NBL-383 September 2006

# MEASUREMENT EVALUATION PROGRAM MEETING MINUTES



## RENAISSANCE HOTEL NASHVILLE, TN

**JULY 15, 2006** 



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY • CHICAGO OFFICE • ARGONNE, ILLINOIS

**NBL-383** 

## U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

# MEASUREMENT EVALUATION PROGRAM MEETING MINUTES

Renaissance Hotel Nashville, TN.

## JULY 15, 2006

### **NEW BRUNSWICK LABORATORY**

9800 South Cass Avenue Argonne, Illinois 60439

NBL Home Page: www.nbl.doe.gov NBL Internet Address: USDOE.NBL@CH.DOE.GOV NBL Telephone Number: 630-252-2776 NBL Facsimile Number: 630-252-6256

#### TABLE OF CONTENTS

NBL: HISTORY AND MISSION	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
INTRODUCTION	1
SYNOPSIS	3
AGENDA	5
ATTENDEES	7
GRAPHICS USED IN TALKS	9

iv

#### **NBL: HISTORY AND MISSION**

The New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) is owned and operated by the United States Department of Energy through the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance (SP-1) and the Office of Technology and Field assistance (SP-30). The laboratory was established in 1949 as an analytical chemistry laboratory in New Brunswick in New Jersey to provide support to the United States Atomic Energy Commission. At that time, it was staffed by scientists from the National Bureau of Standards who had contributed significantly to nuclear material measurement programs in the Manhattan Project. At the New Brunswick Laboratory, they provided the technical expertise and skills to solve problems related to quantitative analyses of uranium-bearing materials. Over the years, these scientists and others following them have expanded the capabilities of the laboratory to include chemical and mass spectrometric analyses of plutonium and other trans-uranium elements, research and development activities in chemical analyses techniques, preparation of certified reference materials, and operation of the nuclear safeguards measurement evaluation program. In 1977, the laboratory moved from New Jersey to its present location at the Argonne National Laboratory site in Illinois.

The major mission of the New Brunswick Laboratory is to provide technical assistance to the Department of Energy in the following areas: measurement evaluation program operation, certified (nuclear) reference materials preparation, measurement techniques development, and actual measurements of special nuclear materials. In addition to fulfilling these tasks, the laboratory helps the Department in three other areas: conducting technical audits, resolving shipper/receiver differences in material transfers, and assisting in nuclear nonproliferation programs within the United States and internationally.

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The organizers of the ME Program Meeting thank the speakers who delivered the technical talks, and the attendees for keeping the proceedings lively. The meeting was successfully organized only because of the efforts expended by several staff at NBL and INMM, and the support received from DOE-HQ.

#### INTRODUCTION

The New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) Measurement Evaluation (ME) Program was initiated in 1985 to assess and evaluate the adequacy of measurement technology as applied to materials accounting. In the beginning stages, the Department of Energy facilities alone participated in the measurement evaluation programs. Later on, laboratories outside the DOE complex were permitted to join on a cost-recovery basis. The current program consists of the Safeguards Measurement Evaluation (SME) program for the evaluation of destructive analyses results of uranium and plutonium bearing materials, and the Calorimetric Exchange (CALEX) program for the evaluation of non-destructive analyses results of plutonium materials. The uranium and plutonium test materials used in the SME program are made from certified reference materials or other well characterized materials. The participating laboratories analyze these materials at periodic intervals for elemental content and isotopic abundance. The results of those analyses are evaluated by NBL for accuracy and precision achieved in the analyses. Performance evaluation reports are sent to the participants and their oversight organizations/agencies. In the CALEX program, laboratories analyze repeatedly plutonium oxide standards (Calex I and Calex II) by a combination of two different non-destructive techniques; calorimetry for power measurements and high resolution gamma spectrometry for plutonium isotopes and <sup>241</sup>Am abundance. The results for power, isotopes abundance, effective specific power and plutonium mass are evaluated for accuracy and precision.

The evaluation results from the SME and the CALEX programs are discussed once a year at the measurement evaluation program annual meeting. The meeting is usually held a day prior to the start of the International Nuclear Material Management (INMM) annual meeting and at the same venue. This year, the meeting was held on July 15<sup>th</sup> at the Renaissance Hotel in Nashville, Tennessee. The annual meeting provides an opportunity to the participants in the measurement evaluation program to discuss topics such as those related to measurement techniques, performance evaluation methods, measurement uncertainties, and new test material needs.

The 2006 meeting was held in two half-day sessions, the morning session devoted to destructive analyses and the afternoon to non-destructive analyses. The agenda for the 2006 meeting is shown in page 5.

#### SYNOPSIS

Jon Neuhoff welcomed the attendees. Chino Srinivasan delivered the first talk that dealt with performance evaluation of destructive analyses results submitted during October 2004 -June 2006. Amy Wong spoke next on LANL facilities upgrade; her talk included an evaluation of the "100 minus impurities" method for plutonium assay. Elmer Lujan spoke on precision achieved in D&G titrations of uranium using Ce(IV) sulfate instead of potassium dichromate as the titrant. Steve Balsley provided an account of the operations of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory at IAEA; he also spoke on the qualification of a robotic D&G titration system. It is noteworthy that he was able to use some of the SME test samples supplied by NBL in the qualification work. Stephan Richter summarized the results and conclusions of the REIMEP-18 campaign conducted by IRMM for uranium isotopes measurements. Jose Perrotta described the structure and purpose of the ABACC organization; in his talk, he spoke about the steady improvement made by ABACC laboratories in uranium assay and uranium isotope measurements. Jerome LaRosa spoke next, and gave an account of the NIST plans for a measurement evaluation programs in environmental radioactivity. The last paper in the morning session by Peter Mason was delivered as the first talk in the afternoon session. In the remaining time in the morning session, the participants discussed some of the problems and concerns in Calex I and Calex II standards measurement; the discussion was initiated by Mark Mount of LLNL with active participation by many attendees. The importance of defining <sup>241</sup>Am abundance in calorimetric standards with high accuracy and precision, and the use of appropriate half-lives of plutonium and americium isotopes (e.g., ASTM values) for making decay corrections were emphasized.

The afternoon session started with introductory remarks by Usha Narayanan of NBL. Peter Mason gave a talk on high accuracy measurements of minor isotope ratios of uranium and plutonium by a modified total evaporation method using TIMS. Chino Srinivasan gave a talk on the evaluation of cal/gamma measurement results of Calex I standards gathered during January 2005- December 2005; his talk also included NBL efforts in preparing a working reference material certificate for the Calex II standard to be issued in September 2006. The next three talks were given by Bud Summers of LLNL. Since LLNL placed some restrictions in incorporating the slides from these talks into the minutes, only short abstracts of the talks, as provided by the authors, are included. Peter Santi of LANL provided a review of new developments in three different non-destructive assay techniques; gamma spectrometry, calorimetry and neutron measurements. The concluding talk in the afternoon session was given by Roger Wellum; he spoke on the IRMM NUSIMEP campaign.



ſ

## AGENDA



9:00 AM	Introductory Remarks	Jon Neuhoff, NBL
9:10 AM	SME Program: Uranium and Plutonium	B. Chino Srinivasan, NBL
9:30 AM	Present and Future Analytical Chemistry Measurements at Los Alamos	Amy Wong* and Laurie Walker, LANL
	Uranium Assay - Control and Precision Measurements	Elmer Lujan, LANL
10:00 AM	2005 SAL Summary; Qualification of Robotic Titration System for D&G Analysis of Uranium	Steven D. Balsley*, Josef Berger, Alfred Zoigner, IAEA
10:30 AM	The REIMEP 18 Inter-Laboratory Comparison for Measurements of Uranium Isotopic Ratios in Nitric Acid Solution	Stephan Richter, IRMM
11:00 AM	ABACC-NBL Collaboration	Jose Augusto Perrotta, ABACC
11:30 AM	Measurement Evaluation Programs in Environmental Radioactivity at NIST	Kenneth G.W. Inn, Lisa Outola, Svetlana Nour, Hiromu Kurosaki and Jerome J. La Rosa*, NIST
12:00 PM	High accuracy determination of minor isotopes in uranium and plutonium materials by thermal ionization mass spectrometry	Peter Mason*, Richard Essex, Steven Goldberg, Rebecca Thomas, and Stephan Richter <sup>+</sup> , NBL
12:30 PM	Lunch Break	
2:00 PM	Introductory Remarks	Usha Narayanan, NBL
2:15 PM	CALEX Program & Calex 2 certification	B. Chino Srinivasan* and Usha Narayanan, NBL
2:45 PM	a Uranium Isotopic masses in 3013 containers filled with MOx	Bud Summers, LLNL
	<ul> <li>b) Accuracy/precision of CRM uranium standards in two isotopic counters</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>Accuracy/precision of CALEX I and CALEX II) Urani plutonium standards in three isotopic counters</li> </ul>	
4:00 PM	Some Recent Developments in Non- Destructive Assay Technologies	Peter Santi, LANL
4:15 PM	IRMM NUSIMEP 5 Campaign	Roger Wellum, IRMM
5:00 PM	Close of ME Program Meeting	

#### ATTENDEES

Balsley, Steve Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, IAEA s.d.balsley@iaea.org

Collins, Linda Y-12 <u>c8i@y12.doe.gov</u>

Collins, Lloyd Y-12 Iqv@y12.doe.gov

Collins, Susan Savannah River National Laboratory susan.collins@srnl.doe.gov

Dixon, Tracy AWE <u>Tracy.dixon@awe.co.uk</u>

Haga, Roger INL <u>Roger.haga@inl.gov</u>

Harper, Derek AWE <u>derek.harper@awe.co.uk</u>

Jackson, Darryl Los Alamos National Laboratory darryljackson@earthlink.net

Jay, Jeff Savannah River National Laboratory Jeffery.jay@srs.gov

LaRosa, Jerome NIST Jerome.larosa@nist.gov

Srinivasan , B. (Chino) New Brunswick Laboratory, DOE <u>b.srinivasan@ch.doe.gov</u>

Summers , Bud Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory summers10@LLNL.gov Lujan, Elmer Los Alamos National Laboratory <u>ejlujan@lanl.gov</u>

Mason, Peter New Brunswick Laboratory, DOE <u>peter.mason@ch.doe.gov</u>

Mount, Mark Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory <u>mount1@llnl.gov</u>

Narayanan, Usha New Brunswick Laboratory, DOE <u>Usha.narayanan@ch.doe.gov</u>

Neuhoff, Jon New Brunswick Laboratory, DOE jon.neuhoff@ch.doe.gov

Perrotta, Jose A. ABACC perrotta@abacc.org.br

Richter, Stephan IRMM <u>Stephan.richter@ec.europa.eu</u>

Sampson, Thomas Los Alamos National Laboratory tsampson@lanl.gov

Santi, Peter Los Alamos National Laboratory psanti@lanl.gov

Sheaffer, Mike Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory <u>sheaffer1@llnl.gov</u>

Wellum, Roger EC-JRC-IRMM Roger.wellum@ec.europa.eu

Wong, Amy Los Alamos National Laboratory wong@lanl.gov

### ATTENDEES (Cont.)

Thompson, Ken Y-12 kyt@Y12.doe.gov Welsh ,Terri Fluor Hanford Safeguards Terri L WelshL@rl.gov

Vogt , Stephan New Brunswick Laboratory, DOE <u>stephan.vogt@ch.doe.gov</u>

#### **GRAPHICS USED IN TALKS**

The graphics (slides, pictures etc.) used in the presentation of the 2006 ME Program Meeting talks are included in the following pages. The graphics for the talks are shown in the same order as shown in the agenda. Note that no graphics were used in the two introductory remarks (by Jon Neuhoff and Usha Narayanan). Also no graphics were made available for the talks given by Bud Summers of LLNL.

## Measurement Evaluation Program Annual Meeting

Safeguards Measurement Evaluation: Uranium and Plutonium July 15, 2006 Nashville, TN.

B. Srinivasan

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

NEW BRUNSWICK

## Safeguards Measurement Evaluation Program: October 2004 – June 2006

Evaluations

- Uranium assay
- Uranium isotope abundance
- Plutonium isotope abundance

## Participants

- ABACC (6 labs in Argentina and 2 in Brazil)
- IAEA (new participant)
- INL
- IRMM (new participant)
- LANL
- NBL
- NFS
- SRS
- Tokai
- Y-12

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

NEW BRUNSWICK

# **Test Samples**

- Uranium Assay and Isotope Abundance
  - UNH solution
  - UO<sub>2</sub> pellet
  - UO<sub>3</sub> powder
  - UF<sub>6</sub>
- Plutonium Assay and Isotope Abundance
  - Dried plutonium sulfate

3

NEW BRUNSWICK

## Methods

- Uranium Assay
  - Davies-Gray titration
  - IDMS
  - XRF
- Uranium Isotope Abundance
  - TIMS
  - ICP-MS
  - GSMS
- Plutonium Isotope Abundance
  - TIMS

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

NEW BRUNSWICK

# Analysis schedule

- Quarterly or semi-annual or annual
- Each sample in each cycle analyzed
  - At least on two different days
  - At least in duplicate on each day

5

## **Statistical Evaluation**

- % RD of measurement result
- Outliers
- Day-to-day variation
- Mean % RD
- Standard deviation of mean % RD
- 95% C.L.
- Bias and precision ITVs

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance



## Quarterly Evaluation Report: Example

#### Day to Day ANOVA analysis

Report for Laboratory A UNH Solution - U Concentration IDMS

Date of Report: January 17, 2006

Sample Number	Aliquant Number	Analysis Date	Reported %U	% Relative Difference	Analyst Code
98NU0076-01-036	1	09/14/05	1.00040	-0.0150	BLM/GPW
98NU0074-01-042	1	09/14/05	1.00300	-0.1016 **	BLM/GPW
98NU0076-01-036	2	09/14/05	1.00040	-0.0150	BLM/GPW
98NU0074-01-042	2	09/14/05	1.00380	-0.0219	BLM/GPW
98NU0076-01-036	3	09/15/05	1.00080	0.0250	DLB/GPW
98NU0074-01-042	3	09/15/05	1.00500	0.0976 **	DLB/GPW
98NU0076-01-036	4	09/15/05	1.00080	0.0250	DLB/GPW
98NU0074-01-042	4	09/15/05	1.00440	0.0378	DLB/GPW
98NU0076-01-036	5	09/19/05	1.00080	0.0250	WS/GPW
98NU0074-01-042	5	09/19/05	1.00420	0.0179	WS/GPW
98NU0076-01-036	6	09/19/05	1.00070	0.0150	WS/GPW
98NU0074-01-042	6	09/19/05	1.00410	0.0080	WS/GPW

""This measurement value was rejected by the NBL statistical outlier evaluation program. The value is not included in the summary below.

