond to the demands for employers for constraining
5 the growth in medical cost and for introducing lower cost
6 products.

7 Additionally, we have seen in some of our
8 markets actually demand -- from organized purchasing
9 groups and from large employers demand to introduce
10 quality incentives or incentives for physicians tied to
11 quality and demand for health plans to begin to become
12 more active in the production of information about
13 quality and the distribution of that information to
14 consumers to help inform their decision-making.

15 And we have also seen growing pressures from
16 purchasers for health plans to stabilize their provider
17 networks and improve their relationships with providers.
18 Over the past four years, we have seen in many of the
19 markets some turbulent relationships between the provider
20 community and the health plan community with a number of
21 very contentious and public contracting disputes, large
22 provider organizations pulling out of the networks of
23 certain health plans and disputes over payment
24 methodologies and rates. And that creating a lot of
25 uncertainty for consumers about continued access to their

1 health care providers.

2 So over this most recent period of time, health
3 plans have faced growing pressure to find ways of
4 stabilizing their networks so they can assure a constant
5 access to providers, a choice for consumers. So this has
6 created additional pressure for health plans to back away
7 from their aggressive negotiating tactics on health care
8 prices, to back away from some of the rigid
9 administrative tools they have used to contain costs, and
10 to find other ways to encourage physicians to deliver
11 health care in efficient and effective ways.

12 So what are we finding nationally across these
13 markets in terms of the use of quality information and
14 the use of incentives tied to quality among health plans?
15 This chart just shows you a summary of the prevalence of
16 different types of quality information and quality
17 incentive arrangements that health plans are using across
18 these markets. By far the most prevalent type of
19 activity related to quality going on in the health plan
20 market relates to the profiling of physicians, so
21 collecting a standard set of measures on health care
22 quality, provider-specific measures, passing those back
23 to providers, comparing providers to other providers in
24 the network on the basis of quality measures. We have
25 seen that activity, an increase in that activity. And

1 again, using measures of quality here as opposed to pure
2 measures of cost or utilization, we have seen this
3 activity now in all 12 of our markets and more than half
4 of the health plans interviewed in this round of the
5 study.

6 In terms of health plans actually releasing
7 that information, provider-specific information on
8 quality, to consumers and to purchasers and others who
9 are making health care decisions, those activities remain
10 much less prevalent today. We saw the health plan
11 activities around public dissemination of information on
12 quality in only three of our markets and in only five of
13 the health plans interviewed.

14 In terms of health plan activities related to
15 creating financial incentives for positions tied to
16 measures of quality, again there has been a fair amount
17 of activity over this most recent two year period of
18 time. We are seeing that in more than half of our
19 markets and about 15 health plans that were included in
20 this round of the study.

21 And then some additional experimentation with
22 ways of creating non-financial incentives to providers
23 that are tied to quality. One example of a health plan
24 using quality measures to establish different tiers of
25 provider networks within their health plan and some other

1 health plans using quality measures to extend exemptions
2 to traditional utilization management requirements or
3 physicians, again as a way to create some non-financial
4 incentives for providers to begin to improve performance
5 on the basis of quality measures.

6 So I am going to go into a little detail on
7 each of these types of mechanisms. First, the most
8 prevalent mechanism that health plans are using now
9 involves collecting standardized information on quality,
10 provider-specific information, providing this information
11 back to providers, comparing them to their peers based on
12 quality measures in order to both identify poor
13 performers and then to try to encourage those providers
14 to improve their performance.

15 So the kinds of developments that we have seen
16 over the past two years are health plans adding quality
17 measures to their existing profiling systems that
18 historically have been based mainly on measures of cost
19 and utilization. We have seen in a number of markets
20 again health plans taking their profiling systems that
21 traditionally have been used only in the tightly managed
22 HMO products, and introducing them into PPO products,
23 particularly as these products have grown much more
24 popular over the past three to four years.

25 And we have also seen health plans introducing

1 a number of new arrangements for providing consultation
2 and assistance to their low-performing health care
3 providers, the providers that score -- that appear to be
4 outliers in terms of the quality measures they are using.

5 And in terms of the quality measures that are
6 being used in health plans, we are seeing a wide range of
7 health care measures being used that target underuse,
8 overuse or misuse of health care services. Probably the
9 most prevalent type of measure being used by health plans
10 are measured that are included in the HEDIS measurement
11 set that originally were developed for profiling
12 performance among health plans. But now health plans
13 again using these measures, collecting them on a provider
14 specific basis.

15 Other types of measures being used, there is a
16 fair amount of activity in developing quality measures in
17 the area of prescribing and prescription drug delivery; a
18 number of health plans are tying quality measures to
19 their disease management programs and looking at
20 physician adherence to clinical practices and guidelines
21 that are established for disease management for specific
22 chronic conditions. Health plans are also using measures
23 related to patient satisfaction and self-reported
24 complaints. And, additionally, health plans in several
25 markets are beginning to create measures around the

1 patient safety measures identified in the Leapfrog
2 initiative that has been undertaken.

3 And in terms of health plans engagement in
4 actually disseminating information on quality to
5 consumers and purchasers, clearly the rationale that
6 health plans give for developing these arrangements is
7 their efforts to enable consumers to begin to migrate
8 from lower quality to higher quality providers based on
9 the measures they are delivering and to begin to
10 stimulate some level of competition among providers on
11 the basis of these quality measures.

12 We have seen more activity in this area on the
13 hospital side than on the physician side, but we have
14 seen some, in at least two of our markets, we have seen
15 health plans engage in disseminating physician-specific
16 or medical group-specific information on quality to
17 consumers. And health plans have been interested in not
18 only disseminating this information to consumers to help
19 inform their decision-making but also in providing this
20 information to employers and other health care purchasers
21 in an effort to inform the purchaser choice of provider
22 network or the purchaser choice of specific health
23 insurance products that may be offered.

24 In terms of the use of financial incentives
25 related to health care quality, clearly the rationale

1 that health plans report in using these arrangements is
2 an interest in stimulating quality improvement at the
3 provider level. In terms of physician incentives, we
4 have seen a variety of arrangements take shape over the
5 past two years, primarily focused on what health plans
6 call upside risk arrangements. So they are not placing
7 any current physician payments at risk under these
8 arrangements but they are creating bonuses or additional
9 payments that would be available to physicians who meet
10 the established criteria related to quality measures.

11 So we are seeing bonus arrangements, as well as
12 shared savings arrangements in some cases where health
13 plans will say any savings that we generate from improved
14 prescribing practice, for example, and limiting the
15 inappropriate prescription of antibiotics, any savings
16 generated from that activity will be shared with the
17 providers.

18 In general, the incentive amounts, we see a
19 fair amount of variation among plans in terms of how much
20 payment is being tied to these measures of quality. But
21 generally it seems to be fairly modest amounts, ranging
22 from 2 to 10 percent of the total physician payments in
23 most of the health plans using these arrangements. And
24 in general, most of these arrangements are still viewed
25 as pilot programs or demonstrations that health plans

1 have introduced for specific segments of their provider
2 networks rather than ruling them out across the provider
3 network. So health plans may be using them with a
4 specific type of provider, very frequently primary care
5 physicians, pediatricians for some of the incentives tied
6 to delivery of well childcare, for example. So health
7 plans are really just still experimenting with these
8 incentives.

9 And then, finally, in a few markets we have
10 seen health plans look at ways to create non-financial
11 incentives for physicians, again tied to quality
12 measures. So the goal is still the same, to encourage
13 quality improvement at the provider level, but finding
14 other ways of incentivizing those improvements beyond
15 directly financial mechanisms. So one strategy that has
16 been used by several health plans is to offer physicians
17 exemption from the health plan's standard prior
18 authorization requirements if they meet established
19 targets on their quality measures. So, for example, a
20 physician who exceeds an established threshold on
21 delivery of services or accurate prescribing patterns may
22 get an exemption from the need to seek prior
23 authorization for the health plan when prescribing
24 certain drugs or when referring patients to specialists.

25 Additionally, in one plan we have seen the use

1 of quality measures to establish tiered networks, tiered
2 provider networks, basically taking their provider
3 networks, sorting them into two different tiers, based in
4 part on quality measures. So you would have a preferred
5 provider network that would be established for the health
6 plan. Typically, it would offer -- consumers would
7 receive lower co-payments, lower out-of-pocket payments
8 if they access care from this preferred network of
9 providers. And the way that providers receive entry into
10 that preferred network is in part based on some of these
11 quality measures. So we have at least one plan
12 experimenting with that and several other plans
13 developing similar arrangements.

14 Just to summarize some of the continuing
15 challenges and issues that health plans are facing in
16 rolling out some of these arrangements around information
17 incentives: data issues are really paramount here. The
18 availability of data, the quality of data, again at the
19 provider level continues to be a problem for many
20 providers, particularly many health plans, particularly
21 those that rely on contracts with individual physicians.
22 It can be very difficult to develop valid and reliable
23 measures of quality at the individual physician level.

24 And there are also issues in risk adjustment.
25 Continued issues around provider acceptance, although

1 this appears to be more difficult on the hospital side of
2 the network than in the physician side in terms of
3 getting providers to agree to contracts that include
4 quality incentives.

5 The cost of implementing and maintaining these
6 incentive systems continues to be an issue and a lot of
7 uncertainty about whether health plans can realize a
8 return on investment in terms of lower health care costs
9 overall through introducing these information and
10 incentive arrangements.

11 And then finally, health plans continue to be
12 challenged with ways of making consumers aware of the
13 information and encouraging consumers to begin to use
14 information on quality in their health care decision-
15 making, in selecting providers and perhaps as well in
16 considering treatment alternatives.

17 So just in conclusion, I think in looking over
18 this most recent round of data from the community
19 tracking study, we clearly have seen an up-tick in the
20 use of information and incentives related to quality in
21 health care among health plans. But plans are still
22 early in their experimentation with these methodologies
23 and still have a lot of uncertainties about whether they
24 will take hold in the marketplace, whether consumers will
25 begin to use them, whether providers will accept them,

1 and whether they will be effective in encouraging
2 quality.

3 There is a fair amount of optimism about the
4 potential rewards in terms of cost savings and quality
5 improvement. And the plans we have talked about, many of
6 them are making substantial investments in information
7 systems and in other mechanisms to support these
8 arrangements. So they are clearly optimistic about the
9 rewards here. But they also recognize the risks in terms
10 of creating new administrative costs and added
11 complexity, both for providers and consumers in this
12 market.

13 So I will stop there.

14 (Applause.)

15 MR. HYMAN: The next speaker is Dr. Wendy
16 Levinson, who once her Power Point loads, will be able to
17 talk.

18 DR. LEVINSON: Well, I appreciate the
19 opportunity to be here today. And I actually want to
20 start by saying that even though it says University of
21 Toronto, I have actually spent most of my career in the
22 U.S. I am a practicing general internist who has
23 practiced mainly in Portland, Oregon and then in Chicago
24 for many years. And my perspective on this really comes
25 from both my own practice and my research related to

1 communication between doctors and patients. And I have
2 focused a lot of my work on issues that are relevant to
3 these hearings relating to malpractice, informed
4 decision-making, and conflict of interest in the
5 doctor/patient relationship. Most of my work is actually
6 being funded by the Agency for Health Care Research and
7 Quality and also by NIH. So that is the perspective I
8 share these comments with you today.

9 So I actually want to start by taking a minute
10 to talk about this diagram because I see the
11 physician/patient relationship and what goes on in our
12 daily work as practicing doctors as embedded in the
13 health care environment and influenced strongly by things
14 of interest to these hearings. The interaction between
15 doctors and patients is situated in the context of the
16 environment. And policy issues really have a direct
17 impact on what happens between doctors and patients in
18 daily interactions. Patients are concerned, as we have
19 heard about, with things in this outer box, quality,
20 cost, information, the legal environment. And many of
21 these things influence both the patient and the
22 physician. In turn, they shape the expectations and the
23 trust that both doctors and patients have before they
24 walk into a health care encounter.

25 Then there is communication that occurs between

1 the doctor and the patient, and I am going to tell you
2 that that is a lot of where patients actually do get
3 informed about health care, before they enter the exam
4 room. And, lastly, what occurs in the encounter between
5 the doctor and patient strongly influences the outcomes
6 that you see in that right-hand box of trust,
7 satisfaction, adherence to treatment, biologic outcomes,
8 malpractice and enrollment or dis-enrollment from health
9 plans.

10 So take, for example, a patient seeking hip
11 replacement surgery. They are going to have heard about
12 who in their health plan performs this well. They might
13 have read the quality data we heard about in the last
14 presentation. They are concerned about what is covered
15 in their health plan. And they may even be concerned
16 about how their doctor is paid and whether their primary
17 care doctor is going to refer them to an orthopedic
18 surgeon if they have certain conditions. And they enter
19 the exam room with this information they have heard about
20 in the environment. The doctor too enters the exam room
21 with his or her own concerns. For example, if they are
22 practicing in certain parts of this country, they are
23 very worried about being sued. And that influences how
24 the doctor comes in to the encounter.

25 Then these lead, as I am going to share with

1 you, with what really transpires between doctors and
2 patients and the communication that they have together.
3 And about why the communication really matters. And a
4 little bit of the science about this because there is a
5 very large body of literature that shows that what
6 transpires between doctors and patients in the
7 communication between them affects all of these outcomes.
8 It certainly affects the trust at the end of the visit.
9 Any of you who have been a patient know this, that you
10 leave the exam room, go home and tell your family member
11 about what the doctor said, and whether you believe the
12 doctor based on something that transpired between you.
13 It certainly has a big impact on patient satisfaction.

14 There are health plans around the country that
15 have been offering communication skills training to their
16 doctors to enhance patient satisfaction because they know
17 it affects the bottom line, which is dis-enrollment. If
18 patients are not happy with what happened with the
19 doctor, if they feel that that provider didn't listen,
20 was hurried, rushed, didn't give them enough information,
21 they are much more likely to dis-enroll from that health
22 plan. And in this market that you are well aware of, the
23 incentive is strong to keep patients enrolled in your
24 plan and enhancing patient satisfaction is one of the
25 ways to do that.

