Log 2514



National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594 Safety Recommendation

Date: JUL | 1996 In reply refer to: A-96-43 and - 44

Mr. David Goulet President Quad City Ultralight Aircraft Corporation 3610 Coaltown Road Moline, Illinois 61265

Several accidents have occurred involving amateur-built Challenger I and II series airplanes in which an apparent loss of directional control of these aircraft occurred immediately following or soon after the installation of Lexan doors¹ supplied by the Quad City Ultralight Corporation as accessories.² The airplanes involved in two of the accidents were flown by commercial flight instructors who lost directional control during initial climb shortly after takeoff. Both pilots reported that despite use of full right rudder, the aircraft continued to bank and turn left during an uncontrolled descent until an in-flight collision with trees or ground impact occurred. The National Transportation Safety Board believes that the installation of the above mentioned Lexan doors for amateur-built Challenger I and II series airplanes results in a significant reduction in directional stability.

The Safety Board has received reports voicing similar concern from the Popular Flying Association (PFA), the representative body in the United Kingdom for amateur aircraft construction, recreational, and sport flying. The PFA indicated that until Quad City suspended sales of all Challenger aircraft kits to the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand in September 1994, the kits imported into these countries were required to include, as a standard assembly, a larger vertical tail and dorsal fin. According to the PFA, the larger tail assembly was required to improve the Challenger's directional stability, particularly when Lexan doors were installed, and to comply with all applicable certification requirements. It is the Board's understanding that Quad City reinforced the fuselage steel weldment attachment structure to accommodate the larger tails and that the United Kingdom distributor for Challenger airplanes, Westcountry Aviation, recommended that all previously purchased airplanes be retrofitted with the larger tail assemblies.

In a 1993 letter describing the characteristics of his airplane to the Challenger News, a quarterly publication of the International Challenger Owners Association, a United Kingdom owner/operator reported:

¹Cockpit enclosure and larger windshield.

²For more detailed information, read Briefs of Accident CHI95LA144, CHI94LA350, and CHI94LA040 (attached).

The main difference as you will probably be able to see from the photo is the UK spec has a larger fin and rudder, since the opinion of everyone who flew it in the early stages over here, was that there simply was not enough rudder available. A factory mod was produced, resulting in another 25% on the dorsal main fin and rudder, which has drastically improved the handling of the aircraft, particularly in turns and close to the ground at lower speeds. Why all Challengers don't have this, I just can't figure out.

Comments appearing in other (1992 and 1993) editions of the Challenger News from United States Challenger owner/operators direct specific attention to the change in flight characteristics with the Lexan doors installed. For example:

The airplane flies great with the doors off and has been a lot of fun. However doors on is another story. The two place Challenger with the doors-on requires a lot of rudder and is somewhat unstable. A slip-skid string taped to the windshield, like sailplanes use, is a must to learn coordinated flight.

Our Challengers fly well with the exception of the Yaw Axis which seems to be very unstable, especially with the doors installed. We have added fins outboard on the horizontal stabilizers that seems to help some but not enough. Seems like it needs a larger vertical stabilizer, or a longer fuselage, or a skeg, or a fly by wire computer.

I'm sure many of you have experienced the strange handling difference when you fly the two seater with doors on. Rudder response is very "different" when compared to doors off flying. Some of it is attributed to the changed airflow into the prop. One of my customers had someone explain another theory to him like this: Adding all that vertical side area in front of the CG causes the front of the plane to fight against the tail in a turn. It's like putting feathers on the front end of an arrow. It wants to de-stabilize its flight; so installing the doors is almost like putting a vertical tail on the front of the plane.

A recent letter that Quad City submitted to the Safety Board contained a draft of an owner/operator advisory describing the effect of the Lexan doors on the Challenger's flight characteristics. The advisory stated, "With the installation of doors, the Challenger has a tendency to oversteer in the yaw (rudder) axis. To help correct this problem we advise installing stabilizer fins to the ends of the horizontal stabilizers. This drawing shows their installation. The drawing is self explanatory." Quad City indicated in its letter that it intended to send the advisory to all Challenger dealers and to the Challenger Owners Association pending an official request from the Safety Board to do so. Also, Quad City indicated that it needed the Safety Board's approval of the stabilizer fin modification. While the Safety Board can and does recommend that design modifications enhancing the Challengers' directional stability accompany installation of the Lexan doors, the Board is an investigative rather than a certification agency and, unlike the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), is not empowered to approve individual airplane designs or design modifications.

