U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
07/15/2003 - 07/16/2003
** EVENT NUMBERS **
39854 39987 39989 39996 39997 39998
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39854 |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HARRIS REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/16/2003|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:53[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/16/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:56[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN YADUSKY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/15/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: ERIC THOMAS +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |ROBERT HAAG R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Hot Standby |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION |
| |
| "On 5/16/03 with the reactor shutdown in MODE 3, an unplanned actuation of |
| Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system occurred during testing of the 'B' Main |
| Feed Pump (MFP). A trip of an uncoupled MFP generated a signal to start |
| both motor-driven AFW pumps during testing following maintenance. The 'A' |
| motor-driven AFW pump was already in service, so the 'B' AFW pump started on |
| receipt of the signal. Feed to the steam generators was always available, |
| even without the additional actuation of the AFW system. The purpose of the |
| actuation of AFW following a trip of the main feed system is to ensure |
| adequate flow to the steam generator. In this case, the main feed pump was |
| being tested and was not being used to provide flow to the steam generator. |
| Therefore the actuation was not required to provide any safety function. |
| The 'B' motor-driven AFW pump was secured within approximately two minutes |
| because the additional flow was not required. This condition is being |
| reported as an unplanned system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR |
| 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). |
| |
| "10 CFR 50.72 requires an 8-hour report for, 'Any event or condition that |
| results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph |
| (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section except when the actuation results from and is |
| part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' In |
| this case, the AFW pump start signal due to trip of the last running MFP is |
| only applicable in MODES 1 and 2, and is not required in the current MODE of |
| plant operation (MODE 3). |
| |
| "The NRC Resident Inspector was notified." |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 7/15/03 @ 1044 BY YADUSKY TO LAURA * * * RETRACTION |
| |
| |
| Upon further evaluation, it has been determined that the reported event did |
| not meet the definition of a valid signal. Therefore, the reporting |
| criterion contained in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was not applicable. Per |
| NUREG 1022, Revision 2 (Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73), |
| "Valid actuations are those actuations that result from `valid signals' . . |
| . That are initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters |
| satisfying the requirements for initiation of the safety function of the |
| system." |
| |
| Because the AFW actuation signal was not initiated in response to an actual |
| loss of the last running MFP (the motor was disconnected from the pump and |
| no MFP was in operation), the actuation was not valid; therefore, the event |
| is not reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv). In addition, because the |
| invalid signal was received after the safety function had already been |
| completed (the alternate train of AFW was operating at the time of the |
| uncoupled motor trip), the event is not reportable per 10 CFR |
| 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)(2)(ii). |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| |
| NRC notified REG 2 RDO. |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39987 |
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| FACILITY: DRESDEN REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/10/2003|
| UNIT: [] [2] [3] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:03[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 07/09/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RON WIGGINS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/15/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: HOWIE CROUCH +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |CHRIS MILLER R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 99 Power Operation |99 Power Operation |
|3 N Y 99 Power Operation |99 Power Operation |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| CONTROL ROOM HVAC REFRIGERATION AND CONDENSING UNIT TRIPPED DURING |
| SURVEILLANCE TEST |
| |
| "At 2200 hours on July 9, 2003, the B Control Room HVAC Refrigeration and |
| Condensing Unit (RCU) tripped and would not stay running during surveillance |
| testing. The RCU is a single train system and therefore is reportable per |
| SAF 1.8 and LS-AA-1400, Event Reporting Guidelines Section 3.2.7. The RCU |
| is required to operate during a design basis accident to remove heat from |
| the Main Control Room. The Air Filtration Unit (AFU) of CREVS [Control Room |
| Emergency Ventilation System] remains operable. This places both units in a |
| 30 day LCORA [Limiting Condition for Operation Required Action] per Tech |
| Spec 3.7.5 Required Action A.1." |
| |
| The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * Retraction on 07/15/03 at 1924 EDT by Dennis Francis taken by |
| MacKinnon * * * |
| |
| "On July 9, 2003, an ENS notification was made regarding the 'B' Control |
| Room HVAC Refrigeration and Condensing Unit Inoperability. The (event) was |
| reported as a condition that would have prevent the fulfillment of a safety |
| function. However, after a review of the actual circumstances it was |
| determined that the system did not trip as was believed at the time of the |
| notification. The system was thought to have tripped because a trip |