1 There is a body of literature that demonstrates
2 the relationship between adherence and communication. In
3 a very clever study, they collected the contents of
4 garbage cans outside of emergency rooms and counted up
5 the prescriptions. Lo and behold, about 50 percent of
6 the prescriptions were in the garbage can. I can assure
7 you 50 percent of the patients did not say to the doctor,
8 "I don't plan to fill this prescription." But they were
9 thinking that. So breakdowns in communication lead to
10 problems with following doctors' recommendations.

11 And there is a really interesting small body of
12 literature about the relationship of communication to
13 biologic outcomes. This literature shows that patients
14 who are actively involved as partners in their health
15 care, participating and making decisions with their
16 doctors, have better outcomes in chronic disease. So in
17 diabetes and hypertension, rheumatologic illness,
18 patients that are active participants in their care may
19 actually do better. So this is what doctors mean by
20 informed and active participation in care.

21 And, lastly, I have done a fair amount of work
22 myself on the relationship of communication and
23 malpractice. And though I won't talk about it a lot, I
24 can assure you that there is just no question, based on
25 the literature, that it is not just bad things that

1 happen in care, it is breakdowns in communication that
2 lead patients to feel that they are going to go to a
3 lawyer to sue them. It is when patients feel their
4 doctor didn't listen, wasn't caring and concerned, and
5 then a bad outcome occurs, that they turn to litigation.
6 And they forgive actually many outcomes that they could
7 litigate if they feel like the doctor was compassionate
8 and caring. So the communication matters to a lot of
9 outcomes to patients and physicians.

10 So the implication of this is that policy
11 decisions have a direct affect on that environment I
12 showed you and that in turn these affect the actual
13 interactions between doctors and patients. And true
14 informed decisions depend not only what happens before a
15 patient enters the health care experience but also what
16 happens between doctors and patients. And I am going to
17 share with you two specific examples of research briefly
18 to give you a flavor for some of this.

19 So I would start by saying that there has been
20 an increasing drive to inform patients in health care.
21 The Institute of Medicine has stated in its "Crossing the
22 Quality Chasm," that "Health care that ensures that
23 decisions respect patients' needs and preferences and
24 solicits patients' input on the support and education
25 they need to make decisions is what we should be striving

1 for." This is often referred to as "patient-centered
2 care." And the Institute of Medicine, along with ethical
3 reasons and certainly legal reasons, would push the
4 profession to try to develop ways to enhance patient-
5 centered care. And there are quite a number of efforts
6 underway to enhance this kind of collaboration, where
7 providers are able to solicit what do patients really
8 want and to try to work with patients to achieve those
9 goals.

10 We did a study where, this is the kind of work
11 I do, I audio taped 1,300 encounters in the community
12 with practicing primary care doctors and surgeons. And
13 we tried to listen to those audio tapes to see how
14 informed consent really happened. And we used these
15 criteria. We looked at whether there was any discussion
16 about a patient's role in decision-making, whether
17 doctors talked about the clinical issue, and the nature
18 of the decision. So if you are going to have hip
19 replacement surgery, what does that surgery entail, and a
20 discussion of alternatives. If you are not going to have
21 the hip replacement, then what can you do for the pain
22 you are having in your hip. And that might be using
23 medications. Did doctors discuss the pros and cons of
24 the different alternatives or the risks and benefits?
25 The assessment of patient's understanding, like after all

1 this stuff the doctor tells you, did the patient get it
2 or did they misunderstand because we tend to use a lot of
3 jargon that can be easily misunderstood. Was there any
4 discussion of uncertainties associated with the decision?
5 And, lastly, did the physician explore what the patient's
6 true preferences were. And these were based on both
7 ethical and legal standards of what we considered good,
8 informed decision-making in the encounter to be.

9 What we found is that in complicated, and I am
10 only showing complicated decisions like you would be
11 considering whether to have a hip replacement, that
12 physicians told the patient that they had a role, like we
13 are going to make this decision together or this decision
14 is really up to you about 18 percent of the time. They
15 were very good at talking about the nature of the
16 decision. So if you listen to a surgeon, you will know
17 what the hip replacement is going to be about and how
18 long you will be in the hospital and what the procedure
19 entails. They talked about alternatives about 30 percent
20 of the time. The pros and cons about 25 percent of the
21 time. Uncertainties, some but not a lot. They assessed
22 patients' understanding very, very rarely. And they
23 solicit the patient's preferences about 27 percent of the
24 time.

25 So what this really says is that true informed

1 decision-making happens a lot when the doctor and patient
2 get together. That is when the patient does hear what
3 the choices are about the pain their hip and whether to
4 consider hip replacement. And I think doctors and
5 patients value the discussion that they have that truly
6 shapes decisions and patient satisfaction. But what this
7 data would say is that really these informed decision-
8 making conversations fall quite a bit below what ethical
9 and legal standards would be for this.

10 I think this has significant malpractice
11 implications. If you have a conversation and then go on
12 to have a bad outcome and reflect back on whether you
13 were well-informed about the risks and the benefits and
14 the alternatives, you may look back and say, "Gee, I
15 didn't know that this bad outcome could happen" and then
16 it makes you more angry that you had the bad outcome that
17 you didn't expect or anticipate was a possibility.

18 It certainly has implications for training of
19 physicians, and I would tell you that there is a lot of
20 interest in the physician community in educating
21 physicians to do a better job of communication. This is
22 driven by data like this. For example, the American
23 Academy of Orthopedic Surgery, based on this and some
24 other work, has a huge national campaign to improve
25 orthopedic surgeons' ability to communicate, particularly

1 on informed decision-making.

2 In addition, the American College of Graduate
3 Medical Education, the standard setter for residency
4 training, has put out new competencies and interpersonal
5 and communication skills as one of the seven key
6 competencies for the ACGME. And the American Board of
7 Medical Specialties is training physicians so they
8 realize its importance. And so there is a recognition
9 that these skills matter to the outcomes that doctors and
10 patients both care about, the ones I mentioned to you
11 earlier.

12 And, lastly, I would say that it does have a
13 very important implication for time during visits. I
14 think one of the things that many of you have heard about
15 through this is physicians have been frustrated over the
16 years by the bureaucratic nature of administering a
17 medical practice now, the insurance control, the
18 preauthorization, the things we are trying to get away
19 from. But one of the reasons doctors have been unhappy
20 with that is that they value time with patients and
21 patients value time with doctors. And you can't
22 adequately inform patients about important or complicated
23 decisions in two minutes. If we don't protect time in
24 that encounter, I think we will have patients who feel
25 ill-informed, no matter what they were told before they

1 entered the exam room because this is, like I said,
2 critical minutes for truly understanding the nature of
3 complicated decisions.

4 So I share that with you a little bit to help
5 you understand what the implications of the policy issues
6 are on how patients actually make decisions in the course
7 of a day with their providing physician.

8 And I want to shift for a minute and talk a
9 little bit about another issue, a policy issue, which is
10 the financial incentives and conflict of interest in the
11 doctor/patient relationship. This is also an area that
12 has been of interest to me, and I think of interest to
13 you. You are certainly aware that there are many state
14 and federal regulations requiring disclosure of initial
15 physicians' financial incentives. So Medicare and
16 Medicaid organizations participating in that, health care
17 organizations, are required by law to disclose, often in
18 fine print, how physicians are paid. Certainly managed
19 care has heightened the consumer's worries that perhaps
20 physician financial incentives might actually not be in
21 their best interest but be undermining quality of care.
22 And in the days of more managed care incentives around
23 constraining costs, this had been a big concern to
24 patients.

25 And, in fact, some patients directly raised

1 this issue with their physicians. In fact, I recall a
2 patient who kind of looked at me one day, mis-trustingly,
3 and asked whether I was not referring her to a
4 neurosurgeon because I was paid more if I didn't refer
5 her. And I was shocked to hear her say this. It wasn't
6 at all on my mind but I realized that if she was thinking
7 this, a lot more people were thinking it and weren't
8 brave enough to say it to me. So I think that some of
9 the regulations and the public is worried about whether
10 physicians are being paid in ways that might not be
11 incentivizing quality, like we heard of before, but
12 actually might be not in their best interest.

13 So we did a study funded by AHRQ to look at
14 what the patient preferences were for disclosure about
15 this kind of information and most importantly to ask the
16 question can you disclose physician's financial
17 incentives without undermining patient trust, which is so
18 key to the doctor/patient encounter. We did that through
19 a major national survey conducted every couple of years
20 called the General Social Survey. This is a two-hour
21 face-to-face interview conducted by the National Opinion
22 Research Center. And we had about 3,000 participants.
23 And for those people we defined financial incentives as
24 "some doctors or groups may be paid more if they limit
25 the use of expensive tests or to use a specialist, such

1 arrangements are known as financial incentives." And
2 then we randomized patients to hear different ways that
3 the doctor could talk about this issue. The patient
4 actually asked for a MRI for headaches. And the doctor
5 had to tell them that they didn't need the MRI and raised
6 the issue of financial incentives. And we had six
7 different strategies to communicate that information.
8 And we measured the effects on satisfaction and trust to
9 put your interests above costs, whether you would agree
10 with the doctor's decision not to order the MRI and
11 whether you might switch doctors or health plans.

12 So, interestingly, we found that 50 percent of
13 the public had heard of financial incentives, physician
14 financial incentives of any kind. That certain groups,
15 blacks, Hispanics, and less educated patients, actually
16 people who are less healthy, were less likely to know
17 about financial incentives that could impact their care.
18 Almost everyone wants to be told that financial
19 incentives to physicians exist, if they do. And they
20 prefer to be told by both the health plan representative
21 when they sign up but they also want doctors to tell
22 them. The vast majority of patients did not want just
23 the health plan alone. They felt doctors should be
24 involved in talking about money. And I can assure you
25 doctors are not experienced in talking about money with

1 patients, and certainly not talking about their own
2 financial incentives in any shape or form. It has not
3 been part of what we have talked about.

4 So we tested six strategies, and I just want to
5 give you a flavor for this because it is interesting.
6 This is what we call the common enemy strategy. "It used
7 to be that physicians were able to provide tests to
8 patients just to set their mind at ease. Unfortunately,
9 your health plan won't allow me to do. Even though I
10 would like to order it, your plan is not going to pay for
11 it." Now I can assure you this is a common strategy.
12 This is what doctors told us in focus groups that they
13 frequently do to tell patients about incentives.

14 And here is another one, this is dealing with
15 emotions. "I can understand that you are worried about
16 whether everything is okay. It also sounds like you are
17 worried that I am not ordering the test because it is too
18 expensive. These days with managed care lots of people
19 share your worries. I want to set your mind at rest
20 because I truly do not think that the test is needed at
21 this point." So this was clearly a different way of
22 communicating similar information. And then we were able
23 by the randomized design to assess the outcomes. And
24 this is just a bit of a flavor for it.

25 As you can see, the common enemy, the people

1 were much less likely to agree with the doctor's decision
2 not to order the MRI than the emotion-handling strategy.
3 They were less likely to trust the doctor. They did, by
4 the way, believe the doctor when they used the common
5 enemy strategy. They thought it was real. And they were
6 more likely to switch doctors or switch health plans than
7 if you used an emotion-handling strategy to address
8 discussing this kind of financial incentive.

9 So the implications of this work really is
10 that, as you know, federal and state requirements require
11 disclosure. Health plans, and more importantly I
12 believe, doctors are going to need to talk about these
13 kinds of things with patients, not something we are used
14 to. And that there are some ways to disclose, which will
15 decrease trust and others which may maintain or at least
16 not damage trust too much. It is not going to be the
17 fine print in a brochure that patients or a web location
18 that patients want to hear about it. They want to hear
19 about this in person if it affects their health.

20 And so what I would say in closing is that
21 patients who are truly informed are going to be informed
22 not only through the kinds of information that we have
23 heard about in other settings but also through effective
24 communication with providers. And in turn, as I
25 mentioned in the earlier diagram, effective communication

1 is going to have a positive effect on many outcomes,
2 biologic outcomes and satisfaction, trust, perhaps
3 malpractice prevention. The policy decisions made in
4 these kinds of settings will directly and indirectly
5 affect the interaction that occurs between doctors and
6 patients. If physicians are really apprehensive about
7 malpractice and the crisis occurring, that will affect
8 their interaction with patients. And if patients are
9 worried that financial incentives are not aligned in
10 their best interest, they will be mistrustful when they
11 enter the exam room. That does affect how the doctor and
12 patient work together. And I think disclosure of
13 financial incentives will affect the outcomes of care
14 through the interaction between doctors and patients.

15 So I am open and eager to participate
16 afterwards in the discussion. Thank you.

17 (Applause.)

18 MR. HYMAN: Thank you, Dr. Levinson. Our next
19 presenter is Dr. Joanne Lynn.

20 DR. LYNN: Hi, delighted to be among you. I am
21 feeling a little out of my league. It is not entirely
22 clear how I helpfully address the issues before the
23 Federal Trade Commission. But I tried putting a few of
24 our issues and ideas together. My background is as a
25 physician. I also work in ethics and health services

1 research. And work mainly with people who are very sick.

2 So it is a bad prognostic sign to be among my
3 scope of interest. I am interested in people who are
4 very sick and never again going to really be well and are
5 going to die of their condition. Interestingly though,
6 for most of us that condition now lasts a few years at
7 the end of life. It is no longer the case that people
8 sort of get terribly sick and die all in one sentence and
9 all in one week. Mostly we get very sick, live with it
10 for a very long time. And then gradually find a way to
11 die. So some of the issues that arise are a little
12 different. I am going to start with a few ideas about
13 how to think about this field and then I will try to lay
14 out some of the ways in which I think it would be helpful
15 to the FTC.

16 First thing to recognize is how people come to
17 the end of life is enormously different than it was even
18 a very short time ago. This is a comparison of 100 years
19 ago. And you will see that -- if any of you don't have
20 the handout, hold up your hand and one of my team will
21 bring it around to you. There has been an enormous
22 shift. Most people, just 100 years ago, died at what we
23 would now say is very young. Only a very small number of
24 people, about one in 10 of the people who now make it to
25 80 would have made it to 80 100 years ago. The causes of

1 death were relatively abrupt. Women who made it to
2 adulthood died of childbirth. Men who made it to
3 adulthood died of work. And only the very rare person
4 who was lucky and had good genes and never smoked and
5 never worked in a dangerous facility managed to make it
6 to old age. And therefore, costs at the end of life were
7 very inexpensive.