Because Challenger airplanes operate in both the ultralight and experimental categories and are constructed in a variety of configurations from kits or components supplied by Quad City, ĺ

including Rotax and Hirth engines, Lexan doors, floats, skis, and Fiberglass nose cones, the directional stability characteristics of these aircraft may differ markedly. As a result, the Safety Board believes that Quad City should determine the design modifications necessary to ensure that all of these configurations exhibit positive directional stability characteristics throughout the operating envelope, i.e., tend to recover from a skid (sideslip) with the rudder free. The appropriate modifications, where applicable, might include vertical fins/endplates on the horizontal stabilizer, an enlarged and/or more effective vertical tail assembly, changes to fuselage shape and/or sideform dimensions, and might be supplied by Quad City as options or accessories, or in the form of engineering drawings for construction by the individual builders of these ultralight/experimental airplanes.

Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Quad City Ultralight Aircraft Corporation:

Issue a safety/service advisory letter to all owner/operators of Challenger airplanes recommending that Lexan door enclosures be removed before further flight until appropriate design modifications are incorporated to provide positive directional stability throughout the operating envelope. (Class II, Priority Action)(A-96-43)

Determine any additional design modifications necessary, if any, to ensure that Challenger airplanes configured with floats, skis, etc., also exhibit positive directional stability characteristics throughout the operating envelope; make such modifications available as options or accessories or provide engineering drawings of the modifications to Challenger owner/builders; and issue a safety/service advisory letter to all owner/operators of Challenger kit airplanes, recommending that they incorporate these modifications. (Class II, Priority Action)(A-96-44)

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency with the statutory responsibility "...to promote transportation safety by conducting independent accident investigations and by formulating safety improvement recommendations" (Public Law 93-633). The Safety Board is vitally interested in any actions taken as a result of its safety recommendations and would appreciate a response from you regarding action taken or contemplated with respect to the recommendation letter. Please refer to Safety Recommendations A-96-43 and -44 in your reply.

Chairman HALL, Vice Chairman FRANCIS, and Members HAMMERSCHMIDT, GOGLIA, and BLACK concurred in these recommendations.

By:

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DGB TIME (LOCAL) - 15:50 EST	FATAL SERIOUS MINOR/NONE CREW D 0 1 PASS 0 0 0 0	LIGHT - Daylight SOURCE- Filot G - Visual (VMC) G - 9000 FT Broken D - 0015,000 SM F) - 60 ON - None ON - None None	FLIGHT TIME (Hours) TOTAL ALL AIRCRAFT - 3091 LAST 90 DAYS - 12 TOTAL MAKE/MODEL - 4 TOTAL INSTRUMENT TIME - 2	ATELY 500 FEET AGL, THE AIRPLANE TO REGAIN CONTROL. ACCORDING TO THE AIRPLANE HAD LEXAN DOORS INSTALLED TO N OF THIS KIT AIRPLANE, BUT WERE DEL. THE MANUFACTURER STATED THAT WHEN AT PILOTS MUST NOT TAKE THEIR FEET OFF
National Transportation Safety Board Washington, D.C. 20594 Brief of Accident Adopted 06/20/1996 RT,MI AIRCRAFT REG. NO. N100GB		CONDITION OF WEATHER INFO BASIC WEATHER LOWEST CEILIN VISIBILITY WIND DIR/SPEE TEMPERATURE (OBSTR TO VISI PRECIPITATION		A RIGHT CLIMBING TURN AFTER TAKEOFF, APPROXIMATELY 500 FEET AGL, E HIS USE OF FULL RIGHT RUDDER, HE WAS UNABLE TO REGAIN CONTROL. INTO A LEFT FLAT SPIRAL TO THE GROUND." THE AIRPLANE HAD LEXAN DOORS WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE ORIGINAL DESIGN OF THIS KIT AIRPL NDARD OR OPTIONAL FEATURE, DEPENDING ON THE MODEL. THE MANUFACTUF S BECOMES RUDDER DOMINANT AND SENSITIVE AND THAT PILOTS MUST NOT
572 05/02/95 BRIDGEPO	MAKE/MODEL - QUAD CITY CHALLENGER ENGINE MAKE/MODEL - ROTAX 503 AIRCRAFT DAMAGE - Destroyed NUMBER OF ENGINES - 1 OPERATING CERTIFICATES - None TYPE OF FLIGHT OPERATION - Personal REGULATION FLIGHT CONDUCTED UNDER - 14 CFR 91 HOMEBUILT	FURE POINT - Same as Accident M - Local Accident On airstrip	<pre>PILOT-IN-COMMAND AGE - 60 CERTIFICATES/RATINGS Commercial, Flight instructor Single-engine land, Multiengine land INSTRUMENT RATINGS Airplane</pre>) THAT WHILE MAKING) THE LEFT. DESPIT) KEPT TIGHTENING UP (Y/CABIN AREA. THE AVAILABLE AS A STAN ALLED. THE AIRPLAN
CH195LA144 FILE NO.	MAKE/MODEL ENGINE MAKE/MODEL AIRCRAFT DAMAGE NUMBER OF ENGINES OPERATING CERTIFIC TYPE OF FLIGHT OPI REGULATION FLIGHT HOMEBUILT	LAST DEPARTURE PC DESTINATION AIRPORT PROXIMITY	PILOT-IN-COMMAND CERTIFICATES/RAT Commercial, Single-engin INSTRUMENT RATIN Airplane	THE PILOT REPORTEL STARTED TO BANK TC PILOT, "THE PLANE ENCLOSE THE COCKPI SUBSEQUENTLY MADE THE DOORS ARE INST THE RUDDER PEDALS.