| indicator light for the refrigeration compressor in the main control room |
| was illuminated. The breaker was inspected and no adverse condition |
| observed. Further investigation revealed that the trip indicator was |
| illuminated due to the local control switch being in the AUTO-AFTER-START |
| position. Therefore when the compressor would not cycle off due to |
| temperature, the trip indicator would illuminate. Even though the condition |
| does not (affect) operability, it does indicate a false trip indication. |
| Then normal position for this switch is AUTO-AFTER-STOP. In this position |
| the amber trip light indicator will not illuminate when the compressor turns |
| off to low temperature in the main control room. |
| |
| "The switch position of AUTO-AFTER-START did not affect the ability of the |
| system to perform its safety function. Therefore the ENS notification (Ref. |
| EN # 39987) is being retracted." NRC R3DO (RIEMER) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this retraction by the |
| licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 39989 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| REP ORG: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/10/2003|
|LICENSEE: MONSANTO CHEMICAL PLANT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:55[EDT]|
| CITY: LULING REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 06/29/2003|
| COUNTY: STATE: LA |EVENT TIME: [CDT]|
|LICENSE#: LA-2216-L01 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/11/2003|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |KRISS KENNEDY R4 |
| |SUSAN FRANT NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+TIM MCGINTY IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE HENRY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BILL GOTT | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE |
| |
| Mike Henry from the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality reported |
| the potential personnel over-exposure due to a loss of control of a 1 Curie |
| Cesium-137 source that came out of a damaged Berthold level gauge (Model # |
| LB7442). The event occurred at the Monsanto Chemical Plant in Luling, LA. |
| The gauge was damaged on 06/29/03 causing the source to come out of its |
| shield. The source was then carried to a planner's desk where it remained |
| until discovery on 07/10/03. The owner of the desk spent approximately 50 |
| to 60 hours in the proximity of his desk during this time. When the source |
| was discovered, the building was evacuated and secured. Medical personnel |
| at Monsanto have contacted the Radiological Emergency Assistance Center, Oak |
| Ridge, TN. Preliminarily, the licensee estimates that the planner may have |
| received a whole body dose of 25 Rem and the person that carried the source |
| may have received 1800 Rem to the hand. Others may have also been exposed. |
| No one has shown signs of sickness or erythema (redness of the skin). A |
| Berthold representative is scheduled to arrive on 07/11/03 to secure the |
| source. Mr. Henry will be traveling to the site to obtain additional |
| information. The State is not requesting NRC assistance at this time. |
| |
| A Commissioners' Assistants brief was held at 1900 EDT 07/10/03. |
| |
| * * * * UPDATE FROM MIKE HENRY TO NRC CONFERENCE CALL 1620 EDT ON 07/11/03 |
| * * * * |
| |
| Mr. Henry provided the following information based on his visit to the |
| Monsanto plant this morning, 07/11/03. A manufacturer's representative for |
| Berthold arrived at the plant and retrieved the source around 0300 CDT |
| 07/11/03. Currently the source is in a shielded pig at the plant site. |
| |
| Blood tests were performed for seven individuals which were favorable with |
| no cell changes noted. These blood tests will be repeated periodically. It |
| was determined that the planner who returned after days off to occupy the |
| desk where the source had been previously left received 39.1 Rem over the |
| calculated 44.7 hours that he occupied the desk during the 10-day period |
| involved. This determination was based on an analysis of his schedule and |
| work habits and on the emissivity of the source. Further dose calculations |
| will be made. The Monsanto company physician is in contact with REAC |
| (Radiological Emergency Assistance Center) in Oak Ridge, TN and has |
| requested their assistance in having a cytogenetic blood study performed for |
| the planner. |
| |
| Preliminarily, it appears that vibration of the centrifuge unit upon which |
| the gauge was mounted may have caused a failure which allowed the source |
| holder with attached source to fall from the gauge. Surveys of the relevant |
| areas and smears taken on the source indicate that no source leakage |
| occurred. |
| |
| Notified R4DO (K. Kennedy), NMSS EO (S. Frant) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39996 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/15/2003|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:29[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/15/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:40[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICK ROBBINS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/15/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |KENNETH RIEMER R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP |
| |
| "On 07/15/03 at 1340hrs [CDT], the Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped from |
| 100% power upon loss of G-06 rod drive motor-generator (MG) set. Automatic |
| transfer of the G-06 MG set to G-07 MG set did not occur. Automatic |
| initiation of the auxiliary feedwater occurred. The cause of the failure of |
| the G-06 rod drive MG set is being investigated. All systems operated as |
| expected." |
| |
| |
| G-06 rod drive MG set was carrying the load and running in parallel with rod |
| drive MG set G-07 when it started to smoke. Rod drive MG set G-06 did not |
| automatically transfer its load to rod drive MG set G-07. No fire was seen |
| and rod drive MG set G-06 was electrically secured. All rods fully inserted |
| into the core. The first out annunciator for the reactor trip was |