8 One of our biggest problems in taking care of
9 people at the end of life is that Americans simply don't
10 recognize that it is plausible that life should end.
11 This is the Wizard of I, and the serf comes and asks, "Do
12 you have anything that stops aging?" And the wizard
13 answers, "Sure. Which disease would you like?" It is a
14 fundamental recognition that most Americans have managed
15 to avoid -- we managed to put out all sorts of things
16 that will save life and rescue you from dying and prevent
17 death. And I am here to tell you that there is nothing
18 that prevents death. At best we trade off causes and
19 make it a little later. But it sure sounds different if
20 you said, "New gizmo for heart disease." Instead of
21 saying that it promises to save a half a million lives
22 next year, than if you said it promises to delay death by
23 a few years and give you the opportunity to die of
24 strokes and dementia.

25 We are down to a very small number of ways to

1 die. About 83 percent of us now die covered by Medicare.
2 Nine out of 10 people who die covered by Medicare die of
3 heart disease, lung disease, cancer, stroke, or dementia.
4 That is five. That is it. If you wipe out one, you will
5 substantially increase the others. A fundamental fact,
6 which is not part of our public consciousness at all,
7 certainly not part of our advertising, it is all prevent
8 this and something truly wonderful will happen. And
9 while it is a good thing to live a little longer, it is
10 also the case that the longer you live, the more likely
11 you are to die with dementia, functional deficit, and
12 frailty. And it is not entirely clear that the public
13 would buy that trade- off.

14 So the fundamental truths are that the
15 dysfunctions in the care system arise from the enormous
16 change in the demographics. We find it very easy to
17 blame doctors and to say it is their venality, stupidity,
18 and inability to communicate. Whereas in fact in a world
19 in which we have not a single evening soap opera kind of
20 character on television and almost no movies that
21 characterize how people live near the end of life for
22 anything other than young women dying of cancer, then --
23 young to me is anything under 80, incidentally -- it is
24 not at all surprising that doctors and patients all have
25 a very hard time talking about how people come to the end

1 of life with heart disease, dementia, frailty, because we
2 have no language, no stories, no cultural myths. So the
3 language categories and assumptions are all fouled up.

4 There is a claim that the big problem is that
5 doctors ignore what patients have to say, and that is not
6 at all clearly to be the case. It seems much more likely
7 that doctors now do follow the preferences and clear
8 statements of patients. But the clear statements and
9 preferences of patients are exceedingly rarely laid out.
10 There are very few patients who walk in with a badge
11 saying: "I am quite clear that here is the way I want
12 treated, here is what I want, here is what I don't want."
13 If a patient has that and has it clearly thought it,
14 there is pretty good evidence that it is followed. There
15 is also pretty good evidence that that almost never
16 happens; patients instead arrive scared, ambiguous,
17 uncertain, and doctors and patients tough it through. So
18 it isn't at all clear that patients clear preferences are
19 being trumped. It is much more likely that they have
20 never been helped to generate clear preferences.

21 And quality comparisons that we have out there,
22 if you go to any of them, any of the national ones, any
23 of the state-based ones, the ones Last Acts put out for
24 end of life care, they really don't address quality
25 comparisons among possible ways of being served at the

1 end of life. So you don't have a way of going to the web
2 and figuring out whether Kaiser or Aetna or just fee for
3 service is going to be better for you as you face your
4 end of life with frailty at 94. The information you need
5 has never been collected, is not catalogued there. If
6 anything, it is almost adverse to that information
7 because instead it is all about how you could
8 successfully manage to get through one or another surgery
9 or procedure. What you really want to know is things
10 like continuity, symptom management, family support,
11 bankruptcy, the kinds of things that weigh on your mind
12 as you are facing living with a bad disease. And those
13 are not only not catalogued, they aren't even collected.
14 We barely know how to address them.

15 One of our myths is that we know who is dying.
16 This is actual data from the Support Project. This is
17 what we call the Hebrew Analysis. The right-hand side of
18 the graph is the zero and you work backwards, right to
19 left. So you are reading right to left. The day ahead
20 of death, the median patient dying of lung cancer still
21 has a 20 percent chance to live two months. A week
22 ahead, the median patient with lung cancer, this
23 metastatic, non-small-cell lung cancer, inoperable and
24 present for more than a month, so this is not sort of
25 anything -- nobody thinks this is a good disease, this is

1 almost a universally fatal illness within six months --
2 nevertheless, within a week of dying, half the patients
3 looked like they could make it two months.

4 How could that be? This is our most
5 predictable big-time illness. The reason is because a
6 fair number of people die rather abruptly. They get an
7 infection. They get a stroke. They get a complication.
8 They get a seizure, and they actually die fairly quickly.
9 This is 20 to 30 percent of people with lung cancer.

10 When you look at heart failure, look what the
11 median does. The median on the day ahead of death is
12 still 60 percent chance to live two months. And just a
13 week ahead, it is 80 percent. Now if you take the Y axis
14 and shift it to six month prognosis, lung cancer goes
15 right to the bottom, because almost nobody makes it six
16 months. What happens to heart failure is that it slides
17 down 10 percent. So the median person on the day ahead
18 of death with heart failure had a 50/50 chance to live
19 six months. Now it takes a while for us to get
20 our brains around a sentence that complicated. It is as
21 if you had a weather reporting system -- weather
22 forecasting system in which the best you could do would
23 be 50/50 chance of rain and every single rainy day
24 followed on a 50/50 chance. So you had 100 days with a
25 50/50 chance. You had exactly 50 rainy days. The model

1 works precisely. But you never have a 90 percent chance
2 of rain in this disease because the usual dying is a
3 sudden death in the context of very fragile health.

4 So these are the people who are going along
5 barely hanging on and then they get a heart attack, they
6 get a stroke, they get a something, and they are suddenly
7 gone.

8 But the best you can do is to have an ambiguous
9 prognosis knowing that if you had a large population, you
10 could draw a Kaplan Meyer curve and plot out exactly how
11 many people would be alive six months from now. But you
12 couldn't tell me whether Mr. Smith was going to die early
13 or late. That means you cannot tie good care to the
14 promise to die quickly.

15 So if we are going to build good care for the
16 end of life, it is going to have to be able to take care
17 of people who live a long time. Some of these people are
18 going to live five years, and every day is a fragile
19 endeavor. And some are going to be gone tomorrow. They
20 are going to have stood downwind of a salt load and they
21 are going to be gone. And you can't tell when that is
22 going to happen. That is a very hard thing for us to
23 believe. We believe that if doctors were just honest
24 with us, we could tell who was going to die. And the
25 idea that three or four weeks ahead of death a doctor

1 cannot tell you who among a group of very sick people
2 will die within a month is contrary to the way we want to
3 think about the end of life or the way we want to think
4 about how to organize care. So we want to think that
5 until doctors say you are dying, you don't have to worry
6 about it.

7 One way we have been misled is by thinking
8 that, if the Y axis is all treatment and the X axis is
9 time, that we safely can stay in an aggressive mode of
10 treatment for a long time and then we will hit some
11 divide, which is terribly uncomfortable, and after that
12 we are supposed to do hospice care, palliative care,
13 something of the sort. And we know how to do one or the
14 other, but never both. It is like you can use the board
15 to play checkers or chess, but you can't play them
16 simultaneously.

17 So we don't know how to do one or the other.
18 What we have is most patients actually present needing
19 this sort of care. From diagnosis there are a few things
20 you need to do to help the person live well with a bad
21 disease. So you are going to be treating symptoms from
22 early on and helping provide support and recognizing that
23 this disease may go badly. But you are going to mainly
24 be doing things to modify the disease. As you go along,
25 the proportions shift. But there is never a point in

1 time in which you only do one or the other. Right up to
2 the end of life you might be doing something that would
3 modify the course of the illness. But the proportion
4 that you would be attending to end of life issues and
5 symptoms would be much higher.

6 That is a very different mental model of what
7 is happening at the end of life. It requires that you be
8 willing to put people in the intensive care unit to
9 unload their central circulation with a do not
10 resuscitate order and support for possible end of life
11 during this hospitalization. It requires that people in
12 hospice might be able to have access to some aggressive
13 treatments. We have been very comfortable in thinking we
14 could only do one or the other and never mix them up.
15 And if we are going to actually serve the population we
16 will all become, we are going to need to think through
17 how to build care systems that can do this instead.

18 So we have been thinking about how to do that
19 and in a very short synopsis we would say that instead of
20 dividing the world by diagnosis and setting of care,
21 which is how we mostly divided it, we divide it by lung
22 disease, gall bladder and so forth and, on the other
23 hand, hospital home care, nursing home. We instead say
24 there are three kinds of people in the population. There
25 are very healthy people. And what do you need from

1 health care on a day that you are healthy is basically
2 911 and prevention, you want mammograms and ambulances
3 and nothing else. You don't want your doctor calling you
4 at 3:00 in the afternoon to see how you are doing. When
5 you accumulate some chronic illnesses, you actually want
6 prevention, but now prevention for the disease you have.
7 So you want secondary prevention. But you actually want
8 the same things. You want to prevent the progression of
9 the disease you have and the rescue services.

10 But all of us get a tour through that last
11 little wedge. That last little wedge is the piece of
12 time when you are living with a very bad disease. And
13 there, what is different, is that the care system has to
14 be more responsive and appropriate or everything that
15 matters to you in life becomes bankrupt. You will not be
16 able to enjoy anything else in life if you are
17 overwhelmed of shortness of breath, by depression, by
18 pain. If your family is overwhelmed by care-giving, if
19 you can't get to food or you can't get to the bathroom.

20 So at the point at which you need daily help,
21 then the care system has to come to you in a very
22 different way. And we have to probably think about how
23 to organize care very differently. Now here is where we
24 are really stymied because we have no way to innovate, or
25 at least in any large numbers, in order to learn the

1 processes that would serve this population optimally.

2 There seem to be three general trajectories.
3 It is useful to think in terms of building care systems
4 around this. One is the one that is epitomized by solid
5 tumor cancers, colon cancer, and so forth, when a person
6 goes along, the X axis is time, the Y axis is sort of how
7 well you are doing, and really does pretty well for a
8 long time and then finally has a short period of time
9 where they really lose ground, take to bed, look sickly,
10 and die. This is the model that was in mind when we
11 built hospice.

12 Many more of us now die with organ system
13 failure, with intermittent exacerbations and a rather
14 sudden dying. This is the one that was characterized by
15 that heart failure slide I showed you earlier. People
16 are terribly sick and rescued. They think they are
17 waiting for cancer. But in fact the disease they have
18 will kill them. It will kill us. It is just a matter of
19 which one, which episode will take our lives.

20 Already this is a little more common than the
21 cancer trajectory, but by far the most common is the
22 failure trajectory of frailty and dementia. Already more
23 than 40 percent of us die this route. It takes the
24 longest time. Much more of the costs are outside of
25 Medicare. We have much more problem because Medicare and

1 Medicaid and private wealth all contribute to supporting
2 this phase of life, and we have not built terribly good
3 care systems for it.

4 But we could build care systems around these
5 three and make it make sense. There are other countries
6 designing their care systems this way. We are still
7 debating whether we can expand hospice 10 percent. And,
8 in fact, the number of people, the number of days that
9 are involved in end of life care is on the order of 1,000
10 to 10,000 times what hospice now covers. It is not a
11 very small piece of the care system. Indeed, the best
12 estimate is it is something on the order of a third of
13 all health care dollars go into taking care of you with a
14 disease that takes your life. That is not surprising,
15 that is when you are sickest.

16 But it is a very different way of thinking
17 about end of life care. Instead of thinking of it as
18 this tiny little sliver of the health care system, you
19 say, no, wait a minute, whole lots of people in
20 hospitals, ICUs, doctors' offices, are actually living
21 with the disease that will take their life. And we could
22 probably do better if we thought about how to put that
23 together.

24 This is the rough proportions, just to show you
25 how they tend to break out. This is all in Medicare

1 population. But 83 percent of us die in Medicare now.

2 So what is it a good care system should be able
3 to promise? And what is important here is not the
4 specifics but that we should have care systems that are
5 able to promise anything. That when you sit down with a
6 patient who faces a terribly serious illness, what you
7 want as a patient and what the provider would ideally
8 want is to be able to promise the patient that they will
9 get the right treatment, their symptoms will never be
10 overwhelming, there are no gaps in the care. We have
11 thought it through. There will be no surprises. We will
12 plan ahead. We will customize the care to your
13 preferences. We will honor your family and take their
14 role seriously. And, most importantly, we will help you
15 to live the life as fully as possible in the shadow of
16 dying. Now those are reasonable promises. Your
17 grandmother would have told you that if she had thought
18 about it long enough.

19 What is important is we have no way to make any
20 of those promises for a care system that crosses any
21 boundary, hospital to home care, home care to hospice,
22 hospice to nursing home. We have no way to even measure
23 the performance of care systems across the way we
24 structure the boundaries. So what a patient needs to
25 hear, you are sitting their with emphysema, you need to

1 hear that you will never suffocate. And instead what you
2 hear is all this garbage about how we know how to treat
3 this or that or the other or you might get a free lung.
4 But what the patient wants to hear is that we know what
5 we are doing and we have thought it all through. We
6 don't even have a way to do that. We don't even have a
7 way to sit all the players down and have them think
8 through how to provide care.

9 So the current shortcomings are just
10 everywhere. We have untreated pain. Forty percent of
11 people in nursing homes have pain when they arrive.
12 Forty percent of them still have it two to six months
13 later. Advanced care planning runs about 20 percent in
14 most studies. Twenty percent of people at the time of
15 dying have an advanced care plan. Almost everybody says
16 they want to live out their end of life wherever they are
17 living, nursing home or home. More than half of us die
18 in hospitals and another 25 percent in nursing homes,
19 after usually relatively short stays.

