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SELinux Mailing ListRe: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions [try #2]
From: Casey Schaufler <casey_at_schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2007 15:46:59 -0800 (PST)
> Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: Linking against libselinux is not now, nor will it ever be, a viable option. There's just too much sophistication contained in libselinux for us simple folk to deal with.
> > > I use to do that, but someone objected... Possibly Karl MacMillan. Me! (smiley inserted here, for those in need)
> > It doesn't fit with how other users of security_kernel_act_as() will That would be consistant with the (perhaps archaic now) behavior of nfsd on Unix, which did nothing but "lend it's credential" to the underlying kernel code. I think it's a rational approach, although I expect that in may have troubles under SELinux.
Casey Schaufler
-- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.Received on Mon 10 Dec 2007 - 18:47:09 EST |
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Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009 |