| overtemperature delta temperature trip. The Turbine Driven and both Motor |
| Driven Auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically started as expected. |
| Currently the licensee is using one train of main feedwater to maintain |
| proper steam generator water level. All emergency core cooling systems and |
| the emergency diesel generators are fully operable if needed. The |
| electrical grid is stable. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39997 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/15/2003|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:35[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/15/2003|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:15[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHAEL SCHAEFER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/15/2003|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |LINDA SMITH R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ACOM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 22 OFFSITE EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERABLE |
| |
| |
| "South Texas Project is making this eight hour notification IAW 50.72 (b) |
| (3) (xiii) for "Loss of Offsite Response Capability". Currently due to |
| local power outages 10 sirens are available and 22 sirens are not available. |
| Compensatory actions are in place to alert the public if necessary. There |
| are three compensatory actions: local law enforcement officials are prepared |
| to respond to areas where the sirens are not available to alert the public, |
| a community alert network is in place to activate a phone tree to local |
| residents and tone alert radios with residents. Power restoration and |
| recovery actions are in progress." State and local officials will be |
| notified of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 39998 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/15/2003|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:05[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2) |EVENT DATE: 07/15/2003|
| COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL |EVENT TIME: 16:00[EDT]|
| |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/15/2003|
| CITY: COLUMBIA REGION: 2 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: RICHLAND STATE: SC |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: SNM-1107 AGREEMENT: Y |JOHN PELCHAT R2 |
| DOCKET: 07001151 |ROBERT PIERSON NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID WILLIAMS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| TEMPORARY PROCEDURE TO COMPACT AIR FILTER PAPER NCS FUNCTION WAS NOT |
| REVIEWED OR APPROVED |
| |
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION |
| |
| |
| "Time and Date of Event |
| 23 Jan 2003 - 19 Mar 2003 |
| |
| "Reason for Notification |
| |
| "On January 23rd 2003, the process engineer generated a temporary procedure |
| to compact air filter paper, and did not place the NCS function on review or |
| approval. The temporary procedure was approved and the process was |
| performed, in violation of the bounding assumptions of the LLRW ISA (compact |
| filter paper was the end product). The process engineer later placed the |
| same process in a formal operating procedure that was reviewed by NCS. On |
| February 20th, the NCS reviewer withheld approval of the formal operating |
| procedure since the "proposed" process would violate the bounding |
| assumptions of the ISA and, therefore, require further analysis and an ISA |
| license annex revision before approval could be given. The NCS engineer |
| informed the process engineer that such analysis was necessary and it was |
| placed in the NCS work queue. The process engineer did not inform the NCS |
| engineer that the process had already been performed. When starting the |
| safety analysis on June 30th 2003, the NCS engineer found records of |
| completed filter paper and subsequent investigation revealed the temporary |
| procedure on July 1, 2003. The temporary procedure had been retired on |
| March 19th, although drums of compacted filter media continued to be created |
| in the item control system into at least April 2003. |
| |
| "Double Contingency Protection |
| |
| "The compaction unit is authorized to be used for volume reduction of |
| noncombustible material that was previously determined to be free of gross |
| contamination in the originating area, and verified to be free of gross |
| contamination by the URRS operator before being placed into the compactor. |
| A criticality would be possible only if an excessive accumulation of uranium |
| occurred with sufficient moderating materials. |
| |
| "The compactor system was operated outside there documented safety basis |
| stated in the ISA. A 24- hour notification, therefore, is being issued. |
| |
| "As Found Condition |
| |
| "Drums contained a range of grams U-235 values from near zero to |
| approximately 50 grams U-235. These low gram U-235 values reflect the low |
| Uranium loading in the filter media. The filter paper media is removed from |
| the filters and "tapped" to remove "loose" material, but is not considered |
| to be "free of gross contamination" due to ability to retain imbedded |
| material. |
| |
| "Summary of Activity |
| |
| "1. The process had already been stopped when discovered. |
| "2. The content of each drum was reviewed and found to contain less than 50g |
| U-235. |
| "3. Selected drums were opened and visually inspected. All were in a safe |
| condition. |
| |
| "Conclusions |
| |
| "1. Much less than a safe mass was involved. |
| "2. At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the |
| public in jeopardy. |
| "No exposure to hazardous material was involved. |
| "3. The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety |
| significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. |
| "4. Notification was the result of an event, not a deficient NCS analysis. |
| "5. A causal analysis will be performed." |
| |
| |
| The certificate holder informed NRC Region 2 (M. Crespo) of this event. |
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