20 Here is one particularly stunning example. We
21 just published this last week in Annals. We asked a
22 bunch of hospitalists about an emphysema patient and said
23 if you had a problem like this, would you want terminal
24 sedation to be available rather than having to be on a
25 ventilator. Ninety-eight percent of the hospitals'

1 physicians that we asked in a big meeting, it was 300
2 people with one of those immediate responder systems, 98
3 percent of the doctors said that they would want terminal
4 sedation available. One percent said they routinely
5 offer it. You don't usually get a split quite that bad,
6 but that one is memorable, right? Ninety-eight percent
7 of doctors would want to be promised that they could be
8 sedated rather than go back on a ventilator. Only 1
9 percent routinely offer it to their patients. They don't
10 even know how to raise the question.

11 So observations on quality, we have this sense
12 that if only doctors would comply, patients all have
13 clear, enduring, important preferences about treatment
14 choices. That is our sense is that we could draw out
15 diagrams and patients could say, oh, yes, I want a
16 ventilator or not or, oh, yes, I want dialysis or not or
17 I want this or that. Shoshana is shaking her head hard.
18 Of course, that is not the case, especially as you are up
19 against dying. Most patients have never been through
20 this before. You get kind of one shot. And so here they
21 have all these ambiguous things. At best their doctor is
22 saying something like you have an "X" percent chance to
23 make it through with this treatment. And they have no
24 idea what the suffering entailed would be like. How
25 fatigue will feel. How shortness of breath will feel.

1 How it will feel to watch what happens to their family as
2 they go through care-giving. Patients don't come into
3 these situations with off-the-shelf preferences.

4 So you have to learn them in the process. And
5 very often the things we are willing to ask them about
6 treatment choices aren't what matters. What matters are
7 things like dignity, comfort, looking good in the eyes of
8 their family, having a good memory left in the eyes of
9 those who live on, sometimes even having a legacy to
10 leave to their children. And we are not comfortable in
11 asking patients if that is what they care about.

12 The best practices, interestingly, are arising
13 in the VA and in staff model managed care. So you are
14 much more likely to have very good end of life care in
15 the Veterans Administration or in Kaiser than you are
16 anywhere else in the care system. And I think we should
17 take that to heart because those are the places in many
18 ways that have the oddest of payment structures, where it
19 is either salaried or salaried with a very distant set of
20 incentives that the doctor doesn't feel very intensely at
21 the time of service. And they are capable of vertical
22 and horizontal integration. So they can really have a
23 population that they look to serve in whatever service
24 they need.

25 Hospice probably does offer high-quality

1 comprehensive care, although that has never been tested
2 or researched. But even if you believe that they are on
3 the whole providing very good care, you have to come to
4 terms with the fact that only 25 percent of us use them
5 at all and then only for the last three weeks of life.
6 So if the average duration of serious illness at the end
7 of life is now two to three years, and it hits about 90
8 percent of us, then you have to realize that hospice is a
9 tiny sliver of the service array.

10 And there is very little innovation or research
11 under way. When the IOM committee asked the Institutes
12 at NIH what they were doing with the bad end of each of
13 their diseases, the fellow from National Heart, Lung and
14 Blood Institute actually managed to answer that that was
15 simply not in their purview. The illness that kills one-
16 third of us is not in the purview of the Institute given
17 the funding to do research on that disease. So they are
18 only interested in cure and prevention. They are not
19 interested in how people live out the end of their life
20 with that illness. That is the kind of approach you get
21 almost everywhere. So even though we are spending now
22 probably a third of our funds on this phase of life,
23 there is almost no research or innovation agenda for
24 this.

25 So let me tell you a few things I can think of

1 about the markets. The first thing is quality is largely
2 unmeasured. Quality in this arena, we don't ask people
3 how do you feel about your life closure. We don't ask
4 people how is your spiritual life. We don't even
5 generally ask about symptoms, are you comfortable. And
6 surely those are terribly high importance issues. In
7 fact, when we go to measure quality, two out of the three
8 national web sites that try to report on the quality of
9 hospital care report hospital and mortality, which means
10 that in the hospitals being rated they are now beginning
11 to disassemble their palliative care programs, trying
12 very hard not to have death in the hospital, because it
13 adversely affects their mortality rate.

14 I would say, my God, if somebody is going to
15 die somewhere, have them die in the most appropriate
16 place. Let's not give hospitals a disincentive to keep
17 somebody on board who is going to die within the next 24
18 hours. It almost never serves them well to bump them out
19 in their last 24 hours.

20 So our measures, because we think, well, you
21 would always want to avoid mortality, in a world in which
22 most of us make it to 21, have avoided infant death and
23 driving and war, so we have made it to adulthood, almost
24 all of us are going to make it past 80. And the idea
25 that you want to always avoid death becomes kind of

1 silly. Most of my 85-year-old patients have kind of made
2 some sense out of the fact that there is going to be a
3 death in store. They don't want it to be worse than it
4 has to be.

5 We need the possibility of geographic
6 concentration. While all of us are going to have this
7 experience, any population has only a tiny fraction of
8 people going through it at any one time. If you want to
9 mobilize most services to the home, then you don't want
10 any one nurse in any one service to have to be spending
11 more than half of her time driving around the city or
12 driving around a rural area to get from one place to the
13 other. Instead, you want any one nurse, any one nursing
14 aide, any one doctor to be able to go to Mr. Smith's
15 house, go a block away, go to Mrs. Jones' house, go to
16 the next one, go to the next one. In all of Washington,
17 D.C., the number of people living very seriously ill on
18 this day is something under 3,000 people. Probably that
19 could be served by at most three good programs. You
20 don't want 27 because then everybody has to spend all
21 their time traveling, even in a city as small as this.
22 So geographic concentration has a real advantage as an
23 efficiency issue. How to manage to do that without
24 causing anticompetitive pressures is quite a challenge.

25 A second is that we need longitudinal

1 integration, which means that you need to be able to have
2 the same hospice working with the same home care program
3 working with the same doctors working with the same
4 hospitals and nursing homes. And right now Medicare
5 aggressively tries to break that up. So that as a
6 patient goes from hospital to SNF, they must be offered
7 every possible SNF. As they go from SNF to home care,
8 they must be offered every possible home care. As they
9 go from home care to hospice, again every possible
10 hospice. Now that sounds like it would be reasonably
11 good because they make their trade-offs. But it means
12 critically that their home health aide can't follow them.
13 Their doctor can actually overcome some of that.

14 But these are people that become very dependent
15 upon the person who comes in to give them a bath. And
16 every time you change your funding stream, you have to
17 change your home health aide, which becomes disastrous.
18 So we need ways of integrating longitudinally in order to
19 serve the population optimally.

20 There is a lot of substitute possible among the
21 services. States that provide almost no home care have
22 very high hospice rates of use. States that provide very
23 heavy home care, like New York state, have almost no
24 hospice use. There is a lot of trade-off among these
25 services. So the fact that we have collected data

1 service by service means we are missing what is happening
2 to this population because we don't know how to describe
3 them as trade-offs among the possibilities. So we simply
4 don't see that piece of our lives as a population. We
5 don't have a metric by which to understand these trade-
6 offs.

7 A very important component of the service array
8 is the voluntary family care-giving, which probably
9 amounts to half of the hands-on care. That is almost
10 completely unmonitored and unreported. Not only that, it
11 is also unsupported. We are the only country in the
12 western world that does not pay volunteer care-givers,
13 give them respite care, give them training, give them
14 insurance, give them any benefits. So not only are they
15 invisible as a labor pool, they also are unsupported as a
16 labor pool. But it is critically important that we start
17 paying attention to voluntary care-givers because we are
18 going to have twice as many people sick when all the
19 boomers get sick. And half as many children to provide
20 the voluntary care-giving. So the most critical labor
21 pool is actually not registered nurses, and maybe not
22 even front-line, hands-on home health aides. The most
23 critical labor pool may well be daughters and
24 daughters-in-law and we haven't even learned how to tally
25 them.

1 Measures of quality look better with earlier
2 death, I have already mentioned. That almost every
3 measure of quality in a care system will look better if
4 the very sick die quick. And it is a real problem for
5 measurement. You can reduce the apparent rates of pain,
6 disability, family bankruptcy, almost everything negative
7 if once you are very sick, you don't live very long. It
8 is not at all clear that the public actually wants that
9 to be the force of the measurement.

10 So we should be very careful about that because
11 by far the easiest way to have a care system look good is
12 to have people either be out of the care system or dead.
13 I guess there are two ways of being out of the care
14 system. You can transfer or you can be gone. But it is
15 a real problem as you get to older populations because
16 you can have a care system look real good on pain because
17 people, once they are in pain, do not live long.

18 Patients want to have had the good death. That
19 is a terribly important tense. They want to have lived
20 out their life with comfort, dignity, and have a proper
21 life closure. But prospectively they want the next one.
22 Small chances of prolonging life. The doctor keeps
23 saying, "But one more treatment might just work." And so
24 prospectively they want that small odd of an increased
25 life span.

1 Current payment does not support key elements
2 of chronic care. If you look at the hand-out we gave you
3 from the Western Journal of Medicine and look at the
4 table on the second page, what we have done is to lay out
5 for heart failure how much it would cost for this couple
6 to have had optimal care versus the care that is the
7 usual ordinary schlock care. And you will see that
8 Medicare would have saved money. Medicare would have
9 saved \$37.30 on this small little case. Every single
10 provider would have lost money; every single provider,
11 the hospital, the doctor, the ambulance, everybody else
12 because Medicare does not pay for self-care education,
13 24/7 on-call, mobilizing services to the home, or
14 continuity. Any of the things that matter for this
15 patient are not regularly paid for by Medicare. That is
16 a profound contrary incentive and very hard to move. It
17 is why, of course, Kaiser and VA are doing better than
18 regular care.

19 There are now six randomized control trials
20 showing better ways of taking care of patients with
21 advanced heart failure. Every single one of those
22 programs has folded at the end of the grant funding
23 because it is not sustainable under Medicare.

24 Prevention and treatment are always presented
25 as achievable. We always say our new gizmo promises to

1 prevent death. I'm here to tell you there is no
2 preventing of death. At best you can delay it. You
3 can't improve a disease. You almost never can cure it.
4 The curable diseases we cure like this. We don't cure
5 very many things in very old people. We give you a
6 better disease to live with. You live a little longer.
7 The honesty in communication is strikingly absent,
8 including from our federal officials.

9 I have a whole file of things called "silliness
10 about mortality." It is almost all federal officials
11 talking about the wonders of prevention. Yes, prevention
12 is a really terrific thing. But I can tell you that no
13 matter how good you are at prevention, you still die.
14 And guess what? You get a choice among those Horsemen of
15 the Apocalypse: your heart, your lungs, cancer, stroke,
16 or dementia. You don't get a whole lot of other choices.
17 So fundamentally we are in an era of trade-offs among
18 those alternative ways of dying. And we probably spend
19 now a whole lot of money on these treatments and support.
20 And yet we call it cure and rehabilitation.

21 So the kind of things the FTC threw out for me
22 to answer, should we be addressing volume-sensitive
23 quality. In my arena, there is no evidence on that. Are
24 academic centers better and trainees worse? Again, there
25 is no evidence. If anything, my anecdotal evidence is

1 that academic centers tend to be the worst places to be
2 when you are very sick and dying. It is much better to
3 be at home in the care of a general practitioner and a
4 good nurse.

5 Do patients get what they want? Sure, if it is
6 absolutely clear what they want and they have made all
7 their trade-offs. That is a very rare circumstance. Has
8 the Patient Self-Determination Act helped? Not much.
9 The Patient Self-Determination Act did help to provide
10 some clarity on state laws but it did not really help in
11 terms of mobilizing patients to provide real instruction.
12 And the role of competition is just terribly complicated.
13 The usual patient does not want the product, that is good
14 care for the end of life. They don't want to be in the
15 end of life. They don't particularly like the
16 information.

17 The good and the bad providers are all very
18 busy. They can fill up their schedules no matter how
19 good or bad they are. Patients are too sick and the
20 families are too stressed to shop around very much.
21 Medicare and Medicaid payment presents real barriers.

22 In our book, "The Handbook for Mortals," we
23 actually tell families that if you go to a doctor, if you
24 have a problem that is likely to lead to shortness of
25 breath, ask a doctor early on about whether they are

1 comfortable in providing terminal sedation and, if not,
2 change doctors. We have gotten all kinds of nasty
3 feedback on that sentence because people say, "Oh, the
4 patients can't handle that." I say, "Well, for heaven's
5 sakes, who can?"

6 This is the slide you have seen now twice
7 because I keep pushing the wrong button. This is a
8 reminder that we are roughly like the explorers in the
9 1600s, virtually everything I have told you in this talk
10 I didn't know 10 years ago. We are in an era of
11 exploding insight and great learning. We could greatly
12 increase the rate of learning by investing in
13 exploration. But we are like the explorers in the
14 1600's, we are proud of having figured out the world is
15 round and still making an awful lot of mistakes on the
16 details.

17 Thanks.

18 (Applause.)

19 MR. HYMAN: I think we will take about a 10-
20 minute break and then we will continue with the two
21 remaining presentations and then go directly into the
22 moderator roundtable so everybody gets a chance to
23 stretch and avoid the health consequences of sitting for
24 too long.

25 (A brief recess was taken.)

1 MR. HYMAN: Our next speaker is Dr. Shoshana
2 Sofaer.

3 MS. SOFAER: This is an ongoing conversation
4 that I had with my friend, Paul Cleary, which is: "What
5 is the revolution?" And for a long time, when I first
6 arrived in Washington in the early '90s, having come from
7 California, where I was an extremely happy patient of a
8 staff model HMO, and coming to a part of the world where
9 HMOs were reviled. But also working within a place that
10 had a staff model HMO, which was GW at that point in
11 time. Everybody said managed care was a revolution, and
12 I never believed it. And now it is not a revolution
13 because basically the managed part of it was never there
14 in the sense of really managing care. It was managing
15 cost except for those places that were genuinely
16 integrated delivery systems organizationally, not just
17 getting a capitated payment. So the real revolution is
18 not managed care.