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

7


NEW BRUNSWICK

## Quarterly Evaluation Report: Example (continued)

Number of Results Analyzed	10
Mean % Difference	0.010
Mean Absolute % Difference	0.021
95% C.L. of Mean (df = 2)	0.058
Standard Deviation	0.021
Between-Day Standard Deviation (df = 2)	0.042
Within-Day Standard Deviation (df = 7)	0.006
Statistical Significance of Between-Day Standard Deviation	100%
U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance	


U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

# Quarterly Evaluation Report: Example (continued)



U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 10


## **Results Evaluation: UNH Solution**



U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 11

#### NEW BRUNSWICK


## Results Evaluation: UO<sub>2</sub> Pellet



U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

## Results Evaluation: UF<sub>6</sub>


New Brunswick Laboratory Safeguards Measurement Evaluation Program



U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

## 

# Results Evaluation: UO<sub>3</sub> Powder




U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

13

#### NEW BRUNSWICK


## Results Evaluation: <sup>235</sup>U Abundance in HEU

New Brunswick Laboratory Safeguards Measurement Evaluation Program



U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

# Results Evaluation: <sup>235</sup>U Abundance in LEU



U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

15




## Results Evaluation: <sup>239</sup>Pu Abundance

New Brunswick Laboratory Safeguards Measurement Evaluation Program <sup>239</sup>Pu N=26 0.012 0.008 (low-burnup international target value) TIMS (G) 0.004 RD, % 0.000 -0.004 -0.008 -0.012 G Laboratory Laboratory Mean Bias Target Values Standard Deviation ٠

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 17






U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance



# Long-term Evaluation: UNH Solution



U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 19

NEW BRUNSWICK

## Summary

Evaluation reports to:

- ABACC
- IAEA
- LANL
- NBL
- SRS
- Tokai
- Y-12

## Summary (continued)

## Measurement results yet to be submitted

• Laboratory J (instrument problem). Successfully solved. Results awaited

## Test sample problem

• Laboratory A observed problems with UO<sub>3</sub> sample possibly due to moisture uptake. Needs re-characterization experiments at NBL

## IDMS spike recovery

• Laboratory G noticed incomplete recovery of spike; successfully solved by addition of HF

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 21

NEW BRUNSWICK

## **Concluding Remarks**

## New organization at NBL

- A-76
- PWS and MEO proposal: October 2004 January 2006
- MEO declared winner: April 2006
- Organizational change: April September 2006
- MEO new organization: October 2006
- Emphasis on two programs
  - Measurement Evaluation
  - Certified Reference Materials



# Concluding Remarks (continued)

Safety inspection and audit

• Stand down of laboratory operations December 2004 Remedial measures

- Rewrite documents including DSA
- Decrease plutonium inventory (Safety Cat 2 to Cat3)
- Restart laboratory operation following thorough review of procedures

Expected date for full scale operation

- Uranium laboratories by December 2006
- Plutonium laboratories (yet to be determined)

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 23

#### NEW BRUNSWICK

## ME Program Plans: July 2006- June 2007

- Minutes of 2006 Annual Meeting: issue August 2006
- Ship test samples to participants by October 2006
- Characterize one new test sample for uranium assay and uranium isotopics: August 2006
- Characterize UF<sub>6</sub> test samples for uranium assay: December 2006
- Characterize Brazil UO<sub>2</sub> test samples for uranium assay and uranium isotopics: December 2006
- Verify UO<sub>3</sub> powder test sample results: December 2006
- Develop new database application software: December 2006
- Evaluation reports to participants: within 3 weeks of receipt of results
- Annual report preparation: June 2007
- Re-start Plutonium laboratory operations: Work towards to re-start within 1 year!!!

# Present and Future of Analytical Chemistry Measurements at Los Alamos

Amy S Wong and Laurie F Walker

NBL Measurements Evaluation Program Meeting July 16, 2006 Nashville, TN

• Los Alamos	UNCLASSIFIED	LA-UR-06-4769	CHEMISTRY
The World's Greatest Science Protecting America			NNSA

## Outline

- Current Status
- Challenges
- Can we use "100 impurities" for Pu Assay?
- Future direction for development



## Actinide Analytical Chemistry Group at Los Alamos National Laboratory

- The group was established in 1943 (Manhattan Project)
- Our focus is on analysis of samples in actinide matrices, including Pu and U assay, isotopic and trace impurities determinations in metals and oxides
- We provide full analytical service in Chemistry Metallurgy Research (CMR) Wings 3, 5 and 7 (~28,000 ft<sup>2</sup>) and limited onsite analysis support in Plutonium Facility (~2,300 ft<sup>2</sup>)
- Samples are shipped from the Plutonium Facility (TA-55) to the analytical laboratories in CMR building

• Los Alamos	UNCLASSIFIED	LA-UR-06-4769	CHEMISTRY
The World's Greatest Science Protecting America			NNSA

## Chemistry Metallurgy Research (CMR) Building



Completed in 1952. Houses analytical chemistry and material characterization capabilities in 550,000 ft<sup>2</sup> space

Los Alamos     NATIONAL LABORATORY	UNCLASSIFIED	LA-UR-06-4769	CHEMISTRY
The World's Greatest Science Protecting America			NNS

## Provide full analytical capabilities for analyses of feed, product and waste

Process	Materials to be Analyzed		
Disassembly	Metals, impure oxide from direct metal oxidation		
Aqueous Purification	Purified oxide, process and waste solutions		
Pyrochemical Processes	Metals from direct oxide reduction (DOR), molten salt extraction (MSE), electro-refinery process (ER), salt residues		
Foundry	Cast metal		
<sup>238</sup> Pu Heat Source	Oxide, ceramic pellet, process and waste solutions		
Advanced Actinide Fuel	Oxide, nitride, ceramic pellet		
Facility Operations	Liquid waste analysis		
Safeguards	Materials control and accountability		
Standard Fabrication	Oxide, metal, and solution		
• Los Alamos	UNCLASSIFIED LA-UR-06-4769		

#### The World's Greatest Science Protecting America

## **Infrastructure Challenges**

- Analytical Chemistry has 28,000 ft<sup>2</sup> laboratory space in 54 years old CMR building contaminated and leaky infrastructure
- Facility availability is ~85% for normal business hours, i.e., frequent ventilation and power failure → interrupt sample preparation and instrument operations
- Authorization for operating CMR facility is scheduled to end in 2010
- The replacement buildings (CMR-R) will not be ready for occupying until 2009 and 2014



NNS

## **Technical and Production Challenges**

- Establish interim analytical capabilities to provide surety of materials used in manufacturing and certification, and basic analytical chemistry support for the entire cycle of nuclear materials programs at Los Alamos
- Meet the production schedule and budget constraints

We must transform analytical chemistry, determine the analysis requirements for nuclear materials programs, and enable a responsive infrastructure

• LOS Alamos	UNCLASSIFIED	LA-UR-06-4769	CHEMISTRY
The World's Greatest Science Protecting America			NNSA

## Can we use "100 – Impurities" instead of Pu Assay?

• In Pu Metal Exchange Program using well characterized metals and consensus values, we observed good agreement between Pu assay value and "100-impurities"

Ratio = 
$$\frac{Pu \text{ (by chemical assay)}}{Pu (100\% - \sum \text{ impurities })}$$

- "Dirty Dozen Impurities"
  - Decay products <sup>241</sup>Am, total U, <sup>237</sup>Np
  - Fe, Ga, Al, Ni, C, O, Si, W, Cr
- Other impurities
  - Ca, Mo, Mg, Cu, Ta, B, Mn, Zn, Zr, Th, Pb, Be, Sn, Ti, Cd



UNCLASSIFIED LA-UR-06-4769

CHEMISTRY

### Pu Metal Exchange Data

(100-impurities) data independently verified the chemical Pu assay data

	Metal 465, 4130.7 ppm total impurities (100% - impurities) = 99.587							N	letal	D, 497	7.5 ppm	total
Rati	Ratio 4/01 8/01 3/03				3/04		(100% - impurities) = 99.950				99.950	
Lab	Lab 1 0.999		0.999	1.001		1.000		Rati	0	5/04	std	v of ratio
Lab	2 0.9	92	0.988	1.002		0.999		Lab	1	1.00	0 (	0.0001
Lab	3 1.0	03	1.003	0.999		0.984		Lab	2	1.00	2 (	0.0007
Lab	4 0.9	99	1.001	1.001				Lab	3	1.00	0 (	0.0017
Lab	5 0.9	99	0.999	0.999				Lab 6	-	0.99	-	0.0006
Lab	-			0.999		0.999		Lab 6		0.98	-	0.0014
Lab	7 1.0	00						Lab	-	0.00		
i						М	letal 4	442, 317	72.0 p	pm to	tal impu	rities
	Metal C, 6579.9 ppm total						(100% - impurities) = 99.683					
	(100% -	impurit	ties) = 9	9.342		Ratio		4/01	8/	01	3/03	3/04
	Ratio	5/04	stdv	of ratio		Lab 1	C	.999	1.0	00	0.999	1.000
	Lab 1	0.999	90	.0005		Lab 2	C	.998	0.9	90	1.002	1.000
	Lab 2	1.004	4 0	.0009		Lab 3	1	.002	1.0	03	1.001	0.996
	Lab 3	0.992	2 0	.0017		Lab 4	C	).999	1.0	01	1.000	
	Lab 6-1	1.006	3 0	.0016		Lab 5	1	.000	0.9	99	1.000	
-	Lab 6-2	0.980	0 C	.0056		Lab 6					1.000	0.999
6						Lab 7	C	).999				
LOS A	LOS Alamos NATIONAL LABORATORY				UNC		E D	LA-UF	२-06-4	769	CH	MISTRY
The Worl	The World's Greatest Science Protecting America									1	NNS	

### **Good Analytical Measurements**

- If you are interested in the Pu value, analyze for Pu
- If you want to know the impurity levels of certain elements, analyze for the impurities

#### BONUS

The Pu assay value should be close to the (100% - impurities) if all impurities are accurately accounted for.



### Goals for Future Analytical Chemistry Development and Improvements

- Provide analysis tools for production control at line and within the production facility
- Choose the right analysis tools and methods for manufacturing analytical tolerance for current and future specifications
- Maintain high precision and accuracy reference methods for certain programs, standardization, and problem solving


• Los Alamos	UNCLASSIFIED	LA-UR-06-4769	CHEMISTRY
The World's Greatest Science Protecting America			NNSA

### **Key Considerations**

- Customers' requirements what are the required analyses? accuracy and precision?
- Must meet production schedule and budget constraints
- Improve safety
- Reduce residue and waste generation
- Reduce space requirements
- Reduce labor intensive steps
- Improve operations efficiency

### Typical Precision and Accuracy for Selected Analytical Methods

Method	Matrix	Typical Conc.	Precision	Detection Limit
Pu Assay by Coulometry	Pu metal	>99%	0.07%	n/a
		<sup>238</sup> Pu	<10%	n/a
		<sup>239</sup> Pu	0.002%	n/a
Pu Isotopic	Pu metal/Oxide	<sup>240</sup> Pu	0.010%	n/a
		<sup>241</sup> Pu	0.8%	n/a
		<sup>242</sup> Pu	1.2%	n/a
Trace Ga by IDMS	Pu metal	< 50ppm	0.5 to 1%	1.5 ppm @50mg
Trace Ga by ICP-AES	Pu oxide	< 50 ppm	20%	0.01ppm @250mg
Iron by Visible Spectrometry	Pu metal	300 to 400 ppm	7%	20 ppm
Iron by ICP-AES	Pu metal	300 to 400 ppm	10%	< 10 ppm



The World's Greatest Science Protecting America

NNSA

- We must integrate the current and future analytical needs with the customers to
  - determine chemical analysis requirements based on technical evaluations
  - maintain analytical capabilities for production, certification and problem solving
- We are the only analytical laboratory in the US, who have full analysis capabilities to support the entire cycle of nuclear materials programs
- We must transform analytical chemistry in the next few years to improve our ability to support program goals and canable a responsive infrastructure

• Los Alamos	UNCLASSIFIED	LA-UR-06-4769	CHEMISTRY
The World's Greatest Science Protecting America			NNS

### Mission Space Constraints (NA-10 Sept 1, 2004. \$850 M CMRR Project)

- Security Cat. 1, Hazard Cat. 2 Nuclear Facility (NF):
  - For analytical chemistry and materials characterization:
    - New CMRR NF  $22,500 \text{ ft}^2$
    - Existing Plutonium Facility  $-5,400 \text{ ft}^2$
- Hazard Cat. 3, Radiological Laboratory (< 8.4 g <sup>239</sup>Pu):
  - CMRR RLUOB (Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building)
    - Total space: 19,500 ft<sup>2</sup> (secured and open areas)
    - To support nuclear facility: 10,000 ft<sup>2</sup>
    - Office space: 350 employees
    - Training center with classrooms and simulated laboratory space



### **Typical Laboratory Setup**



LASSALATORY
 UNCLASSIFIED LA-UR-06-4769
 HEMISTRY
 The World's Greatest Science Protecting America

### Analytical Chemistry Development – FY07 and beyond (proposed)

- Assessment of analytical needs for Pit Manufacturing
- Feasibility study of centralization in sample preparation
- Micro column concept and chromatography separation
- Pu isotopic analysis by gamma spectroscopy
- Np trace analysis method
- Hand-held XRF a quick diagnostic tool
- Work flow development for future operations
- Instrument interface with analytical data tracking laboratory information management system (LIMS)
- Improve radiochemistry analysis for high Am residues

PRECISION AND CONTROL OF DAVIES AND GRAY PROCEDURE

### 2006 MEASUREMENT EVALUATION ANNUAL MEETING Elmer Lujan Kathy Garduno Laurie Walker



UNCLASSIFIED LA-UR-06-4778 CHEMISTRY

### Precision and Control of Davies and Gray Procedure (Modified)

- This Method is modified to use less sample material, 25 mg verses 100 mg and  $Ce(SO_4)_2$  is substituted for  $K_2Cr_2O_7$ .
- This method is applicable to the determination of uranium compounds and solutions containing uranium with/without plutonium.
- Uranium is reduced to U(IV) by excess Fe(II) in strong phosphoric-sulfamic acid.