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CHI95LA144 FILE NO. 572	05/02/95	BRIDGEPORT, MI	AIRCRAFT REG. NO. N100GB	TIME (LOCAL) - 15:50 EST
Occurrence# 1 LOSS OF CONTROL - IN FL Phase of Operation TAKEOFF - INITIAL CLIMB	LOSS OF CONTROL - IN FLIGHT TAKEOFF - INITIAL CLIMB	IN FLIGHT CLIMB		
Findings 1 AIRCRAFT 2 ACFT/EQUI	- AIRCRAFT CONTROL - NOT MAINTAINED - ACFT/EQUIP, INADEQUATE DESIGN - K	AIRCRAFT CONTROL - NOT MAINTAINED ACFT/EQUIP, INADEQUATE DESIGN - KIT MANUFACTURER		

Occurrence# 2 IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH OBJECT Phase of Operation DESCENT - UNCONTROLLED

Findings 3. - OBJECT - T

3. - OBJECT - TREE(S)

Occurrence# 3 IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH TERRAIN/WATER Phase of Operation DESCENT - UNCONTROLLED

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the Probable Cause(s) of this Accident was: INADEQUATE DIRECTIONAL STABILITY OF THE AIRCRAFT (DUE TO INSTALLATION OF LEXAN COCKPIT ENCLOSURE DOORS), WHICH PRECIPITATED A LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL.

Format Revision 7/95

TIME (LOCAL) - 10.00 Com	SERIOUS MINOR 0 1 1	light her observation facility al (VMC) .000 SM /007 KTS	FLIGHT TIME (Hours) L ALL AIRCRAFT - Unk/Nr 90 DAYS - Unk/Nr L MAKE/MODEL - Unk/Nr I INSTRUMENT TIME - Unk/Nr	UDDERED, AND BEGAN TO TURN UDENT FILOT SAID THAT IN AN NOT RESPOND. THE AIRPLANE IN THE CHALLENGER, WITHOUT LLED AT THE TIME OF THE LLED AT THE TIME OF THE
National Transportation Safety Board Washington, D.C. 20594 Brief of Accident Adopted 06/20/1996 , IL AIRCRAFT REG. NO. NONE	CREW	CONDITION OF LIGHT - Day WEATHER INFO SOURCE- Weat BASIC WEATHER - Vist LOWEST CEILING - None VISIBILITY - 0010 WIND DIKYEPEED - 240 TEMPERATURE (F) - 72 OBSTR TO VISION - None PRECIPITATION - None	TOTAL LAST 9 TOTAL TOTAL	ET ABOVE THE GROUND, THE AIRPLANE JOLTED, SHUDDERED, AND BEGAN TO TURN SR AND THE TURN PROGRESSIVELY TIGHTER, THE STUDENT FILOT SAID THAT IN AN DDER AND RIGHT AILERON, BUT THE AIRPLANE DID NOT RESPOND, THE AIRPLANE EAN FIELD, THE STUDENT PILOT'S FIRST FLIGHT IN THE CHALLENGER, WITHOUT THE ACCIDENT. HOWEVER, THE DOORS WERE INSTALLED AT THE TIME OF THE OF THE
Nati Rati FILE NO. 1979 09/20/94 PRINCETON, IL	MAKE/MODEL - ULTRALIGHT CHALLENGER II ENGINE MAKE/MODEL - ROTAX Model Unk/Nr AIRCRAFT DAMAGE - Substantial NUMBER OF ENGINES - 1 OPERATING CERTIFICATES - 1 OPERATING CERTIFICATES - None TYPE OF FLIGHT OPERATION - Personal REGULATION FLIGHT CONDUCTED UNDER - 14 CFR 103 HOMEBUILT	LAST DEPARTURE POINT - ERIE, IL DESTINATION - ARGOS, IN AIRPORT PROXIMITY - Off airport/airstrip	PILOT-IN-COMMAND AGE - 25 CERTIFICATES/RATINGS Student INSTRUMENT RATINGS None None	THE STUDENT FILOT REPORTED THAT AT ABOUT 1100 FEET ABOVE THE GI LEFT. THE BANK ANGLE BECAME FROGRESSIVELY STEEPER AND THE TURN ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN CONTROL, HE APPLIED RIGHT RUDDER AND RIGHT ENTERED INTO A DIVE TO THE LEFT AND IMPACTED A BEAN FIELD THE ACCIDENT. ACCIDENT AND STAKEN THE DAY BEFORE THE ACCIDENT.