19 To some extent it is more, but still not quite
20 the same, the emergence of purchasers, who recognize
21 their clout in the marketplace. This is something that
22 has only emerged. We really did have a much more
23 monopolistic system in health care 20 years ago. And we
24 have verged to some extent on what the economists
25 sometimes call monopsony, which is that the monopoly is

1 on the buyer side rather than on the seller side. But
2 Glen's data about how the provider resistance made people
3 back off tells you that that monopsony isn't working
4 terribly well either. For-profit medicine was another
5 potential villain in the piece. That hasn't really
6 turned out to be much of a revolution, primarily because
7 a "non-profit" facilities in health care often behave so
8 much like for-profit facilities in health care.

9 What we also feared for a while was the
10 consolidation and integration of ownership of facilities,
11 whether for profit or nonprofit. It is something that
12 the FTC has been, of course, very concerned about. And
13 not -- yet anyway, what many call "evidence-based
14 medicine" -- to me the real revolution is the idea that
15 health care and physicians have to be accountable for the
16 quality and value of their work. And that they have to
17 be accountable, not just like in the "good old days" to
18 each other, not just to those who pay the bills, not just
19 to their individual patients (I have heard many
20 physicians tell me that they are accountable to their
21 individual patients) but to the public and society at
22 large. That is a big, big change. And I think it is a
23 really profound change for medicine and is a very
24 profound change for society. And that in a sense is what
25 we are reckoning with.

1 What has caused this revolution? The first
2 phrase I put up there is "question authority." I see
3 enough people in this room who probably grew up like I
4 did in the 60's and had this bumper sticker somewhere in
5 their graduate student apartment. But we have become,
6 the Baby Boomers who question authority. And a major
7 authority figure in this society are physicians, and
8 people who manage hospitals. So we are questioning their
9 authority. And that questioning has to some extent led
10 to an undermining of that authority, although that is not
11 the only thing. Maybe because the answers we have gotten
12 haven't been terribly satisfying.

13 In addition to that, from a more database
14 perspective, the quality variations in this country are
15 significant. And it may be the case that not only is the
16 floor too low but the ceiling is too low. And I could
17 only point you back to what Dr. Lynn was saying just a
18 few minutes ago to tell you that perhaps even the very
19 best of care at the end of life is far from what it could
20 and should be. And particularly if try to think about
21 patient-centered care, patient care that takes psycho,
22 social, and environmental issues into consideration, as
23 well as biomedical, both the floor and the ceiling are
24 way too low. We spend more than anybody else per capita
25 as a society, and in a lot of ways we are getting only

1 very mediocre results and again results that vary very
2 much depending on where you are, what kind of insurance
3 you have, what your education level is, et cetera, et
4 cetera.

5 In addition to that, we know a lot more than we
6 used to about how define and measure quality. When I
7 first started graduate school in 1975, there were big
8 arguments about whether or not it was at all possible to
9 measure quality. These are in the days when -- was
10 somebody who was really a revolutionary in his own right.
11 We have come a long way. Are we there? Not by a long
12 shot. But we now have the sense that it is a feasible,
13 doable thing to define and measure the quality of health
14 care.

15 So let's talk a little bit about what the
16 response of physicians has been to this, and I speak both
17 as somebody who is a patient, somebody who lives with a
18 physician, some of my best friends are physicians, I work
19 with physicians, and I have an enormous amount of respect
20 for the vast majority of physicians with whom I interact
21 in my day to day life. But what I have seen is that
22 shaped by their perception of lost autonomy, lost public
23 influence, lost prestige, and lost income, and I think
24 all of these are losses that have been sustained by the
25 people in this profession, they are angry, they are

1 resistant, and they are, in many cases, in denial.

2 We just recently finished a set of focus groups
3 with physicians in group practices in Massachusetts, as
4 well as practice leaders, et cetera. And we were talking
5 to them about the possibility of disseminating publicly
6 information based on patient reports of their experiences
7 with physicians. And they were appalled by the idea that
8 this might happen. Convinced that the reason it was
9 happening was so that their pay could be adjusted. And
10 they were not thinking of it, as Glen put it, in terms of
11 that they were going to be upside incentives. They were
12 convinced that this was being done to reduce their income
13 further, to make their life even more full of hassles.
14 And what I think they really personally experience is
15 disrespect. That is sort of the emotional climate that
16 we are dealing with. There is an unwillingness to accept
17 lay definitions of quality or patient reports on their
18 experience. And there are concerns, sometimes often
19 grounded, about the validity of the measures that are
20 being used and the cost of the measurement process to the
21 system as a whole and to them.

22 But on the flip side, I also see physicians
23 coming to this issue from the perspective of their
24 continuing desire to heal, to cure, to help, and to, I
25 put it in quotes, "be scientific." Physicians are as a

1 profession and they take pride in the fact that they are
2 a science-based profession.

3 So what does that get you? Distress at their
4 current situation, especially in the decline in the
5 quality of their relationships with patients. Somebody
6 was speaking about the time that you spend with patients.
7 Well, very interesting indications that everybody feels
8 like they are getting less time with their patients even
9 though in fact they are getting more. So it must be
10 something about that quality of that time that is
11 changing and is making them feel like they are being
12 pushed to do an awful lot more in a lot less time.

13 Now what you also have to take note of is that
14 there are a lot of physicians at this panel. And there
15 are a lot of physicians who have sort of made it their
16 business to try to improve the measurement process, find
17 better measures to replace worse measures. And, in
18 addition, many, many physicians who are making a
19 commitment to quality measurement and to quality
20 improvement; a much smaller percentage of them are then
21 making the commitment to disclosure of the comparative
22 quality information. But I think that that is because
23 they are really afraid of malpractice and afraid of
24 looking bad. Humiliation, public humiliation, how many
25 of us really enjoy that experience? Not a whole lot. So

1 I think we should be aware of these things.

2 So then in this context why should the quality
3 and performance of physicians be measured and publicly
4 disclosed? First of all, I think we have got to
5 recognize that people believe that it is physicians who
6 control quality. When I have asked people in focus
7 groups about health plan indicators, they will tell you
8 health plans don't have anything to do with quality. It
9 is the physician that has to do with quality. It doesn't
10 matter what health plan I am in, it matters what
11 physician I have.

12 People also actually have more control over
13 choosing their physician than they do over choosing their
14 plan or choosing their hospital. It is the case that
15 over 50 percent of the insured people in the United
16 States are only offered one health plan. So plans is not
17 where they are exercising choice so that they can be
18 effective in the marketplace. It isn't even really
19 hospitals because how do you get to a hospital most of
20 the time? Your physician refers you because that is the
21 place she or he has their staffing privileges unless you
22 live in a place like Los Angeles, where everybody has to
23 have privileges at a least 10 hospitals in order to be
24 able to make a living because the hospitals are so small
25 because of the lack of density in the city.

1 So then I have heard the ultimate consumer, my
2 nephew's wife, who wanted to be able to have a vaginal
3 birth after a Caesarean on her first. She actually went
4 to the trouble of calling the two hospitals that her OB
5 practiced at, getting information on their VBAC rates and
6 how they handled VBACs, visiting and talking to the
7 nurses, and finding out that one was completely different
8 from the other; she went to the one that supported the
9 VBAC experience. How often does that happen? Probably
10 more rarely than the patient that Joanne was talking
11 about who actually comes in with a very clear set of
12 advance directives to their physician.

13 So in addition to that, physicians are living
14 with the heritage, the history, and the tradition that
15 they have embraced over the last 100 years. That is,
16 their own self definition that they are the captain of
17 the team. So if you are the captain of the team,
18 especially in our individualistic society, you are
19 responsible. You are the one with the authority.

20 So now I am going to turn around and say, well
21 why not physicians? And there are some good reasons why
22 we shouldn't focus on physicians or certainly shouldn't
23 focus just on physicians. First of all, in today's
24 medicine, physicians have only partial control over
25 quality. The whole message of the quality chasm report

1 was it is the system, stupid. And it is the system,
2 stupid.

3 But physicians are a part of the system.
4 Physicians have leadership roles in that system. And
5 physicians are going to have to recognize that they have
6 got the responsibility to make that system work for
7 themselves and for their patients. And they must get
8 engaged in a different kind of way than many of them have
9 been, i.e., where they have basically said let somebody
10 else do that, I am going to stick to the "practice of
11 medicine and see my patients." It doesn't work that way
12 anymore.

13 In addition, besides the system, there is also
14 the fact that outcomes in particular are very, very
15 influenced by individual behavior and by society as a
16 whole, not just policies. But where you live, how you
17 live, who you live with, and do you have social support
18 influence your care. All of those different things have
19 a profound effect on the quality of the care that you get
20 and on the outcomes of your care.

21 Another thing that has intrigued me is how do
22 we know that a patient and a physician belong to each
23 other? What is our definition of that? I have been
24 going around asking physicians that I know, "How do you
25 know that somebody is your patient?" And this is

1 especially problematic in a context where a person may
2 have to change providers every year as their employer
3 changes their insurer and their insurer changes their
4 provider network or doesn't or whatever.

5 So how do we make that meaningful link between
6 a physician and a patient because the real question is
7 not who is your patient but who are the people whose care
8 you are willing to be accountable for? That is the
9 really meaningful question here. My friend Barbara
10 Sebohar is here from the surgery side. It is a whole lot
11 easier in that context because it is a procedure by and
12 large that has a beginning and a middle and an end. If
13 we are dealing with the medicine side of things, it gets
14 way more complicated and the continuity issues become
15 more important.

16 There are a raft of technical reasons why this
17 is going to be tough. Reliable sampling is a nightmare,
18 either in terms of identifying the people and linking
19 them with a patient, and getting enough numbers, privacy
20 concerns. Last night I was talking about this with a
21 friend of mine who said, "How can you find out given
22 HIPAA what patient is attached to what physician?" He is
23 a psychiatrist so he doesn't want anybody to know who his
24 patients are. He is an analyst, he only has 27, right,
25 at any given point in time. He doesn't have 5,000

1 patients. We can't do a sampling of his patient
2 population. We have serious skills, challenges of risk
3 adjustment for any quality measure. The data collection
4 costs are serious. The cost of really effective
5 reporting and dissemination of quality information is
6 also substantial. And we have not even begun to scratch
7 the surface of how much it is going to take to do that
8 really well. Underlying all this is that we don't have
9 an efficient information infrastructure to actually
10 generate this data without super, super hassles. So this
11 is what we are balancing.

12 However, in spite of these problems, more and
13 more people believe that physician quality can and should
14 be measured and disclosed. More and more institutions
15 are committing resources to that end, all different kinds
16 of institutions. We heard about plans from Glen today
17 but I am going to tell you about the Central Florida
18 Health Care Coalition in Orlando, Florida. And they are
19 going to start rating physicians as either platinum, gold
20 or silver based on data that includes technical quality
21 information, utilization information, and patient
22 experience information. They are going to wrap it up and
23 give people their Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.
24 And they are going to make that available initially to
25 the purchasers and the providers and then eventually to

1 the consumers. So this is going to happen. The question
2 is not whether, but rather when and how well and at what
3 price. So this is not one you want to fight.

4 Now, I mentioned our little gang of 15. We are
5 called the Consumer Health Care Quality Group. And we
6 created ourselves and have no funding. We sort of talk
7 to each other on the phone periodically, and we talk
8 through issues that are of concern to us. We are a mix
9 of advocates, academics, people who work for various
10 kinds of trade associations. We have membership from
11 NCQA, from the Foundation for Accountability, and we have
12 a good time. Every so often we get a foundation person
13 to talk for us. And we don't have any government folks
14 by decision on our part, we don't have government folks
15 involved, okay.

16 We actually managed to write an article that
17 actually got published in Health Affairs in March of this
18 year and it is a call to action that identifies essential
19 elements that are going to be necessary in order to drive
20 quality improvement through public disclosure of
21 comparative quality measures. And these are the seven
22 things that we said we were going to have to do. First,
23 we were going to have to convince people that quality
24 problems were real and that quality could in fact be
25 better. When I talk to advocates for low-income people,

1 they say, "Why should we look at quality information
2 unless we know that somebody is actually going to do
3 something with this quality information to make our lives
4 better?" And I think that is a really good question.

5 Quality reporting must be standardized and
6 universal, okay. We didn't use the word "mandated" but
7 we were about a hair's breath away from it. This is not
8 going to work if somebody has to be a knight in shining
9 armor to be the first person to come up and say, "I will
10 agree to have that javelin thrown at me." That way lays
11 a certain degree of madness. What we report is going to
12 have to be relevant and valued by the people we think
13 should act upon it. Why haven't consumers used the
14 quality information that they have had so far? Because
15 they don't think it means anything to them because it is
16 about health plans and that is not where they think
17 quality is.

18 So now we are going to have to try to figure
19 out, quite really, if we are going to provide quality
20 information, that can't be our excuse anymore. We are
21 going to have to measure the things that matter to them.
22 And those things are probably going to be very different
23 from the things that matter to clinicians and even then
24 the things that matter to purchasers. So there is going
25 to be some way that multiple stakeholders are going to

1 have to get together in a constructive environment to
2 figure out what is the test to which we want the health
3 care system to teach, so we don't do what Joanne was
4 talking about and have measures that encourage,
5 prematurely early death. Maybe we can say it that.
6 Okay, so this is another important one.

7 The reports have to be easy to understand and
8 use. I am aware of one of the health plan reports that
9 compare all their groups that you were probably talking
10 about Glen. It is God awful. From any perspective of
11 human communication and communication with lay people, I
12 would never want to use it myself. It makes your eyes
13 boggle, not to mention your mind. We have to do this a
14 whole lot better, and we really are beginning to learn
15 how. In addition, it is not just enough to have a report
16 somewhere. You have got to figure out how to get it to
17 people when they need it, through a channel that they
18 trust, and how to help them actually use it. So that is
19 another issue.

20 And, again, providers are going to have to
21 reward two things, quality improvement. And this I think
22 is even more important, reward not just providing quality
23 care but reward providing care to the people that are the
24 bad risks. And Bob Berenson will tell me what the
25 likelihood is of that without some really significant

1 shifts. Because right now the deck is stacked all in the
2 opposite direction.