### Precision and Control of Davies and Gray Procedure (Modified) *(continued)*

- Excess Fe(II) is selectively oxidized by nitric acid in the presence of a Mo(VI) catalyst.
- V(IV) is added to sharpen the end point.
- U(IV) is titrated potentiometrically with cerium (IV) titrant to an end point of 600 mV.



### Analysis of Sample and Standards

- Dissolve a 25 mg U sample aliquot that has been dried with 0.5 M  $H_2SO_4$ . in a 100 ml beaker.
- Place a stir bar into the beaker containing the sample aliquot or standard.
- Add 2 ml of 1.7 M sulfamic acid and turn on magnetic stirrer.
- Add 25 ml of reducing solution,  $(11.8 \text{ M H}_3\text{PO}_4, 0.09 \text{ M FeSO}_4, \text{ and } 0.17 \text{ M H}_2\text{SO}_4)$  stir solution for 60 s (solution is cloudy.)
- Add 5 ml of oxidizing solution,(8 M HNO<sub>3</sub>, 0.24 M sulfamic acid, and 0.4% ammonium molybdate) wait an additional 3 m after solution clears.



### Analysis of Sample and Standards (continued)

- Turn off stirrer and rinse the walls of beaker with 10-15 ml of vanadyl sulfate (0.008M in  $0.5M H_2SO_4$ ).
- Insert electrode into solution and add more  $VOSO_4$  solution until volume of ~80 ml is reached.(~430 mV).
- Turn on stirrer, titrate carefully to end point of 600 mV.



### Calibration and Standardization

- During the course of a day's operation, sample assays are interspersed with a total of three calibration assays on NBL CRM 112-A (NBS 960) normal uranium metal or equivalent.
- Stated daily precision of method is 0.10% rsd as demonstrated by analysis of standards.





# Calculations

Titer =  $\frac{\text{U Standard, mg}}{\text{wt. Ce (IV) solution used, g}}$ 

 $U(\%) = \frac{(Ce(SO_4)_2 \text{ titer}, \overline{T}) (\text{wt. of } Ce(SO_4)_2 \text{ used}, g) (100\%)}{\text{wt. of sample, mg}}$ 



UNCLASSIFIED LA-UR-06-4778 CHEMISTRY

### NBS 960(CRM 112 A) Standard Verification

- Several times annually (usually each quarter), adjust the concentration of the NBS-960 parent working standard solution concentration using two small portions of independently and freshly prepared portions of NBS-960 metal.
- Run two analyses from each "verification" standard.





### NBS 960(CRM 112 A) Standard Verification (continued)

- · Analysis of these "verification" standards are used to adjust the concentration of the large NBS-960 working standard solution if needed.
- Typical adjustment of the NBS-960 working standard solution is <0.10 % annually.
  - i.e. Conc. on  $3/22/04 = 29.358_2$  mg U/g sol.
    - Conc. on  $4/20/06 = 29.399_4$  mg U/g sol.
    - $\Delta = 0.14\%$  over two years



#### UNCLASSIFIED LA-UR-06-4778


CHEMISTRY MNS®

### **Average Titer and Precision**

	Date	Titer	Percent RSD	
	3/22/2004	2.5615	0.053	
	3/23/2004	2.5681	0.022	
	6/15/2004	2.5656	0.084	
	6/16/2004	2.5673	0.065	
	12/9/2004	2.5656	0.046	
	12/10/2004	2.5677	0.034	
	3/23/2005	2.5687	0.058	
	3/24/2005	2.5652	0.077	
	10/4/2005	2.5657	0.036	
	10/5/2005	2.5658	0.032	
	2/22/2006	2.5622	0.074	
	2/23/2006	2.5623	0.049	
	4/19/2006	2.5621	0.028	
~	4/20/2006	2.5642	0.042	
NATIONAL LABORATORY		UNCLASSIF	I E D	CHEMISTRY
		LA-UR-06-477	8	NNSA








# Control Sample (CF 83-18-52)

- A high purity depleted U metal from AWE-UK (under JOWOG 22).
- Prepare aliquots from dissolved metal (~2 gm. U metal/dissolution) and distributed in 25 mg portions for analysis as a control sample.
- Analyze two portions on each day that Davies Gray is run.



UNCLASSIFIED LA-UR-06-4778






# 2005 Summary Nuclear Sample Destructive Analysis


# Steve Balsley IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL)

# 10-Year Trend



8 August 2006


# 5-Year Nuclear Sample Trend



8 August 2006

Sample Types Received in SAL for Destructive Analysis (2005)\* INPUT UF6 UOx POWDER UNH SOL PROD **UO2 PELLET** PNH MG Methods HALW U Assay (D&G) U308 POWDER U Assay (IDMS) U Assay (Other) MNH MG U ISO (TIMS) Pu Assay (IDMS) Pu ISO (TIMS) MISC. LIQUID 238Pu (AS) 244Cm (AS) UF4 UOx SCRAP Th Assay D2-DTO 241Am (HRGS) MOx HEAVY WTR n=2127 AUC 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Measurement Requests

> \*SAL received >55 sample types in 2005. This list includes only the top 15 sample types.



8 August 2006

# Conclusions

- The Davies & Gray method represents approximately 20% of all measurement requests for nuclear samples collected during IAEA inspections in 2005.
- The D&G method is the second most frequently applied method in SAL (IDMS is the #1 used method).
- Participation in NBL SME Program is most welcomed in SAL.

# Qualification of a Robotic System for Potentiometric Titrations (Davies & Gray Method)

Steve Balsley, Josef Berger, Alfred Zoigner IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL)

# **Robot D&G Titration System**

- TIMS 900 titrator
- Mitsubishi robot arm
- Computer control
- Custom software for robot arm control
- Custom titration stand and sample holders
- Established in 2005
- Validation in 2006



8 August 2006

# **Justification**



- The Uranium Laboratory receives ~600 samples per year for assay.
- 1200 Samples + 350 Stds
  + 230 Controls = 1780
  titrations made in 2005.
- A good chemist can make 80 titrations per day.
- Robot system can make 30-40 titrations per day.

8 August 2006

# Qualification Approach

- A validated method (modified D&G) is to be qualified on new equipment.
- Criteria for qualification:
  - Precision (repeatability, reproducibility)
  - Accuracy
  - Measurement reliability
- Archived NBL SME (2006) UO<sub>3</sub> powder and UO<sub>2</sub> pellet samples were chosen to facilitate the testing.

# **Qualification Approach**


- A combination of archived original solutions and freshly dissolved powders and pellets from SME 2006 was used.
- Samples were measured in duplicate over 10 different dates.
- Results are compared against these NBL values:
  - UO<sub>3</sub> powder: 82.671% uranium
  - UO<sub>2</sub> pellet: 88.129% uranium

3 October 2006

	Date Code	Analysis Date	
	1	March 21, 2006	
SME	2	April 4, 2006	
Measurements	3	April 25, 2006	
	4	June 14, 2006	
	5	June 15, 2006	
	6	June 18, 2006	
	7	June 22, 2006	
	8	June 29, 2006	
	9	June 30, 2006	
	10	July 3, 2006	
	11	July 4, 2006	
	12	July 5, 2006	
8 August 2006	13	July 11, 2006	
-			

### Date Codes


# Sample Results- UO<sub>3</sub> Powders



8 August 2006


13

# Sample Results- UO<sub>3</sub> Powders



8 August 2006

# Sample Results- UO<sub>3</sub> Powders




8 August 2006

# UO<sub>3</sub> Powder Summary-Robot System

- Assay of archived SME powder solutions are in good agreement with the NBL stated value.
- Assays of freshly dissolved SME powders are in good agreement with the NBL stated value.
- There is ~0.08% negative bias against the NBL stated value.


## Sample Results- UO<sub>2</sub> Pellets



8 August 2006


17

# Sample Results- UO<sub>2</sub> Pellets




8 August 2006

### Sample Results- UO<sub>2</sub> Pellets



8 August 2006

Sample Results- UO<sub>2</sub> Pellets




8 August 2006

## UO<sub>2</sub> Pellet Summary-Robot System


- Assay of archived SME pellet solutions are in good agreement with NBL stated value.
- Assay of new SME pellet dissolutions are in good agreement with NBL stated value.
- Robot assay data (archived and new solutions) are bias slightly above original SME assay data.

8 August 2006

Rejected Results Normal vs. Robot



# Robot Titrator: Not as Reliable



8 August 2006

# Summary

- SAL robotic titration system produces repeatable and reproducible data that matches the operator-assisted system performance.
- Robotic system accuracy is good.
- The robotic system has a failure rate ~2x higher than the operator-assisted titration system.
- The robot system may be qualified for routine use, however the challenge is to reduce the number of rejected measurements.

53



### REIMEP 18 Inter-Laboratory Comparison for Uranium Isotope Ratio Measurements in Nitric Acid Solution


<u>Stephan Richter</u>, Adolfo Alonso-Muñoz, Jan Truyens, André Verbruggen, Roger Wellum

Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM) Geel, Belgium


> http://www.irmm.jrc.be http://www.jrc.cec.eu.int

INMM 2006 REIMEP 18 SRi 1

oint Research Centre



-irm




- Measure ratios <sup>234</sup>U/<sup>238</sup>U, <sup>235</sup>U/<sup>238</sup>U and <sup>236</sup>U/<sup>238</sup>U
- \_
- Calculate abundances and mass fractions for <sup>234</sup>U, <sup>235</sup>U, <sup>236</sup>U, <sup>238</sup>U \_
- Task for IRMM: Measure & Certify Isotopic Composition •
  - <sup>235</sup>U/<sup>238</sup>U measured using a UF<sub>6</sub>-gas source mass spectrometer \_ MAT511, calibrated using synthetic isotope mixtures. Relative Uncertainty about 0.05% (k=2).
  - $^{234}U/^{238}U$  and  $^{236}U/^{238}U > 2x10^{-5}$ : measured on a TRITON TIMS Faraday-Multi-collector, no need for ion counting on <sup>234</sup>U.
  - New 10<sup>12</sup>-Ohm amplifiers used to detect <sup>234</sup>U to improve signal to \_ noise ratio.
  - $^{236}$ U/ $^{238}$ U < 2x10<sup>-5</sup>: measured on a TRITON TIMS,  $^{236}$ U detected using ion counter, <sup>238</sup>U on Faraday cup.
  - Method for <sup>236</sup>U/<sup>238</sup>U measurements validated using new synthetic mixtures with certified <sup>236</sup>U/<sup>238</sup>U=10<sup>-6</sup>, 10<sup>-7</sup>, 10<sup>-8</sup>.


