

A-69-9

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20591

September 27, 1968

IN REPLY
REFER TO: NC-1/NA-80

Mr. David D. Thomas
Acting Administrator
Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue, S. W.
Washington, D. C. 20590

Dear Mr. Thomas:

The Safety Board has recently adopted an aircraft accident report (Member Francis H. McAdams concurring and dissenting) culminating our investigation of the accident involving Trans World Air Lines, Inc., B-707, N742TW, which occurred at the Greater Cincinnati Airport, Erlanger, Kentucky, on November 6, 1967. The report is due to be released to the public on October 4, 1968.

The report contains a number of recommendations which will be of interest to the Federal Aviation Administration in terms of possible corrective action. In order to comply with our policy of affording your agency advance notice of safety recommendations prior to their being made public, there is transmitted herewith a copy of the aforesaid report. Your attention is directed in particular to the "Recommendations" section on p. 27 of the report. In addition, these same recommendations are discussed in the "Analysis" portion of the report at pp. 16-17 and 21-23.

Sincerely,

[Faint signature]

Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr.,
Chairman

Enclosure

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(b) Probable Cause

The Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the inability of the TWA crew to abort successfully their takeoff at the speed attained prior to the attempted abort. The abort was understandably initiated because of the first officer's belief that his plane had collided with a Delta aircraft stopped just off the runway. A contributing factor was the action of the Delta crew in advising the tower that their plane was clear of the runway without carefully ascertaining the facts, and when in fact their aircraft was not a safe distance under the circumstance of another aircraft taking off on that runway.

Recommendations and Corrective Measures

1. The Board recommends that the FAA establish, and appropriately publicize to pilots and controllers alike, meaningful standards of safe clearance from runway edges for aircraft as well as for ground-based vehicles which will permit reasonable assurance to all concerned that no interference with flight operations on the runway will be caused by the presence of such movable obstructions. Such new standards should take into account the effect of the exhaust from jet engines.

2. The Board believes that the circumstances of this accident dramatize the need for a major reappraisal of the current training manuals and instructions provided by all airlines with a view toward a new, positive approach toward abort procedures. Such an approach would include

an amplification and clarification of such procedures, including safety margins provided and the need for prompt and proper sequencing of each action.

3. The Board believes that a reassessment of the respective duties and responsibilities of the captain and first officer during critical phases of flight is in order. In so doing, the "captain in command" concept should be re-examined with respect to its applicability in situations where time may not permit the captain to countermand effectively the decision of a first officer who is flying the aircraft.

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD:

/s/ JOSEPH J. O'CONNELL, JR.
Chairman

/s/ OSCAR M. LAUREL
Member

/s/ JOHN H. REED
Member

/s/ LOUIS M. THAYER
Member

/s/ FRANCIS H. McADAMS CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
Member

~~Member McAdams concurring and dissenting~~