3 I think about when the Top Docs came out in
4 Washingtonian Magazine the year after I got to GW that
5 announced that GW was the best place to go if you
6 happened to have HIV/AIDS. And the death knells that
7 were rung throughout that facility because no good deed
8 goes unpunished. And this is an example of that. And it
9 isn't just a matter of sort of risk adjustment. I don't
10 think that is the whole thing here. We really have got
11 to be very careful about how we reward quality
12 improvements and care for the sickest. And providers are
13 going to have to create both the informational and the
14 organizational infrastructure for improvement. They are
15 going to have to learn how to do quality improvement.

16 It is easy to do all of this stuff badly. So
17 that is why it is really important to stress doing it is
18 not enough. You have got to do it really well. And that
19 is frightening to me because most of the time most people
20 don't do things really, really well. So this really
21 makes my heart shiver.

22 The price is going to be very high if we do
23 this badly. No one is actually going to use the
24 information, either to make better choices or to improve
25 quality. People are going to lose even more trust in

1 health care. We are going to continue to waste a lot of
2 money. And those with the greatest needs are going to
3 continue to be avoided unless they can pay their own way
4 in some way, shape or form. So is that sounding a little
5 grim? Those are some grim outcomes but those are the
6 ones that we have to avoid.

7 So what do we want to measure and report? I am
8 going to talk about three categories, patient
9 experiences, technical quality and not really cost,
10 economic issues. These are a list that you should have
11 seen many elements of. Clearly, these are the things
12 that patients are in the best position to report on
13 because it is their experience. Patients, and in some
14 cases, family members of patients: their access to care;
15 their communication and interactions with physicians and
16 with others, such as the medical staff, the office staff.
17 They can tell us: I have left physicians because I
18 couldn't stand anymore the way that I was treated, not in
19 the examining room but in the front office. Those are
20 things that are real.

21 Responsiveness and understanding of issues that
22 are not purely biomedical. When people walk into a
23 doctor's office they remain human beings with multi-
24 faceted aspects to them. And I don't really believe that
25 it is possible to heal them or help them, let alone cure

1 them, which we will put that on a side, care for them if
2 that wholeness as a human being is not going to be taken
3 into consideration. And so people are going to want you
4 to show compassion, to show caring, and to also
5 understand that you want this particular medication
6 because it is going to improve, not your chances of
7 survival from a mortality perspective, but your quality
8 of life, which is of great importance. Your ability to
9 interact with your family. Don't give a diabetic a diet
10 to follow if you don't also tell that diabetic how are
11 they going to negotiate the new eating pattern with their
12 family, okay? People are not in a vacuum. So those
13 issues and we are not asking about those issues very much
14 in our quality measures, just so you are clear about
15 that.

16 And whether or not people have actually
17 received certain kind of services that a large number of
18 the population need to get, screenings, immunization,
19 services that are evidence-based.

20 Let's talk a little bit about technical
21 quality. We can talk about structure, process and
22 outcome. There is a lot of structural variables that are
23 in fact going to be important. There probably are very
24 few uncertified neurosurgeons around, but I sure wouldn't
25 want to go to any of them. So certification I think,

1 affiliation, staffing is important. Language that is
2 spoken is very important. When are your office hours
3 open?

4 Processes that are known to have significant
5 effects on outcomes, outcomes including cure, chronic
6 condition management, functional status, and psycho-
7 social. Those are broad areas. And if you are going to
8 tell people about technical quality, you can't use
9 jargon. You have to tell people in English. And you
10 especially have to tell people why these measures are
11 important.

12 So another issue that we need to deal with is
13 which patients do you report on. Do you report on
14 everybody? Do you report on the high users, which I
15 actually would prefer because those are the people that
16 have the most experience of the system. Those who have
17 used services recently and actually remember what
18 happened to them? So these are technical issues but I
19 think they have significant implications, not only for
20 the accuracy of the data but for how compelling and
21 meaningful the data are to others.

22 In terms of economic issues, I want to just
23 signal that we have forgotten about the one thing that
24 you are talking is quality; we don't have comparative
25 information on costs in health care and price. We don't

1 have that information. That hasn't been important up to
2 now because people have had insurance coverage. So they
3 have needed to understand their benefit structure but not
4 necessarily what the doctor is getting paid as a fee.
5 But if you go to a consumer-driven health plan world,
6 then cost is going to become important. And they are
7 especially important for the procedure-driven
8 specialities.

9 One statement I want to make about financial
10 incentives. I think that we are in murky territory here
11 because we only assume, and I think have very little
12 evidence to demonstrate, the effect of financial
13 incentives on physician behaviors. We assume
14 theoretically that these financial incentives have these
15 effects. But I have to tell you that when patients tell
16 you that 95 percent of them say that they want the
17 information, what they really want is they want to know
18 that bad things are not being hidden from them, which is,
19 I think, a little bit different. But if you gave them
20 the information, they wouldn't know what to do with it
21 and they wouldn't know what to make of it unless they had
22 some really heavy duty translation.

23 So cruising to the end here, here are my
24 implications for you folks. And this is belief, I am not
25 going to claim evidence on this, this is sort of like

1 belief, Kantian. The public, on both an individual and
2 societal level, have I believe a right to valid,
3 reliable, relevant, and useful comparative information
4 about quality and cost; which is to say the value of
5 physicians. This can help make individuals make choices
6 for themselves that can in turn help them achieve better
7 health outcomes in a personal sense. And we hope that
8 public disclosure can also create external incentives or
9 push for quality and value improvements in the market as
10 a whole.

11 However, I do not believe that we can leave the
12 fate of consumers strictly in the hands of the market.
13 There is too much at stake. Your commissioner said
14 earlier that health care is not like other markets and I
15 completely agree. Market solutions alone are not going
16 to work. People, and especially the most vulnerable,
17 need protection as well as information. They need
18 regulation and advocacy as well as market-based
19 interventions. Patients are still the least powerful
20 stakeholder in health care. And we are sitting here
21 today saying we haven't been able to improve quality in
22 health care, "we" being the physicians, the purchasers,
23 the hospitals, and the federal government. So you know
24 what "we" are going to do is we are going to let patients
25 be the ones that bear the burden and the onus because

1 they are going to be able to do it where we have never
2 been able to do it. I don't think so. This is going to
3 take everybody participating.

4 Final thought, which I think is going to echo
5 some of Wendy's earlier statements. To me the heart of
6 medicine is the relationship between the physician and
7 the patient. That is where it lives, breathes, and dies.
8 This relationship needs to be one of trust, respect, and
9 integrity. One that embodies the ideals of what we call
10 professionalism. My desire, hope is that we disclose
11 comparative quality information publicly. But that we do
12 it in a manner which reinvigorates that relationship
13 between the physician and the patient and does not
14 require either party to give up their autonomy. In other
15 words, I am not saying going back to the days of a
16 paternalistic kind of physician/patient relationship. I
17 am saying we need to reinvigorate that as a much more
18 relationship of equal and mutually respected and
19 respectful partners.

20 Thank you.

21 (Applause.)

22 MR. HYMAN: Finally, Dr. Nielsen, from the
23 American Medical Association.

24 DR. NIELSEN: Nothing like being the last
25 speaker on a Friday afternoon when it is sunny out, and I

1 am the only thing standing between you and getting out
2 there or a strong drink or whatever you are looking for.

3 This is not a time to use Power Point. This is
4 a time for us to think about some of the very important
5 things heard this afternoon. How many of you were here
6 this morning? Good, a fair number of you were. This has
7 been an extraordinary day and you have heard a wide
8 variety of opinions on a variety of things. And as I am
9 about to weigh in you have a right to know who I am and
10 what I represent and who I represent. I am an internist.
11 I live in Buffalo. I have had a big practice for 23
12 years. I am also vice speaker of the American Medical
13 Association's House of Delegates and that is why I was
14 asked to come here today. But I wear a couple of hats
15 that you need to know about because you can, depending on
16 your point of view, decide that I have a personal
17 commitment to this quality issue or you can consider it
18 very serious conflict of interest, depending on your
19 point of view.

20 So let me tell you about them. First of all, I
21 am on the board of directors of the National Patient
22 Safety Foundation. That is an organization that the AMA
23 started in 1997, two years before the IOM's, "To Err is
24 Human." And that organization is very committed to
25 systems change, the kinds of things that several of the

1 speakers this afternoon have talked about. I also am
2 senior associate dean of the medical school at the
3 University of Buffalo. And then finally, if I don't have
4 enough conflicts of interest already, I am associate
5 medical director for quality at a large HMO in Buffalo.
6 I do that part time. So I know full well about the
7 profiling. I have seen that. We do some of that.
8 Fascinating discussion, by the way. Thank you very much.
9 You taught me some things and taught me some things to do
10 and not to do when we go back. So those are where I am
11 coming from.

12 I am here actually on behalf of the American
13 Medical Association. And I think the way the last
14 speaker left it at the end is the way I want to start.
15 And that is there are no villains in this piece. There
16 are no villains. We are all in this together. We have a
17 mess of a health care system in some ways, do we not? We
18 have over 41 million people in this country who do not
19 have health insurance. That is a moral issue and there
20 is not right now the political will to change that. We
21 cannot avoid that particular problem. But we are all in
22 it together. And, yes, it is true that physicians do
23 feel a loss of autonomy. The ones I deal with aren't
24 quite as angry as you heard about -- I don't know who you
25 know but you have got to meet some of our friends too.

1 But in Buffalo they are not quite so angry but they do
2 feel the loss of autonomy, there is no question about it.
3 They feel helpless. And they do feel the enormous burden
4 of regulation. So it is quite true what the speaker
5 said, that the impact of federal regulation is enormous
6 and it invades the doctor/patient relationship right
7 there in that examining room. There is no doubt about
8 it.

9 Well, that is the bad news. And I am also here
10 to tell you that this is the best profession in the world
11 simply because of that doctor/patient relationship. We
12 are committed deeply to caring for our patients. And
13 because of that we have for a long time been a player in
14 this quality arena, before it became the de rigueur thing
15 to talk about. Our commitment goes back a long time,
16 back in the early 90's, along with AHRQ and with the
17 American Association Health Plans. Now they are strange
18 bed fellows for you, the AMA and the AAHP. Think about
19 that one.

20 We were the early sponsors, the original
21 sponsors of the National Guidelines Clearinghouse. And
22 those guidelines are on the web. And they are there for
23 consumers, for physicians. They are easily accessed.
24 You don't have to be a member of the AMA to get it. Any
25 consumer can go to the web, as many do, and look at the

1 guidelines that have been posted there to help physicians
2 in their decision-making and patients in their choices.

3 And even before we developed the Clearinghouse
4 along with those other organizations, we have been
5 bringing together state medical societies and the
6 national specialty societies together to try to deal with
7 the issues of quality. That includes practice
8 guidelines, partnership, and the clinical quality
9 improvement forum. These have been ongoing for years and
10 so our commitment is there.

11 And every once in a while when there are very
12 important gaps between what we know in terms of our
13 medical knowledge and what is happening in the workplace
14 in terms of physician practices, the AMA and the
15 appropriate medical societies have collaborated on such
16 alerts as quality care alerts. Now this morning you
17 heard about beta blockers. That was one of the things
18 that we did issue a quality care alert on. And we were
19 also partners in changing the statistics on the number of
20 patients who received beta blockers after MI. So we are
21 all partners in this morass, and we all have a vested
22 interest in doing it right. Not a vested self-interest
23 nearly as much as the interest in getting it right.
24 Because all of us, physicians alike, are also going to be
25 patients and are patients.

1 Well, let's talk about our newest initiative
2 and this is our most vigorous one. This was referred to
3 by Dr. Tuckson this morning. This is the Physician
4 Consortium for Performance Improvement. We have brought
5 together clinical experts from over 60 specialty and
6 state societies, along with AHRQ and CMS, and we are
7 working together with them to develop the clinical
8 measures that result in improved patient care.

9 What is the difference between guidelines and
10 the performance measures? There is a difference. If you
11 think about the guidelines as a road map, then you can
12 think about the performance measures as the most critical
13 markers along the way that are associated with good
14 patient outcomes. But remember what presents as a
15 patient in the office is not an abstraction. Each
16 patient is unique in their own risk factors and
17 underlying diseases and that obviously impacts on the
18 outcomes. And that is what we are calling the risk
19 adjustment. And that is not the only factor but clearly
20 risk adjustment is very important. Those of you who were
21 here this morning heard Dr. McGinnis talk about that
22 quite eloquently. If you don't case mix adjust, you will
23 inadvertently stigmatize a physician who may be caring
24 for a high number of high risk patients. And obviously
25 nobody wants to do that. You want to get it right. And

1 so we are in this together in terms of trying to get it
2 right and seeing what the actual measures should be. But
3 remember that you should case mix adjust first.

4 Let me give you an example of where that was
5 done in my home state of New York. Many of you know that
6 in New York for a number of years, over 10 years, there
7 has been public disclosure of the cardio bypass surgery
8 mortality data. It used to be hospital-specific, it is
9 now physician-specific and it is made public. And that
10 has had some interesting consequences. Some of them have
11 been very good. Physicians who may have been operating
12 on patients without taking the appropriate care to assess
13 what their risk factors were have stopped doing that.
14 But let me caution you about an unintended consequence.
15 And those are the things that we need to all think out
16 together. The unintended consequence is this. Cardiac
17 surgeons in New York are reluctant to operate on high
18 risk patients. In Buffalo, you will find that the high-
19 risk patients are not operated on in New York. They go
20 to the Cleveland Clinic. And that is because of
21 physician reluctance. Why? Because their statistics are
22 publicly available. I think that is not the outcome that
23 we want. We want accountability. There is no question
24 about it. But we do have to think through those things
25 and try to figure out how we are going to avoid those

1 kinds of unintended consequences.

2 There was a recent study from Massachusetts
3 called Physician Clinical Performance Assessment, the
4 state of the art. And that study places in perspective
5 the assessment of physician clinical performance. The
6 study concluded that the use for external reporting
7 carries with it a number of analytic challenges. That
8 doesn't mean it shouldn't be done. Just be aware of the
9 challenges that are presented. For example, sample size.
10 You wouldn't want to report on a physician's care of a
11 diabetic patient if he only had three, would you? The
12 sample size is just not big enough to make any meaningful
13 conclusions.