INMM 2006 REIMEP 18 SRi 4


oint Research Centre



























INMM 2006 REIMEP 18 SRI 1











BRAZILIAN-ARGENTINE AGENCY FOR ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS

# INTERCOMPARISON PROGRAM ABACC-NBL Cooperation

# José Augusto Perrotta

NBL Measurement Evaluation Program - Nashville July 15, 2006



#### Declarations and Other Documents in the Field of Nuclear Safeguards between Brazil and Argentina

- 1985 Declaration of Foz do Iguaçu
- **1987** Declaration of Viedma
- 1988 Declaration of Iperó
- 1990 Declaration of Foz do Iguaçu
- 1991 –Bilateral Agreement for for the Exclusively Pacific Use of Nuclear Energy (18/07/91) (foundation of ABACC)
- 1991 Quadripartite Agreement for the Application of Comprehensive Safeguards (13/12/91) (AR-BR-ABACC-IAEA)
- **1994 Enforcement of the Quadripartite Agreement (INFICIRC/435)**
- **1994** Full adhesion of Argentina (in January) and of Brazil (in May) to the Treaty of Tlatelolco
- **1995** Adhesion of Argentina to the Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (TNP)
- 1997 Adhesion of Brazil to the Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (TNP)
- 2005 Puerto Iguazú Commitment ("importance of ABACC and the SCCC")



### Safeguards Under INFCIRC/435

- Full scope safeguards agreement in force since March 1994
  - ABACC and IAEA shall coordinate activities to avoid unnecessary duplication of ABACC's safeguards
  - When performing their activities, ABACC and IAEA shall work jointly in accordance with compatible safeguards criteria of the two organizations
  - ABACC and IAEA shall reach independent conclusions
- Guidelines for Coordination of Routine and Ad-hoc Inspections approved in 1997

# ABACC Information

69

- 78 Nuclear facilities under safeguard
  - Argentina (43); Brazil (35)
  - Nuclear Power Reactors, Enrichment Plants; Fuel Fabrication Plants; Research Reactors; Laboratories; Nuclear Material Storage Facilities
- ~ 120 inspections per year
- US\$ 3 million budget per year
- ~ 30 DA samples analysis per year
- ~ 8 swipe samples analysis (particle analysis) per year

# ABACC

# ABACC Organization

- Commission
  - 2 Argentine Members
  - 2 Brazilian Members
- Secretariat

 $\Delta($ 

- Secretary
- Deputy Secretary
- Officers (10)
- Auxiliary staff (5)
- Inspectors (83) (under convening)

## Secretariat Organization

- The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary and a Deputy Secretary, an Argentine and a Brazilian, who exchange their position each year
- Planning and Evaluation (2 officers)
- Operations (2 officers)
- Accounting of Nuclear Materials (2 officers)
- Technical Support (2 officers)
- Institutional Relations (1 officer)
- Management and Finances (1 officer)

# ABACC

# Technical Support (1)

- Coordinate the technical analyses (DA; NDA; C&S) necessary to safeguards application
- Identify, purchase, assemble, calibrate, install and provide for the maintenance of equipment and materials
- Prepare the safeguard equipment for utilization during inspections
- Organize the training of ABACC inspectors
- Coordinate the development of new equipment and methodologies to be used by ABACC or in collaboration with the IAEA

# Technical Support (2)

- Technical Support has the responsibility of analyzing by DA the samples taken by ABACC during safeguards inspections
- Having no analytical laboratory, ABACC relies on an Analytical Network of existing laboratories on both countries (Brazil and Argentina)
- Technical Support evaluates the performance of these laboratories

# ABACC

# **Technical Support (3)**

Established an Intercomparison Program as a permanent activity, counting with the highest possible number of participating laboratories from both countries; and taking into account the existing infrastructure in both countries

#### Intercomparison Program Main Objectives

- To provide the participants with the opportunity to verify and improve their performance through the *identification* of statistically significant *sources of error* and the estimation of their magnitude
- To detect any possible abnormal results and apply corrective actions
- To maintain an Analytical Network of reliable laboratories analyzing ABACC's samples from safeguards inspections

# US-DOE/ABACC Safeguards Agreement


- Agreement signed on April 18, 1994
- Cooperation on research, development, testing and evaluation of technologies, equipment and procedures for the application of international safeguards
- 16 Action Sheets have been established and developed up to now

# US-DOE/ABACC Safeguards Agreement

- The NBL is cooperating with ABACC in the implementation of Intercomparison Programs, Sample Exchange Programs and Laboratory Quality Assurance through Standards and Samples Exchange Programs
- 2 Action Sheets: 1 finished, 1 active

# ABACC

ABA	CC-N	BL Cooperation
First Round Robin Analysis of UO <sub>2</sub> powder	1995	
NBL hosted ABACC experts	1996	NBL specialists visit ABACC Network labs
NBL hosted ABACC experts	1997	NBL specialists visit ABACC Network labs
Second Round Robin Analysis of U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>e</sub> using a pellet of reference material	1998	Participation of the ABACC network labs on NBL SME
Start the production of an internal traceable working standard	1999	Program
Participation of the ABACC Network labs on NBL SME Program	2000	NBL hosted ABACC experts
ABACC		



	NBL-SME 2006
	<ul> <li>ABACC Network Laboratories Participation</li> <li>4 laboratories from Brazil</li> <li>6 Laboratories from Argentina</li> <li>Measurements</li> <li>UO<sub>2</sub> Pellets <ul> <li>Uranium Concentration</li> <li>Uranium Enrichment</li> </ul> </li> <li>UF<sub>6</sub> <ul> <li>Uranium Concentration</li> <li>Uranium Concentration</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
ABA(	Uranium Enrichment

# Participating Laboratories in Argentina RAW DATA

				<sup>235</sup> U Enr		
Laboratory	Material	Analysis	Wt	:%	Wt	%
		Method	Mean	STD	Mean	STD
AB	UO <sub>2</sub>	D&G Tritation	88.123	0.022		
			88.087	0.031		
	UF <sub>6</sub>	<b>D&amp;G</b> Tritation	67.418	0.025		
			67.455	0.029		
AC	UO <sub>2</sub>	D&G Tritation	88.005	0.033		
			87. 975	0.006		
AA	$UO_2$	TIMS			4.0051	0.0000
					4.0051	0.0000
	UF <sub>6</sub>	TIMS			0.7114	0.0011
					0.7108	0.0014
$\square \Lambda /$						

# Participating Laboratories in Argentina RAW DATA

Laboratory	Material	Analysis		ncentration t%	<sup>235</sup> U Enr Wt	
		Method	Mean	STD	Mean	STD
AD	UO <sub>2</sub>	D&G Tritation	88.114	0.013		
			88.108	0.015		
AE	UO <sub>2</sub>	D&G Tritation	88.113	0.023		
			88.144	0.026		
	UF <sub>6</sub>	D&G Tritation	67.428	0.010		
			67.689	0.017		
AF	UO <sub>2</sub>	ICP-MS			3.9975	0.0068
					3.9885	0.0160

ABACC

# Participating Laboratories in Brazil RAW DATA

Laboratory	Material			ncentration t%	<sup>235</sup> U Enrichment Wt%	
		Method	Mean	STD	Mean	STD
BF	UO <sub>2</sub>	D&G Tritation	88.089 88.135	0.026 0.028		
BA	UO <sub>2</sub>	D&G Tritation	88.054 88.031	0.063 0.066		
BE	UO <sub>2</sub>	HRICP-MS			4.0490 4.0460	0.0230 0.0150
BC	UO <sub>2</sub>	D&G Tritation TIMS	88.108 88.014	0.042 0.017	4.0069 4.0091	0.0018 0.0026
	UF <sub>6</sub>	GSMS			3.1893 3.1994	0.0024 0.0034

# Measurement Evaluation Uranium Concentration

Laboratory	Analysis			Measurement	Day-to-Day Variation	
	Method	Bias	Precision	Bias		
UO <sub>2</sub>						
AB	D&G Tritation	Yes	Yes	Negligibly Small	Absent	
AC	D&G Tritation	No	Yes	Negative Bias	Marginal	
AD	D&G Tritation	Yes	Yes	Negligibly Small	Absent	
AE	D&G Tritation	Yes	Yes	No Bias	Marginally Significan	
BA	D&G Tritation	Yes	Yes	No Bias	Significant	
BC	D&G Tritation	Yes	Yes	Negative Bias	Absent	
BF	D&G Tritation	Yes	Yes	No Bias	Absent	
UF <sub>6</sub>						
AB	D&G Tritation	No	Yes	Negative Bias	Significant	
AE	D&G Tritation	Yes	No	No Bias	Not Evaluated	

NBL Report – B.Srinivasan

		Measurement Evaluation Uranium Enrichment				
Laboratory	Analysis	5		Measurement	Day-to-Day Variation	
	Method	Bias	Precision	Bias		
UO <sub>2</sub>	Sec					
AA	TIMS	Yes	Yes	Negative Bias	Absent	
AF	ICP-MS	No	No	Negative Bias	Marginally Significant	
BC	TIMS	Yes	Yes	No Bias	Absent	
BE	HRICP-MS	No	No	Positive Bias	Significant	
UF <sub>6</sub>						
AA	TIMS	Yes	Yes	No Bias	Absent	
BC	GSMS	Yes	No	No Bias	Absent	

NBL Report – B.Srinivasan

# ABACC

### FUTURE ACTIONS ABACC/NBL Cooperation

- UF<sub>6</sub> samples characterization by NBL and analysis by ABACC Network Laboratories
- Second Round of 2006 SME
- Critical analysis on measurement evaluation results and laboratories performance
- Advisory meetings with ABACC Network Laboratories for improvements identification
- Plan new intercomparison exercise (2007-2008)



#### Summary

- ABACC is completing 15 years of existence
- ABACC applies the SCCC between Brazil and Argentina and performs safeguards activities jointly with the IAEA
- US-DOE through NBL is cooperating with ABACC in the implementation of Intercomparison Programs, Sample Exchange Programs and Laboratory Quality Assurance through Standards and Samples Exchange Programs
- ABACC support network laboratories are participating in the SME-2006
- New activities and intercomparison exercises are foreseen to the ABACC/NBL cooperation



<b>ABA</b>	СС	
		Thank you!
www.aba	cc.org	perrotta@abacc.org.br

# Measurement Evaluation Programs in Environmental Radioactivity at NIST

Kenneth G. W. INN lisa OUTOLA Svetlana NOUR Hiromu KUROSAKI Jerome J. LA ROSA

#### NBL Measurement Evaluation Program Meeting 15 July 2006 Nashville, TN

#### **Goals of Environmental Radioactivity Unit:**


- Promote the **accurate measurement** of environmental-level radionuclide concentrations in naturally occurring materials
- Provide a traceability link between organizations engaged in this type of measurement and the primary national metrology laboratory, NIST

Examples of naturally occurring materials (matrices):

Soil	Sediment	Vegetation	Water				
Biological materials (shellfish, seaweed)							
		(hono och uning f					

Bioassay substances (bone ash, urine, feces, lung, liver)

Radionuclides: natural (cosmogenic, primordial) and anthropogenic



How does NIST strive towards attaining these goals?

- NRIP (NIST Radiochemistry Intercomparison Program)
- RTP (Radiological Traceability Program)
- SRM (Standard Reference Material) Natural Matrix Program
- Intercomparison Program for Radionuclide Isotopic Studies Workshop (February 28 – March 2, 2006)

NRIP and RTP are performance evaluation (PE) programs

All of these programs/efforts require active involvement with participating laboratories and organizations which seek to maintain or achieve a high level of radioactivity measurement accuracy (most commonly, measurement of radionuclide concentration)

#### NRIP = NIST Radiochemistry Intercomparison Program\*

- Established in **1997** [special emergency NRIP started in 2003]
- Supports low-level radioanalytical labs performing environmental radioactivity and radiobioassay measurements
- Implements traceability according to ANSI N42.23 (ANSI, 1996), ANSI N42.22 (ANSI, 1995) and HPS N13.30 (HPS, 1996)
- Specific objectives
  - 1. Assess measurement traceability
  - 2. Evaluate capability for matrix and radionuclide interference(s)
  - 3. Validate existing and new radiochemical methods

#### • Overall objective:

Improve quality of low-level radioactivity measurements of participating laboratories

\*Reference: Z. Wu et al., Appl. Rad. Isotopes 56 (2002) 379 - 385

#### **NRIP** – continued

#### Radionuclides:

- gamma <sup>54</sup>Mn, <sup>60</sup>Co, <sup>65</sup>Zn, <sup>133</sup>Ba, <sup>134</sup>Cs, <sup>137</sup>Cs, <sup>152</sup>Eu
- beta <sup>90</sup>Sr
- alpha <sup>230</sup>Th, <sup>234,235,238</sup>U, <sup>238,239+240</sup>Pu, <sup>241</sup>Am

Activity levels: 0.03 – 0.3 Bq/sample

Sample types: air filter, water (acidified), soil, synthetic urine, synthetic feces

#### **NIST responsibility:** high quality, traceable PE materials

- use available NIST SRM solutions as starting materials
- calibrate others (short-lived <sup>54</sup>Mn, <sup>65</sup>Zn, <sup>134</sup>Cs)
- traceability chain through gravimetry, verified by radioactivity measurement
- <u>consistency evaluation</u>: individual samples of each set of PE materials are measured (comparative gamma) to ensure relative conformity

#### **NRIP** – continued

2 types of exercises (choice of participants):

**Routine** - participants (typically 5 - 10) select  $\leq 4$  matrices

- time for analyses ~ 3 months
- pass/fail traceability assessment based on reported results and uncertainties

**Emergency**  $- \le 4$  matrices selected by participants (typically ~ 6)

- notified by NIST just before shipment on "surprise" date
- participant selects radionuclides and/or gross alpha/beta
- report results/uncertainties < <u>8 hours</u> of actual sample receipt!!!!
- pass/fail traceability assessment based on reported results and uncertainties

NRIP - continued

### Acceptance criteria

ANSI N42.22 (environmental and radiobioassay)

 $|X_{LAB} - X_{NIST}| \le 3 \text{ x} [U_{C}(LAB)^{2} + U_{C}(NIST)^{2}]^{1/2}$ 

where X refers to measured value and U<sub>c</sub> refers to total combined standard uncertainty of mean

HPS N13.30 (radiobioassay)

 $-25\% \leq [(X_{\text{LAB}} - X_{\text{NIST}})/X_{\text{NIST}}] \leq +50\%$ 

and  $U_{\rm C}(\text{LAB}) \le \pm 40\%$  (1s)

NRIP - continued

Report of Traceability issued by NIST for each radionuclide includes:

- reported mean value, X<sub>LAB</sub>
- NIST gravimetric value, X<sub>NIST</sub>
- corresponding reported and NIST value uncertainties (k = 2)
- [(X<sub>LAB</sub> X<sub>NIST</sub>)/X<sub>NIST</sub>] x 100%
- traceability limit, based on ANSI N42.22 formula
- pass/fail evaluation based on  $|X_{LAB} X_{NIST}|$  compared to ANSI N42.22 calculated traceability limit
- when appropriate, bias and precision evaluation for HPS N13.30 (pass/fail)

Overall summary of materials, methods and instruments used for NIST PE sample preparation and verification