New York

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Occurrence# 1 Phase of Operation	CHI94LA350 FILE NO. 1979
LOSS OF CONTROL - IN FLIGHT CRUISE	09/20/94
IN FLIGHT	PRINCETON, IL
	AIRCRAFT REG. NO. NONE
	TIME (LOCAL) - 10:00 CDT

Findings

N 14 AIRCRAFT CONTROL - NOT MAINTAINED
 ACET/EQUIP, INADEQUATE DESIGN - KIT MANUFACTURER

Occurrence# 2 Phase of Operation IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH TERRAIN/WATER DESCENT - UNCONTROLLED

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the Probable Cause(s) of this Accident was: INADEQUATE DIRECTIONAL STABILITY OF THE AIRCRAFT (DUE TO INSTALLATION OF LEXAN COCKPIT ENCLOSURE DOORS), WHICH PRECIPITATED A LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL.

Format Revision 7/95

TIME (LOCAL) - 12.30 Esm	SERIOUS MINOR 0 0 0	ght Her observation facility 1 (VMC) 1 (VMC) 1 (000 SM 008 KTS	FLIGHT TIME (HOUTS) I ALL AIRCRAFT - 1700 90 DAYS - 39 L MAKE/MODEL - 17 L INSTRUMENT TIME - 315	reports being unable to it to a forced landing on company stated that the ditional flight training
National Transportation Safety Board Washington, D.C. 20594 Brief of Accident Adopted 06/20/1996 A.MI AIRCRAFT REG. NO. N4285V	EATAL FATAL PASS	<pre>dent CONDITION OF LIGHT - DayLight WEATHER INFO SOURCE- Weather c MEATHER INFO SOURCE- Weather c AIRPORT BASIC WEATHER - Visual (V LOWEST CEILING - UNK/Nr VISIBILITY - 0010,000 WISIBILITY - 290,008 TEMPERATURE (F) - 28 OBSTR TO VISION - None PRECIPITATION - None</pre>	TOTA LAST TOTA TOTA	th a door modification installed. The pilot reports being unable ing in a circling climb then circling descent to a forced landing of the President of the aircraft distribution company stated that the lot had to stay ahead of the aircraft and additional flight trainir
Nat CHI94LA040 FILE NO. 2112 11/28/93 ESCANABA.MI	MAKE/MODEL - STEVEN ULRICH CHALLENGER II ENGINE MAKE/MODEL - HIRTH 203 AIRCRAFT DAMAGE - SUDStantial NUMBER OF ENGINES - 1 OPERATING CERTIFICATES - None TYPE OF FLIGHT OPERATION - NODER - 14 CFR 91 HOMEBUILT	LAST DEPARTURE POINT - Same as Accident DESTINATION - Local Accident AIRPORT PROXIMITY - On airport AIRPORT NAME - DELTA COUNTY AIR RUNWAY IDENTIFICATION - 27 RUNWAY SURFACE - Asphalt RUNWAY SURFACE - DIY	PILOT-IN-COMMAND AGE - 66 CERTIFICATES/RATINGS Commercial, Flight instructor Single-engine land INSTRUMENT RATINGS Airplane	The flight was the first flight for this pilot with a fly the aircraft in other than a left bank resulting the airport. No control malfunction was found. The plane could be flown with the doors on but the pilot h would be suggested.

Brief of Accident intinued)

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CHI94LA040 FILE NO. 2112	11/28/93	ESCANABA, MI	AIRCRAFT REG. NO. N4285V	TIME (LOCAL) - 12:30 EST
Occurrence# 1 LOSS OF CONTROL - IN FL Phase of Operation TAKEOFF - INITIAL CLIMB	LOSS OF CONTROL - IN FLIGHT TAKEOFF - INITIAL CLIMB	FLIGHT '		. *
Findings 1 AIRCRAFT CO 2 ACFT/EQUIP,	- AIRCRAFT CONTROL - NOT MAINTAINED - ACFT/EQUIP, INADEQUATE DESIGN - KIT MANUFACTURER	- KIT MANUFACTURER		
Occurrence# 2 DRAGGED WING, ROTOR, P Phase of Operation DESCENT - UNCONTROLLED	AGGED WING, ROTOR, SCENT - UNCONTROLLE	DRAGGED WING, ROTOR, POD, FLOAT OR TAIL/SKID DESCENT - UNCONTROLLED		

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the Probable Cause(s) of this Accident was: INADEQUATE DIRECTIONAL STABILITY OF THE AIRCRAFT (DUE TO INSTALLATION OF LEXAN COCKPIT ENCLOSURE DOORS), WHICH PRECIPITATED A LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL.

Format Revision 7/95

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