14 There could be a number of other impediments to
15 outcomes that you might not so easily understand if you
16 were even case mix adjusting. For example, what if you
17 have a patient who has poor health literacy, doesn't
18 understand the instructions even though they nod and
19 appear to understand? I remember a situation in my
20 practice, I had known a patient for two years before I
21 realized he couldn't read. He always brought his
22 girlfriend with him. His girlfriend signed everything.
23 She didn't come in the examining room. He was very
24 bright but he couldn't read. I had no idea.

25 I finally found that out after we had a long

1 encounter and after a long talk and I changed a whole lot
2 of ways I dealt with him after that. But he did not
3 offer that and I wouldn't have known it. You couldn't
4 tell on the surface.

5 What about patients that have economic barriers
6 in following through, what if they can't afford the drugs
7 that you are proscribing? They may or may not volunteer
8 that. There may be an insurance barrier in terms of
9 coverage for accepting the recommendations, the
10 therapeutic recommendations that a doctor is giving. So
11 there are a lot of things that enter into this that we
12 have to consider, which does not mean that any of us
13 should not be accountable. Indeed, we should and we want
14 to be.

15 All right, let's look at a couple of the issues
16 we were asked to consider. One was volume. Well, you
17 have heard already from some of the speakers this
18 afternoon that volume indicators are not so simple. We
19 at the AMA recommend that volume indicators should only
20 be applied when it has clearly been shown by valid
21 statistical means that the outcomes are influenced by
22 frequency of performance. You might wonder why that is.
23 You might say, gee, it is just intuitively obvious, isn't
24 it, that if a physician does something often, they are
25 going to do it better. But not so. Not necessarily so

1 at all. In fact, one of the humorous comments that was
2 made this morning was you remember the situation out in
3 California where there was a lot of cardiac surgeries, a
4 lot of angios going on but not very many of them that
5 apparently were truly indicated. Nobody would support
6 that sort of approach. And if that was true, that was
7 fraud and hopefully that will be prosecuted to the
8 fullest extent.

9 It is absolutely true that a patient should
10 feel free in that room with the doctor to ask questions,
11 not only about quality but about volume. And the
12 physician must answer honestly. But the physician also
13 has the right to say, wait a minute, this is a new
14 treatment. We don't know yet. There aren't that many
15 that have been done. Let's talk about it. There is no
16 exact relationship to volume if that is true. But it has
17 to be discussed openly and honestly and physicians cannot
18 be defensive about that.

19 The imbalance -- Commissioner Leary spoke this
20 afternoon about the imbalance in knowledge between
21 physicians and patients. Let me raise another one that I
22 haven't heard anybody speak of, this morning or this
23 afternoon. There is one source of knowledge that
24 physicians find difficult to deal with. And that is, let
25 me describe it to you. It is the patient leaping through

1 the ragweed field without the allergy symptoms. You
2 recall that TV ad. The direct consumer advertising is an
3 important force that has become a bit of a problem. The
4 drug industry maintains that that educates consumers. I
5 maintain that there is a little of that. But there is a
6 whole lot of marketing going on. And so whenever anybody
7 gets information, whether it is from the Internet or from
8 a TV commercial or from their doctor, they have a right
9 to ask what are the perverse incentives, what are the
10 incentives that are operating here?

11 Well, what about geographic variation? There
12 are a number of articles that have been written about the
13 variations in particular practices or procedures. This
14 occurs much more often when there is not a clearly
15 defined single path to treat a condition or when beliefs
16 about the risks and benefits of a particular kind of
17 treatment do vary. In the situation where there is
18 agreement or relative agreement, for example, hip
19 fracture repair, you don't see geographic variation. So
20 we at the AMA believe that the way to address the
21 geographic variation is pretty simple. Take a look at
22 the evidence. Let's find out what the science is. Strip
23 the science away from past practices, which may have been
24 based on honest belief but are not based on science.

25 And, finally, related to consumer information

1 in the academic setting, which was one of the questions
2 we were asked to address, and I haven't heard anybody
3 else talk about patients who receive care at teaching
4 hospitals, such as the ones I work at, and who may indeed
5 be treated by physicians in training, medical students.
6 Those students must be supervised. Residents must be
7 supervised. That is absolutely mandated. And the AMA
8 Code of Medical Ethics states very clearly that patients
9 must be informed of the identity and the training status
10 of individuals involved in their care. And patients have
11 a right to refuse to be cared for by medical students if
12 they choose. All health care professionals have to
13 properly identify themselves. And we teach our medical
14 students in the first year that they in clear and
15 unambiguous terms tell patients that they are a medical
16 student, no euphemisms, no young Dr. Jones. Young Dr.
17 Jones is a medical student in one year and you say it
18 that way. And if they don't, we deal with their lack of
19 professionalism and take care of that in different ways.

20 I know it is late. I am going to stop now. I
21 simply want to thank the FTC and the Justice Department
22 for the opportunity to come here to tell you that
23 physicians are very interested in this whole issue of
24 determining better quality for all of us. We are in it
25 with all of you and we are thrilled to be here. And we

1 look forward to a hopefully brief discussion, because it
2 is a nice afternoon. Thank you.

3 (Applause.)

4 MR. HYMAN: I just ask all the panelists to
5 come up and sit where their names are. I committed a sin
6 of omission in introducing people. I explained that Dr.
7 Berenson was a long-time Washington participant in the
8 area of health care policy. But I neglected to explain
9 that I had invited him to be a sort of a free-lance
10 commentator, mostly because I couldn't persuade him to do
11 his own formal presentation. So I took him on the terms
12 that I could get him. And so I would like to ask Bob to
13 make whatever remarks he wants and then we can open it up
14 for broader discussion.

15 DR. BERENSON: I will do my best in a few
16 minutes. I have got at least half an hour worth of
17 comments but I will try to keep it to seven minutes.
18 Just to pick up on Dr. Nielsen's last point, when I was a
19 second year, just about to enter third year medical
20 student, I was rounding with one of the attendings on the
21 private side of the hospital that didn't have any house
22 staff of any kind. And the patient turned to me when my
23 attending said, "Why don't you draw blood on this
24 patient," said, "You are not an intern, are you?" And I
25 said with full disclosure, "No, I am not."

1 Let me just go through the presentations very
2 briefly and just make a few points. It could all go on
3 forever. They were terrific and I think you got a lot of
4 useful information. On Glen's sort of review of what
5 plans are doing, using incentives on quality, just I want
6 to refer to -- he didn't emphasize it much but I have
7 spent a lot of time thinking about the difficulties plans
8 have actually investing in and promoting their work in
9 quality and actually wrote a health affairs article in
10 '98 which has been ignored by most of the world. But
11 basically argued that the structure of markets don't
12 promote this kind of activity very much. When you have
13 got all the docs and all the hospitals and all the plans,
14 you have got first a market share problem where any
15 individual plan doesn't give enough business. And so
16 even if the incentives are two to 10 percent, that
17 ultimately is a 10 percent market share plan for any
18 given provider, the marginal part at risk might be under
19 one percent. So that is a problem. There is first a
20 free rider problems. When one plan invests in all the
21 other plans' benefit. There is absolutely the issue of
22 adverse selection that Shoshana was referring to; i.e.;
23 that if a plan really gets a reputation in a certain
24 area, they may get adversely selected, they are not then
25 first mover advantaged. So I actually recommended that

1 within the antitrust enforcement strictures, and this is
2 why I think it is relevant, is that plans should actually
3 do more collaboration in this area.

4 Clearly, there is a practical issue also, which
5 we found out on a site visit. I go on site visits, is
6 that hospitals and doctors have a real problem complying
7 with 10 different sets of requirements. And so at least
8 in a few markets there has been some good work to
9 standardize data, standardize measurements. But for the
10 most part plans then use the information and may have
11 different reward systems or different carrots or sticks.
12 I raised the question in my article whether plans could
13 actually get together to have common carrots and sticks
14 and whether the antitrust laws would permit that. And
15 not being a lawyer, I suggested they might. But I think
16 it is actually an issue for you guys.

17 The other point I would make on Glen's is that
18 I also picked this up on the site visits is that it is
19 nice to have marginal incentives to do good. But it is
20 the base incentives that drive the market. So I remember
21 an interview with a large cardiology group who is
22 actually getting involved now with putting up cardiac
23 facilities, of which they will be owners. And asking
24 what they were doing for congestive heart failure,
25 disease management type programs. And the answer was

1 basically why would we do anything in disease management
2 for congestive heart failure? What we are doing is
3 catheterization and putting in stints in people. That is
4 where the money is. That is where the Medicare and other
5 payment systems are. So this thing has to be aligned.
6 Payment systems need to be aligned.

7 Wendy's, just a couple of comments, Shoshana
8 already picked up on one thing I was going to say is that
9 even though docs, and I was once a doc, I consider myself
10 a lapsed physician, are sure that there is less visit
11 time, there is actually as much visit time. But the
12 point I wanted to make was the visit is anachronistic.
13 And the idea that you would have this kind of a
14 discussion, let's say it is about deciding about how the
15 last year or two of life should be, in a visit, it should
16 be over time. It should have lots of different forms of
17 communication. We don't have payment systems yet to
18 really accommodate that. And we have to figure that out.

19 The other point I would want to make about
20 disclosure of financial incentives, I found it curious
21 that the definition had to do with potential withholding.
22 But I have been impressed by -- especially now in a world
23 where apparently there are so many loopholes in self-
24 referral restrictions that doctors can be owners of
25 facilities or have real incentives to bring ancillaries

1 in house that I think in disclosure on the fee for
2 service side may be equally important and deserve some
3 attention as well.

4 And then in your discussion about the
5 importance of communication, it really raised for me an
6 issue that applies to the sort of last three, four
7 presentations, which is that we tend to focus on -- we
8 have in recent years focused on outcome measures, some
9 process related to outcome measures. Shoshana sort of
10 mentioned there are structural elements of quality also.
11 But I would refer to it as information that I think at
12 this point, I think the technical barriers to really
13 doing measures of physicians are formidable because there
14 is no good case mix adjustment, because of small numbers,
15 because of a lot of things that I think patients should,
16 in some kind of routine way, want, and should be educated
17 as to why they should want, information about -- language
18 is a good one and not just self-declared "I speak
19 Spanish," but some reason to believe or whatever
20 mechanism the office has for doing interpretation
21 services but the use of an electronic medical record.
22 Or, as Paul Elwood would recommend, a shared electronic
23 medical record or some way of identifying the nature of
24 shared decision-making and does the office commit to it.
25 We could go down the line on any number of things. Does

1 the office use Internet communication as the sort of
2 standard way of communicating evidence-based guidelines.
3 Now there would be big problems here as well in self-
4 declared adherence to these things.

5 So there would be a standardization issue, a
6 verification issue. But I think we should be thinking,
7 at least in my 30 years of having been a physician, about
8 how medicine is practiced may be fundamentally shifting
9 now in some ways or it should be to sort of provide
10 information to patients about what is the nature of this
11 person's practice. And do that while we are trying to
12 figure out how to do the more complicated outcome
13 measures.

14 There is not too much I can say about Joanne.
15 I agree with her on most everything and in fact have -- I
16 would only want to add one or two things. Particularly
17 on the issue of geographic concentration and the
18 suggestion that instead of 27, we should have three. Now
19 I guess the antitrust laws don't affect government
20 purchasing, if I understand that. But, interestingly,
21 just for information, the couple of competitive bidding
22 models that Medicare has actually are pro-competitive in
23 my view and actually get you down from 27 to three or in
24 the real case of the demos for DME supplies, from 5,000
25 vendors to about 20 in a geographic area. The first

1 selection is based on price bids. And once you pass the
2 threshold on price, then there is a review of quality and
3 service. And actually an opportunity for the purchaser,
4 in this case, Medicare, to do a form of negotiation or
5 say if you answer your phone 24 hours when the oxygen
6 goes bad and the patient needs some help, you are in.

7 In other words, I think you can have
8 competitive bidding models which are pro-competitive and
9 I think would apply to the private sector as well. You
10 have to protect against embedding a certain sort of
11 organization forever but you don't have to have everybody
12 in a competitive system.

13 And I guess the final point I wanted to make, I
14 have covered most of everything in shorthand here, is
15 that to Shoshana's point about accountability for quality
16 to society and the public, I was a little confused
17 because I thought you were suggesting that it is now
18 happening. And I thought most of your information
19 suggested that it isn't happening. And I have actually
20 been impressed by the lack of impact, despite the IOM
21 report. It is an inside baseball discussion right now.
22 And to me the best evidence of this, at least inside
23 baseball, is that there have now been a few articles, I
24 am oriented to Medicare now so I will use that, a couple
25 of JAMA articles documenting quality problems for the

1 Medicare population on sort of 23 measures of pretty well
2 accepted process and some outcome measures on quality,
3 which has gotten mostly yawns from the policy-makers.

4 But the Iowa delegation and some others are
5 going to the mat to get more money for Iowa, even though
6 Weinberg has I think done a pretty good job of suggesting
7 that more spending doesn't necessarily result in better
8 quality. They want their piece of that spending as well.
9 So the concern is really about spending. There is still
10 an assumption that more is better. There is not any real
11 sophistication in this town about quality problems.

12 And I applaud the efforts of organizations,
13 like the AMA and others, that are doing something. But I
14 still think for most practices and most policy-makers, it
15 is still of marginal importance. And I will end on that.

16 MR. HYMAN: Does anybody want to respond to any
17 of Dr. Berenson's comments?

18 Let me throw out two questions and see whether
19 I can get anyone to bite at 4:48 on Friday. And it, of
20 course, creates bad incentives for all of you to have
21 revealed that beforehand. The first is just to ask
22 whether we should think about information, collecting,
23 gathering, disseminating, in terms of utility? Do we
24 want to target the supply side, that is the providers or
25 the demand side. And who do we identify on both of

1 those. Is it employers? Is it insurers? Is it
2 individual patients? What part of the -- if we say the
3 answer is demand side, who is it we are going after?