# **NRIP** Sample Analyses

#### 2004 Emergency Exercise 6 participating laboratories


	AF air filter	AW water	SS soil	SU syn urine	SF syn feces
Gamma	5	5	3	1	1
G[Alpha]	1	2	1	0	0
G[Beta]	1	2	1	0	0
Isotopic	0	2	0	0	0

# **NRIP Sample Analyses**

### 2004 Emergency Exercise 6 participating laboratories

	AF air filter	AW water	SS soil	SU syn urine	SF syn feces
Gamma	5	5	3	1	1
G[Alpha]	1	2	1	0	0
G[Beta]	1	2	1	0	0
Isotopic	0	2	0	0	0


Single Lab Results (Isotopics in Water) for '04 and '05 Emergency Exercises



**RTP** = **R**adiological Traceability **P**rogram (RESL and NIST, since 2004)

#### RESL

- designated reference laboratory for DOELAP and MAPEP
- prepares PE samples for participating labs
- analyzes materials of unknown activities
- must maintain traceability to NIST



#### RTP – continued

#### Radionuclides:

- gamma: <sup>54</sup>Mn, <sup>57</sup>Co, <sup>60</sup>Co, <sup>65</sup>Zn, <sup>125</sup>I, <sup>131</sup>I, (<sup>134</sup>Cs), <sup>137</sup>Cs
- beta: <sup>3</sup>H, <sup>90</sup>Sr
- alpha: <sup>230</sup>Th, <sup>234</sup>U, <sup>238</sup>U, <sup>237</sup>Np, <sup>238</sup>Pu, <sup>239/240</sup>Pu, <sup>241</sup>Am

#### Matrices:

air filters (glass fiber) water (acidified) soil vegetation synthetic urine synthetic feces

#### Activity levels, representative:

- alpha 0.1 1 Bq/sample
- <sup>3</sup>H 1 10 Bq/g
- 90Sr 1 10 Bq/sample
- gamma 10 100 Bq/sample (except <sup>125</sup>I, <sup>131</sup>I)
- <sup>125</sup>I, <sup>131</sup>I 110 2000 Bq/g

**RTP** – continued

Turn-around time of 120 days

**Traceability Acceptance Criteria:** 

For RESL results of NIST-prepared samples:

• synthetic urine and synthetic fecal: difference  $\leq 9\%$ • soil, water, vegetation, air filter: | difference |  $\leq 12\%$ 

For NIST measurement of RESL-prepared samples:

ANSI N42.22 (ANSI, 1995)

 $|V_{\text{NIST}} - V_{\text{RESL}}| \le 3 \text{ x} [U_{\text{C}}(\text{NIST})^2 + U_{\text{C}}(\text{RESL})^2]^{1/2}$ 

where V refers to nuclide concentration value  $U_{\rm C}\,$  refers to total combined 1 sigma uncertainty in V

# **Natural Matrix SRMs**

for Environmental Radioactivity Measurement



- Rocky Flats Soil I
- **River Sediment**
- **Peruvian Soil**
- Human Lung
- Human Liver
- Lake Sediment
- **Ocean Sediment**
- Bone Ash
- Shell Fish

#### New SRMs forthcoming:

- Seaweed (ocean) SRM 4359, featuring bio-accumulated radionuclides (Pu, Am, Cs, K, Pb, Po, U, Th, Ra) in plant tissue
- Rocky Flats soil II SRM 4353A, replacement for Rocky Flats soil I, featuring Pu "hot particles" and elevated Pu levels; certified Pu, U, <sup>137</sup>Cs, <sup>90</sup>Sr, <sup>228</sup>Ra, <sup>210</sup>Pb; certified activity ratios <sup>238</sup>Pu/<sup>239+240</sup>Pu, <sup>228</sup>Th/<sup>232</sup>Th, <sup>230</sup>Th/<sup>232</sup>Th. <sup>234</sup>U/<sup>238</sup>U
- Shellfish (ocean) SRM 4358, oyster [87.9% Japan Sea, 12% White Sea, 0.1% Irish Sea] with bio-accumulated radionuclides (under development)
- **Peruvian soil II** future replacement for Peruvian soil I (SRM 4355), very low Pu content ("blank"), southern hemisphere; possible mass spec Pu application, 240/239 Pu atom ratio different from northern hemisphere

Fish? Building materials?



Roc

CKY FLATS

KILOMETERS

RF-I - East RF-II - West

## Rocky Flats Soil (contact person: Svetlana Nour)


- Low organic low carbonate content
- The contamination fairly well-known
- The logistics and costs of obtaining the samples and shipping were reasonable
  - Air dried
  - Milled twice
  - Sieved
  - Jet pulverized
  - Blended
  - Bottled and



sterilized







#### Intercomparison Program for Radionuclide Isotopic Studies Workshop

February 28 - March 2, 2006

<u>Goal</u>: Establish a traceability testing and intercomparison program for isotopic measurement of anthropogenic radionuclides

#### Focus:

- Environment
  - Forensics
    - Radiobioassay
      - Emergency

**About 60 Participants** 

National Laboratories, NMI, Academia, Defense, Federal Agencies, International Agencies, Commercial PT Laboratories, IAEA

# **Environment Breakout session**

Radiometric

Atom counting

Geochemistry

Waste Acceptance

### **Radiometric Proficiency Test Needs**

Find suitable PT Exercises with Web Base Database

Future PT? Atom Counting, Geochemistry, Transportation WAC, Treatment, Storage

#### Radiometric SRM Needs

- 1. Matrix : Sludge from Water Treatment, Soil(s)
- **2. Nuclides** : <sup>228,230,232,234</sup>Th, <sup>210,212,214</sup>Pb, <sup>212,214</sup>Bi, <sup>40</sup>K, <sup>226,228</sup>Ra..... etc
- 3. Concentration Range : 0.3-7 Bq/g
- 4. Isotopic Ratio : Natural

# **Atom Counting Needs**

- Certify current NIST SRMs for atom counting (to TIMS level)
- Isotopic Ratios

# **Geochemistry Needs**

- Natural and anthropogenic radionuclides in environmental matrices
- All matrices are of potential interest

# Radionuclides :

- Ra-228, Pb-210, Na-22, Sr-90
- Pu, U, Th, Cs....

#### Waste Acceptance Criteria Needs

WAC for transportation, treatment, storage, etc

#### **Matrices**

- Irradiated graphite/concrete
- Sludge (disposal sites/evaporators)
- Resins/water (primary coolant)

#### **Radionuclides**

H-3, C-14, Co-60, Cs-137, Cl-36, Pu & U isotopes, gamma emitters long lived radionuclides for disposal sites characterization

#### Nuclear Forensics, Safeguards, and Nonproliferation Reference Material Needs

- Natural matrix RMs certified for actinide isotopic content (in addition to activity)
- Isotope dilution tracer and isotope ratio standards
- Radiochronometry RMs

# Radionuclide Isotopic RMs

- Round robin for Rocky Flats, Columbia River Sediments (or sub), Peruvian soil (U, Pu) = \$600K
- Blank matrix & spiked matrix (soil/rock): 2 or 3 Pu, U, Am, Np, Cm, Th, Cs135/137 = \$250K per CRM
- RDD mix solutions, Sr90, 137Cs, 60Co, 192Ir, 241Am, 238Pu, 3H = \$150K

# **Isotope Dilution Tracers and Ratio RMs**

#### Spikes:

- 233U \$500K
- 244Pu \$200K to improve delivery date
- 229Th \$300K
- 243Am \$500-1500K
- 236Np \$3000K
- 236Pu for alpha \$500K with 236Np

#### **Calibration Stds:**

- Mixed 241-243Am \$500K
- Mixed 230-232Th \$500K
- Higher precision alpha stds \$200K

# **Radiochronometry RMs**

- 234U-230Th \$100K for existing materials
- 235U-231Pa, \$100K for existing materials
- 241Pu-241Am \$150K for existing materials
- 137Cs-137Ba \$175K

## **Other RM and Test Material Needs Identified**

•	Burn-up standard – Cs burn-up standard – Nd burn-up standard	\$300K min for bo	oth				
•	Trace element standards for u	ranium fuel cycle	\$1000K				
•	• Oxygen isotope standard for uranium oxide						
•	Trace Pu in U (1E-06)	\$300K					
•	<b>Particles:</b> U/Pu mixture (1:1, 1000:1)	on swipes \$15	500K				

• U with minor isotopes \$1500K

#### **Radiobioassay**


- Need: 1. Pu in synthetic fecal samples
  - 2. Am-241 in natural urine sample;
    - 3. U concentrations and isotopic ratios in synthetic urine for calibration (ICP-MS) and quality control
- Matrix: Urine; Fecal; Hair (neutron exposure screen); Fragment (wound materials)
- Nuclides: 1. Actinides U and Pu and their isotopes, Am-241 2. Fission/activation products - Cs-137, Sr-90, Co-60. Ir-192, Se-75 3. Nuclides prioritized against the list from CDC and other agencies.
- Conc: mBq Bq/sample
- Isotopics:1. U-234/235/236/238 2. Pu-238/239/240 3. Ratios for different nuclides (eg. Am-241/Pu-239)
- Acceptance Criteria; 1. ANSI N13.30; 2. Draft original standards; 3. ANSI 42.22
- Priorities: 1. Consequence management (DHS/DOE/FRMAC) responder screening 2. Population monitoring (CDC)

Responsibilities/Time lines: 1. The Army looks for funds - U standard preparation 2. Health Canada work on Pu fecal & Am urine

#### Emergency Response

- Need: PT to qualify laboratories to analyze samples for early and intermediate phases of the response to a radiological incident
- Matrices: Air particulate filter/air cartridge, swipes, soil, water, bioassay (especially urine), and food/vegetation
- Nuclides: H-3, Pu-241. Sr-89/90, Pm-147. I-129, Am-241, Cs-137, Co-60, Y-88, Ir-192, Cf-252. Isotopic Pu, U, Th, Po-210, Ra-226, Cm-244
- Concentration: 0.25 to 2 or 3 times the PAG (program action guideline)
- Funding: DHS -- via ICLN (Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks)
- Acceptance Criteria: ± 25% except gross alpha/beta in early phase ± 20% for intermediate phase Uncertainties reported but not used for evaluation
- Traceability limits -- combined reported and tester uncertainty with incentive to keep estimated uncertainties reasonable

# Summary







High accuracy determination of minor isotopes in uranium and plutonium materials by thermal ionization mass spectrometry

Peter Mason Reference Materials Program Manager New Brunswick Laboratory

> Measurement Evaluation Program Meeting July 15, 2006 Nashville, TN

# Acknowledgements

- Dr. Richard Essex
- Dr. Rebecca Thomas
- Dr. Steven Goldberg
- Dr. Stephan Richter IRMM


# Why better minor isotope characterization?

- Naval and Commercial Fuel Specifications (U-233, U-236, Pu)
- Nuclear Forensics/Nuclear Smuggling signatures for history/ID
  - Reactor Fuel Burnup Monitors and Identification of Reactor Type
  - Source Attribution Fuel-Related RDDs (Radiological Dispersion Device) and INDs (Improvised Nuclear Device)
  - Proliferation Indicators identify enrichment, processing, or production method
  - Chronometry age of material production or last chemical separation
- Environmental Monitoring
  - U/Pu minor isotopes refine pathway transport models
  - identify contaminants in presence of natural U
  - health physics/bio-assay data



How to improve accuracy and sensitivity?

- Modify the Ion Source
- Modify the Detector System
- Improve Measurement Protocols







### Improved Mass Spectrometric Methods

- 1. Modified total evaporation
- 2. High intensity with background correction
- 3. Advanced ion counting method
- Above methods take advantage of significant precision/accuracy advantage of total evaporation and/or internal correction
- Advanced methods (and rigor of certification) require extra effort to account for uncertainty contributors

# Conventional mass spectrometry limitation: inherent precision limitation



## Total Evaporation yields improved precision Problem: peak tails bias minor ratios




## Conventional vs Total Evaporation

- Conventional Analysis:
  - Sample pre-heated (10-40 min) towards target ion beam intensity
  - Measurement for a short span of sample
  - Periodic background measurement during analysis
- Total Evaporation Analysis:
  - Sample pre-heated to low intensity for ion beam focussing only
  - Measurement continuously until sample exhausted
  - Two-to-four fold better precision; faster analyses; smaller sample size; less susceptible to interferences
  - No background correction minor isotope data biased


## NBL-Modified Total Evaporation

- NBL-Modified Total Evaporation Analysis:
  - Measurement until sample exhausted
  - Measurement periodically interrupted to allow background measurement and/or multi-dynamic data acquisition
  - Periodic peak centering and focusing also allowed
- Best of both worlds:
  - Improved precision (2-4 fold)
  - Allows for background correction to compensate for peak tailing: More accurate minor ratio data

## Modified TE Strength: Minor Ratios



## Modified TE Strength: Minor Ratios



### High Intensity Method

- New amplifiers and Faraday detectors allow up to 50 V ion beam
- Extremely stable amplifiers and matrix switching minimize detector calibration influence on uncertainty
- Large sample load (5-15 μg vs <1 μg)</li>
- Allows for accurate minor measurements using Faraday detectors only (or SEM for extreme ratios)
- Eliminates or minimizes SEM linearity and SEM/Faraday detector calibrations (e.g. better uncertainties)
- Internal fractionation correction using previouslydetermined <sup>235</sup>U/<sup>238</sup>U ratio

# High Intensity Method Example (C129A)

#### Material:

Isotope:	234	235	236	238
Atom %:	0.005296	0.72087	0.0000097	99.27382
Intensity:	2 mV	291 mV	ND	40 V

#### **Measurement Scheme:**

Cycle	L1	С	H1	H3
1	234	235	236	238
2	233.7	234.7	235.7	
3	234.4	235.4	236.4	

### High Intensity Method Example (C129A)

#### Material:

Isotope:	234	235	236	238
Atom %:	0.005296	0.72087	0.0000097	99.27382
Intensity:	2 mV	291 mV	ND	40 V

#### **Measurement Scheme:**

Cycle	L1	С	H1	H3
1	234	235	236	238
2	233.7	234.7	235.7	
3	234.4	235.4	236.4	

- Dynamic ion counting method with:
  - Internal fractionation correction
  - Near-real time SEM/Faraday calibration
  - SEM linearity correction
  - Can be combined with high intensity technique
  - □ Suited for minor to extreme ratios  $(10^{-4} \text{ to } < 10^{-8})$

# Advanced Ion Counting Method

Sample:

- Plutonium metal standard CRM 126-A
- □ 93.9% <sup>239</sup>Pu; 0.01% <sup>238</sup>Pu
- □ Already characterized for <sup>239</sup>Pu/<sup>240</sup>Pu via TE

Approximate Pu ion beam intensities:

- <sup>238</sup>Pu: 70,000 cps (0.05 mV)
  <sup>239</sup>Pu: 7 Volts
  <sup>240</sup>Pu: 400 mV
  <sup>242</sup>Pu: 4 mV = 220,000 cps
- NOTE: High intensity would offer no specific benefit: <sup>238</sup>Pu max intensity < 0.3 mV

Peak Jumping Analysis Scheme:

Step	Cup L3	Cup L2	Cup L1	SEM	Cup H1	Cup H2
1					242	
2						
3						

Step 1: Acquire <sup>242</sup>Pu beam in faraday detector

# Advanced Ion Counting Method

Peak Jumping Analysis Scheme:

Step	Cup L3	Cup L2	Cup L1	SEM	Cup H1	Cup H2
1					242	
2				242		
3						

Step 1: Acquire <sup>242</sup>Pu beam in faraday detector Step 2: Acquire <sup>242</sup>Pu beam in ion counter to establish SEM/Faraday cup calibration factor

Peak Jumping Analysis Scheme:

Step	Cup L3	Cup L2	Cup L1	SEM	Cup H1	Cup H2
1					242	
2				242		
3				238	239	240

<sup>₄</sup>∠Pu beam in faraday detector Step 1: Acquire <sup>2</sup> Step 2: Acquire <sup>242</sup>Pu beam in ion counter to establish SEM/Faraday cup calibration factor

Step 3: Acquire <sup>238</sup>Pu intensity and <sup>240</sup>Pu/<sup>239</sup>Pu ratio for mass fractionation correction

## Advanced Ion Counting Method

Step	SEM	Cup H1	Cup H2
1		242 (F <sub>2</sub> )	
2	242 (l <sub>2</sub> )		
3	238 (I <sub>8</sub> )	239 (F <sub>9</sub> & M <sub>o</sub> )	240 (M <sub>o</sub> )


Corrected <sup>238</sup>Pu/<sup>239</sup>Pu: 
$$[\frac{I_8/F_9}{I_2*L/F_2}]*[(M_0/C)]$$

Where

measured <sup>238</sup>Pu ion intensity in SEM detector


- measured <sup>239</sup>Pu ion intensity in Faraday detector
- measured <sup>242</sup>Pu ion intensity in SEM
- $I_8 = F_9 = I_2 = L =$ SEM linearity correction
- measured <sup>242</sup>Pu ion intensity in Faraday detector =
- F<sub>2</sub> M<sub>o</sub> measured <sup>240</sup>Pu/<sup>239</sup>Pu ratio =
- Č certified value for <sup>240</sup>Pu/<sup>239</sup>Pu ratio =


 SEM linearity correction (unique to each SEM)




RPQ to eliminate peak tailing

Abundance sensitivity
 <30 ppb (17 cps at <sup>238</sup>Pu)





## QA and sample data



Material	238/239	Std Dev	%RSD
CRM 122 QC:	0.0005064	0.0000011	0.22
Metal Sample:	0.00012984	0.00000047	0.36



		C	C126A 2	One SD E		, n=3 or 4		y		
Average Ratio	0.0001310 0.0001305 0.0001300 0.0001295 0.0001290 0.0001285 0.0001285	I	Ī	Ī	Į	Ī	Ī	Ī	•	Ŧ
	0.0001280 ±	C126A-01	C126A-03	C126A-04	C126A-05	C126A-08 Sample	C126A-10	C126A-12	C126A-13	C126A-18

# Conclusion

- NBL has developed and implemented three methods
- Improved precision and accuracy
- Methods are complementary, and are selected based upon sample composition
- Require latest-generation instrumentation
- Uncertainty determinations require extensive knowledge of instrument operation/detector performance

# Measurement Evaluation Program Annual Meeting

Calorimetry Exchange July 15, 2006 Nashville, TN.

#### B. Srinivasan

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

NEW BRUNSWICK

#### Calorimetry Exchange: January 2005 – December 2005

Measurement evaluation of Calex 1

- Isotopic abundance of Pu isotopes and <sup>241</sup>Am
- Effective specific power (P<sub>eff</sub>)
- Calorimetric power
- Mass of Pu
- Working reference material certification of Calex 2
  - Pu assay
  - Pu isotope abundance
  - <sup>241</sup>Am abundance
  - Mass of Pu



# Participants, measurement methods and analysis schedule

#### Participants

- Hanford and LLNL participated.
- LANL and SRS did not participate.

#### Method

- Pu and <sup>241</sup>Am isotopes abundance by gamma ray spectrometry
- Calorimetric power by calorimetry

#### Analysis schedule


• Frequent measurements throughout the year

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

# Statistical Evaluation

- % RD of measurement results with respect to reference values and standard deviations
  - Pu isotope abundance
  - <sup>241</sup>Am abundance
  - Calorimetric power
  - P<sub>eff</sub>
  - Mass of Pu


<u>Note</u>:  $P_{eff}$  is calculated from measurements of isotope abundance and calorimetric power, and mass from calorimetric power and  $P_{eff}$  3



U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance




### Annual evaluation: an example



U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance




### Calex 1: <sup>238</sup>Pu evaluation



U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance




### Calex 1: <sup>239</sup>Pu evaluation



U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

7


### Calex 1: <sup>240</sup>Pu evaluation



U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance



### Calex 1: <sup>241</sup>Pu evaluation




U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

9




#### Calex 1: <sup>241</sup>Am evaluation



U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance




Calex 1: P<sub>eff</sub> evaluation



U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 12




#### Calex 1: Calorimetric power evaluation



U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance



#### Calex 1: Pu mass evaluation



U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

14

### Calex 1: Evaluation summary

Table 3. Performance evaluation of Calex 1 measurement results fro Hanford and LLNL. The % RDs are shown along with 95 % confident intervals (i.e.,  $\pm$  twice the standard uncertainty).

Measured	% RD				
Quantity	Hanford	LLNL			
Pu mass	-0.42 <u>+</u> 0.14	0.01 <u>+</u> 0.11			
Power	-0.41 <u>+</u> 0.12	-0.07 <u>+</u> 0.08			
P <sub>eff</sub>	-0.12 <u>+</u> 0.04	-0.16 <u>+</u> 0.03			
<sup>238</sup> Pu	-4.46 <u>+</u> 1.23	-2.36 <u>+</u> 1.00			
<sup>239</sup> Pu	-0.02 <u>+</u> 0.01	0.00 <u>+</u> 0.01			
<sup>240</sup> Pu	0.44 <u>+</u> 0.17	-0.07 <u>+</u> 0.12			
<sup>241</sup> Pu	0.31 <u>+</u> 0.14	-0.03 <u>+</u> 0.15			
<sup>241</sup> Am	-0.43 <u>+</u> 0.10	-0.59 <u>+</u> 0.12			

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

NEW BRUNSWICK

# Calex 2: Working reference material certification

Calex 1	Calex 2
$400 \text{ g PuO}_2$ ; 6 units	2000 g PuO <sub>2</sub> ; 10 units
$^{239}$ Pu/ $^{240}$ Pu = 16.2	$^{239}$ Pu/ $^{240}$ Pu = 7.2
Low <sup>241</sup> Am	High <sup>241</sup> Am
1 watt	6 watt
05/29/1979	07/24/1995

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 16

	NBL	LANL
Moisture (weight %)	0.025	0.026
Std. dev	0.013	0.025
n	4	5
% RD	≡ 0.0	4 %

# Calex 2: Moisture content

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 17

#### NEW BRUNSWICK

### Calex 2: Plutonium content (as of 07/24/1995)

	NBL	LANL
Pu (weight %)	87.451	87.711
Std. dev	0.038	0.054
n	10	5
% RD	≡ 0.0	0.3 %

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 18



#### Calex 2: Plutonium isotope abundance (as of 07/24/1995; all in weight %)

	NBL	LANL	% RD
			$(NBL \equiv 0.0)$
<sup>238</sup> Pu	0.0803	0.0853	6.2%
<sup>239</sup> Pu	86.5366	86.5304	-0.007%
<sup>240</sup> Pu	12.1689	12.1691	0.001%
<sup>241</sup> Pu	1.0074	1.0085	0.11%
<sup>242</sup> Pu	0.2067	0.2067	0.0 %
Total	100	100	

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 19

NEW BRUNSWICK

# Calex 2: <sup>241</sup>Am content (as of 07/24/1995)

	NBL	LANL
$\frac{Am}{(\mu \sigma/\sigma Pu)}$	4730	4780
(µg/g Pu) Std. dev	98	95
n	10	5
% RD	≡ 0.0	1.1 %

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 20



# Calex 2: working reference material characterized values

#### Pu content

- Statistical disagreement between NBL and LANL
- Characterize the Pu content by pooling NBL and LANL results
- Characterized value with expanded uncertainty 87.60 ± 0.18 g Pu/g sample (as of 7/24/1995)
- Uncertainty estimate may be revised

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 21



### Calex 2: working reference material characterized values (continued)

Pu isotopes

- NBL and LANL results in disagreement for <sup>238</sup>Pu only
- Characterized isotope abundance same as NBL result (as of 7/24/1995) with expanded uncertainty at 95% C.L.; uncertainty estimate may be revised

Isotope	Wt %	95% C.L.
<sup>238</sup> Pu	0.08031	0.00056
<sup>239</sup> Pu	86.5366	0.0050
<sup>240</sup> Pu	12.1689	0.0022
<sup>241</sup> Pu	1.0074	0.0018
<sup>242</sup> Pu	0.2067	0.0006

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance



### Calex 2: working reference material characterized values (continued)

<sup>241</sup>Am content

- NBL and LANL determinations agree within about 1%; use mean of NBL and LANL values
- Characterized value (as of 7/24/1995) with expanded uncertainty

#### 4755 ± 84 $\mu$ g <sup>241</sup>Am/g of Pu

• Uncertainty estimate may be revised

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 23

### Calex 2: working reference material characterized values (continued)

Pu mass

- Pu mass calculated from mass of PuO<sub>2</sub> (2000 g) and Pu content
- Characterized value (as of 7/24/1995) with expanded uncertainty is

#### **1752 ±** 4 g Pu

• Uncertainty estimate may be revised

# Calex 2: verification of characterized values

- Calorimeteric power measurement for wattage
  - ≻Two different calorimeters
  - Calibrated using heat source standards
- Isotope measurements for P<sub>eff</sub>
  - ≻FRAM isotope code
  - ≻TRIFID isotope code
  - ≻Mass spectrometer

# Calex 2: verification of characterized values (continued)

• Calorimetric power measurement:  $6.2378 \pm 0.0045$  watt

	FRAM	TRIFID	Mass spec
Peff mw/g Pu	3.564	3.534	3.564
% RD	0.00 %	-0.84 %	≡ 0.00

• P<sub>eff</sub> from FRAM, TRIFID and mass spec measurements

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 26



# Calex 2: verification of characterized values (continued)

Pu mass <ul> <li>Coulometry</li> </ul>	Method	Pu mass (g)	% RD
<ul> <li>PuO<sub>2</sub> mass X Pu content</li> <li>Mass spec</li> </ul>	Coulometry	1752.0	≡ 0.00
<ul> <li>Power/mass spec P<sub>eff</sub></li> <li>FRAM</li> </ul>	Mass spec	1750.2	- 0.1 %
<ul> <li>Power/FRAM P<sub>eff</sub></li> <li>TRIFID</li> <li>TRUE D</li> </ul>	FRAM	1750.2	- 0.1 %
Power/TRIFID P <sub>eff</sub>	TRIFID	1765.2	0.75 %

U. S. Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 27

### Calex 2 working reference material characterization: conclusions

Pu content

- NBL/LANL: 87.60 ± 0.18 g Pu/g
- The uncertainty of 0.2%; it is at least a factor of 2 or 3 higher than expected in coulometry
- Higher uncertainty acceptable for NDA standard (calorimetry/neutron measurements)

Pu isotope abundance

- NBL results from TIMS determination
- <sup>241</sup>Am abundance
- Average from NBL/LANL determinations

NEW BRUNSWICK

### Effects of Variations in Half-Lives on Decay-Corrected Characterized Values of Plutonium Standards in Calorimetric Exchange Program