4 And the other question I think flows from a
5 number of speakers, all of whom pointed out the
6 difficulty that physicians have in determining the actual
7 preferences of patients. The discussions are hard to
8 have. Sometimes they don't happen at all. What can be
9 done to make that happen more often and happen more
10 effectively? Is it medical school training? Is it
11 collusion at the other end of the spectrum? Or is it
12 something in between?

13 DR. LEVINSON: I will start with the second
14 question. So I think historically medical education and
15 doctoring has been very biomedical. And the whole way of
16 thinking about medicine that has contributed to the
17 discussion that we are having is doing procedures is
18 good. And curing disease is good. And that that is kind
19 of the culture of medicine. And I think that really the
20 shift towards a different kind of model of care, a more
21 collaborative model of care, a less paternalistic model
22 of care and a different kind of communication that very
23 much is integrated with this discussion about patients
24 being involved in making choices is happening. And it is
25 happening in medical schools. It is going to be in

1 residencies because of a accreditation. And it is
2 happening in certification.

3 So the American Board of Internal Medicine in
4 their re-certification process now has modules on
5 communication and physicians need to re-certify every 10
6 years. And instead of it just being a paper and pencil
7 test about right information, which is of course equally
8 important, there is also questions about these kinds of
9 issues, like end of life care and talking about difficult
10 topics like domestic violence and patient preferences.

11 MS. SOFAER: I actually want to respond first
12 to the first question that you asked, which was about the
13 do we go to the supply side and the demand side. And I
14 don't think there can be an either/or here. One of the
15 things that we have learned is that even though consumers
16 have had very good reason not to make particularly good
17 use of the quality information that is out there, the
18 fact that it is out there and so far has been an
19 incentive for the providers to respond even though the
20 consumers aren't making -- I think that the pathway is a
21 different one. Again, it is sort of that more the fact
22 that it is publicly out there that hospitals or
23 physicians are worse or better than each other, that does
24 seem to have had an impact. And Dr. Hibbard, who was
25 here yesterday, in her recent study in Wisconsin with

1 hospital ratings, in a very well-designed study, it is
2 clear that the people whose information was publicly
3 disclosed, that audience paid attention to the fact that
4 there was another audience that was seeing it. So I
5 think that it is not an either/or kind of situation.

6 I also want to respond actually to what Bob
7 said earlier, which is I said it was the idea of
8 accountability. I don't think the accountability -- I
9 think that accountability for quality to society and
10 public is far from a reality. But even considering the
11 fact that we should be doing things comparatively
12 speaking is revolutionary in medicine.

13 I will stop there.

14 DR. NIELSEN: I want to comment on how we train
15 physicians a little bit differently. I think you are
16 absolutely right, medical education is changing. The
17 example that is being used now is all medical students
18 are taught by standardized patients, you all know what I
19 am talking about. These are patients who are actors, who
20 have a standard script that they learn, they are then in
21 a room. The student goes in, interviews the patient,
22 examines the patient. And then the patient grades the
23 medical student. The patient grades the medical student
24 on those parameters that the patient is best able to
25 assess. Did the student listen to me? Did the student

1 respect my choices? Did the student give me choices?
2 Did the student give me any hope? Did the student do all
3 the talking? Remember that communication is a two-way
4 thing. It is not talking at, it is also listening to.
5 So that is being done in medical schools right now and it
6 certainly is being done because of our RC requirements in
7 the residencies.

8 I want to propose that we really want, and what
9 I think consumers want to know, see if this one fits, is
10 how to pick a doctor. That is what they want to know.
11 And I want to tell you a story, and I will make it quick
12 because it is late. I had a superintendent of schools
13 come into my office as a new patient. And I asked him
14 how he happened to choose me and he told me the following
15 story. He just moved to town and he said he didn't know
16 how to find a doctor, didn't want to call the Medical
17 Society because they would just tell him geographically
18 who was closest. And he didn't want to ask neighbors
19 because he said the neighbors could have a doctor who is
20 friendly but not very good, how would I know?

21 So he decided that he would ask which is the
22 best hospital in Buffalo. And after he found that out,
23 he then called the nursing supervisor on the 3:00 to
24 11:00 shift. And his theory was the following. His
25 theory was that the nursing supervisor on the 3:00 to

1 11:00 shift, who probably had more time to talk than 7:00
2 to 3:00 and probably wasn't asleep from 11:00 to 7:00,
3 would know who the doctors were who responded the best in
4 an emergency. Who were the doctors who didn't get mad at
5 2:00 in the morning when the patient went bad and the
6 nurse called. Who knew who talked to the patients and
7 listened to the patients and dealt with their discharge
8 instructions and dealt with their family. And I will
9 tell you that I think whatever our model is it has got to
10 simulate the nursing supervisor on the 3:00 to 11:00
11 shift.

12 DR. LYNN: Congratulations on being the doctor
13 picked that week.

14 DR. NIELSEN: I was thrilled.

15 DR. LYNN: A couple of thoughts on your two
16 questions. Trying to figure out how to be helpful to the
17 FTC is certainly not my usual role. I think that, at
18 least in my arena, we desperately need an epidemiology,
19 just a basic description. There is no way to know
20 whether Dallas does better than Denver on end of life
21 care. How many people are bankrupt and how many people
22 are in pain; how many families are driven to distraction;
23 how many patients get their preferences documented; how
24 many of them get it followed. It would not be hard to
25 do. You could do it with just a couple of 100 people

1 sampling in every area. But we just don't do it yet. It
2 is like child abuse. It wasn't really a problem until we
3 started having all ERs report it, and then all of a
4 sudden we started seeing how many there really were. So
5 we need an epidemiology that would allow us to do trends
6 over time and comparisons across regions.

7 A second thing though about the information
8 gathering and dissemination and sort of where you take it
9 from which part. The degree to which we fail to provide
10 honest information in my arena is just astonishing. I
11 have been doing this sort of ad hoc little collection of
12 all the consent documents from defribillators, those
13 marvelous gizmos, the ER in your chest that Dick Cheney
14 has. I have been told now of one, but I have not yet
15 seen one, that tells patients if they ever want to be
16 deactivated. Here we are putting a device in the chest
17 that stops your one clean exit, which is a cardiac
18 erythema, and we are putting them in old people with bad
19 disease and we are routinely not telling anybody that you
20 might ever want it stopped.

21 So hospices are having to learn how to slap
22 magnets on to chests because people get sent clear to
23 hospice with no one having thought about stopping the
24 damn device. Surely there is some level of information
25 in which we are all involved in a magnificent collusion

1 to avoid the obvious when we put defribillators into
2 people's chest and don't think about stopping them.

3 Let me talk a second about the determining
4 preference. It was interesting the way you phrased it.
5 You said that doctors have such trouble determining
6 preference, which is a mental model that implies that it
7 already exists out there. I think we have to find some
8 more creative language, something like helping people
9 come to understand what would serve them best. It is not
10 just sort of now that you are in this situation, tell me
11 what your preferences are because almost nobody has them
12 that way. They have got to live it through, try to
13 devise it.

14 MS. SOFAER: The preference is not to be in the
15 situation.

16 DR. LYNN: Well, that is the first one, yes. I
17 think though there are some simple leverage points. I
18 think that for some of these things it would be -- one of
19 the mercies of growing old and dying slow, which is what
20 most of us will get to do, is that we will get a few
21 rehearsals. We will come close to a fire a few times.
22 But why don't we after the first round just nail anybody
23 who hasn't taken an opportunity to deal with that
24 rehearsal. I would propose that the second time a person
25 comes into the same hospital with the same serious

1 chronic illness and they have had no advance care
2 planning, the hospital should get half the DRG. I think
3 it would take us about a week to figure out to start
4 talking to people before they left the first time. We
5 just haven't even started getting serious about this at
6 all. So we don't have any of those sorts of things.

7 I think we need some kind of a feedback loop so
8 that the doctor at the end, there is no payment for
9 dealing with death certificates. Slap a \$50 payment on
10 but the trigger is you have to write three paragraphs
11 about what happened in the last few months and then use
12 the U-pins and send it back to all the doctors who took
13 care of this patient in the last year. And the doctors
14 at the end of the line would start learning to say this
15 patient and family could have had a whole lot better care
16 if... and then collect those and start seeing where our
17 real shortcomings are. Nobody upstream ever knows what
18 happens in hospice. Nobody upstream ever knows what
19 happens in a nursing home. We are all in our own little
20 bailiwicks and we don't talk to each other. So just some
21 feedback loops I think would be very important.

22 And then finally, I don't want to make it sound
23 maudlin but we have got to find some ways to get some of
24 these issues into popular stories and mythology.
25 Families stand there and look at you and say, "What do I

1 do now?" And I used to think what they wanted was a
2 decision tree and sort of choices. Now I realize what
3 they are saying is I don't know how Tuesday follows
4 Monday in the circumstance in which we now are thrust. I
5 have never heard of this. I don't know anybody who has
6 been in this situation. I don't know how to be a care-
7 giver. I don't know how to live with somebody who is
8 dying. And we have got to actually have to have some
9 more realism in our popular culture that arms people with
10 stories because the stories that come from the Bible and
11 the stories that come from Babe, The Blue Ox and Paul
12 Bunyan were magnificent for the problems of an earlier
13 era but we don't have the stories now to get us through
14 the situations we actually face.

15 So I think we need -- not that the FTC is
16 likely to be in a position to do that, but I just see red
17 when I pick up Newsweek and see the ad for Airaccept that
18 has the wonderful guy looking 58 years old, holding his
19 grandchild and talking about how Airaccept gave his life
20 back. That is not my patient. That is not the way we
21 use Airaccept. That is just misleading. You feel a
22 little bit better for a little bit of period of time but
23 no one is going to let you go waltzing off with a
24 grandchild if you are bad enough to need Airaccept. Let's
25 get real. The degree to which we could start trying to

1 be a little bit more honest about what it is we face as
2 mere mortals, none of us gets to evade that, it seems
3 that we could try for it. I am not sure what the FTC's
4 role in any of that would be. The community kind of has
5 to grow up enough to stomach the fact that you don't get
6 to live forever. And maybe we aren't yet there. But we
7 certainly could stop lying.

8 DR. BERENSON: Can I do 30 seconds on this one?

9 MR. HYMAN: Sure. I was going to say anybody
10 who is willing to try and follow Dr. Lynn.

11 DR. BERENSON: I am going to change the
12 subject.

13 MR. HYMAN: I now know how Shoshana feels. And
14 I would have laid serious money, "Babe, The Blue Ox"
15 would not have come up today.

16 DR. BERENSON: I thought a lot about sort of
17 using the words "choosing for quality" in health care and
18 how we contrast that in other markets. People pick
19 quality airlines to fly. And for the most part it has to
20 do with amenities related to scheduling and what used to
21 be food and things like that. But we rely on other
22 mechanisms to assure safety. Call it supply side, with a
23 heavy dose of regulation. And I think we should, going
24 back to health care, there is a whole bunch of stuff
25 under the quality rubric, which is about basic safety in

1 the system and reliability of the system that is not the
2 consumers' and the patients' responsibility. And they at
3 some point all have preferences or should have
4 preferences or we can help them figure out how to think
5 about things that they care about. But they shouldn't be
6 deciding to go to one hospital or the other because of
7 basic safety issues and that is a supply side issue.

8 DR. LEVINSON: I just need to come back to one
9 issue that has come up twice, which is about time in the
10 doctor/patient encounter and whether the encounter is
11 going to go away and be configured differently. I
12 actually think that face to face time between doctors and
13 patients is never going to go away. It is what patients
14 value and doctors value. It is the critical component of
15 care in any phase of life. And I think that one thing
16 that should be considered by regulators is the effect of
17 regulations on that time. I would give you the specific
18 example that in Medicare reimbursement now physicians are
19 required to ask a whole lot of questions to meet
20 compliance with Medicare reimbursement rules and it is
21 completely opposed to what all patients would tell you
22 and what research would tell you about what good quality
23 communication is about. Good quality communication is
24 about open-ended questions. The discussion we have had
25 about trying to understand the person in front of you,

1 and how the disease is affecting them. And regulations
2 tell you you have to ask a series of 20 or 30 close-ended
3 questions about what kinds of symptoms you have if you
4 are going to bill at a higher level.

5 And I think that is the kind of way regulatory
6 issues impact on the doctor/patient actual encounter that
7 these policy-makers should take into consideration. I
8 think the time that exists has been eroded by regulatory
9 constraints in a real way and undermining what doctors
10 and patients value.

11 MR. HYMAN: Quickly.

12 MS. SOFAER: Quickly, yes. To the FTC, you
13 have heard a lot of echos in here about the fact that
14 competition may not be the best mechanism for achieving
15 quality goals. And I just want to reinforce that, that
16 it is going to be a mix of competition on some factors,
17 regulation on other factors. And the third thing that I
18 want to talk about is the potential need or collaboration
19 across different stakeholder groups at the national,
20 state, and local level in order to figure out because
21 these are not little tweaks to the system. These are
22 significant overhauls to the system that are going to be
23 needed in order to be able to make the kinds of changes
24 in the practice of medicine that we are talking about
25 today.

1 MR. HYMAN: Well, I would like to thank our
2 panel for a wonderful afternoon session. And can I get a
3 round of applause from the audience.

4 (Applause.)

5 MR. HYMAN: We will reconvene these hearings on
6 June the 10th, when we will take up the subject of market
7 entry, and we will hold hearings June 10th, 11th, and
8 12th in this room.

9 Thank you very much.

10 (Whereupon, the hearing was concluded.)

11 * * * * *

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 C E R T I F I C A T I O N O F R E P O R T E R

2

3 DOCKET/FILE NUMBER: P022106 4 CASE TITLE: HEALTH CARE AND COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 5 DATE: MAY 30, 2003

6

7

8 I HEREBY CERTIFY that the transcript contained
9 herein is a full and accurate transcript of the tapes
10 transcribed by me on the above cause before the FEDERAL
11 TRADE COMMISSION to the best of my knowledge and belief.

12

13

DATED: JUNE 11, 2003

14

15

16

LISA SIRARD

17

18 C E R T I F I C A T I O N O F P R O O F R E A D E R

19

20 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I proofread the transcript for
21 accuracy in spelling, hyphenation, punctuation and
22 format.

23

24

25

SARA J. VANCE