B. Srinivasan, M. Soriano, and W. Losinger New Brunswick Laboratory

Presented at the 47<sup>th</sup> INMM Annual Meeting, Nashville, TN, July 2006

New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

#### NEW BRUNSWICK

#### Reference Values For CALX Standards

Date	CALX 1 5/29/79	CALX 2 7/24/95
PuO <sub>2</sub> Mass	454.60	2000 g
Pu Concentration	87.819	87.60 wt %
Pu Mass	399.23	1752 g
<sup>238</sup> Pu		0.08031 wt %
<sup>239</sup> Pu		86.5366 wt %
<sup>240</sup> Pu		12.1689 wt %
<sup>241</sup> Pu	0.3712	1.0074 wt %
<sup>242</sup> Pu	0.0290	0.2067 wt %
<sup>241</sup> Am	0.0061	0.4755 g <sup>241</sup> Am/g Pu, %
P <sub>eff</sub>	2.3012	3.564 mW/g
Power	918.71	6244.9 mW

New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

# Published Sources of Half Life Values

•ASTM C 1458-00 Test Method	(Set A on Charts)
•Nuclear Wallet Cards NuDat 2 2002	(Set B on Charts)
•NuDat 2 2006	(Set C on Charts)
•IUPAC 2001	(Set D on Charts)
•NuBase 2003	
•NuBase 2006	
•Values used in NBL CALX Program	(Set E on Charts)

New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

NEW BRUNSWICK

#### ASTM C-1458-00 Test Method (First Published 1987)

	Half Life	
Isotope	Value, Yrs	Uncertainty
<sup>238</sup> Pu	87.74	0.04
<sup>239</sup> Pu	24119	16
<sup>240</sup> Pu	6564	11
<sup>241</sup> Pu	14.348	0.022
242Pu	376300	900
<sup>241</sup> Am	433.6	1.4

New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

3

NEW BRUNSWICK		
LABORATORY	NuDat2 Nuclear	Wallet Cards 2002

	Half Life	
Isotope	Value, Yrs	Uncertainty
<sup>238</sup> Pu	87.7	0.3
<sup>239</sup> Pu	24110	30
<sup>240</sup> Pu	6564	11
<sup>241</sup> Pu	14.29	0.006
242Pu	373300	1200
<sup>241</sup> Am	432.2	0.7

New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

NEW BRUNSWICK NuDat2 Nuclear Wallet Cards 2006 Half Life Value, Yrs Isotope Uncertainty <sup>238</sup>Pu 87.7 <sup>239</sup>Pu 24110 <sup>240</sup>Pu 6561 <sup>241</sup>Pu 14.29 0.006 242Pu 375000 2000 <sup>241</sup>Am 432.2

6

5

0.1

30

7

0.7

#### IUPAC 2001

	Half Life	
Isotope	Value, Yrs	Uncertainty
<sup>238</sup> Pu	87.7	0.1
<sup>239</sup> Pu	24100	30
<sup>240</sup> Pu	6560	10
<sup>241</sup> Pu	14.4	0.1
242Pu	375000	2000
<sup>241</sup> Am	432.7	0.6

New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

#### NuBase 2003

	Half Life	
Isotope	Value, Yrs	Uncertainty
<sup>238</sup> Pu	87.7	0.1
<sup>239</sup> Pu	24110	30
<sup>240</sup> Pu	6564	11
<sup>241</sup> Pu	14.35	0.1
242Pu	375000	2000
<sup>241</sup> Am	432.2	0.7
,	102.2	0.1

8

	NuBase 2006		
	Half Life		
Isotope	Value, Yrs	Uncertainty	
<sup>238</sup> Pu	87.7	0.3	
<sup>239</sup> Pu	24110	30	
<sup>240</sup> Pu	6564	11	
<sup>241</sup> Pu	14.35	0.1	
242Pu	373300	1200	
<sup>241</sup> Am	432.2	0.7	

New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

#### Values used in 2005 NBL CALX Program

	Half Life
Isotope	Value, Yrs
<sup>238</sup> Pu	87.7
<sup>239</sup> Pu	24119
<sup>240</sup> Pu	6563
<sup>241</sup> Pu	14.35
242Pu	373000
<sup>241</sup> Am	433

10

#### NEW BRUNSWICK

#### **Decay Equations**

 $\lambda_i = \frac{\ln(2)}{\text{Half Life}_i}$ , where Half Life<sub>i</sub> is the half life for Plutonium isotope i and i = 238, 239,240, 241, and 242.

 $\lambda_{Am}=\frac{ln(2)}{HalfLife_{Am}}$  , where Half Life\_{Am} is the half life for  $^{241}Am.$ 

 $Den(t) = \sum_{i=238}^{242} Pu_i * e^{-\lambda_i * t}$ , where t is the elapsed time from initial measurement in the same units as the half lives and Pu\_i is the abundance of Plutonium isotope i at initial measurement in weight percent.

New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 11

#### **Decay Equations (cont.)**

 $Pu_i(t) = \frac{Pu_i * e^{-\lambda_i * t}}{Den(t)} * 100$ , where  $Pu_i(t)$  is the abundance of Plutonium isotope i at elapsed time t in weight percent.


$${}^{241}\text{Am}(t) = 100 * \left[ {}^{241}\text{Am} * e^{-\lambda_{\text{Am}} * t} + {}^{241}\text{Pu} * \frac{\lambda_{241}}{\lambda_{\text{Am}} - \lambda_{241}} * (e^{-\lambda_{241} * t} - e^{-\lambda_{\text{Am}} * t}) \right] / \text{Den}(t) \text{, where}$$

<sup>241</sup>Am is the initial amount of <sup>241</sup>Am and <sup>241</sup>Am(t) is the amount of <sup>241</sup>Am at elapsed time t, both in g <sup>241</sup>Am/g Pu, percent.

# Half Life Values Variation, Yrs


la stan s	N 41:	N.4	Denne	Relative
Isotope	Minimum	Maximum	Range	Range, %
<sup>238</sup> Pu	87.7	87.74	0.04	0.046
<sup>239</sup> Pu	24100	24119	19	0.079
<sup>240</sup> Pu	6560	6564	4	0.061
<sup>241</sup> Pu	14.29	14.4	0.11	0.767
<sup>242</sup> Pu	373000	376300	3300	0.881
241				
<sup>241</sup> Am	432.2	433.6	1.4	0.323


New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 13



New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 14










New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 16

# Effects of Different Half Life Values on CALX 2<sup>241</sup>Am Calculations over Time






New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 18



New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 19



New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 20

### GUM Workbench Screen Shots

1.0			Hodel Observation Correlation Budget Law Result	
Tilje		Model Equation	Quantity Data	
			(3 SA., Hd., Returne Order	Ext
uation:	In(2)/hi241	s		
	In(2)/hi241			
	n(2)/hi242	n,		
		n238*t) + pu2390*e	exp(-lam239*t) + pu2400*exp(-lam240*t)+pu2410*exp(-lam241P*t) + pu2420*exp(-lam242*t);	
		lam230*t)/den*100		
		lam239"t)/den*100		
		lam240*t)/den*100		
		lam241P*t)/den*10		
		lam242*t)/den*100		
			12410"((lam241P/(lam241A-lam241P))"(exp(-t*lam241P)-exp(-t*lam241A))))/den* 100;	
			ou240t*sp240 + pu241t *sp241P + pu242t * sp242 + am241t * sp241A) / 100;	
	pumass*de			
	masst * per			
Quantity	Unit	Definition		
pu241t	wt %	Pu241 at time t		
pu242t	vit %	Pu242 at time t		
	vel な vel な			
pu2421		Pu242 at time t		
pu242t am241t	wt %	Pu242 at time t Am241 at time t	eer at line t	
pu2421 am241t am2410	wit %	Pu242 at time 1 Am241 at time 1 Am241 at time 0		
pu242t am241t am2410 petf	wt % wt % nlw//gPu	Pu242 at time 1 Am241 at time 1 Am241 at time 0 Effective specific power	A239	
pu242t am241t am2410 pell sp229	wt % wt % mW/gPu mW/gPu	Pu242 at time t Am241 at time t Am241 at time 0 Effective specific pow Specificio Power for Po	229 229	
pu2421 am2411 am2410 pell sp238 tp239 tp240	wt % wt % nlw//gPu nlw//g nlw//g	Pu242 at time 1 Am241 at time 1 Am241 at time 0 Effective specific power Specificio Power for Pu2 Specific Power for Pu2	229 29 20	
pu242t am241t am2410 petf ep229 tp239	wt % wt % nW//gPu nW//g nW//g nW//g	Pu242 at time 1 Am241 at time 1 Am241 at time 0 Effective specific power Specific Power for Pu2 Specific Power for Pu2 Specific Power for Pu2	haan 229 240 241	
pu2421 am2411 am2410 pell up239 up239 up239 up240 up241P up242	wt % wt % nhw/gPu nhw/g niw/g niw/g nhw/g nhw/g	Pu242 at time 1 Am241 at time 1 Am241 at time 0 Effective specific power Specific Power for Pu2 Specific Power for Pu2 Specific Power for Pu2 Specific Power for Pu2 Specific Power for Pu2	209 209 200 201 201 202	
pu2421 am2411 am2410 pelf up238 up239 up240 up241P up2412 up241A	vet % vet % nhv//gPu nhv//g nhv//g nhv//g nhv//g nhv//g	Pu242 at time 1 Am241 at time 1 Am241 at time 0 Effective specific power Specific Power for Pu2 Specific Power for Am	529 29 20 20 24 24	
pu2421 am2411 am2410 pelf sp228 sp228 sp240 sp241P sp242 sp241A pumasst	vet % vet % mbw/gPu mbw/g mbw/g mbw/g mbw/g mbw/g mbw/g g	Pu242 at time t Am241 at time t Am241 at time 0 Effective specific powe Specific Power for Pu2 Specific Power for Pu2 Specific Power for Pu2 Specific Power for Pu3 Specific Power for Am3 guarts Pu in standard at	haze 229 260 261 262 264 264 264	
pu2421 am2411 am2410 pelf up238 up239 up240 up241P up2412 up241A	vet % vet % nhv//gPu nhv//g nhv//g nhv//g nhv//g nhv//g	Pu242 at time 1 Am241 at time 1 Am241 at time 0 Effective specific power Specific Power for Pu2 Specific Power for Am	2019 2019 2010 2011 2012 2012 2014 2014 2014 2015	

New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance

	Pro - CALX2 Decaya.smu						8
Edit View Option	1.	Model Observ	ation Correlation	Budget Reput			
mind sound sized sizes					AND MARK		-
pu239	pu240k pu241k	pu242	am2411	pell	pumant power		12
ower for standard at tim	et						_
ncertainly Budget:							_
Quantity	Value	Standard Uncertainly	Distrik	ution Sensitivity Coefficien		Index	
H241P	14.3480 Years	0.0110 Years	nor	nal -44	-0.43 mW	0.1%	
lam241A	1.59859-10-3	2.58-10-6					
H241A	433.600 Years	0.700 Years	not	nal 0.20	0.14 mW	0.0 %	
lon242	1.94201-10-K	2.20.10.9					
H242	376.300 10 <sup>3</sup> Years	450 Years	not	nal 62-10-12	2810-9 mW	0.0%	
den	99,09901	2.46-10-3					
pu2380	0.080314 wt %	490-10-6 wt 3	i nor	nal 7800	3.8 mW	8.9 %	
1	30.0 years						
pu2390	96.53659 wt %	2.20 10-3 wt		nal 34	0.074 n/w	0.0 %	
pu2400	12.168910 wt %	960-10-5 wt 5	10.0	nal 120	0.12 mW	0.0%	
pu2410	1.007442 wt %	780-10-6 wt 3		nal 1500	1.2 mW	0.6%	
psi2420	0.206737 wt %	270-10-6 wt 3		nal 2.0	550 10 <sup>-6</sup> mW	0.0 %	
am2410	0.47298 wt %	4.2010-3 vit	t nor	nal 1900	Wm 0.8	30.0 %	
sp230	567.570 mW/g	0.260 mW/g		nal 1.1	0.29 mW	0.0 %	
sp239	1.929800 mW/g	300-10-6 mW/		nal 1500	0.45 mW	0.0 %	
sp240	7.08240 mW/g	2.00·10·3 mW.		nal 210	0.43 mW	0.0%	
1p241P	3.41200 mW//g	2.00 10-3 mW		sal 4.1	8.310-3 mW	0.0 %	
sp242	0.115900 mW/g	300-10-6 mW/	9 nor	nal 3.6	1.1-10 <sup>-3</sup> mW	0.0%	
1p241A	114.200 mW/g	0.420 mW/g	non	nal 21	8.8 m/w/	36.4 %	
Durbhis .	1752.02 g	1.74 a	not	nal 4.3	7.4 mW	25.7 %	
power	7471.4 mW	14.6 mW					
Result Value	Expanded Uncertainty:	C	C				
Value: 2421 mW		Coverage Factor: 2.00	Coverage: 95% (normal)				

#### NEW BRUNSWICK

#### New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 22



#### Effects of Parameter Uncertainty on Power Reference Value Uncertainty

	CALX 1	CALX 2	
T = 10 Years	Uncertainty Contributions	Uncertainty Contributions	
	Specific Power <sup>241</sup> Am 79%	Specific Power <sup>241</sup> Am 98%	
	Specific Power <sup>239</sup> Pu 16%		
	Specific Power <sup>240</sup> Pu 3%		
	<b>Result:</b> 978.49±0.56 m W	<b>Result:</b> 6904±13 m W	
T = 30 years	<b>Uncertainty Contributions</b>	<b>Uncertainty Contributions</b>	
	Specific Power <sup>241</sup> Am 93%	Specific Power <sup>241</sup> Am 99%	
	Specific Power <sup>239</sup> Pu 5%		
	Specific Power <sup>240</sup> Pu 1%		
	<b>Result:</b> 1034.05±0.98 m W	<b>Result:</b> 7471±18 m W	

New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 23

#### NEW BRUNSWICK

Effects of Measurement & Parameter Uncertainty on Power Reference Value Uncertainty for CALX 2

T = 10 Years	Uncertainty Contributions		
	Initial <sup>241</sup> Am Value	39%	
	Initial Pu Mass Value	27%	
	Specific Power <sup>241</sup> Am	22%	
	Initial <sup>238</sup> Pu Value	12%	
	<b>Result:</b> 6904±27 m W		
T = 30 years	Uncertainty Contributions		
	Specific Power <sup>241</sup> Am	36%	
	Initial <sup>241</sup> Am Value	30%	
	Initial Pu Mass Value	26%	
	Initial <sup>238</sup> Pu Value	7%	
	<b>Result:</b> 7471±29 m W		

New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 24

#### Conclusions


•Varying half life value and associated uncertainties have no significant effect on decay-corrected reference values' uncertainties.

NEW BRUNSWICK

•Uncertainties on isotopic specific power values, primarily <sup>241</sup>Am , have a significant effect on the decay-corrected reference values' uncertainties.


•Uncertainty on the initial characterization measurements of values, in particular the <sup>241</sup>Am and Pu content, are the major contributors to the decay-corrected reference values' uncertainties.






New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 26


# Effects of Different Half Life Values on CALX 1 <sup>241</sup>Pu Calculations over Time




New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 27



New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 28



New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance



New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 30




-0.02

6/23/85

12/14/90

### CALX 1 Power over Time



New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 31

#### Effects of Different Half Life Values on CALX 1 Power Calculations over Time 0.03 0.025 0.02 0.015 0.01 Power RD, % From A Half Lives B 0.005 Half Lives C Half Lives D 0 - Half Lives E -0.005 -0.01 -0.015

New Brunswick Laboratory/Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 32

11/26/01

5/19/07

6/5/96

Date

#### ABSTRACTS OF PRESENTATIONS BY BUD SUMMERS, LLNL

## a. LLNL experience with determining uranium isotopic masses in 3013 containers filled with MOx.

LLNL has measured uranium isotopic masses in 3013 containers filled with MOX using three gamma isotopic counters. These containers have significantly more shielding for low energy gammas than typical containers. Information will be presented concerning LLNL experience in measurement precision and accuracy of uranium isotopic masses in the 3013 containers based on historical knowledge of the amount of uranium isotopic mass in these containers.

#### b. LLNL accuracy/precision of CRM uranium standards in two isotopic counters.

LLNL has measured the uranium isotopic masses in seven CRM uranium standards in two gamma isotopic counters. Information will be presented concerning LLNL experience in measurement precision and accuracy of uranium isotopic mass in these isotopic counters. The LLNL precision and accuracy experience will be compared to analogous results from Hanford.

## c. LLNL accuracy/precision of Calex-1 and Calex-2 plutonium standards in three isotopic counters

LLNL has measured the plutonium isotopic masses in Calex-1 and Calex-2 plutonium standards in three gamma isotopic counters. Information will be presented concerning LLNL experience in measurement precision and accuracy of plutonium isotopic mass in these isotopic counters. The LLNL precision and accuracy experience will be compared to analogous results from Hanford.

### Some Recent Developments in Nondestructive Assay Technologies

Peter A. Santi Safeguards Science and Technology Group (N-1) Los Alamos National Laboratory



July 15, 2006

LA-UR-06-4844 40 Years of Safeguards at LANL, 1966 - 2006


Los Alamos 2

141

## Outline

- Three components of Nondestructive Assay: gamma, neutron, and calorimetry
- Recent developments in gamma-ray detector technology
  - Nanocomposite Scintillators
  - $-\mu$ -calorimetry
- Neutron Multiplicity Counting
  - ENMC
  - LSMC
- Recent work in Calorimetry
  - Modeling of heat flow in calorimeters
  - Improvements in water bath control





#### Composite Scintillators for Radiation Detection and Nuclear Spectroscopy\*

Edward A. McKigney
Luiz G. Jacobsohn
Ross E. Muenchausen
T. Mark McCleskey
James F. Smith


Rico E. Del Sesto Peter A. Santi, Kevin C. Ott Bryan L. Bennett D. Wayne Cooke


#### LANL



\*This work supported by DOE BES, LANL LDRD, LANL TT Tech Maturation Fund and LANL N Division Tech Maturation Fund.

40 Years of Safeguards at LANL, 1966 - 2006





#### LaF<sub>3</sub>:Ce Transparent Nanocomposite Scintillator Events versus ADC counts for a LaF<sub>3</sub>:Ce doped sample illuminated by different sources showing photopeak shift. 1000 <sup>57</sup>Co 800 600 EVENTS 10 nm 400 Transmission electron micrograph showing 10 nm primary particle size. 200 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 ADC Counts Los Alamos 9 40 Years of Safeguards at LANL, 1966 - 2006

Work in Progress

- Produce larger scintillating pieces
- Synthesis of nanophosphors of brighter scintillators and fabrication of these into a composite
- Further characterization of nanophosphors
  - absolute light yield
  - linearity of the nanocomposite materials



#### **Microcalorimeter Development for Precision** Gamma-Ray Spectroscopy\*

#### LANL

- A. Hoover
- S. Lamont
- M. W. Rabin
- C. R. Rudy
- M. K. Smith
- D. M. Tournear
- D. T. Vo

#### NIST

- J. N. Ullom B. L. Zink J. A. Beall W. B. Doriese L. R. Vale W.D. Duncan L. Ferreira
- G.C. Hilton K. D. Irwin C. D. Reintsema

\*Sponsored in part by the NIST/EEEL Director's Reserve program, the Department of Energy, Office of Non-Proliferation Research and Development (NA-22), and DCI postdoctoral fellowship


40 Years of Safeguards at LANL, 1966 - 2006

#### Large Microcalorimeter Arrays LANL/NIST Calorimeter #1 Gd-153 source with steel attenuator Data 140 97 keV and 103 keV gamma-rays 1 mm 120 160 100 /5eV bin 120 80 Counts 80 60 40 20 103.20 103.25 103.05 103.10 103.15 0 102 Mo/Cu , 98 , 100 Sn Energy (keV) Transition-Edge absorber U Ka1 x-ray Simulation Sensor (TES) thermometer **Target Applications:** Counts / 20 eV bin **Nuclear Forensics** Pu Kr1 x-ra Pu isotope analysis **Mass of Pu in Spent Fuel** 100 102 Energy (keV) 6

40 Years of Safeguards at LANL, 1966 - 2006

Los Alamos 12

Los Alamos 11



#### **Neutron Multiplicity Counting**

- Neutron multiplicity counting determines mass of special nuclear material (SNM) in an item by converting single neutron (S), double neutron (D), and triple neutron (T) counting rates into m<sub>eff 240</sub>, α, M.
- While neutron multiplicity counting is effective for a wide range of materials, the technique has a reduced precision and accuracy for materials which have a high (α,n) reaction rate (impure items), or for items which have a large leakage multiplication (metals, dense oxides)



### 


### Range of Pu Materials Studied

Standard ID	Material	Multiplicity Alpha	Total Pu (g)	Isotopics Date	Pu-239 (g)	Pu-240eff. (g)
FZC-158	Pu-240 oxide	Low (0.169)	0.695	78/12/15	0.006	0.705
P240	Pu-240 oxide	Low (0.184)	55.57	02/12/04	3.22	52.2
646078	MOX pellet	Medium (1.08)	0.8061	91/08/30	0.7128	0.089
646081	MOX pellet	Medium (1.09)	0.5077	91/08/30	0.4490	0.056
646078+081	MOX pellet	Medium (1.08)	1.314	91/08/30	1.1620	0.145
646119	MOX pellet	Medium (0.813)	0.2651	91/08/30	0.2311	0.033
PuOC-1	PuO2	Medium (0.917)	2.002	02/05/23	1.881	0.119
PuOC-2	PuO2	Medium (0.916)	4.971	02/05/23	4.671	0.295
PuOC-3	PuO2	Medium (0.913)	9.935	02/05/23	9.337	0.589
PuF-A1	Pu metal	Low (0.040)	1.765	00/01/01	1.658	0.105
LAO250C10	PuO2	Medium (0.525)	59.84	83/09/09	49.57	9,934



40 Years of Safeguards at LANL, 1966 - 2006

### Results



- ENMC could possibly be used to characterize secondary standards for low multiplication items (MOX, oxides, etc)
  - Current ENMC detector parameterization based on low mass items would have a 2-3% accuracy for higher mass items.





#### Liquid Scintillator Neutron Multiplicity Counter\*


Kate Frame, Jonathan Thron, Tim Elmont, Ernst Esch, Duncan MacArthur, Edward McKigney, Peter Karpius, Peter Santi, Sy Stange and Morag K. Smith


#### Fast vs. Thermal neutrons

- No need for moderator
- Coincidence gate < 100 ns (vs ~10-50 µs for thermal neutron multiplicity counters)
- Virtually insensitive to accidental coincidences from high single neutron


Ideal for:


- Pu items with high  $(\alpha, n)$
- HEU active interrogation





### **GEANT Modeling of an LSMC**





LSMC Status

GEANT simulations to determine performance of various design options for an LSMC module ongoing

Measurements using actual liquid scintilator modules needed to benchmark GEANT results.

Gamma and PSD analysis

Data acquisition electronics development.



For more details, see Abstract #339 to be presented on Monday, July 17 4 PM in Center Room 205

40 Years of Safeguards at LANL, 1966 - 2006

### Other Neutron Counting Developments

- Configurable ENMC (see Abstract #307 to be presented on Monday, July 17<sup>th</sup> at 4:20PM in Center Room 205)
- Neutron Pulse Simulator (see Poster on Abstract #316 on Tuesday, July 18<sup>th</sup> in Center Room 206)

<u> </u>	40 Years of Safeguards at LANL, 1966 - 2006	
	Calorimetry	

- > Measures the amount of heat produced in a sample
- Since you can't hide the heat of material, calorimetry is inherently matrix independent (bias-free)
- When combined with gamma-ray spectroscopy, it is the most accurate NDA technique for plutonium
- Is considered the "gold standard" of all of the NDA techniques throughout DOE complex for Pu
- Throughput is an issue due to long measurement times (one to several hours)
- Question often heard from users is "How long will measurements take?"



Los Alamos 26

### Heat Flow Calculations for 3013 canisters

Peter A. Santi, and David S. Bracken

The heat equation describing the flow of heat as a function of time is:

$$\nabla \cdot (k\nabla T) + Q = \rho \cdot C_p \frac{\partial T}{\partial t} \tag{1}$$

where

 $T(\vec{r},t)$  - temperature of the system (K) k - thermal conductivity (W/m\*K) Q - heat source P - density (kg/m<sup>3</sup>)  $C_p$  - specific heat capacity (J/kg\*K)


Determine which 3013 canister configuration would come to thermal equilibrium the quickest in a gradient calorimeter




40 Years of Safeguards at LANL, 1966 - 2006

Los Alamos 27

**Setup of calculations** 





### **Results of 3013 container calculations**

Outer Can	Inner Can	Convenience Can	Relative Difference in Time to Equilibrium	Total Mass of Configuration (g)
LANL	ARIES	ARIES	0.	834.
BNFL	ARIES	ARIES	19.9%	1808.
BNFL	BNFL	BNFL	51.1%	2308.
LANL	BNFL	BNFL	42.3%	1333.
LANL	BNFL	LLNL	1.8%	871.
BNFL	BNFL	LLNL	21.4%	1846.
LANL	SRS BTS	SRS	1.3%	1305.
BNFL	SRS BTS	SRS	21.9%	2280.
BNFL	SRS BTS	Cogema	27.2%	2323.
LANL	ARIES	ARIES	2.3% (0.5 mm air gap)	834.




Green – fastest

Brown – 20-25% increase in time Red – additional 20-25% increase in time

Los Alamos 30

40 Years of Safeguards at LANL, 1966 - 2006




• Not shown are two 150V Power supplies and controllers for cooling plate, and controlling computer (Mini-PC)

• Average 4 hour standard deviation on Water Bath Temperature is  $\sim 55~\mu K$ 





	EUROPEAN COMMISSION JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements Geel, Belgium
	NUSIMEP 5
F	R. Wellum, L. Benedik, A. Stolarz
http://www.irmm.jrc.be	/html/interlaboratory_comparisons/index.htm NBL/SME July 2006



## **NUSIMEP 5 basics**

Recognising that we cannot measure and certify in samples of low concentrations we certify 'bulk' materials and dilute and mix with a matrix under carefully controlled conditions


We do not reach the lowest concentration ('conservative approach')


Compromise between realistic materials and level of certification

NBL/SME July 2006

## Responsibilities

- Matrix: cleaning and preparation
  - Anna Stolarz
  - Measurement of residual uranium in the matrix:
     A. Stolarz, L. Benedik, S. Richter (IDMS/TIMS)
- Uranium:
  - Selection from materials already certified at IRMM (UF<sub>6</sub>: J. Truyens, A. Alonso)
  - Dilution and addition to matrix (adjustment for nat U in the matrix)





## Uranium

- Stick with what we know best: prepare dilute solutions of uranium with very well specified isotopics with enrichments between depleted and low enriched
- Lower previous requirements regarding minor isotopes
- 5 ppb solutions; 100 ng total

NBL/SME July 2006


## Matrix

- Semi-complex matrix essential (to enforce chemical treatment)
- Saline matrix ('sea-water') shown to be very useful (N3, N4)
- Purify the matrix from natural uranium


## Plutonium


- Problem of isotopic ratios by massspectrometry and activity ratio measurements by alpha spectrometry
- Selected materials previously certified for both at IRMM
- Certification based on previous certificates plus verification measurement of activity by alpha spectrometry


NBL/SME July 2006





- Mixtures of solutions by weighing
- Verification on mixtures
- Dilution and adding to matrix
























NBL/SME July 2006



166